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Juan Carlos, lui, a bien sauvé l'Espagne (Walther L. BERNECKER), à tel point que la transición peut servir de modèle pour les dictatures d'Amérique du Sud. La première phase de la transition débute à la mort de Franco en 1975, s'achève en 1978 (adoption de la constitution), ou en 1981 (l'échec du putsch) ou encore en 1982 (les socialistes au pouvoir). Comment Juan Carlos s'est-il dépris de l'empreinte franquiste? En 1969, lorsque le Caudillo présenta le futur roi aux Cortez, celui-ci jura fidélité au »mouvement national«, i. e. au franquisme. En 1975, il dut choisir entre la rupture radicale avec le régime qui l'avait intronisé et la correction graduelle du système. Bien conseillé, il opta pour la seconde solution et par degrés, il se désolidarisa du franquisme (remplacement d'Arias Navarro par Adolfo Suarez). Il entretint des liens serrés avec le commandement militaire, proclama l'amnistie, voyagea dans le pays pour soigner sa popularité, insista dans ses discours sur sa légitimité à régner et les devoirs que cela impliquait. Dans la constitution, Juan Carlos est présenté comme l'héritier légitime de la dynastie, ce qui gomme la genèse franquiste de son pouvoir. A cette légitimité de type ancien, Juan Carlos ajouta, par son rôle politique, par sa détermination lors du putsch de 1981, une véritable légitimation démocratico-charismatique. Les sondages ne cessent de traduire l'accroissement de la popularité de celui qui veut être un *poder moderator*. Dans les années 1920–1930, la démocratie semblait passer par l'élimination de la monarchie; un demi-siècle plus tard, Juan-Carlos, c'est la Monarchie plus la démocratie. Cet avatar ultime et rassurant de l'incarnation du prince sera-t-il le dernier que nous réserve un monde qui a usé en un siècle nombre d'innovations politiques? Faut-il voir là une ruse de l'histoire ou alors un témoignage de la sagesse de la vieille Europe?

Claude MICHAUD, Paris

Allan ELLENIUS (Hg.), Iconography, Propaganda, and Legitimation, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1998, XIX–310 S. (The Origins of the modern state in Europe 13th to 18th centuries).

›Iconography, Propaganda, and Legitimation‹ presents one of the seven themes put forward by the European Science Foundation-project on the origins of the modern state: the changing representations of political power from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Art historians and historians from various European countries discussed this theme in a serie of conferences held between 1989 and 1992; this volume presents their endeavours in written form.

In a useful but very concise introduction the editor, Allan ELLENIUS, spells out the major fields of research, and offers some interpretations. Kurt JOHANNESSON, opening the first section, scrutinises the role of literary and visual portraits of rulers, and notes their didactic and rhetorical nature. The portraits had to convince and instruct both courtiers and those subjects able to understand them. Johannesson attacks the aesthetic nineteenth-century overstatement of Renaissance ›individualism‹ : rulers' portraits, he argues, depicted ›exempla‹ more than individuals. Friedrich POLLEROSS describes the various ways in which Hercules and Herculean imagery (the choice between vice and virtue, the defeat of serpents and other monsters) were used to glorify rulers and educate their subjects. Hercules, probably the most important figure of identification for rulers in the early modern age, took on various forms, following the prescripts of humanism, counter-reformation, absolutism, and enlightenment. Matthias WINNER analyses the political program of Rubens' paintings for Maria de Medici's gallery in the Palais de Luxembourg, concentrating on the orb as a symbol of state. Winner also discusses the formative stages of the co-operation and the contacts between painter and patron.

In the second section of the book Fernando CHECA CREMADES and José NIETO SORIA have contributed articles with a wider scope, and a more historical focus. Checa Cremades concentrates on court painting, but he also shows the gradual development of a ›Spanish‹

style not only of court painting, but also of rulership and court life: the ›hidden‹ king, depicted as an aloof and almost abstract being. Like Johannesson, Checa Cremades stresses the archetypal nature of these representations; moreover, he argues that the attributes and the bearing of the portrayed rulers had become so immutable, that even a less educated public would readily grasp their symbolic message. Nieto Soria reveals the lasting importance of the clergy and of religious symbolism in late-medieval Castilian monarchy. Clergymen served the ruler, the ›praying king‹ dominated royal iconography, and various other close ties between rulership and religious symbolism remind us that we cannot wholeheartedly embrace the oftrepeated notion of ›secularisation‹ in these spheres. The Habsburg example shows that Nieto Soria's remarks are equally relevant for later ages.

Sergio BERTELLI's overview of the coronation from the Carolingians to Napoleon opens the third section on ›Medieval legacy and Renaissance imagery‹. Bertelli brilliantly examines the close but often competitive relationships between *Rex* and *Sacerdos*. Anointment, communion in two kinds, and the right to wear liturgical garments such as the ›dalmatica‹ symbolised the kings' spiritual power – also underlined by the ceremonial role of crystal flasks and the ›nef‹ during a royal banquet, or the washing of the feet of twelve poor on Maundy Thursday. Bertelli mentions the influences of Byzantine and papal ceremonial – a subject not further addressed in this volume, but surely very important. The changes in papal pretensions and their artistic reflections are admirably charted by Gunnar DANBOLT. He presents a detailed but analytical comparison of papal representation in a medieval and a renaissance context. More than most contributors, Danbolt succeeds in combining iconographical precision with historical contextualisation. Rudolph PREIMESBERGER's discussion of the visual representations of papal authority in Bologna, is equally rich in historical context. Bologna's Neptune fountain, he argues, offered a justification for papal rule; like Neptune, the papacy banished the storms of the sea with the powers of reason and persuasion.

In the fourth section addressing ›Rituals and Ceremonies‹, Juliusz CHROSCICKI takes ›space‹ as his point of departure, recapitulating the ceremonial aspects of church, residence, town, and country – and, more interestingly, the ›viae‹ or itineraries connecting them. Who actually saw and appreciated the rulers' representations? Can we simply jump from the iconography to conclusions about propaganda, and legitimation? Gérard SABATIER poses these and others perceptive and highly important questions, only incidentally addressed in this volume. Sabatier, however, then concentrates not so much on court ceremony at Versailles, but on the decoration of the apartments, the ambassador's staircase, and finally the great gallery and the salons of war and peace. From the changes in written descriptions of Versailles, he infers a change from a ›quantitative appreciation‹ to a more ›qualitative intellectualisation‹: in the early eighteenth century, Versailles was increasingly presented as a ›temple of good taste‹.

Peter BURKE opens the final section, ›The demise of time-honoured mythologies‹, with a discussion of the ›Querelle des anciens et des modernes‹ already briefly referred to in several other contributions. The ›organic analogy‹ lost its appeal; clarity was more valued than the opaque system of correspondences. Furthermore, the classical-mythological programme seems to have been abandoned in favour of a more direct depiction of the king's deeds. Did a more quantitative and concrete presentation of Louis XIV's greatness indeed dethrone these older forms in the 1680s? Burke earlier presented this interesting suggestion in his ›Fabrication of Louis XIV'‹. Surely, a change in the customary forms of representation took place, but we should be careful not to present this change as too momentous: it must have been a slow and geographically unevenly distributed development. In the last contribution, Thomas FRÖSCHL analyses the political legitimation and the artistic representation in various early modern republics. He shows that there is a clear connection between Venice, Amsterdam, Berne, the French Republic, and the United States. In Europe and in the United States, Fröschl argues, the early nineteenth century witnessed the end of an

iconological tradition: the impressive array of classical deities and symbols was increasingly perceived as a useless secret language.

This book contains several excellent contributions, expanding our understanding of the representation of rulership. Some contributions, however, show signs of hasty editing, and so does the incomplete and somewhat outdated bibliography. Moreover, court life, ceremony at court, and court festivals are only fleetingly mentioned – they seem to have fallen between the ranges of this theme (G) and the project's theme D, ›Power Elites and State-Building‹. Such a division of themes may inadvertently have reinforced an anachronistic ›Trennungsdenken‹ between aesthetic and socio-political assessments of representation, the bias of this volume towards painting and other fine arts does little to correct this impression. Finally, ›Iconography, Propaganda, and Legitimation‹ does not offer a coherent interpretation, nor does it show an attempt to systematically and collectively address certain basic questions – such as those suggested by Sabatier. The debate between the ›functionalist‹ and the ›symbolic action‹ approaches (between ›cynics‹ and ›believers‹) is too fundamental to leave out; and the same can be said for the discussion about the ›audiences‹ of representation. We miss a concluding chapter, pondering the development of the representation of power throughout the period, and discussing the intricate relationships between ›power‹ and the ›representation of power‹: was it a reflection of power, or could it also be a compensation for loss of power? Such questions, earlier put forward by among others A. Winterling and V. Bauer, are not mentioned. The delay between the conferences and this publication may offer a partial explanation for these defects. We can read and value individual contributions, but the work as a whole does not offer an exemplary case of interdisciplinary cooperation, nor does it compare favourably with recent research in this field.

Jeroen Duindam, Utrecht

Jeremy Black, Why Wars Happen, London (Reaktion Books) 1998, 272 S. (Globalities).

Il est particulièrement délicat de faire le compte-rendu d'un livre qui, dans une tentative de vision globale présente tant d'érudition et de réflexion en moins de 300 pages. L'auteur a voulu sortir son analyse de l'origine des guerres, des cadres traditionnels: l'Europe et la politique, et prend en compte les aspects culturels et leurs composantes économiques, techniques et psychologiques dans toutes les parties du monde. On ne peut que l'en féliciter. Lui-même reconnaît que c'est une gageure : »Etendre une discussion des causes des guerres en incluant toutes les rébellions ... nécessiterait une étude politique du monde« (p. 76). En fait, J. Black a osé faire cet effort. On reste confondu par la multiplicité des exemples tirés de l'histoire de toute la planète, qui représente une somme considérable de faits et de réflexions puisée d'ailleurs presque exclusivement dans des ouvrages en langue anglaise (sur environ 300 références, on compte moins de dix tirés d'ouvrage en langue allemande ou française). Il est vrai que l'historiographie anglo-saxonne a été particulièrement attirée par ce genre d'analyses. A cela s'ajoutent les nombreuses réflexions de l'auteur dont l'une des qualités maîtresses est l'intuition.

Ce genre d'ouvrage porte toujours un défi à tous les spécialistes de toutes les spécialités de l'histoire. Les uns regretteront que certains facteurs n'aient pas suffisamment retenu l'attention. Par exemple: le désir d'accès aux mers libres des Etats continentaux, la suppression de la traite des noirs suggérant l'utilisation de la main d'œuvre africaine chez elle, donc la colonisation de l'Afrique et son partage, le désir de contrôler la production du pétrole, etc. D'autres, plus critiques, regretteront des rapprochements téméraires ou des affirmations discutables. Sans doute à cause de sa prise de position dans la controverse sur la révolution militaire des temps modernes, J. Black ne considère pas la période 1450–1660 comme un »point tournant«, alors que le coût croissant des armements et le développement de l'Etat