Francia. Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte
Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris
(Institut historique allemand)
Band 34/3 (2007)

DOI: 10.11588/fr.2007.3.50755

nous ne pouvons, hélas, passer complétement sous silence. Mais c'est un sujet si triste que malgré notre insensibilité scientifique nous reculons devant les détails. Il s'agit des seins, dont je dirais seulement qu'ils ne sont plus des saints, mais des martyrs« (S. 66).

Nicht nur in künstlerischer und menschlicher Hinsicht bildet »Le Verfügbar aux Enfers« ein einmaliges Zeugnis. Den Historikern liefert die Operette auch interessante Hinweise auf die besondere Lagerrealität eines Frauenkonzentrationslagers. Dazu gehört – wie im angeführten Zitat – die Körpererfahrung von Frauen und an anderer Stelle die Thematisierung von Weiblichkeit und (Homo-) Sexualität. Erfreulicherweise wurde dieses außergewöhnliche Zeugnis vom Verlag in der ihm gebührenden Form veröffentlicht. So ist der Originaltext auf der rechten Buchseite als farbiges Faksimile und auf der linken gedruckt zu lesen, womit eine optimale »Rekonstruktion« gewährleistet wurde. Dort, wo das Kontextwissen zum Verständnis fehlt, helfen präzise erläuternde Kommentare von Anise Postel-Vinay, Freundin und Schicksalsgenossin in der Deportation. Schließlich ist der gesamte handschriftliche Text als ein zweites Faksimile in Nachahmung des Originals als kleinformatiges Heft dem prächtigen Band beigegeben.

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Jörg Ganzenmüller, Das belagerte Leningrad 1941–1942. Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern, Paderborn (Ferdinand Schöningh) 2005, 412 p., ISBN 3-506-72889-X, EUR 38,00.

This book is an excellent history of a Soviet region during the Second World War. Ganzenmüller worked in the German Military and in seven Russian archives and seems to have tracked every single relevant publication in order to write about Leningrad during the Second World War. A revision of a doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Freiburg in 2003, his book discusses the respective roles of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, the evacuation of industry and people out of Leningrad, military production, famine, and Soviet terror on the inside, and the way in which Soviet and German societies used to remember the siege. It arrives at original and convincing conclusions.

Ganzenmüller argues that Adolf Hitler thought far less than is often assumed about the symbolic weight of Leningrad as the cradle of the Bolshevik Revolution. He worried far more about the addition through conquest of a large number of non-German mouths to feed, which he believed would create food shortages among the Germans. This obsession with food shortages helps to explain why on July 8, 1941, Hitler decided in principle not even to attempt to capture Leningrad. The Nazi goal became to seal it off, and the *Führer* began fantasizing about destroying it. The decision was made before the Red Army had been able to offer any resistance near the city. Even when Soviet resistance came, to Hitler military strategic considerations remained secondary.

The ultimate result was what Ganzenmüller calls a »Hungerpolitik«, or hunger policy, that was tantamount to genocide. The conscious Nazi policy to isolate Leningrad »was aimed at destroying large parts of a disliked population« (p. 79). Ultimately stemming from a racist outlook on the world, Hitler and his followers justified the mass murder to themselves as necessary for feeding the homeland, and thus for victory in the war. Their aggressive disavowal of responsibility for feeding the Soviet population quickly hardened into a doctrine to which all German decision makers in the field adhered. No Soviet surrender should be accepted. (The one exception was the supreme commander of Army Group North, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, who remained willing to accept Leningrad's surrender should it come.) The Nazis knew what happened next. As Joseph Goebbels put it in his diary in September 1941, a drama unfolded that had no precedence in world history. Hitler told an audience in November 1941 that Germany's opponent was going to »starve to death

in Leningrad«. In line with this thinking, the secret General Plan East of 1942, which planned to Germanize Soviet cities by twenty percent in five years and by half in fifteen years, did not even mention Leningrad.

Ganzenmüller argues that the *Genozid* against the people of Leningrad had various components. German artillery shelled bread factories, central food supply institutions, and (from the middle of December 1941) traffic into the city, and German soldiers were ordered to shoot refugees. (Though in practice, he adds, such shootings remained rare.) In addition, in the occupied regions close to Leningrad it was official policy to prevent the local civilian population from getting food, and tens of thousands of them were deported to barren places. Inside besieged Leningrad, 1 to 1.3 million civilians starved to death, or possibly about half of its population.

From the Nazi perspective, the genocide was not entirely successful. City life survived the first winter, and though Hitler in July 1942 planned the »removal« (flattening) of the city two months later, a Red Army attack on August 27 south of Lake Ladoga punched a hole in the German encirclement. Ganzenmüller sees similarities with the development of the Holocaust of the Jews in eastern Poland. He believes that had all the Jews been murdered, the Nazis would have focused their »dynamic of destruction« *(Vernichtungsdynamik)* on the Slavs of the Soviet Union. That is, the genocide against Leningrad was merely a first step in that broader direction, just as were the killing campaigns against the Soviet prisoners of war and disabled Soviet civilians.

Ganzenmüller argues that after the fall of 1941, when the German high command reduced the number of German troops in the Leningrad region, the Red Army was working to liberate Leningrad, not to *defend* it (as Soviet propaganda claimed); the Wehrmacht was both unwilling and incapable of taking it. Although some Russian historians have argued in recent years that Stalin could have broken the encirclement sooner if he had wanted to, Ganzenmüller's appraisal of the man is more nuanced. The Soviet dictator was wrong to believe that the Germans wanted to capture Leningrad, but he did notice the comparative strategic insignificance of the region. Moreover, he authorized five Soviet attempts from September 1941 to January 1943 to break the blockade. In the remainder of 1943, the city remained subject to German shelling, but the Leningrad front barely moved as the Soviet command waited with its final push. It saw good reasons for doing so. The food situation had vastly improved (that is, the issue was no longer to put an end to the famine inside the city) and Leningrad still had a useful role to play in Soviet propaganda as a testimony to Soviet resilience.

Before the war, no Soviet plans for a possible evacuation of Leningrad had been made. On July 11, 1941, Stalin ordered the evacuation of its industry. Reports about the actual number of evacuated Leningrad factories, machines, and work benches are contradictory, but Moscow was disappointed. The removal of people was a low priority. So-called »non-independent« civilians came on the evacuation lists only from July 1942, a time when regional party leader Andrei Zhdanov decided that Leningrad had to become a productive frontline city. Officially, until mid-April 1942, 1 287 088 people were evacuated, or some 40 percent of the population, followed by 262 000 more between late May and early December 1942. The resulting total of 1.75 million cannot be verified, Ganzenmüller notes, who adds that it perhaps included wounded soldiers. In all, the evacuation was chaotic and dysfunctional, but Ganzenmüller emphasizes that the results were impressive given the circumstances. In this sense, the evacuation was typical for the Stalinist system that tolerated chaos but that had the ability to mobilize. Its mobilization tools were the familiar mixture of actions by an activist minority, propaganda, and material incentives. Another system would have been less successful, Ganzenmüller seems to believe.

The three chapters about life inside Leningrad conclude that June 22, 1941, was not a rupture in the history of Stalin's system of rule. The methods of the regime and the response of

its subjects remained the same. Already before the German invastion, the regime had created a war atmosphere as well as a constituency of loyalists (such as members of the Communist Youth League). Ordinary people took the leading role of the Communist party for granted and the regime never faced a serious crisis of legitimacy. The prewar terror also continued, something which Western studies neglect and all post-Soviet Russian studies but one ignore. (The widely held view that Stalin loosened his grip stems, Ganzenmüller shows, from a handful of mistaken Russian writers and intellectuals.) The NKVD arrested many people, and it deported thousands – 16 500 ethnic Germans (in 1941), 59 200 ethnic Germans and ethnic Finns (in 1942), 40 200 »social aliens«, and 30 300 alleged criminals.

In April 1944, a Blockade Museum was opened in Leningrad that devoted attention to human suffering. But it closed again during the purge of the city's officials in the last years of Stalin's reign. Nikita Khrushchev declared ordinary Leningraders to have been heroes again, and built the large Piskarev Cemetery to commemorate the siege. But until the very end of the Soviet period, in Leningrad as elsewhere in Russia, the dead remained on the margins of a memory culture that focused on resistance, survival, and victory. Soviet public culture (and East German historiography along with it) presented the blockade as a heroic tale. The first public commemoration of the closure of the ring was only on September 8, 1986. West German historiography meanwhile tended to dismiss Leningrad as a minor military operation against a population that supported the Red Army and hence was a legitimate target. Both memory cultures were alike in that they did not think of the events as the history of a genocide. Ganzenmüller appears to be the first historian to do so.

»Das belagerte Leningrad« is a fluent, gripping, and convincing narrative that evinces a sure grasp of German and Russian sources and studies. I must slightly disagree with the author in only one respect. He mentions that the Wehrmacht insisted on extreme ruthlessness in Soviet territory even before the invasion, and that in May 1941 there were high-level talks about the inevitability of millions of famine deaths in the Soviet space. Yet Ganzenmüller says there are no indications that genocide of the Leningraders was on the cards *(feststand)* at that time (p. 61). Moreover, a different outcome remained possible even in the first months of Operation Barbarossa. This is supposedly suggested by the way the German invader treated two other Soviet cities, Kiev and Kharkiv (Kharkov). There the German authorities supposedly allowed city dwellers to obtain food on the outside. Actually, Kharkiv's fate resembled that of Leningrad, as Ganzenmüller writes earlier in his book, and there is a great deal of evidence that Kiev was deliberately starved. Thus by May 1941, a policy to starve Soviet city dwellers was not inevitable, but it was more likely than this book argues.

This excellent book should be widely read by historians of the Second World War and historians of Soviet history alike.

Karel C. Berkhoff, Amsterdam

Sönke Neitzel, Abgehört. Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942–1945, Berlin (Ullstein-Propyläen) 2005, 639 S., 31 Abb., ISBN 13-978-3549-07261-5, EUR 26,80 – Richard Overy, Verhöre. Die NS-Elite in den Händen der Alliierten 1945. Aus dem Englischen von Hans-Ulrich Seebohm und Udo Rennert, Berlin (Ullstein-Propyläen) 2002, 656 S., 16 Abb., ISBN 3-549-07163-9, EUR 30,00.

Es ist inzwischen zu einer gängigen Formel geworden, daß die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit der Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges durch den Fall der Mauer eine neue Dynamik erhalten habe. Doch nicht nur im Osten, auch im Westen bergen die Archive noch Schätze, die es wert sind, entweder erstmals gehoben, oder aber – im Licht der inzwischen gewonnenen Erkenntnisse, noch einmal hervorgeholt und neu bewertet zu werden.