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The Realm of Enlightenment in *Vijñapti-mātratā*: The Formulation of the “Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas”

by *Noriaki Hakamaya**

(Translated, from the Japanese,
by John Keenan)

Buddhist doctrine (*buddha-deśana*) had its beginning with the fact that Gotama Siddhattha was awakened (*buddha*) to the truth (*dharma*), and enunciated that inner experience in doctrinal teaching (*dharma*, i.e., *deśana*). The subsequent history of Buddhist doctrine thematizes the question of just how one can personally realize such an inner experience of enlightenment. In short, at its inception Buddhist doctrine passed from the realm of inner enlightenment to that of enunciated doctrine, while the subsequent history of doctrine passes from the realm of enunciated doctrine to that of inner enlightenment.

However, inasmuch as words are unable to express inner experience just as it is, the realm of enlightenment, which is mediated in the words of doctrinal discourse, became somewhat distorted.¹ Thus, a negative attitude developed in regard to words, for truth transcends verbal expression (*nirabhilāpya*). The tradition repeats that this inner experience of the realm of enlightenment (*buddha*) could be understood only by another one so enlightened (i.e., a Buddha).² But it is a clear, objective fact that the passage from doctrine to enlightenment

* *Translator's Note*: Central to any religious thought is the notion of the ultimate. This article treats the nature of the ultimate of Yogācāra thinking, one of the foundational synthesis of Mahāyāna doctrine. It thus deals with notions that are basic to all later Mahāyāna thinking. It has been a strong point of Japanese Buddhology to interpret Chinese and Japanese doctrinal endeavours in light of their earlier Indian predecessors, for without a clear understanding of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, later thinking has no context in which to be interpreted.

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does indeed characterize the Buddhism of later times. On the other hand, there was a conscious, subjective attempt to restore the inner realization of enlightenment through doctrinal discourse, rather than to regard enlightenment as ascertainable only by inner experience. It is this conscious endeavour that constitutes the internal history of Buddhist doctrine. The everyday tendency to move from words to understanding is analyzed in such an endeavour, for the movement from doctrinal discourse to enlightenment replaces the tendency to move from direct insight to words.³ Such an endeavour probably formed the context in which the Yogācāra masters first formulated their thinking.

The present article does not attempt to describe the entire formulation of enlightenment in *Vijñaptimātratā*, but rather, from the above perspective, will examine the teaching concerning “The Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas,” i.e., the realm of enlightenment in the context of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine, which is the fundamental insight of *Vijñaptimātratā*.

This examination will be divided into four sections: 1) the realm of enlightenment as expressed in doctrinal interpretations, that is, the four kinds of pure dharmas, 2) verbal expression as doctrine and the inner subjectivity of the practitioner, that is, the relationship between the purity of object (*ālambana-vyavadāna*) and the purity of path (*mārga-vyavadāna*), 3) the relationship between the realm of enlightenment and the inner subjectivity of everyday verbalization, that is, the relationship between original purity (*prakṛti-vyavadāna*) and dependent co-arising (*paratantra*), and 4) the realm of enlightenment as the radical re-orientation of verbal activity, that is, the formulation of undefiled purity (*vaimalya-vyavadāna*).

I

The *Vijñaptimātra* synthesis developed from a new awareness of the meaning of the earlier scriptures, principally of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. This new awareness was embodied in the *trisvabhāva* doctrine.⁴ In clarifying and re-interpreting these earlier Mahāyāna scriptures (*vaiṣṭulya*) of the *Prajñā* lineage, Asaṅga thematized this *trisvabhāva* in chapter two, section twenty-six of his *Mahāyānasamgraha*:⁵

The Mahāyānistic *Vaiṣṭulyas*⁶ were spoken by the Buddha-Bhagavat, and in this teaching the question is raised as to how one is to under-

stand the nature of mere imagining (*parikalpita-svabhāva*). It should be understood as being synonymous with (*paryāya*) non-existence (*nāsti*). How should one understand the nature of dependent co-arising (*paratantra-svabhāva*)? It should be understood to be like (*upama*) a magical trick (*māyā*), a mirage (*marīci*), a dream (*svapna*), a reflection (*pratibhāsa*), an image (*pratibimba*), an echo (*pratiśrutkā*), as the moon's reflection in water (*udakacandra*), as a transformation (*nirmita*). How should one understand the nature of full perfection (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*)? It should be understood through the teaching of the four kinds of pure dharmas (*caturvidho vyavadāna-dharmāḥ*). Among these four, the first is original purity (*prakṛti-vyavadāna*), that is, suchness (*tathatā*), emptiness (*śūnyata*), reality (*bhūtakoti*), the unmarked (*animitta*), the highest truth (*paramārtha*). It is equivalent to the *dharmadhātu*. The second is undefiled purity (*vaimalya-vyavadāna*),⁷ that is, the same [original purity] inasmuch as it is free from all obstacles. The third is the purity of path (*mārga-vyavadāna*), which attains to the [undefiled purity], that is, all virtues (*dharma*) favorable to enlightenment (*bodhipākṣikāḥ sarva-dharmāḥ*). The fourth is the purity of object (*ālambana-vyavadāna*), which gives rise to that [path], namely, the doctrine of the true dharma of the Mahāyāna (*mahāyāna-saddharma*). Because this [doctrine] is the cause of purity (*vyavadāna-hetutva*), it is not merely imagined (*parikalpita*). Because it is the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu* (*viśuddha-dharmadhātu-niśyandatva*), it is not dependently co-arisen (*paratantra*). All pure dharmas are included in this fourfold purity.

Concerning this the verses⁸ say: Magical tricks etc. are proclaimed in regard to that which is produced (*bhūta*, i.e. *paratantra*), and non-existence in regard to that which is imagined (*parikalpita*), and the four kinds of purity in regard to full perfection (*pariniṣpanna*). These purities are original purity, undefiled purity, purity of path, and purity of object. All pure dharmas are included in these four kinds of purity.

This passage is most important as a source for the interpretation of the earlier Mahāyāna scriptures (*vaiṣṭulya*) in terms of the *trīsvabhāva* doctrine,⁹ but we here limit ourselves to an examination of the four kinds of purity, which are explained as *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*, because in this explanation the specific Yogācāra understanding of enlightenment is described. Vasubandhu comments on these purities:

Understand that wherever any of these four kinds of purity is explained, there is Mahāyāna, and know that this is the manifestation of *pariniṣpanna* of the *trīsvabhāva*.¹⁰

Thus the broad meaning of enlightenment, which is scattered among the various Mahāyāna scriptures, is summarized under the theme of this fourfold purity. Vasubandhu continues:

The first two of these four kinds of purity are unchangeable (*nirvikāra*), and are the full perfection of full perfection, while the last two, being unfailing (*aviparyāsa*), are full perfection.¹¹

This passage corresponds to verse eleven of chapter three of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, which explains that “because *pariniṣpanna* is both unchangeable and unfailing, it is of two kinds.”¹² The passage from the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is given as the response to the question of how the path, being a conditioned dharma (*samskṛta*), can be termed *pariniṣpanna*. This inclusion of the path within *pariniṣpanna* has a close connection with the interpretation of the three meanings of *paramārtha* as object (*artha*), realization (*prāpti*), and practice (*pratipatti*).¹³ In these three meanings the compound *parama-artha* is to be understood respectively as a *tatpuruṣa*, *karmadhāraya*, and *bahuvrīhi* compound.¹⁴ *Artha-paramārtha*, the truth of the ultimate object, is *tathatā*, i.e., *paramārtha* as the object of transcendent wisdom (*paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ*). *Prāptiparamārtha*, realized ultimate truth, is *nirvāṇa*, i.e. *paramārtha* itself becomes the transcendent object (*paramo' arthaḥ*). *Partipatti-paramārtha*, the ultimate truth of practice, is *paramārtha* inasmuch as the path of practice refers to that which has ultimate meaning (*paramo 'syārthaḥ*).¹⁵ The path is not itself *paramārtha*, but inasmuch as it bears ultimate meaning, or is in harmony with ultimate truth, it pertains to *pariniṣpanna* as unfailing (*aviparyāsa*). *Tathatā*, which is just as it is, whether one be conscious of it or not, and *nirvāṇa*, which embodies *tathatā* in one's consciousness, are both the unchangeable realm of enlightenment. But the conscious practice (*pratipatti-paramārtha*), which leads to these, is subject to change. However, because such consciousness has the realm of enlightenment as its objective, it does not turn away from (*aviparyāsa*) that enlightenment, and, as such, is included in the broad meaning of the realm of enlightenment.

We can outline the relationships of the explanations of the *Mahāyānasamgraha vis-à-vis* the *Madhyāntavibhāga* as follows: *Pariniṣpanna* embraces:

- A) The unchangeable realm of enlightenment, which includes:
 - I) Original purity (*prakṛti-vyavadāna*), i.e., the truth of the ultimate object (*artha-paramārtha* read as a *tatpuruṣa* compound), which

is the object of

- 2) Undeified purity (*vaimalya-vyavadāna*), i.e., realized ultimate truth (*prāpti-paramārtha* read as a *karma dhāraya* compound).
- B) The unailing harmony with that realm of enlightenment, which includes:
- 1) Purity of Path (*mārga-vyavadāna*), i.e., the ultimate truth of practice (*pratipatti-paramārtha* read as a *bahuvrīhi* compound), which takes as object
 - 2) Purity of object (*ālambana-vyavadāna*) —

The correspondence of purity of path (*mārga-vyavadāna*) to practice (*pratipatti-paramārtha*) is clear, for both treat of the path. Again both texts similarly take undeified purity (*vaimalya-vyavadāna*) or realization (*prāpti-paramārtha*) as *nirvāṇa* and consider it the result of practice. Furthermore, Sthiramati explains it as undeified (*nirmala*) *tathatā*.¹⁶ However, the correspondence between original purity (*prakṛti-vyavadāna*) and the truth of the ultimate object (*artha-paramārtha*) is not quite clear. But, since both texts do identify them as *tathatā*, one can conclude that they do correspond, although the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*'s treatment seems to be much fuller. Also, in their commentaries on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva interpret *prakṛti-vyavadāna* as *tathāgata-garbha*, the matrix of tathagatahood.¹⁷ And both texts agree that the fullness of the world just as it is (*tathatā*) is *tathāgata-garbha*, whether people are conscious of it or not. They further agree that such is realized and known only by saints (*paramasya jñānasyārthah*, i.e. *tatpuruṣa* compound). In his commentary Asvabhāva interprets *paramārtha* as one of the synonyms of *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. Although he probably knew about the three interpretations of *paramārtha*, he simply interprets *paramārtha* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, thus emphasizing that the meaning of *paramārtha* in regard to *prakṛti-vyavadāna* is that which is the object of the highest wisdom.¹⁸

Thus, the first three of the four kinds of purity do correspond to the three meanings of *paramārtha*. But to what does the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*'s purity of object correspond? This purity of object, just as the purity of path, is included in the question of how a conditioned dharma can yet be *pariniṣpanna*, i.e. *paramārtha*. Doctrine is expressed in words, and such verbal expression is conventional (*samvṛti*) rather than ultimate (*paramārtha*).¹⁹ However, as the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu* (*viśuddha-dharma-dhātu-niṣyanda*), doctrine is included within *paramārtha*. This paradoxical characteristic of doctrine is perhaps why the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*'s notion of *ālambana-vyavadāna* is not found in the *Madhāyāna-*

vibhāga. But we should carefully note that both purity of path and purity of object involve the inner subjectivity of practice, and are both objects of such practice. Both have this paradoxical nature, and both are open to the same question. Due to the *trīsvabhāva* doctrine, both play an important role in *Vijñāpitmātratā*, for the central theme of *trīsvabhāva* is that the inner subjectivity of practice is dependently co-arisen.

II

In the *Madyāntavibhāga*, *paramārtha* is explained in contrast to *saṃvṛti*. Its explanation interprets the two truths, which were propounded in the *Prajñāpāramitā* and *Mādhyamika* literatures,²⁰ in the context of *trīsvabhāva*. Just as there are three meanings for *paramārtha*, so there are three meanings for *saṃvṛti*, namely, conceptualization (*prajñāpti-saṃvṛti*), practice (*pratipatti-saṃvṛti*),²¹ and manifestation (*udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti*). These correspond respectively to that which is imagined, the dependently co-arisen, and the fully perfected.²² Thus this interpretation differs from the three meanings of *paramārtha*, in which all three meanings are *pariniṣpanna*. However, the third meaning of *saṃvṛti* as manifestation includes both *saṃvṛti* and *pariniṣpanna*, and it is this that corresponds to the purity of objects. Since the text of the *Madyāntavibhāga* is not entirely clear on this point, we will examine the commentary of Sthiramati:

Saṃvṛti as manifestation is an instruction by means of such synonyms as emptiness (*śūnyatā*), suchness (*tathatā*), defilement (*samala*), and undefilement (*nirmala*), even although *pariniṣpanna* transcends analytical understanding (*vikalpa*) and verbal expression (*abhilāpa*).²³

When one indicates (*samsūcana*) the *dharmadhātu*, which transcends verbal expression (*nirabhilāpya*), by means of words, such as *tathatā*, etc., then the manifestation (*udbhāvanā*) and verbal expression (*vyavahāra*), which arise from this treatment of *dharmadhātu*, are *saṃvṛti* as manifestation (*udbhāvanā*).²⁴

Manifestation as verbal activity in regard to *dharmadhātu* (*dharmadhātor vyavahārah*) is then quite similar in content to the purity of object (*ālambana-vyavadāna*), whereby doctrine is the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu*. However, there is the important difference that, while the

former has the characteristics of both *saṃvṛti* and *pariniṣpanna*, the latter is defined only as *pariniṣpanna*, even although it is not the unchangeable realm of enlightenment. The purity of object (*ālambana-vyavadāna*), since it occurs in the path (*mārga*) as conscious practice (*pratipattiparamārtha*) does reflect everyday verbal activity, in which words lead to understanding. But the main point emphasized in the explanation of *ālambana-vyavadāna* is the inner experience that is in harmony with and flows from direct insight out into words, from the realm of enlightenment into doctrine. In contrast, *saṃvṛti* as manifestation (*udbhāvanā*), i.e., meaning verbally manifested, does nothing more than indicate *pariniṣpanna* categories of thought. Within such limits, even *pariniṣpanna* is located within the sphere of *saṃvṛti*, because it is verbal expression.²⁵ On this level, the inner subjectivity of unconscious practice (*pratipattisaṃvṛti*) passes from words to understanding, and has the constant danger of objectifying (*prajñaptisaṃvṛti*, i.e., *parikalpita*) even doctrine concerning *pariniṣpanna*, and turning it into conceptual knowledge (*prajñapti*).

This same danger is present in regard to the purity of object, and this is why Asaṅga emphasizes that it is neither that which is imagined (*parikalpita*) nor the dependently co-arisen (*paratantra*). Asvabhāva does not comment in any detail upon the purity of object,²⁶ but Vasubandhu does take up Asaṅga's text:

With regard to the phrase "the purity of object, which gives rise to this [path],"²⁷ because all the virtues favorable to enlightenment (*bodhipāksika-dharma*) give rise to clear insight (*abhisamaya*), and, because they are objects, they are "objects which give rise." Moreover, because they are pure, they are said to be "the purity of object, which gives rise to this [path]." This is also the teaching of the *sūtra*, [*geya*], etc. in the twelve-section canon (*dvādaśāṅga-vacogata*).²⁸ Such being the case, whatever kind of doctrine arises from that which is imagined (*parikalpita*), arises from impure (*samkleśa*) causes. And whatever arises co-dependently (*paratantra*) is not true. But, since it is the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu*, [the purity of object] is neither of these, is not untrue, and arises from *pariniṣpanna* itself.²⁹

This commentary of Vasubandhu regards that which is imagined and the dependently co-arisen as positive conventional *dharma*s and describes them in a negative fashion even more than does Asaṅga in the principal text, probably because (Vasubandhu) was intensely aware

of the above-mentioned danger. For when doctrine is conceptually understood (*parikalpita*) in the passage from words to understanding, then it will issue in verbal activity that is unconscious of *paramārtha* (*pratipatti-samvṛti*, i.e. *paratantra*). When doctrine is verbally expressed by an inner subjectivity (*paratantra*) of unreal imagining (*abhūtaparikalpa*), then it is not true. Doctrine is constantly faced with this danger. But doctrine itself, according to Vasubandhu, is the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu* and is not subject to change, although the inner subjectivity of the practitioner may be either conscious (*paramārtha*) or unconscious (*samvṛti*) of the function of words in regard to *paramārtha*.³⁰

The term *dharmadhātu* in the phrase *viśuddha-dharmadhātu-niṣyanda* is synonymous with *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, and can be expressed by other similar terms, such as *tathatā*, *śūnyatā*, *bhūtakoṭi*, *animitta*, and *paramārtha*. But within the limits that it is pure, i.e., as *viśuddhi*, it corresponds rather to *vaimalya-vyavadāna*.³¹ Outflow (*niṣyanda*) means flowing out of the same essence (*sadrśaḥ syandaḥ*), a result that is consistent with that [essence] (*tad-anurūpam phalam*).³² How then does this outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu* relate to the four kinds of pure dharmas? Doctrine flows out from the same essence, and is a consistent result of the *dharmadhātu* of undefiled purity. It takes as its object original purity. Such doctrine is manifested to an inner subjectivity which is conscious of *paramārtha*, and in which the purity of path issues in the purity of object. Doctrinal enunciation, to be of the same essence as *dharmadhātu*, implies the presence of one who has realized undefiled purity, which intends original purity as its object. The inner experience of such wisdom is termed non-discriminative wisdom (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*). But doctrine is not the realm of no thought or no words.³³ Although this inner experience is said to transcend verbal expression (*nirabhilāpya*), yet such intensely aware consciousness does manifest itself in verbal expression. Even although it does indeed transcend such expression, nevertheless, of necessity, it attempts to embody the directly experienced insight in words.³⁴ At the initial moment, the object given in the wisdom of undefiled purity (*paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ*, i.e. *nirvikalpa-jñānasyārthaḥ*) i.e. the *dharmadhātu* of *viśuddha-dharmadhātu*, flows out as the doctrine of wisdom and non-duality. This is doctrine as the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu*. And such is none other than the passage from enlightenment to doctrine.

In the inner subjectivity of conscious practice (*pratipattiparamārtha*) doctrine issues forth in such a passage from direct insight into words, rather than passing from words to understanding. This is vividly

described in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā*:

Truly, when doctrine (*dharma*, i.e. *deśanā*) is enunciated by the Tathāgata, those who cultivate that doctrine (*dharma-deśanā*) gain insight into (*sākṣātkurvanti*) and bear in mind (*dhārayanti*) that *dharmatā*. And, having insight into, and bearing it in mind, whatever they say, or explain, or relate, or speak, or clarify, or understand is all in accord with that *dharmatā*. Oh, Sāriputra, such good sons, when they narrate that *dharmatā*, in nowise contradict it, because such is the outflow of the certain doctrine of the Tathāgata (*tathāgata-dharma-deśanā*).³⁵

Haribhadra explains that at the stage of *nirvedbhāgīya* (i.e. that which conduces to insight, the third stage of the path), one cultivates the manifested doctrine, at *darśanamārga* (the path of insight) one gains direct insight into it, and at *bhāvanāmārga* (the path of meditation) one bears it in mind.³⁶ This explanation re-arranges the simpler *Prajñāpāramitā* exposition of the necessity of direct insight. In order to understand doctrine, the *dharmatā* must first be given in direct experience. And then, by the radical re-orientation of the conventions of everyday words, one experiences the passage from enlightenment to words, in an outflow from direct insight into words. Spoken words then do not run counter to the realm of enlightenment. Those who have had such a direct insight do enunciate meaning and embody it in words, as did the *sūtra* writers. In support of this, the thrust of poetic understanding cuts through the conventions of everyday speech.³⁷

Thus *Vijñaptimātratā* seeks for a radical directional re-orientation from the passage from words to understanding to the passage from direct insight to words. It takes as its source the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature,³⁸ and affirms such an occurrence in an inner subjectivity (*āśraya*) that is clearly dependently co-arisen. This is why *Vijñaptimātratā* so thoroughly analyzes this inner subjectivity of practice (*pratipatti*, i.e. *āśraya*) in its relationship to original purity.

III

In the *Vijñaptimātra* systematization, everything is included within *dharmadhātu*, which is *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. It is important to emphasize this point, for although *Vijñaptimātratā* is formulated in the *trisvabhāva* thesis, and systematically analyzed in the related explanations of *ālaya-*

vijñāna, yet this entire endeavour is carried out from the prior direct insight into *dharmadhātu*. The term *vijñaptimātra* itself is an expression of direct insight. A contrasting term is found in verse eighty-one of chapter nine of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*:

Bodhi (wisdom) is said to have been attained by those non-discriminative bodhisattvas, who have seen that everything that has been explained is merely discrimination (*kalpanā-mātra*).³⁹

According to the commentary, the phrase “everything that has been explained” refers to the mind previously attained (*aupalambhika*) in contrast to *bodhi*.⁴⁰ Even though this insight is attributed only to bodhisattvas, it probably also applies to the generality of people, for the all-inclusive consciousness of both *vijñapti-mātra* and *kalpanā-mātra* is given in a completely non-discriminative direct insight. One who has had such an experience knows that he himself is included in *dharmadhātu*, i.e., in *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. Being so aware, he progresses along the path of *ālambana-vyavadāna* to *mārga-vyavadāna* and *vaimalya-vyavadāna*. This systematization of object, practice, and result is clearly reflected in the *Vijñaptimātratā* literature.⁴¹

However, what of the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of *paramārtha* (*pratipatti-saṃvṛti*)? Certainly it is also included within the originally pure *dharmadhātu*, which is, as mentioned above, also termed *tathāgata-garbha*. One must note carefully that here *tathāgata-garbha* is simply another way of expressing *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. To borrow Vasubandhu’s own terminology, whenever *tathāgata-garbha* is explained, there is Mahāyāna, because it explains the original purity of the four pure dharmas.⁴² Thus, it is a mistake to interpret *Vijñaptimātratā* by means of such *tathāgata-garbha* thought as systematized in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. But it is also a mistake to reject the notion of original purity in *Vijñaptimātratā* simply because it rejects that version of *tathāgata-garbha*. The first seems to be no longer present in the scholarly community, but the second has not yet been entirely eradicated. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between *prakṛti-vyavadāna* and the *vijñapti-mātra* thesis. Original purity includes all beings just as they are, whether they are conscious of it or not. But at the basis (*āśraya*) of their conscious activity there is a contradiction. In analyzing the nature of this conscious subjectivity, *Vijñaptimātratā* does recognize that beings, just as they are, are enmeshed in this contradiction. This is why Asaṅga

says that *paratantra* is not entirely non-existent.⁴³ Furthermore, Asaṅga's statement, that if *paratantra* is non-existent, there would be no *pariniṣpanna*, is further explained by Asvabhāva to mean that even if both were non-existent, *pariniṣpanna* as *prakṛti-vyavadāna* would still exist, even though as *vaimalya-vyavadāna* it would not exist.⁴⁴ Thus, the denial of the paratantric nature of inner subjectivity implies the non-existence of undefiled purity as the conscious attainment of the result. But even in this case, original purity would still be universal and unchangeable. But it is only when the wisdom, which is the result of undefiled purity (*paramasya jñānasya*) gains insight into original purity (*artha*), which includes even unconscious beings (*paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ* i.e., *prakṛti-vyavadāna*) just as it is, that one becomes conscious of original purity. Through the insight of such wisdom, the doctrine of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is formulated in the context of the *trisvabhāva*. Thus the relationship between inner subjectivity and doctrine is the relationship between the purity of path and the purity of object, which obtains in the case of one who is subjectively conscious of *paramārtha*. In the case of one who is not so conscious, the relationship of his inner subjectivity to doctrine is still defiled, and, while being included within original purity, constitutes the relationship between *paratantra* (everyday consciousness) and *parikalpita* (conceptualized doctrine). But, whether conscious or not, doctrine arises in synergy with the same basic inner subjectivity (*āśraya*), and it is herein that the contradiction of consciousness is most deep.

This relationship is set forth in the explanation of the famous verse on the beginningless *dhātu*.⁴⁵ Asvabhāva's commentary rightly indicates that this contradiction exists within the same inner subjectivity:

"The *dhātu* without beginning, etc." is without beginning (*anādikālika*) because it has no limits for its arising (*dang po'i mu, pūrvakoṭi*). *Dhātu* means cause (*hetu*), seed (*bīja*). But what kind of cause is it? It is the cause of all defiled *dharma*s (*saṃkleśa-dharma*), and not the cause of the pure (*vyavadāna*). As is said in the next [chapter], "the basis (*āśraya*), which becomes permeated by much listening (*bahu-śruta*) is not comprised in *ālaya-vijñāna*, but, being seeds, just as is *ālaya-vijñāna*, they are comprised in correct reflection (*yoniso-manasikāra*)."⁴⁶ Because it means "holding, (*rten, dhṛti*)," it is "the basis of all *dharma*s (*sarvadharmasamāśraya*)," and not because it is their cause. The meaning of holding is the meaning of basis (*āśraya*), and since it does not have the meaning of cause, the term "basis" is also employed. If this were not so, then the term "*dhātu*" alone would be sufficient.⁴⁷

This passage from Asvabhāva explains the basic text of Asaṅga.⁴⁸ *Ālaya* consciousness is the cause only of defilement, i.e., of illusion, and Asaṅga frequently indicates this contradictory nature of *ālaya-vijñāna* in contrast to the hearing of doctrine (*śruta-vāsana*) within the same inner subjectivity. It is not that consciousness is a mixture of both truth and illusion.⁴⁹ The term *dhātu* in the original verse may refer to the foundation (*āśraya*) of all dharmas, and include both truth and illusion, but, if it be interpreted as *ālaya-vijñāna*, then, in the Yogācāra formulation, it must be understood only as the cause of defilement.

The interpretation of *dhātu* as *tathāgata-garbha* is a separate and distinct tradition. *Vijñaptimātratā* simply takes the Mahāyāna teaching that *sarva-sattvās tathāgata-garbha* (all beings are the womb of *tathāgata*) to refer to *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, and does not expatiate on the point. Thus, inner subjectivity (*sattva*), which is grounded upon *ālaya-vijñāna*, is only illusion, but it is included within *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. The practice of listening to doctrine (*śruta-vāsana*), which issues in the awareness of this contradictory nature of consciousness, is *mārga-vyavadāna*, even though it occurs within the same inner subjectivity. Such a radical reorientation, which occurs in the same inner subjectivity, is a direct reversal, and *Vijñaptimātratā* sees such as the outflow of the pure *dharmadhātu* (*viśuddha-dharmadhātu-niṣyanda*). In such a process, it is natural that *Vijñaptimātratā* emphasizes that it is difficult to reveal *ālaya-vijñāna* to ordinary persons, who yet remain unconscious that it is the basis of their inner subjectivity.⁵⁰ The foremost characteristic of *ālaya* is verbal permeation (*abhilāpa-vāsana*),⁵¹ which is the passage from words to understanding. However, the consciousness of this situation, just as it is, is *bodhi*, i.e., the passage from direct insight to words. Such a passage is disrupted by the use of verbal meanings, for in their basic nature words are unsuitable to enunciate direct insight. The basic capability of words is to communicate, to describe. They are intended to evoke action, to point to things. As such, words reflect the process whereby knowledge selects from reality,⁵² and their efficacy is always selective and particularized. Everyday understanding (*vikalpa*) is dependent upon the accumulation of such selective knowledge in verbal traditions (*abhilāpa-vāsana*), and only from this matrix can one move on to an understanding of new affairs. But the understanding of new affairs, just as they are (*tathatā*), is not possible from a matrix of already-known verbalized thoughts.⁵³ Such an understanding demands a radical re-orientation of inner subjectivity. This re-orientation is thematized as *āśraya-parivṛtti*, and is nothing other than *vaimalya-vyavadāna*. In a word, this is the realm of enlightenment. Let us then turn to a fuller consideration of undefiled purity.

IV

Asvabhāva, in his commentary, considers *vaimalya-vyavadāna* as self-evident: "This phrase is explained by itself."⁵⁴ But Vasubandhu adds some further explanation:

Vaimalya-vyavadāna means that the very same *tathatā* becomes *buddhatā*, which is characterized (*prabhāvita*) as pure *tathatā*, inasmuch as it is free from the defilements of the obstacles, of passion and knowledge.⁵⁵

The phrase "this very same *tathatā*" certainly refers to *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, for *prakṛti-vyavadāna* and *vaimalya-vyavadāna* are the same *tathatā*. However, the latter is different, inasmuch as it is *buddhatā*, the attainment (*prāptih*) of that pre-eminent wisdom (*paramasya jñānasya*), whereby one's inner subjectivity is radically re-orientated to that *tathatā*, which is severed from (*prahāna*) the obstacles of passion and knowledge. It is the result of conscious practice (*pratipatti-paramārtha*). Sthiramati is essentially in agreement with this commentary of Vasubandhu when he explains the phrase *prāpti-paramārtha* in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* as:

It has as its characteristic the re-orientation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) which is entirely undefiled (*ekānta-nirmala*) *tathatā*.⁵⁶

Vaimalya-vyavadāna, as the result of practice, is a unitary inner experience, in which the severance from obstacles and the attainment of wisdom are not two different things. The former emphasizes the negative aspect of severance, the latter the positive aspect of wisdom. The term that comprehends both of these aspects is *bodhi*. In the *Bodhipāṭala* chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *bodhi* is described as being both the severance from the two obstacles, of passion and knowledge, and as the corresponding establishment of the two kinds of wisdom.⁵⁷ In the *Bodhyadhikāra* chapter of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, where *bodhi* is thematized in verses fifty-six to seventy-six, the positive aspect is emphasized.⁵⁸ Both Sthiramati and Asvabhāva recognize the internal unity of these verses, and offer almost the same commentary. For reasons of space, we give the commentary of Asvabhāva only:

After explaining the maturation of sentient beings (*sattva-paripāka*), [the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*] discusses *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*. What is their inner relationship (*sambandhana*)? This relationship is explained as *bodhi*. The text stated above:

By means of hundreds of difficult practices, having performed rare ascetical practices, having amassed all good, having traversed a great time period (*mahākalpa*) and innumerable ages, having severed all obstacles, because he has destroyed even the most subtle obstacle in all the *bhūmis*: such is *buddhatā*.

Thus it is like the opening of a basket that contains many jewels, which has vast powers.⁵⁹

In this manner we have considered *bodhi* in general. After this, the text investigated the maturation of sentient beings from the state (*avasthā*) of having attained *buddhatā*. *Bodhi* is examined from the aspects of its proper nature (*svabhāva*), cause (*hetu*), result (*phala*), activity (*karman*), associated [qualities] (*yoga*), and function (*vr̥tti*).⁶⁰ Thus is *bodhi* discussed.

But what does the bodhisattva cultivate? He cultivates the seven stages (*gnas bdun po*)⁶¹ from the stage that benefits both himself and others to that of *bodhi* itself. Up to this point, *bodhi* has been considered in a broad sense as it appears in all the *sūtras*,⁶² but [in this part] it is considered as it appears in a particular *sūtra*. It is for this reason that the text takes *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* as its theme, and thus is correct. In the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra* it says: "The stage of Buddha (*buddhabhūmi*) is comprised by the five *dharmas*, namely, the *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* (the immaculate ultimate realm), *ādarśanajñāna* (mirror wisdom), *samatājñāna* (equality wisdom), *pratyavekṣanajñāna* (wondrous insight wisdom), and *kr̥tyānuṣṭhānājñāna* (performance wisdom)."⁶³ Because the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* first thematized *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*, so it is treated first [in this text]. Thus the analysis of the five *dharmas* must proceed as they are given in the *Mahāyānabuddhabhūmisūtra*.⁶⁴

Dharmadhātu-viśuddhi is here understood as the object of the four wisdoms, but this does not imply that it is to be equated with *prakṛti-vyavadāna*.⁶⁵ Rather, both the four wisdoms and *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* are *vaimalya-vyavadāna*. This is so because verse fifty-six,⁶⁶ which explains the nature (*svabhāva*) of *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*, states that its characteristic is *tathatā* severed from the defilements of the obstacles of passion and knowledge, and is also the unexhausted supernatural power in both *vastu-jñāna* (i.e., *tat-pr̥ṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*) and *tad-ālambana-jñāna* (i.e., *nirvikalpa-jñāna*).⁶⁷ Since this commentary parallels the above description of *bodhi*, which is characterized as both serverance and wisdom, *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* must pertain to *vaimalya-vyavadāna*. In this understanding the terms *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* and *dharmadhātu* are not synonyms. *Dharmadhātu*, which is synonymous with *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, is the object of non-discriminative wisdom (*tad-ālambana-jñāna*) of *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*. Thus the word *viśuddhi* is not just an

unimportant adjective in the phrase *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*, but is rather to be taken in the same meaning as *vaimalya*. *Dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* is thus definitely not *prakṛti-vyavadāna*.

The terms “resultative severance” and “resultative wisdom” emphasize severance and wisdom as the result of *mārga-vyavadāna*. These topics are treated, respectively, in chapters nine and ten of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*,⁶⁸ as *āśraya-parivṛtti* and *trikāya*.⁶⁹ But, if *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* be identified with *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, as the object of wisdom (*jñāna*), then *āśraya-parivṛtti*, the radical re-orientation of consciousness, loses much of its meaning, because its specific characteristic is not original purity. *Āśraya-parivṛtti* takes place in the inner subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner (*ālaya-vijñāna*, i.e., *paratantra*), which is included within *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. This inner subjectivity then becomes *vaimalya-vyavadāna*, through the mediation of *mārga-vyavadāna*, and cannot be termed *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. Since that inner subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner cannot of itself become conscious of *paramārtha*, the hearing of doctrine (*śūtra-vāsanā*), which depends on *ālambana-vyavadāna*, is necessary.

Thus, the main import of this article is to describe the process whereby the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of *paramārtha* is radically re-oriented to become so conscious, within all-inclusive *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, and, within this process, to examine the verbal enunciation of the realm of enlightenment as *āśraya-parivṛtti*, which passes from *ālambana-vyavadāna* (doctrine) to *mārga-vyavadāna* (practice), to issue in *vaimalya-vyavadāna* (realization). The development of the *trivabhāva* thesis seems to have occurred in tandem with the verbalization of this process.

If, then, the realm of enlightenment, which has *vaimalya-vyavadāna* as its result, is the *āśraya-parivṛtti* of *ālaya-vijñāna*, then what relationship is there between *śrūta-vāsanā*, which plays such a crucial role in *ālaya-vijñāna*, and *āśraya-parivṛtti*? *Āśraya-parivṛtti* specifically means the severance of the obstacles of passion and knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). In *Vijñaptimātratā*, the severance of passion issues in the body of deliverance (*vimukti-kāya*), while the severance of both obstacles issues in *dharmakāya*. *Vimukti-kāya* is accorded but a low value, since it is seen as a Hīnayāna result.⁷⁰ The severance of the more difficult *jñeyāvaraṇa* then becomes a major theme of Mahāyāna. However, this contrasting of *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa* is not of ancient usage,⁷¹ and probably developed together with the new understanding of the fundamental function of *ālaya-vijñāna* as verbalization (*abhilāpa-vāsanā*).⁷² If such be

the case, then we can conjecture that the severance of *jñeyāvaraṇa* is precisely the radical re-orientation of verbalization in *ālaya-vijñāna*, whereby the passage from words to understanding is reversed into the issuance of words from direct insight.

NOTES

1. This is the point of the Buddha's hesitation to enunciate the Dharma teaching, even when importuned to do so by the Brahma Sahampati: "*adhigato myāyam dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkhāvacarō nipuṇo paṇḍita-vedanīyo.*" (SN, I, p. 136)

2. "*tathāgata eva Śāriputra tathāgatasya dharmam deśayed yān dharmāms tathāgato jānāti.*" (*Saddharmaṣuṇḍarīka*, Nanjio ed., p. 30, 11. 2–3). Another passage states that the Buddha's wisdom is difficult to understand: "*gambhīram Śāriputra durdrśam duranubodham buddha-jñānam*" (*ibid.*, p. 29, 1. 2).

3. These two tendencies correspond to the two aspects of speech. In his *Cours de linguistique générale* (p. 166), Ferdinand de Saussure writes: "Un système linguistique est une série de différences de sons combinées avec une série de différences d'idées." In this article, then, we distinguish the meaning of words, which corresponds to a series of thoughts from the physical enunciation of words, which corresponds to a series of sounds. We understand things because of the meaning of everyday words, and this is the tendency from words to understanding. In contrast, as occurs in poetry, a unitary awareness is first enunciated and given in direct insight, and then, from within that direct insight, draws upon the power of words. This we consider to be the tendency from direct insight to words. In general, the former is the verbal understanding of adults, while the latter can be seen in the verbal learning of children.

Furthermore, in this article the use of the term "direct insight" is quite close to Bergson's notion of intuition: "Nous appelons ici intuition la *sympathie* par laquelle on se transporte à l'intérieur d'un objet pour coïncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conséquent d'inexprimable." ("La pensée et le mouvant," *Oeuvres*, p. 1395)

4. For the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, which treats *parikalpita*, *vikalpita*, and *dharmatā*, and thus has a close relationship with the *trīsvabhāva* thesis, confer my article "Miroku Shōmōshō Wayaku" in *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 6, pp. 210–190. For an historical consideration of the date of the composition of this chapter, see my "A Consideration of the *Byam shū kyū lehu* from the Historical Point of View" in *The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, vol. XXIV, No. 1, Dec. 1975. It appears that Asaṅga at least knew about the existence of a *Prajñāpāramitā* passage similar to this chapter.

5. É. Lamotte, *La somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga*, I, pp. 37–38; II, pp. 120–122.

6. On *vaiṣṭulya* see my article "Asaṅga no Seitenkan — *Abhidharma-samuccaya* no *dharmavinīscaya* shō ni tsuite" in *Sōtōshū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō*, No. 4, pp. 26–30. It is here probably not the name of a particular *sūtra*. Also confer Aramaki Noritoshi, "Shōdai jōron no Etakishō" (*Paratantra-svabhāva* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*) in *Indogaku Shirōshū*, IV–V, pp. 49–50.

7. For the terms *vaimalya* and *prakṛti* see *Ratnagotravibhāga* (Johnston ed., p. 80, II, 15–16): "*Tatra viśuddhiḥ samāsato dvivīdhā prakṛti-viśuddhis vaimalya-viśuddhiśca.*" In the thought of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* everything is explained by the relationship between

these two, but in *Vijñaptimātratā* the further two categories of *mārga-vyavadāna* and *ālabana-vyavadāna* fulfill an important role.

8. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* quotes this verse, and attributes it to the *Abhidharma-sūtra*: *Māyādi-deśanā bhūte kalpitān nāsti-deśanā/ caturvidha-viśuddhes tu pariniṣpanna-deśanā/ śuddhiḥ prakṛti-vaimalyam ālambanam ca margatā/ viśuddhānām hi dharmānām caturvidha-grhītam.* (Yamaguchi ed., p. 112)

9. See Hattori Masaaki, "Dignāga no Hannyakyō Kaishaku" in *Osaka-furitsu Daigaku Kiyō (Jimbun-shakai Kagaku)*, vol. 9, pp. 128–129. The same author indicates the verse in Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpīṇḍārtha* (E. Frauwallner ed. WZKO, III, p. 142), which parallels the verse quoted in the above note: *prajñāpāramitāyām hi trin samāsṛitya deśanā/ kalpitām paratantram ca pariniṣpannam eva ca// nāstīty-ādi-padaih sarvaṃ kalpitam vinivāryate/ māyopamādi-drṣṭāntaiḥ paratantrasya deśanā// caturdhā vyavadānena pariniṣpanna-kirtanam/ prajñā-pāramitāyām hi nānyā buddhasya deśanā.* This same verse is alluded to in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhisāstra* and in his *Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra* (A. Thakur ed., *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*, p. 5050, p. 549). Note that in place of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*'s *vaipulya*, the term *prajñāpāramitā* is used.

10. *yang gang du rnam pa bzhi po de dag las gang yang rung ba zhig bstan pa ni theg pa chen po ste/ yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo ston pa yin no shes 'di ltar rig par bya'o//* (P. ed., No 5551, Li, 180b6)

11. *de lu dang po gnyis ni mi 'gyur bar yongs su grub pa nyid kyi yongs su grub pa'o// phyi ma ni phyin ci ma logs par yongs su grub pa yin no//* (ibid., 180b6–7)

12. *Nirvikāraviparyāsa-pariniṣpattito dvayam.* (Nagao ed., 41, I, 22)

13. *Paramārtha* as practice (*pratipatti*) is closely related to *saṃvṛti* as practice (*pratipatti*) in the three kinds of *saṃvṛti*. Since the original term is the same, both are correctly translated as practice. Dependent on whether this practice is conscious of *paramārthasatya* or not, it is either *paramārtha* or *saṃvṛti*. Thus in this article *pratipatti-paramārtha* is rendered as conscious practice, and *pratipatti-saṃvṛti* as unconscious practice.

14. This interpretation of the grammatical forms is found in *Bhāvaviveka*. See Ejima Yasunori, "Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū I" in *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō*, No. 51, pp. 116–117, and p. 130.

15. *artha-paramārthas tathatā paramasya jñānasyārtha iti kṛtvā/ prāpti-paramārtho nirvāṇam paramo'artha iti kṛtvā/ pratipatti-paramārtho mārggaḥ paramo'syārtha iti kṛtvā/* (MAV, Nagao ed., p. 41, II. 18–20)

16. *prāpti-paramārtho nirvāṇam, ekānta-nirmala-tathatāśraya-parāvṛtti-lakṣaṇam/* (MAVT, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125, II. 19–20)

17. Vasubandhu's commentary reads: *de yang de bzhin nyid du yod pa yin na sems can thams cad la spyi'i mtschan nyid kyi de ni yod pa nyid kyi phyir chos thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po can zhes gsung sol//* (180a6–7). Asvabhāva's reads: *de bzhin nyid ni gsan du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir chos thams cad kyi spyi mtschan nyid yin te/ de nyid la brten nas sems can thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'o/ zhes gsung rab las 'byung ngo//* (282b1–2). Asvabhāva simply explains *tathā* as being within *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, while Vasubandhu indicates that everything is contained in *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, but they appear to be in essential agreement. See Takasaki Jikido, *Nyorazō shisō no Kenkyū*, pp. 329–330 for both commentaries.

18. *don dam pa ni ye shes mchog gis thob par bya ba'i phyir ro/* (282b34). That which must be realized by transcendent wisdom refers to the object realized (*artha*), but not to the realization itself (*prāpti*). His interpretation of *paramārtha* means the same as *paramasya jñānasyārtha*, i.e., the object of the highest wisdom (*taṭpuruṣa*).

19. *saṃvṛtir vyavahārah* (MAVT, Yamaguchi ed., p. 124, I.16)

20. See *Fang-kuang Pan-jo* (T. 8, p. 140a), *Ta-hin Pan-jo* (T. 8, p. 413c), *Ta Pan-jo* (T. 7, p. 422a), and the Tibetan translation of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* (P ed., No. 731, Di, 228b1–3) and the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā* (P ed., No. 732, Phi, 159a2–5). Also confer Conze, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā II: bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ dvayo satyayo sthitvā sattvānām dharman deśyati. Yaduta saṃvṛti-paramārtha-satyayo.* (p. 89), and its corresponding section in *Ta-hin Pan-jo*, p. 405a. For an alternate interpretation of the *Mādhyamika* position, see Takahashi Sō, “Nāgārjuna no Nitaisetsu,” *Shūkyō Kenkyū*, No. 215, pp. 75–97.

21. For *pratīpatti-saṃvṛti* see note 13.

22. *trividhā hi saṃvṛtiḥ prajñāpti-saṃvṛtiḥ/ pratīpatti-saṃvṛtiḥ/ udbhāvanā-saṃvṛtiś ca/ tayā saṃvṛti-satyatvam mūla-tatve* (i.e., *svabhāva-traye*) *yathākramam vedītarīyam* (MAV, Nagao ed., p. 41, II. 11–13).

23. MAVT, Yamaguchi ed., p. 124, II. 12–14.

24. *ibid.*, p. 124, II. 22–24.

25. Doctrinal explanations that flow from the pure *dharmadhātu* (*dharmadhātu-niśyanda*) are always revealed from the side of Buddha. That is, original purity, as *paramasya jñānasya-arthaḥ*, is enunciated from the enlightenment of undefiled purity. Conventional truth as manifestation (*udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti*) implies the unenlightened use of words to refer to *pariniṣpanna*.

26. *de skyed pa'i phyir dmigs pa rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba la de zhes bya ba ni lam dang sbyar te/ byang chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa'o/* (282b7).

27. *de skyed pa nyid kyi dmigs pa rnam par byang ba.* This translation differs from that in the immediately preceding note, as it is the work of a different translator.

28. For *dvādaśāṅga-vacogata* see my “Yuishikisetsu ni okeru Ho to Hosshō” (*Dharma and Dharmatā in Vijñaptimātratā*) in *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 5, p. 157.

29. P ed., No. 5551, Li. 180b2–6.

30. The *Madhyāntavibhāgaśikā* treats the practice (*mārga-vyavadāna*) of ordinary people before they reach *darśana-mārga* as follows: “Why does the practice of ordinary people not fail, since it indeed can fail? Because it arises from *śruta-vāsanā*, which is the outflow of the most pure *dharmadhātu*.” (*katham viparyastā satī, aviparyāsānukūlā bhavati/ suvisuddha-dharmadhātu-niśyandāyāḥ śruta-vāsanāyā utpannāt*). (Yamaguchi ed., p. 186, II. 5–7) Thus conscious practice, as unfailing, establishes *mārga-vyavadāna*.

31. See note 65.

32. Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*, Wogihara ed., p. 30, II. 8–9.

33. In *Vijñaptimātratā*, non-discriminative wisdom (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) is defined as the denial of the five conditions, i.e., the severance of the five marks. See *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (Yamaguchi Susumu's “Mirokuzō Ho-Hosshō Fumbetsuron,” in *Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyōgaku Bunshū*, I, p. 189 and pp. 195–196, note 17). Also *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Lamotte ed., ch. VIII, sec. 2), *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D ed.), No. 4049, 74a 40, and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Tatia ed., p. 139, II. 10–26).

34. It is in this regard that *tat-praśṭhalabdha-jñāna* takes as its object *nirvikalpa-jñāna*. See note 67, which deals with Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*.

35. *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, Vaidya ed., p. 2, I.10–p. 3, I. 2; Wogihara ed., pp. 29–30; *Tao-hsing Pan-jo* (T. 8, p. 425c); and *Hsiao-hin Pan-jo* (T. 8, p. 537b).

36. *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*, Wogihara ed., p. 30, II. 4–6.

37. See Georges Gusdorf, *La parole, Introduction Philosophique*, 3 (Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), p. 73, II. 5–11.

38. *Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter 11, section 21; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (N. Taita ed., pp. 137–139, chapter IV, section 195b).

39. *Paśyatām kalpanā-mātram sarvam etad yathoditam/ akalpabodhisattvānām prāptū bodhir nirūpyate/* (Lévi ed., p. 49).

40. Both the commentary of Sthiramati (P ed., No. 5331, Mi, 161b8–162a3) and that of Asvabhāva (P ed., No. 5530, Bi, 84b3–4) are identical.

41. In Paramārtha's translation, Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* reads: From these ten points, we devolve the three virtues, viz., the unequalled object, the unequalled practice, and the unequalled result. (T. 31, p. 156a) The Tibetan version, *Don gsang ba rnam par phyed ba bsdus te bshad pa* (P ed., No. 5553, Li, 359b3–6) has: the essence of practice is divided into six kinds of (3) entering (*praveśa*), (4) cause-result (*hetu-phala*), (5) the distinctions of their practice (*bhāvanā-prabheda*), and (6–7–8) the three learnings (*sikṣā-traya*). The object (*dmigs-pa, ālambana*) is referred to as (1) the basis of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*), and (2) the characteristic of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*). The characteristic of the knowable, as that which is to be known with certitude, is the actual real (*dnegos su rang gi ngo bos*) known object. The basis of the knowable is the object as point of support. The result of such practice are the two pre-eminent elements of severance and wisdom, and thus they are explained last. The underlying theme of the above passage is The Discourse on the Mahāyāna Object, Practice, and Result.

42. See note 10.

43. *Mahāyānasamgraha*, Lamotte ed., ch. II, section 25.

44. *gnysis ka med na yongs su grub pa shin tu 'grub pa ma yin nam zhe na/ rang bzhin gyis rnam par byang ba ni 'grub kyi/ dri ma med pa'i rnam par byang ba ni med do zhes lan 'debs so/* (282a7–8).

45. *anādikāliko dhātuh sarva-samāśrayah/ tasmīn sati gatih sarvā nirvānādhiḡamo'pi vā/*, quoted from the *Abhidharmasūtra* in the *Triṃśikāvi jñaptibhāṣya Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter I, section 1.

46. *mang du thos pas bsogs pa'i gnas kun gzhi rnam par shes pas bsdus pa ma yin la/ kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ltar tshul bzhin yid la byed pas bsdus pa'i chos rnam kyī sa bon gang yin pa'o*. This is cited from chapter III, section 1 of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and reflects the statement of Asaṅga himself.

47. P ed., No. 5552, Li, 238b8–239a4.

48. Ui Hakuju, in his *Shodaijoronkenkyū* (pp. 214–215), has argued that the original conception of Asaṅga was that *ālaya-vijñāna* was both pure and impure, and that the notion that it is cause only of defilement began with Asvabhāva and was inherited by Dharmapāla. But Asvabhāva's passage here reflects Asaṅga's statement in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and thus the understanding of *ālaya* as cause only of defilement does go back to Asaṅga.

49. *Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter I, section 46; Lamotte, II, p. 66: "Is the permeation of hearing (*śruta-vāsanā*) comprised in *ālaya-vijñāna* or not? If it is comprised in *ālaya*, then how could it be the seed, which disciplines (*pratipakṣa*) that consciousness? But if it is not so comprised, then what is the ground (i.e. foundation) (*āśraya*) for such a permeation of hearing?"

50. For example, chapter I, section 4 of *Mahāyānasamgraha* quotes the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* verse on *ādāna*, a synonym for *ālaya*: *ādāna-viñāna gambhīra-sukṣmo ogho*

yathā vartati sarvavījo/ bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi mā hāiva atmā parikalpayeyuh// Also see note 52.

51. The *Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter 1, section 58, distinguishes three characteristics of *ālaya*: verbal permeation (*abhilāpa-vāsanā*), permeation of belief in self (*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*), and permeation of the elements of existence (*bhavāṅga-vāsanā*). *Abhilāpa-vāsanā* is the basis of nine of the eleven manifestations (*vijñapti*) herein described, while the other two correspond to *ātmadrṣṭi*- and *bhavāṅga-vāsanās*.

52. The famous parable of the group of blind men and the elephant in chapter 1 of *MS*, section 20, expresses the difficulty of knowing *ālaya-vijñāna*. (See *Udāna*, VI, 4, pp. 68–69) The group of blind men selectively extract parts of the elephant. But, even by gathering them together, they are unable to know the whole of the elephant. In order to know the whole, just as it is, it must be given in direct insight.

53. Confer Bergson, "La pensée et le Mouvant." *Oeuvres*, pp. 1320–1323.

54. *dri ma med pas rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba ni tshig de nyid kyis bshad zin to//*

55. P ed., No. 5551, Li, 180a7–8.

56. *MAVT*, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125; cited in note 16.

57. *tatra bodhiḥ katamā. samāsato dvividham ca prahānam dvividham ca jñānam bodhiḥ ity ucyate. tatra dvividham prahānam kleśāvaranam jñeyāvaranam ca. dvividham punar jñānam yat kleśāvarana-prahānac ca nirmalam sarva-kleśa-niranubaddha-jñānam jñeyāvarana-prahāna ca yat sarvasmin jñeye apratihitam anāvarana-jñānam.* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed., p. 88, II. 1–7)

58. See my article "Asvabhāva's Commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* IX. 56–76" in *The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 473–465.

59. *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, IX, verse 3 (Lévi ed., p. 33).

60. For these six meanings, see Takasaki Jikido, "Description of the Ultimate Reality by means of the Six Categories in Mahāyāna Buddhism," in *The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, vol. IX, No. 2, pp. 24–33.

61. These words are translated as *don rnam pa bdun* in the Tibetan translation of Sthiramati's commentary. They are probably cited from the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, but I have been unable to locate the reference.

62. In place of "all the sūtras" Sthiramati has *Gzungs kyī bdang phyug go rgyal po*, i.e., *Saddharmapundarīka*, and so forth.

63. From this description, Asvabhāva appears to consider the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* as the basis of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*. Sthiramati is in accord with this understanding. However, recently the opposite view has been expressed by Takasaki Jikido in "Hosshin no Ichigenron," in *Hirakawa Akira Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronshū — Bukkyō ni okeru Hō no Kenkyū*, p. 239, n. 38.

64. P ed., No. 5530, Bi, 80b5–81a5.

65. In the above cited article (note 63) Takasaki Jikido mentions "the separation of the wisdom aspect from the *dharmadhātu per se*" and "the separation of the principle from wisdom." I understand this as the distinction between *dharmadhātu* and *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*, i.e., as the distinction between *prakṛti-vyavadāna* and *vaimalya-vyavadāna*. It is clear that the historical development of this distinction in Yogācāra is of the utmost importance. I think this distinction was first formulated as a description of *vaimalya-vyavadāna* in the light of *prakṛti-vyavadāna*, and did not see the basic *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* as *vaimalya-vyavadāna*, i.e., as *āśraya-parivṛtti*. However, when viewed in this manner, *vaimalya-vyavadāna* becomes absorbed into *prakṛti-vyavadāna*. The result of such an absorption is that *tathatā*, i.e., *prakṛti-vyavadāna* becomes aloof from and unrelated to all

dharmas. See my article “*Shōjō Hōkai Kō*” (Historical Remarks on the Development of Interpretations of *Dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*) in *Nanto Bukkyō*, No. 37, pp. 1–28.

66. *sarva-dharma-dvayāvara-tathatā-śuddhi-lakṣaṇah/ Vastu-jñāna-tad-ālamba-vaśitā-kṣaya-lakṣaṇah*// (Lévi ed., p. 44).

67. Asvabhāva’s commentary states: “Being *tathatā* of all dharmas, it is characterized by purity from the two obstacles of passion and knowledge. That is to say, because it is purified from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, it has become pure of them. But what is pure? The *tathatā* of all dharmas, and because of this we speak of *āśraya-parivṛtti* (*gnas yongs su gyur pa*) of *tathatā*. *Vastu-jñāna* is subsequently attained wisdom (*tat-prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*). By the word *vastu* (phenomenal) is meant the paratantric nature of *ālaya-vijñāna*. Because of this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the ineptitudes of consciousness (*dauṣṭhulyāśraya-parivṛtti*). The radical re-orientation of this paratantric nature is the sphere (*gocara*) of *nirvikalpa-prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*, and is not the sphere of any other wisdom. *Tad-ālabhana-jñāna*, the wisdom that intends that as its object, has as its characteristic the supernatural power (*vaśita*) that knows not exhaustion, and because of this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the path (*mārgāśraya-parivṛtti*). The word *tad* [of *tad-ālabhana-jñāna*] indicates the *dharmadhātu* mentioned above. As that which is characterized by the abiding that knows no exhaustion, *nirvikalpa-jñāna* attains that abiding without exhaustion in *tathatā*, because it freely, abidingly, and universally operates. *Prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna* intends as its object that which is unfailing, and attains abiding without exhaustion in regard to *paratantra-svabhāva*.” (81a5–b6) See my article “*Sanshu Tenne Kō*” (On the Triple *Āśraya-parivṛtti*) in *Bukkyō-gaku*, No. 2, esp. pp. 57–58.

68. See quotation in note 41.

69. *Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter IX, section 1. Also confer chapter X, section 1.

70. *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, Lamotte ed., Chapter X, section 2, p. 149. The *Mahāyānasamgraha*, chapter I, section 10, explains that the reason why *ālaya*, i.e. *ādāna-vijñāna* is not presented to *śrāvakās* is because this term “refers to a subtle object. *Śrāvakās* do not venture to know all knowable objects (*sarvajñeya*). Thus, without it being presented to them, they realize wisdom. Because they realize *vimukti-kāya*, it need not be presented to them. But *bodhisattvas* do venture to know all objects, and thus it is presented to them. For, if they did not know it, it would not be easy to realize the wisdom of all wisdoms (*sarvajñajñāna*).”

71. *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, IX, section 28 (Lamotte ed., p. 145, i. 33) appears to be the first instance.

72. Asaṅga’s statement in note 51 appears to be the first instance.