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»A REAL FOREIGN COUNTRY«: BAVARIAN PARTICULARISM
IN IMPERIAL GERMANY, 1870-1918*

The most glamorous issue of German historiography during the past decade has been the notion of »social imperialism.« As a market leader, however, this blue-chip has begun to show signs of fatigue. What began in the late 1960s as a radical challenge by a younger generation of historians against their elders is now becoming, in its turn, a widely accepted and already rather conventional wisdom. It is symptomatic that many of the early proponents of the social-imperialist emphasis have become frankly bored with the entire controversy and have turned their attention to other matters. Since most of them are now established in university chairs, the rhetorical excess of their earliest formulations has become something of an embarrassment, and we are beginning to read in their post facto explanations that such verbal overkill was actually intended as a heuristic device. The term »heuristic device« is ordinarily employed, it seems, when one intends neither to defend a proposition nor to retract it.¹

Thus, for example, the expression »Bismarckian dictatorship« was introduced after 1945 – and especially in the late 1960s – as some historians searched for explanations of Nazism and, in doing so, chose to stress the continuity from imperial to totalitarian Germany. But the subliminal associations of this terminology were not and could not be adequately sustained by a solid analytic framework. Beyond that, both the mood and the tone were wrong. However autocratic and unscrupulous Bismarck may have been, the atmosphere of the Second Reich was not similar enough to that of the Third to justify a common denominator of »dictatorship.«²

A similar but more subtle problem was posed by the phrase »Bismarck's Bonapartism.« Repeated tirelessly in article after article, this epithet epitomized

* And review on: Manfred RAUH, *Die Parlamentarisierung des deutschen Reiches*, Düsseldorf (Droste Verlag) 1977, 523 S.

¹ For example, see the defense of »Primat der Innenpolitik« as a »polemischer Gegenbegriff« by Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, *Moderne Politikgeschichte oder ›Grosse Politik der Kabinette‹?* in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, I (1975), 344–69; and his amplification of that theme in: *Die Sozialgeschichte zwischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte und Politikgeschichte*, in: *Sozialgeschichte und Strukturgeschichte in der Schule*, Bonn 1975, pp. 13–25.

² Notably, Bismarck's »dictatorial will to power« was criticized by Heinrich HEFFTER, *Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 1950, pp. 654–77. This charge was vigorously denied by Gustav Adolf REIN, *Die Revolution in der Politik Bismarcks*, Göttingen 1957, pp. 81–132. See the analysis by Hans BOLDT, *Deutscher Konstitutionalismus und Bismarckreich*, in: Michael STÜRMER (ed.), *Das kaiserliche Deutschland. Politik und Gesellschaft 1870–1918*, 2nd ed. Darmstadt, 1976, pp. 119–42.

for a time the new historiographical gospel.³ The specific allegation was that Bismarck, like Napoleon III, had carried out a »revolution from above«, deliberately conjuring and exploiting diplomatic crises so as to maintain a firm grasp on the levers of power and to throttle internal opposition. Thus the mirror image of »pragmatic expansionism« abroad was a plebiscitary autocracy at home: a kind of German Bonapartism. Certainly there is much to be said for such a view, and much has been said.⁴ The further one ventures out onto this analytic structure, however, the more insecure its comparative buttresses become. In a number of crucial respects – political, social, and economic – the circumstances of the French Second Empire did not in fact precisely correspond to those of Bismarckian Germany.⁵

Among the peculiarities of the German constitution of 1871, for which there was no genuine parallel in France, was the federal system. The relatively long delay of German nationhood meant among other things that localism and regionalism were simply facts of life that could not be obviated no matter how Germany was unified. Bismarck possessed no miraculous powers with which to banish these special interests; nor, of course, as a self-respecting Junker and a faithful servant of the Prussian crown, did he have any compelling reason to do so.

Hence we are confronted with a subject that will not disappear, even though it has never achieved the radical chic of some other historiographical problems. One of the obvious reasons for the silence surrounding German particularism is that much of the relevant literature is technical, antiquarian, and just plain dull. Mostly it is of two kinds: either constitutional and legal history or local and regional monographs. Neither is apt to set bells aringing or feet astomping. But if we are to understand imperial Germany at all, these are matters that cannot be neglected.

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To derive a precise definition of German particularism is problematic. In the parlance of American politics the equivalent term that most readily comes to mind is »state's rights.« This has the limitation as well as the analytical advantage of initially restricting discussion to the political realm and of ruling out of consideration various cultural protests or minority movements that might have their own reasons for wishing to thwart the claims of a central state authority. Valuable as a sociological study of these problems might be, the original concept of particularism seems more appropriately confined to political science. The point of departure, in short, is government.

³ Especially see the essays by Helmut BÖHME, Michael STÜRMER, and Hans-Ulrich WEHLER in: STÜRMER, *Das kaiserliche Deutschland*, pp. 26–50, 143–67, 235–64.

⁴ This thesis underlies the massive work by WEHLER, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, Köln–Berlin 1969, and is elaborated by him in: *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918*, Göttingen 1973.

⁵ Allan MITCHELL, *Bonapartism as a Model for Bismarckian Politics*, in: *Journal of Modern History*, XLIX (June 1977), 181–209.

Hence it is useful to conceive a fairly broad gauge of political opinion stretching from federalism to particularism to separatism. Admittedly the boundaries cannot be sharply demarcated, but it is relatively easy to distinguish ideal types at one end of the spectrum from the other. The federalist is one who supports the aspirations of his region (or specifically his state's rights) within the given constitutional framework in order to preserve or augment local privileges but without the intention of throwing into question or indeed of destroying the central authority. Federalism implies, therefore, that the relationship between the central government and its member states is considered sound and requires at most some adjustment. The federalist is thus willing to tinker within an accepted governmental system. At the opposite extremity, as the name indicates, the separatist meanwhile adopts a distinctly more belligerent stance toward the centralizing authority of the nation-state. The threat of a complete rupture is never absent from this view and gives it emotional force, especially when the central government proves uncompromising in enforcing its demands. Although separatism might be democratically motivated, taking the form of vigorous protest against autocracy, its primary thrust – certainly this was true in the German case – is more likely to be an insistence on the inviolability of local prerogatives. Whenever these are deemed to be threatened, the separatist call to militancy (*Bayern den Bayern*) is bound to be heard.

Between these two types, for which concrete historical examples are not difficult to identify, stands the particularist. The term suggests an attachment to the principle of state's rights but leaves unspecified the degree of ferocity. Uncomfortable as we may be with such imprecision, it would be distorting not to concede that an essential ingredient of particularism is its ambiguity. By the very nature of his middlingness the particularist wants to have it both ways: to join in a greater political enterprise and yet to preserve the familiarity of local traditions. How could the circumstance have been perceived otherwise by millions of Germans after 1870 who had long taken for granted certain indigenous arrangements but who were simultaneously confronted with both the thrill and the threat of an unprecedented national unity?

If one were to have taken a reading before 1890, the fluctuating needle of German politics was probably pointing uncertainly toward the center of the gauge. Thereafter it began to drift toward a milder form of federalism. Only in rare instances was there a sudden spasm back in the opposite direction, the most extreme episode of which occurred at the end of the Empire when Kurt Eisner delighted himself and many of his fellow Bavarians by breaking off diplomatic relations with Berlin. But that is another story.⁶

The foregoing typology permits us to enumerate in rapid order three interim conclusions from which to proceed. First, German particularism was by no means static; it was not a fixed reality of which the contours were drawn in 1871 without being susceptible to further change. Second, the nature of particularism varied considerably, depending on the specific region, state, or locale. Third,

⁶ Allan MITCHELL, *Revolution in Bavaria 1918–1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republik*, Princeton 1965, pp. 126–42.

there is no adequate way to treat particularism apart from particulars. There is, in short, no substitute for a journey into the provinces.

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If a case for particularism in Bavaria cannot be made, then there is no case. If the largest and most populous of the non-Prussian states could not maintain a unique identity, then the federal system was truly a fraud and merely a front for Prussian domination. That Germany suffered from a bad case of *Verpreussung* in 1871 is a charge that has often been made, by no one more earnestly than the Bavarian premier and chief delegate to Versailles at the time, the Count von Bray-Steinburg. Worried that the concessions and special privileges accorded to Bavaria in the settlement would prove to be a delusion, Bray soon voted with his feet by resigning and withdrawing to an elegant diplomatic exile in Vienna. Surely he was correct to assume that the ultimate constitutional sanction favored centralism at the expense of particularism. One need cite only a single unambiguous paragraph of the imperial constitution: *Reichsrecht bricht Landesrecht*. Yet as we survey the ensuing half century of German history in retrospect, we may very well conclude that the rights obtained or retained by Bavaria were not so fatuous as Bray feared and as historians have sometimes imagined.⁷

Let us quickly review the stipulations germane to this discussion, leaving aside the four to five million marks passed under the royal table to Ludwig II who, in a brilliant stroke of mad genius, invested the sum in all those gorgeous castles that have brought Bavaria such handsome dividends in tourist dollars.⁸

The special constitutional prerogatives accorded to Bavaria fell into two categories: »membership rights« (*Mitgliedschaftsrechte*) and »reserved rights« (*Reservatrechte*). The former included the permanent vicechairmanship of the Bundesrat and the chairmanship of that house's Committee for Foreign Affairs. The latter assured that the state of Bavaria would retain its own citizenship laws, diplomatic corps, postal and railway systems, military command in peacetime, property insurance regulations, and beer and brandy taxes. Furthermore, the Reich's constitution left to the federated states whatever functions were not specifically allocated by law to the central government. The states could not secede from the Union, but neither could their identity be altered without their self-consent.⁹

⁷ Graf Otto von BRAY-STEINBURG, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben*, Leipzig 1901, pp. 119–204. See Eberhard WEIS, *Vom Kriegsausbruch zur Reichsgründung. Zur Politik des bayerischen Aussenministers Graf Bray-Steinburg im Jahre 1870*, in: *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, XXXIII (1970), 787–810.

⁸ See the disparate estimates of Ernst DEUERLEIN, *Deutsche Kanzler von Bismarck bis Hitler*, Munich 1968, p. 52; and Otto KIMMINICH, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 1970, pp. 424–25.

⁹ Ernst Rudolf HUBER, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, 4 vols. Stuttgart 1957–1969, III, 778–80, 806–07, 961–63, 999–1000. Also see KIMMINICH, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, pp. 428–40; and Otto PFLANZE, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany. The Period of Unification, 1815–1871*, Princeton 1963, pp. 486–90.

What did it all amount to? The answer to that question is rather more complicated than an enumeration of some constitutional provisions. In the interests of brevity we must confine ourselves here to only two considerations: diplomacy and taxation. This is to leave aside one aspect of the problem that is of special concern for the internal history of Bavaria before 1914, namely the political rivalry between the National Liberals and the more strongly particularistic Patriot Party. Our attention must focus here, rather, on the issues that above all served to define the evolving relationship between Berlin and Munich. Such an examination should suffice to offer at least a suggestion of the extent and importance of Bavarian particularism in imperial Germany.

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The diplomatic history of Bavaria after 1870 might seem to be a singularly unpromising topic – and in certain respects it is. The hope that Bavaria might exercise some control over the conduct of Germany's foreign affairs from the chair of the Bundesrat committee was only a mirage.¹⁰ Nor were the expectations fulfilled by which Bavaria was to play a crucial mediating role in contacts with the Vatican. True, Munich had a papal diplomatic representation whereas Berlin did not; but it was conspicuously designated as a *Nunciatur zweiter Klasse* and it was subject to constant changes of personnel: fifteen different nuncios appeared in Munich between 1871 and 1918.¹¹ Consequently, since both of these major conduits to Berlin and to Rome were blocked, it has often been assumed – falsely – that Bavaria's diplomatic exchanges provided nothing more significant than some extra frills for the Wittelsbach monarchy. Several things need to be said to the contrary.

In the first place, the influence of the court in Munich should not be altogether discounted. This was not a matter of political clout, of course, but of popular sentiment. The Bavarian royal family, for all of its difficulties, both embodied and deliberately cultivated a non-Prussian style of public life. The first thing to understand about Bavaria after 1870 is that the visual and audial impact of national unification was very slight. Citizens carried Bavarian passports and had their bags checked by Bavarian customs officials at the state border. Soldiers wore Bavarian uniforms in the barracks and on the streets, so that they made no impression of a Prussian occupation force. Blue-and-white checkered flags were everywhere; the imperial red-black-white was seldom seen. Bavarians licked their own postage stamps which they bought from Bavarian postal clerks in offices that did not bear the inscription above the door, »Kaiserliches Postamt,« which appeared everywhere else in Germany except in Württemberg. The administration of justice, like the bureaucracy, was Bavarian: judges and district attorneys and policemen were local rather than na-

¹⁰ DEUERLEIN, *Der Bundesratsausschuss für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten 1870–1918*, Regensburg 1955.

¹¹ KONRAD REISER, *Bayerische Gesandte bei deutschen und ausländischen Regierungen 1871–1918*, Munich 1968, pp. 47–67.

tional officials. And all of them spoke either Bavarian dialect or Hochdeutsch with a penetrating Bavarian accent.¹² Thus even when concessions to Bavarian sensibilities were »more symbolic than substantial,« as George Windell has observed, »they helped to preserve a climate in which particularism would remain respectable.«¹³ Bavaria's diplomacy has to be regarded in the context of that climate and as one manifestation of it. To the eye and the ear of an outsider, as Thomas Mann had Tony Buddenbrook write back to her Lübeck family from Munich, Bavaria remained »a real foreign country.«¹⁴

A second consideration worth noting was Bavaria's special relationship with France. The close traditional contacts between the two states were suddenly interrupted by the war of 1870 which, from a diplomatic viewpoint, afforded Bismarck an opportunity to interpose himself between the French and their South German colleagues. Consequently, in the peace negotiations leading to the treaty of Frankfurt, Bavaria was kept far from realizing that »direct influence on European affairs« which the Count von Bray-Steinburg had hoped to secure.¹⁵ The momentum of unification thus created a diplomatic hiatus, but Paris and Munich were eager to reestablish contact and made an exchange of legations in July 1871. Through their Foreign Secretary Jules Favre, the French expressed »satisfaction over the resumption of diplomatic relations between France and Bavaria.«¹⁶ We cannot pursue here a detailed narrative of events, but a few observations are appropriate.

Initially the only non-Prussian state of Germany to enjoy a direct exchange with France, Bavaria maintained a low profile there: the Bavarian minister was invariably deferential to his Reich superior – even, or perhaps especially, when the German embassy was occupied for many years by the Bavarian statesman Chlodwig von Hohenlohe. Yet the resulting lockout of the Southern states served to stir some resentment against Bismarck not only in Munich but also in Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Dresden, thereby nourishing the second thoughts that began to develop in the 1870s among certain southerners that they had been carried all too far into Prusso-Germany.¹⁷ Such reconsiderations, moreover,

¹² See the cryptic but suggestive treatment of this topic by Arnold BRECHT, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany*, 2nd ed. New York 1971, pp. 25–6, 48–51.

¹³ George G. WINDELL, *The Bismarckian Empire as a Federal State, 1866–1880: A Chronicle of Failure*, in: *Central European History*, II (December 1969), 291–311.

¹⁴ Thomas MANN, *Buddenbrooks*, translated by H. T. Lowe-Porter, New York 1961, p. 239.

¹⁵ Bray-Steinburg to Ludwig II, 22 November 1870, quoted by BRAY-STEINBURG, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, pp. 193–99. See Allan MITCHELL, *Bismarck and the French Nation 1848–1890*, New York 1971, pp. 55–71.

¹⁶ Rudhart to Ludwig II, 12 July 1871, GSA Munich, MA 2129. See Klaus STURM, *Frankreichs diplomatische Vertretung in München 1871–1914*, unpublished manuscript (1966) in the Institut für bayerische Geschichte, Munich.

¹⁷ This was evident even among Prussia's most loyal allies in Baden. Walther Peter FUCHS (ed.), *Grossherzog Friedrich I. von Baden und die Reichspolitik 1871–1907*, vol. I Stuttgart 1968, 15–18, 36, 76, and passim. See Lothar GALL, *Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei. Das Grossherzogtum Baden zwischen Restauration und Reichsgründung*, Wiesbaden 1968, pp. 475–78.

were increasingly stoked both by the *Kulturkampf* and by the onset of economic depression in 1873 which was widely blamed on Prussian mismanagement of the Reich. Although French diplomats generally realized that they could be little more than »discrete spectators« in this resurgence of South German particularism, their business was of course to promote a francophilia that was bound to encourage it.¹⁸ A small but characteristic episode was the reaction in Germany to the succession of Marshal MacMahon to the French presidency in May 1873: whereas a formal diplomatic letter was sent from Berlin to Versailles which stiffly (and, conspicuously, in German) began *Herr Präsident*, the corresponding note from Munich bore the warm salutation *Notre Grand et Bon Ami, Monsieur le Président de la République Française* and was signed simply »Louis.«¹⁹ Thus recommenced the long flirtation between France and Bavaria that lasted throughout the ensuing decades, without which the brief affair of Bavarian separatism following the First World War would not be entirely comprehensible. They were like two childhood sweethearts who had failed to marry when young but remembered the thrill of a first romance and later enjoyed the temptation of a geriatric fling.

The French connection also helps to explain the formation of a diplomatic front between Bavaria and the other major non-Prussian states in the mid-1870s. This began when a Bavarian deputy openly criticized Bismarck in the Reichstag for his failure to keep the state governments sufficiently informed about French and Spanish affairs. The Bavarian premier at that time, Pfretschner, personally took the matter up in the Wilhelmstrasse, only to conclude that the »given circumstances« – meaning Bismarck's distemper – would prevent the virtually defunct Bundesrat Committee on Foreign Affairs from convening.²⁰ But the eruption of the »war scare« with France in 1875 provoked the Württemberg premier Mittnacht to make a similar and more urgent inquiry directly to Bismarck whether the Bundesrat Committee might not be a »useful instrument« of diplomacy after all.²¹ This time, confronted with evidence of more widespread disaffection in the South, Bismarck attempted to appear more conciliatory. He whispered sweet nothings to Mittnacht and then stalled. But the problem would not evaporate. First Mittnacht consulted with Pfretschner, then both of them met with the Saxon premier Friesen so that the three could jointly

¹⁸ Lefebvre de Béhaine to Rémusat, 10 July 1872, MAE Paris, Bavière 251. See REISER, *Bayerische Gesandte*, pp. 8–46.

¹⁹ Ludwig II to MacMahon, 16 June 1873, GSA Munich, MA 83277. That the contrast was altogether deliberate is proved by another document: »Promemoria den Gebrauch der französischen Sprache im diplomatischen Verkehr von Seiten Bayerns betreffend«, 16 June 1873, *ibid.*

²⁰ Perglas to Ludwig II, 5 December 1874, GSA Munich, MA 2654; Pfretschner to Perglas, 9 January 1875, GSA Munich, MA 1045.

²¹ Mittnacht to Bismarck, 7 June 1875, Bismarck Nachlass, Schloss Friedrichsruh, B 79.

²² Bismarck to Mittnacht, 16 June 1875, BISMARCK, *Die gesammelten Werke*, 15 vols. Berlin, 1924–1935, XIV/b, No. 1541. Freiherr von MITTNACHT, *Erinnerungen an Bismarck*, 5th ed. Berlin 1904, pp. 33–40. See DEUERLEIN, *Der Bundesratsausschuss*, pp. 70–91; and Karl WELLER, *Württembergische Geschichte*, 4th ed. Stuttgart, 1957, pp. 195–97.

present their grievances to Bismarck in Berlin during a session of the Bundesrat in December 1875.²²

All of which foreshadowed Bismarck's first major political setback as chancellor: his inability to force nationalization of the German railways in 1876. Initially it was assumed, as one French official wrote back to Paris, that Bismarck would »succeed once again in violating the federal constitution.«²³ But resistance to the railway scheme broke with »unexpected vigor.« Even Ludwig II was heard to grumble in a rare moment of lucidity: »if our railways are taken away, that will be the beginning of the end.«²⁴ Opposition to Bismarck's plan quickly solidified in Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg as well as in Hesse. When Landtag elections in Württemberg in January 1877 produced a strong shift away from the National Liberals and toward the particularists, Bismarck's initiative collapsed. In discussions about the construction of a new Berlin–Dresden rail line, as the French chargé d'affaires in Munich reported, the chancellor was ostentatiously »concerned to respect the susceptibilities of the separate governments.«²⁵ The entire plan proved to be an embarrassing fizzle, and to his credit Bismarck did not disguise the reason: »the non-Prussian states,« he said, would »seek to make out of the *Reichseisenbahngesetz* a bulwark against the Reich – a Magna Carta of particularism.«²⁶



Although the taxation issue was already evident in Bismarck's time, it can better be examined during the period after 1890. The problem was, in brief, that the Reich's taxing powers were restricted not only by the constitution of 1871 but also by the precedents of state's rights. In the days when the distinction between direct and indirect taxes was thought to be clear, the Reich had tacitly conceded the right to levy direct taxes to the member states. The rub was that with a burgeoning military budget in the 1890s – first for the army and then for the navy – the need of the central government for more revenue became acute.²⁷

Perhaps the best way to analyze the ensuing struggle is to focus on Bavaria's stubborn defense of the precious beer tax. The Bavarian excise on the state's favorite brew was higher than elsewhere in Germany. This enabled the Munich government to pay its share into the Reichskasse, commensurate with the obli-

²² Tallenay to Decazes, 14 January 1876, MAE Paris, Correspondance commerciale: Stuttgart 6.

²³ Lefebvre de Béhaine to Decazes, 3 March 1876, MAE Paris, Bavière 256.

²⁴ Lefebvre de Béhaine to Decazes, 12 March 1877, MAE Paris, Bavière 257.

²⁵ Bismarck to Bülow, 15 December 1877, quoted by Hans GOLDSCHMIDT, *Das Reich und Preussen im Kampf um die Führung*, Berlin 1931, p. 192. See Helmut BÖHME, *Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht*, Köln–Berlin 1966, pp. 381–82; and Frank B. TIPTON, Jr., *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the Nineteenth Century*, Middletown (Conn.) 1976, pp. 139–40.

²⁷ The general background is set forth in detail by Manfred RAUH, *Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus im Wilhelminischen Reich*, Düsseldorf 1973, pp. 208–41, 263–346; and by Peter-Christian WITT, *Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913*, Lübeck and Hamburg 1970.

gation of other states, and still retain a sizable portion with which to help meet Bavaria's own budgetary requirements. Thus any assault on the beer tax was in an important sense a threat to Bavarian independence. If the Reich claimed a larger share, Bavaria would be forced either to raise the beer tax further, or to forfeit the surplus revenue, or else to raise new tax proceeds in another fashion. All three of these choices were disagreeable and to be avoided if possible.²⁸

The stratagems by which Bavaria fought a rearguard action in defense of the beer tax were principally two; and the ironic fact is that both finally led Munich into an informal alliance with Berlin. One was to shift the increase of excise on spirits from beer to wine. This suited Prussia and Bavaria well enough but not Baden, Württemberg, or Hesse which were at first overruled in the Bundesrat but which then counterattacked in the Reichstag. Tax legislation was thereby delayed for a time but, especially with the imposition of higher agricultural tariffs, the Reich's income was substantially increased as the levy of indirect taxes – except on beer – began to grow.²⁹

The second defensive tactic was to permit the Reich to make a limited incursion into the heretofore jealously guarded domain of direct taxation. This, too, has a long and complicated history in its own right, but the salient points to note are: 1) that Bavaria actually cooperated in allowing this breakthrough of the Reich's taxation powers; and 2) that Bavaria did so primarily to protect its own special interests. This seeming contradiction is resolved by a study of the 1905–1906 tax reform which allowed, for the first time, the introduction of a Reich inheritance tax – although, to be sure, only on distant relatives. Symptomatic of the Bavarian perspective on the proceedings was the fate of the beer tax: originally proposed at 67 million marks out of 180 million in new taxes, it was reduced in the final bill to just 29 million marks. Similarly, two years later, in the ultimate version of another tax measure which permitted a drastic increment in the Reich's revenues from tobacco and brandy, the beer tax rose to only 37 million in a total allocation of 500 million marks.³⁰

If these statistics do not speak unequivocally for themselves, they do reflect the persistent resilience of Bavarian particularism and the congenital imperfection of national unification. The termination of the Bülow regime in 1909 and the subsequent disarray of the Tirpitz naval program are but two conspi-

²⁸ RAUH, *Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus*, pp. 213–14.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 139–50. Also see J. C. G. RÖHL, *Germany without Bismarck. The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890–1900*, London 1967, pp. 98–102. It is important to bear in mind that the internal politics of imperial Germany were sporadically marked by disharmony among the major non-Prussian states and jealousy displayed by the others toward Bavaria. As one prominent Bavarian representative in Berlin once remarked with exasperation: *Sobald es sich darum handelte, etwas für Bayern zu erreichen, liessen uns die süddeutschen Bundesbürger meist im Stich*. Hugo Graf von LERCHENFELD-KÖFERING, *Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten, 1843 bis 1925*, 2nd ed. Berlin 1935, p. 197.

³⁰ RAUH, *Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus*, pp. 263–97, 316–46. In an impressive sequel the analysis of this volume has now been extended to 1918 by RAUH, *Die Parlamentarisierung des Deutschen Reiches*, Düsseldorf 1977.

cuous aspects of a faulty tax structure in which state's rights continued to play a crucial part in the history of imperial Germany.³¹

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Three general conclusions come immediately to mind. First, in any interpretation of imperial policy after 1870, it makes far more sense to conceive of Bismarck as a mediator between central power and state's rights than as the Great Unifier. His leniency toward particularism had a number of explanations: a desire to protect Prussian prerogatives; a wish to stunt the development of parliamentarianism; and also a need to assuage doubts among South Germans as to the wisdom of acknowledging Berlin as the omnipotent capital of the German nation. The last of these motives ought not to be crowded out by the others.

Second, Bavaria's stance in imperial Germany should likewise be regarded as ambiguous and not as that of a consistent proponent of state's rights. The reasons were of course elaborately and deeply rooted in Bavarian history. But they were also related specifically to the curious financial arrangements by which the Reich had recourse only to retrogressive measures of indirect taxation, whereas the member states possessed by precedent the supposedly more democratic power of direct taxation. For the liberal cabinets which dominated Bavaria's administration throughout most of the Empire's existence, this was a nagging dilemma. To ignore it is to overlook a basic and complex component of particularism.

Finally, it is apparent that a disproportionately intensive effort has already been expended on the constitutional history of imperial Germany. What is lacking is a comparative social history of the Reich's member states in order to measure more accurately the distance between constitutional paragraphs and life styles. If Bavarian particularism actually persisted in imperial Germany, it did so above all in the daily routine of the Bavarian people – in the sights and sounds and smells of which we still know too little.

³¹ V. R. BERGHAN, *Der Tirpitz-Plan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II.*, Düsseldorf 1971; these issues are more succinctly reformulated by him in *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914*, New York 1973, pp. 73–84, 155–59.