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Frederick van Horn and the Discourse on Loyalty, Treason, and Vengeance at the Court of Mary of

Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria (1481)

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JELLE HAEMERS – FREDERIK BUYLAERT

MURDER AS »GOOD LORDSHIP«

The Request for Pardon for the Murder of John van Dadizele by Frederick van Horn and the Discourse on Loyalty, Treason, and Vengeance at the Court of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria (1481)

Truly, my lord [husband] and I, we are well governed when such an unfaithful villain as John van Dadizele has such power over us. He is able to deprive us of our good and faithful servants with the intention of imposing on us people at his will. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see myself avenged on this traitor¹.

These vitriolic remarks about Sir John van Dadizele², a prominent official at the Burgundian-Habsburg court, were attributed to Mary, Duchess of Burgundy (1457–1482) by the nobleman Frederick van Horn. Mary became the ruler of the Burgundian Low Countries in 1477 and in that year also married Archduke Maximilian of Austria (1459–1519), the heir to the Habsburg lands. Frederick attributed the words to Mary in a letter addressed to Maximilian, requesting a pardon for having ordered an assassination attempt on Sir John on 7 October 1481. A contemporary chronicle, the »Excellente Cronike van Vlaendren«, records that Sir John came to Antwerp that day at Maximilian's request and was stabbed by five men after dinner and left for dead. On 20 October, John succumbed to his wounds. According to the chronicle, Maximilian visited John on his deathbed and promised the sum of one thousand crowns to whoever would deliver up the perpetrators³. Despite that promise, Maximilian shortly afterwards acceded to Frederick's request for a pardon. Philip van Huerne, a kinsman and ally of Frederick, also received protection and a warm welcome at the court of Maximilian and Mary, much to the chagrin of those who suspected Philip of implication in the murder⁴. In light of these decisions by the royal couple, there may

1 *Certes, monseigneur et moy, [nous] sommes bien gouvernez quant ung tel desloial paillart que Jehan de Dadizelle a telle auctorité sur nous que de nous oster noz bons et loiaulx serviteurs pour nous baillier gens a son plaisir, et ne me pourroit plus grand plaisir advenir que me veoir vengier de ce traicte!* The word *paillart* is difficult to translate but is an insult similar to *ribaud* or *larron* (Nicole GONTHIER, *Sanglant coupaul! Orde Ribaude! Les injures au Moyen Âge*, Rennes 2007, p. 135).

2 In Dutch-speaking Flanders, knights were routinely addressed as *mer*, an abbreviation of »my lord«. We have translated this as »Sir« in English.

3 Douai, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 1110, fol. 410r. About the chronicle: Lisa Demets, *Onvoltooid verleden. De handschriften van de Excellente Cronike van Vlaenderen in de laatmiddeleeuwse Vlaamse steden*, Hilversum 2020 (*Middeleeuwse Studies en Bronnen*, 172), p. 118–140.

4 The »Excellente Cronike« states that Mary »kept the lord of Gaasbeek [Philip of Huerne] with her« shortly after the murder (*si hilt altoos bi haer mijnhere van Gaesbeke*); Willem VORSTERMAN (ed.), *Dits die Excellente Cronike van Vlaenderen*, Antwerp 1531, fol. 223v.

have been some truth in Frederick's claim, stated in his petition, that in assassinating Sir John, he was merely carrying out the will of his sovereign. In much the same way, three hundred years earlier, Thomas Becket's assassins claimed merely to have responded to King Henry II's frustrated exclamation about courtiers who »let their lord be treated with such shameful contempt by a low-born cleric«⁵.

This murder brought a bloody end to the spectacular career of John van Dadizele. When King Louis XI of France had tried to take advantage of the unexpected death of Duke Charles the Bold and the difficult succession of Mary of Burgundy by attacking the Low Countries in 1477, Sir John had emerged as one of the leaders of the successful military resistance to the French invasion. As a result, he had been given a series of important positions at the Burgundian-Habsburg court not normally open to someone belonging to the lowest echelons of the Flemish nobility⁶. With that remarkable success came unusual challenges. As a war hero, Sir John also became the face of growing Flemish resistance to the policies of Maximilian of Austria, who made the controversial choice to continue the war against France after the threat to the Low Countries had been averted in the summer of 1479. For reasons that we discuss below, Frederick van Horn, a sworn enemy of Sir John, decided to kill him, gambling – correctly – that he would eventually be forgiven. By getting rid of Sir John, he was not only relieving Maximilian of Austria and Mary of Burgundy of a thorny problem, but was also helping Maximilian to emancipate himself from the influence of certain great aristocrats, several of whom were Sir John's patrons. These aristocrats had dominated Mary's early reign, and Maximilian required the support of other noble factions, including that of Frederick van Horn, to push through his own policy choices⁷.

The occasion for this article is the recent discovery of the apologia thanks to which Frederick van Horn managed to escape prosecution for murder⁸. The short document, an edition of which we include in the appendix, deserves scholarly scrutiny for several reasons. Firstly, it provides a satisfactory ending to an academic »whodunit«. The murder of John van Dadizele has fascinated historians since the nineteenth century, because it was a starting point for a decade-long civil war. The assassination and the failure to punish the perpetrators aroused tremendous anger among the Flemish cities, and ultimately contributed to their decision to revolt against Archduke Maximilian in 1482, when, after the unexpected death of Mary of Burgundy, he presented himself as regent for their infant son, Philip the Fair, the legitimate heir to Flanders

5 Wilfred WARREN, *Henry II*, Berkley, Los Angeles 1973 (reprinted New Haven 2002), p. 506–509.

6 For a detailed analysis of the political context of 1477–1482: Jelle HAEMERS, *For the Common Good. State Power and Urban Revolts in the Reign of Mary of Burgundy, 1477–1482*, Turnhout 2009. For a brief biography of Frederick van Horn: Hans COOLS, *Mannen met macht. Edellieden en de moderne staat in de Bourgondisch-Habsburgse landen (1475–1530)*, Zutphen 2001, p. 235.

7 HAEMERS, *For the Common Good* (as in n. 6), p. 135.

8 Maarten van Driel, a former archivist with the Gelders Archief in Arnhem, provided us with the reference to this document (Arnhem, Archief van de Graven en Hertogen van Gelre, nr. 1649, fol. 2r–5v). We are also greatly indebted to him for a stimulating correspondence about this hitherto unknown document. We also thank Thérèse de Hemptinne for her advice on the transcription of the document – it is a copy of the original petition; the latter is presumably lost.

and the other Netherlandish principalities⁹. Until now, the identity of Sir John's murderer has been something of an enigma. The contemporary chronicle of Jean Molinet mentions a certain Frederick, lord of Montigny, as the culprit, while other chronicles point the finger at Philip van Huerne. The sixteenth-century chronicle by Nicolas Despars suggests that he was murdered by one of his former patrons, the Hainaut aristocrat Josse de Lalaing¹⁰. Thanks to this newly found document, we can be certain that the murder was committed by Frederick van Horn. Indeed, he explicitly confessed to it: *j'ay consenty et fait faire la dicte entreprinse*.

Owing to an unusual circumstance, however, Frederick's plea for a pardon has an additional importance, which transcends this intriguing episode in the history of the Burgundian-Habsburg dominions. We not only have the assassin's apologia, in which the actions of John van Dadizele are depicted as a perversion of the ideal of the noble courtier, but also an apologia by Sir John himself, justifying his own life and deeds. In 1480, shortly before his death, Sir John had begun to write an elaborate manuscript in which he presented himself as a good lord, a brave knight, and a loyal courtier. This unfinished document, which we have discussed in a separate publication, thus constitutes a blueprint for »good lordship«, while the perspective of his murderer provides us with a blueprint for »bad lordship«, based on that same life history¹¹. This extraordinarily rare situation, where we can compare divergent perceptions of a turbulent moment in Netherlandish politics, allows us to determine the cultural assumptions of nobles who were active at the highest political level. The apologia of Frederick van Horn thus helps to outline the nobility's political ideology.

A comparison of the self-aggrandizing egodocument by John van Dadizele with the character assassination of him (following his actual assassination) by Frederick van Horn, yields some important observations. The first is that both John and Frederick acted on a worldview in which nobles claimed a right to independent action, which they denied to lower-ranking groups in society. This attitude was typical of nobles of the time: they did not wait obediently to carry out the will of their prince, but took the initiative and acted as they saw fit in order to serve the Common Good¹².

9 Jelle HAEMERS, *De strijd om het regentschap over Filips de Schone. Opstand, facties en geweld in Brugge, Gent en Ieper (1482–1488)*, Ghent 2014 (*Historische Monografieën Vlaanderen*, 2).

10 Despars was confused by fiefs with similar names: Josse de Lalaing was lord of Montigny-sur-Meuse, Frederick van Horn was lord of Montigny-en-Ostrevant; Jean Molinet, *Chroniques*, edd. Georges DOUTREPONT, Omer JODOGNE, vol. 1, Brussels 1935 (*Collection des anciens auteurs belges*, N.S. 1), p. 368; Nicolas DESPARS, *Cronycke van den lande ende graefsece van Vlaenderen*, ed. Jan DE JONGHE, vol. 4, Bruges 1840, p. 209.

11 Frederik BUYLAERT, Jelle HAEMERS, *Record-Keeping and Status Performance in the Early Modern Low Countries*, in: Liesbeth CORENS, Kate PETERS, Alexandra WALSHAM (eds.), *The Social History of the Archive: Record-Keeping in Early Modern Europe*, Oxford 2016 (*Past and Present Supplement*, 11), p. 131–150. For what follows, see also Jelle HAEMERS, *Le meurtre de Jean de Dadizeele. L'ordonnance de cour de Maximilien d'Autriche et les tensions politiques en Flandre (1481)*, in: Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, Alain MARCHANDISSE (eds.), *L'envers du décor. Espionnage, complot, trahison, vengeance et violence en pays bourguignons et liégeois*, Neuchâtel 2008 (*Publication du Centre Européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes*, 48), p. 227–248 and Frederik BUYLAERT, *El discurso del señorío nobiliario entre las ciudades y el estado en el Flandes del siglo XV*, in: José Antonio JARA FUENTE (ed.), *Discurso político y relaciones de poder. Ciudad, nobleza y monarquía en la Baja Edad Media*, Madrid 2017, p. 613–642.

12 Kristen NEUSCHEL, *Word of Honor. Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France*,

Sir John, for example, stressed in his autobiography that he had not awaited orders from the Burgundian-Habsburg administration in the war against the king of France, but, on his own initiative, had mobilized urban and seigneurial militias in order to halt Louis XI's invasion. Similarly, Frederick considered it legitimate to act as he saw fit against his political opponents – although he did find it expedient to legitimize the extreme choice of assassination by suggesting that he was merely accommodating the wishes of the young Princess Mary. John and Frederick may have been mortal enemies, but they both viewed the political arena as a polycentric system, in which policymaking was not the exclusive prerogative of the prince, but where princes, noble lords and towns governed jointly¹³.

While they agreed on basic principles, John and Frederick were diametrically opposed in their view of how nobles should position themselves in the political game during the difficult reign of Mary of Burgundy. Whereas John could probably identify with the desire for peace articulated by the Flemish cities, Frederick was more attracted to the opportunities for riches and glory that would arise for nobles if Maximilian had his way and the defensive war against France was turned into an offensive project¹⁴. Frederick's apologia shows in granular detail how the game was played, in dialogue with both the specific political needs of the moment and the cultural assumptions of the ruling class of the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries. Precisely by making a sharp assessment of the acute need of Maximilian and Mary for allies, while insisting on the importance of nobles' submissive loyalty to their prince, Frederick was able to dismiss his political opponent as a traitor and claim license to eliminate him with impunity.

The use of violence between nobles was not unknown, but it was unusual and certainly not sanctioned lightly. In the fifteenth century, sovereigns did not have a monopoly on legitimate violence, because noble lords and towns could also raise their own militias. In the county of Flanders, however, the sovereign was usually strong enough to prevent his nobles from killing each other and feuding was much rarer than in many other parts of Europe after the mid-twelfth century¹⁵. The case of the murder of Sir John, however, confirms the recent suggestion by historians that sovereigns did not have the means to eliminate feuding altogether and that in specific circumstances, nobles still opted for acts of violence with relatively limited consequences¹⁶. We will never know whether Mary of Burgundy effectively provoked the

Ithaca, London 1988; Yuval HARARI, *Renaissance Military Memoirs. War, History, and Identity, 1450–1600*, Woodbridge 2004.

13 John WATTS, *The Making of Polities. Europe, 1300–1500*, Cambridge 2009.

14 Amable SABLON DU CORAIL, *La guerre, le prince et ses sujets. Les finances des Pays-Bas bourguignons sous les règnes de Marie de Bourgogne et Maximilien d'Autriche (1477–1493)*, Turnhout 2019 (*Burgundica*, 28), p. 158–162.

15 A comparative discussion in Justine FIRNHABER-BAKER, *Seigneurial Violence in Medieval Europe*, in: Deborah TOR, Harriet ZURNDORFER, Richard KAEUPER (eds.), *The Cambridge World History of Violence*, vol. 2: 500–1500 CE, Cambridge 2020, p. 248–266. For the near-absence of seigneurial violence in Flanders, see Dirk HEIRBAUT, *Over heren, vazallen en graven. Het persoonlijk leenrecht in Vlaanderen, ca. 1000–1305*, Brussels 1997 (*Algemeen Rijksarchief en Rijksarchief in de Provinciën. Studia*, 69), p. 207.

16 For an introduction to the vast scholarship, see Claude GAUVARD, Andrea ZORZI (eds.), *La vengeance en Europe, XII^e au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris 2015; Jean-Marie MOEGLIN, *Le droit de vengeance*

murder of Sir John by calling for revenge in the words that Frederick attributed to her, but what is certain is that the Burgundian-Habsburg court let the murderer go free. This deviated from the usual scenario, namely that violence was not acceptable, even for members of what was still a heavily militarized ruling class of noble lords. In 1363, for example, when Gerard de Moor, lord of Wessegem, committed murder, the then-reigning count of Flanders, Louis of Male, confiscated all the knight's possessions and banished him from the county for life¹⁷. In 1481, by pardoning Frederick, Maximilian and Mary made an entirely different choice. Although they probably knew that their decision would cause a further deterioration in their strained relations with the great Flemish cities, they apparently calculated that they needed the support of the noble factions around Frederick van Horn too badly to act otherwise; turning a blind eye to an assassination was the price they had to pay to secure that support.

Frederick's successful scheming thus provides an extreme illustration of an important observation historians have made before, namely that, even in peacetime, rulers were often constrained and manipulated by nobles who liked to portray themselves as loyal servants of the prince and the »Common Good«. For example, even Duchess Mary's powerful grandfather, Philip the Good, did not have as much control over who held what position at his famous court as historians have assumed¹⁸. His remarkable success as a powerful ruler lay in his skill as an arbiter, elevated above the various court factions and able to keep them in balance during his reign. The case of Frederick van Horn shows that circumstances were so difficult for Mary and Maximilian that they could not place themselves above the rivalries of elite networks in the same way. Frederick's apologia offers an unusually explicit testimony to the mentality of nobles in this situation. Proud and headstrong as they were, they found no difficulty in adopting the discourse of the loyal and obedient courtier, precisely because they were acutely aware of the great measure of control they often exercised over rulers who, while increasingly claiming absolute sovereignty, were also dependent on cooperation with established elites to give steel to their claims to power.

The protagonists and the turbulent reign of Mary of Burgundy

In what follows, we will take the words attributed to Mary of Burgundy for what they are, namely an argument brought into play to obtain a pardon. A recent discussion on Mary's personal role in politics concluded that it is impossible to discover her views from the available records. Of course, since Frederick's request for pardon

chez les historiens du droit au Moyen Âge (XIX^e-XX^e siècles), in: Dominique BARTHÉLEMY, François BOUGARD, Régine LE JAN (eds.), *La vengeance, 400-1200*, Rome 2006 (Collection de l'École Française de Rome, 357), p. 101-148. For the Low Countries, see Aude MUSIN, *Le droit de vengeance et son déclin dans les Pays-Bas (XIV^e-XVI^e siècles)*, in: Krypton 5-6 (2015), p. 9-16.

17 Jacques SABBE, *De Ondergang van twee Vlaamse adellijke Geslachten in de 14^e eeuw: de Heren van Wessegem en van Praet*, in: *Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis* 103 (1966), p. 5-16.

18 Hanno BRAND, *Appointment Strategies at the Court of Duke Philip the Good: New Applications of Old Mechanisms*, in: Steven GUNN, Antheun JANSE (eds.), *The Court as a Stage. England and the Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages*, Woodbridge 2006, p. 85-100.

was written five months before Mary's fatal accident in March 1482, it is always a possibility that Maximilian contacted his wife to verify Frederick's claim that she had egged him on to eliminate Sir John, and that confirmation from Mary persuaded Maximilian to grant the pardon¹⁹. Be that as it may, the murder must be situated at the heart of a profound political crisis in the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries. An almost unbridgeable clash of conflicting views on how the polity should be governed intersected with personal rivalries. In the career of John van Dadizele, these lines of conflict crystallized: on the one hand, as one of Maximilian's masters of the court (i.e., one of the officials who oversaw the complex workings of the court as a princely household and as a political institution), he was partly responsible for court policy, but on the other hand, as high bailiff of Ghent, he was just as closely involved in that city's opposition to court policy. What complicated matters was that resistance to Maximilian's plans was also growing among prominent courtiers, while other aristocrats endorsed them. Consequently, the elimination of Sir John is also an indicator of factional struggles among nobles in the entourage of Maximilian and Mary.

The career of Sir John constitutes a remarkable story. He was born in 1432 in the Flemish seigneurie of Dadizele (near Kortrijk), the son and heir of the local lord. In his apologia, Frederick van Horn sneered that John was only the lord of a »small place«, who consequently enjoyed only a low position in the noble hierarchy, one which did not rhyme with his prominent position as a master of the court and a councilor to the prince. This sneer should be viewed with caution. In 1463, Dadizele was described in a ducal ordinance as a »rather large« *fief* (*assez grande et spacieuze*)²⁰. John was the lord of a village of about nine hundred inhabitants, which was, relatively speaking, a substantial population. In addition, he had extensive jurisdiction as lord, holding the right to punish criminals with banishment and execution²¹. In fact, John was a fairly typical lord, since the Flemish countryside was dotted with some eight hundred seigneuries with these so-called rights of high justice. These seigneuries constituted one of the pillars of a political system in which the prince, although officially responsible for the administration of the country, reserved his scarce resources to pay for the expensive court, foreign diplomacy, and wars, while entrusting the day-to-day governance and administration of justice to noble lords in the countryside and political elites in the towns. In doing so, the prince accepted that he did not have an exclusive right to the use of legitimate violence, but that noble lords also had to be able to use force or to threaten violence to maintain local order. In the case of Sir John, we know that he ruled over his village as one of a hardened milieu of about fifty local notables who had military experience and who were willing to follow him into battle. When Louis XI attacked Flanders, John made his name precisely by

19 Michael DEPRETER, Jonathan DUMONT, Elisabeth L'ESTRANGE, Samuel MAREEL (eds.), *Marie de Bourgogne. Figure, principat et postérité d'une duchesse tardo-médiévale*, Turnhout 2021 (Burgundica, 31).

20 Ghent, State Archives, Fonds Raad van Vlaanderen, nr. 7351, fol. 230v.

21 Mathijs SPEECKE, Miet ADRIAENS, Pieter DONCHE, Jesse HOLLESTELLE, Frederik BUYLAERT, *Repertorium van de hogere heerlijkheden van het graafschap Vlaanderen (ca. 1360–ca. 1570)*, Ghent 2023 (*Historische Monografieën Vlaanderen*, 5), vol. 1, p. 228.

drumming up his own village militia and then successfully engaging the French armies long before the princely armies of Mary and Maximilian joined the fray²².

Frederick's depiction of John van Dadizele is correct, however, in asserting that John belonged to the lower fringes of the nobility. As lord of only one seigneurie, he was a modest »squire« (Dutch: *schildknaap*, the title of address for lesser nobles in this county) in the service of great aristocrats; that is, nobles who held not one but dozens of seigneuries. John made his military debut in the retinue of the Hainaut noblemen Simon de Lalaing and his son Josse, whom he followed on their campaigns. In 1472, John took over Simon's function as castellan of Wijnendale, an important fief near Bruges that was controlled by the powerful nobleman Adolph of Cleves, one of the kinsmen of Duke Charles the Bold²³. Thanks to the patronage of these mighty lords, John became sovereign-bailiff of Flanders in 1474, when Josse de Lalaing was too busy on the battlefield to hold the position any longer²⁴.

The crisis that unfolded in 1477, with the sudden death of Duke Charles and the subsequent French attack on the Burgundian dominions, offered John the opportunity to make a career in his own name. Indeed, Mary of Burgundy faced not only a French invasion but also fierce resistance from the Flemish cities, which wanted to reverse many of her father's policies. The largest city, Ghent, led the resistance. No doubt to maintain some influence in this city, Mary's principal protector, her kinsman Adolph of Cleves, had entrusted his faithful retainer John van Dadizele with the office of high bailiff of Ghent. This appointment could only have been made with the city's approval, because the high bailiff would henceforth command the Ghent urban militia that would soon take on the French army. John was probably acceptable to the city of Ghent because of his connections via his wife. As a nobleman of modest stature, he had married Catharina Breydel, who was not a noblewoman but a daughter of one of the leading political families of the city of Bruges, the other great Flemish stronghold of resistance against overbearing princely policies. Whatever the case, by successfully combining urban and seigneurial militias and leading them to victory in skirmishes that slowed down the French invasion, John proved himself as an army commander of great merit in a time of extreme need. Little wonder, then, that he was soon appointed as commander of all the Flemish troops, a mandate that, in turn, ensured that he played an important role in the battle of Guinegate in August 1479, where a French defeat finally averted the danger of conquest. Maximilian had knighted John before the battle and he rewarded him after it with the important positions that provoked such anger on the part of Frederick van Horn. In the fall of 1479, Sir John became councilor-chamberlain, and his great influence among the Flemish towns – whose fiscal contributions and militias were crucial to the war effort – led to his appointment as one of four masters of the court in May 1481²⁵.

22 A detailed analysis in BUYLAERT, El discurso del señorío (as in n. 11).

23 Charles CARTON (ed.), *Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, souverain-bailli de Flandre*, Bruges 1850, p. 40. About Josse and Adolph, see Jelle HAEMERS, Kleef (Adolf van), in: *Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek* 17 (2007), c. 540–547, and Jules NÈVE, Lalaing (Josse de), in: *Biographie Nationale* 11 (1890–1891), c. 112–113.

24 CARTON (ed.), *Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele* (as in n. 23), p. 42.

25 A detailed discussion in HAEMERS, *Le meurtre de Jean de Dadizeele* (as in n. 11).

The relationship of Sir John with Maximilian and Mary probably began to sour at this time, with increasingly intense discussions over military aims. After the victory at Guinegate, Maximilian wanted to continue the war, but the Flemish cities disagreed, as this would be detrimental to their economic interests. In 1481, criticism of the policies of the Habsburg prince and his entourage became louder and louder, and from the summer onwards, Ghent embarked on the open resistance that would eventually culminate in the Flemish Revolt of 1482–1492. After the unexpected death of Mary of Burgundy in March 1482, Ghent refused to recognize Maximilian as regent for his son, Philip the Fair, whose extreme youth required a long regency. Crucially, an important faction of high nobles joined the opposition to Maximilian, including Adolph of Cleves, one of Sir John's former patrons. Later, in 1483, Adolph would even take charge of the regency council for Philip the Fair that was set up by the leading Flemish cities and various noble factions²⁶.

John van Dadizele seems at least to have sympathized with the Flemish cities and their worries that continuing the war against France would undermine industry and trade, the lifeblood of the Netherlandish urban network²⁷. Until the eve of his death, he continued to supplement his manuscript with copies of gracious letters, invitations, and notes of thanks addressed to him by Maximilian, showing that he still cherished the accolades bestowed on him by the Habsburg prince. On the other hand, in August 1481, as bailiff of Ghent, he severely condemned the attempt by supporters of Maximilian to bend the annual election of aldermen in Ghent to their will. The very idea that John might join the Ghent insurgents against Maximilian was political gunpowder. After all, he was a celebrated war hero and commander of the Flemish armies, and a pivotal figure in relations between the court of Maximilian and Mary, dissident noble factions, and the two major cities of Ghent and Bruges. In his apologia, Frederick van Horn accused John van Dadizele of placing himself at the head of the anti-Habsburg resistance. He went as far as to argue that even the leaders of the notorious Ghent uprisings in the fourteenth century, Jacob and Philip van Artevelde, »would have opposed their prince less than John van Dadizele«. This is an extreme statement, since Ghent under Artevelde rule had even recognized the king of England as its lord rather than the French king, and Jacob van Artevelde had appointed a substitute for the then-reigning count of Flanders²⁸. »The people [of Ghent] themselves would never have thought of opposing the prince«, Frederick claimed. This accusation is not particularly convincing, because Ghent had a long tradition of rebelling against its prince, as Frederick must have realized.

That Frederick was prone to exaggeration is consistent with what we know about his life. He was born in 1451, the son of Count Jacob van Horn and Johanna van Meurs, and he was thus some twenty years younger than his victim. As lord of Montigny (near Douai) and Vimy (near Lens), he was a scion of the high nobility²⁹. His prominent social position explains why, at a young age, Frederick was one of the 115 chamber-

26 *Id.*, For the Common Good (as in n. 6), p. 106–113.

27 For what follows, see *id.*, Le meurtre de Jean de Dadizeele (as in n. 11).

28 David NICHOLAS, *The van Artevelde of Ghent. The Varieties of Vendetta and the Hero in History*, New York 1988.

29 Félix-Victor GOETHALS, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Hornes*, Brussels 1848, p. 144–148.

lains assigned to Maximilian upon his arrival in the Netherlands in 1477. In 1480 and 1481, he received an annual pension from the Archduke for his services³⁰. It is clear that Frederick embraced the martial ethos of his class with unusual vigor. On Maximilian's orders he was involved in several sieges, including the capture of the rebellious city of Liège in 1485. When his brother, John van Horn, was appointed Archbishop of Liège by Maximilian, Frederick personally tricked his brother's rival, William van Arenberg, into an ambush and then executed him³¹. Frederick himself died a violent death on 13 March 1487 during Maximilian's siege of Guise, having been mortally wounded confronting a soldier whom he suspected of treason³².

In 1481, however, the crucial question for Frederick van Horn was whether he could count on Maximilian's support. To avoid punishment for the assassination attempt, Frederick addressed a letter to the Archduke, requesting a pardon, on 15 October, that is, a few days before his victim died of his wounds. A copy of that petition has been preserved. Why the petition should have been kept after the pardon was granted is unclear. Normally, such supplications were destroyed once they no longer served a purpose. Moreover, why a copy of this particular document should be present to this day in the archives of the Dukes of Guelders is a mystery³³. It is certainly a copy, not the original, because references to the sender and the addressee (Frederick and Maximilian, respectively) are copied in the text. The original was presumably kept in the private archives of the recipient, which (as far as we know) have been lost. That Frederick did get his pardon can be gleaned, however, from a casual entry in the archives of the princely Chamber of Accounts in Lille. A note, probably dating from 1486, reveals that Frederick and his companions had been jointly pardoned for the murder³⁴. However, the text of the request for pardon is not copied and the note does not mention the date on which Maximilian granted the pardon. The absence of this information is due to the fact that the Archduke lost control of

30 Valérie BESSEY, Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, Werner PARAVICINI, *Les ordonnances de l'hôtel des ducs de Bourgogne*, vol. 3: Marie de Bourgogne, Maximilien d'Autriche et Philippe le Beau, 1477–1506, Berlin 2019 (Kieler Werkstücke. Reihe D, 18), p. 126. For the payment of that pension: Lille, Archives départementales du Nord (ADN), série B 2121, fol. 90r and B 2124, fol. 70v.

31 Jean Molinet, *Chroniques* (as in n. 10), vol. 1, p. 457.

32 He died of gangrene after his leg had been amputated (*ibid.*, p. 555).

33 Perhaps this has to do with the presence of Charles, Duke of Guelders, at the court of Mary and Maximilian? From 1479 on, Charles received a sum to stay at the court (Lille, ADN, B 2118, fol. 85r; B 2124, fol. 67r).

34 *Maximilien etc., savoir faisons a tous presens et avenir, nous avons receu l'humble supplication de notre amé et feal, le seigneur de Montigny et ses complices, remission in forma, de l'omicide commis en la personne de feu messire Jehan, seigneur de Dadizelle* (Lille, ADN, B 1703, fol. 163v – this note is found amongst various notes written in the same hand, all of which date to 1486). Given the explicit reference to *omicide* we can be sure that the pardon was granted after the death of Sir John (the request for the pardon predates his death). In the margin is noted: *Soit scen se ceste remission est donnee sans amende ou en payant icelle*. The clerk thus did not know whether the pardon was paired with a fine, and – if so – whether the fine had been paid. Apparently, the scribe did not have a copy of the pardon letter to hand; the original would have been handed over to Frederick. The accounts of the so-called *Audiencier* do not reveal any payment (Brussels, State Archives, Chamber of Accounts, nr. 20372). Probably the administration dropped this case after Frederick's death.

the comital administration at Lille in 1482, resulting in a confused state of affairs which persisted until mid-1485.

What is certain is that Frederick obtained the remission because he met the formal conditions required for such an act of grace. He confessed to the murder and there were extenuating circumstances that allowed the prince to be lenient³⁵. The pardon would have absolved the murderer and his co-perpetrators from criminal prosecution. Unsurprisingly, this displeased both the relatives and friends of Sir John and the city of Ghent. In the view of Ghent's citizens, the Low Countries were dominated by a clique of courtiers and princely officials who did not care about the rights of the prince's subjects, enshrined in the county's privileges. On 7 March 1482, Ghent lodged a formal protest against the pardon with the so-called Great Council, the supreme court of law in the Netherlandish dominions, but this was in vain³⁶. When Duchess Mary died shortly thereafter, protest at the improper response to the murder of Sir John was subsumed in the larger political refusal to accept Maximilian as regent for Philip the Fair, the new ruler of the Low Countries.

The murder of a traitor

The arguments by which Frederick sought and received forgiveness from Mary and Maximilian were many, but most of them revolved around the claim that he had committed the murder because it was best for the Burgundian-Habsburg dynasty, and for the Low Countries. Frederick did not consider the attack to be a crime, but a justifiable, even necessary act in the name of the Common Good. In making this claim, Frederick was implicitly referring to his own position as a nobleman, for the nobility legitimized its social preeminence with the assertion that elite military specialists were necessary to protect society against threats, both external and internal³⁷.

Frederick hoped that the prince would consider his elimination of John van Dadizele to have been appropriate («of the opinion that it was a good thing») and therefore pardon the deed. Strikingly, Frederick made use of a historical example, well-known in his time, namely the murder of the Duke of Orléans by John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, in 1407. The Duke of Orléans, a brother of the French king Charles VI, was John's uncle and a political rival. In the wake of his murder, a controversial apology for John the Fearless was published in 1408 by the legal specialist Jean Petit³⁸. In his treatise, Petit claimed that the murder was lawful – «according to divine and natural reasons», as Frederick quoted it in his letter – because the Duke of Orléans

35 Claude GAUVARD, «De grace especial». *Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Paris 1991 (Publications de la Sorbonne. Histoire ancienne et médiévale, 24), p. 895. For the Low Countries: Michel NASSIET, Aude MUSIN, *L'exercice de la rémission et la construction étatique (France, Pays-Bas)*, in: *Revue Historique* 661 (2012), p. 3–26; Peter ARNADE, Walter PREVENIER, *Honor, Vengeance, and Social Trouble. Pardon Letters in the Burgundian Low Countries*, Ithaca 2015, p. 1–22.

36 Ghent, City Archives, series 94, nr. 727.

37 Craig TAYLOR, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War*, Cambridge 2013.

38 Bertrand SCHNERB, *Jean sans Peur. Le prince meurtrier*, Paris 2005, and Bernard GUENÉE, *Un meurtre, une société. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans, 23 novembre 1407*, Paris 1992.

had served the king disloyally, with the intention of usurping royal prerogatives. Perhaps Frederick had read or heard Petit's pamphlet, for his own apologia includes highly similar phrases³⁹. Frederick's interpretation of the facts is idiosyncratic, however. According to him, the Council of Constance had absolved Duke John of murder in 1416. In reality, however, a commission at the Council had merely lifted the condemnation of Petit which had been passed by a special court in Paris, without commenting on the merits of the case⁴⁰.

Frederick listed three reasons to explain why he had committed the murder. First, he no longer wanted to stand by as others endangered the Common Good, that is, the public interests of society. Second, he wanted to avenge the harm John had done to Mary of Burgundy. Third, he wanted to settle the feud between himself, his kin, and Sir John. In all this, according to the tenor of the letter, he was motivated entirely by loyalty to the prince.

Loyalty was a key concept in late medieval discourses on nobility⁴¹. Service and loyalty to the overlord were central tenets of a nobleman's creed. A nobleman provided advice and support (*consilium et auxilium*) to his lord, who rewarded him in return, thus securing future services. Earlier scholarship has already revealed how contemporaries imagined that exchange: nobles expected to hold important offices, to advise their prince on all kinds of affairs of government, and to receive ample financial compensation for the military duties or other services that they provided to him⁴². The claim of Frederick van Horn went much further; he implied in his apologia that the murder of alleged »traitors« also fell under this concept of loyal service, if it protected the interests of the lord and the polity. Of course, the very fact that Frederick composed an extensive apologia to secure a pardon shows that this was a contentious claim. However, in stressing again and again that Sir John had not displayed the loyalty to Maximilian that was expected of nobles (in his words: *comme nobles hommes doivent faire*), Frederick was referring implicitly to the normative literature on nobility and virtue that circulated widely in his milieu⁴³.

39 A phrase from that pamphlet: *Il est licite a un chascun subgiect sans quelconque mandement ou commandement, selon les loys moral, naturel et divine, de occire ou faire occire ycellui traître et desloial tirant* [Louis d'Orléans], *non pas tant seulement licite, mes honorable et meritoire* (Alfred COVILLE, Jean Petit. La question du tyrannicide au commencement du xv^e siècle, Paris 1932, p. 220).

40 COVILLE, Jean Petit (as in n. 39), 535. The pamphlet was fiercely debated among legal scholars, see Lucie JOLLIVET, La résistance du milieu humaniste français à la justification de Jean Petit et à sa diffusion, 1408–1435, in: *Questes. Revue pluridisciplinaire d'études médiévales* 39 (2018), p. 91–112.

41 Jörg SONNTAG, Coralie ZERMATTEN (eds.), *Loyalty in the Middle Ages. Ideal and Practice of a Cross-Social Value. Essays in Honour of Gert Melville*, Turnhout 2015.

42 Klaus SCHREINER, Religiöse, historische und rechtliche Legitimation spätmittelalterlicher Adels-herrschaft, in: Otto Gerhard OEXLE, Werner PARAVICINI (eds.), *Nobilitas. Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa*, Göttingen 1997 (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 133), p. 376–430.

43 Bernhard STERCHI, Über den Umgang mit Lob und Tadel. Normative Adelsliteratur und politische Kommunikation im burgundischen Hofadel, 1430–1506, Turnhout 2005 (*Burgundica*, 10); Arjo VANDERJAGT, Practicing Nobility in Fifteenth-Century Burgundian Courtly Culture: Ideology and Politics, in: David KNECHTGES, Eugene VANCE (eds.), *Rhetoric and the Discourses of Power in Court Culture. China, Europe, and Japan*, London 2005, p. 321–341.

In contemporary writings on nobility, treason was the antipode of loyalty and justice: traitors promised to be loyal to their lord, to prevailing customs, to an oath, and so on, but in practice they did the opposite. Traitors simulated love of their lord while actually serving another lord, preached peace even though they were bent on war and were preparing an attack to undermine their lord⁴⁴. Frederick tried to put that label on John. For example, he claimed that the latter had spread false claims concerning Maximilian in various taverns in Ghent; namely that the Archduke »adored administrators who hate the good city of Ghent«. In this way, so the petition stated, John encouraged the population of Ghent to rebel, even though he had promised the prince that he would govern the country well. In a similar vein, Frederick stressed that Sir John, as a high-ranking official, had a duty to disseminate princely commands and make sure that they were put into practice, while in fact he had concealed them, »to ruin the whole country and the seigneuries«. Contrary to his promise to serve the lord, John had thus acquitted himself poorly as an instrument of princely government. This was treasonous, for Sir John had actually »usurped the country« and »abused his power«. Not only had he betrayed his lord, but he had also betrayed the entire polity, whose interests the prince and his officers were supposed to protect. Frederick thus argued that the pernicious deeds of Sir John were not just a case of feudal relations gone wrong – the seigneurie of Dadizele was held in fief from Mary of Burgundy as Countess of Flanders – but an act of political rebellion. Political rebellion was a charge that had also been levelled at, among others, Philippe de Commines and Anthony of Burgundy, powerful courtiers of the Dukes of Burgundy who had defected to King Louis XI⁴⁵.

Following the same logic, Frederick suggested that John's treachery leaned toward *lèse-majesté*, another crime that was often punished by death. The argument was that the lord of Dadizele's attitude towards Maximilian had been so insolent that it had benefited the French king, the archenemy of the Burgundians; so much so, in fact, that the French king really had no better servant than Sir John. This accusation went hand in hand with the claim that Sir John had tried to control Maximilian (»make himself master of you«) by »talking to you in one way, and to the people in another way«. This was an argument often used by nobles to get rid of rivals during factional struggles at royal courts in the Middle Ages⁴⁶. In the concluding lines of his request for mercy, Frederick stated that he had wanted to avenge himself against John van Dadizele because in doing so, he would also be meting out a capital punishment that his victim richly deserved.

44 Corinne LEVELEUX-TEIXEIRA, *La trahison au Moyen Âge ou ambivalence du signe*, in: Myriam SORIA, Maïté BILLORE (eds.), *La trahison au Moyen Âge. De la monstruosité au crime politique (v^e-xv^e siècle)*, Rennes 2010, p. 385–394. See more generally: Simon CUTTLER, *The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France*, Cambridge 1981 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. Third Series, 16); SONNTAG, ZERMATTEN (eds.), *Loyalty in the Middle Ages* (as in n. 41).

45 Joël BLANCHARD, *Commines n'a pas »trahi«*. Pour en finir avec une obsession critique, in: *Revue du Nord* 380 (2009), p. 330; COOLS, *Mannen met macht* (as in n. 6), p. 112–117.

46 See, for instance, Djro KOUAMENAN, *Solitaires prospères ou membres d'un petit groupe influent? Les favoris et les factions à la cour royale*, in: *Francia* 49 (2022), p. 77–94.

By stressing that Maximilian, in his capacity as the prince-consort of Duchess Mary, was responsible for the well-being of the polity, Frederick van Horn linked the alleged violation of the Common Good to the personal honor and interests of the Burgundian-Habsburg dynasty. This was no accident, because it opened the door to the line of defense with which we opened this article, namely, the suggestion that Frederick had merely done what Mary had required of him. Frederick had wanted, in his own words, to »avenge the displeasures, griefs, and suffering« (*vengier les desplaisirs, griefz et rigueur*) that his opponent had inflicted on Maximilian and Mary. To do this, he had invoked the right of self-help; in other words, of taking the law into his own hands. If someone had caused great harm to the princely dynasty, then revenge was a legally sanctioned option for Frederick. Had the princess Mary not herself alluded to that in the words that he attributed to her? Whether Frederick did act on some remark by Mary or not, by granting the pardon, the ducal couple endorsed his reasoning. One of the mitigating factors which might justify pardoning a murder, after all, was grievous harm previously inflicted on the perpetrator by the murderer⁴⁷. By stressing time and again that the princely dynasty, as guardians and protectors of the Common Good, had suffered greatly from the actions of Sir John, Frederick could present the elimination of Sir John as the act of someone who had Mary and Maximilian's best interests at heart.

A good servant

Thus far, Frederick van Horn's defense was rooted in the fierce debates going on in 1481 about policy choices in the Burgundian-Habsburg lands, with Frederick stressing his own role as a supporter of Maximilian's plans, while asserting that Sir John was his fiercest critic. Other parts of Frederick's apologia were devoted to more personal attacks, intended to discredit his target and show him to have been unsuitable as an official or courtier. A first example of this was the accusation that John van Dadizele was guilty of fraud and corruption. In making this accusation, Frederick referred to another tenet of princely rule in a polycentric political system: having received funds from his subjects in the form of taxes, a ruler should use them only for agreed-upon purposes. Princely officials, therefore, as Frederick stressed, were under the moral obligation of accountability for the use of public funds. Loyalty to the prince as the protector of the Common Good thus implied, among other things, the proper use of the resources that a nobleman or a princely official had under his command⁴⁸. Sir John, however, had supposedly embezzled money. Frederick claimed that

47 Aude MUSIN, »S'il puelent ou vuelent vengier de chu ne s'en ont il point a meleur«. Survivance et déclin du droit de vengeance au tournant du Moyen Âge et des Temps Modernes (Namur, 1360–1555), in: GAUVARD, ZORZI (eds.), *La vengeance* (as in n. 16), p. 195–208; Rudi BEAULANT, Quentin VERREYCKEN, *Pardonner des traîtres ou des rebelles. La trahison dans les lettres de rémission des ducs de Bourgogne (XIV^e–XV^e siècles)*, in: Alain MARCHANDISSE, Gilles DOCQUIER (eds.), *Loyauté et trahison dans les pays bourguignons et voisins (XIV^e–XVI^e siècles)*, Neuchâtel 2022 (Publication du Centre européen d'Études bourguignonnes, 62), p. 5–20.

48 As has been shown in detail for England, this discourse was not easily squared with the actual lack of control on public spending (John SABAPATHY, *Officers and Accountability in Medieval England, 1170–1300*, Oxford 2014; John WATTS, *The Problem of the Personal. Tackling Corrup-*

Sir John had not paid out the promised pay to his troops, even although the Flemish towns had granted substantial aides to the princely administration to do just this. No one knew what had become of these payments, because, in the words of Frederick, »John did not submit accounts of this, but claimed the funds for himself out of sheer rapacity«. Frederick hastened to add that his corruption had greatly endangered the polity because failure to pay the troops had crippled the defense of the Burgundian-Habsburg lands against French aggression.

Frederick was certainly correct in stating that the Burgundian-Habsburg armies were not doing well on the battlefield in 1481, but this was mainly due to the inadequate resources the prince had at his disposal. An important factor was Ghent's refusal to pay any more taxes for what had morphed into a war of aggression after the summer of 1479⁴⁹. According to Frederick, Ghent's policy had its origins in John's meticulously executed strategy to take over power in the county. In making this claim, Frederick ignored the resistance that the city had been mounting for years against princely policies, even before John took office as high bailiff of Ghent. But of course, blaming Sir John for the military failures was highly convenient for his murderer. Frederick's emphasis on Sir John's supposedly defective military performance was largely rooted in the ideological consideration that military service was a crucial privilege and duty for all noblemen, so much so that martial prowess was essential for upholding one's noble standing⁵⁰. Here, again, Frederick was on thin ice, because it was precisely thanks to his remarkable military successes that John had transcended his role as a lesser nobleman in the retinue of great aristocrats to take up a leading position in the Burgundian-Habsburg state. Similarly, the accusation of fraud was probably not the most convincing part of Frederick's heavy-handed attempt at character assassination. In his own manuscript, John van Dadizele presented himself as a responsible army leader and he had evidence to back up the assertion that others perceived him as a competent and honest commander. For example, he included in his manuscript a copy of a verdict that the city of Ypres had pronounced in December 1479 against a certain Hannekin Stucke, a soldier who had slandered Sir John by claiming that he was embezzling the pay of his own troops. The city of Ypres, which had placed its militia under the authority of Sir John, was not amused. The Ypres aldermen sentenced the soldier for slander and ordered him to go bareheaded and with a burning candle in hand to the parish church of Dadizele on Christmas Eve – when the church would have been packed with all John's seigneurial subjects – to kneel before his lord⁵¹. This ritual punishment shows that the Flemish towns had

tion in Later Medieval England, 1250–1550, in: Ronald KROEZE, André VITÓRIA, Guy GELTNER [eds.], *Anti-Corruption in History. From Antiquity to the Modern Era*, Oxford 2017, p. 91–102).

49 SABLON DU CORAIL, *La guerre* (as in n. 14), p. 160.

50 Philippe CONTAMINE, *Noblesse et service. L'idée et la réalité dans la France de la fin du Moyen Âge*, in: OEXLE, PARAVICINI (eds.), *Nobilitas* (as in n. 42), p. 299–311; Marco GENTILE, Pierre SAVY (eds.), *Noblesse et États princiers en Italie et en France au xv^e siècle*, Rome 2009 (Collection de l'École Française de Rome, 416).

51 Manuscript Dadizele (private collection of the Arickx family, Belgium), fol. 135v. We discuss the manuscript at length in BUYLAERT, HAEMERS, *Record-Keeping* (as in n. 11), p. 133–135.

confidence in the integrity of their army commander and that they would go to great lengths to protect his reputation.

Finally, the charge of abuse of power looms large in Frederick van Horn's apologia. This is an important component of the story, for it was here that the root of the personal animosity between the murderer and his victim lay. Frederick took an enormous personal and political risk with the murder, and his hatred of John van Dadizele was clearly rooted in frustrations over the loss of influence of the noble faction to which he belonged. In his letter, Frederick claimed that John, as a newcomer with great influence, had made far-reaching personnel changes at the Burgundian-Habsburg court. He stated that John had replaced the commanders of the towns of Aire-sur-la-Lys and Saint-Omer, two crucially important defensive positions in southern Flanders and Artois, with his own confidants. Moreover, as a nobleman of humble rank who had made it to the position of master of the court in March 1481, John had dared to remove several noblemen from the court's key offices. By his actions, Sir John »compared himself to the greatest of the household« – by »household« (*maison*) Frederick was referring to the princely entourage of relatives and high nobles. In a similar vein, Frederick alleged that the lord of Dadizele had duped Duchess Mary herself, ignoring her wishes by removing several women from her court »to appoint other ladies«, an act that had greatly troubled the then pregnant princess⁵². Since the records of the composition of the courts of Maximilian and Mary have not been preserved, it is not possible to test these claims⁵³. What is clear, however, is that Frederick's accusation referred to the ongoing conflicts between different factions at court to control as many key positions as possible and to have as much influence as possible on the decision-making process⁵⁴. Since great power – and substantial income – was at stake, emotions could run high among competing factions and individuals, and this was clearly the case with Frederick. In his apologia, he pointed out that his cousin Philip van Huerne, lord of Gaasbeek, who was also his brother-in-law, had been captured by the Ghent rebels in 1477. Frederick claimed that John was responsible for that action⁵⁵. Although Philip had been quickly released, the rivalry between the two lords, according to Frederick, had only increased since then.

We can reconstruct the precise conflicts of interest at play here from the surviving textual records. One of the most remarkable privileges that John van Dadizele had acquired with his rise to power was a position on the committee for the renewal of the benches of aldermen of the Flemish cities, a very exclusive committee that was

52 Frederick was referring to François, the third child of Mary and Maximilian, who was born on 2 September 1481 and died shortly thereafter.

53 BESSEY, CAUCHIES, PARAVICINI, *Les ordonnances de l'hôtel* (as in n. 30), p. 145–146: there are various references to individuals who had been removed from office but no clear connection to the murder stands out.

54 Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, *Des conseillers protecteurs? L'entourage politique de Marie de Bourgogne*, and Valérie BESSEY, *L'hôtel de Marie de Bourgogne d'après l'ordonnance de cour du 26 mars 1477. Continuités et adaptations*, in: DEPRETER et al. (eds.), *Marie de Bourgogne* (as in n. 19), resp. p. 193–209, and p. 211–223.

55 Philip had married his cousin Margaret, the sister of Frederick (GOETHALS, *Histoire généalogique* [as in n. 29], p. 144). Ghent banished Philip from the county when he defiantly moved around Bruges with troops shortly after the assassination of John van Dadizele (HAEMERS, *Le meurtre* [as in n. 11], p. 245).

normally only accessible to highborn noblemen with excellent personal connections to the prince⁵⁶. Sir John is said to have used his now considerable political influence in the summer of 1481 to remove Philip van Huerne from the committee, so that he could allocate the vacant seat to John van Nieuwenhove from Bruges⁵⁷. The latter's sister was married to Cornelis Breydel, an important member of the Bruges political elite, who also happened to be the brother of John's own wife. Here we clearly see at work the rivalry between elite families (held together by marriages), with one faction claiming an important position at the expense of another. As already mentioned, emotions in factional conflicts could run high⁵⁸. When Frederick van Horn stated in his apologia that Sir John wanted to have him and his cousin and brother-in-law killed by public decapitation, his words reflected, first and foremost, his own and his relative's hatred of John. The string of insults that Frederick heaped on John in his letter reveals an intense animosity: Sir John was a »weed unworthy to compete with the good men, the inventor of all evil, the thief of your money [i.e. that of the prince]«, and so on.

Frederick van Horn went to great lengths to stress that the violation of his private interests warranted an extreme reaction because it also endangered the public interest. After all, the machinations of Sir John were undermining the proper workings of princely government, a precondition of a well-ordered society. It is no coincidence that the climax of the apologia is the accusation that John had violated the trust of Mary and Maximilian by giving them »wrong« advice. The accusation that John was a perfidious councilor may not have been the most serious one, but it is the one that touches most directly on how power was exercised in a polycentric political system, where monarchs were all-powerful in name but could act effectively only with the legal, fiscal and military support of seigneurial and urban elites. The nickname *Croit conseil*, given to Philip the Fair, is revealing in this sense⁵⁹. Councilors not only assisted the prince, but often also made decisions for him, either because the prince could not be everywhere at once or because he had to lean heavily on the patrimonial resources of leading councilors to implement policy choices. Whether or not Frederick's allegations were true, the great influence that John van Dadizele acquired in Flanders demonstrates both the strength and the weakness of the Burgundian-Habsburg court: effective rule relied on the loyal service of nobles. Moreover, the fact that Maximilian's entourage was aware of this is revealed in a remarkable passage in the minutes of the meeting of the Golden Fleece of May 1481. The Archduke had gathered all the members of this prestigious order in 's-Hertogenbosch for the knighting of his son and heir. During the meeting, however, these leading nobles reproached Maximilian for being too often guided in his policy by specific advisors and, in particular, by what the city

56 Jacoba VAN LEEUWEN, *De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing. Een onderzoek naar de jaarlijkse keuze en aanstelling van het stadsbestuur in Gent, Brugge en Ieper in de Middeleeuwen*, Brussels 2004.

57 A full discussion in HAEMERS, *Le meurtre* (as in n. 11).

58 For Flanders, see JONAS BRAEKEVELT, Frederik BUYLAERT, Jan DUMOLYN, Jelle HAEMERS, *The Politics of Factional Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders*, in: *Historical Research* 85 (2012), p. 13–31.

59 Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, »Croit conseil« et ses »ministres«. *L'entourage politique de Philippe le Beau (1494–1506)*, in: Alain MARCHANDISSE, Jean-Louis KUPPER (eds.), *A l'ombre du pouvoir. Les entourages princiers au Moyen Age*, Geneva 2003, p. 385–405.

of Ghent suggested to him. Was this an omen for what was to come? Maximilian replied that he had done nothing without informing himself properly (*il n'avoit pas fait sans conseil*), and he promised that he would lend his ear more to the knights of the order (*il voudroit user de leur bon conseil*)⁶⁰.

The pardon letter that Frederick van Horn would eventually receive also shows that – in specific circumstances – noble councilors could exert great influence over their prince. Frederick zoomed in on this social dimension of princely authority in his request for a pardon: he pointed out to Maximilian that his victim had replaced many advisors in crucial positions, and in this way had exerted an unduly large influence over the decision-making process. Such an individual had to be stopped, a moral duty that Frederick had taken upon himself, so that his actions, although an infringement of a long-standing tradition of princely control over elite violence, were worthy of a pardon. The young prince – Maximilian was only twenty-two years old at the time of the assassination – relied very much on his advisers during the reign of Mary of Burgundy, a difficult position that both John and Frederick were aware of and tried to bend to their will. With his letter of 15 October 1481, Frederick acted on this insight again.

Conclusion

Earlier research on pardon letters has stressed how they strengthened the ideological stature and political might of rulers⁶¹. The privilege of grace was an important instrument in the repertoire of state-building, including in the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries. Claiming the privilege of issuing pardon letters was part and parcel of the successful attempts of successive dukes of Burgundy to present themselves as the sovereign rulers of the Netherlandish dominions and as a new powerhouse, situated on the crossroads of the kingdoms of England and France and the Holy Roman Empire⁶². To be clear: the rather spectacular affair of the murder of Sir John and the subsequent pardon of his murderer does not undercut this interpretation of princely grace. By pointedly granting a pardon to Frederick, who was clearly not wracked with guilt, Maximilian ostentatiously flaunted the powers that set him and his wife Mary of Burgundy apart from the great aristocrats of their realm. By obviating the legal consequences of a high-profile murder, Maximilian and Mary asserted their role as the supreme arbiters of a polycentric political system. In light of the fierce opposition to Maximilian's policies by substantial segments of the nobility and the leading Flemish towns, granting this pardon was certainly a signal of strength, in the sense that was an ostentatious display of the sovereign powers of the Burgundian-Habsburg dynasty.

60 STERCHI, Über den Umgang (as in n. 43), p. 435: *Il se soit fort mis en la subjection de ceulx de Gand*.

61 Olivier MATTÉONI, *Institutions et pouvoirs en France, XIV^e–XV^e siècles*, Paris 2010 (Les médiévistes français, 10), p. 32.

62 Jonas BRAEKEVELT, *Un prince de justice. Vorstelijke wetgeving, soevereiniteit en staatsvorming in het graafschap Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van Filips de Goede (1419–1467)* (unpublished PhD dissertation Ghent University, 2013).

On the other hand, Frederick's quest for a pardon is unusual in that it also reveals the structural constraints that princes suffered under. The ruling elites very much understood that their support – in the form of advice, military service, the staffing of princely institutions, the patrimonial control over strategic lordships, the providing of local governance, and so on – was essential to give steel to the claims to sovereign rule of their prince. More often than not, the ruling classes were happy to lend this support and to subscribe to the ideal of sovereign authority as the pinnacle of the polity. In return, however, they expected the prince to share control over state resources and policymaking with them. In difficult situations, nobles who saw no conflict between two key tenets of the ideology of nobility – on the one hand, a seigneurial entitlement to independent action, including violence, and, on the other hand, the discourse of loyal service to the prince and the Common Good – could bring princes dangerously close to losing control.

Appendix: The Request for a Pardon by Frederick van Horn
to Archduke Maximilian of Austria (15 October 1481)

Copy preserved in Gelders Archief (Arnhem), Graven en hertogen van Gelre, nr. 1649, fol. 2r–5v.

Mon tres redoubté seigneur, je me recommande a votre tres noble grace le plus humblement que je le puis et scay faire. Et vous plaise scavoir, mon tres redoubté seigneur, que je suys adverty que par votre commandement et ordonnance se font enquestes pour scavoir celluy qui a entrepris a l'encontre de messire Jehan de Dadizelles. Sur quoy, mon tres redoubté seigneur, vous soit plaisir de scavoir que j'ay consenty et fait faire la dicte entreprinse, non pas cuidant offencer a vous, qui estes mon prince et mon seigneur, mais vous faire service qui doit estre agreable a vous et a voz pays. Et se plustost m'en eust esté demandé, j'en eusse respondu en maniere qu'on eust cogneu que je suys noble homme et homme de verité et votre tres humble subject et serviteur. Et ce que je me suys absenté, n'a pas esté en diffidence de votre noble justice, ne pour monstrier que je me reputasse autre que votre tres humble subject, mais seulement comme celluy qui admire et doute le pover et fureur de son prince qui par sinistres et par faulx rappors vous porroient estre faiz a l'encontre de moy et de ladicte emprinse, esperant que vous, mon tres redoubté seigneur, bien adverty des causes de ladicte emprinse vous me serez bon prince, et agreerez ce que je cuide estre faite pour votre service. Et se par ignorance la chose vous estoit entendue autrement que vous me serez prince misericors, car ladicte entreprinse ne fut oncques advoee que pour cuyder bien faire.

Mon tres redoubté seigneur, ceste chose a esté entreprinse contre ledit de Dadizelle pour trois choses. La premiere pour eviter les grans perilz et dangiers qui estoient apparans advenir par son moyen a vous, mon tres redoubté seigneur, madame et messeigneurs, voz enfans, subjectz et seignouries. La seconde pour vengier les desplaisirs, les griefz et rigueurs tenez par son moyen a madicte dame. Et la tierce en souvenance des entreprinses faictes par luy et par son moyen a l'encontre de ma personne et de mes parens, amys et aliez.

Et quant au premier point: pour eviter les grans perilz et dommaiges apparans d'advenir et desja avenez a vous, monseigneur, et a voz seigneuries, et par ledit Dadizelle, il est commune renommee que par luy et ses soubtivetez et cautelleux moyens, votre bon pays de Flandres qui par cidevant a tant soubstenu de fraiz et missions tant par messeigneurs voz predecesseurs comme pour vous, puis peu de temps encha se sont retirez de vous faire aucuns aides et ont reffusé de payer les gens d'armes et malicieusement a tourné les deniers qui vous devoient venir en paiement du peuple dont il s'est fait capitaine, et fait lever les deniers de votre conté de Flandres a la grand foule de votre peuple et dont vous n'avez eu aucun service. Et ne sceit l'on que ces deniers sont devenus ne n'en a esté aucun compte rendu, mais sont mys iceulx deniers en privee rapine au prouffit d'aucuns particuliers dont ledit Dadizelles estoit le chief et gouverneur.

Item, ce faisoit ledit Dadizelle doubter et craindre de la qualité de Flandres et amer d'autres par les advanchemens qu'il leur faisoit envers vous et en la mant[en]ance des

affaires du pays et par ce moyen pretendoit rebouter et deffaire toute la noblesse tant de Flandres comme d'ailleurs fors celle qui luy estoit obeissante et qui adheroit a luy. Et par moyens soubtilz et malicieux eslevoit le peuple de Gand et autres et les mettoit a sa cordelle et voulenté. Et ne croy pas que jamais Jaquemart ne Philippe de Arthevelde⁶³ ou aultre s'eslevast plus hault contre son prince que pretendoit ledit Dadizelles de soy eslever contre vous et votre seignourie.

Car sera bien prouvé qu'il dist par pluseurs fois a ceulx de Gand: »Se j'eusse esté avec vous du temps du duc Phelippe en la derniere guerre de Gand, j'eusse bien gardé que vous ne fussiez cheuz en la servitude ou vous avez esté«, et pluseurs parolles telles ou semblables, en rammenant les choses passees et cuidant esmouvoir icellui bon peuple a l'encontre de vous et de votre haulteur et seignorie que par sa soubtiveté deust advenir ce que ledit peuple n'avoit jamais pensé, c'est de soy eslever a l'encontre de vous.

Et qu'il soit vray, il est en votre noble memoire, que par le faulx donné a entendre dudit Dadizelle, les membres de Flandres vous ont constraint ou voulu contraindre de habandonner voz bons et loyaulx subjectz de Bourgogne, d'Artois et d'ailleurs qui tant ont soustenu et soubtiennent de povretez, angoisses et miserés, dont il n'a pas cuer de gentilhomme qui n'en ait pitié et compassion. Et pour merites de leurs loyaultez par l'enhortement dudit Dadizelles, vous avez esté efforchié contre votre vouloir de les deschassier ensuz de vous et du moins de les faire royer hors de voz escroes non pas par priere, requeste ou remonstrance raisonnable, mais par forche et malgré vous, luy mesmes de sa main les a royez et mys hors de voz ordonnances, y mettant autres gens a son plaisir. Et luy par son ambicion non ayant regard au petit lieu de sa nativité, mais pour furnir a l'apetit de son couraige, il a royé contes et barons pour luy mesmes se compter et mettre en leurs places, et a comparé sa personne aux plus grans de la maison. Mon tres redoubté seigneur, il vous peult bien souffire a vous monstrier qu'il ne vous servoit point comme subject, mais se vouloit faire maistre de vous et de votre plaisir, et qu'il pretendoit de vous mettre sy anbaz que vous contraindre de faire son plaisir en toutes choses. Et conduisoit son fait par faintes et dissimulacions de parler a vous d'une fachen et au peuple d'une autre.

Et vous donnoit a entendre que s'il ne feust et par les bons moyens qu'il tenoit a votre prouffit tout le peuple de Flandres et de Gand fust desja tourné et esmeu a l'encontre de vous et de voz serviteurs, ce que le bon peuple ne vouldroit pour rien faire, mais il le disoit pour les mectre en suspicion a l'encontre de vous affin de continuer son emprinse. Et d'autre part il abusoit votre peuple et disoit [que, *corrected*] a ceulx de Gand que vous estiés tres content de luy et de son dit peuple et faisoit semer telz langaiges par la ville et par les cabarets que vous amez aucuns gouverneurs qui portoient hayne a la bonne ville de Gand et la mectoient en votre male grace, et leur vouloient oster ou amoindrir leurs previleges et qu'ilz se tenussent fiers et le laissassent faire. Et il conduiroit le tout sy saignement qu'ilz demouroient entiers malgré les gouverneurs. Et ainsi faisoit ledit Dadizelle son prouffit en abusant de toutes pars par telles soubtivetéz cautelles, et par ce moyen estoit creu de composer le peuple et de

63 Jacob and Philip van Artevelde (father and son), leaders of several Ghent revolts in the fourteenth century (respectively c. 1290–1345 and 1340–1382); NICHOLAS, The van Arteveldes of Ghent (as in n. 28).

lever les deniers de votre pays sans en rendre compte, et destourboit que aucuns deniers ne feussent donnez pour son mesme prouffit affin que vous n'eussiez de quoy payer les gens d'armes de votre frontiere, querant qu'ilz vous habandonnassent pour sa propre sceurté. Et qui plus est, pour vous defouler et oster votre haulteur [il] a pretendu d'avoir le gouvernement total de voz villes de Saint-Omer, Aire, Lille et Douay⁶⁴, et de tyrer hors icelles les capitaines et gens de guerre par vous ordonnez a la garde et en leurs lieux y mettre et bouter autres pour en faire et user a son prouffit et plaisir comme il est bien notoire qu'il a fait desdites villes de Lille et de Douay. Et par les termes et moyens par luy tenuz est advenu nouvellement que les autres deux villes de Saint-Omer et Ayre ont esté en peril et adventure d'estre perdues, se ne feust la grand leaulté du seigneur de Bevres⁶⁵ et autres voz subgetz qui de par vous en avoyent charge, ledit Dadizelle vous avoit mys en ce dangier et par consequent de tout votre pays de Flandres a la destruction et desheritance de vous, de madame et de voz enfans.

Item, en continuant de plus en plus en son malice a fait faire ordonnance et commandement aux gouverneurs des villes de Courtray, Audenarde et autres chasteleunnies soubz la ville de Gand qui sur tant qu'ilz povoient meffaire, ilz ne feussent sy osez de prendre et recevoir esdites villes aucunes gens de guerre pour y tenir garnison de par vous. Et [il] deffendist et leur interdit absolument de prendre ne recevoir autres gens de guerre que ceulx et soubz telz capitaines qu'il leur ordonneroit, mesmement [il] fist commandement expres ausdites villes de non recevoir ne faire publicacions des mandemens que des lors en avant [vous] leur envoyerez touchant voz haulx affaires, mais renvoyassent iceulx mandemens pardevers luy et autres ses complices audit Gand pour en faire user a son apetit au grand reboutement de votre haulteur. Et en soy eslevant contre vous, attribuant a soy dominacion et seigneurie desordonnee et telle que pour tourner tous voz pays et seigneuries en ruyne et desolacion.

Item, peult sambler l'entreprinse et la conduite dudit Dadizelle apparante a la faveur du roy [de France] et de voz ennemys. Car mieulx ne peult estre servy le roy que de deschasser voz gens d'armes qui est votre deffence, et aussi de mescontenter les nobles, voz subgetz dont le roy tient le pays par conqueste, car s'il a le pays en ses mains, il n'a point encores les couraiges qui vous demouront bons malgré ledit Dadizelle, et garderont leur loyauté envers vous comme nobles hommes doivent faire.

Et quant au second article parlant des griefz et durtez faictes par ledit Dadizelle a ma tres redoubtee dame, madame votre compaigne, ma dame et ma princesse, il est notoire que en sa presence devant sa noble personne et malgré elle et contre sa volenté, sans avoir regard qu'elle estoit sa naturelle princesse, sans avoir la vertu de porter honneur et complaisance telle qu'il appartenoit a sy noble dame, sans monstrer amour ne devoir a ce qu'elle estoit grosse et enchainée d'e[n]fant (et dont il en pourroit advenir qu'il seroit subject et homme du noble fruit dont elle estoit enchainée),

64 Saint-Omer, Aire-sur-la-Lys, Lille, and Douai (Département du Nord, France), which were then towns on the border between Flanders, Artois, and the kingdom of France.

65 Philip of Burgundy (the son of Antoine, The Great Bastard), lord of Beveren-Waas (1455–1498). During the reign of Mary of Burgundy, he was the governor of the principalities of Namur and Artois; Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, *Bourgogne (Philippe de)*, in: *Nouvelle Biographie Nationale* 3 (1994), c. 275–276.

touteffoiz luy, eslevé de presumpcion, luy roya et osta plusieurs de ses bons serviteurs et luy vouloit encores roster plusieurs dames et damoiselles pour luy baillier autres femmes a son plaisir. Et a grand paine et difficulté obtint la noble princesse que ses femmes luy demourassent, dont plusieurs de ceulx de Gand larmoyèrent de pitié de la durté et fierté que tenoit ledit Dadizelles. Et ne se vouloient les bonnes gens contenter, mais il leur donna a entendre que c'estoit pour le bien de vous et de voz pays, et qu'il ne royoit que ceulx qui vouloient entreprendre a l'encontre d'eulx et de leurs privileges.

Item, il vouloit forchier vous et madicte dame d'avoir en ses mains monseigneur le conte de Charolois⁶⁶, votre filz, et s'est plusieurs fois devisé que s'il pavoit tenir l'enfant a Gand, monseigneur et madame alassent a leur plaisir, car l'en feroit bien sans eulx. Et de ces choses mon tres redoubté seigneur, vous ne devez riens demander a votre bon peuple de Gand ne de Flandres. Car ce qu'ilz faisoient, ilz le faisoient en loyalle et cordialle amour envers vous et en bonne entencion, mais il abusoit vous et le peuple par subtillitez faulces et desloialles, dont justice criminelle et publicque se devoit faire a sa personne.

Et quant au tiers point que ledit Dadizelles a emprins sur ma personne, sur mes parens et amys aliez, mon tres redoubté seigneur, je croy qu'estes assez bien adverty que ledit Dadizelle a pretendu de moy faire prendre et mener prisonnier a Gand. Et quant il n'y a peu parvenir, il a commiz de moy faire bannir de toute Flandres. Et en desprisant ma personne [il] a dit publicquement qu'il pleust a Dieu qu'il me tenist sur le marchié de Gand et qu'il me feroit copper la teste.

Item, il est chose notoire que par son enhort gens furent commis et ordonnez pour trouver monseigneur de Gaesbeque⁶⁷, mon beaufrere, et pour le admener a Gand, vif ou mort. Et pour vous donner a entendre les causes pourquoy ledit Dadizelle vouloit defaire et murdrir ledit de Gaesbeque et moy, ce fut pour ce que toute Flandre adheroit a sa volenté par son faulx donné a entendre. Mais ledit seigneur de Gaesbeque, ses parens et amys ne voulrent oncques adherer a luy, ne entendre a ses desloialles emprinses, combien qu'il en fut par plusieurs foiz requis. Mais est ledit seigneur de Gaesbeque deliberé pour luy et pour les siens de garder et deffendre pour y morir le droit et la seignourie de vous, de madame et de voz nobles enfans. Et pour ce queroit ledit Dadizelle les moyens seullement de notre mort et destruction.

Les choses dessusdites considerees et principalement et qui plus fort me touchoit au cuer, je me trouvoy present en la ville de Gand ou ma tres redoubtee dame, madame votre compaigne dessusdite, ma seulle princesse, a laquelle je doy loyauté, service et hommaige, estoit toute desplaisante que plus ne pavoit plaine de plours, de regretz et de sospirs, dont elle monstra si grand apparence que certes moy et les presens feismes grand doubte du noble fruit dont elle estoit enchainte et de sa personne. Elle, qui ne peult trouver que toute rigeur audit Dadizelle, dist publicquement telles parolles ou semblables: »Certes, monseigneur et moy, [nous] sommes bien gouvernez quant ung tel desloial paillart que Jehan de Dadizelle a telle auctorité sur nous que de nous

66 Philip the Fair (1478–1506), then Count of Charolais; Jean-Marie CAUCHIES, *Philippe le Beau. Le dernier duc de Bourgogne*, Turnhout 2003 (Burgundica, 6).

67 Philip van Huerne, lord of Gaasbeek and Bancigny (1423–1488); COOLS, *Mannen met macht* (as in n. 6), p. 125.

oster noz bons et loiaux serviteurs pour nous baillier gens a son plaisir, et ne me pourroit plus grand plaisir advenir que me veoir vengier de ce traictre!«. Monseigneur, ceste piteuse parolle a esté la principale cause pourquoy j'ay emprins contre luy si tost qu'il m'a esté possible. Et cuide certainement cognoistre et scavoit tant de loiauté en voz bons subgetz de Gand et de Flandres que luy mys hors de avec eulx dedens brief temps, vous vous parchevrez que les difficultez ja monstrez a vous et en voz affaires venoient de luy et non d'eulx, et les trouverez voz leaulx et bons subgets et luy faulx et desloial a vous et a voz pays. Et quant vous penserez bien le recoraigement qu'il a donné a [vous, *corrected*] voz ennemys par sa [subjection, *corrected*] suggestion en quoy il vous a bouté et le reboutement que vous avez eu par son moyen envers voz aliez et bien vueillans, ensemble la renommee qui est a ceste cause nonchié aux estraingnes royaulmes et seigneuries par la subjection en quoy votre peuple vous a mys par son moyen, vous cognoistrez legierement que telle herbe malicieuse n'est digne d'estre avec les bonnes, ne tel ennemy prins avec les gens de bien. Et ne me desplaist en ceste emprinse que de vous avoir courouchié seullement. Et se votre plaisir est de mettre mon fait devant votre conseil, je vous supplie y appeller nobles hommes et gens qui entendent a votre honneur, non pas les semblables dudit Dadiselle en meurs et en volenté. Car c'estoit l'inventeur de tous mauulx, le desvoyeur des bons, l'esleveur des mauvaiz, le hayneur de ceulx qui bien vous veillent, le conforteur de voz ennemys, le laron de voz propres deniers, et le rebouteur et contraire de tous ceulx qui ayment votre bien, et plus apparant serviteur du roy que le vostre.

Item, et n'est il pas vray que contre sa loyauté et son serement, il a pourchassé ung nouvel privilege par lequel ceulx de Gand pevent bannir de Flandres toutes gens nobles et autres, voire les officiers du prince a quoy vous ne povez donner rappel? Et de ce [il] donna le conseil affin qu'il feust craint par toutes Flandres soubz le povoit de ceulx de Gand et tout homme doubtast le bannissement dont il avoit conseillé le privilege.

Vous suppliant, mon tres redoubté seigneur, en toute humilité que se j'ay fait ou fait faire en ceste partie chose qui tourne a votre desplaisir vous le me vueilliés pardonner et aussi a ceulx que j'ay entremys en ceste emprinse, car j'ay cuidé faire le bien et utilité de voz pays. Car il estoit homme dont l'en ne pavoit avoir raison par autre voye tant pour ce qu'il se faisoit grand d'empres vous faindant de vous servir et estre a vous, et par le contraire il s'estoit fortiffié par le povoit de ceulx de Gand, lesquelz il abusoit comme dit est. Et croy que vous et messieurs de votre conseil aura bien souvenance que ce n'est pas le premier de telle condicion qui licitement et selon raison divine et naturelle a esté mys hors des autres par euvres de fait, exemple du duc d'Orleans⁶⁸ dont sa mort faite et perpetree par nuyt et d'aguet sur sy hault prince que d'ung frere du roy, touteffois par le saint concille de Constance fut jugié estre bien et deument faite et jugiez francs et quictes les consentans et facteurs, veu les cas de ses demerites et dont icesuy Dadizelles a desservy plus griefve pugnicion. Priant a Dieu, mon tres redoubté seigneur, qu'il me donne le povoit d'acquérir votre grace, laquelle je n'ay point merité de perdre par vous avoir fait perdre celluy qui tant

68 Louis I, Duke of Orléans (1372–1407), a brother of King Charles VI of France. He was assassinated at the command of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy; see SCHNERB, Jean sans Peur (as in n. 38).

vous estoit contraire, mais il m'est adviz que vous devez jugier le cas bien fait et bien advenu tant de moy comme de mes complices. Et je prieray Dieu pour vous et pour votre noble lignié.

Esript a Mariny⁶⁹, le xv^e jour d'octobre l'an mil IIII^C IIII^{XX} et ung.

Esript embaz: le tout votre tres humble et tres obeissant serviteur F. de Hornes⁷⁰; et au dehors: a mon tres redoubté seigneur monseigneur le duc d'Austriche, de Bourgogne etc.

69 We could not identify this place. Possibly this is a scribal error for Montigny?

70 Frederick van Horn, lord of Montigny and Vimy (?–1487); see the article for more details about his life and career.