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Indian Altruism: A Study of the Terms bodhicitta and cittotpāda

by Gareth Sparham

The highest form of altruism in scholastic Mahāyāna Buddhism is conveyed by the term cittotpāda ("mind-production, lifting up the heart"). In an earlier paper I dealt with the place of this altruism in the Abhisamayālamkāra (=AA) and its commentaries. In those texts cittotpāda enjoys pride of place as entrance into the Mahāyāna, the first of seventy topics (Tib. don bdun bcu) under which the concealed meaning (Tib. sbas don) of the Prajñā-pāramitā (=PP) sūtras is discussed. In this paper I shall attempt to identify the PP sūtra from which the cittotpāda doctrine originates and show how it differs, in its origins, from bodhicitta.

Identification of the Original-Passage

The most important PP sūtra we possess is the [Ārya-]aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā(=A). As Conze remarks, it, or a now-lost precursor, was the first PP sūtra. The later Indian and Tibetan PP tradition, based on Haribhadra's (circa 800) Abhisamayālamkārālokā Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā (=AAA), traces the origin of the cittotpāda doctrine to the opening lines of the AAA in accord with the AA's elaborate schema of understanding. Though helpful for making sense of the different PP sūtras, as we shall show, this position is not historically justifiable. The origin of cittotpāda is rather to be found in the following passage from a later part of the A (Wogihara's ed. 116.3-118). For convenience's sake I will refer to this throughout as the Origin-Passage.

[subhūti:] nāham āyusman śāriputra icchāmi bodhisattvam mahāsattvam duskara-cārikāñ carantam nāpi sa bodhisattvo mahāsattvo vo duskara-samināvā carati. tat kasya hetoh? na hy āvusman śāriputra duskara-samiñām janayitvā śakyo aprameyānām asamkhyeyānām sattvānām arthah kartum. api tu sukha-samiñām eva krtvā sarva-sattvānām antike mātrsamiñām, pitr-samiñām, putra-samiñām, duhitr-samiñām krtvā, stri-purusesv evam etam samiñām krtvā bodhisattvo mahasattvo bodhisattva-cārikāñ carati, tasmān mātr-samiñā, pitṛ-samiñā, putra-samiñā, duhitṛ-samiñā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvo-sattvānām antike vāvad ātmasamiñotpādavitavyā. yathātmā sarvena sarvam sarvathā sarvam sarva-duhkhebhyo mocayitavyah evam sarva-sattvāh sarvena sarvam sarvathā sarvam, sarva-duhkhebhyo mocavitavyā iti. evam ca sarva-sattvesu saminotpādavitavyā. mayaite sarva-sattvā na parityaktavyāh. mayaite sarvasattvāh parimocayitavyā aparimānto duhkha-skandhāt. na ca mayaitesu citta-pradosa utpādavitavyo 'naśah śataśo 'pi chidyamāneneti. evam hi bodhisattvena mahāsattvena cittam utpādayitavyam. saced evam-citto viharişyati na duşkarasamiñi viharisyati. punar aparam āyuşman śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvenaivam cittam utpādayitavyam yathā sarveṇa sarvaṁ sarvathā sarvaṁ sarva-dharmā na saṁvidyante nopalabhyante.

(I do not look for a bodhisattva who goes on the difficult pilgrimage. In any case, one who courses in the perception of difficulties is not a bodhisattva. because one who has generated a perception of difficulties is unable to work the weal of countless beings. On the contrary, he forms the notion of ease, he forms the notion that all beings, whether men or women, are his parents and children, and thus he goes on the pilgrimage of a bodhisattva. A bodhisattva should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self, like this: "As I myself want to be quite free from all sufferings, just so all beings want to be quite free from all

sufferings." In addition with regard to all beings he should form the notion: "I ought not to desert all these beings. I ought to set them free from the quite measureless heap of sufferings! And I should not produce towards them a thought of hate, even though I might be dismembered a hundred times!" It is thus that a bodhisattva should lift up his heart. When he dwells as one whose heart is such, then he will neither course nor dwell as one who perceives difficulties.)

The context for this Origin-Passage is the response to an inquiry (beginning with the phrase [W75] bodhisattva[sya] mahāsattva[sya] mahāsamnaha-samnaddha[sya] mahāyāna-samprastita[sya] mahāyāna-samārūḍh[sya]..."A bodhisattva, a great being, who is armed with the great armor, who has set out in the great vehicle, who has mounted on the great vehicle...") about the use of great in great vehicle and great being. The A's response develops two lines of thought: a) of aprameyatva ("immeasurability"), which is further developed into b) the notion of samatā ("self-identity" or "state of being found equally everywhere"). Asked just "how great" (kiyatā) is the bodhisattva's armor the Lord says (W87) "A bodhisattva thinks: immeasurable and beyond number (asamkhyeya) are the beings to be liberated by me...and yet there are no beings liberated by anyone... for this is the ultimate reality of things (dharmata), based on the fact that ultimate reality is illusory (māyā-dharmatām upādāya)... It is just as if a magician (māyākāra) who conjures up a host of creatures then causes them to disappear again." We are told (W106-7) that a great vehicle holds an infinite number of living beings, just as there is room for an infinite number of living beings in space (ākāśa). Such spaciousness is on account of the sameness (samatā) of space, i.e., its "self-identity" or "state of being found equally everywhere." It is on account of this samatā that there is no beginning, middle or end and that no vehicle sets out to a beyond. It is also on account of this sameness that none of the constituent aggregates of a bodhisattva, indeed, of any dharma whatsoever, has a beginning (=utpāda) or end (=nirodha).' It is (W111) "as with the self (ātman) which does not come forth on account of being completely beyond limits (atyantatayābhinivṛtta)." Hence duality is not applicable to any dharma since every dharma is unproduced (W114). At the point that a bodhisattva is equated with every other dharma in the ultimate, uncreated and self-identical state, Śāriputra asks the question to which the Origin-Passage is direct answer. His question boils down to: how could this unity, this lack of duality, also be an illusion? How could the universe really be such a nothingness as all that?

There are so many threads of meaning, introduced earlier in the A, woven so intricately together in this Origin-Passage that it is hard to conceive of a later writer interpolating it so skillfully.⁷ The notions of a) immeasurability, b) sameness, c) similarity with self and d) nonduality are all woven together skillfully on the basic fabric of unfindability. Furthermore, Lancaster's analysis of the earlier and later Chinese translations of the A, dating from 179 to 985, enable a reader to know in general what parts of the A are earlier and later. The entire first parivarta (W1-128) is present, in the main, in the earliest versions and there is no definite reason, based on Lancaster's work, to preclude the entire Origin-Passage from the earliest version. In particular, the presence in the earliest versions of the A of the Origin-Passage is corroborated by the Ratna-guna-samuccaya-gāthā (=RGS). The presence of lines in the RGS corresponding to a passage in the A strongly suggests the A passage to have been in the original version, even if we do not know, for sure, exactly where the passage was situated, and there are correspondences between verses of the RGS and the sentiments expressed in the Origin-Passage.

Based on the Origin-Passage, cittotpāda was originally an attitude, constucted out of the willful manipulation of ideas or imagination, that welled up within the person banishing negativism and depression and inspiring further effort. In the earliest formulation of cittotpāda this uplifting of the heart was to be caused by thinking about living beings in a certain fashion: (a) imagining them to be relatives and (b) reflecting on the sameness of them and oneself. Such thoughts or ideas were to make bearable the difficult work of a bodhisattva. Although altruistic sentiments are clearly identifiable in the Origin-Passage there is no unequivocal altruistic message, in

the sense of an exhortation urging the bodhisattva to make work for others his primary motivation.

Bodhicitta and cittotpāda in the original PP sūtra

As mentioned at the outset the first of the AA's seventy topics is cittotpāda. In explaining it the AA first mentions its two ālambana ("objective supports"): (i) perfect enlightenment (samyak-sambodhi) and (ii) the needs of others (parārtha) and then gives twenty-two examples corresponding to stages on the bodhisattva's path and to the stage of enlightenment. Of the many PP sūtras, one, the Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā (=Pañca) has sections which correspond exactly to this presentation, to though in the Pañca, unlike the AA, the actual term [bodhi]-cittotpāda does not occur."

The older PP sūtras do not contain a passage which corresponds exactly to the AA's initial presentation of cittotpāda. Whereas the Pañca mentions both enlightenment and the great number of living beings, conspicuous by its absence, not only from the A, but also from the Sata-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā (=Śata), is any passage which corresponds to others and their needs, i.e., to parārtha, the second of the two objective supports for cittotpāda spelt out in AA:1.18 cittotpādaḥ parārthāya samyak sambodhi-kāmatā. At the beginning of the A there is no reference to a great number of living beings at all.¹²

The presence of a specific parārtha ("others' needs") objective support passage at the very beginning of the Pañca suggests that this later PP sūtra was constructed by a person or persons with the AA's developed notion of path (mārga). The difference between the opening lines of the Pañca and earlier PP sūtras is best accounted for by modifications introduced into the Pañca based on the basic cittotpāda doctrine set forth in the Origin-Passage, under the influence of a systematic understanding of a Mahāyāna path different from a Śrāvaka-yāna.

Although there is no obvious correspondence between the opening lines of the A and the AA's cittotpāda, Haribhadra, in his two commentaries on the A (the AAA and AASp) and in his commentary on the RGS¹³ attempts to show that the words of these two earlier sūtras also correspond equally to the AA's categories. An indication of just how hard it is to find such correspondences is Haribhadra's statement that he considered his insight that there is, in fact, a correspondence to be divinely inspired. Haribhadra says just the opening line of the A contains the entire meaning of cittotpāda. Packed into it are the two objective supports and twenty-two examples explained in AA 1.18-19. The correspondence must appear forced to any ordinary reader not blessed with Haribhadra's divine insight. Is

Though there is no reference to the needs of others in the opening lines of the A, the corresponding section of the RGS at first sight presents a difficulty because its opening verses refers explicitly to If this bodhicitta is the bodhi-cittotpāda scholasticism the RGS would corroborate the position of the AA that the origin of the bodhi-cittotpada doctrine is to be found in the A's opening lines. It is clear, however, that the citta in the citta bodheh of RGS 7, as well as the citta in the entire opening section of the A does not correspond to the citta in the cittotpada of the Origin-Passage. The citta in these former compounds is not a thought or intention but something more fundamental. The A says of citta that it is a-citta (absence of mind) because the fundamental nature of citta is clear illumination (prakṛtiś citasya prabhāsvarā). And it says of this mind, which is an absence of mind, that it is avikāra (unmodified) and avikalpa (without conceptualization). Since the cittotpada of the Origin-Passage is described as requiring to be produced (utpādayitavya) and hence as arising (utpāda), and since it is caused to arise by a set of notions (samjñā) that others have been one's parents, etc., it can hardly be the same as this fundamental citta which is taken here to be the very locus of personality and existence.17

The first part of the compound bodhi-citta (synonymous with bodhi-sattva in the early PP sūtras?) should be understood not as referring to a for-others state of enlightenment (a sambhoga-kāya)

but to the the Prajñā-pāramitā herself, beyond all conceptualization and absorbed indivisibly with the ultimate. Rather than a dative tat-puruṣa, the compound is better construed as a curious Buddhist sort of bahuvrihi meaning (one whose) fundamental state of being or mind is perfect wisdom, i.e., the ultimate. It is a curious compound because the Buddhist axiom which denies the existence of a person beyond the five constituent-aggregates (skandha) leaves both compounds without a clearly identifiable noun to qualify.

The cittotpada set forth in the Origin-Passage cannot, then, be equated with bodhicitta (or bodhisattva) nor can it be thought of as the outcome of a systematic understanding. Rather it was a notion which would itself contribute, as an integral part of a revealed text requiring explanation, to the development of Mahāyāna scholasticism's The early notion of systematic understanding of two truths. cittotpāda would be transformed, under the influence of later systematization associated paticularly with Madhyamikas, into the conventional or surface level (sāmvṛtya) bodhi-cittotpāda, i.e., one concerned with conventional realities such as the needs of other living beings and the attainment of enlightenment. This would be unlike the ultimate bodhi-cittotpāda which was none other than the original bodhicitta (i.e., the non-dual liberating vision and ultimate reality called Prajñā-pāramitā) changed insofar as it was now a part of an edifice of scholastic thought.

This explanation of the terms has the great benefit of explaining what are, otherwise, confusing usages of bodhicitta, cittotpāda and bodhi-cittotpāda. The two former terms were originally different in meaning. Later, however, bodhicitta became even more popular, as a shortened form of bodhi-cittotpāda, than the original cittotpāda itself and it was used with this secondary sense by later writers in contexts where it is historically inappropriate to do so.

The Sameness of Self and Other Lineage

In tracing the earliest developments of the bodhi-cittotpāda doctrine an important source is Śāntideva's Śikṣa-samuccaya (=ŚSa). This companion volume to the Bodhicaryāvatāra (=BCA) contains

passages from earlier sūtras on which, Śāntideva tells us, his BCA was based. Since the BCA is little more than a verse monograph on bodhi-cittotpāda the sūtra passages Śāntideva quotes in his ŚSa provide the best clues to the bodhi-cittotpāda doctrine's early developments.

Śāntideva (writing ca. 650) had no modern sense of history and accepted as authentic works of the Buddha (buddha-vacana) those which historically are quite late, in particular the Gagana-gañja-sūtra and the Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa, both of which can be seen as part of a second wave of revelation (cp. the Pañca-virnśati-sāhasrikā), building on and systematizing the early proto-Mahāyāna doctrines found in PP sūtras like the A.¹¹ These second wave sūtras, all anonymous, contain the earliest known interpretations of the A's Origin-Passage.

There are two bodhi-cittotpāda traditions¹⁹ found in Tibetan lineage lists (gsan yig). Of them, one tradition is traced back to Sāntideva and then to the mythological figures Nāgārjuna and Mañjuśri. This is called the "sameness of self with others" (parātma-samatā) tradition and it begins with the Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa's interpretation of the Origin-Passage. The Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa, a work on which Śāntideva draws heavily, is, in the main, a reformulation of the A. In it we find a first stage in the systematization of bodhi-cittotpāda, based particularly on the equation of nairātmya with dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda), and an emphasis on the sameness of self and others (parātma-samatā) an idea that Śāntideva would make a central pivot of his presentation.

The very first of the twenty-seven $m\bar{u}la-k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$ of the SSa is $yad\bar{a}$ mama pareṣām ca bhayam duṣkham ca na priyam / tad-ātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yat tam rakṣāmi netaram //("Since I and my fellow man abhor pain and fear alike, what distinction can I rightly make for self, that I should preserve it and not other?")²⁶ It contains a distinctive echo of the cittotpāda of the Origin-Passage.²¹ There is hardly a mention of the A in the entire SSa, however, and this echo might be an interesting, but otherwise inconsequential footnote, were it not that (i) in a long quotation from the $Tath\bar{a}gata-guhya-nirdeśa^{20}$ with which Sāntideva brings the SSa to its conclusion this theme is developed at

length and (ii) the most important section in the BCA for understanding Śāntideva's conception of bodhi-cittotpāda, the so-called "changing self into others meditation" (Tib. bdag gzhan mnyam brjes) (BCA 8.96ff) has the very same verse and is, in essence, an elaboration on this same ŚSa kārikā 1.

The importance of the "sameness of self with others" passage (BCA8.96ff) has already been recognized by La Vallée Poussin who says of Sāntideva's formulation of the bodhi-cittotpāda doctrine that it is at once "orthodox and yet original." La Vallée Poussin notes that the "nothingness of the ego does not warrant us in remaining inactive; we find in it a reason for sacrificing ourselves for our neighbour." He intimates that, to some extent at least, Śāntideva's explicit exhortation to the religiously minded to renounce personal needs in favour of the needs of others is not so much a reinterpretation of parātma-samatā but a valid understanding of it: "This practice of abnegation.. results... in purging the mind of error; that is to say, since every idea, as such is erroneous, abnegation 'purifies' the mind by emptying it (moha=jñeyāvarana; śuddha=śūnya)."²⁴

Elsewhere, in his translation of BCA 8.90,25 La Vallée Poussin points us in the direction of two sources for Santideva's formulation of bodhi-cittotpāda. Dividing BCA 8.90 into two parts he translates 90a "Le [Bodhisattva] s'applique d'abord, avec diligènce et scrupule, à ne pas faire de différence entre le moi et le prochain, [de qui est de l'essence de la pratique du futur Bouddha]." This is the PP sūtra's notion of parātma-samatā (interpreted in light of the Tathāgataguhya-nirdeśa) based on the progression of ideas from anutpāda through to advaya mentioned earlier. He then translates 90b "Ce qu' est la joie pour moi, elle l'est pour autrui; ce qu'est la douleur pour moi, elle l'est pour autrui. Je dois faire pour autrui ce que je fais pour mois," citing Dhammapada 129 as the probable source. We thus find here the fusion of two different observations: a) that self and other are ultimately undifferentiable (the doctrine of the PP sūtras) and b) that empathy with the plight of others is natural because one shares feelings of happiness and sorrow in common with them. This later idea, enshrined in pre-Mahāyāna texts, is not distinctly Buddhist but is also found associated with a universalist Krsna, for instance in the

reformulation of the notion of sacrifice and the body of the deity in the *Bhagavad-gītā*.

The Seven-point Lineage

Śāntideva's formulation of bodhi-cittotpāda developed from the Origin-Passage's sameness of self and other (parātma-samatā) interpreted along the lines of the Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa. Another important stream of development of the cittotpāda doctine takes as its point of departure the Origin-Passage's specific mention of family members ("A bodhisattva should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self...") and developed the idea of equalizing attachment, especially the equalization of attachment to sons. This stream of development, systematized in seven points (Tib. rgyu 'bras man ngag bdun), is associated with the names of Maitreya and Asanga in the Tibetan tradition and like the parātma-samatā developments associated with Śāntideva its source is an interpretation of the Origin-Passage. Together the two streams provide an interesting example of parallel interpretations of a PP sūtra.*

Although the ideas in the "sameness of self and other" and "seven points" traditions are not fully developed in the Origin-Passage, and are unlikely part of the original intention of the A, it was open to later writers to interpret the A's statements about (i) sameness of self and other and (ii) others as family members in such a way if only because the inspired language of the early PP sūtras lent itself to creative interpretation.

Unlike the ŚSa which provides an explicit record of the sources which Śāntideva used, in the so-called "seven points" stream of intrepretation not only is there no record of any particular text, but even a specific section in the texts attributed to Maitreya and Asaṅga setting out a coherent way of producing altruism is not readily identifiable.

Thinking of all living beings as one's son is found in an different and older form in the *Udgradatta-paripṛcchā.*²⁷ There it says that a

father should not be too attached to his own son and should think all other beings are as dear as his son. This is a sentiment not far removed from the much older, pre-Mahāyāna notion enshrined in the legend of Prince Siddhārtha, the Buddha-to-be, leaving Yaśodharā and Rahula to seek enlightenment. As in older pre-Mahāyāna texts, the relatively late *Udgradatta-paripṛcchā* focuses on equalizing (i.e., making the same) (sama-kṛ) excess attachment to a son. There is also evident, however, a shift in emphasis towards actually imagining (samjñotpāda) that other people are one's son and calling up, thereby, emotions of tenderness and concern.

Based on later explanations of bodhi-cittotpāda attributed to Asaṅga³ the essential element in the seven point tradition is that the uplifting of the heart comes about by reflecting on the relation between oneself and one's close family members. In the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, which Tibetan writers consider to be a work of Asaṅga, and which in its completed form presents a systematization of the path (mārga) at about the same stage of development as the Pañca and AA³ there is a passage³ that says one dimension of a bodhisattva's sama-citta is his consideration that all beings are as beloved as a son. In later Tibetan works the protective feeling of a child for his or her parents is emphasized and the original notion of treating all as a son is lost. This development is also, however, anticipated to some extent in the Bodhisattva-bhūmi³ where a bodhisattva is mentioned as sometimes looking after living beings like a wife (kalatra-bhāvena) and sometimes as a head of a household (svāmi-bhūta).

The earliest versions of the A were concerned with the question of the person of the Buddha. The PP's great bodhisattva, of whom no dharma can be found (so 'ham bhagavan bodhisattvam vā bodhisattva-dharmam vāvindann anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan... W31) was, originally at least, the Buddha himself before final nirvāṇa. The idea of a bodhisattva referring to all truly altruistic persons who deny themselves nirvāṇa for the benefit of others is a later development.²² The reformulation of Bodhisattva Siddhārtha's setting out for nirvāṇa into an altruistic person setting out for full enlightenment based on an empathy with others seen as oneself, or on seeing all living beings as a son, was not, therefore, a part of the

original message of the A. They are interpretations that later fit in well with the general tendency of proto- and early Mahāyāna writers to redefine the meaning of buddha and enlightenment in more universalist terms.

Some final remarks about the place of altruism in Mahāyāna Buddhism are in order. No group, theoretical or real, has a monopoly on kindness. Most religious faiths nevertheless reserve for their own particular religion possession of a unique compassion. Mahāyāna writers are not different in this regard. They say Mahāyāna Buddhism has a special altruism that distinguishes it from what they call the earlier deficient (hīna) Buddhism. While such statements retain little importance for understanding the rise and development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, they remind the modern reader of a tension that distinguishes much early Mahāyāna thought. In the course of a more general discussion of a bodhisattva's (=altruistic person's) two equipments (sambhara) La Vallée Poussin mentions these tensions in Mahāyāna Buddhism which make the role of altruism, or lack of it, problematic:

Buddhists . . . endeavored to . . . reconcile the serious antinomy of the two dogmas: "Nothing exists," and "We must work, labour, suffer for our neighbour." It is certain, says a Mādhyamika philosopher, that our neighbour does not exist, but the Bodhisattva cherishes within himself this illusion (moha) that he must become a Buddha for the salvation of creatures.

The mature attitude of Mahāyāna Buddhist writers, arrived at over the course of developing a viable theory of bodhicittotpāda can be compared with a theory of tragedy. What value, in an ultimate sense, has the uplifting of the heart in a feeling of oneness and commiseration when reflecting on a tragic actor's plight? Such tears, after all, are shed for a hardship that was never experienced, and seen by a rational person from behind the side of the curtain, as it were, we, the audience, wallow in the enjoyment of a feeling of pity for a suffering that was never there. Altruism, pity for others' hardship, has no place beyond that, and the insistence that there should be a basis for pity

in "real" misery felt by "real" persons merely misses the point of the entire drama.

NOTES

- 1. The meaning of the term cittotpāda, (later, more fully bodhi-cittotpāda, reduced often simply to bodhicitta) is found in the AA and its later commentaries. There, encapsulated in the statement cittotpādaḥ parārthāya samyak sambodhi-kāmatā ("cittotpāda is the state of wanting full enlightenment for the sake of others") cittotpāda is the altruistic desire (kāma), intention (cetanā at MSA:4.1; prārthana at Bbh:1.2) or thought (citta at AAA:22 and AAV:15) motivating a bodhisattva's religious activity.
- 2. "Background Material for the First of the Seventy Topics in Maitreyanātha's Abhisamayālamkāra" JIABS 10.2 (1987):139-158.
- 3. pratibhātu te subhūte bodhisattvānām mahāsattvānām prajfiāpāramitāyām ārabhya yathā bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ prajfiā-pāramitām niryāyuḥ. Conze translates: "Make it clear now, Subhūti, to the Bodhisattvas, the great beings, starting from perfect wisdom, how the Bodhisattvas, the great beings go forth into perfect wisdom."
- 4. In the corresponding section of the other PP sūtras and in the explanation of this passage in the AAV and AAA no special attention is paid to it whatsoever. In Pañca 260.9ff (translated by Conze p. 196) the basic outline of the Origin-Passage remains but there is an explicit reference to working for the benefit of innumerable living beings (aprameyānām asamkhyeyānām sattvānām artham kartum) and it is said, explicitly, that it is for this purpose that one imagines everyone to be one's parents and so forth. It is also interesting to note that the notion of parātma-samatā (sameness of self and other) which was to be picked up as the central notion of cittotpāda by Śāntideva is absent from this part of the Pañca. It says simply yathā ātmā ātmeti cocyate atyantatayānutpanna ātmā evam sarveṣv ādhyātmika-bahyeṣu dharmeṣu samjītotpādayitavyaḥ. Ārya Vimuktisena (AAV 126) does no more than mention the existence of the passage in a list (...duṣkara cāryānupapattyā).

The corresponding passage is not in Ghoşe's 1888-1900 edition of the Sata. The fact that his ed. runs to three, not inconsiderably sized volumes, and that he condensed the repetitious passages in the text by a variety of ingenious strategies (unfortunately making the admittedly overwhelmingly wordy text unreadable in the process) and yet still does not quite reach the corresponding section, points to its incredible length. The originality of the notion of cittotpāda which comes across so forcefully in the A is impossible in the Sata where the different themes of illusory living beings (Vol 3 130ff), greatness (Vol 3, 228ff) space (Vol 3 294ff) and immeasurability (Vol 3 313ff) are thrashed to death by repetition.

Since the rationale behind Haribhadra's comments in his AAA is, as

mentioned earlier, rooted in the axiom that the message of each of the major PP sūtras is one and the same it is not surprising that he adheres strictly to the AA schema which lumps the Origin-Passage under the general rubric sarvākārajħatā-niryāṇa-pratipatti (on the place of which in the AA's scheme see Obermiller's Analysis of the AA, Calcutta 1933-36, p. 189). Although arbitrary when taken as a rubric under which to include the Origin-Passage, the Gagana-gaħja-sūtra quoted in the SSa (Bendal ed. p. 117, trans. p. 115) gives a clear indication of how the part of the A within which the Origin-Passage is embedded relates to the more general context of being armed with great armor. "Just as the wind enters through a chink, so Māra takes his opportunity from any part where there is a chink in the heart." Therefore the bodhisattva's heart must be whole and without chink. This is what is meant by whole-heartedness, namely full realization of the doctrine of the void, which implies sarvākārajħatā.

- I have not been able to consult A. Wayman's "A Report on the Akṣayamatinirdeśa-sūtra (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 2)," Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture, Vol. 6, ed. by Lokesh Chandra (International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, Cot. 1980), pp. 211-232. In his recent Ethics of Tibet, (Albany: SUNY, 1991), p. 9 Professor Wayman cites the Akṣayamatinirdeśa-sūtra's reformulation of a Bodhisattva-piṭaka-sūtras a possible important source for Asaṅga's formulation of the bodhi -cittotpāda doctrine. See also Mark Tatz, Asaṅga's Chapter on Ethics (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986).
- 5. The different dimensions of samatā are brought together in a description of the ultimate cittotpāda (pāramārthika-cittotpāda) at MSA 4.9: dharmeşu ca sattveşu ca tat-kṛtyeṣūttame ca buddhatve / sama-cittopālambhāt prāmodya-viśiṣṭatā tasya. This is explained (Levi's ed. 15.23-25) as follows: "There is sama-cittatā in regards to dharmas because of understanding them as being devoid of reality (dharma-nairātmya); then sama-cittatā in regard to living beings because of realizing the sameness of self and others; sama-cittatā in regard to what is to be done for others because of others wanting, like oneself, to end their misery and there is sama-cittatā in respect of the state of awakening (buddhatva) because it and the sphere of ultimate reality (dharma-dhātu) are, in their final nature (ātmanī), seen as undivided."
- 6. I take this to be the import of yadi cāyuṣman subhūte bodhisattvo 'py anutpādaḥ kim bodhisattvo duṣkara-cārikāň carati yāni vā tāni sattvānām kṛtaso duḥkhāny utsahate pratyanubhavitum?
- 7. The evam etat ("How right you are") refrain immediately following the Origin-Passage (W119) (this is a refrain that recurs time and again in the PP sūtras where there is a direct, unanswerable question about the ultimate) may have been the A's original response to Śāriputra's question. In that case the Origin-Passage would not have been part of the very earliest PP sūtra, but an addition to an earlier version of the text aimed at toning down the unyieldingly nihilistic tone in the Original.
 - 8. As Conze has pointed out, we have no access to an edition of the RGS

earlier than Haribhadra's version set forth in accord with the divisions of the AA, and we have, therefore, no way of knowing what changes to the original order of the verses of the RGS Haribhadra did or did not introduce.

- 9. The MSA appears to be attempting to recapture the original notion of a welling up of feeling when *cittotpāda* is described as an intention (*cetanā*) "that is a full coming into being of *citta*" (*citta-sambhava*). This welling up is captured in Conze's "It is thus that a Bodhisattva should lift up his heart."
- 10. Pañca 18 begins sarvākāram sarva-dharmān abhisambodhukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñā-pāramitāyām yogaḥ karaṇiyaḥ ("The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to be completely, fully awakened to all dharmas should make a practice of perfect wisdom.") This corresponds to the first ālambana set out in the samyak-sambodhi kāmatā of AA 1.18. Immediately following this and corresponding to the second ālambana is the statement daśa-dikṣu pratyekam ganga-nadī-vālukopameṣu loka-dhātuṣu ye sattvās tān sarvān anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātau parinivāṇayikukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñā-pāramitāyām śikṣitavyam. ("The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to place in the realm of non-residual nirvāṇa all those beings who are in each of the ten directions, in world-spheres like [in numbers] to sand-grains of the river Gaṇgā should learn perfect wisdom.")

The correspondence between the Pañca and the AA, at this point, both in terms of the position assigned by the AA to the first occurence of the discussion of cittotpāda, and in the general conception of cittotpāda presents us with further evidence, were we to need it, that the AA was, in its origins, a commentary on, or even a part of, the Pañca. Ārya Vimuktisena's AAV, the earliest extant commentary on the AA treats it throughout as a commentary on the Pañca without mentioning any of the shorter PP sūtras.

11. The term cittotpāda is not found in the Pañca until some pages later in a passage corresponding, according to the AA, to the cittotpāda exemplified by a treasury (mahā-nidhana). Pañca 21.18 says: matsariṇaḥ sattvān dāne pratiṣṭāpayitukāmena sarva-śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhebhyo dānāni diyamānāni ekena anumodanā-sahagatena cittotpādena abhibhavitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajāā-pāramitāyām śikṣitavyam. "The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to foster charity in miserly beings, wanting to surpass the charity made by every śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha with the single thought that arises (cittotpāda) accompanied with rejoicing, should learn perfect wisdom."

It is not irrelevant, perhaps, that this first explicit use of the term cittotpāda in the Pañca is in the context of what has been called increased sectarianism (perhaps "self awareness as distinct Mahāyānists" would be a more apt description) implicit in the denigration of the Śrāvaka vehicle, such denigrations being one of the criteria Lancaster identified for ascertaining a PP sūtra passage to be a later addition to the text.

12. The absence of such a passage, even in the Sata is particularly interesting as evidence that one should not understand the interminably long Sata

as simply a further expansion of the Pañca, but rather as an expansion of the A along independent lines.

¹³ Bhagavad-ratna-guṇa-samcaya-gāthā-pafijikā-nāma. Also called Subodhinī. Extant only in Tibetan as Bcom Idan 'das yon tan rin po che sdud pa'i tshig su byas pa'i dka' 'grel shes bya ba (P5190).

"So, at least according to the Tibetan interpretation of the opening verses of his AASp where he first says "I make homage (namah) reverently (sādaram) to the PP by discriminating/sorting out/showing (vivi) the verses (kārikā) ornamenting it (tad-ālamkr) which are an ornament of all (sarva/nikhilālamkr). (shes rab pha rol phyin pa ni // de'i rgyan tshigs su 'gyur pa dag // kun gyi rgyan du 'gyur pa ni // mam par dbye phyir dgus phyag 'tshal) AASp2. His statement, in verses 6 and 7 (AASp 3) that it is astonishing and only through the grace of the Buddha that he fathomed the whole of the AA in this way, especially in view of the host of brilliant scholar saints who had earlier written expanations of it, refers just to his insight, mentioned in verse one, namely that the AA is an ornament (i.e., explanation) of not just the Pañca but of the A and Sata as well.

15 Haribhadra's main scriptural source for his opinion about the A is a verse from the Prajñā-pāramitā-pindārtha (PPP) which describes the A as a condensed version (grantha-samksepa) of the other longer PP sūtras, containing all their topics. The verse is quoted by Haribhadra just a few pages earlier at W12 as well. It is worth mentioning here in passing that, so far as is known, no mention is made of the PPP (a very brief work systematizing the Yogācāra tri-svabhāva doctrine) prior to Haribhadra, and it is worth noting that Haribhadra makes a point each and every time he cites the text to prefix the quotation with ahacarya-dignagah. The verse is clearly identified in this manner both times it is quoted, even though Haribhadra style is usually to simply write iti, or ityapare, etc. when referring to other authors from whose works he repeatedly quotes. Since the sanctity of the author of the PPP becomes very important for Haribhadra's argument there is a certain self-interest evident in this repeated insistence on Dignaga's name. At the very least some People during Haribhadra's time required being told again and again that it was indeed Dignaga's text, a circumstance Frauwallner does not mention when accepting the PPP as one of Dignaga's authentic works.

While premature, in the absence of further documentation, to deny that the Dignāga who wrote the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* also wrote the PPP, it should be noted that the question of its authorship does bear heavily on other issues: (i) the extent to which it is correct to understand the logico-epistemological works of Dignāga as being the output of a Vijñapti-mātrin, (ii) the period in Indian history during which it was first felt necessary to reconcile the revelation contained in differing versions of the PP sūtras, and (iii) the person of Ārya-Vimuktisena.

I acknowledge a series of conversations with Dr. A. Singh which stimulated this line of thought.

16. RGS 7: citta [sic] bodheh.

17. Similarly, when immediately following (W41) Sariputra says it is for

this reason (etaś ca) that a bodhisattva is not reversible from bodhi, one should understand the reason for his statement not (as in Conze's translation p. 84) in terms of his wish (kāma) or intention (cetanā) for enlightenment in order to be able to work on others' behalf, which characterizes the bodhi-cittotpāda at the beginning of the Pañca, but rather in terms of the ultimate truth (paramārthataḥ) that all dharmas, including the bodhisattva's perfect wisdom are equally unproduced (anutpanna) and are, therefore, equally free of defilement and to that extent awakened or in a state of enlightenment.

Such an interpretation of bodhicitta as equivalent to bodhisattva ("one whose essence/mind/soul is perfect awareness/enlightenment") is further corroborated by a passage later in the A (W81-83), where, in answer to the question "Why is a great being called a great being (mahāsattva)?" Subhūti answers that he is called a great being if he remains unattached to, and uninvolved in the mind of enlightenment (bodhicitta), the mind of all-knowledge, the undefiled mind, the unequalled mind, the mind equal to the unequalled.

- 18. The dating of these texts based on translations into Chinese (most recently in Akira Hirakawa A History of Indian Buddhism trans. and ed. by Paul Groner, Asian Studies at Hawaii 36, University of Hawaii Press, 1990) would fit with Conze's dating of the A and RGS to the first century BCE though Hirakawa assigns the entire PP literature a slightly later date than Conze. The appearance of the earliest versions of what I have called the second wave of PP revelation in Chinese translation, texts like the Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa, would also appear to predate the accepted dates of the works associated with the names of Asanga and Maitreya, particularly the date assigned to the AA.
- 19. Two streams of interpretation of, or method to produce, byang chub sems (=bodhi-cittotpāda) are an accepted fact in popular Tibetan oral teaching. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, in Meaningful to Behold (London: Tharpa, 1985, p. 22) talks of two unbroken lineages. Of these bdag gzhan gnyam rjes sgo nas byang chub sems bskyed tshul ("equalizing and changing yourself into others method") can be traced back to BCA8.89ff. The rgyu 'bras man ngags bdun... ("seven-fold cause and effect method"), though anticipated in parts of both the Bbh and MSA, and in the process of systematization in Kamalaśila's Bhāvanā-krama and Dīpamkara Śrī-jñāna's Bodhi-patha-pradīpa, is not set forth clearly in any texts earlier than those of the fully developed Tibetan lam rim and blo sbvong genre.
 - 20. SSa p.xxxix; trans. p.3.
- 21. ...tasmān mātṛ-samjñā, pitṛ-samjñā, putra-samjñā, duhiṭṛ-samjñā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvo-sattvānām antike yāvad ātma-samjñotpādayitavyā. yathātmā sarveṇa sarvam sarvathā sarvam sarva-duḥkhebhyo mocayitavyaḥ evam sarva-sattvāḥ sarveṇa sarvam sarvathā sarvam sarva-duḥkhebhyo mocayitavyā iti. ("A bodhisattva should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self, like this: 'As I myself want to be quite free from all sufferings, just so all beings want to be quite free from all sufferings."

- 22. The long quotation, which runs from 357.15-366.2 in Bendall's ed.; trans. pp. 315-320 is, in the main, a reformulation of the opening of the A. It begins Parātma-samatābhyāsād bodhi-cittam dṛḍhibhavet / āpekṣitvam parātmatvam paravaram yathā mṛṣā // tat-kūlam na svataḥ param kim apekṣyastv apāratā / ātmatvam na svateḥ siddham kim apekṣya paro bhavet? "One must exercise oneself in making no difference between other and self if bodhicitta is to become strong. Self and other exist only relatively, just as the hither and further banks of the river, and are false. That bank is not of itself the other bank; then in relation to what could this bank exist? Selfhood is not of itself realized, then in relation to what should there be another?"
- 23. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 2, pp. 752-753.
 - 24. Ibid., p. 752.
 - 25. BCA trans. pp. 96-97.
- 26. A similar parallel interpretation is found in the Maitreya-pariprechā's three nature (tri-rūpa) explanation and the Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra's three nature (tri-svabhāva) explanation and the Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra's three nature (tri-svabhāva) explanation of the PP's dharma-nairātmya doctrine. These two streams of thought, like the profound and vast bodhi-cittotpāda traditions are also associated, more or less with Mādhyamika and Yogācāra thinkers.
 - 27. Quoted \$\$a p.19; trans. p. 21.
 - 28. Cf. Lam rim chen mo, in the skye bu chen po section.
- 29. See, for example, the order of the opening sections on gotra, cittotpāda and sva-parārtha and the explicit mention of cittotpāda's two ālambana.
- 30. Pañca:194 sarva-sattveșv cka-putraka iva prema-sahagatena cittena sama-citto bhavati.
 - 31. Bbh:249ff.
- 32. See, for example, Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932).
 - 33. La Vallée Poussin, ERE 2, p.741 note.

Abbreviations:

- A [Ārya-]aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā. Ed. by Wogihara in AAA. Translated by E. Conze. Bibliotheca Indica, 284. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1958; revised reprint ed., San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973.
- AA Abhisamayālamkāra-nāma-prajnā-pāramitopadeśa-śāstra-[kārikā]. Ed. by Wogihara in AAA. The kārikās of the first abhisamaya are numbered in accordance with Obermiller's 1929 ed.; i.e., kārikā 1 in Wogihara's ed. is numbered as kārikā 3 and so forth.

- AAA Abhisamayālamkārālokā Prajūā-pāramitā-vyākhyā Ed. by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932-35; reprint ed. 1973.
- AASp Abhisamayālamkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstra-vṛttiḥ. (Short Tib. title, 'grel pa don gsal = Vṛttiḥ Sphuṭārthā). Tib. text ed. by Bhikṣu Samdong Rinpoche. Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica-2. Sarnāth, 1977.
- AAV Abhisamayālamkāra-vṛtti. (Ārya Vimuktisena). Ed. by C. Pensa. Rome: Is.M.E.O., 1967.
- Bbh Bodhisattva-bhūmi. Ed. by N. Dutt. Tibetan Skt. Works Series, 7. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966.
- BCA Bodhicaryāvatāra. Ed. by V. Bhattacharya. Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960. Trans. by L. de la Vallée Poussin. Bodhicaryāvatāra: Introduction a la Practique des Futurs Bouddhas. Paris: Librarie Blond et Cie., 1907.
- MSA Mahāyāna-Sūtrālamkāra. Ed. by Sylvan Levi. Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 190. Paris: Champion, 1907-11.
- Pañca Pañcavimśati-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā. Ed. by N. Dutt. Calcutta Oriental Series, 28. London: Luzac, 1934. Trans. by E. Conze in The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom. Berkeley 1975; reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
- PPP Prajňā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha-[samgraha]. Ed. by E. Frauwallner. WZKS (1959) 3:140-144.
- RGS [Bhagavad-prajñā-pāramitā-]ratna-guna-samcaya-gāthā. Ed. by E. Obermiller. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 29. Leningrad, 1937; reprint ed. by E. Conze. 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1960
- Sata Sata-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā. Ed. by P. Ghośa. Calcutta: Baptist Press, 1902.
- ŚSa Śikṣa-samuccaya. Ed. by C. Bendall. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 1. St Petersburg, 1902. Trans. by C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse in Śikṣa-samuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine; reprint ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
- W U. Wogihara's ed. of the AAA.