Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos
de-DEDeimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte3052-6221Editorial
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110448
Christian BarthelLennart GilhausMichael Zerjadtke
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-04-232025-04-2311410.60630/deimos.2025.1.110448The Dark Side of Mars. Some Dissident Voices on War in Ancient Literature
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110449
Armin Eich
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2025-08-122025-08-12152610.60630/deimos.2025.1.110449The Importance of Athletics and Athleticism in the Classical Spartan Army
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110397
<p>The Spartans were a feared and organized fighting force on the ancient battlefield. They treated hoplite warfare as a skill, or techne, honed through athletics training and discipline to become proficient hoplite warriors. This paper will examine how the Spartans used athletic competitions to train for warfare. Additionally, this research will examine how the Spartans were molded from an early age by their culture, via their state–sponsored upbringing known as the paideia, to value discipline, athletic competition, and traits associated with athleticism for later use in their hoplite phalanx.</p>Patrick Clancy
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2025-08-122025-08-121274510.60630/deimos.2025.1.110397Hamilcar Rhodanus, a Carthaginian Spy in Alexander’s Army? A Historiographical Perspective
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110451
<p>The aim of this article is to analyse the figure of Hamilcar Rhodanus, a Carthaginian spy in the army of Alexander the Great. In order to achieve this, the sources that report on this alleged episode of history must be reviewed: Frontinus, Justin and Orosius. The historiographical analysis put forth in this article allows to consider that, if there was a Carthaginian spy in Alexander’s ranks, any credibility of the event has been lost in the course of history.</p>Christian San José Campos
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2025-08-122025-08-121466010.60630/deimos.2025.1.110451Against the Corvus
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110404
<p>This article focuses is on the venerable Corvus, a boarding–bridge that, according to Polybios, enabled the Romans to win the Battle of Mylae. This paper aims to show that the Corvus was, in fact, a piece of fiction invented by Polybios, that key technical difficulties would have prevented its usage as described by Polybios and that the device is in fact not necessary to explain the Roman victory of Mylae. The Corvus—or “Korax” as it is called in Greek—is described by Polybios in the first book of his histories (1.22). It consists of a long pole, projecting 24 feet (about7.5 metres) from the Deck of the prow of a ship.To this a sort of bridge or ladder was attached. The bridge was four roman feet wide and thirty–six feet long (about 11 m.), twenty–four feet (about 7.5 m) of which were fully usable as a passageway. The other twelve feet were slit in an oblong fashion to accommodate the holding–pole. On the opposing end, a pestel–like, curved iron spike was mounted to pierce the deck of an enemy vessel, allowing roman marines to board it.</p>Peter Freiherr von Danckelman
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-122025-08-121617910.60630/deimos.2025.1.110404Auxiliaries in the Social War
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110452
<p>The Social War deprived Rome of many of its Italian allies. The recourse to auxiliaries thus became a necessity to compensate for the loss of the Italians. Although the sources attest the presence of auxiliaries from many regions of the Mediterranean on both sides during the conflict, it cannot be proven decisively that they were more numerous than before. However, auxiliaries were already used in substantial numbers since the third century. The data available for the decades between the Social War and the civil war between Pompey and Caesar shows ratios of auxiliaries similar to that of the two previous centuries.</p>François Gauthier
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-122025-08-121809410.60630/deimos.2025.1.110452The Initial Spread of the Provincial Census: Warfare and the Census
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110453
<p>The Roman provincial census was a key institution of imperial administration and Roman control. Did Augustus have a grand plan for extending it to the provinces of Rome’s empire? Was there a global census (Lk. 2:1–5) or was this a piecemeal process? Using a novel lens to this debate, namely the wartime contexts of provincial censuses under Augustus, I argue that the impetus for the earliest provincial censuses was to gather information on human and natural resources to support impending or ongoing military campaigns. The provincial census then did not serve a single purpose at any one time. Rather, it was an institution that could serve local, global, and ideological purposes simultaneously.</p>Jared Kreiner
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-122025-08-1219511810.60630/deimos.2025.1.110453FIDES MILITVM: Medallions and Military Alliances during the Reign of Valerian and Gallienus
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110454
<p>During the 3rd century, Roman emperors increasingly issued gold coins and medallions for high-ranking military officials, evolving from earlier bronze versions. Under Emperor Gallienus, these heavy gold medallions served as gifts and religious symbols of loyalty, aiming to counteract inflation’s impact on the army’s purchasing power. This paper examines medallions from Valerian and Gallienus’s reign (253–268), focusing on materials, imagery, and reverse inscriptions. Obverses prominently feature figures like Gallienus, <em>Concordia</em>, or <em>Pietas</em>, while reverses emphasise <em>Moneta</em>, <em>Virtus</em>, and <em>Fides Militum</em>, underscoring monetary quality, martial valour, and military loyalty.</p>David Serrano Ordozgoiti
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-122025-08-12111913310.60630/deimos.2025.1.110454Ancient Warfare and the News Media
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/110460
<p>The public relies on news media to learn of discoveries about ancient warfare, whether from archaeological explorations of military sites or from academic research. This paper explores the world of print, broadcast and Internet media in the UK and USA. The author calls for greater care in preparing press releases for publication and forethought about how the journalists might use them. Guidance is offered on how to collaborate with journalists based on the author’s experience of working in the profession.</p>Lindsay Powell
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2025-08-122025-08-12113415410.60630/deimos.2025.1.110460Paths to Glory – Tacitus Historiae 4.68, the Routes of the Reinforcements Sent to Suppress the Batavian Revolt, and the Career of Sextus Julius Frontinus
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/111721
<p>Tacitus <em>Hist.</em> 4.68 details the reinforcements sent from Italy to combat the Batavian Revolt in early AD 70. Tacitus lists three groups of reinforcements made up of different legions and auxiliaries and the three routes which those forces took over the Penine, Cottian and Graian Alps, but these routes seem to be given in an illogical order. The significance of the passage has been overlooked; it actually gives us precise clues of the make-up of these groups of reinforcements, who commanded each, and which route they each took including, significantly, the command of <em>II Adiutrix</em> by Sextus Julius Frontinus.</p>Murray Dahm
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-07-022025-07-02115516510.60630/deimos.2025.1.111721Cultic Battle Preparation in Christian Late Antiquity
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/112173
<p>Throughout most of human history, it was common for rituals to be performed immediately before a battle in order to sway the gods in favour of one's side. For Christian Late Antiquity a primacy of mass celebrations carried out by priests is postulated by scholarship. In this paper the surviving sources from Late Antiquity concerning cultic preparation in the Christian period will be examined, and based on the results, an argument against such a primacy, at least till the end of the 6th century, and an alternative modus of preparation will be formulated.</p>Winfried Kumpitsch
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-122025-08-12116618610.60630/deimos.2025.1.112173At the Emperor’s Service: The Armies of Dependent States and Peoples as a Military Factor in the Early Imperial Period
https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/deimos/article/view/112743
<p>The armies of the dependent allies of the Roman Empire have thus far received little attention in scholarship. The paper will look at their contributions to the defence of the imperium, to suppressing rebellions and to offensive operations. Three case studies (Commagene, Nabataea, Cherusci) will be analysed regarding the numerical strength, equipment and organisation of their militaries and their operational history as Roman allies in the first century AD. The analysis demonstrates the value of allied armies in a range of campaigns and suggests that such forces were vital to military success in all parts of the early empire.</p>Julian Gieseke
Copyright (c) 2025 Deimos – Zeitschrift für Antike Militärgeschichte
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2025-08-202025-08-20118721110.60630/deimos.2025.1.112743