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MOROCCAN RESISTANCE, PAN-ISLAM  
AND GERMAN WAR STRATEGY, 1914-1918<sup>1</sup>

This article seeks to assess the support for Moroccan resistance to French domination furnished by Germany and Turkey during World War I. There has been little study of Moroccan resistance during World War I, or of German war strategy in North Africa<sup>2</sup>. There has been no study at all of the external component of resistance movements in North Africa. It is nonetheless clear from a survey of the existing literature that there exist substantial grounds for asserting the importance of such external support even before the first stirrings of nationalism in the region. Morocco furnishes a particularly clear and interesting example of the extent to which movements of resistance sought external allies as a way of compensating for their weaknesses. The following ought therefore to interest both students of modern German history (especially those concerned with German war strategy), and those with interests in the subject of resistance to imperialism.

This article is primarily based upon the record of the German war effort which has been preserved in the French military archives in Paris at the »Service Historique de l'Armée, Section d'Afrique et d'Outre-Mer«. The materials consist of intelligence reports on German activities in Morocco, and allow us a unique view of the inner workings of the German war effort. German and Moroccan archival materials, when they become available, may be expected to fill in the general outlines of the account presented here<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The research on which this article is based was conducted under a grant provided by the Faculty Research Committee of the University of California at Santa Cruz, during the summer of 1970. The Committee is not responsible for any of the opinions or conclusions expressed in this article.

<sup>2</sup> On Moroccan resistance and German war strategy, see Louis BARTHOU, *La Bataille du Maroc* (Paris, 1919), and Louis RIVIÈRE, *Un Centre de Guerre Secrète: Madrid* (Paris, 1936).

<sup>3</sup> French military intelligence files provide a remarkably detailed picture of German and Turkish activities in Morocco during the period 1914 to 1918. The archives of the Section d'Afrique, especially Serie E carton 12 bis contain much interesting material. For further discussion of the value of this material, see Note 47, below.

## 1. Moroccan Resistance to French Imperialism 1900-1912

The focus of this article is the contribution of external support to the Moroccan resistance movement, from 1914 to 1918. I will first of all briefly describe the chief stages of the Moroccan resistance movement (1860-1914) and trace the previous history of German and Turkish involvement in Morocco in order to provide a context for the study which follows. In succeeding sections I will trace the history of Moroccan resistance and French response during the period 1914 to 1918, and discuss in detail the patterns of German and Turkish intervention. The conclusion will discuss the significance of the World War I experience in the later development of Moroccan nationalism.

Pre-nationalist movements of resistance to imperialism in Africa and Asia have recently come in for renewed historical study<sup>4</sup>. Far from being merely traditional opposition, it is now claimed that such movements were in fact a compound of old and new political forms which represent a distinctive new response to the onset of social and economic change in the period 1870 to 1930. These resistance movements, in order to have a chance of success, had to find ways of expanding the scale of political action beyond the limits of local ties and particularist influences. This problem, which Professor T. O. Ranger has called the problem of scale, is of central importance not only for East African resistance movements (where Ranger first developed his ideas) but also for much of the remainder of Africa and Asia<sup>5</sup>. While these pre-nationalist resistance movements were able to make some gains in putting together broader and more cohesive political movements, in the end they were failures. The nationalist movements which replaced them were more successful in creating more persuasive ideologies and more permanent forms of political organization.

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<sup>4</sup> Historians of Africa have been especially prominent in the study of pre-nationalist resistance to imperialism. Among other recent volumes which explore this subject, see Michael CROWDER (ed.) *West African Resistance* (London, 1971) and Robert ROTBERG and Ali MAZRUI (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (Oxford, 1970).

<sup>5</sup> T. O. RANGER, 'Connexions between ›primary resistance‹ movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa', *Journal of African History*, IX (1968) and: 'African Reaction to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa', in *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, L. H. GANN and P. DUIGNAN (eds.), (Cambridge, 1969) Vol. I. For other views see John ILIFFE, *Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905 to 1912* (Cambridge, 1969); Eric STOKES, 'Traditional Resistance Movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism: The Context of the 1857 Mutiny Rebellion in India ›Past and Present (1970), pp. 100-118; and the author's 'Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Imperialism, 1900-1912', *Journal of African History*, XIII (1972), pp. 97 to 118.

The recent literature on resistance has dealt primarily with the internally generated strategies of response to imperialism, and has focused upon these movements as seen from within. Where African resistance movements are concerned, this approach is clearly appropriate. But in the case of Islamic resistance, it does seem overly narrow. The concept of the *umma Muhammadiya*, the community of the faithful of Islam, suggests the existence of a multiplicity of ties which transcended the local political horizon. The pilgrimage to Mecca, the movement of scholars and merchants to and from the Middle East, presented Muslims with the possibility of action on a broader scale<sup>6</sup>. The Islamic renaissance of the nineteenth century and the development of an important newspaper press in the Near East facilitated the spread of new ideas and political ideologies. Among them was the ideology of Pan-Islam, which proclaimed the unity of all Muslims, and exhorted them to aid one another in resistance to the West<sup>7</sup>. Given the weakness and fragility of local Islamic resistance movements in the face of the European military challenge, it was to be expected that they would seek external allies and support for their efforts. Especially therefore in the study of resistance to imperialism in Islamic areas of the world, it is useful to focus upon external as well as the internal components of resistance movements. It is within this framework of analysis that German and Turkish support for Moroccan resistance is to be situated.

The following summary of the development of Moroccan resistance during the period 1860 to 1914 will make clear the internal and external aspects of the resistance movement, and point up the increasing importance of the latter after 1912. Three principal phases in the development of Moroccan resistance can be distinguished<sup>8</sup>. Increasingly broader segments of the Moroccan elite became involved in resistance from one phase to another. In the first stage, that of military reforms and internal improvements, it was primarily government officials who manifested concern with French expansionism.

As French intentions became clearer, a second stage of development can be distinguished (1905–1911) during which first the »*‘ulama*« (religious scholars) of the cities and then the urban bourgeoisie and provincial notables emerged to champion resistance. In response to French in-

<sup>6</sup> BURKE, *opt. cit.*, pp. 97–100.

<sup>7</sup> On Pan-Islam, see A. HOURANI, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London, 1970), pp. 106–108, 155–156; B. LEWIS, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp. 341–342; and N. KEDDIE, »Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism,« *Journal of Modern History*, XLI (1969), pp. 17–28.

<sup>8</sup> Moroccan resistance to French imperialism is treated more extensively in the author's »Moroccan Political Response to French Penetration, 1900–1912,« Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1970.

tervention at Casablanca (1907), a broadly based but fragile coalition was formed which brought about the deposition of sultan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the proclamation of his more militant brother, ʿAbd al-Hafīz, as sultan. ʿAbd al-Hafīz possessed little margin for maneuver, however. His efforts to repudiate the Moroccan debt and to build a new army came to naught, and in 1912 he was compelled to sign the protectorate treaty.

The outbreak of a mutiny of Moroccan troops against their French officers at Fez on April 17, 1912, was the signal for the beginning of a third phase of resistance: an attempted general uprising. Tribal resistance groups began to form coalitions throughout the country, and to coordinate their activities with an eye toward a general uprising. A champion of the holy war emerged in the south in the person of Mawlāy Aḥmad al-Hība, who began to advance on Marrakech. These domestic activities intersected with plans for a general revolt made by a secret Pan-Islamic group operating out of Cairo named »al-ittihād al-maghribī«<sup>9</sup>. Agents of »al-ittihād al-maghribī« infiltrated into Morocco during the spring. They initiated an anti-French campaign in the Arabic newspaper »al-Haqq«, published at Tangier, which called for a general revolt. It was timed to coincide with the abdication of ʿAbd al-Hafīz and the arrival of al-Hība at Marrakech. Joint action by the various tribal resistance groups, stiffened by trained Pan-Islamic agents, was to occur all over Morocco, leading to the defeat and expulsion of the French. In the end, however, vigorous French military action snuffed out the threat before it could materialize. Lack of organization and discipline, inferior armaments, and poor cooperation between the resistance groups all played a role in the failure of the uprising.

A useful distinction between the urban and rural strands of the resistance movement in Morocco can be appropriately introduced at this time. Urban resistance leaders included members of the »ʿulama«, merchants, and government officials. They were strongly influenced by Near Eastern currents of thought, including Pan-Islamism, Islamic reformism, and Ottoman-style constitutionalism<sup>10</sup>. Small groups favoring each of these tendencies were active during the period 1905–1912, and were instrumental in bringing about the Hafiziya revolution of 1907. It was through their influence that there was a brief attempt in 1909–1910 to introduce Turk-

<sup>9</sup> On the »al-ittihād al-maghribī« conspiracy, see *ibid.* Also, Great Britain, Foreign Office Archives, Confidential Print Series, F. O. 413/57, Kennard to Grey, August 16, 1912, No. 216; and September 6, 1912, No. 239, most confidential.

<sup>10</sup> In addition to the author's dissertation, cf. Jacques CAGNE, »Les origines de mouvement Jeune Marocain«, *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire du Maroc* (1968), I, pp. 8 to 17.

ish military advisors to modernize the Moroccan army<sup>11</sup>. Many of the same individuals who looked to the Near East for support also favored an alliance with Germany as the chief means to forestall a French protectorate<sup>12</sup>. The search for external support was thus very much a part of the strategy of resistance of the urban elite. The urban strategy tended to focus upon the need to strengthen the state (through projects like military reforms and internal improvements) in order to better be able to oppose the French.

The concerns of rural resistance leaders were broadly similar to those of the cities. But they tended to diverge on one crucial point. The increasing demands for revenue by the central government, in pursuit of its reform schemas, threatened the livelihood of many rural people as a result, rural resistance leaders stressed not only opposition to the French colonial offensive, but also opposition to the centralizing drive of the »makhzan«. Rural resistance drew upon a tradition of Islamic populism which threatened the elites in place, and frequently verged on jacquerie. The interests of urban and rural elites led them to seek potentially opposed means of resisting the French advance: modernization, or guerilla resistance. Since most of the urban elite possessed lands and business interests which would be threatened by a populist revolt in the countryside, they became less eager for resistance. Instead, they exploited their ties to the »makhzan« and sought to benefit from the French presence. Thus after 1912 rural resistance leaders were left isolated from the cities, increasingly radical in their aims, but also divided among themselves.

Following the implantation of the protectorate in 1912 resistance in Morocco did not fade away. The urban notables, recognizing the fact of French dominance, suspended their participation in the resistance effort. In the countryside, the effort to forge a broadly based coalition of resistance bands persisted. By the end of 1912 most of the resistance activity in Morocco was confined to up-country hill districts around the cities of Fez and Meknes, and the Atlas mountains and Sous valley to the south. There the terrain afforded some advantage to the local population and French firepower could be used to less effect. Because of the difficulty of communications, these districts tended to be rather parochial, and assembling a broadly based coalition was difficult. In this context Pan-Islam acquired importance as one of the few means of developing a coherent resistance strategy capable of transcending the narrow confines of kinship

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<sup>11</sup> The Turkish military mission is discussed by Jean DENY, »Instructeurs militaires turcs au Maroc sous Moulay Hafidh«, Memorial Henri Basset (Paris, 1928), Vol. I.

<sup>12</sup> German support of Moroccan resistance is dealt with by Pierre GUILLEN, *L'Allemagne et le Maroc, 1870-1905* (Paris, 1967) and Louis MAURICE (pseud. Maurice Bompard), *La politique marocaine de l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1916).

and local ties. By 1914, these bands were clearly on the defensive. More than ever, external support appeared to them as a vital necessity. Only experienced leadership and a regular supply of weapons and funds could convert their opposition into a credible threat to the French presence. The outbreak of war in 1914, as will be seen in the section which follows, produced a situation eminently favorable to renewed German and Turkish intervention.

The response of the French to the continued threat presented by this resistance activity was severalfold. The protectorate administration which was implanted between 1912 and 1914 stressed respect for the local religion and institutions<sup>13</sup>. Under the direction of Louis-Hubert Lyautey, the first Resident General, steps were taken to insure that the traditional Moroccan governmental apparatus remained undisturbed in its essential outlines, and that the sultan continued to possess at least the symbols of power, if not its substance. Officially, the pacification of Morocco was portrayed as the submission of rebellious tribes to the authority of the »makhzan«, rather than the suppression of patriotic resistance. An effort was made to associate Moroccans with the economic benefits brought by the protectorate, through such devices as building roads, establishing markets, and purchasing supplies locally insofar as possible. At least on the level of official policy, if not always on that of reality, efforts were made to curb the excesses of land speculation and a bureaucracy obsessed with regulations. The native policy devised by Lyautey was thus one which sought to disturb the fabric of Moroccan society as little as possible, while gradually increasing the degree of French control.

## 2. The War in Morocco, 1914–1918

Moroccan resistance forces were everywhere on the defensive in 1914 when war broke out in August, 1914. The immediate practical effect of the war on Morocco was a recrudescence of resistance throughout the country and a temporary slowdown in the French pacification of unsubmitted tribes. Dormant contacts with Germany and the Ottoman empire were reestablished by resistance leaders, weapons smuggling was greatly increased, and guerrilla bands sought to coordinate and expand their activities. For four years the »battle of Morocco« was fought, as French forces sought to contain the thrusts of Moroccan tribal irregulars, augmented by substantial German material support and advice, and operating under

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<sup>13</sup> For a brief description of the early years of the protectorate, cf. *La Renaissance du Maroc Dix Ans du Protectorat* (Rabat, 1922).

the banner of Pan-Islam. This section explores the chief phases of the development of the war in Morocco.

German war strategy in the Middle East was part of a much wider effort aimed at exploiting the revolutionary potential of suppressed national groups within the territories controlled by the Entente<sup>14</sup>. Prior to the onset of hostilities in Europe, German theorists of Pan-Islam like Max von Oppenheim, Carl Becker, and Georg Kampffmeyer had convinced important segments of the German government of the potential importance of such a doctrine for German war strategy<sup>15</sup>. By causing revolts and unrest throughout British and French possessions in Africa and the Middle East, Pan-Islam would compel the Entente powers to divert scarce resources from the European front in the event of a major war in Europe. The most extravagant claims were made for the possibilities of »exporting revolution«, and in at least some quarters they were believed. Even before the war German funds had helped support the Pan-Islamic activities of the Young Turk government<sup>16</sup>.

While more attention has been paid by historians to German war strategy in the Middle East, the Muslims of French North Africa were no less an item of interest to the German theorists of Pan-Islam. Becker was convinced of the likelihood of major revolts throughout French North Africa in the event of war in Europe<sup>17</sup>. Morocco especially seemed to promise important dividends due to its strategic position. Since the landing of the Kaiser at Tangier in 1905, the Moroccan people had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to Germany. By 1914, after two years of French rule, resistance still continued in the countryside and if given adequate support might cause considerable difficulties to France. For all of these reasons Morocco was singled out for special attention by German

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<sup>14</sup> German war strategy is elaborated in Fritz FISCHER, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf, 1961), English trans. *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York, 1967).

<sup>15</sup> The clearest discussion of German strategy in the Middle East is contained in Jon KIMCHE, *The Second Arab Awakening* (New York, 1970), pp. 17–40. More generally, Ulrich TRUMPENER, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918* (Princeton, 1968), and Frank G. WEBER, *Eagles on the Crescent, Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914–1918* (Ithaca and London, 1970). Cf. also, Carl BECKER, *Deutschland und der Islam* (Berlin, 1914); Georg KAMPFFMEYER, *Nordwestafrika und Deutschland* (Berlin, 1914); and Ernst JACKH, *Die Deutsch-türkische Waffenbruderschaft* (Berlin, 1915). For a hostile French view, A. BERNARD, »Allemagne et l'Islam«, *Afrique Française* (1915), pp. 88–90. Hereafter cited as A. F.

<sup>16</sup> Thus, for example, German funds helped finance the activities of Pan-Islamic groups in Egypt, through the Deutsche Orient Bank. Archives, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris) Maroc. Defense Nationale. IX, De France to Cruppi, 7 June 1911, No. 297.

<sup>17</sup> BECKER, *op. cit.*



strategists concerned with causing difficulties in France's North African empire.

In the month which preceded the outbreak of war in Europe, French intelligence became aware of an increase in arms-smuggling activity into Morocco. The source of the weapons was Germany, and they were destined for Moroccan resistance groups, in particular for the forces of Mawlāy Aḥmad al-Hayba in the Sous valley<sup>18</sup>. Under the circumstances, Lyautey deemed it advisable to crack down immediately on the German community living in Morocco. When war broke out, orders were issued to expel all German diplomats, and to arrest and question all German civilians. Allegedly incriminating evidence was found sufficient to justify drastic measures. A German businessman, Karl Ficke, was executed on August 2, along with three of his comrades. The German civilians were eventually sent to a French prison camp in the Algerian interior at Sebdou<sup>19</sup>. The measures taken by Lyautey were harsh, but the situation was judged perilous. News of the outbreak of war in Europe had given new vigor to Moroccan resistance groups everywhere. Rumors were abroad in the countryside that France intended to evacuate Morocco. As the bands of resistance fighters jockeyed for position and waited for their opportunity, the political situation in the pacified territory continued to deteriorate.

Already on July 28, in anticipation of the war, Lyautey received an urgent directive from Paris, ordering him to dispatch all available troops immediately to the metropole, and to withdraw his remaining forces into coastal enclaves until the end of the war. After reflecting on the consequences of so drastic a step, Lyautey responded that while he was in complete agreement on the need to make all necessary sacrifices for the home front, he could not accept the order to evacuate the interior of Morocco. »Such a shock would result immediately all over Morocco . . . that a general revolt would arise under our feet, on all our points . . .«<sup>20</sup> Instead he chose to retain French advance posts along the limits of submitted territory, and dispatch all of the reserves and support troops to the front. Within a month, over thirty-seven battalions and six artillery batteries had been embarked for France, more than had originally been requested

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<sup>18</sup> Archives. Ministère de la Guerre (Vincennes), Section d'Afrique et d'Outre-Mer, Maroc Serie E. Carton 12-bis, Rapport du Commissaire Resident General sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc, July 4, 1919, No. 71 C. M. C. This report will hereafter be cited as Rapport sur l'Action Allemande.

<sup>19</sup> A. F. (1914), *passim*. Lyautey gives his justifications in Pierre LYAUTEY (ed.), *Lyautey l'Africain* (Paris, 1954), Vol. II, pp. 317-320. For a view of a participant, see the memoirs of Albert Bartels, tr. by H. J. STENNING, *Fighting the French in Morocco* (London, 1932).

<sup>20</sup> P. LYAUTEY (ed.), *Lyautey l'Africain*, Vol. II, p. 243.

of him<sup>21</sup>. This apparent weakness of French forces presented the Moroccan resistance forces with an opportunity.

By November, the last of the French occupation troops were departing for the front. Before the armature of French posts could be securely established, however, French troops suffered a major defeat in the field. On November 13, a column commanded by Colonel Laverdure, after an impetuous raid on the camp of Moha Ou Hamou, the leader of the powerful Middle Atlas Berber tribe of Zaian, was decimated at a place called El Herri. In all, the French suffered losses of 623 men killed and 176 wounded, making the defeat one of the most disastrous suffered by France in modern colonial annals. Perhaps most important, the men left the bulk of their arms, including cannon and machine guns, on the field of battle. Even though the captured arms were recovered soon thereafter, the weakness of the French was exposed<sup>22</sup>. As soon as it became known elsewhere in Morocco, the battle of El Herri resulted in a new impetus to the resistance efforts of the tribes.

The plans which were activated by war strategists at the Political Affairs section of the Ministry of War in Berlin aimed at causing uprisings and confusion in colonies belonging to the Entente powers. Their strategy called for coordinated action by the various bands of resistance fighters throughout the country, aimed at a general rising. Germany would provide arms, money, and military advisors to the tribes. Pending actual planning for a mass insurrection, a major search went on to find a Moroccan leader of sufficient prestige to serve as the rallying point of such an effort<sup>23</sup>. Essentially, then the strategy was similar to the one which had been followed in August of 1912 by the Egyptian secret organization *al-ittihād al-maghribī*. The German intervention in Morocco went through several major phases during the course of the war.

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<sup>21</sup> *La Renaissance du Maroc, Dix Ans de Protectorat* (Rabat, 1922), P. 151. Although much criticized at the time, it is clear that Lyautey's daring move preserved Morocco for France.

<sup>22</sup> On the disaster of El Herri, General GUILLAUME, *Les berbères marocains et la pacification de l'Atlas central (1912-1933)*, (Paris, 1946), pp. 159-168.

<sup>23</sup> *Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande*. German war strategy with regard to Morocco and North Africa bears a striking resemblance to their policy in Persia during the war. There, also, the aim was to infiltrate men, arms and funds, and to crystallize a broad coalition of tribal forces against an Entente power. In Persia the principal role in organizing resistance to the British among the Bakhtiyari tribe was taken by Wassmuss. See, on German action in Persia, Dag. von MIKUSCH, *Wassmuss der Deutsche Lawrence* (Leipzig, 1937) and Percy SYKES, *Wassmuss, »the German Lawrence«* (London, 1936). More generally, Ulrich TRUMPENER, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918* (Princeton, 1968), and Frank G. WEBER, *Eagles on the Crescent, Germany Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918* (Ithaca and London, 1970).

The intervention of Germany and of Near Eastern Pan-Islamic groups in support of Moroccan resistance had been moderately successful in helping to stem the tide of French advance in Morocco prior to 1912, but in the absence of any leverage internally, the competition among resisting groups had seriously weakened the net effectiveness of such aid. In order for German attempts to bring about a crystallization of Moroccan resistance forces, three conditions needed to be satisfied. First, there would have to be a secure base within reasonable proximity to Morocco from which the campaign could be directed and financed, that is, a privileged sanctuary. The second necessary condition was that there would have to be a capable leader with sufficient prestige on a national level in Morocco that he could attract all resistance forces to him; and thirdly, this leader would have to be sufficiently well provided with funds and munitions to attract large numbers of supporters and to insure his position as chief arbiter of inter-group rivalries by virtue of his control over weapons.

The problem of finding a privileged sanctuary was resolved when the Spanish government, not wanting to be drawn into the struggle, adopted an attitude of neutrality. Since there was considerable sympathy for Germany within the government as well as Spanish society at large, this in fact amounted to a policy of *de facto* support for Germany<sup>24</sup>. There are a number of reasons why there should have been strong pro-German sentiment in Spain at this time. Some Spaniards, haunted by the humiliating defeats of 1898, had sought to reestablish Spanish prestige by a successful colonial venture in Morocco. They were outraged by what they regarded as the arrogance of France when it came to the division of the spoils in Morocco. All of the best land had gone to France, leaving Spain with the mountainous zone in the North. For these die-hard proponents of an enlarged Spanish role in Morocco, collaboration with Germany must have seemed a useful way of striking a blow at France. Others in the government and elsewhere in Spanish society greatly admired Germany for its military and industrial power, and saw in the adoption of German methods a way to bring about the regeneration of Spain. In addition, Spanish business interests with important mining and other concessions in Morocco were closely connected with German firms. Many of them were in fact subsidiaries of international corporations in which substantial German capital was invested<sup>25</sup>. Then too, especially in the cities of Barcelona, Malaga, Algeciras, and Cadiz there were sizable expatri-

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<sup>24</sup> P. LYAUTEY (ed.), *Lyautey l'Africain* (Paris, 1956), Vol. III, pp. 34-42, details the involvement of Spain. Also, Raymond CARR *Spain, 1808-1939* (Oxford, 1966), pp. 497 to 500.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* Also, RIVIÈRE, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

ate German communities, and many Germany business establishments. Not surprisingly, these cities tended to be centers of pro-German feeling. Clearly, there was substantial support for Germany and the Central Powers in important sectors of the Spanish government and within the business community.

During the war Spain served in important ways as a clandestine base for German activities, and Morocco was but one focus of these actions. In all there were some 80,000 Germans in Spain by the end of 1914, including substantial numbers of German businessmen and officials repatriated from Africa, most of whom inhabited the ports along the Mediterranean coast<sup>26</sup>. Many of them were recruited for the war effort, and were involved in seeking to infiltrate propaganda, funds, agents, and occasionally arms to groups supporting the Central Powers in Africa, and North and South America. Instructions and funds were dispatched from Berlin via telegraph by the Political Section of the General Staff. The German Embassy in Madrid, with its ambassador Prince Max von Rati-bor, and military attaché Major Albert Kalle, had overall authority for the secret operations in Spain. Lower echelons in the hierarchy included the consular and diplomatic personnel in the ports, German civilians resident in Spain, and repatriated personnel from the German colonies in Africa. German submarines for a time were able to utilize the port of Cadiz, although strenuous protests from the Entente powers brought an end to that<sup>27</sup>. Only so long as the German operations remained discreetly removed from public attention could they be allowed to continue. Otherwise, official Spanish neutrality would be placed in jeopardy, and the government forced to intervene to put a stop to them. Throughout the period of the war, therefore, Spain was used as a staging area for clandestine warfare by the Central Powers.

In order for the original German plans of a general insurrection to be successful, a Moroccan leader of stature who was willing to cooperate in the venture was required. Yet throughout the war, the Germans continued to be plagued by difficulties in finding such a person. The first choice of German strategists was a former sultan, Mawlāy ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (1894 to 1908). Tentative negotiations with him broke down soon after the war began, however, and to cut short further intrigues, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz moved to the south of France where he remained for the duration of the war<sup>28</sup>. Thwarted in their attempt to win over ʿAzīz, the Germans turned next to his elder brother Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Hafīz (1908–1912). Despite the fact

<sup>26</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. Also Lyautey L'Africain, Vol. III, pp. 34–42.

<sup>28</sup> A. F. (1916), p. 5; Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande.

that he had been the Moroccan ruler to sign the Treaty of Fez with France in 1912, 'Abd al-Hafiz possessed considerable prestige in 1914. He had originally come to power in 1908 as a champion of Moroccan resistance, to which cause he remained committed until his abdication in 1912. As a religious scholar and proponent of Islamic reformism along Near Eastern lines, Hafiz had special prestige in the eyes of the tribes. Perhaps most importantly, 'Abd al-Hafiz was known to be strongly pro-German. In brief, he had numerous qualities which recommended him to German military strategists, and they continue in their attempts to persuade him to take the leadership of the anti-French cause until June, 1916.

In the fall of 1914, breaking with his public pro-Entente stand, 'Abd al-Hafiz left Tangier and moved to Spain. He took up residence in Barcelona, and there began to frequent the officials of the German consulate and the members of the German community of the city. Making no secret of his favorable attitude toward the Central Powers, he entered into prolonged secret negotiations with German officials about leading a regenerated Moroccan resistance effort<sup>29</sup>. At the same time, he entered into correspondence with Moroccan resistance leaders, and with Turkish officials in Istanbul. As the negotiations dragged on, however, it gradually became apparent that he had no intentions of returning to Morocco. Instead, 'Abd al-Hafiz vacillated over whether to become the leader of a new »jihād« in Morocco, or to sell his information to French intelligence. In the end, this attempt at extortion almost backfired upon him. Hafiz refused to take part in a projected German submarine landing in Morocco, thereby moving German military strategists in Berlin to dispense with the idea of using him, while at the same time he aroused the French (to whom he had in the meantime been feeding information) to cut off his pension and have him interned at El Escorial. Despite this lengthy history of duplicity, in June, 1916 the German government agreed to pay him a substantial pension to prevent him from further compromising their efforts<sup>30</sup>.

The failure to find a sufficiently prestigious sharif to head resistance activities in Morocco induced German strategists in Madrid and Berlin to alter their plans. If a mass insurrection was unfeasible, there remained the option of supporting the regional groupings of resistance fighters. It was this strategy which was in fact pursued during the remainder of the war. Even before the negotiations with 'Abd al-Hafiz had failed, Germ-

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<sup>29</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande.

<sup>30</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Messimy to General Duparge, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands au Maroc, 2ème partie, November 5, 1916, Secret. Hereafter cited as Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands.

an planners decided to begin by building up regional efforts, with the expectation that when a suitable leader was selected they could merge these activities into a common effort<sup>31</sup>. At the same time, to make its intervention more palatable to Moroccans, Germany was careful to associate Turkey with its efforts. A small mission was solicited from the Committee on Union and Progress government at Istanbul, and Ottoman military advisors joined German agents in the field. Thus German involvement in Morocco took place under the banner of Pan-Islam. In this manner the tendency of Moroccan resistance forces to turn toward the Near East and Germany for support was perpetuated during the war<sup>32</sup>.

A schematic view of the progress of the war in Morocco reveals the following major phases. From the outbreak of the war in August until March of 1915, the German command in Madrid devoted itself to preparing the ground for a major insurrection through the development of the system for disseminating propaganda and smuggling arms into Morocco. In the meantime, the search continued for a prominent Moroccan to lead the »jihād« against the French. Moroccan tribes were greatly heartened by their victory at El Herri in November, and redoubled their efforts. The evacuation of the interior of Morocco by French troops, and the news of the first German victories on the western front provided further cause for optimism. The massive deployment of French political efforts, and the harsh repressive measures taken against the German community in Morocco only partly dampened the enthusiasm of the tribes.

German efforts to attract to their cause a prominent sharif came to fruition in March, 1915, when the Amīr ʿAbd al-Malik decided to join them. Born in Damascus and educated in the Near East, ʿAbd-al-Malik Muhyī al-Dīn was a son of the famous Algerian resistance leader, Amīr ʿAbd al-Qadir. As a young man, ʿAbd al-Malik had served in the Ottoman army, and rose to the rank of captain. In 1902 he came to Morocco and began a career marked by bizarre twists and turns<sup>33</sup>. At the outbreak of the war in 1914, he was an officer in the Moroccan port police based at Tangier. In March, 1915, after sending his family to Tetouan in the Spanish zone (were they would be safe from French police) he made his way to the Rif where he sought to gather supporters to attack the French<sup>34</sup>. A new phase of Moroccan resistance was beginning.

German and Turkish support enabled ʿAbd al-Malik to continue resistance throughout the war. From the outset his camp received a steady

<sup>31</sup> A. F. (1916), p. 5; Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande.

<sup>32</sup> The history of the activities of C. U. P. agents in Morocco during the war will be examined below, section 4.

<sup>33</sup> ʿAbd al-Malik has been but little studied. On his antecedents and early career, cf. Pierre GUILLEN, *L'Allemagne et le Maroc, 1870-1905* (Paris, 1967), pp. 680-681.

<sup>34</sup> A. F. (1916), pp. 5-6.

stream of agents of the Central Powers. The first German advisor to join him was Franz Farr, an ex-businessman who served as liaison with the German command in Madrid<sup>35</sup>. When Farr died in November, 1915, he was replaced by Albert Bartels, another former businessman who remained with 'Abd al-Malik until 1918<sup>36</sup>. A substantial number of deserters from the French Foreign Legion joined the party and provided needed technical advice. During the war, 'Abd al-Malik was in constant contact with the Young Turk government in Istanbul through his uncle, the Amīr 'Ali, who was vice president of the Ottoman parliament and a known proponent of Pan-Islam<sup>37</sup>. A Turkish advisor named Muhammad Nūrī was also in his camp during much of the war<sup>38</sup>. The core of 'Abd al-Malik's fighting force was composed of 1500 tribesmen from the eastern Rif and Jabala. Regular supplies of arms and money smuggled in by the Germans enabled operations to continue with little interruption. As a result of this external aid, 'Abd al-Malik constituted the principal focus for resistance forces in northern Morocco.

A lesser guerrilla leader in the north of Morocco during the war was Mawlāy Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, a sharif from Beni Arous in the Jabala district. During the period of governmental instability which had preceded the protectorate, al-Raysūnī had risen to become a major figure in the hill country below Tangier and Tetouan. Although technically a native official of the Spanish protectorate government, he became a rallying point for many of the Jabala tribes who wished to attack French posts near Wazzan during the war. From 1916 until 1918, al-Raysūnī received German support, and launched several offensives against the French<sup>39</sup>. Unfortunately for the cause of resistance, however, he was never able to coordinate his actions with 'Abd al-Malik, and the mutual suspicion which

<sup>35</sup> Farr claimed to be a mining consultant employed by the Compagnie Navarette, interested in a Rifian concession. He held an American passport, but was in fact a lieutenant in the German army. Farr arrived in Morocco on June 25, 1915 and remained active in organizing resistance in the Rif until his death on November 26, 1915. For a detailed inside account of Farr's activities by a German deserter from the Foreign Legion, see Robert de SEGONZAC, *Carnet de Route de Fritz Bottjer A. F.* (1917), pp. 124-127.

<sup>36</sup> Albert Bartels began his career in Morocco in 1903 as an employee of the German firm Brandt and Toel at Mogador. His memoirs, *Fighting the French in Morocco*, present a fascinating picture of the wartime career of this »German Lawrence.«

<sup>37</sup> Amīr 'Ali was the fifth son of 'Abd al-Qadir. In addition to serving as Vice President of the Ottoman parliament, he was Deputy from Damascus. He served as chief publicity agent for 'Abd al-Malik, with whom he was in regular contact throughout the war. It was through his intervention that the German press service, Agence Wolff, regularly carried information concerning resistance in Morocco. *A. F.* (1916), pp. 5-6.

<sup>38</sup> BARTELS, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

<sup>39</sup> In addition to the pages of *Afrique Française* for the period, on the action of al-Raysūnī, see Rosita FORBES, *El Raisūnī* (London, 1924).

divided the two resistance leaders in the north handicapped the war effort in the region.

Among the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas, resistance had been constant ever since 1911. It was the Zaian, a Middle Atlas Berber tribe, which had won the signal victory at El Herri in November, 1914. The warlike tribes of the Middle Atlas were therefore in many ways the soundest bet for German strategists to keep intense pressure upon the French posts. But due to the difficulties of communication with the coast, there was a limited amount which could be done to supply them with arms and ammunition. Moha ou Sa'īd of the Berber Ait Wirra near Kasbah Tadla was the principal beneficiary of this aid<sup>40</sup>. The mutual jealousies and antagonisms which divided the tribes of the Middle Atlas further limited the possibilities for a coordinated military campaign. The development of a Berber policy by protectorate authorities during the war, which played upon these differences of opinion, skillfully reduced the threat which they posed. After the French recovered from the defeat of El Herri, therefore, the region never again constituted a major threat.

The leader of Moroccan resistance forces in the south of Morocco was the sharif Mawlāy Aḥmad Haybat Allāh (known as al-Hība)<sup>41</sup>. As the son of the noted scholar and patriot Mā al-ʿAynayn, and the conqueror of Marrakech in 1912, al-Hība possessed considerable prestige among the tribes of the Sous valley. From his base at the city of Tiznit he continued to struggle to reestablish the coalition which had made him so powerful a figure in 1912. Al-Hība was in contact with the Ottoman sultan and C. U. P. leaders at Istanbul through his brother Aḥmad al-Shams, who was resident at the Ottoman court<sup>42</sup>. He was able to benefit from substantial amounts of German aid smuggled in past the watchful eyes of the French along the southern coast. In October, 1916, the Germans sought to land a party of advisors and a large supply of contraband weapons from a submarine. The inopportune arrival of a French warship, before the landings could be completed, led to the abandonment of the operation, however<sup>43</sup>. For the remainder of the war, al-Hība contin-

<sup>40</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc. The Zaian are discussed in Saïd GUENNOUN, *La Montagne Berbère* (Paris, 1929), pp. 193-201.

<sup>41</sup> On el-Hiba, see Robert de SEGONZAC, *El Hiba Fils de Ma El Ainin*, *Renseignements Coloniaux* (supplement to *Afrique Française*, hereafter cited as *R. C.*), 1917), pp. 62 to 69, 90-94. Also, Anon., *El Hiba et les Allemands*, A. F., (1918), p. 24 where his true name, Mawlāy Aḥmad Haybat Allāh ibn Mā al-ʿAynayn is given.

<sup>42</sup> de SEGONZAC, *El Hiba*, op. cit., pp. 91-92. El Hiba was in contact with the Spanish through another brother, Muḥammad al-Aghdāf at Tarfaya. Cf. Lyautey *L'Africain*, Vol. III, pp. 124-128.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90-94. Also, Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands, 1<sup>ère</sup> partie and 2<sup>ème</sup> partie. A second submarine landing was in the planning stage at war's end.



ued without great success to try to generate the momentum to threaten the French line of defense in the south.

French political control in the south of Morocco was exercised through the great barons of the Western High Atlas, among whom the notorious Glawī brothers were the most powerful. This system of indirect rule was able to withstand the onslaught of al-Hība with relatively little difficulty. In the upper Sous valley, French authority was represented by Haida ou Mouis, the Pasha of Taroudant. His forces were well supplied with French weapons, including machine guns and artillery, and were led by French advisors. The creation of a French post at Agadir in 1913 further reinforced the position of Haida ou Mouis<sup>44</sup>. Against this relentless pressure, German aid to al-Hība was insufficient to provide the necessary firepower to make a credible threat of the disparate coalition of tribal forces which gathered around him.

The French response to the activities of Moroccan resistance forces during the war were not confined to direct military counterattacks. The whole range of political and economic forces which the protectorate administration had at its disposal were employed to convince the rural populations to remain loyal to France. Those who remained beyond the range of French posts were given concrete demonstrations of French wealth and confidence, in an attempt to lure them into submitting. For example, as a way of showing French power, a series of commercial expositions was held beginning with the Casablanca Fair of 1915. In accordance with the principles of native policy à la Lyautey, French posts along the frontiers were charged with establishing markets, initiating public works projects employing local paid labor, and in general displaying the advantages of cooperation with France. Liberal distribution of bribes and propaganda helped to counter the attraction of the German-backed resistance movements such as that of 'Abd al-Malik<sup>45</sup>.

There was an additional reason for the French success in holding Morocco. French counterintelligence was very effective in acquiring information on the German war effort in Morocco, and in infiltrating the German ranks through the promise of bribes. Soon after the outbreak of war, Lt. Fourtoul, a nephew of Lyautey, was dispatched to the south of Spain to survey German penetration in the area. His report led to the establishment of a major French intelligence presence in the region, and to formal French protests to the Spanish government in Madrid about the violation of its neutrality. Simultaneously in Morocco a trusted Lyautey po-

<sup>44</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc.

<sup>45</sup> P. LYAUTEY (ed.), *Lyautey L'Africain*, Vols. II and III on French policy during the war. Cf. also, L. BARTHOU, *op. cit.*, and the collection of *Afrique Française* for period of the war.

itical affairs officer, Commandant Huot, was charged with the task of establishing a reliable network of French spies in Tangier and the Spanish zone to keep the protectorate government informed of the progress of German penetration<sup>46</sup>. British diplomatic posts in Spain and northern Morocco cooperated fully in sharing information with the French, and British naval intelligence based in Gibraltar further helped to keep track of German activities in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. As early as 1915, the French had broken the code used by the German Embassy in Madrid in communicating with the General Staff in Berlin<sup>47</sup>. From that time on, France possessed an almost complete record of the essential communications which passed between the two. The arrival of the Turkish military mission in Spain to aid in the clandestine operations in Morocco provided another opportunity for French intelligence to penetrate German security. As is recounted in greater detail below, the promise of bribes appears to have been sufficient to gain at least one and later several Turkish participants to the French cause, and to expose in detail the modalities of the Turkish participation<sup>48</sup>. Even without the French intelligence breakthrough, however, Moroccan resistance forces would have experienced disappointment in their military aims.

The final results of German and Turkish intervention in Morocco in support of resistance forces during World War I are certainly meagre enough. With the exception of a few temporary setbacks, the French protectorate was not significantly damaged by the military action of the tribes. Indeed, the amount of territory controlled by French troops in 1918 had increased over what it had been at the war's beginning. Yet it is also clear from the foregoing that the war was a major watershed for Morocco, and that while the economic and social consequences of the war were of considerable moment for the average Moroccan, they were by no means the whole story. The military and political aspects of the war were important as well. The cooperation of Moroccan rural resistance groups with Germany under the banner of Pan-Islam in operations against French occupation forces played a major role in demonstrating the importance of external links to the tribesmen. The patterns of German and Turkish involvement in Morocco did much to stimulate and reinfor-

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<sup>46</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Lyautey to Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 21, 1914.

<sup>47</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands au Maroc, 1ère partie, makes it clear that the German code was broken from early 1915, and that French intelligence possessed a complete record of all telegraphic correspondence between Madrid and Berlin. In addition French penetration of German and Turkish networks in both Spain and Morocco was very considerable, and accurate information on the German effort was readily available.

<sup>48</sup> On French bribes, see BARTELS, *op. cit.*, p. 151. Members of the official Turkish mission proved willing to sell confidential information to France from the beginning.

ce tendencies toward wider cooperation, but they also laid the seeds of bitter disputes between Moroccans and their would-be supporters, and among various factions of Moroccan resisters. These patterns are explored in the sections which follow.

### 3. Patterns of German Involvement in Morocco 1914-1918

From our sources it is possible to explore the essential features of the German program of action in Morocco. In this way the level of German involvement and the effectiveness of the external aid provided to Moroccan resistance forces can be estimated. Four main kinds of assistance can be distinguished. These were the provision of weapons, money, and trained military advisors, and the distribution of Pan-Islamic propaganda. In addition German military planners were also interested in several kinds of activities not of direct importance to Moroccan resistance »per se«, namely espionage and encouraging desertions from the French Foreign Legion. Neither of these last two activities will be dealt with here.

There were serious difficulties in getting large shipments of weapons past the vigilant eyes of French spies in the Spanish zone into the hands of Moroccan resistance forces. The principal points through which contraband arms were smuggled included Melilla and Alhucemas on the Mediterranean, Larache on the northern Atlantic coast, and the southern Atlantic coast below Agadir<sup>49</sup>. Smuggling was a way of life for Rifian tribes, and since the nineteenth century, weapons had constituted one of the chief items of that clandestine trade. The family of 'Abd al-Krim, for example, was involved in arms traffic during World War I<sup>50</sup>. Once into the Spanish zone, the arms would be sent via trusted couriers through the tribes until they reached their destination. Thus the Middle Atlas tribes received their contraband weapons from Larache, with the tribes of Branes and Ait Warrayn constituting the circuit into the French zone<sup>51</sup>. Other tribes received their arms in similar fashion.

Another way for the tribes to obtain weapons was to purchase them from Spanish army sources or from gun-runners in the French zone, with

<sup>49</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande. Also, RIVIÈRE, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> J. ROGER-MATHIEU, *Les Memoirs d'Abd el-Krim* (Paris, 1927), pp. 61-63; J. LADREIT DE LACHARRIÈRE, *Le rêve d'Abd el Krim* (Paris, 1925), pp. 99-102.

<sup>51</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc. A. F. (1918), p. 197.

money supplied by the Germans<sup>52</sup>. 'Abd al-Malik appears to have acquired large quantities of arms and ammunition in this fashion. There were always a few merchants who with no questions asked could obtain quantities of French military stores and sell them to the tribes. The French authorities, despite considerable effort to restrain this trade, were powerless to prevent it entirely.

While it is difficult to estimate the quantity of contraband arms delivered to Moroccan resistance forces during the war, some specifics can be offered. To begin with, it is clear that the tribal forces were frequently without sufficient arms and compelled to resort to expedients. While local artisanal manufacture of gunpowder and homemade cartridges could to some extent alleviate the chronic shortage of ammunition, resistance forces were handicapped in responding to the French threat. In the spring of 1916, for example, the forces of 'Abd al-Malik were left to confront a French counter-offensive with inadequate resources. According to the memoirs of Bartels, only forty modern rifles were on hand, most of the men being armed with out-moded French Chassepots and old muzzle-loaders of dubious accuracy<sup>53</sup>. Earlier, the strenuous protest of French agents at Malaga had led to the seizure of over 4000 rifles and 400 000 rounds of ammunition by Spanish customs officials<sup>54</sup>. Had they been available to 'Abd al-Malik, the results of the fighting against the French might well have been different. In July, 1916, a large shipment of munitions to the resistance forces in the north got through, including 3000 rifles and three million rounds of ammunition<sup>55</sup>. In the Sous valley, al-Hiba received several shipments of arms prior to the Proebster mission in the fall of 1916, and further supplies thereafter<sup>56</sup>.

In a more speculative vein, it seems likely that, given the major difficulties of smuggling weapons into Morocco and the problem of communications between one region and another, resistance groups situated nearest the main points of entry tended to acquire a disproportionate share of both munitions and contraband money. Resistance forces located in more out of the way places, for example in the Middle Atlas Berber tribes, received supplies of weapons and money only sporadically. One result of this

<sup>52</sup> A. F. (1916), pp. 247-248. Also, BARTELS, op. cit., p. 191. Especially for Middle Atlas tribes this appears to have been the more usual way for resistance groups to obtain arms.

<sup>53</sup> BARTELS, op. cit., pp. 129-130. According to Bartels, in 1918 only 500 modern rifles and 5,000 mixed and out-of-date ones were available for a major battle, along with 180,000 cartridges, half of which were homemade.

<sup>54</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc. Also, A. F. (1916), p. 73, with slight variation.

<sup>55</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands, 1ère partie.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. Also, Guerre, Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc.

pattern of distribution of arms was no doubt to reinforce existing tensions between tribes, and between one resistance band and another. An example which illustrates many of the problems inherent in control over key mountain passes or trade routes is that of the relations between 'Abd al-Malik and al-Raysūnī. At one point during the war, Tetouan became the central point for the smuggling of funds to the various resistance groups in the Jabala and Rif. In order for funds destined for 'Abd al-Malik to reach their destination they had to pass through the hands of al-Raysūnī, his supposed ally. Al-Raysūnī confiscated all of the money for himself, and refused to give it up even under strong German pressure. This helped to increase the friction between the two resistance chiefs, and handicapped the resistance effort<sup>57</sup>.

An additional observation can be made about the impact of contraband arms upon the balance of power between Moroccan resistance forces and the French. Continued superiority was assured the French by their virtual monopoly of field artillery and machine guns. Without cannon and machine guns rebel forces were unable to mount much of a threat against French posts. They had to confine their activities to ambushes and sudden commando raids in which surprise was a major element. A more direct confrontation with French forces implied a very high number of casualties, and this was generally deemed unacceptable by resistance leaders<sup>58</sup>. By way of contrast the startling success of 'Abd al-Krim against Spanish forces during the Rif War (1921–1926) depended upon his acquisition of large numbers of cannon and machine guns following the great victory of Anoual (1921)<sup>59</sup>. French troops were not likely to get themselves in so vulnerable a position because they were far better officered, and possessed superior intelligence about the enemy. The full effect of the Zaian victory at El Herri in 1914 was tempered by the immediate recovery of the machine guns and artillery pieces which had been lost.

The dispatch of funds to support the resistance activities of Moroccan tribes throughout the country was a carefully organized and efficiently

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<sup>57</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands, 1ère partie. Much the same difficulties were later to plague the wilāya commanders of the FLN during the Algerian revolution. Those nearest the borders freely appropriated weapons intended for their comrades further in the interior.

<sup>58</sup> The absence of machine guns and artillery is remarked by French observers. Cf. A. F. (1916), p. 73. BARTELS, *op. cit.*, p. 196, reveals the presence of at least one machine gun in the hands of 'Abd al-Malik. At the end of the war, Bartels was still waiting for a shipment of contraband machine guns (p. 229). For a discussion of the military balance of power between European and African units, which stresses the crucial role of the machine gun, see Michael CROWDER (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>59</sup> Arnold TOYNBEE (ed.), *Survey of International Affairs* (1925), Vol. 1, *The Islamic World* (London, 1927), p. 117.

conducted affair. The German Embassy at Madrid made recommendations to the Political Section of the General Staff in Berlin about which groups and individuals should be placed on the payroll, and how much they should be paid. The Political Section gave its approval and authorized the expenditures. Checks were made out by Major Kalle or other Embassy personnel, and drawn on Spanish affiliates of German banks like the Banco Alemán Transatlántico, the Banco de Castilla, or the Kutsche Bank in Málaga. Checks were generally issued in French francs or Spanish pesetas. Funds were then transferred from Spain either by boat or telegraphically to German agents in Tetouan and Melilla<sup>60</sup>.

Once in Melilla, the money was shipped in strong boxes, or hidden in trade goods through Spanish check points and across tribal districts to its intended recipient. Protection money was paid to insure smooth transit at each point along the way, and the complicity of the Moroccan Pasha of Melilla, Bashir ibn Sennah, and the chief of the Spanish native affairs bureau at Melilla, Captain Mermaita, could be counted on the guarantee that there was no trouble<sup>61</sup>. An alternative routing for funds intended for Mawlāy al-Hība in the south of Morocco passed via German authorities and banks in the Canary Islands before being transhipped to al-Hība's forces in the Sous<sup>62</sup>. There appear to have been more difficulties in keeping this route open, and several large dispatches of funds do not ever appear to have reached their destination.

The amounts involved could be quite large. In 1916, 'Abd al-Malik was receiving 300 000 pesetas per month for operation in the Rif, and by 1917 he was receiving (how regularly is uncertain) 600 000 pesetas<sup>63</sup>. When al-Raysūnī sought to get German backing, in return for promising to launch a military campaign against the French from the Jabala, he requested one million pesetas as a minimum necessary to get operations under way. After much debate, the Germans decided to grant him the money in installments<sup>64</sup>. Al-Hība in the south was the beneficiary of amounts which ranged from 300 000 to 600 000 pesetas per month<sup>65</sup>.

<sup>60</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. Also, A. F. (1916), p. 247.

<sup>62</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc. Also R. de SEGONZAC, *El Hiba, Renseignements Coloniaux* (1917), pp. 90-94, and Guerre. E-12 bis, *Action Allemande au Maroc*, February 24, 1918, No. 1422 9/11.

<sup>63</sup> See the estimates in P. RIVIÈRE, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Also, BARTELS, *op. cit.*, *passim*, and Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, *Action Allemande au Maroc*, February 24, 1918, No. 1422 9/11.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. Also, Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, *Les Agissements Allemands au Maroc*, 2ème partie. Also RIVIÈRE, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

<sup>65</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, *Action Allemande au Maroc*, February 24, 1918, No. 1422 9/11. Also RIVIÈRE, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Funds to al-Hība were routed through Larache and the Canary Islands to Tarfaya.

It is clear that the leaders of resistance in the Middle Atlas also received (no doubt, more irregularly) shipments of money as well as arms from the Germans. In the beginning of the war, Moha ou Hamou, the head of the Zaian and father-in-law of ex-sultan Mawlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīz, was the principal beneficiary of German favor. No doubt this was true at least partly because of the mystique of the victory of El Herri. By 1916, however, the relative inaction of the Zaian had convinced the German policymakers that support of other Middle Atlas Berber leaders, especially Moha ou Saʿīd al-Irawarī and Sīdī ʿAlī Amhawsh, should be granted primacy<sup>66</sup>. The chief recipient of German money, and arms among the more northern group of Middle Atlas Berbers was Sīdī Rāhū, resistance leader of the Ait Yūsī and the Ait Serghouchen<sup>67</sup>. There can be little doubt that the sending of funds had an important function in enabling regional bands of resisters to remain on the offensive during the period of the war.

French protectorate officials took very seriously the danger represented by German and Pan-Islamic propaganda in Morocco. In 1912, the Arabic newspaper »al-Haqq« published in Tangier under the auspices of the Spanish Legation, had been an important element in the abortive plot of the Pan-Islamic group »al-ittihād al-maghribī«. Near Eastern Arabic newspapers and even the French opposition press were banned by protectorate authorities on more than one occasion<sup>68</sup>. From the outbreak of the war, French officials were alert to the printing of large numbers of Pan-Islamic leaflets and brochures in the Near East and Germany for distribution elsewhere in the Islamic world.

The range and variety of propaganda materials being diffused in Morocco during the war indicates that there were three principal places – Istanbul, Berlin, and Madrid – where tracts were composed<sup>69</sup>. At Istanbul, overall Turkish war propaganda was in the control of Enver Pasha, and was funded at five million marks per year. An employee of the Arab section of the Ottoman Ministry of War who had earlier seen action in Morocco, Salah ibn Sharīf al-Tūnisī, was the author of numerous pamphlets aimed especially at Moroccans<sup>70</sup>. In July, 1915, French

<sup>66</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'action Allemande au Maroc. Also A. F., p. 249, where the difficulty of supplying the Middle Atlas tribes is made clear.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. Also A. F. (1916), pp. 64 and 249.

<sup>68</sup> On the role of »al-Haqq« in the abortive rising of 1912, see A. F. (1912), pp. 354 to 356, as well as Anon., Le Panislamisme et la France, Le Temps (Paris), November 2, 1912. In 1915 »al-Haqq« was still being employed to diffuse Pan-Islamic propaganda in Morocco. Lyautey L'Africain, Vol. III, p. 38.

<sup>69</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, de Saint-Aulaire to Ministry of War, July 26, 1915, Telegramm No. 302 G. bis. Also, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, de Saint-Aulaire to Ministry of War, July 26, 1915, Telegramm No. 302 G. bis. Lyautey L'Africain, Vol. III, pp. 40–41.

intelligence sources discovered one such booklet turning up in Morocco in large quantities. In Germany, it was the Society for Islamic Culture at Berlin which was a major source of tracts to be distributed<sup>71</sup>. By 1918, the propaganda effort had become so sophisticated that tracts were being composed not only in Arabic and French, but also in the Middle Atlas Berber dialect, »thamazight« (written using the Arabic alphabet)<sup>72</sup>.

The Spanish zone of Morocco was employed as a staging area for German and Turkish attempts to infiltrate anti-French materials into the French zone. The consular postal service, which benefitted from diplomatic immunities, was often used to mail anti-French materials into the French zone<sup>73</sup>. From the beginning of the war much effort was devoted to generating unrest among the pacified tribes of the French zone, and to encouraging Muslim soldiers of the Moroccan auxiliary forces to desert their units and join the rebels. News of German victories were widely publicized, and proclamations of the Ottoman sultan calling for »jihād« were disseminated. Much of this propaganda was sensationalist in tone, such as the 1914 leaflets which announced that Casablanca had been captured by Moroccan resistance forces – when in fact French forces were still at Taza<sup>74</sup>.

As has been briefly mentioned above, French protectorate authorities were very alert to the potential dangers of the propaganda of the Central Powers. In fact, they were able successfully to curb most of the effect of this intensive anti-French campaign by a carefully orchestrated counter-campaign of their own. Trade fairs, like that held at Casablanca in 1915, demonstrated the continued wealth and power of France. Incessant political action by French native affairs officers prevented any spectacular defections of prominent leaders. The thousands of new jobs and economic opportunities for Moroccans which were opened up during the war by the economic policies of the protectorate administration gave many Moroccans a stake in a continued French presence. Finally, French officials skillfully utilized the religious position of the sultan in Morocco to combat Pan-Islamic influences from the Near East. Prominent Moroccan religious scholars were induced to deliver »fatwās« (formal legal opinions) in which they upheld the claims of the Moroccan sultan to the caliphate

<sup>71</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Bulletin de Renseignements (Questions Musulmanes), December 3, 1916, No. 8.188 9/11, which includes a list of the chief members of the Society.

<sup>72</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Boissanas to Briand, August 19, 1918, No. 254.

<sup>73</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, de Saint-Aulaire to Ministry of War, July 26, 1915, Telegram No. 302 G. bis. Also, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande, op. cit.

<sup>74</sup> A. F. (1915), pp. 75–76 gives several examples of the exaggerated propaganda which was being diffused in Morocco in 1914.



by virtue of his sharifian descent, and denigrated the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan<sup>75</sup>. The success of all of these French efforts to retain the loyalties of their Muslim subjects cannot be doubted. Throughout the war there were few disturbances in submitted territory, and the war effort of the Central Powers in Morocco produced few lasting effects.

German support for Moroccan resistance was finally of relatively little advantage to the war effort of the Central Powers. Large numbers of French troops were not tied down in Morocco as had been hoped by German strategists, and Morocco continued to supply raw materials and labour for the French throughout the period. Entente control of the seas greatly limited the possibilities of German intervention. Despite important efforts at smuggling in weapons and money, the Moroccan resistance effort suffered chronic shortages throughout the war, and was never able to do more than parry the vigorous French political and military offensive designed to keep the resistance forces off balance.

#### 4. P a t t e r n s o f T u r k i s h I n v o l v e m e n t i n M o r o c c o 1914 – 1918

There is no question that the support of Germany was by far the most significant material aid received by Moroccan resistance forces during World War I. It is accordingly especially easy to overlook the significance of the Turkish participation in the war effort in Morocco. Turks were recruited by Germany to serve in Morocco as early as 1915, and Turkish Pan-Islamic propaganda was an important ingredient in the propaganda effort of the Central Powers in Morocco. What was the extent of Turkish involvement in Morocco? Why was Germany so interested in gaining the participation of C. U. P. agents? The answers to these questions will take us into a clearer understanding of the overall significance to Moroccan resistance forces of the external support provided by the Central Powers during the war.

The Turkish Embassy in Spain in 1914 was represented only by a secretary, Ibrahim Zia Bey<sup>76</sup>. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Major Kalle, the German military attache in Madrid, became convinced of the need of Turkish assistance in carrying out plans for a general insurrection in Morocco. The Young Turk government was app-

<sup>75</sup> *Revue du Monde Musulman*, XXIX (1914), pp. 303–386, esp. 323–382, where the »fatwās« of the leading Moroccan »ulamā« on the question are printed in French translation.

<sup>76</sup> *Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc.*

roached on the subject with assurances that Germany would pay all of the expenses of an Ottoman mission. On October 27, 1915, after lengthy negotiations the C. U. P. finally agreed to dispatch a small group of experienced agents. Traveling under Bulgarian passports, the Ottoman mission eventually arrived in Spain in November<sup>77</sup>.

The leader of the Turkish contingent was Prince 'Azīz Ḥasan, a liberal constitutionalist opponent of the C. U. P. His second in command, Commandant 'Arif Ṭāhir Bey, had considerable earlier experience in Morocco. He had been the commander of the Turkish military mission to Morocco in 1909–1910, and a leader of the »al-ittihād al-maghribī« conspiracy of 1912. In addition he had also seen service with Ottoman irregular forces in Libya in 1911, as part of the attempt of the »teskilat-i mahsuṣa« (Ottoman special branch) to organize resistance against the Italians. Other members of the mission included Commandant Aḥmad Shukrī Bey, Captain Aḥmad Khayrī Bey, another Turkish officer, Ghamsi Efendi, and an Albanian named Kismett<sup>78</sup>. To avoid openly violating Spanish neutrality the group was attached to the staff of the Turkish Embassy.

The fact of Ottoman involvement in Morocco may strike some as strange. The demands of the war in the Middle East clearly took priority over involvement in North Africa for the Ottomans. A long-standing dispute between the Ottoman and Moroccan sultan had moreover barred official relations between the two. Despite these impediments, however, the Ottomans had begun to intervene in support of Moroccan resistance from 1909, when a military mission had been sent to help train the Moroccan army under 'Abd al-Ḥafīz. Through the policies of Enver Bey, one of the Young Turk triumvirs, the support of resistance movements among Muslim peoples beyond the frontiers of the Ottoman empire was encouraged even before the outbreak of the war. The dissemination of Pan-Islamic propaganda, and the supply of money, arms and trained officers were twin aspects of this policy. On the outbreak of World War I, it was therefore natural that the Young Turk government should seek to utilize Pan-Islam to stimulate opposition among the Muslim subjects of the British and French. The Ottoman special branch, »teskilat-i mahsuṣa« was the chief instrument for subverting of the loyalties of Muslims under Entente control<sup>79</sup>. French colonies in North Africa, partic-

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. Lyautey L'Africain, Vol. III, p. 35.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. On 'Arif Ṭāhir Pasha, cf. BURKE, Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance, op. cit., pp. 109–114.

<sup>79</sup> On the role of the »teskilat-i mahsuṣa«, see Phillip H. STODDARD, The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teskilat-i Mahsuṣa, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1963.

ularly Morocco, were of course prime targets in this effort of »export revolution.«

Little is known about the extent of Turkish involvement in Morocco during the war. There is some evidence that there were additional efforts besides that of the six-man »official« mission. Agents of »teskilat-i mahşuşa« were allegedly directly involved in action in Spanish Morocco, especially around the city of Melilla. The future leader of the Rifian rebellion (1921–1926), Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Krim, claimed in 1962 to have been an agent of »teskilat-i mahşuşa« in Morocco during the war. His arrest by Spanish authorities in 1917 after repeated French complaints about his complicity in arms smuggling and the dissemination of anti-French propaganda helps add credence to this story<sup>80</sup>. Among the members of the official Turkish mission to Spain, several saw active service in Morocco. Ghamsi Effendi spent about a year in the Jabala with the forces of al-Raysūnī in 1916–1917, while Aḥmad Khayrī Bey participated in the ill-fated Proebster expedition to the Sous in the fall of 1916<sup>81</sup>. Another Turk, not attached to the mission, who saw action was Muḥammad Nūrī<sup>82</sup>. He served in the Rif with ʿAbd al-Malik. There is reason to suspect that still other Ottoman agents may have been connected with the war effort in Morocco.

The Turkish military mission in Spain never really delivered its full promise. Few of the official Turkish contingent saw action in Morocco, and the contribution of the Turks to resistance was seemingly of little moment. Internal dissention racked the group, and there was steady bickering over the financial conditions of their employment with the German Embassy in Madrid (which was paying their salaries). ʿĀrif Ṭāhir in particular appears to have been a leader of these complaints. By late 1915 he was demanding that the Germans agree to pay group five hundred pounds sterling, and book them passage for America, or he threatened to reveal all he knew to the French. Under the pressure of this threat, lengthy and often acrimonious bargaining with the Germans was begun. The situation deteriorated rapidly in 1916, when news of Turkish repression of Arab dissenters in Beirut and of the outbreak of the Arab Revolt reached Spain. Since many of the Ottoman agents operating in Spain and

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 58a reports the interview with ʿAbd al-Krim. On his arrest by Spanish authorities, David S. WOOLMAN, *Rebels in the Rif Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (Stanford, California, 1968), pp. 77–78. Also Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur les Agissements Allemands au Maroc, 1ère partie.

<sup>81</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Rapport sur l'Action Allemande au Maroc. Also, Les Agissements Allemands, 1ère partie and 2ème partie; Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Valentin to Resident General, January 10, 1917, No. 225 9/11.

<sup>82</sup> BARTELS, op. cit., p. 140.

Morocco were in fact Arab, this news further reinforced the intransigent position taken by Ṭāhir and his supporters. The other members of the Turkish mission also began to take their distance from the project at this time, and to approach the French and British in an effort to insure their post-war situations. By September of 1916, an agreement had been worked out with the German Embassy by which all those who wished would be sent to America<sup>83</sup>. The other Turks in Morocco, who had not been connected with the Madrid contingent, seem to have continued their activity despite this turn of events. Far from enforcing the image of Germany as an Islamic power, the Turkish mission ended in a lamentable failure in which Germany had been made to appear ridiculous.

Why was Turkish participation in the effort to support Moroccan resistance at all necessary to Germany? The small size of the mission which was sent to Spain seems hardly calculated to substantially reinforce the German effort. The answer to this question, I feel, lies in a consideration of the ideological significance of Turkish participation. Without Ottoman participation, Moroccans tended to see Germany as one more European imperialist power. Only German opposition to Great Britain and France made an alliance with Germany even remotely conceivable. Turkish participation, accordingly, served to legitimate German involvement by associating Germany to the Pan-Islamic movement, thereby further underscoring for Moroccans the pro-Muslim sentiments of the Kaiser and the German people. The breakdown of the Turkish mission following the Arab Revolt was therefore an important blow to the German aims in Morocco, and helps explain the lengthy negotiations to retain the Turks. Since there was no choice, Germany had in the end of course to acquiesce in the departure of Ṭāhir and his friends. Actual Turkish participation and material support for Moroccan resistance was finally less important for the Germans than the credence which their presence lent to Germany as a reliable ally.

There is a second sense in which the Turkish connection was important: by demonstrating the access of particular Moroccan resistance leaders to the Ottoman sultan and Young Turk leadership, it enhanced their legitimacy against that of other would-be local resistance leaders. It is not without importance that the major Moroccan guerilla chiefs could boast an extensive correspondence with Istanbul as marks of their special status. In the competition between Moroccan resistance leaders, access to external support was evidently a major factor in determining power relation-

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<sup>83</sup> Guerre. Serie E-12 bis, Les Agissements Allemands au Maroc, 1ère partie, details the intrigues of Ṭāhir.

ships<sup>84</sup>. Charisma alone was not sufficient to make a resistance leader successful; or put slightly differently, an important sign of the possession of »baraka« might well have been the ready access to substantial supplies of arms, funds, and German aid of all kinds.

The Turkish involvement in the effort to support Moroccan resistance during World War I points up the persistence of Moroccan connections with the Near East, and underscores the continuities between an earlier mode of Moroccan resistance and later nationalism. The leaders of Moroccan resistance during the war were not the only ones to maintain contacts with the Near East – nor indeed the only North Africans to seek the support of the Central Powers for the internal struggle<sup>85</sup>. Long before Shakīb Arslān converted the Young Moroccans to Pan-Arabism and showed them the importance of external alliances with Near Eastern powers for the nationalist struggle, Moroccan resisters sought to play the Near Eastern card.

## 5. Conclusion

It is often enlightening to take the time to examine political movements in history which did not succeed. German support of Moroccan resistance during World War I clearly falls into this category. In the preceding pages, I have explored in some detail the modalities of German and Turkish aid to Moroccan resistance groups in an attempt to discover the bases of their successes and failures. The strategy which was adopted by Germany represented an important attempt to deal with the problem of scale mentioned in the introduction: that is, it sought to assemble a broadly based coalition of rural resistance groups under the leadership of a prominent Moroccan political personality. While a coordinated mass movement was never likely, in the process new forms of organization which cut athwart local particularisms to place Arab and Berber, peasant and tribesman, in close and prolonged contact were generated. Most importantly, these alliances were formed outside of the usual pattern of tribal alliances and represent a willingness to try a more coherent style of politics. With all of their weaknesses, therefore, the new forms of organization which were pioneered in Morocco during the First World War under

<sup>84</sup> Thus we note above, for example, that Moha Ou Sa'īd was invested with the title of Qaid of the Berbers by the Ottoman sultan and sent autographed letters. All of the major resistance figures during the war appear to have had regular communications with the Ottoman court: al-Hība through his brother Ahmad al-Shams, 'Abd al-Malik through his uncle Amīr 'Alī, 'Abd al-'Hafīz and Raysūnī via direct correspondence.

<sup>85</sup> Other known North African affiliates of »teskilat-i mahsusa« include 'Alī Bash Hamba, 'Abd al-'Azīz Shāwīsh, Shaykh Sālīh al-Tūnisī and Sharīf Bourguiba (father of Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia), all of Tunisia.

German and Turkish sponsorship are signs of a growing political sophistication among the most backward groups of Moroccan society.

The importance of German intervention, then, lay not in its military record (although Lyautey himself was at several points very much alarmed at the potential of the resistance forces). Rather, its importance was political. For in providing a focus for continued organized resistance on a country-wide scale, the German intervention helped to broaden the horizons of rural leaders. By placing leaders of resistance in constant communication with each other, as well as with Istanbul and Berlin, and by providing tangible signs of their membership in a wider range of political loyalties, German strategists were laying unawares the groundwork for later, more successful political groups, like the Rifian Republic of 'Abd al-Krim. While the available sources do not permit certainty on this point, it would appear that in the development and spread of new conceptions of political organization, the role of German and Turkish propaganda was of great importance. Throughout the war, propaganda leaflets and brochures were continually being distributed among the tribes. Their influence was an important reason for the increasing agitation in unsubmitted territory. While it is generally the case that propaganda was primarily directed toward the rural populations, some of it made its way into the cities and it is likely that there were discreet groups of urban notables opposed to the French presence throughout the war. We get some hint of the existence of such a movement in the cities in a brief note in »*Afrique Francaise*« during 1918, indicating that the Pasha of Meknes and his chief assistant had been arrested for communication with the enemy<sup>86</sup>. A study of the protectorate archives, when they are opened to researchers, can no doubt be expected to reveal further cases of such collaboration.

An unresolved question must now be addressed. Granted the importance of the German contribution to the war effort in Morocco, how does one explain the cooperation of Moroccan resistance forces who presumably were aware of the potential threat which Germany represented to Moroccan independence should France in fact be expelled? Was this even an issue for Moroccan leaders? During the pre-protectorate period, it was the Moroccan government which was in the forefront of the attempt to win the backing of the German government. Dissident Moroccan resistance leaders during this period also sought to open relations with Germany, but with private German interests like the Mannesmann brothers, and not with the German government. After 1912 this pattern changed. The Moroccan government was now in French hands, and the Moroccan

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<sup>86</sup> A. F. (1919), p. 26.

urban elite were for the most part either cowed into submission or clients of the French. Only semi-organized rural forces remained as active resisters. They sought German assistance, but with the clear idea of the difficulties of becoming too closely identified with German interests. It is therefore not surprising to discover that 'Abd al-Malik spent a considerable amount of time in keeping his distance from Albert Bartels and from the other German agents in his camp. According to Bartels, he was several times angrily informed by an important Moroccan advisor of 'Abd al-Malik named Muḥammad Ibn al-Ghiti (Belghiti, in the conventional form), that Moroccan independence and not the German war effort was uppermost in his mind<sup>87</sup>. In this context, the importance of the Turkish connection reemerges with renewed clarity.

The most widespread and effective aspect of the participation of the Central Powers in Morocco was, as has been noted above, the propaganda campaign. The tone of the resistance effort was substantially set by the widespread dissemination of Pan-Islamic propaganda. The presence of Turks alongside the principal resistance leaders testified to the importance attached to Morocco by the Porte in the eyes of most Moroccans. Auto-graphed letters from the Ottoman sultan, and a barrage of well-conceived propaganda in Arabic, further completed the impression of wider Islamic interest in the struggle in Morocco. Under the banner of Pan-Islam, rural resistance leaders could cooperate with Germany without apprehension. They could even, for the moment, accept German as well as Turkish aid and direction, while preserving freedom of action on most significant questions. Thus, for example, an individual like Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Krim could cooperate in anti-French smuggling and propaganda activities at Melilla while stoutly maintaining that Germany was primarily interested in the mineral wealth of the Rif, like all the other European powers<sup>88</sup>. This attitude should not, however, obscure from view the pro-Central power stance adapted by Krim during the war. Other Moroccans made their individual adjustments to cooperation with Germany. The expedient principle, »the enemy of my enemy is my friend«, remained however the main justification for Moroccan cooperation.

From the foregoing one is tempted to assert the connections between Moroccan resistance during World War I and later nationalism. The available sources do not support such a direct hypothesis. But the question

<sup>87</sup> BARTELS, *op. cit.*, pp. 108, 124.

<sup>88</sup> Andres SANCHEZ PEREZ, *Abd-el-Krim*, in *Selección de Conferencias y Trabajos Realizados por la Academia de Interventores Durante el Curso 1949-1950* (Tetuan, 1950), pp. 67-69. I am indebted for this reference to David M. HART, personal communication, February 27, 1972.

is worthy of further examination. The groups which were primarily involved in the struggle against the French during the war were from the most backward segments of Moroccan society. Their participation in the war effort, the experience of being part of a wider effort of resistance which was capable of being articulated in a language of politics shared with Muslims throughout the world, as well as with non-Muslims – all of these things can only have represented the broadening of political horizons and the movement toward a more complex political view of the world. The testimony of later Moroccan nationalists about the rural resistance movements indicates the inspirational quality which the continuing struggle in the countryside had for young Moroccan nationalists<sup>89</sup>. Moroccan resistance to France during World War I appears to have played an important role in the gradual development of new forms of political organization among the rural populations of the country.

In the wake of several decades of militant and successful movements of national liberation in Africa and Asia, the tendency to see nationalism as inevitably triumphant has grown especially intense. In the process, the reliance of most nationalist movements on external sources of support, whether it be exiled leaders, foreign sympathizers, or governments, has receded from view. As a result, one of the most signal characteristics of nationalism as a political ideology, that is, its manipulability by outside sources, has at least temporarily been ignored. In the case which has here been examined, the attempts of each side to influence and use the other for its own ends was marked. Indeed, it may be argued that Moroccan resistance forces received far more of benefit from their association than either the Germans or the Turks did. Especially weak and divided groups, like the rural Moroccan forces of opposition to France, were most apt to derive advantage from cooperation with a stronger power, and most tempted to do so too. Prior to the emergence of a full-blown nationalist movement in Morocco, such assistance was especially needed. That the benefits lay more in the realm of broadening political horizons, rather than that of material aid received, should not surprise us.

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<sup>89</sup> See, for example, the opinion of 'Alāl AL-FASĪ, *al-Harakat al-istiqlāliyya fī al-maghrib al-ʿArabī* (Marrakech, 1956), pp. 105–108.