

JIABS

Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 26 Number 2 2003

<i>General Introduction</i>	
by Robert KRITZER	201
Nobuyoshi YAMABE	
<i>On the School Affiliation of Āśvaghoṣa: “Sautrāntika” or “Yogācāra”?</i>	225
Takumi FUKUDA	
<i>Bhadanta Rāma: A Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu</i>	255
Bart DESSEIN	
<i>Sautrāntika and the Hṛdaya Treatises</i>	287
Yoshifumi HONJŌ	
<i>Sautrāntika</i>	321
Robert KRITZER	
<i>Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i>	331
Oskar VON HINÜBER	
<i>Report on the XIIIth Conference of the IABS</i>	385
Cristina SCHERRER-SCHAUB	
<i>IABS Treasurer Final Financial Report</i>	391
Notes on the Contributors	395
JIABS volume 26 Number 1 2003 • <i>Errata</i>	397

SAUTRĀNTIKA AND THE HRDAYA TREATISES

BART DESSEIN

0. Introduction

P'u-kuang's *Chü-she Lun Chi*, a 7th century commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, contains a passage on the origin of the Sautrāntikas, in which also the philosophical position of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and of a section of Dharmatrāta's **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* are explained.¹ In this passage, P'u-kuang states that the Sautrāntika tradition goes back to Kumāralāta and that these Sautrāntikas issued from the Sarvāstivādins (or, alternatively, that they owe their origin to the concept of the three time periods²). P'u-kuang further claims that the *Abhidharmakośa* and the section of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* that contains the set of four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*) on the three forms of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*) agree with the philosophical position of the Sautrāntikas. As the section of the Chinese **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* under scrutiny here³ disagrees with "the Sanskrit version," this, still according to P'u-kuang, implies that the Chinese translator made a mistake here.⁴

This **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* is one of three *Hṛdaya* treatises contained in the Taishō edition of the *Tripitaka*, i.e., in its translation by Saṃghavarman, titled *Tsa A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun* (T. 1552). The other two *Hṛdaya* works are Saṃghadeva's translation of Dharmasreṣṭhin's **Abhidharmahṛdaya*, titled *A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun* (T. 1550), and the *A-p'i-t'an Hsin*

¹ T. 1821: 35c4-14. A translation of the passage is given further on in this article. Fa-pao's *Chü-she Lun Shu* (T. 1822: 496a9-17) contains a similar passage.

² See note # 88.

³ See T. 1552: 875b5-10.

⁴ Nishi (1978: 134, note # 33) explains that, probably, the Chinese version of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* used by P'u-kuang differs from the present Chinese translation. He suggests that the *catuṣkoṭi* of the present Chinese version was probably revised, based on the Sanskrit. See also note # 13.

Lun Ching (T. 1551), the translation of Upaśānta's **Abhidharmahṛdaya* by Narendrayaśas. These three *Hṛdaya* treatises led to the compilation of the *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu. Two Chinese translations of this work are included in the Taishō edition: one by Paramārtha (500-569), titled *A-p'i-ta-mo Chü-she Shih Lun* (T. 1559), and one by Hsüan-tsang, titled *A-p'i-ta-mo Chü-she Lun* (T. 1558).

The authors of the above works are all from the same geographical region. Judging from P'u-kuang's *Chü-she Lun Chi*, Dharmasreṣṭhin (= Dharmasrī) was a Tocharian from Bactria.⁵ Upaśānta refers to the Kāśmīri masters repeatedly⁶ and disagrees with them. This implies that he most likely did not belong to this group. In the *Ta T'ang Hsi-yü Chi*, Dharmatrāta is said to have written his work in Gandhāra, more precisely in the neighborhood of Puṣkarāvaṭī.⁷ Vasubandhu was from Puruṣapura in Gandhāra.⁸ This explains the tradition that says that Vasubandhu was invited to send his stanzas (*kārikā*) to Kaśmīra.⁹ Commentating on Gandhāra, Stefan Anacker (1984: 12) views the above works as belonging to the same geographical line of Sarvāstivāda philosophy, and he claims that "this birthplace of the Sarvāstivāda masters Dharmasrī and the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, kept up its old tradition of scholastic Buddhist learning."

As for textual format, the treatises enumerated above form a separate group within Sarvāstivāda literature. They are composed of verses with an accompanying prose auto-commentary.¹⁰ In this respect, they resemble the *Abhidharmasaṅgītiparyāyapādaśāstra* (T.1536) and the *Abhidharmadharmaskandhapādaśāstra* (T.1537), the earliest works of what became known as the Sarvāstivāda *ṣaṭpādābhidharma*. The two latter works were translated by Hsüan-tsang's translation team.¹¹

⁵ T. 1821: 11c12-13. See also Kawamura (1974: 40) and Willemen (1975: ii and xxix, note # 16). See also note # 19.

⁶ T. 1551: 841c17, 855a28, 855c27.

⁷ T. 2087: 881a17-19.

⁸ T. 2049: 188a10-11. See also Takakusu (1904: 269); Hirakawa (1973: iii).

⁹ T. 2049: 190b11. See also Takakusu (1904: 287); Anacker (1984: 15).

¹⁰ See Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 174). Dhammajoti (1995: 20) remarks that the use of 'simile of proof' (*avadāna*) to explain stanzas started in the western region, particularly Gandhāra, which had become the center of missionary activities of the Dārṣṭāntika masters. See also note # 33.

¹¹ On these two works, see Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 177-189).

1. The *Hṛdaya* works as a set of Sarvāstivāda works

There is textual evidence that, indeed, the *Hṛdaya* works form a series. In the introduction to Saṃghavarman's translation of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, we read:

When explaining the meaning of Dharmasreṣṭhin's **Abhidharmahṛdaya*, different instructors have been unequal as to conciseness. Dharmasreṣṭhin's [own] explanation is the most concise [one]. Upasānta has an explanation of 8,000 stanzas in length.¹²

As the total number of stanzas contained in Upasānta's work amounts to 249, as opposed to the 250 of Dharmasreṣṭhin's work, Saṃghavarman here undoubtedly refers to the prose auto-commentary, Upasānta's work consisting of six volumes, and Dharmasreṣṭhin's of four. In Seng-yu's *Ch'u San-tsang Chi Chi* too, we find evidence that Dharmatrāta's work is related to Dharmasreṣṭhin's **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. One passage supporting a connection between the two texts is contained in the *Tsa A-p'i-t'an Hsin Hsü*, an anonymous introduction to Guṇavarman's Chinese translation of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*. Guṇavarman's translation is the third translation that was made of the text, Saṃghavarman's version being the fourth.¹³ The passage concerned reads as follows:

After a hundred years had passed since the *parinirvāna* of the Tathāgata, there was the venerable Dharmasreṣṭhin. From the collection of scriptures proclaimed by the Buddha, he selected the essentials (*shih-yao* 事 要) amounting to 250 stanzas. He called [this work] **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. Later, there was the venerable Dharmatrāta. When he took over what had been composed, he regarded the essence of the words as incomplete and the meaning as having shortages. He thereupon also selected from the scriptures and made 350 stanzas more. He completed what was lacking, and called [this work] **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*.¹⁴

¹² T. 1552: 869c18-19.

¹³ The first translation of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* mentioned in Chih-sheng's *K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao Lu* is the work of Saṃghadeva. This translation has to be dated between AD 385 and 397. However, it is not unlikely that this translation actually is a translation of Dharmasreṣṭhin's work. See Dessein (1999, vol. 2: 25, note # 360). A second translation mentioned in Chih-sheng's catalogue is the work of Fa-hsien and Buddhahadra. This translation is to be dated ca. AD 418. The third translation was started by Īśvara and completed by Guṇavarman. It is to be dated ca. AD 426. Saṃghavarman's translation is dated AD 434. See Dessein (1999, vol. 1: lxxvii-lxxxix); T. 2154: 648a8-9 and 649b23-c7; and T. 2157: 954b18-29 and 985c20-986a3.

¹⁴ T. 2145: 74b5-9. On the interpretation of the title **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, see Dessein (1999, vol. 1: xix-xxii).

A second passage in the *Ch'u San-tsang Chi Chi* is found in Chiao-ching's preface to Saṃghavarman's translation of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, dated AD 435.¹⁵ Here we read:

Later, after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Tathāgata, in the time of the Ch'in and the Han, there was the venerable Dharmaśreṣṭhin. He made the work [titled] **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. It totals 250 stanzas that form ten chapters. Later, having come to the time of the heyday of the Chin, there further was the venerable Dharmatrāta. He added 350 stanzas to form eleven chapters, and called [this work] **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*.¹⁶

That Dharmatrāta sees his work merely as an expansion of Dharmaśreṣṭhin's is stated in the preface to his work as follows:

I pay homage to the venerable Dharmaśreṣṭhin: I humbly accept what he has said. I, Dharmatrāta, explain what has not yet been explained by him;¹⁷

as well as in the work itself, where we read:

Deliberating with little wisdom on what the honored Dharmaśreṣṭhin has said, I now compile chapters and sentences to comment on and complete the doctrine as it has been transmitted. It is not because of wishing for pride and seeking for glory. He has said the same.¹⁸

In the above passages from the *Ch'u San-tsang Chi Chi*, two opinions on Dharmaśreṣṭhin's dates appear: one hundred years after the demise of the Buddha, and in the time of the Ch'in and the Han. In P'u-kuang's *Chü-she Lun Chi*, we find the following formulation:

In the five hundred years following the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, the philosopher Dharmaśreṣṭhin, a Tocharian from the land of the Oxus,¹⁹ composed the **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. [In this work,] it is explained that [when afflictions (*kleśa*)] 'arise' successively [to certain factors (*dharma*), these factors] are impure (*sāsrava*)²⁰. Six hundred years [after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*], Dharmatrāta changed [the phrase "to arise successively"] into "to increase

¹⁵ See Lin (1949: 341).

¹⁶ T. 2145: 74b23-26.

¹⁷ T. 1552: 869c22-23.

¹⁸ T. 1552: 963c8-10.

¹⁹ T. 1821: 11c13 reads 縛 蠡: most likely Vakṣu (cf. Soothill and Hodous, 1987: 449). Vakṣu has been identified with the Oxus River (Edgerton, 1985: 466-467; Monier-Williams, 1990: 911).

²⁰ See T. 1550: 809b10-12.

successively,” because the meaning of “arising” is erroneous, since although impurities [may] arise in succession to the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*) and that of the path (*mārgasatya*), [these factors] are not said to be impure.²¹ Since this [last opinion] is not erroneous, the master of this treatise follows this explanation.²²

As is the case in the passage of the *Chü-she Lun Chi* referred to in the beginning of this article, this passage too connects Vasubandhu with Dharmatrāta. This passage further corroborates the version of Chiao-ching’s preface concerning the dates of Dharmasreṣṭhin, placing this author between the beginning of the common era and the 3rd century AD. Moreover, placing Dharmasreṣṭhin as far back in time as “one hundred years after the Buddha’s *parinirvāṇa*”²³ is highly unlikely, as one hundred years after the Buddha’s demise, Abhidharma literature cannot have reached that degree of development yet.²⁴ Providing more exact dates for the author of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* remains a highly difficult task. The biography of Dharmakāla in the *Kao Seng Chuan* informs us that when Dharmakāla was twenty-five years of age, he entered a Buddhist monastery where he saw Dharmasreṣṭhin’s Abhidharma.²⁵ The same biography informs us that Dharmakāla arrived in Lo-yang in the Chia-p’ing era (AD 249-254).²⁶ It is not clear how much time elapsed between his acquaintance with Dharmasreṣṭhin’s work and his arrival in Lo-yang. However, as in the first half of the 3rd century AD the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* was already spread among the monasteries of India, it is not unlikely that the work is anterior to the 3rd century AD. Upaśānta must have lived later than the compilation of the **Mahāvibhāṣā*. More precisely, he most likely lived one generation prior to Dharmatrāta,²⁷ author of the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, who lived in the beginning of the

²¹ See T. 1552: 871a15-22.

²² T. 1821: 11c12-16. The same information is found in Fa-pao’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*, T. 1822: 469a28-b3. For the *Abhidharmakośa* opinion, see T. 1558: 1c6-10.

²³ T. 2145: 74b5.

²⁴ See Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 170-176).

²⁵ T. 2059: 324c19-20. The same information is found in the *Li-tai San-pao Chi*, T. 2034: 56b12-13. See also Shih (1968: 18).

²⁶ T. 2059: 324c27-28. The same information is found in the *Li-tai San-pao Chi*, T. 2034: 56b20. See also Shih (1968: 18).

²⁷ See Watanabe, Mizuno and Oishi (1932: 124); Kimura (1974: 230); Dessein (1999, vol. 1: xxxvii).

4th century AD.²⁸ As Dharmatrāta is dated approximately one hundred years after Dharmaśreṣṭhin in the above quotation from the *Chü-she Lun Chi*, this would place Dharmaśreṣṭhin around the beginning of the 3rd century AD.²⁹ This implies that the three *Hṛdaya* works were written in the time span of about one hundred years.

Much controversy exists on the dates of Vasubandhu, generally accepted to be a Sautrāntika philosopher who, in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, criticized the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal viewpoint. The earliest proposed date of “around 316 AD”³⁰ would make Vasubandhu a contemporary of the author of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*. The textual format of the *Abhidharmakośa*, as well as the philosophical position of its author, however, force us to date Vasubandhu later than Dharmatrāta. It has been shown that Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* is a rewriting of Dharmatrāta’s work.³¹ The fact that the three *Hṛdaya* works themselves, as well as the Chinese tradition as included in the Buddhist catalogues of translations, see the three texts as closely related and the fact that a comparison of Dharmatrāta’s work with Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s and with Upaśānta’s **Abhidharmahṛdaya* shows that the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* was influenced by the Vaibhāṣikas, seem to suggest that Vasubandhu wanted to accomplish two aims in one text: perfecting the structure of the *Hṛdaya* works, and criticizing the Vaibhāṣika influence in these works. As the commentators of Vasubandhu’s work, having started their argument by mentioning Kumāralāta, explain that Vasubandhu took the development of philosophical ideas into account when composing his treatise, and as they seem to suggest that at least parts of the original version of Dharmatrāta’s work agreed with the *Abhidharmakośa*, it appears that, in the Chinese tradition, the *Hṛdaya* works were seen as a series, ending with Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa*.³² Also geographically, these works form a unit.

²⁸ T. 2145: 74b25 dates him in the beginning of the Eastern Chin Dynasty (i.e. AD 317). See also Dessein (1999, vol. 1: xxiii).

²⁹ Kimura (1974: 223) situates Dharmaśreṣṭhin around 200 AD. Yamada (1959: 113) states that the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* was written simultaneously with the **Mahāvibhāṣā*. This date is contradicted by the fact that Dharmaśreṣṭhin is referred to in the *Ch’u Yao Ching*. See also note # 34, # 35, # 37, and # 39.

³⁰ Anacker (1984: 11). See also Schmithausen (1992: 396-397).

³¹ See Kimura (1974: 259-261); Dessein (1999, vol. 1: lv-lvi).

³² See Dessein (1999, vol. 1: xxxv, xxxviii-xl, xlv-l, lv-lxvi).

Now that we know that the above four texts (T. 1550, T. 1551, T. 1552 and T. 1558/T. 1559) form a series, we can investigate the nature of these texts. Hui-yüan's introduction to the Chinese translation of Dharmaśreṣṭhin's work in the *Ch'u San-tsang Chi Chi* calls the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* the "Essential stanzas (*gāthā*) of the *Tripitaka*," (*san-tsang chih yao-sung* 三藏之要頌).³³ This meaning is parallel to the meaning of *hṛdaya*, and is reminiscent of the passages quoted above on the compilation of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya*: "He selected the essentials," and of the **Samyuk-tābhidharmahṛdaya*: "He selected from the scriptures and made 350 stanzas more."³⁴ It may be very noteworthy that Dharmaśreṣṭhin is quoted in the Chinese translation (4th century AD) of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta's *Ch'u Yao Ching*: "Therefore, the venerable Dharmaśreṣṭhin (*T'an-mo-shih-li* 曇摩世利) said the following stanzas: [...]."³⁵ Dharmaśreṣṭhin

³³ T. 2145: 72c1. 要頌 is the standard Chinese translation of 'Udāna.' Rockhill (1975: vii) explains "udāna" as follows: "[...] the word udāna must [...] be understood [...] something nearly approaching 'gāthā,' verse, or stanza." On the same page, note # 2, he continues: "It would be perfectly admissible to call this work 'a sūtra,' using, however, that word in its habitual sense of 'series of aphorisms.' He further remarks (op. cit.: viii), "It appears to me that the founder of Buddhism must have attached great importance to these verses [...]. As a natural consequence of the importance attributed to these verses, it appeared desirable to the first successors of the Buddha to collect in separate works all such utterances of the Master as might prove especially instructive, and as best answering the purposes of their school." See also Dhammajoti (1995: 8).

³⁴ In the introduction to the *Ch'u Yao Ching*, T. 212: 609b27-29, we read that Dharmatrāta compiled the work by collecting 1,000 stanzas and forming 33 chapters. The work was called *Dharmapada*. Together with their commentary, this work is said to have been called *Udāna*. Dhammajoti (1995: 17) further remarks that "No other extant source confirms the assertion that the stanza portions alone of this Sarvāstivāda version, without the commentary, was called a *Dharmapada*; though it does seem that when stanzas from this version were quoted by other schools, they are mentioned as being from the '*Dharmapada*.'" See also T. 1545: 1b18-20. It may be reiterated here that the Chinese version of the *Ch'u Yao Ching* also dates from the end of the 4th century. See also in this regard Dhammajoti (1995: 17-18). See also note # 10. According to Nakamura, "The *Udānavarga* composed by the Sarvāstivādins seems to be collation of the Pali *Dharmapada* and the *Udāna* with some verses from the *Sagātha-vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* and from the *Suttanipāta* in Pali. There is a legend that the *Udānavarga* was compiled by Dharmatrāta, a contemporary of king Kaṇṣka. The *Ch'u-yao-ching* (30 vols.) and the *Fa-chi-yao-sung-ching* (4 vols.) are considered to be Chinese translations of this text, which corresponds to the *Dharmapada* of other sects. Legend has it that the *Ch'u-yao-ching* translated into Chinese by Buddhasmṛti, was composed by Dharmatrāta who lived about 300 years after the death of the Buddha. This is earlier than the *Dharmapadaṭṭhakathā* of Buddhaghosa," (1980: 42-43).

³⁵ T. 212: 626a17-21. On the compiler Dharmatrāta, see AKV: 12, 2-4.

is further referred to in the following passage of the *Ch'u Yao Ching*: “Those who reflect on [the calamities]³⁶ of the body, explain things as in the scriptural texts. The venerable Dharmasreṣṭhin (*T'an-mo-shih-li* 曇摩尸梨) also said this.”³⁷ This Bhadanta Dharmatrāta of the *Ch'u Yao Ching* is generally accepted to be a Dārṣṭāntika,³⁸ and is also referred to in the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, i.e., as the “Dharmatrāta of former times.”³⁹

Judging from the above, the purpose of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* was similar to the purpose of the **Aṣṭagrantha / Jñānaprasthāna*: summarizing the doctrine. It has been proven that the *Jñānaprasthāna* is more recent than Dharmasreṣṭhin's **Abhidharmahṛdaya*.⁴⁰ As we know that the *Jñānaprasthāna* served as basis for the **Mahāvibhāṣā* of the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins, the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* appears to be a summary digest of non-Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda.

2. The origin of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas

Above, Dharmasreṣṭhin has been connected with the Dārṣṭāntika Dharmatrāta, author of the *Ch'u Yao Ching*, a work similar in purpose to the **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. We hence need to investigate who these Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas are.⁴¹ The *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* places their origin in the beginning of the fourth century after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*.⁴² Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of this text, *I-pu Tsung Lun Lun* (T. 2031), calls them *Ching-liang Pu* 經量部. The text further states that they are also called “Saṃkrāntivādin” (*Shuo-chuan Pu* 說轉部), and that

³⁶ Cf. T. 212: 642c28.

³⁷ T. 212: 643a2-3. See also Lin (1949: 51 ff.); Armelin (1978: 241-242, note # 19).

³⁸ See Lin (1949: 322 ff.).

³⁹ T. 1552: 946b15. Lin (1949: 351) dates this Dārṣṭāntika Dharmatrāta around the 2nd century BC. This approximately agrees with the traditional date given by P'u-kuang, T. 1821: 11a7-8: “Dharmatrāta [...] was born three hundred years after the Buddha's *Nirvāṇa*.” See also Dharmajoti (1995: 19).

⁴⁰ Yamada (1959: 113); Frauwallner (1971: 71); Willemen (1975: viii); Dessein (1996: 643). For a review of scholarly opinions on the relative dating of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* and the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, see Kawamura (1974: 39 ff.).

⁴¹ Cf. AKV: 400.17: “*Dārṣṭāntikāḥ Sautrāntika-viśeṣā ity arthaḥ*”. On the identity of Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas, see Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 106-110).

⁴² T. 2031: 15b18-19.

they claim to have Ānanda (*Ch'ing-hsi* 慶喜) as their teacher.⁴³ This is confirmed in the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Shu-chi*, where K'uei-chi (632-682) says that a master called Pūrṇa developed especially the Abhidharma and Vinaya, and that this invoked a reaction of some monks who took Ānanda as their patron and followed only the *sūtras*.⁴⁴ In the *I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*, the same K'uei-chi comments on the origin of the Sautrāntikas. He states the following:

These masters only rely on the scriptural texts as true measure (*cheng-liang* 正量); they do not depend on the Vinaya and on the Abhidharma. In everything they claim, they depend on the scriptural texts as proof. This is why they are called "Sautrāntika"-masters (*Ching Pu Shih* 經部師). They also obtained the name "Sautrāntika" (*Ching-liang Pu* 經量部) because they follow what was established. They are also called "Sāṃkrāntivāda" (*Shuo-chuan Pu* 說轉部). These masters acknowledge the existence of seeds (*bija*). [They say that] there is only one seed that, in its course, evolves from the present (*pratyutpanna*) to reach a later period of time. Therefore it is said that, when evolving, a later [period of time] is reached. It should be known that formerly they were called "Sāṃkrāntivāda" (*Shuo-tu Pu* 說度部). However, when Gautama's words were edited, the honored Ānanda especially emphasized the collection of scriptural texts. It is precisely because [the Sautrāntikas] take the scriptural texts as norm that they claim that Ānanda is their teacher and that their present name was formed [because] they follow what was established. They are full of sympathy for an emphasis on the Abhidharma, and do not neglect an emphasis on the Vinaya, but since they do not depend on the Abhidharma and on the Vinaya, they now only accept Ānanda as their teacher.⁴⁵

Paramārtha, who made the first translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, also made a translation of the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*. This text, titled *Shih-pa Pu Lun* (T.2032),⁴⁶ also places their origin in the fourth century. The text further says that they obtained their name 'Sāṃkrāntivāda' (*Seng-chia-lan-to* 僧迦蘭多) from their master Dharmottara (Yü-to-lo 鬱多羅),⁴⁷ and that they are also called *Hsiu-to-lo-lun Pu*

⁴³ T. 2031: 15b19-20. See also Bareau (1954: 237-238).

⁴⁴ T. 1830: 274a8 ff. See also K'uei-chi (*I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*: 22a2-3); Bareau (1955: 155); Bechert (1985: 44).

⁴⁵ K'uei-chi (*I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*: 22a2-8). I will return to this in my discussion of the explanation of the three time periods. See also note # 88.

⁴⁶ See Masuda (1920: 1) and Demiéville (1925: 48, note # 1).

⁴⁷ T. 2032: 18b4-5. See also Bareau (1954: 238, note # 1).

修多羅論部。⁴⁸ When we interpret this in the light of the above quoted passage from the *I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*, it appears that Dharmottara is credited with the seed-theory.⁴⁹ Paramārtha's translation of the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, titled *Pu Chih I Lun* (T. 2033), calls them *Tu Pu* 度部 or, alternatively, *Shuo-ching Pu* 說經部。⁵⁰ As is evident from the *I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*, the first of the latter two names is a translation of "Saṃkrāntivāda." Also the *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchāsūtra* places the origin of the Sautrāntikas in the fourth century after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*.⁵¹ According to the *Śāriputrapariṣcchāsūtra*, finally, the Sautrāntikas only recognized the authority of the *sūtra* literature.⁵² This latter opinion is corroborated in the Chinese names *Ching-liang Pu* 經量部, *Hsiu-to-lo-lun Pu* 修多羅論部, and *Shuo-ching Pu* 說經部. The second of these three names, further, is a combination of *sūtra* and *śāstra*.

Must we conclude from all this that the history of the Sautrāntikas goes back to a master Dharmottara⁵³ who lived around the fourth century after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*,⁵⁴ and that his followers took Ānanda – the one who, according to tradition, heard the *sūtras* from the mouth of the Buddha⁵⁵ – as their example? Must we further assume that this Dharmottara summarized the doctrine in stanzas that were selected from the *sūtras*? Theoretically speaking, this is not impossible. It is undoubtedly true that the development of Abhidharma literature is related to the schismatic development of Buddhist sects, and that this kind of literature has, at a certain moment in its history, served to express the own sectarian viewpoints

⁴⁸ T. 2032: 18b5.

⁴⁹ T. 1821: 11c12. It must be recalled here that "Dharmottara" is also found as an interpretation of 法勝, i.e., Dharmasreṣṭhin, author of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1550) in *Fa-pao Tsung-mu-lu* 1: 696a20-22. For "uttara," Wogihara (1974: 243) gives 勝 as a possible translation. However, a date for Dharmottara of the fourth century after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* does not correspond to the different alternatives given for the lifetime of Dharmasreṣṭhin in the Chinese catalogues.

⁵⁰ T. 2033: 20b18-20.

⁵¹ T. 468: 501a19-b25, esp. 501b23-24.

⁵² T. 1465, p. 900c12-13. See also K'uei-chi (*I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*: 22a2); and Takakusu (1956: 42).

⁵³ T. 2032: 18b4-5.

⁵⁴ T. 2031: 15b18-19; T. 2032: 18b3-4; T. 468: 501b23-24.

⁵⁵ T. 2031: 15b19-20; T. 1830: 274a8 ff.

in defense against the opinions of other sects. However, it is highly unlikely that the Abhidharma literature arose precisely as such an instrument of philosophical discussion. It is far more plausible that the early Abhidharma works were non-sectarian. This implies that, at a later date, texts may have been claimed by one school or another.⁵⁶ Sometimes, as has been the case for the Vaibhāṣikas, a school was called after a text or set of texts. It can be recalled here that also the first reference to the Sarvāstivāda *Ṣaṭpādābhidharma* as a “set” of texts dates from after the publication of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (translated AD 402-405).⁵⁷ It would thus not be unlikely that the *Hṛdaya* treatises were also only at a later date (i.e. from the time of Dharmatrāta – 4th century AD – onwards) presented as embodying a separate lineage, leading to the “Sautrāntika” *Abhidharmakośa*.⁵⁸ This may explain why – at least in the Chinese tradition – the *Hṛdaya* works were seen as “summaries” of the doctrine as it had been proclaimed by the Buddha.⁵⁹ This may also explain why the introduction to Guṇavarman’s translation of the **Samyuktābhidharmaḥṛdaya* places Dharmasreṣṭhin “one hundred years after the Buddha’s *parinirvāṇa*,” and, analogously, why Ānanda is claimed to be the founder of the Sautrāntikas. It may also be reiterated here that the Sarvāstivāda tradition places the synod of Vaiśālī, the synod that is related to the first schism in the Buddhist community, in 110 AB.⁶⁰ With this, the Chinese tradition places the origin of the *Hṛdaya* works (Dharmasreṣṭhin) in the beginning of Sarvāstivāda history.

Must we further assume that these Sautrāntikas, named after the *sūtra* literature, had “*saṃkrāntivāda*” as one of their major doctrinal points?

3. The Sautrāntika theory of ‘resisting’ (*pratigha*)

For any investigation into the doctrines and the doctrinal affiliation of Abhidharma schools, we are lucky to possess such a major work as the

⁵⁶ See Willems, Dessein, Cox (1998: 10-11, 143-144).

⁵⁷ See Dessein (1999, vol. 2: 9, note # 94).

⁵⁸ See T. 1821: 35c4-14 and T. 1822: 496a9-17.

⁵⁹ Cf. T. 1821: 35c6-7: “Because they took the *sūtras* as norm, they are called Sautrāntika.”

⁶⁰ T. 1435: 450a28; T. 1451: 411c2-3. See also Hofinger (1946: 23, 131).

**Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (T. 1545). In this work, many Abhidharma schools and masters are mentioned, and various doctrinal standpoints are attributed to different schools or teachers. The **Mahāvibhāṣā* contains only two references to the *Ching Pu Shih* 經部師, “the masters of the school that holds to the *sūtras*.” The first of these is an indirect reference: “Some say that this is what the Sautrāntikas (*Ching Pu* 經部)⁶¹ claim. The Sautrāntikas also, in order to refute such assertions of the Vibhajyavādins as [mentioned] above, say the following [...]”⁶² In the second reference, the Sautrāntikas are contradicted.⁶³ It has been remarked by Louis de La Vallée Poussin that the portions attributed to the Sautrāntikas in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* are attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*.⁶⁴ The **Mahāvibhāṣā* in total contains 86 references to these Dārṣṭāntikas. Keeping in mind the fact that the **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* is a sectarian (Vaibhāṣika) work, we can observe that the term Dārṣṭāntika appears to be a pejorative term, used in contempt by an opponent, while the term Sautrāntika holds a positive connotation.⁶⁵ This is affirmed by the fact that the **Mahāvibhāṣā* repeatedly reproaches the Dārṣṭāntikas for relying on the *sūtras*.⁶⁶ The fact that the *vibhāṣā* compendia were compiled in a period of sectarian self-consciousness,⁶⁷ and that the term “Sautrāntika” appears later than the term “Dārṣṭāntika” further sustains our assumption that a Sautrāntika self-consciousness arose in a period posterior to the compilation of the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, more precisely, around the 4th to 5th century AD.⁶⁸

Fa-pao, in his *Chü-she Lun Shu*, states the following regarding the origin of the Sautrāntikas:

⁶¹ Cf. Nakamura (1985: 237).

⁶² T. 1545: 8b6-7.

⁶³ T. 1545: 189b3.

⁶⁴ La Vallée Poussin (1971, vol. 1: lii-liiii).

⁶⁵ See Przyluski (1940: 250); Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 106-110).

⁶⁶ T. 1545: 283a23-24; 309a12; 680b28; 760a29-b1.

⁶⁷ See Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 229).

⁶⁸ We can further recall here that in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, the term Dārṣṭāntika is translated as 譬喻者. It seems highly unlikely that when Hsüan-tsang translated Dārṣṭāntika as 譬喻者, he was unaware that 譬喻 is also used as translation of “*avadāna*,” one of the twelve constituent parts of the word of the Buddha. See also Lamotte (1967: 160, 176) and Dhammajoti (1995: 20).

Kumāralāta, in Chinese Hao-t'ung, is the founder (*Tsu-shih* 祖師) of the Sautrāntikas. In this school, he composed the *Dṛṣṭāntapañkti* and other works. In these [works], there is this stanza that makes clear that they do not agree with the Sarvāstivādins concerning [the notion of] “resisting” (*sapratigha*).⁶⁹

There is no scholarly agreement on the dates of Kumāralāta, opinion varying from 100 years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*⁷⁰ to the 4th century AD.⁷¹ According to tradition, this Kumāralāta, who is also referred to as ‘Bhadanta’ in Upāśānta's *A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun Ching*,⁷² was the teacher of Harivarman⁷³ and Śīlāta.⁷⁴ Śīlāta was the direct teacher of Vasubandhu.⁷⁵ Precisely the fact that Fa-pao, who claims that Vasubandhu agrees with the Sautrāntikas,⁷⁶ was a disciple of Hsüan-tsang who translated the *Abhidharmakośa* may be the reason why Fa-pao claims that Kumāralāta, a native of Gandhāra, is the founder of the Sautrāntikas, and that Śīlāta was a Sautrāntika.⁷⁷

The passage of the *A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun Ching* referred to above, deals with the notion of “resisting” (*pratigha*). It runs as follows:

As Bhadanta Kumāralāta said: “That which, at the moment an idea (*manas*) is about to arise, is resisting, should be known as ‘resisting’ (*sapratigha*). In the contrary case, it is unresisting (*apratigha*).”⁷⁸

⁶⁹ T. 1822: 496a11-12. See also Katō (1980: 199).

⁷⁰ Cf. T. 1830: 274a8-14: “One hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, in the country *Takṣaśilā (怛叉翅羅), there was Kumāralāta [...] As he was compared with the sun, he was named “the master of comparison” (*Dārṣṭāntika*). Or he was named *Dārṣṭāntika* because he had composed the *Dṛṣṭāntapañkti*. [...] Because [they depended] on the lineage (*gotra*) of the section of sūtras, the Sautrāntikas took this as the name of their school. At that moment, there were no Sautrāntikas yet, since the Sautrāntikas appeared 400 years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*.” See also Hahn (1985: 255-256). On the relation between the «*Dṛṣṭāntapañkti*» and the term “*Dārṣṭāntika*,” see Przyłuski (1940: 247).

⁷¹ T. 2145: 78c3-4: “[...] nine hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*.” See also Katō (1980: 197; 1989: 37 ff.).

⁷² T. 1551: 835b27. The Chinese translation by Narendrayāśas was done between AD 550 and 558. See Dessein (1999, vol. 1: xxxviii).

⁷³ Cf. T. 1545: 78c9-10; T. 1852: 3c11-14.

⁷⁴ See Katō (1989: 59 ff.).

⁷⁵ See Frauwallner (1971: 103); Cox (1995: 41).

⁷⁶ T. 1822: 496a16-17.

⁷⁷ T. 1822: 604a5-6. See also T. 1821: 168a8-9. Yaśomitra (AKV: 307.17) identifies the speaker in the following passage of the AKB (146.3-5) as Śīlāta: “*sūtrapramāṇakā vāyam na śāstrapramāṇakāḥ. uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā sūtrāntapratīśaranair bhavitavyam iti.*” See Cox (1995: 6 and 17, note # 20).

⁷⁸ T. 1551: 835b27-28. See also Katō (1980: 200).

The idea of “resisting” was first formulated in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, where ten elements (*dhātu*) – five faculties (*indriya*) and five objects (*viṣaya*) – are said to be resisting.⁷⁹ In Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s work, the idea of the *Prakaraṇapāda* is adopted.⁸⁰ The **Mahāvibhāṣā* is the first Sarvāstivāda work that differentiates three forms of “resisting”: “resisting by way of being an obstruction” (*āvaraṇapratighāta*): the quality that enables a body to obstruct the arising of another body; “resisting of the object” (*viṣayapratighāta*): the object of a faculty (*viṣaya*) that strikes its respective faculty; and “resisting of the supporting object” (*ālambanapratighāta*): the striking of the mind and mental states by their proper object (*svālabhana*).⁸¹ These three forms are also mentioned in Upaśānta’s **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. The passage goes as follows:

There are three forms of “resisting”: “resisting by way of being an obstruction” (*āvaraṇapratighāta*), “resisting of the object” (*viṣayapratighāta*), and “resisting of the supporting object” (*ālambanapratighāta*). “Resisting by way of being an obstruction” is [as in the case of] one’s hands: the left and the right hand are opposed to each other. “Resisting of the object” is that a faculty (*indriya*) and its object (*viṣaya*) are opposed to each other. “Resisting of the supporting object” is [the relation between] mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and all factors (*sarvadharmā*). Of these, only “resisting by way of being an obstruction” [can be] accepted. Because of mutual⁸² obstruction, something is said to be “resisting.” All these ten elements are mutually obstructing. When it is not so, it is impossible for [consciousness] to arise. As Bhādanta Kumāralāta said, “That which, at the moment an idea (*manas*) is about to arise, is resisting, should be known as ‘resisting’ (*sapratigha*). In the contrary case, it is unresisting (*apratigha*).”⁸³

It thus is clear that Upaśānta here refers to Kumāralāta to deny the Vaibhāṣika development of the notion of ‘resistance’ as we find it in the

⁷⁹ T. 1542: 756c9-10, 762c9-10.

⁸⁰ T. 1542: 762c5-10: “Of the eighteen elements (*dhātu*) [...] one is visible (*sanidarśana*) and seventeen are invisible (*anidarśana*). How many are resisting? Ten are resisting (*sapratigha*) and eight are unresisting (*apratigha*)”; T. 1550: 809c19-22: “Of the [eighteen] elements, one is visible (*sanidarśana*) [...] It should be known that seventeen are invisible (*anidarśana*). Ten are then said to be resisting (*sapratigha*). The ten elements that are resisting are the eye (*cakṣus*) and matter (*rūpa*), the ear (*śrotra*) and sound (*śabda*), the nose (*ghrāṇa*) and smell (*gandha*), the tongue (*jihvā*) and taste (*rasa*), and the body (*kāya*) and the tangible (*spraṣṭavya*)”.

⁸¹ T. 1545: 391a8-c20.

⁸² On the interpretation of 更 in this passage, see Willemen (1975: 202, note # 11).

⁸³ T. 1551: 835b22-29.

**Mahāvibhāṣā*. In fact, the interpretation of ‘resisting’ in the second and third form differs from the interpretation of resisting in “resisting by way of being an obstruction,” and can be seen as derived from the first meaning. By retracing the elaboration on “*pratigha*” to the basic meaning of “obstruction” (*āvaraṇa*), Upaśānta retains the position of the *Prakaraṇa-pāda* and Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s **Abhidharmahṛdaya*. It is possible that, as Upaśānta knew the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas, he tried to use the argument of the Sautrāntika master Kumāralāta, against the development of the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas.

The **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* also mentions the three forms of “resisting.” Here, the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*⁸⁴ is referred to to justify the second of the three aforementioned forms,⁸⁵ i.e., the form that deals with the five faculties and their respective objects. This is the form of “resisting” that was mentioned in the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Vasubandhu too, in the *Abhidharmakośa*, differentiates three forms of “resisting.” In line with Upaśānta, he refers to Kumāralāta for a correct interpretation, i.e. a denial of the existence of the second and third form of “resisting” listed in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*.⁸⁶ Kumāralāta is, more precisely, quoted as referring to the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*.⁸⁷ It is on this issue that P’u-kuang comments with the passage referred to in the beginning of this article. The passage runs as follows:

Kumāralāta, in Chinese Hao-t’ung, is the founder of the Sautrāntikas. In this school, he has composed the *Dṛṣṭāntapañkti* [...] and other works. Originally, the Sautrāntikas followed the Sarvāstivādins and issued from them.⁸⁸ Because

⁸⁴ See T. 1538: 523c24-524a9. Notice that the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1552: 875a26) calls this work *Prajñāptisūtra*.

⁸⁵ T. 1552: 875a16-b12.

⁸⁶ T. 1558: 7a13-b23.

⁸⁷ See also Katō (1980: 207), who further claims: “Cela nous amène à conclure que la kārikā de Kumāralāta fut composée après la création des deux derniers sapratigha dans la Mahāvibhāṣā, c’est-à-dire que le Bhadanta Kumāralāta est postérieur à la Mahāvibhāṣā.” For a complete analysis and discussion of the passage, see Katō (1980: 203-207). See also de La Vallée Poussin (1971, vol. 1: 52).

⁸⁸ Katō (1980: 199) translates this passage as: “Les Sautrāntika viennent des Sarvāstivādin.” As only the variant reading of the version of this text written in Tennin 天仁 2 (AD 1109) and preserved in Tōdaiji 東大寺 and of the version published in Genroku 元祿 15 (AD 1702) read 說一切有部 instead of 說一切有, another possible translation of this passage would be: “The origin of the Sautrāntikas derives from the explanation of [the notion that] everything exists.” This interpretation makes sense in the light of the discussion that follows on the explanation of the three time periods.

they [only] take the *sūtras* as norm, they are called Sautrāntika. Those who take what is proven (*yukta*) as norm, are called the Sarvāstivādins. When, in this stanza, “obstruction” (*āvaraṇa*) is mentioned, the idea is that it is so that because something is hindered by something else, it does not succeed in arising.⁸⁹ When properly taking the specific object (*svaviṣaya*) as supporting object (*ālabhana*), what is then said to be obstructing? It is as when visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*) wants to arise regarding matter (*rūpa*) as object (*viṣaya*), its arising would be hindered by such other things as sound (*śabda*). When it would be obstructed by other things, it should be known it is “resisting” (*sapratigha*); when properly taking matter as supporting object, it is said to be “unresisting” (*apratigha*).⁹⁰ On this point, not all schools agree. The master of this treatise agrees with the Sautrāntikas. Therefore, it is said that this [explanation] can be allowed. The phrasing of the set of four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*) of the **Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*⁹¹ corresponds with the Sautrāntikas.⁹² [Since] this does not agree with the Sanskrit version, the translator must be wrong. As there is an explanation by an old virtuous [master],⁹³ it is the case that this stanza does not agree with the Sarvāstivāda [viewpoint].⁹⁴

The idea forwarded by P’u-kuang here seems to be the following. In the early Abhidharma literature, “resistance” was explained to be the

⁸⁹ Judging from the further philosophical elaboration of this issue in terms of “appropriatedness” (*upāta*), this “something else” is likely to refer to the object (*viṣaya*) of another faculty (*indriya*). See below.

⁹⁰ This contradicts the second (and by expansion also the third) form of “resisting” differentiated in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*. The argument is based on the interpretation of the word “resisting”.

⁹¹ T. 1552: 875b5-10: “Four alternatives should be mentioned. Sometimes, resisting of the object is not resisting by way of being an obstruction: the seven elements of awareness (*sapta cittadhātavaḥ*) and what is associated with awarenesses (*cittasamprayukta*) of the element of factors (*dharmadhātu*). Sometimes, resisting by way of being an obstruction is not resisting of the object: five outward elements. Sometimes, there are both resisting of the object and resisting by way of being an obstruction: five inward elements. Sometimes, there are neither resisting of the object nor resisting by way of being an obstruction: matter that is included in the factor sense-field, that what is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), and formations dissociated from awarenesses (*cittaviprayukta saṃskārāḥ*).” See also Dessein (1999, vol. 1: 46). See also note # 4.

⁹² This item is not discussed in Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s **Abhidharmahṛdaya*.

⁹³ The Chinese 有古德釋 (T. 1821: 35c13-14) most likely refers to ‘Kumāralāta,’ as the quoted passage is preceded by 此中大德至此是所許者 (T. 1821: 35c4-5). Also in Fapao’s *Chū-she Lun Shu*, T. 1822: 496a9 we read: 中大德至此是所許. In the *Abhidharmakośa*, Kumāralāta is referred to as 大德 (鳩摩羅多) in the passage concerned (T. 1558: 7b11).

⁹⁴ T. 1821: 35c4-14. See also T. 1822: 496a9-17.

relation between a faculty and its respective object. In the course of philosophical development, three forms of ‘resistance’ came to be distinguished: “resisting by way of being an obstruction,” “resisting of the object,” and “resisting of the supporting object.” Of these, “resisting of the object” corresponds to the interpretation of ‘resisting’ presented in early Abhidharma literature. Therefore, Vasubandhu as well as Dharmatrāta explain this form by referring to the *Kāraṇaprajñapti*, and Vasubandhu further relates the *Kāraṇaprajñapti* to Kumāralāta. That they do not refer to the *Prakaraṇapāda* may be explained by the fact that the latter work had, in the course of time, been claimed by the Vaibhāṣikas as one of the *Śatpādābhidharma* works. By expansion, the same reasoning can be applied to “resisting of the supporting object,” the specific case of mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). ‘Resisting by way of being an obstruction’ is then explained as “something else” that hinders the arising of a specific form of consciousness. In that specific case, this other thing is “resisting” in the sense of “obstruction” (*āvāraṇa*); in the contrary case, this other thing is “unresisting,” in the sense of “no obstruction.” As stated above, the explanation of P’u-kuang further suggests that (1) the Sautrāntikas issued from the Sarvāstivādins; that (2) Vasubandhu agrees with the Sautrāntikas; and that (3) Dharmatrāta too should, at least on this issue, be considered as agreeing with Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika viewpoint.

4. The arising of perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*)

Related to the above subject, is the problem of the arising of perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*). In the *sūtra* literature, perceptual consciousness is said to arise in dependence upon a sense organ (*indriya*) and its respective object (*viṣaya*):

What arises because of the eye (*caḥṣus*) and matter (*rūpa*) is visual consciousness (*caḥṣurvijñāna*). The combination of [these] three things, makes feeling (*vedanā*), conceptual identification (*saṃjñā*), and reasoning (*cintā*) arise.⁹⁵

One interpretation of the idea expressed in this passage, is that perceptual consciousness (viz. visual consciousness) needs two conditions to

⁹⁵ SA 13, Nr. 306, T. 99: 87c26-27; MA 54, Nr. 201, T. 26: 767a24-26. See also Cox (1988: 72, notes # 14 and # 15) and Cox (1995: 120); T. 1545: 449a13-22.

arise: a faculty (*indriya*) and an object (*viṣaya*). These two in the first moment condition the arising of perceptual consciousness in the subsequent moment. The combination of this faculty (viz. the eye), its object (viz. matter), and the form of perceptual consciousness (viz. visual consciousness) of this second moment in its turn leads to thought concomitants (*caitasika*) in the third and following moments.⁹⁶ In this formulation, a cause-effect relationship, whereby causes (*hetu*) exist prior to their effects (*phala*), is understood. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* attribute this interpretation to the Dārṣṭāntikas.⁹⁷ P'u-kuang and Fa-pao attribute this idea to the Sautrāntikas.⁹⁸ Saṃghabhadra attributes it to the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika master Śīlāta.⁹⁹

The earliest definitions of perceptual consciousness in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature are provided in the *Dharmaskandha* and *Samgītiparyāya*.¹⁰⁰ These definitions are in line with the definitions we read in the Sūtra literature. The *Dharmaskandha* defines visual consciousness as follows:

Visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises because of the eye (*cakṣus*) and matter (*rūpa*). Because of the combination of [these] three, contact (*sparśa*) arises. Because of [this] contact, feeling (*vedanā*) arises. Among these, the eye is the dominant [sense organ]. Matter is what is taken as object (*ālam-bana*). Contact of the eye (*cakṣuḥsaṃsparśa*) is the cause (*hetu*) [for visual consciousness]. [The form of consciousness that] is produced because of contact of the eye, belongs to the class of contact of the eye. What arises through contact of the eye, is associated with attention (*manaskāra*) arisen through contact of the eye. All feeling of matter of which visual consciousness is conscious, belongs to feeling. This is what is understood as feeling arisen through contact of the eye.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ See also Cox (1988: 41).

⁹⁷ AKB: 145.5 ff; AKV: 306.27 ff. See also Kajiyama (1977: 117).

⁹⁸ T. 1821: 176c4-6; T. 1822: 608a15-16. This idea is seen as contradicting the Vai-bhāṣika opinion (T. 1821), alternatively the Sarvāstivāda opinion (T. 1822), according to which simultaneity of cause and effect is also possible. On the Dārṣṭāntika model of perception, see Cox (1988: 38-43).

⁹⁹ T. 1562: 385b15 ff. I.e., provided we accept Junshō Katō's interpretation that, with Sthavira, Saṃghabhadra means Śīlāta. See Katō (1976; 1980; 1989: 52 ff.). See also AKB: 145.20 ff; AKV: 307.17 ff. T. 1562: 386b16 ff and 504a29 ff.

¹⁰⁰ On the dating of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works, see Willems, Dessein, Cox (1998: 166-176).

¹⁰¹ T. 1537: 501b9-14. The definition provided in the *Samgītiparyāya*, T. 1536: 429a15-18 ("What is caused by the eye (*cakṣus*) and matter (*rūpa*) is visual consciousness

The first treatment of this subject in the *Hṛdaya* treatises is found in Upaśānta's *A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun Ching*, i.e., in connection with a discussion of how many elements are appropriated (*upātta*) and how many are unappropriated (*anupātta*). The latter discussion is also found in Dharmasreṣṭhin's work. Here, matter (*rūpa*) that comprises faculties (*indriya*) and matter that is not separated from these faculties are explained to be appropriated when thoughts (*citta*) and thought concomitants (*caitasika*) dwell within this matter and, hence, proceed in it. This implies that the eye (*caḥṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāṇa*), tongue (*jihvā*), and body (*kāya*) are appropriated when they are present, because at this time, thoughts and thought concomitants dwell in them. When past or future, they are unappropriated.¹⁰² Upaśānta adopts this passage and applies the idea of appropriatedness to the forms of consciousness, claiming that "the five inward elements are appropriated when they are present, [and that,] sometimes, a form of consciousness (*vijñāna*) that is present [remains] idle, whereby [the five inward elements] are still said to be appropriated."¹⁰³

In the **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, the argument of the "idle" form of consciousness is included in a discussion on the exact locus of vision.¹⁰⁴ Five alternatives for this are given. The opinion attributed to the Venerable Dharmatrāta is that vision is located in visual consciousness. The idea that it is wisdom associated with consciousness of the eye that sees is attributed to Ghoṣaka. The Dārṣṭāntikas are said to adhere to the opinion that it is a combination that sees matter.¹⁰⁵ The Vātsīputīyas are credited with the idea that it is one eye that sees matter. These four

(*caḥsurvijñāna*). In this case, the eye is the dominant [sense organ] and matter is the object (*ālambana*). Discernment regarding matter where the eye is conscious of, extreme discernment, the discernment that it is 'matter,' this is called 'visual consciousness.'" appears as a summary of the definition in the *Dharmaskandha*. On the problem of dating the *Dharmaskandha* vis-à-vis the *Samgītiparyāya*, see Willemen, Dessein, Cox (1998: 172). See also Stache-Rosen (1968, vol. 1: 160). The definitions in the *Dhātukāya* (T. 1540: 615c4-7) and in the *Prakaraṇapāda* (T. 1542: 701a3-5) are parallel to the one in the *Samgītiparyāya*.

¹⁰² T. 1550: 810a24-b1. See also Willemen (1975: 9-10); Armelin (1978: 58-59).

¹⁰³ T. 1551: 836a26-27.

¹⁰⁴ T. 1545: 61c7-24.

¹⁰⁵ It should be remarked that Katō (1989: 23-24) notes that the "combination" mentioned here, is different from the "combination" identified as Sautrāntika in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKB: 31.12). From what follows, it appears that the "combination" attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the **Mahāvibhāṣā* is understood as a combination of a faculty with a form of consciousness related to another faculty. See also notes # 97-99.

alternatives are denied, and the compilers of the **Mahāvibhāṣā* claim that only a fifth alternative, viz., the two eyes see matter, is the correct idea. To the objection that if, indeed, it is the two eyes that see matter, matter should also be seen when these eyes are combined with another form of perceptual consciousness, the compilers of the **Mahāvibhāṣā* argue that there are two kinds of eyes: eyes that are combined with their specific form of perceptual consciousness, and eyes that are combined with an idle form of perceptual consciousness. It is when combined with their specific form of perceptual consciousness that they see, not when together with an idle form of perceptual consciousness. This, in fact, is the explanation alluded to in Upaśānta's work, and discussed elaborately in Dharmatrāta's work under the topic of "homogeneity."

As stated, the **Mahāvibhāṣā* denies the possibility that it is a combination (*sāmagrī*) that sees matter. This opinion is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas.¹⁰⁶ The **Mahāvibhāṣā* argues that "vision as a combination" is erroneous because, in that case, "there should always be vision of matter, because there is no moment in which there is no combination."¹⁰⁷ In the light of the argument given in the **Mahāvibhāṣā* in favor of the eyes as locus of vision, i.e., the idea that it is only when combined with their specific form of perceptual consciousness that the eyes see, not when combined with an idle form of perceptual consciousness, one possibility would be that the compilers of the **Mahāvibhāṣā* claim that the Dārṣṭāntika argument is that the eyes would see matter, even when they are combined with a form of perceptual consciousness other than visual consciousness. This interpretation of "combination" differs from the idea of a "combination" acknowledged as Sautrāntika. Another possible interpretation would be that the Dārṣṭāntikas refused to designate an isolated factor as having prominent causal capability in perception. A "combination" would thus have to be understood as that perceptual consciousness is a stream of experience, i.e., a stream of cause and effect.¹⁰⁸ This

¹⁰⁶ T. 1545: 61c10-11. The fact that another opinion is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntika Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is evidence that the names of teachers in the **Mahāvibhāṣā* may only have been given for the sake of tradition. This then makes conclusions based solely on these names highly conjecturable.

¹⁰⁷ T. 1545: 61c17.

¹⁰⁸ See ADP: 31.6 ff; AKB: 473.25 ff; AKV: 712.31 ff.; T. 1821: 448b19 ff.; T. 1822: 810a1 ff. Cox (1988: 39): "Therefore, as in the Dārṣṭāntika model, Vasubandhu suggests

interpretation is likely to be closer to the idea suggested in the early Sūtra literature and in the early Sarvāstivāda treatises.

As stated above, it is evident from Dharmaśreṣṭhin's and Upaśānta's works that the eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāṇa*), tongue (*jihvā*), and body (*kāya*) are thought to be appropriated when they are present, because thoughts and thought concomitants dwell in them then. When past or future, they are unappropriated.¹⁰⁹ This explains why Śrīlāta is credited with the idea that past and future are known through deduction,¹¹⁰ and it also explains why the Dārṣṭāntikas accept that "nonexistent [objects] also are able to serve as object-fields that produce cognition."¹¹¹

Dharmatrāta's **Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya* also contains a section on the locus of vision. In this work, the passage analogous with the above-mentioned section of Dharmaśreṣṭhin's and Upaśānta's work is followed by the following question:

What sees? Is it the eye that sees? Is it visual consciousness that sees? Is it wisdom associated with visual consciousness that sees? Is it a combination that sees?¹¹²

After claiming that all above proposed possibilities are erroneous,¹¹³ Dharmatrāta formulates the answer that "the eye sees matter when it is homogeneous (*sabhāga*)."¹¹⁴ This position explains why the first alternative quoted above (vision of the eye) is denied: homogeneity is a necessary condition for a faculty to operate. Dharmatrāta's argument can be summarized as follows: each faculty has to be homogeneous (*sabhāga*)

that one cannot sharply distinguish the activity of the object from that of the perceptual consciousness that is said to apprehend it; instead, one must view perception as a causal process." See also Cox (1988: 76-77, note # 41 and # 45). The latter interpretation is likely to be closer to the opinion in the early Sūtra literature.

¹⁰⁹ T. 1550: 810a24-b1. See also Willemsen (1975: 9-10); Armelin (1978: 58-59). For the Sarvāstivādins, this does not apply to mental consciousness, as this form of consciousness is not restricted to the present moment only but can apprehend factors of any of the three time periods. See Cox (1988: 35-38). See also T. 1545: 390b10-c16.

¹¹⁰ See T. 1562: 628c6-8. See also T. 1562: 447b29-c9. See note # 99 on the identity of Sthavira with Śrīlāta.

¹¹¹ T. 1562: 622a17-18. See also Cox (1988: 31-33). For Saṃghabhadra's objection to this opinion, see T. 1562: 384c2 ff; 420c18 ff; 447b16 ff. See also Cox (1988: 43).

¹¹² T. 1552: 876b12-13. See also Dessein (1999, vol. 1: 55 ff.). The same discussion is also found in the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, see Imanishi (1969: 24-26).

¹¹³ T. 1552: 876b14.

¹¹⁴ T. 1552: 876b20.

with its specific form of consciousness in order to be able to function. In this case, the perceptual activity itself lies within the faculty, but discernment belongs to the domain of consciousness.¹¹⁵ Applied to visual consciousness, this means that the eye can only function when it is linked to (is homogeneous with) visual consciousness. In this case, the visual activity is situated in the eyes. Although the eyes are linked to visual consciousness, this does not imply that consciousness takes over the function of the eyes (i.e. seeing), or that the eyes and consciousness attain a combined function. This interpretation is also in line with the above suggested idea that perceptual consciousness is a stream of experience.

In the period of Sautrāntika self-awareness, Vasubandhu, in his *Abhidharmakośa*, follows Dharmatrāta's explanation: "The eyes see matter when it is homogeneous."¹¹⁶ Vasubandhu gives the following quotation from the Sūtra literature: "The *brāhmaṇa* should know that the eye is like the gate through which matter is seen. Therefore it should be known that visual consciousness depends on the gate that is the eyes to see."¹¹⁷ This quotation is paraphrased in the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*: "Oh *brāhmaṇas*, the eye is a gate because it sees matter."¹¹⁸ The *Abhidharmakośa* concludes with the Sautrāntika position: "All masters of the Sautrāntika say that the above is a senseless discussion. Visual consciousness arises because of the eye and matter. Here, there is no act of seeing; there are only causes and fruitions, no function. For the sake of ordinary discourse, it is said that the eyes see and that consciousness discerns. The wise one does not adhere to this saying. As the World-honored one has said, one should not adhere to popular sayings, one should not take serious the expressions of common use."¹¹⁹ The statement that visual consciousness arises because of the eye and matter, with no act of seeing, indeed points to the fact that, according to Vasubandhu, it is impossible to designate an isolated factor as having prominent causal capability in perception.

¹¹⁵ Complete discussion: T. 1552: 876b12-877a3. See also Dessein (1999, vol. 1: 55-59).

¹¹⁶ AKB: 29.24; T. 1558: 10c23-24. See also de La Vallée Poussin (1971, vol. 1: 81-86).

¹¹⁷ AKB: 30.23; T. 1558: 11a15-16.

¹¹⁸ T. 1552: 876c28-29. Quotation from SA 9, Nr. 255, T. 99: 64a10-11. Pāsādika (1989: 26): "*caḅṣur brāhmaṇa dvāraṃ yāvad eva rūpāṇāṃ darśanāya ity.*" See also Dessein (1999, vol. 2: 78, note # 682).

¹¹⁹ T. 1558: 11b1-6.

5. The three time periods (*trikāla*)

The facts that the Dārṣṭāntika interpretation of the arising of perceptual consciousness involves different time periods and that, according to Vasubandhu, “there are only causes and fruitions, no function,” relates this topic to the interpretation of the existence of the time periods themselves.

One of the five theses that Vasumitra enumerates as fundamental for the Sautrāntikas in the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* is as follows:

All aggregates transmigrate (*saṃkrāṃanti*) from a previous existence to a later existence. This is why they are called *Saṃkrāntivāda*.¹²⁰

The opinion that all aggregates transmigrate from a previous to a later existence is, in fact, not peculiarly Sautrāntika. It probably is the most fundamental doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins in general.¹²¹ Within Sarvāstivāda, however, there are different explanations for this passing of the aggregates through the periods of time. The **Mahāvibhāṣā* contains a famous passage on this issue:

There are four great Sarvāstivāda masters, each of whom established the difference of existence in the three time periods (*trikāla*) in a different way. The Venerable Dharmatrāta said that there is difference in mode (*bhāvānyathātva*). The Venerable Ghoṣaka said that there is difference in characteristic marks (*lakṣaṇānyathātva*). The Venerable Vasumitra said that there is difference in state (*avasthānyathātva*). The Venerable Buddhadeva said that there is mutual difference (*anyonyathātva*).

Those who say that there is difference in mode claim that when the factors proceed through time, it is their mode (*bhāva*) that is different, but not their substance (*dravya*). It is just as when a golden vessel is broken and other objects are made of it, the form (*saṃsthāna*) is different, but not the color (*varṇa*). It further is just as when milk changes to koumiss, the power of its taste is abandoned, but not the color. In this way, when factors reach the

¹²⁰ T. 2031: 17b3-4; T. 2032: 19c11; T. 2033: 22b21. See also Bareau (1954: 265). This is also found in Bhavya’s treatise *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*. See A. Bareau (1956: 182). In Vinītadeva’s *Samayabhedoparacanacakrenikāyabhedopadarśanasamgraha*, this is formulated thus: “Beings (*sattva*) transmigrate (*saṃkrānti*).” See also Demiéville (1931-1932: 23, 63); Bareau (1955: 156); Frauwallner (1973: 104-105); Dutt (1977: 186-187); Rüegg (1985: 111). Bareau (1955: 155): “Le Śāriputrapariṇchāsūtra distingue les Sautrāntika des Saṅkrāntivādin [...], mais toutes les autres sources les identifient.” See Demiéville (1931-1932: 23, 63).

¹²¹ See also note # 88.

present from the future, although they leave the mode of the future and attain the mode of the present, it is not their substance that is obtained or left. When they further reach the past from the present, they leave the mode of the present and attain the mode of the past, but it is not the substance of these factors that is obtained or left.

Those who say that there is difference in characteristic marks claim that when the factors proceed through time, their characteristic marks are different but not their substance. All factors in time have the characteristic marks of the three periods of time. They are combined with one kind of characteristic marks but are not free from the two other kinds of characteristic marks. It is just as when a man is afflicted by one woman, he cannot be called free from affliction regarding other women. In this way, when factors abide in the past, they are properly combined with the characteristic marks of the past, but it cannot be claimed that they are free from the characteristic marks of the other two periods of time. When abiding in the future, they are properly combined with the characteristic marks of the future, but it cannot be claimed that they are free from the characteristic marks of the other two time periods. When abiding in the future, they are properly combined with the characteristic marks of the future, but it cannot be claimed that they are free from the characteristic marks of the other two time periods.

Those who say that there is a difference in state claim that when all factors proceed through time, it is their state that is different, but not their substance. Just as when a counter is placed in the units [column], it is one; when placed in the tens [column], it is ten; when placed in the hundreds [column], it is one hundred. Although the respective positions are different, the substance of the counter does not change. In this way, factors proceed through the positions of the three time periods. Although they attain three time periods, their substance does not change. The establishing of the time periods by these masters is not in disorder. They depend on activity (*kāri-tra*) to establish the difference of the three time periods, and say that when a conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) factor does not yet have activity, it is said to be of the future time, when properly having activity, it is said to be of the present time, and when its activity has already disappeared, it is said to be of a past period of time.

Those who say that there is mutual difference claim that when factors proceed through time, their name differs depending on what comes before and after, just as a woman is called “daughter” depending on the mother and is called “mother” depending on the daughter. Although their substance is not different, they are called “daughter” or “mother” depending on what is different. In this way, it is the case that factors are “past” when depending on what comes later, are “future” when depending on what is before, and “present” when depending on both. The establishment of the periods of time by these masters is in disorder [...]

Establishing the three time periods by claiming that there is difference in characteristic marks is also disorderly [...]

Those who claim that there is difference in mode also are unreasonable [...]
Only the third establishment of the periods of time is good.¹²²

The question that is raised in this passage is the following: when things are really existing in the three time periods, what is it then that differentiates them as being past, present, or future? According to Erich Frauwallner, who has made an extensive study of this issue, the first of the above opinions, the theory attributed to Dharmatrāta, is the oldest one.¹²³ It differs from the other three opinions, as it is the only theory that implies a changing mode (*bhāva*). The reason this theory is rejected is that mode cannot exist free from specific nature (*svabhāva*), i.e., free from substance (*dravya*). The Vaibhāṣika argument against this theory is as follows:

What can the mode (*bhāva*) of something be, free from its specific nature (*svabhāva*)? [...] When a conditioned factor (*saṃskṛta dharma*) reaches the present from the future, its previous mode has to be extinguished. When [a conditioned factor] reaches the past from the present, its later mode has to arise. How can the past be [characterized by] arising and the future be [characterized by] extinguishing?¹²⁴

The argument here is as follows: when something is future, it by definition has not yet arisen. When it is claimed that something changes mode when becoming present, this implies that its future mode has to be extinguished, without ever having arisen. As the specific nature of this thing has never existed as future yet, it can hence have no effect on the present. This implies that the present mode has to exist free from its previous (i.e. future) specific nature. A change in mode would thus imply a change in substance. This is impossible. The same is true for the present mode with respect to the past mode.

As the idea of a changing substance was not acceptable, other explanations that derive the difference of things in the three time periods from external conditions were sought. The first of these alternative explanations is attributed to Ghoṣaka. According to this theory, objects always possess

¹²² T. 1545: 396a13-b23. See also T. 1546: 295c6-296a2 and T. 1547: 466b7-28. See also de La Vallée Poussin (1936-1937: 22-25), Frauwallner (1973: 99).

¹²³ Frauwallner (1973: 101).

¹²⁴ T. 1545: 396b18-22.

the characteristic marks of the three time periods, whereby they are combined with one of them without being disconnected from the other two. This theory was refuted because the three time periods would become one.¹²⁵ The fourth theory was unacceptable because past, present, and future are also applicable to the past, present, and future themselves, i.e., there is earlier and later in the past, also, and this theory would – as with Ghōṣaka’s theory – imply that the difference between the three time periods was lost.¹²⁶ The third theory, the one attributed to Vasumitra, claims that the passing of things through time is like the placing of a counter in the units, tens, or hundreds columns. This theory solves the problem of a changing mode and substance: objects of which the mode is not changing in itself are placed in another state (*avasthā*). This solution appears to be the most logical solution to the problem invoked by the first option. It is this theory that is accepted by Vasubandhu as “the most correct one” in his *Abhidharmakośa*.¹²⁷

It is most remarkable that in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, this theory of Vasumitra that does not accept a change in substance, is explained with the concept of “activity” (*kāritra*). Vasumitra is credited with the following explanation: “When a conditioned factor does not yet have activity, it is said to be of the future time; when properly having activity, it is said to be of the present time; and when its activity has already disappeared, it is said to be of a past period of time.”¹²⁸ The claim is that it is the *activity* of the future time that is extinguished to become the *activity* of the present, and that it is the *activity* of the present that is extinguished to become the *activity* of the past. Such a theory, in fact, accepts a change in mode (*bhāva*). This means that in the explanation of the third theory, the mistake of the first theory is reintroduced. How is this possible? As already remarked by Erich Frauwallner, this passage on the three periods of time is anterior to the compilation of the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, and merely serves as a “doxographical appendix.”¹²⁹ It is this that must have made it possible for the theory of “difference in state” to become linked to the explanation

¹²⁵ See Frauwallner (1973: 101).

¹²⁶ See Frauwallner (1973: 102).

¹²⁷ T. 1558: 104c25-26: 最善. See also de La Vallée Poussin (1971, vol. 4: 55).

¹²⁸ T. 1545: 396b7-8; T. 1546: 295c21-22; T. 1547: 466b22-247.

¹²⁹ Frauwallner (1973: 100).

of the theory of “activity,” both theories being attributed to a certain Vasumitra.¹³⁰

As the theory of “activity” implies that something is past, present, or future depending on its functioning, one in fact accepts that the concept of time is inherent in the thing itself, and the whole concept of “time” loses importance. This precisely is the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas in the following passage of the **Mahāvibhāṣā*:

There are three kinds of factors: past, future, and present factors. Question: “Why this discussion?” Answer: “In order to stop other schools and to manifest the correct principles. Some adhere to [the theory] that time (*kāla*) and conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are different, such as the Dārṣāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins. They say that the substance of time is permanent and that the substance of the conditioned factors is not permanent. The conditioned factors pass through the periods of time (*adhvan*) like a fruit in a utensil. It is taken from this utensil and transferred into another utensil. They are also like people who leave this abode and enter another abode. The same is true for conditioned factors. They enter the present period of time from the future period of time, and they enter the past period of time from the present period of time. [This issue is raised] in order to stop this idea and to show that time and conditioned factors do not have a different substance. Time is [none other than] the conditioned factors, and the conditioned factors are [none other than] time.”¹³¹

The statements, “the conditioned factors pass through the periods of time like a fruit in a utensil” and “like people who leave this abode and enter another abode,” parallel the statement that factors that proceed through time are “like when a counter is placed in the units [column], it is one; when placed in the tens [column], it is ten; when placed in the hundreds [column], it is one hundred.” This connects the theory of Vasumitra to the opinion that is attributed to the Dārṣāntikas in the above section of the **Mahāvibhāṣā* and explains why Vasubandhu claims that this theory is the most correct one. It is remarkable that while this theory of

¹³⁰ See Frauwallner (1973: 104). Frauwallner (1973: 105) concludes that it can only be that a Vasumitra, master of the theory of the fruits was thought to be the same person as a Vasumitra, master of the theory of “activity.” See also Kajiyama (1977: 122); Cox (1995: 139-145).

¹³¹ T. 1545: 393a9-17. See also T. 1546: 293c20-26. T. 1547 does not contain this passage. An abridged version of this passage can be found in T. 1545: 700a26-b2. See also T. 1545: 696b24-29 and Frauwallner (1973: 104).

Vasumitra does not accept a change in substance, the Dārṣāntikas are, in this passage, reproached for claiming that “the substance of the conditioned factors is not permanent.” This, in fact, is the position of the first theory. As the **Mahāvibhāṣā* accepts the theory of “activity,” it is not to be excluded that the Dārṣāntikas at first adhered to the theory that is attributed to the Venerable Dharmatrāta. When the problems this theory invoked were acknowledged, they changed their opinion in line with Vasumitra’s theory.

The discussion on the explanation of the existence of the three time periods is also taken up in the **Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya* in the chapter “Investigations,” which is not contained in Dharmasreṣṭhin’s work. This work, too, agrees with the third theory. As Dharmatrāta wrote his **Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya* in the 4th century AD, i.e. later than the **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, this implies that here, too, this passage may only have been included as a “doxographical appendix.” We should further remark that in the **Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*, the theory of “difference in mode” (*bhāvānyathātva*), claiming that things change mode without change in substance when they proceed through the periods of time, is attributed not to a particular Sarvāstivāda master, but to the *Chuan-pien Sa-p’o-to* 轉變薩婆多 (the “Sarvāstivādins of Change”).¹³² It is not impossible that “*chuan-pien* 轉變” hereby refers to a change in mode. This would explain why Dharmatrāta agrees with the third theory.

K’uei-chi’s statement in the passage from the *I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*, quoted above, “These masters acknowledge the existence of seeds (*bīja*). [They say that] there is only one seed that, in its course, evolves from the present (*pratyutpanna*) to reach a later period of time,”¹³³ possibly should be interpreted in the light of Vasumitra’s theory.¹³⁴ It is also not to be excluded that Vasumitra, in his *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, refers to this viewpoint in the theory he attributes to the Sautrāntikas, quoted in the beginning of this section.

¹³² T. 1552: 962a4-5. See also Dessein (1999, vol. 1: 749; vol. 2: 548, note # 1132). According to the *Abhidharmakośa* (T. 1558: 104c20-21), this opinion is to be refuted along with the Sāmkhya theory. See de La Vallée Poussin (1971, vol. 4: 54-55, note # 3).

¹³³ K’uei-chi (*I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi*: 22a4-5). Regarding this, see Jaini (1959); de La Vallée Poussin (1936-1937: 131); Cox (1992: 80).

¹³⁴ See also *San-lun Hsüan I Chien Yu Chi* T. 2300: 466b25-28, where it is formulated thus: “They hold to it that there are seeds (*bīja*) in the present that are continued and reach a later existence.”

References

Primary Sources

- [*Abhidharma*] *dharmaskandha*[*pādaśāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo Fa-yün Tsu-lun* 阿毗達磨法蘊足論). T. 1537.
- [*Abhidharma*] *dhātukāya*[*pādaśāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo Chieh-shen Tsu-lun* 阿毗達磨界身足論). T. 1540.
- Abhidharmadīpa* (ADP). Jaini, P.S. (ed.), *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.
- **Abhidharmahrdaya*[*śāstra*] (*A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun* 阿毗曇心論). *Dharmaśreṣṭhin. T. 1550.
- **Abhidharmahrdaya* (*A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun Ching* 阿毗曇心論經). Upaśānta. T. 1551.
- Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*A-p'i-ta-mo Chü-she Lun* 阿毗達磨俱舍論). Vasubandhu. Hsüan-tsang 玄奘. T. 1558.
- Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*A-p'i-ta-mo Chü-she Shih Lun* 阿毗達磨俱舍釋論). Vasubandhu. Paramārtha. T. 1559.
- Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* (AKB). Pradhan, P. (ed.), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 8. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, [1967] 1975.
- [*Abhidharma*] *mahāvibhāṣā*[*śāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo Ta-p'i-p'o-sha Lun* 阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論). T. 1545.
- *[*Abhidharma*] *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (*A-p'i-ta-mo Shun Cheng-li Lun* 阿毗達磨順正理論). Saṃghabhadra. T. 1562.
- [*Abhidharma*] *prakaraṇapāda*[*śāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo P'in-lei Tsu-lun* 阿毗達磨品類足論). T. 1542.
- [*Abhidharma*] *saṃgūtiparyāya*[*pādaśāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo Chi-i-men Tsu-lun* 阿毗達磨集異門足論). T. 1536.
- *[*Abhidharma*] *vibhāṣā*[*śāstra*] (*A-p'i-t'an P'i-p'o-sha Lun* 阿毗曇毗婆沙論). T. 1546.
- [*Abhidharma*] *vijñānakāya*[*pādaśāstra*] (*A-p'i-ta-mo Shih-shen Tsu-lun* 阿毗達磨識身足論). T. 1539.
- Chen-yüan Hsin-ting Shih-chiao Mu-lu* 真元新定釋教目錄. Yüan-chao 圓照. T. 2157.
- Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Shu Chi* 成唯識論述記. K'uei-chi 窺基. T. 1830.
- Ch'u San-tsang Chi Chi* 出三藏記集. Seng-yu 僧祐. T. 2145.
- Chü-she Lun Chi* 俱舍論記. P'u-kuang 普光. T. 1821.
- Chü-she Lun Shu* 俱舍論疏. Fa-pao 法寶. T. 1822.
- Daśādhyāvinaya* (*Shih Sung Lü* 十誦律). T. 1435.
- Fa-pao Tsung-mu-lu* 1. Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.
- I-pu-tsung Lun Lun Shu-chi* 異部宗輪論述記. K'uei-chi 窺基. Dainihon Zokuzōkyō.

- K'ai-yüan Shih-chiao Lu* 開元釋教錄. Chih-sheng 智昇. T. 2154.
- Kao Seng Chuan* 高僧傳. Hui-chiao 慧皎. T. 2059.
- Li-tai San-pao Chi Chi* 歷代三寶記. Fei Ch'ang-fang 費長房. T. 2034.
- Madhyamāgama* (*Chung A-han Ching* 中阿含經). T. 26.
- Mañjuśrīpariṣcchāsūtra* (*Wen-shu-shih-li Wen Ching* 文殊師利問經). T. 468.
- [*Mūlasarvāstivāda*] *Vinayaśūdrakavastu* (*Ken-pen Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu Pu Pi-nai-yeh Tsa-shih* 根本說一切有部毗奈耶雜事). T. 1451.
- Prajñaptiśāstra* (*Shih-she Lun* 施設論). T. 1538.
- P'o-sou-p'an-tou Fa-shih Chuan* 婆敷槃豆法師傳, Paramārtha. T. 2049.
- Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (*I-pu-tsung Lun Lun* 異部宗輪論). Vasumitra. Hsüan-tsang 玄奘. T. 2031.
- Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (*Shih-pa-pu Lun* 部執異論). Vasumitra. Paramārtha. T. 2032.
- Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (*Pu-chih-i Lun* 部執異論). Vasumitra. Paramārtha. T. 2033.
- **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (*Tsa A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun* 雜阿毗曇心論). Dharmatrāta. T. 1552.
- Samyuktāgama* (*Tsa A-han Ching* 雜阿含經). T. 99.
- San-lun Hsüan I* 三論玄義. Chi-tsang 吉藏. T. 1852.
- San-lun Hsüan I Chien Yu Chi* 三論玄義檢幽集. Cheng-ch'an 證禪. T. 2300.
- Śāriputrapariṣcchāsūtra* (*She-li-fu Wen Ching* 舍利弗問經). T. 1465.
- Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (AKV). Wogihara, U. (ed.), *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The Work of Yaśomitra*. Tokyo: The Publishing Association of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 1932.
- Ta T'ang Hsi-yü Chi* 大唐西域記. Pien-chi 辯機, Hsüan-tsang 玄奘. T. 2087.
- **Udāna* (*Ch'u-yao Ching* 出曜經). Chu Fo-nien 竺佛念. T. 212.
- **Vibhāṣā[śāstra]* (*P'i-p'o-sha Lun* 毗婆沙論). *Sitapāṇi. T. 1547.

Modern Works

- Anacker, S. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu – the Buddhist psychological Doctor*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
- Armelin, I. (trans.). *Le Cœur de la loi suprême. Traité de Fa-cheng. Abhidharmakośavyākhyā de Dharmasīri*. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1978.
- Bareau, A. *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule*. Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955.
- . “Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinītadeva.” *Journal Asiatique* CCXLII (1954): 229-66.
- . “Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques Attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinītadeva. IIe Partie: L'explication des divisions entre les sectes (*Nikāya-*

- bhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*) de Bhavya.” *Journal Asiatique* CCXLIV (1956): 167-200.
- Bechert, H. *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*. (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung III1). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985.
- Buswell, R.E. Jr. and R.M. Gimello (eds.). *Paths to Liberation – The Mārga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*. Studies in East-Asian Buddhism 7, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
- Cox, C. “Attainment through Abandonment: the Sarvāstivādin Path of Removing Defilements.” *Paths to Liberation – The Mārga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*. Ed. R.E. Buswell Jr. and R.M. Gimello. Studies in East-Asian Buddhism 7, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992, 63-105.
- . *Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence. An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra*. Studia Philologica Buddhica. Monograph Series XI. Tōkyō: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995.
- . “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣāntika Theories.” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 11.1 (1988): 31-87.
- Demiéville, P. “Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha.” *Bulletin de l’École Française D’extrême-Orient* XXIV (1925): 1-253.
- . “L’origine des sectes bouddhiques d’après Paramārtha.” *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* I (1931-1932): 15-64.
- Dessein, B. “Dharmas associated with Awarenesses and the dating of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Works.” *Asiatische Studien* L.3 (1996): 623-51.
- . (trans.). *Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions. Saṃyuktābhidharmahrdaya*. 3 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
- Dhammajoti, K. *The Chinese Version of Dharmapada. Translated with introduction and annotations*. Sri Lanka: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, 1995.
- Dutt, N. *Buddhist Sects in India*. Calcutta: Firma KLM Private, Ltd, 1977.
- Edgerton, F. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. 2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.
- Frauwallner, E. “Abhidharma-Studien. III. Der Abhisamayavādaḥ.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* XV (1971): 69-121.
- . “Abhidharma-Studien V. Der Sarvāstivādaḥ.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* XVII (1973): 97-121.
- Hahn, M. “Vorläufige Überlegungen zur Schulzugehörigkeit einiger buddhistischen Dichter.” *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*. Ed. H. Bechert. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung III1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985, 239-57.

- Hirakawa, A. *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Part I: Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese*. Tōkyō: Daizō Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, 1973.
- Hofinger, M. *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*. Louvain: Bibliothèque du Muséon. Vol. 20, 1946.
- Imanishi, J. *Das Pañcavastukam und die Pañcavastukabvibhāṣā*. Abhidharmatexte in Sanskrit aus den Turfanfunden I. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969.
- Jaini, P.S. "The Sautrāntika Theory of bīja." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XXII.2 (1959): 236-49.
- Kajiyama, Y. "Realism of the Sarvāstivāda School." *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization. Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on his Sixtieth Birthday*. Ed. L.S. Kawamura and K. Scott. Emeryville CA: Dharma Publishing, 1977, 114-31.
- Katō, J. *Kyōryōbu no Kenkyū*. Tōkyō: Shunjūsha, 1989.
- . "Kyōryōbu Shūrīrata." *Bukkyōgaku* 1 (1976): 45-65.
- . "Notes sur les deux Maîtres bouddhiques Kumāralāta et Śrīlāta." *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*. Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 23. Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980, 197-213.
- Kawamura, K. *Abidatsumaron no Shiryōteki Kenkyū*. Kyōto: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai, 1974.
- Kawamura, L.S. and K. Scott (eds.). *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization. Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on his Sixtieth Birthday*. Emeryville CA: Dharma Publishing, 1977.
- Kimura, T. *Kimura Taiken Zenshu IV: Abidatsumaron no Kenkyū*. Tōkyō: Daihōrinkaku, 1974.
- La Vallée Poussin, L. de. "Documents d'Abhidharma – La Controverse du Temps; les deux, les quatre, les trois Vérités." *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* V (1936-1937): 1-187.
- . *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Traduction et Annotations*. 6 vols. Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971.
- Lamotte, É. *Histoire du bouddhisme indien des origines à l'ère Śāka*. Louvain: Bibliothèque du Muséon, [1958] 1967.
- Lin, L.-k. *L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi – Introduction au compendium de la loi*. Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1949.
- Masuda, J. "Early Indian Buddhist Schools. A Translation from the Hsüan-Chwang Version of Vasumitra's Treatise." *University of Calcutta: Journal of the Department of Letters* I (1920): 1-11.
- Monier-Williams, M. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Etymologically and Philologically Arranged, with special reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1899] 1990.
- Nakamura, H. *Bukkyōgo Daijiten*. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Shojaku Kabushikikaisha, 1985.

- , *Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*. Tokyo: Kufs Publications, 1980. Reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, [1987] 1996.
- Nishi, G., *Abidatsumakusharon*. Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Bidonbu, Vols. 25-26, [1935] 1978.
- Pāsādika (Bhikkhu). *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu*. Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Beiheft 1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989.
- Przyluski, J. “Dārṣāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādin.” *The Indian Historical Quarterly* 16 (1940): 246-54.
- Rockhill, W.W. *Udānavarga. A Collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon compiled by Dharmatrāta*. London. Reprint Amsterdam: Oriental Press, [1883] 1975.
- Rüegg, D.S. “Über die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas und den Ursprung der philosophischen Schulen des Buddhismus nach den tibetischen Quellen.” *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur*. Ed. H. Bechert. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, III, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985, 111-26.
- Schmithausen, L. “A Note on Vasubandhu and the Lañkāvatārasūtra.” *Asiatische Studien* XLVI.1 (1992): 392-397.
- Shih, R. (trans.). *Biographies des Moines éminents (Kao Seng Tchouan) de Houei-kiao*. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1968.
- Soothill, W.E. and L. Hodous. *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms. With Sanskrit and English Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1937. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987.
- Stache-Rosen, V. *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im Älteren Buddhismus II. Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya*. 2 vols. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968.
- Takakusu, J. *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1956.
- , “The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569).” *T’oung Pao* Série II, vol. 5 (1904): 269-96.
- Watanabe, B., K. Mizuno and H. Oishi (trans.). *Abidonshinronkyō*. Kokuyaku Issaikyō Bidonbu Vol. XXI, 1932.
- Willemen, Ch. (trans.). *The Essence of Metaphysics*. Bruxelles: Publications de l’Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques, 1975.
- Willemen, Ch., B. Dessein and C. Cox. *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998.
- Wogihara, U. *Bonwa Daijiten*. Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 1974.
- Yamada, R. *Daijō Bukkyō Seiritsuron Josetsu*. Kyōto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1959.