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FROM MĀDHYAMIKA TO YOGĀCĀRA

An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.18 and MV, I.1-2

by Gadjin M. Nagao

In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition, the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tenets have been understood to be both parallel and opposite to each other. The San-lun-tsun, the Chinese version of the Mādhyamika, was regarded as nihilistic or an Emptiness School, and the Fa-hsiang-tsun, the Vijñānavāda, was regarded as realistic or an Existence School. While the former was characterized as Mahāyāna due to its doctrine of emptiness, the latter was considered to be semi-Mahāyāna for three basic reasons: the Vijñānavāda remained realistic like the Abhidharma School; it elucidated the three yānas side by side without being confined to the Bodhisattvayāna; and it did not emphasize the doctrine of Buddha-nature. These traditional but erroneous views have now been revised by most modern scholars. Presently, the Mādhyamika philosophy, which began with Nāgārjuna, is believed to be wholly inherited by Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga, and other Yogācāras. The *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* are equally revered as authentic by both schools, and further, the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even in the Yogācāra school.

While, in the history of Western philosophy, it was deemed necessary for a newcomer to negate and transcend previous philosophies through criticism, the situation in Buddhism, especially Yogācāra Buddhism, was such that it developed its doctrines in a fairly different pattern from that of Western philosophy. The Yogācāras developed their doctrines by inheriting the entire body of thought of their former masters. Of course, even though a faithful transmission of a teaching without any changes was intended, in so far as there was a development,

this development necessarily involved a degree of change. Therefore, although both schools advocated the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, the manner in which they interpreted the meaning of this term has been different. In accordance with the divergent views held by the schools as they grew in India and in China, there has been a difference in how they worded the doctrine and in how they logically developed it.

The verse XXIV.18 of Nāgārjuna's *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (hereafter, MMK)¹ has been famous in the Sino-Japanese tradition since the T'ien-t'ai school elaborated the doctrine called "Threefold Truth" and took this verse as one of its bases. The verse concludes with the term *madhyamā pratīpat* (Middle Path), and hence the treatise was named *Madhyamaka-kārikā*. On the other hand, there is a treatise of the Yogācāras named *Madhyāntavibhāga* (hereafter, MV). The root verses of this text have been ascribed to Maitreya-nātha or Asaṅga and the prose commentary (*bhāṣyā*) has been attributed to Vasubandhu. The features of the first two verses, MV I.1-2,² closely resemble those in verse XXIV.18 of MMK. In this paper, I would like to examine all three verses in the hope that I can trace an aspect of the development of Buddhist philosophy from Mādhyamika to Yogācāra.

It seems that T.R.V. Murti was also aware of this similarity.³ After pointing out that the Abhidharmic systems interpreted *pratītya-samutpāda* (originating co-dependently) incorrectly and arguing that the Mādhyamika system was a re-interpretation of it as *śūnyatā*, he refers to MMK, XXIV.18. He then explains the Vijñānavāda position by saying, "In the Vijñānavāda, *śūnyatā* is accepted, but with a modification," and quotes MV, I.1 as the Vijñānavāda formula. He should, however, have included MV, I.2 in the formula, because the two verses together not only represent the basic tenet contained in the first chapter of MV, but also the fundamental point of view which the treatise is attempting to express.

At the outset, let us examine in detail MMK, XXIV.18. The verse in Sanskrit is as follows:

*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyataṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe /
sa prajñaptir upādāya pratīpat saiva madhyamā //*

This can be rendered in English as follows:

What is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness.

It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the Middle Path.⁴

In this verse we see four key-terms: *pratītya-samutpāda* (originating co-dependently), *śūnyatā* (emptiness), *upādāya-prajñapti* (designation based upon some material), and *madhyamā pratipad* (Middle Path). Generally, these four are associated with each other and in some way considered equal. According to Candrakīrti's explanation, *śūnyatā*, *upādāya-prajñapti* and *madhyamā-pratipad* are considered to be "different names" (*viśeṣa-saṃjñā*, synonyms)⁵ of *pratītya-samutpāda*. Of these four terms, however, the last three (omitting the first, *pratītya-samutpāda*), were taken by the T'ien-t'ai school to constitute the so-called "Threefold Truth": the truth of the empty (*k'ung*), the provisional (*chia*), and the middle (*chung*).⁶

As the context of the verse and Candrakīrti's "*viśeṣa-saṃjñā*" suggest, these three or four terms are regarded as reciprocally identical and simultaneous, but not in chronological sequence. Especially in the T'ien-t'ai doctrine, the ultimate and perfect identity of the three is emphasized. It is true that there is no chronological sequence of the four terms, but neither is it permitted to re-arrange them and state them in reverse order; there must be something that led the author to select the four terms and mention them in this particular sequence. I believe this something can be called the author's "logic," and consequently the four terms are in logical order, being linked to each other through a process of reasoning.

Now, to begin with, all interpretations are in agreement with the fact that what is originating co-dependently is empty, or non-existent. In other words, co-dependent origination is characterized by emptiness. This is, as Murti puts it, a re-interpretation of *pratītya-samutpāda* in contradistinction to the Abhidharmic interpretation, which understands it from a realistic viewpoint, taking it to be existent. This re-interpretation is revolutionary, because *pratītya-samutpāda*, which had been conceived of in terms of something real, existent and affirmative is now declared to be empty, non-existent and negative. In order to give a logical rationale for this process, Candrakīrti (as well as Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka) introduced the phrase: "Because it is devoid of self-being (*niḥsvabhāva*), it is

empty.”⁷ Here, existence and non-existence or affirmation and negation are combined into one. This indicates the dynamism or paradox spoken about in Mahāyāna texts. It differs from the static idea of the Abhidharmic systems and corresponds to what the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* expound in the formula: “*rūpam eva śūnyatā*” (this very matter is the essence of emptiness).

Next, the verse states that *śūnyatā* in this context is *upādāya-prajñapti*, or “a designation based upon (some material).” Although the compound *upādāya-prajñapti* is problematic, and scholars have interpreted it differently,⁸ it is safe to assume that it can be interpreted as: *upādānam upādāya prajñaptiḥ*.⁹ In this case, *upādāna* means: “material as cause”; *upādāya* (an absolute) literally means: “having taken to one-self,” “appropriating,” and therefore, I have translated it “based upon,” which is an interpretation also substantiated by the Tibetan translation *brten nas* (depending on). *Prajñapti* (Tib. *gdags pa*) or “designation” is of a worldly or conventional character, being opposite to *paramārtha*, which is supra-mundane and beyond any conceptualizations. Thus, the phrase as a whole means: “a designation based upon (some material).”

Jacques May translates the compound *upādāya-prajñapti* as “désignation métaphorique” (he seems to prefer this translation to L. de La Vallée Poussin’s “désignation en raison de”), and, after equating “*śūnyatā* = *upādāya-prajñapti*,” he gives the following explanation: “La *śūnyatā* est désignation métaphorique de la réalité absolue.” And also equating “*śūnyatā* = *madhyamā-pratipad*” in regard to the 4th pada, he gives a similar interpretation: “*Madhyamā pratipad* est aussi une désignation métaphorique de la réalité absolue.”¹⁰

His interpretations would indicate that absolute reality manifests itself on the level of conventional truth, metaphorically taking the names *śūnyatā* or *madhyamā-pratipad*. If this be the case, these explanations seem not to coincide with the two equations mentioned by him, and also seem to disregard the positive role played by *upādāya-prajñapti* as the third key-term. As he explains, any concepts, names or designations, are conventional; they are not on the level of ultimate truth and cannot represent the ultimate reality, which remains silent (*tūṣṇīm-bhāva*), beyond all grasping (*anupalabdhi*, *anabhilāpya*). This is the truth revealed by Nāgārjuna in terms of the Twofold Truth (*satya-dvaya*), the conventional and the ultimate. But, I believe,

the present verse is not intended to discuss the Twofold Truth; rather, it expresses a logical process starting from the Buddha's *pratītya-samutpāda* and concluding with the Buddha's Middle Path. In this process, *upādāya-prajñapti* occupies an important stage.

Venkata Ramanan translates *upādāya-prajñapti* as "derived name," although he does not clarify how and from what the name is "derived." He states, however, "the [meaning of] relativity, conditionedness (*pratītya-samutpāda*) . . . is also conveyed by *upādāya-prajñapti*, derived name."¹¹

It is my contention that *upādāya-prajñapti* is another name for *pratītya-samutpāda*. In a passage, Candrakīrti states: "[Those foolish people] do not see the truth of *pratītya-samutpāda* which has the most profound meaning, being free from [the wrong views of] eternalism and nihilism, and being given the name *upādāya-prajñapti*."¹² This indicates that *upādāya-prajñapti* and *pratītya-samutpāda* are synonymous.

According to Avalokitavrata's explanation of the phrase *upādānam upādāya prajñaptiḥ*,¹³ the word *upādāna* (material cause) means *hetu-pratyaya* (cause and condition): a sprout is so named based upon a seed, its *upādāna*; Tathāgata is so designated based upon the virtues such as the ten powers, the four convictions, etc., as His *upādāna*. Being thus designated as based upon causes and conditions, not only the sprout but also Tathāgata is empty, devoid of self-being. It is clear that Avalokitravrata interprets *upādāya-prajñapti* with the meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda*.

However, the compound *upādāya-prajñapti*, although similar to *pratītya-samutpāda* of the first pada, should still be different from it for the reason that, in the second pada, *pratītya-samutpāda* has been negated and declared as *śūnyatā*. In the 3rd pada, in contrast to this, *upādāya-prajñapti* is *pratītya-samutpāda* revived from within *śūnyatā* after having been once negated. In other words, the world of *pratītya-samutpāda*, in so far as it has been negated or has a negative aspect (1st and 2nd padas), is *śūnyatā*. But, in spite of this negation, in so far as the ultimate reality does not cease to manifest itself as *upādāya-prajñapti* (3rd pada), *pratītya-samutpāda* is operative and functioning in the saṃsāric world, and therefore, still alive. Without this aliveness or the revival from *śūnyatā*, even *madhyamā pratīpat* could not be established. The Middle Path is a dynamic path and not a

mere cessation or extinction as expressed by the "Hīnayānic" *nirvāṇa* (of course, I do not intend "Hīnayānic" to refer to Theravāda). One of the meanings of "Mahāyānic" *nirvāṇa* is the Bodhisattva's *apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* (not dwelling in *nirvāṇa*).

Such a revived *pratītya-samutpāda* is a "designation" (*prajñāpti*), for it appropriates, depends upon, or bases itself upon (*upādāya*) something else, or some kind of material (*upādāna*). In this sense, it is synonymous with *saṃketa* (conventional symbol) and *loka-vyavahāra* (common practice), terminologies used to designate conventional truth. Thus, *upādāya-prajñāpti* means "a designation based upon some material." Because it comes after the negation of *śūnyatā*, it is a knowledge gained by a sort of *bodhi* or enlightenment. It can also involve the Buddha's *laukika-praṣṭhalabdha-jñāna* (conventional knowledge functioning after non-discriminative knowledge is obtained), to use the later Yogācāra terminology.

To recapitulate, *pratītya-samutpāda* is twofold:

- (1) the first order *pratītya-samutpāda* as expounded in the first pada of the verse, and
- (2) the second order *pratītya-samutpāda* (= *upādāya-prajñāpti*) as expounded in the 3rd pada.

The first order *pratītya-samutpāda* is said to be "direct," because it has not yet been denied and represents the ordinary worldly life which is not yet negated as *śūnyatā*. In other words, people are living it without any awareness of its true nature as *śūnyatā*. This *pratītya-samutpāda* dies in the second pada. In spite of its death, or its negation, worldly life necessarily continues, but now it is accompanied by a kind of *śūnya* consciousness. The 3rd pada represents this stage, in which the second order *pratītya-samutpāda* is revived.

This second order or revived *pratītya-samutpāda* is said to be "indirect," because it has come through *śūnyatā* and consequently was not directly derived from the first order. In contrast to the first order, which must be negated, and which corresponds to the word *rūpa* of "*rūpam eva śūnyatā*," the second order is a re-affirmed *pratītya-samutpāda* which corresponds to the word *rūpa* of "*śūnyataiva rūpam*" (this very essence of emptiness is matter). Although the first order *pratītya-samutpāda* must be negated, there still is a need for a life in which people can strive to live a moral life or can make every effort to exert

themselves in religious practices.

Finally, the fourth pada states: "Only this is the Middle Path." The Middle is always revealed by being freed from two extremes, such as existence and non-existence, or affirmation and negation. The dynamic movement from the first order *pratītya-samutpāda* of the first pada, to its negation (*śūnyatā*) in the second pada, and further to its revival as the second order *pratītya-samutpāda* (= *upādāya-prajñapti*) in the third pada is the Middle Path (*madhyamā-pratīpad*). It is dialectical, moving from affirmation to negation and again to affirmation. The Middle is not a point between two extremes and cannot be found at a certain point, because the path is total process, dynamic and dialectical. (The Middle can be found even in the extremes in so far as affirmation is negation and negation is affirmation.)

To conclude this section, the four terms explained above can be equated in a straight line:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{pratītya-samutpāda} &= \textit{śūnyatā} \\ &= \textit{upādāya-prajñapti} \\ &= \textit{madhyamā-pratīpad}. \end{aligned}$$

But from the above discussion and from the dialectical character of the whole process, I would rather equate them in the following way:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{pratītya-samutpāda} \quad = \quad \textit{śūnyatā} \\ \text{(affirmative)} \quad \quad \quad \text{(negative)} \\ \hline \text{[}\textit{śūnyatā} = \text{]} \quad \textit{upādāya-prajñapti} \\ \quad \quad \quad \text{(affirmative)} \end{array} \right\} = \textit{madhyamā-pratīpad}$$

The equation of *pratītya-samutpāda* = *śūnyatā* is the most basic: all others are derived from it. Any one of these terms can be equated with *madhyamā-pratīpad*, but only through the whole process of negation and affirmation as discussed above.

Having examined MMK, XXIV.18, we are now in a position to analyse the two verses of MV which elucidate the notions of *abhūta-parikalpa*, *śūnyatā*, and *madhyamā-pratīpad*. In Sanskrit, verses I.1-2 read as follows:

*abhūtaparikalpo 'sti, dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate /
śūnyatā vidyate tv atra, tasyām api sa vidyate //1.1
na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate /
sattvād asattvāt sattvāc ca, madhyamā pratīpac ca sā // 1.2*

This can be rendered in English as follows:

There exists unreal imagination; duality does not exist therein.

Emptiness, however, exists in it, and also the former exists in the latter. (I.1)

Therefore it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor non-empty,

Because of existence, because of non-existence, and again because of existence. And this is the Middle Path. (I.2)¹⁴

The word “imagination” (*parikalpa*) generally refers to cognitive functions or consciousness (*viññāna*), which in turn is characterized by the Yogācāras as “dependent-on-other” (*paratantra*), i.e., *pratītya-samutpāda*. Basically speaking, the cognitive functions or thought of ordinary people is always stained by ignorance, hence the word “unreal” (*abhūta*). The phrase “there exists unreal imagination” (the 1st pada), however, does not mean that *existence* (of the imagination) is proclaimed or insisted in a metaphysical or ontological sense. It simply describes the fact that all the common features of daily life are constituted by cognitive functions. Thus the fact that “unreal imagination exists” is the beginning point of the Yogācāra’s *Weltanschauung*. “Duality” (*dvaya*) means the duality of subject and object. Although, on the one hand, cognition necessarily implies a dichotomy, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of ultimate truth, neither the object grasped nor the grasping subject has substantial existence. Therefore, “duality does not exist therein” (the 2nd pada), i.e., duality does not exist as substantial reality to be found in unreal imagination. This negation of duality, or absence of cognition with regard to duality, is restated in the third pada, employing the term *śūnyatā*: “Emptiness, however, exists in it (i.e., in unreal imagination).” Because *śūnyatā* is found in unreal imagination, unreal imagination is negated and, therefore, equal to *śūnyatā* itself. Thus far, the verse conveys a meaning similar to the equation *pratītya-samutpāda* = *śūnyatā* in the MMK. In the 4th pada, however, the opposite is also true: “the former [unreal imagination] exists


in the latter [in emptiness]." The phrase is important in that it means the revival of unreal imagination (or *pratītya-sa-mutpāda*) and corresponds to *upādāya-prajñapti* of the MMK.

Next, in accordance with the above statement, verse I.2 reads: "Therefore . . . all entities are neither empty nor non-empty." The reason for this is explained by three phrases beginning with "because of." According to the Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya*, the first phrase, "because of existence" means "because unreal imagination exists," and refers to the statement, "neither empty." The second phrase, "because of non-existence," meaning "because duality does not exist," refers to the statement, "nor non-empty." The third phrase, "again because of existence," meaning "because emptiness exists in unreal imagination and unreal imagination exists in emptiness," refers to the statement, "neither empty."

The verse concludes with the statement, "This is the Middle Path." In this sense, the two verses clearly indicate that the MV, whose title was originally "*Madhya-vibhāga*" (instead of "*Madhyānta-vibhāga*"),¹⁵ was originally written to elucidate the Middle Path and to exemplify that very fact by discussing the emptiness of unreal imagination.

When one compares verse XXIV.18 of the MMK with these two verses of MV, the similarity between them should now become obvious. The reason why Murti should have given both verses as the Yogācāra formula should also be clear. As stated previously, these two verses of MV are key-verses of this text and convey the fundamental ideas of the Yogācāra school. And one can see that the Yogācāras, indeed, inherited the idea of emptiness and the Middle Path from Nāgārjuna. It is almost as if Maitreya-nātha or Asaṅga imitated, elaborated and expanded Nāgārjuna's verse. An analysis of these two verses will not only help us to understand Buddhist thought, but will also demonstrate how these ideas progressed in the development of Buddhist thought from Mādhyamika to Yogācāra.

Now that we have discussed the MMK verse and the two verses of MV individually, I would like to devote the remainder of this paper to a comparative study of the similarities and differences between the MMK verse and the two verses of MV. The corresponding padas of these verses and the relationship of them can be diagrammed as follows (the four padas are indicated by the letters: a, b, c, and d, respectively):



As the diagram suggests, the point of departure for the two schools differs. MMK, XXIV.18a begins its discussion with *pratītya-samutpāda*, whereas MV, I.1a begins its discussion with *abhūtaparikalpa*. The different topics with which the two texts begin reflect the fact that, while the discussions found in the MMK are always metaphysical and abstract, dealing with such notions as *pratītya-samutpāda*, *utpatti* (arising), *gamana* (going), and so on, the author of MV replaced these notions with ones such as *citta* (mind), *viññāna* (consciousness), and *abhūtaparikalpa* (unreal imagination), which are more concrete, practical, and related to everyday life situations. But, *abhūtaparikalpa*, which is essentially *viññāna*, is not contextually different from *pratītya-samutpāda*, because it also has the nature of *paratantra* (dependent-on-other), as stated before. Therefore, even though *abhūtaparikalpa* is a term deeply associated with a monk's yogic practices, in so far as it is of *paratantra* nature and is taken as the starting point or the primary object of investigation, *abhūtaparikalpa* does not differ from *pratītya-samutpāda*, where the Mādhyamikas begin their investigation.

Whereas MMK, XXIV.18b simply and directly informs us that *pratītya-samutpāda* is *śūnyatā*, without elaborating its logical process, MV, I.1 gives a fuller explanation and develops its view around a more complicated logical process. Here *śūnyatā* is discussed from two points of view: non-existence (of duality) and existence (of *śūnyatā*). The discussion extends its logical argument into MV, I.2 as the diagram indicates. At first, the *śūnyatā* established by negating the "duality" of subject and object may seem far removed from the "emptiness" of the MMK. When one considers, however, that the author of the MV wanted to demonstrate the *śūnyatā* of *abhūtaparikalpa*, which is characterized as *pratītya-samutpāda* and is the most logical and natural place to begin one's reflection in yogic practice, it is not unusual to find that the author of MV chose to negate the "duality" of subject and object. Moreover, it should be noticed that not only object but also subject is negated. The later Viññānavāda is sometimes referred to as a school in which the outer world (object) is negated (*bāhyārthābhāva*) and only the existence of inner consciousness (subject) is maintained (*viññānamātra*).¹⁶ But this is not the case here. By the negation of both subject and object the *śūnyatā* of the whole world is intended. This is parallel to the statement often found in the Mahāyāna sūtras,

“all entities are empty,” and to the Mādhyamika equation of the whole world (*pratītya-samutpāda*) with *śūnyatā*.

This *śūnyatā* is not a mere negation; it transcends both existence and non-existence. Consequently, MMK (XXII.11) states: “one should not proclaim something as empty, nor non-empty.” MV, I.2, however, gives us a more elaborate explanation. It first states that “all entities are neither empty nor non-empty” and then continues to explain this statement on the basis of three reasons: existence, non-existence, and existence. On the foundation of such a paradoxical statement, the MV finally develops its thought into the Middle Path.

Undoubtedly, the three reasons beginning with “because of existence” are reasons expounding different levels. The first two, “because of existence” and “because of non-existence,” are obviously paradoxical and on the same level represent affirmation and negation respectively. The third reason, “again because of existence,” must be understood to transcend the former two and, therefore, to be different from the first, in spite of the fact that the first and the third reasons are worded in the same way. The meaning of “existence” in the third reason is twofold: it includes the existence of *śūnyatā* and the existence of unreal imagination.

Śūnyatā was originally characterized by negation and non-being. Therefore the “existence of *śūnyatā*” is itself a contradiction and this has been the focus of attack by Bhāvaviveka, the Mādhyamika polemicist. The Yogācāra teachers, however, aware of this contradiction, dared to define *śūnyatā* as “non-existence of the duality and existence of [that] non-existence” (MV, I.13). *Śūnyatā* is thus simultaneously non-existent as well as existent.

As for the “existence of unreal imagination,” it corresponds to the second order *pratītya-samutpāda*. As I have shown in my previous discussion, *pratītya-samutpāda* is once negated as *śūnyatā*, but revived again in the term *upādāya-prajñapti* (MMK, XXIV.18c). But MV does not stop with the statement that emptiness exists in unreal imagination; it goes on further to say that unreal imagination exists in emptiness: “also the former exists in the latter” (*tasyām api sa vidyate*). That is to say, *abhūtaparikalpa* (as *paratantra* = *pratītya-samutpāda*) is revived in the midst of emptiness, as the second order *abhūtaparikalpa*, so to speak, after its duality is negated. It is in a sense a redeemed and jus-

tified *abhūtaparikalpa*. This revived *abhūtaparikalpa* is to be understood as contextually the same as “designation based upon (some material)” (*upādāya-prajñapti*).

In conclusion then, it is now clear that the zigzagging logic found in the MMK, XXIV.18, which develops its thought through the steps of affirmation (*pratītya-samutpāda*) to negation (*śūnyatā*) and further to affirmation again (*upādāya-prajñapti*) is followed exactly by the author of the MV, with the exception that the latter, using a little different wording, adds the logical basis for this dynamic process with statements such as “because of existence,” and so on. By zigzagging logic I mean a paradoxical and dialectical logical process which evidences a dynamism continually moving from being to non-being and again to being, in which the former two are transcended. Both texts agree with each other in so far as they arrive ultimately at the same Middle Path through that vital and dialectical process.

Although I have attempted to show that these texts are similar in their schemes of developing the Middle Path, very subtle problems remain. It may be true that the Yogācāras inherited in general the Mādhyamika thought concerning *śūnyatā*. But, is it proper to speak of the logical process involved in establishing *śūnyatā* as the same in both schools? Isn't it that, although the name *śūnyatā* is shared by both, what is intended by this name is entirely different in the two schools? For one thing, their points of departure differ: the Mādhyamika starts from *pratītya-samutpāda*, while the Yogācāra starts from *abhūtaparikalpa*. Another remarkable difference is that the Yogācāras speak of the “existence of non-existence” when defining *śūnyatā*. We must also pay attention to the fact that, although both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras are thought to base their idea of *śūnyatā* on the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, the Yogācāras also place importance on the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta* of the Majjhima-nikāya. (For details about this point, readers are referred to my discussion in another paper.)¹⁷ Due to these differences, one can assume that there is, or could be, a considerable difference between the two schools concerning their idea of *śūnyatā*.

Even if there is such a difference, however, is it due to natural development during the course of time, or to the different tenets particular to the schools, or to the differences in the texts

upon which they established themselves? Or, rather, are we to say that in spite of these questions, the difference, if any, is negligible when contrasted to the vast universality and ultimacy of ideas such as *śūnyatā*, the Middle Path, and co-dependent origination?

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NOTES

1. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (mādhymikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna, avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (St.-Petersbourg, 1913), p. 503.

2. Gadjin M. Nagao (ed.), *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit Manuscript* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 17-18.

3. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 7-8.

4. Other translations by modern scholars are available in: Jacques May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959), p. 237; Frederick J. Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 213; Kenneth K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna. A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay* (Tokyo: Hokuseido-shoten, 1970), etc.

5. La Vallée Poussin, MMK, p. 504.14.

6. Cf. J. Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., Third Ed.), p. 129: "Therefore, objectively, we have the triple truth, and subjectively, we have the triple knowledge. Of the triple truth, the Void is at the same time the temporary, the temporary is at the same time the middle, which is at the same time the Void."

7. La Vallée Poussin, p. 500.15.

8. F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 145 (s.v. *upādāya*); May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 161, n. 494; p. 237, n. 840.

9. Bhāvaviveka interprets *upādāya-prajñapti* as "*ñe bar len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa*" in his *Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka* (Peking Edition), ed. D. T. Suzuki, 95, p. 247-1-2.

10. May, p. 238, n. 840.

11. K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarasingh, 1975), p. 339a.

12. La Vallée Poussin, p. 214-215.

13. Avalokitavrata, *Prajñā-pradīpa-ṭīkā*, Tibetan Tripiṭaka Peking, 97, p. 277-3. The following is an abridged translation.

14. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Madhyānta-vibhanga*, Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR Press, 1936), pp. 16, 24.

15. The title, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, "Elucidation of the Middle and Extremes," is generally used, but the author himself states that the treatise was originally called *Madhya-vibhāga*, "Elucidation of the Middle." Therefore, it can be interpreted to be more a "Madhyamaka-śāstra" than that of Nāgārjuna. Actually, its discussion on the Middle appears initially in verses I.1-2 and then in verses V.23-24. See my article: "On the Title *Madhyāntavibhāga*" (in Japanese), in *Chūkan to Yuishiki* (Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda: A Collection of papers on the Mahāyāna Philosophy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), pp. 443-454.

16. In the earlier Yogācāra, too, we can find the affirmation of the non-being of outer things and being of cognition-only. But at the same time it is stated that perceiving the truth of cognition-only, the non-being of outer things is perceived, and when an outer object is not perceived, the perceiving subject likewise is not perceived (MV, I.6). After the realization of such *śūnyatā*, the cognition-only is re-attained which is different from the first one and equal to *tathatā* (suchness), or *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva* (consummated nature) and in which impressions of both subject and object (*grāha-dvayavāsanā*) are extinguished.

17. G. M. Nagao, "'What Remains' in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness" in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 66-82.