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Asaṅga's Understanding of Mādhyamika: Notes on the *Shung-chung-lun*

by John P. Keenan

I. Introduction

Since Mādhyamika and Yogācāra are the two principal *śāstra* schools of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the relationship between these two schools is of central importance in understanding the development of Mahāyāna thinking. Yet the main Yogācāra thinkers of the classical period—Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu—do not, it would appear, refer to the Mādhyamika masters Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva nor outline their view of Mādhyamika philosophy.

Edward Conze writes that “these two schools were engaged in constant disputes and the works of one have no authority for the other.”¹ Yet upon a closer examination, it becomes clear that such disputes took place between later proponents of these schools and, as will be shortly evident, Mādhyamika texts do indeed retain their authority for Yogācāra thinkers.

In contrast to Conze's opinion, Nagao Gadjin argues that “Mādhyamika philosophy, which began with Nāgārjuna, is presently believed to have been wholly inherited by Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga, and other Yogācāras.”² According to his understanding, Yogācāra differs in the way it interprets emptiness but in no wise rejects the main themes of Mādhyamika. Nagao has presented this view by focusing on analogous passages from Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamakakārikā* and Maitreya-nātha's *Madhyānta-vibhāga*.³ He convincingly shows the lines of doctrinal development from the Mādhyamika notion of the middle path to the Yogācāra interpretation of the same. Yet in these Yogācāra texts no specific reference is made to Nāgārjuna or Mādhyamika. It almost seems that, although these lines of developing thought

did occur in cognizance of one another, the Yogācāra thinkers intentionally refrained from mentioning Mādhyamika and did not accept its authorative status, as Conze maintained.

Yet this is not the case, for there does exist a commentary by Asaṅga which interprets the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* through Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikā*. This text is invaluable in delineating the development from Mādhyamika to Yogācāra. It is the intent of this paper to offer evidence in support of Nagao's thesis of the organic relationship between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika by examining this text and outlining Asaṅga's understanding of Mādhyamika and the Mādhyamika ideas that underlie his explanation of the central Yogācāra theme of the three patterns of consciousness.

II. Asaṅga on Mādhyamika

The text in question is the *Shun-chung-lun-i ju tai-pan-jo-po-mi-to-ching chu-hin-fa-men*, "Introduction to the Doctrine of the Introductory Section of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* in accord with the Meaning of the *Mādhyamikaśāstra* (i.e., *Madhyamakakārikā*).” Ui Hakuju has restored the Sanskrit title as *Mādhyamikaśāstra-artha-anugata-Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra-ādiparivarta-dharma-paryāya-praveśa*.⁴ Unfortunately no Sanskrit version is extant and apparently no Tibetan translation was made. The sole source for our consideration then is the Chinese translation made in 543 by Gautama-Prajñāruci, a translation which was characterized by Ui Hakuju as “rude” or “immature.”⁵ Indeed, it is because of the poor quality of this translation that the *Shun-chung-lun* has received scant attention both in Japan and in the West, for the difficulties in interpretation are numerous and often not amenable to definitive solution. Unfortunately, its Asaṅgan authorship cannot be definitely established, since it is attested only by this Chinese text. There is, however, little reason to reject this Chinese attribution. The text is clearly Indian, delving into the intricacies of formal logic and argumentation in a way few early Chinese attempted. The “rudeness” of the translation in part comes from the difficulty of finding Chinese terms for the Sanskrit terminology. Modern Japanese scholars accept Asaṅga as its author.⁶ Indeed, the only reason to reject

it is for the anachronistic reason that the text treats Mādhyamika thought, not Yogācāra. In this article its Asaṅga authorship is accepted as probable and its thematic structure employed to ascertain Asaṅga's understanding of the basic Mādhyamika teachings.

Although composed by the Yogācāra thinker Asaṅga, the *Hsun-chung-lun* presents no Yogācāra philosophy. One might expect that Asaṅga would interpret Mādhyamika in Yogācāra fashion, through the basic themes of the three patterns of consciousness. Indeed, that is what Sthiramati does in his commentary.⁷ In fact, the *Hsun-chung-lun* is a straightforward Mādhyamika commentary. This leads Mochizuki Shinkyō to conclude that it represents an early work of Asaṅga and dates to a pre-Yogācāra period when, as is recorded in Vasubandhu's biography, he was struggling with the notion of emptiness and before he adopted Yogācāra.⁸ It does seem probable that this text represents an early stage in his developing understanding of emptiness as presented in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and explained by Nāgārjuna.

Asaṅga's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's stanzas should amply convince the scholar of later Tibetan and Chinese disputes between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra that Asaṅga himself, at this stage at least, fully accepted and affirmed the basic Mādhyamika notions, and, inasmuch as he never is recorded to have repudiated Mādhyamika in any later text, that he maintained his commitment to Mādhyamika throughout his entire career. His intention in this text, it would seem, is to explicate Nāgārjuna's basic teaching. The anonymous author of the brief introductory note explains:

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva was a master of the basic teaching and, relying on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, composed the full text of the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*. But he did not exhaust its ramifications. The Mahāyāna *śāstra* master Asaṅga understood points not yet clarified and composed this article in a discerning manner.⁹

This note agrees with Nagao's appraisal of the role of Asaṅga in inheriting Mādhyamika thought. It further specifies that Asaṅga identified his task as the explication of the ramifications of Mādhyamika thought, not as the offering of an alternative

philosophy to Mādhyamika. The *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten* explains:

As this text is an interpretation focused on the eight negations and *prapañca* in the dedicatory stanzas of the *Madhyamakakārikā*, it is not a complete commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is an interpretation of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikā* by the Yogācāra Asaṅga, one can surmise that at their origin these two schools were not in opposition.¹⁰

It would seem reasonable then to conclude that the *Hsun-chung-lun* presents Asaṅga's early understanding of Mādhyamika and, in comparison with Asaṅga's mature thought as expressed in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, can be used to highlight some aspects of the development from Mādhyamika to Yogācāra.

III. The Content of the Hsun-Chung-Lun

The *Hsun-chung-lun* focuses from beginning to end on the dedicatory stanzas of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikā* and their themes of *prapañca* and the eight negations. Asaṅga describes his effort clearly:

These (dedicatory) stanzas from the *śāstra* (i.e., *Madhyamakakārikā*) summarize its basic meaning and it is in their light that I now reinterpret its unexplicated significance. This is the meaning I treat, for it is this that severs the craven attachments of sentient beings. I compose this essay in accord with this [basic] meaning and do not present an ordered treatment [of Nāgārjuna's entire text].¹¹

The first *chüan* distinguishes counterfeit perfection of wisdom, engrossed in *prapañca*, from true perfection of wisdom, characterized by an absence of *prapañca*. Refutations are offered on a number of heretical views: Maheśvara, time, atoms, an original source, original matter, etc. In addition, as Mochizuki Shinkō observes, this section would appear to be the first Chinese text to examine arguments through the three marks of logical reasoning: thesis, reason, and example.¹² The second *chüan* treats the eight negations, developing the theme of emptiness and denying essence to all things, even the truth of ultimate

meaning.

The text begins by quoting the dedicatory stanzas of the *Madhyamakakārikā*:

I bow before universal wisdom—

“Not passing away and not arising,
 Not annihilated and not eternal,
 Not one and not many,
 Not coming and not going,
 Buddha taught dependent co-arising
 To sever all *prapañca*—
 Thus I bow my head in reverence
 Before the best of all Dharma teachers.”¹³

Asaṅga understands these stanzas of Nāgārjuna to describe universal wisdom (*sarvajñāna*) and sees Nāgārjuna’s source as the Prajñāpāramitā teaching. Immediately after stating his intent to closely follow the structure of these two stanzas in the passage quoted above, a questioner asks:

What intent do you understand [Nāgārjuna] to have had in composing his *sāstra*? What doctrine did he rely upon?¹⁴

Asaṅga responds by citing the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* in a passage that distinguishes the true perfection of wisdom from a counterfeit perfection of wisdom that issues from a preaching of the perfection of wisdom “in accord with one’s own ideas and understanding,”¹⁵ and which consequently fails to understand its nature as skillful means (*upāya*) and treats wisdom as a goal to be attained.¹⁶ By contrast, true perfection of wisdom relies on not the slightest doctrine,¹⁷ since in the perfection of wisdom there is no true doctrine.¹⁸ Thus, even if one articulates the doctrine of emptiness that all things are impermanent and empty, that can still be a counterfeit perfection of wisdom, if it constitutes attachment.¹⁹ Quoting the appropriate passages from the *Madhyamakakārikā*, Asaṅga strongly argues against taking emptiness as yet another view, for “all views are transcended by emptiness.”²⁰ In support he quotes a passage from an unknown work of Rahulabhādra, the third master of the Mādhyamika lineage after Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva:

The counter against all views is
 Emptiness as taught by the Tathāgata.
 Neither seek after nor be attached to emptiness;
 For, when one is attached to emptiness, emptiness becomes reified.
 Seek neither emptiness nor non-emptiness;
 Both are to be abandoned.
 Do not cast aside the Buddha's words,
 Spoken in so many places.²¹

All views are to be rejected because they arise from *prapañca* and, as Nāgārjuna's stanzas teach, the Buddha taught dependent co-arising in order to sever *prapañca*. The term *prapañca* has caused some confusion among scholars.²² Asaṅga offers a definition:

The term *prapañca* means attachment to the duality between attaining as something real and the thing [attained] as something real and the inability truly to apprehend the equality of all characteristics. The term *prapañca* denotes a ludicrous dialogue [as occurs on stage].²³ In a word, it is the apprehending of essences.²⁴

The Buddha taught dependent co-arising in order to sever such ludicrous dialogue, and Asaṅga explains that "all that which is dependently co-arisen is *prapañca*,"²⁵ for any view, even about the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, being conceptually and coherently expressed, functions within the duality of a subjective attaining and an object attained.

In the Hīnayāna the Buddha introduced doctrinal meaning by arranging it in an ordered fashion in order to counter the doctrine of the heretics.²⁶

Dependent co-arising is then explained as the presentation of the teaching on the twelfold chain of conditioned arising from primal ignorance to old age and death, seen by Asaṅga as a deconstructive strategy functioning within the realm of *prapañca* to refute the various views propounded by the heretics, which occupy the next eight columns of the text. When asked why then Nāgārjuna composed the *Madhyamakakārikā*, Asaṅga answers not just by referring to the views of the heretics, but by negating the genesis of all such dualistic views.

He employed reason to introduce the meaning of the *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā* to lead sentient beings to abandon *prapañca*. Having done so, through reasoning they will speedily enter the perfection of wisdom.²⁷

Upon being asked just what this perfection of wisdom is, Asaṅga responds by quoting the first of the Nāgārjuna's stanzas on the eight negations, which he describes as "reasoning upon the *sūtras*, an ordered interpretation of the *Āgamas*."²⁸ He then proceeds to interpret the eight negations as signifying the absence of any essence which might validate the genesis of views, insisting that nothing ever arises or passes away in an essentialist context.

The questioner, thinking perhaps to hoist Asaṅga upon his own petard, raises the question of the truth of ultimate meaning. Does that not truly exist?

If that were the case [and the truth of ultimate meaning were a real identifiable essence], then there would be two levels of truth, the worldly truth and the truth of ultimate meaning. Only if these two truths were to exist [in that essentialist fashion] would your assertion hold.²⁹

The questioner continues to press his point, arguing that apart from worldly truth, there is a truth of ultimate meaning, and that this validates his assertion. He quotes the *Madhyamakakārikā* to the effect that both of two truths are real (二諦兩種實), apparently a misquotation of chapter 24.9. Asaṅga agrees that the Tathāgata preached the doctrine of the two truths, but points out that in so doing in fact he was preaching the suchness of things and it is incorrect to understand the two truths as two disparate levels of truth:

[Nāgārjuna] neither rejected [the truth of ultimate meaning] nor bifurcated [it from the truth of worldly convention]. If in the two truths one regarded ultimate meaning as disparate, then the suchness of beings would be separate from things true in the world.³⁰

There are then no solid reasons for propounding a dualistic suchness of things. In fact the two truths do not refer to two separate levels of truth. Both truths have the same characteristic:

being without essential characteristic. It is precisely this absence of essence and original emptiness that constitutes truth as beyond deconstruction (止比不破).³¹ Asaṅga presents yet another stanza from the *Madhyamakakārikā*:

These two truths are both non-existent
 And are not projected in ludicrous dialogue.
 They are neither imagined nor separated.
 This meaning characterizes truth.³²

This stanza shows, Asaṅga explains, that while all *tathāgatas* rely upon the two truths, they all in fact have no support. They do not rely on worldly truth and they do not rely on the truth of ultimate meaning, for their minds are unsupported. Being without essential characteristic, ultimate meaning cannot be mediated in thinking. It cannot be employed as a thesis to refute other theses.

Thus no thinking of any kind can identify the essence of the truth of ultimate meaning. Therefore it cannot refute arising, nor passing away. To conceive the truth of ultimate meaning as a subtle essence that can be brought to speech is itself an expression of selfhood.³³

This inability of thought to identify ultimate meaning does not, however, imply the abandonment of reasoning. Rather it casts reason in a deconstructive role in negating the assertions of *prapañca* consciousness in its mistaken formulation of views and attachment to propositional claims. Indeed, the remainder of Asaṅga's text turns to an examination of reason in the context of emptiness and outlines norms of logical consistency that can apply to all questioning.

IV. The Move to Yogācāra

Yogācāra attempts to develop a critical understanding of consciousness as the dependently co-arising support for both illusion and wisdom. It tries to explicate the ramifications of Mādhyamika insight into emptiness and dependent co-arising

in terms of a reflective understanding of consciousness as a synergistic functioning between the latent habit-seeds in the container consciousness and the manifested activities of the active consciousnesses of sensation, perception, and thinking. The entire attempt is to critically ground insight into the genesis of illusion and into the nature of awakening within a reflective understanding of consciousness by identifying the basic structure and functioning of the mind through critical analysis.

The *Hsun-chung-lun*, although Mādhyamika in its entire context, contains inchoate Yogācāra themes. One can discern a clear parallelism between the above themes and Asaṅga's presentation of the three patterns of consciousness in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

The theme of *prapañca* echoes Asaṅga's presentation of the imagined pattern (*parikalpita*), which is defined as:

The appearance of conscious constructs [as real], despite the fact that objective things are not real and are only conscious construction.³⁴

The appearance of what seems to be an object over against the knowing subject and the imagining of that object to be an essence constitutes the basic illusion of primal ignorance and engenders attachment to such putative objects as if they themselves already contained meaning. Asvabhāva comments:

In reality there is neither an object known (*grāhya*) nor a knowing subject (*grāhaka*). There is simply a host of mental constructs within unreal imagining in virtue of which imagination takes on the appearance of an object.³⁵

This explanation probably is based upon the first stanza of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, which affirms the existence of unreal imagining, but the non-existence of the apparent duality within that imagining. This is the basic text used by Nagao to outline the Yogācāra development of the Mādhyamika notion of the middle path.³⁶ Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* further describes the imagined pattern as thinking endowed with concepts and having as its seed the permeation of language.³⁷ The *Hsun-chung-lun* in describing *prapañca* as "ludicrous dialogue" and the "duality

between attaining and the thing [attained]" is then an early attempt to understand this imagined pattern of consciousness, for it too treats the illusory nature of subject-object knowing and the influence of the ludicrous dialogue of *prapañca* in engendering that illusion.

Similarly, the definition of the perfected pattern (*pariniṣpanna*) in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* is that it is:

The complete absence of all images as objective realities in that same other-dependent pattern.³⁸

The *Hsun-chung-lun* treats true perfection of wisdom as the absence of *prapañca* and non-attachment to one's own ideas and understanding. In the *Mahāyānasamgraha* Asaṅga explains the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* as the counter-agent to all views, echoing once again the theme of the *Hsun-chung-lun* that true perfection of wisdom abandons all views.³⁹

The crux of the matter, however, is the Yogācāra understanding of the other-dependent pattern, for Asaṅga defines it as the basic nature of consciousness, becoming manifest either in the imagined pattern or in the perfected pattern. The other-dependent pattern is defined as follows:

The other-dependent pattern consists in all the conscious constructs that have the container consciousness as their seed and that are comprised within unreal imagining.⁴⁰

These mental constructs are engendered chiefly through the permeations of language, for it is in imagining that words refer to objective essences over against the subjective knower that the other-dependent pattern functions in an imagined, illusory manner.

The central insight in the teaching on the three patterns relates to this other-dependent pattern, for that is the fulcrum upon which the other two patterns turn.⁴¹ The *Mahāyānasamgraha* describes the other-dependent pattern in the following passage.

With what intent did the World-Honored One teach in the *Abhidharmamahāyānasūtra* that "there are three factors: that which

pertains to the pure aspect, that which pertains to the defiled aspect, and that which pertains to both?" That which pertains to the defiled aspect is the imagined pattern. That which pertains to the pure is the fully perfected pattern. The other-dependent pattern itself is that which has both these aspects. This was the intention of the World-Honored One.⁴²

The Yogācāras employ this notion of the threefold other-dependent pattern of consciousness to explain the meaning of the apparent contradictions in the scriptures, especially the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. Asaṅga explains that in the other-dependent pattern there is neither arising nor passing away, for the arising of essences is negated as imagined, yet the other-dependent pattern is recovered and affirmed as itself other-dependent, i.e., dependently co-arisen. Nagao explains that it is in virtue of becoming perfected and thus eliminating the imagined world of illusion that "the other-dependent pattern is restored as other-dependent. To be fully perfected means that this restoration [of the basic other-dependent pattern] is realized. . . ."⁴³

This developed notion of the other-dependent pattern is not present in the *Hsun-chung-lun*, for it implies the critical Yogācāra understanding of the structure of consciousness as the interplay between the container and active consciousnesses. Thus the *Mahāyānasamgraha* differs from the *Hsun-chung-lun* in that it moves within a realm of conscious interiority where meaning is established through analysis of the internal functioning both of insight and understanding, and of ignorance and misunderstanding.

Nevertheless, in its treatment of the two truths the *Hsun-chung lun* presents basic themes that seem to have led Asaṅga to develop such a critical understanding. The main point of that explanation was that the two truths are not to be conceived as two disparate levels of truth, one worldly and falsifiable and one true and beyond deconstruction, because that would attribute an essence, however subtle, to the truth of ultimate meaning. Rather, Asaṅga thinks, both truths are characterized as empty and without essential characteristic. Being without essential characteristic, the truth of ultimate meaning is ineffable and unobtainable in words and concepts, while worldly truth, being enunciated and expressed, can make no claim to anything

beyond a provisional validity.

From a Yogācāra perspective, the question this elicits is how truth, both worldly and ultimate, is grounded within the structure and functioning of conscious understanding.⁴² If truth is not a double-layered essence out there to be encountered by the subjective mind, then how does it occur? It is in response to such questions that the Yogācāras developed their critical understanding of consciousness and their account of the three patterns, for truth, just as ignorance, must be identified within its operational structure. Central to the endeavor is their understanding of other-dependent consciousness.

The fulcrum structure of other-dependent consciousness allows Aśaṅga to offer a critical understanding of conversion (*āśraya-parivṛtti*) and to outline the realization of truth. Upon conversion, one abandons attachment to the putative realities of the imagined pattern and realizes non-discriminative wisdom and awakening. But in the Mahāyāna understanding this does not sever all mental function, for the task of carrying out *bodhisattva* action necessitates a wisdom and encompasses an awareness of all the myriad factors that constitute the world. Awakening includes not only insight into silent emptiness, but also insight into the suchness of thinking as itself dependently co-arisen. Awakening does not abolish the structure of consciousness, but rather enables one to recover the heretofore obstructed and obfuscated pattern of other-dependence itself. In this recovery one neither imagines things to be essences nor remains in silent awareness of uncharacterizable emptiness, but rather, in full awareness of the genesis of views from language and of their ultimately “ludicrous” quality, brings to skillful speech and clear reason doctrines that flow from emptiness and leads others toward awakening. This mode of being fully conscious of the other-dependent functioning of consciousness is insight into the limited, but valid role of worldly truth.

Here the distinction in the *Hsun-chung-lun* between counterfeit perfection of wisdom, caught in the web of *prapañca*, and true perfection of wisdom, liberated therefrom, is expressed in terms of the Yogācāra focus on conscious interiority. The theme of the restoration of the other-dependent structure of consciousness brought about by the realization of the pattern of full perfection represents a critical explication of the two truths, for

both are understood by the same consciousness to be essence-free and empty. Asaṅga has grounded both truths in the awakened mind functioning through insight into the ultimate meaning of emptiness in the recovery of its other-dependent structure.⁴⁴

Both awareness of ultimate meaning and of worldly truth occur in the same consciousness. They are not disparate levels corresponding to separate realities, but differing modes expressing the identical awareness of emptiness—the one in abeyance of all words and the other in an employment of all words. In ultimate meaning one realizes the emptiness of all things. In worldly truth one realizes the dependently co-arisen being of all that is empty, for dependent co-arising is the designation of emptiness within the world of mediated and verbalized meaning.⁴⁵

In these points one can, perhaps, discern the developmental lines of Asaṅga's thinking from the *Hsun-chung-lun* to the *Mahāyānasamgraha* in his progressive focus on conscious interiority and in his attempt to critically ground the Mādhyamika themes which he fully accepted and articulated within his understanding of conscious understanding.

NOTES

1. *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, 1934–1972*, San Francisco: Wheelright Press, 1980, p. 52.

2. "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra; An Analysis of MMK XXIV.18 and MV I.1–2," in *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 2.1 (1979), p. 29.

3. *Ibid.* Also see "Kū-i yori sanshōsetsu e," [From the Meaning of Emptiness to the Theory of the Three Patterns], in *Chūkan to yuishiki*, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1978, pp. 180–206.

4. *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū*, Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1938, vol. 1, p. 400.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Besides the references to Ui in note 4 and to Mochizuki in note 8, see Kajiyama Yūichi, *Chūkan shisō*, vol. 7 of the *Kōsu: Daijō bukkyō* series. 1982, Tokyo: Shunjusha, p. 10.

7. In his *Mūlamadhyamakasaṃdhanirmocanavyākhyā*, T. 30, #1567. This text also awaits further study. It is also influenced, so it would seem, by Bhāvaviveka and is important in delineating the structure of Mādhyamika-Yogācāra synthesis. See Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (Ithaca: Snow

Lion, 1987) for the best study in a Western language of these late developments in Indian Buddhist thinking. On Sthiramati's chronology, see Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla," in *Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens: Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner* (Wien, 1968), pp. 193–203.

8. *Butten daijiten*, 3.2526c.
9. T. 1565, p. 39c.110–12.
10. *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten*, 5.242d.
11. T. 1565, pp. 39c.29–40a.3.
12. *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten*, 5.242d.
13. T. 1565, p. 39c.24–28.
14. T. 1565, p. 40a.4–5.
15. T. 1565, p. 40a.7. See Edward Conze, *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 263–265.
16. T. 1565, p. 40a.13–14.
17. T. 1565, p. 40a.21. See Conze, *The Large Sutra*, p. 265.
18. T. 1565, p. 40a.22.
19. T. 1565, p. 40b.6.
20. T. 1565, p. 40b.13–14.
21. T. 1565, p. 40b.19–20. Compare Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*: "Emptiness is taught in order to lay to rest all *prapañca* without exception. Thus the intent of emptiness is the laying to rest of *prapañca* in its entirety. But you, in [attributing] to emptiness the sense of non-being, hypostatize it." (Jacques May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959, p. 23, #491.)
22. Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, pp. 380–81.
23. M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 681c, includes among the meanings of *prapañca* "ludicrous dialogue (as in drama)." This seems to be the sense of the Chinese "*hsi-lung*."
24. T. 1565, p. 41a.1–3.
25. T. 1565, p. 41a.8.
26. T. 1565, p. 41a.9.
27. T. 1565, p. 44c.24–25.
28. T. 1565, p. 45a.6.
29. T. 1565, p. 45a.14–16.
30. T. 1565, p. 45a.23–24.
31. T. 1565, p. 45b.2.
32. T. 1565, p. 45b.7–8; reference is the *Madhyamakakārikā* 18.9, but Asaṅga relates the stanza to the two truths.
33. T. 1565, p. 45c.6–8.
34. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.3; Étienne Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, Louvain: Éditions Peeters, 1973, p. 90; Nagao Gadjin, *Shodaijōron: Wayaku to chūkai*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982, p. 281.
35. Lamotte, *La Somme*, p. 90, n. 3.
36. Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra," p. 36.
37. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.16; Lamotte, p. 108; Nagao, pp. 328–329.
38. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.4; Lamotte, pp. 90–91; Nagao, p. 283.
39. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.22; Lamotte, pp. 115–118; Nagao,

pp. 349–351.

40. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.2; Lamotte, pp. 87–88, Nagao, p. 275.
41. Nagao, *Shodaijōron*, p. 273.
42. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.29; Lamotte, p. 125; Nagao, p. 376.
43. Keenan, John P., "The Intent and Structure of Yogācāra Philosophy: Its Relevance for Modern Religious Thought," *Ōtani daigaku shinshū sōgō kenkyūjo: Kenkyūjohō*, #15, 1987.
44. *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.26; Lamotte, p. 121; Nagao, p. 362.
45. *Madhyamakakārikā* 24.18.