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Francia. Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte
Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris
(Institut historique allemand)
Band 13 (1985)

DOI: 10.11588/fr.1985.0.52115

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ALLAN MITCHELL

THE GERMAN INFLUENCE ON
SUBVERSION AND REPRESSION IN FRANCE DURING
THE EARLY THIRD REPUBLIC

In nineteenth-century France the histories of subversion and repression were inseparable. One searches for an appropriate image: they were two sides of the same coin, twin faces of Janus, extreme points on a political spectrum, the Scylla and Carybdis of social unrest. No matter. In any event their relationship was clearly symbiotic, each drawing sustenance from the reality and myths of the other. The ubiquitousness of the significant opposite was of course frequently exaggerated. Impending violence sometimes existed only in the mistrustful eye of the beholder. Conspirators or informers, clandestine anarchists or disguised agents were alleged to lurk in every bistrot and Bahnhof of Europe. It was a time for bogeymen, of whom two – Karl Marx and Otto von Bismarck – easily eclipsed all the rest. Their contorted and menacing countenances created a double exposure of every public disturbance for decades after the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune. The rational was unreal, and the unreal was rational.

Accordingly, subversion and repression constitute extremely elusive subjects of scholarly research. Depending upon where the investigator looks, there seems to be either too much evidence or too little; and none of it is impartial. Data must be pieced together from a variety of sources: statistical surveys, judicial records, police reports, ministerial papers, parliamentary debates, diplomatic dispatches, private correspondence, and even a scabrous chanson or two. Withal, we can never hope to amass the complete record of such a dispersed phenomenon, which by its nature depended so much on innuendo and intrigue. For such a subject archival documents are not ordinarily laid out in neat rows, as if for some notable episode in the public record: a military engagement, a formal treaty, a presidential election, or the passage of a fiscal reform. Too often, moreover, the sources are onesided. Plotting the progress of radicalism primarily through police records is much like reconstructing the life of the poor from wills left by the rich. Despite these obvious problems it should nonetheless be possible with persistence to illuminate a few dark corners and perhaps even to perceive a consistent pattern. If so, we may be able to fill in the lacuna between the crushing of the Commune in May 1871 and the resurgence of French socialism about a decade later.

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The outburst of insurrection in France during the spring of 1871 could not have been a total surprise for anyone aware of labor unrest that existed in the latter years of the Second Empire. True, the most important provocations of the Paris Commune were more immediate: Napoleon III's military reversals, the French people's sense of

betrayal, their fear of the foreigner, and the deep distrust in some quarters of a nervous provisional government that attempted to seize cannons from a few dozen rebels on Montmartre, thereby igniting the passions of mutiny¹. Yet one must view these events in a longer perspective, because a latent militancy undoubtedly antedated them and was to continue long afterward. Even before the war a writer in the fashionable »Revue des deux mondes« had described the situation of France as »pregnant with peril« – a reference not to a possible armed conflict with Germany but to presumed radical machinations of the International, »whose mysterious hand is to be found everywhere«. The specter of subversion was already at large².

Throughout France, in fact, the atmosphere was noticeably agitated. A major strike at Le Creusot received the most public attention in early 1870; but as Charles de Mazade commented, this commotion was »only the manifest expression of a more general movement«. He therefore found reason to fear that industrial strikes were »becoming a habit«³. From the intellectual perch of the »Revue des deux mondes« another contributor added that »these subversive ideas and these frequent material disorders« must be attributed to a »spirit of radical hostility against the existing order«. Such easily accessible evidence suggests that the Commune can scarcely be considered an anomaly⁴. Naturally the Bonapartist regime was fully aware of the radical thrust and was prepared to parry it. In a directive issued on 12 January 1870 the Ministry of the Interior advised that »the government will not tolerate any attempted disorder«. The prefects of France were instructed »to repress every arbitrary act, every excess of force, no matter who the perpetrator may be«⁵. Once the war began in July, that determination to defend legality and internal tranquility was further stiffened, because henceforth insurrectionary activity within France would be »a victory for the Prussians«. Under the circumstances of the German invasion, in other words, subversion was tantamount to treason⁶.

The Government of National Defense, like its imperial predecessor, was little disposed to tolerate civil disobedience, as the communards were soon to learn in the streets of Paris and the cemetery of Père Lachaise. Who was to blame for the rebellion? The first public statements by French politicians referred vaguely to »marauders«, »criminals«, »misérables«, and »demagogues«⁷. But who was behind them? There were two plausible hypotheses. Either the leaders of the Commune were German hirelings, whose purpose it was, as Ernest Picard put it, »to prepare the domination of

1 Among the most useful introductions to this subject and its vast bibliography are Stewart EDWARDS, *The Paris Commune, 1871*, London 1971; and Jacques ROUGERIE, *Paris libre 1871*, Paris 1971.

2 Louis REYBAUD, *Les agitations ouvrières et l'association internationale*, in: *Revue des deux mondes* 81 (1869), pp. 871–902. On the wave of labor strikes at the end of the Second Empire, see Michelle PERROT, *Les ouvriers en grève: France, 1871–1890*, 2 vols. Paris/the Hague 1974, 1, pp. 74–80; and Charles TILLY et al., *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*, Cambridge Mass. 1975, pp. 19–21 and passim.

3 Charles de MAZADE, *Chronique de la quinzaine*, *Revue des deux mondes* 86 (1870), pp. 752–64.

4 Paul LEROY-BEAULIEU, *La question ouvrière au dix-neuvième siècle: le radicalisme et les grèves*, *ibid.*, pp. 88–116.

5 Directive from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 12 January 1870, Archives Nationales (AN) Paris, F¹a 2125.

6 Advisory from the Conseil des Ministres to the population of Paris, 6 August 1870, Bibliothèque Nationale (BN) Paris, Papiers Ernest Picard, NAF 24371.

7 Such terms – employed by Adolphe Thiers, Jules Favre, Jules Grévy, and others – appeared in the parliamentary papers and minutes published by the *Journal Officiel*, 21 March–9 April 1871.

the foreigner«⁸. Or they were agents of the International, that is, members of a vast leftist conspiracy bent on social revolution. The short answer was Bismarck or Marx. Given these choices, the latter explanation was vastly preferable for the embattled regime of Adolphe Thiers for one compelling reason: it justified both repressive military measures and the collaboration with Germany that was indispensable to execute them. To deputies in the Assembly who could not bear to accept all of the implications of such a policy, including the forfeit of Alsace and Lorraine, Thiers posed the question bluntly: »Yes or no, do you want order?« They did⁹.

Once a bargain with Bismarck was struck, the official version was inevitable that the International was exclusively to blame. After all, even if the Germans had once encouraged instability in France, they no longer had reason to do so. By a process of logical elimination, the public danger stood on the left. Scattered reports from police informants seemed to confirm this conclusion: operatives of the International were said to be infiltrating the Army of Versailles as it prepared for the final assault on the capital, ostensibly with the intention of weakening the resolve of government soldiers to storm the city. If Marxist agents were actually charged with such a mission, one must observe, they altogether failed¹⁰.

For his part, Thiers was far from being an unwitting or unwilling stooge on the Kaiser's lap. He was eager to deal the Commune a devastating blow, and he ardently wished for his army to perform that task alone, while his German patrons literally watched at a distance through their binoculars. He therefore urged Bismarck to hold Prussian troops in abeyance and »to allow us to accomplish by ourselves this repression of anti-social brigands«. The leaders of the new French republic would thus demonstrate that they yielded to no one, not even the German chancellor, in their resolve to strangle the forces of subversion. »Let him count on us«, Thiers exclaimed, »and social order will be restored in the course of a week.« And so it was¹¹.

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Once the nightmare of the Commune was past, the imminent threat of subversive activity remained. Such, at any rate, was the suspicion of Foreign Minister Jules Favre, who cautioned French diplomats to keep a careful watch. The Commune, he explained, had been the creation of »deserters and foreigners«, many of whom had escaped and were still on the loose: »Like a vast freemasonry, their society envelopes all of Europe¹².« As usual, the organization to which he referred was the infamous International, headquarters of which were in London but with a base of operations in Geneva, where many French communards had fled. Favre was convinced that organized international subversion must be met with organized international repression. From this ideological acorn a giant oak flourished in Favre's imagination: something commensurate with the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars, at which Metternich's part would be taken by Bismarck and he, Favre, would appear as a

⁸ Ibid., 21 March 1871.

⁹ Ibid., 9 April 1871.

¹⁰ MacMahon to Thiers, 15 April 1871, Bibliothèque Victor Cousin (BVC) Paris, Papiers Barthélémy St. Hilaire, 122.

¹¹ Thiers to Favre, 21 May 1871, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE) Paris, Papiers Jules Favre, 6.

¹² Directive from Favre to French diplomatic agents, 6 June 1871, *ibid.*

latter-day Talleyrand to reestablish France firmly within the conservative comity of European nations. He consequently made diplomatic overtures to the Germans, who, he trusted, would acknowledge »the sincerity and effectiveness of our efforts to repress disorder and to establish the bases of a legal and respectable government«¹³. In confidence he elucidated his proposal for a gathering of European statesmen, defining its purpose as an »exchange of views« that would be »not a persecution but an investigation«. After mutual consultation the great powers would then be prepared to adopt »regulations derived from morality and common sense, which would serve both as a protection and an obstruction« against radicalism¹⁴.

Through the French embassy in Berlin Favre sought to elicit Bismarck's support for his project. He expressed alarm over information concerning a branch meeting of the International in Dresden, and he inquired whether the German government intended to tolerate »this scandalous provocation«. The response from Berlin was that Bismarck and the Kaiser were no less concerned about radical potential. Nor were they opposed in principle to repressive measures, especially at a time when every political issue seemed to bring a social disturbance. But it appeared dubious that England, albeit the seat of the International, would participate in a common cause¹⁵. Although the German reply was evasive, it was sufficient to satisfy Favre, who thereupon proposed to ask the ultimate question: how would Bismarck respond to the »idea of an international convocation«? This trial balloon was wafted eastward across the Rhine in mid-July 1871, less than two months after the liquidation of the Paris Commune¹⁶.

Germany's official reaction was far more qualified and cautious than Favre had anticipated. Not only must one reckon with English recalcitrance, he was told, but Italy was little affected and probably unconcerned. Moreover, of course, both St. Petersburg and Vienna would need to be consulted before any action was taken. To be sure, the general disposition of the major Continental powers could not be in doubt: it was certain that »the reprobation against the excesses of the Paris Commune [and] the desire to cure this European malady are unanimous«¹⁷. Thus the German attitude was not total rejection but indefinite delay. In reality, however, the statement that reached Paris was largely significant for what it hid and only hinted. In retrospect we know that Bismarck already had a better idea: the Three Emperors' League. Rather than include the French within the vanguard of conservatism, Bismarck chose to isolate the republic and to identify the Paris Commune as the source and inspiration of a radical conspiracy. Staked off as the seedbed of subversion, France would be vilified as a permanent menace to European stability¹⁸.

By the time Favre was replaced at the Quai d'Orsay by Charles de Rémusat in early August 1871, the mirage of a dramatic summit meeting had completely dissipated.

13 Favre to Fabrice, 10 June 1871, *ibid.*

14 Confidential directive from Favre to French diplomatic agents, 23 June 1871, *ibid.*, 7. See Allan MITCHELL, *The German Influence in France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic*, Chapel Hill 1979, pp. 40–43.

15 Favre to Gabriac, 11 July 1871, MAE Paris, *Allemagne 1*; Gabriac to Favre, 13 July 1871, *ibid.*

16 Favre to Gabriac, 15 July 1871, *ibid.*

17 Gabriac to Favre, 18 and 21 July 1871, *ibid.*

18 On the German chancellor's general policy toward the Thierist republic, see MITCHELL, *Bismarck and the French Nation, 1848–1890*, New York 1971, pp. 78–83.

Rémusat's conception was appropriately more modest. What Europe needed to combat radicalism was not a concert of nations but an »ensemble of measures« enacted by individual governments according to their own internal situations. The Germans were already considering such legislation. »We should precede them on this path«, Rémusat advocated, and thereby »give to other peoples an example of reform that . . . has become necessary in face of the great social peril to which all nations are exposed at this time.« If Rémusat's rhetoric was hardly less grand than that of his predecessor, his pretensions were tempered¹⁹.

Yet the French found themselves in a constraining circumstance. After beating the drums of repression, they now had to demonstrate that they took seriously the threat of subversion. The government could not very well promote a red scare for diplomatic gain and then deny its reality in domestic affairs. To save face abroad and to assure respectability at home, the cabinet would therefore need to sponsor repressive measures or laws. »To refuse«, wrote the French ambassador in Berlin, the Marquis de Gabriac, »is perhaps to revive against us the reproach of lacking energy vis-à-vis the menace of revolution and to justify to some extent the misgivings of Europe.« The others should be reassured that the republic would permit no repetition of the Paris Commune or any acts of violence that might start in France and spread elsewhere²⁰.

Without pursuing the details any farther, or wending through the parliamentary process, we may assume a direct connection between Rémusat's initiative and the passage of anti-Socialist legislation by the French Assembly in Versailles on 14 March 1872, a bill which stipulated that membership of a French citizen in the International was punishable by an imprisonment of two to five years. Thus the first formal instrument of postwar repression was fashioned in France²¹.

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The French population meanwhile continued to live under martial law. Police records leave little question about the repressive character of the Thierist regime or the ruthlessness with which it attempted to stamp out traces of the Commune. Scarcely a day passed during three years without additional news of arrests, expulsions, or executions. By the summer of 1872 more than 33 000 citizens had been subjected to criminal investigation because of their alleged participation in insurrectionary activity, and the number was still rising²². On a few occasions, such as the elimination of Louis Rossel at the guillotine in November 1871, public emotion erupted in the working-class districts of Paris. But the remarkable fact was the extent to which the populace remained docile and dispirited²³. Police informants found the bourgeoisie solidly in favor of »firmness against whoever may threaten public security«. More surprisingly,

19 Rémusat to Gabriac, 7 September 1871, MAE Paris, Allemagne 1.

20 Gabriac to Rémusat, 1 October 1871, *ibid.*, 2.

21 *Journal Officiel*, 13–15 March 1872. See Georges BOURGIN, *La lutte du gouvernement français contre la première Internationale*, in: *International Review for Social History* 4 (1939): 39–138.

22 »Situation du Service de la Justice et résultats qu'on peut apercevoir«, 15 January 1872, AN Paris, BB³⁰ 487. A large number of such weekly reports are contained in this dossier. See ROUGERIE, *Procès des communards*, Paris 1964, pp. 17–24.

23 Typical was a report about the »universal feeling of compassion« aroused by Rossel's execution; but it was also noted that »order did not appear to be troubled anywhere«. Prefecture of Police to the Ministry of the Interior, 28 November 1871, Archives de la Préfecture de Police (APP) Paris, B A/86.

the great majority of workers seemed to be »solely preoccupied by questions of salary«. Hostility toward Thiers was prevalent but muted. There was little sign of a radical fringe, since most of its elements had either been imprisoned or exiled²⁴. This tepid condition did not preclude the possibility of strikes, but in the early 1870s that story was mainly one of disorganization. According to the police, French artisans and industrial laborers were generally cowed, even when, »following the example of German workers, they demand an augmentation of their salaries«²⁵.

The principal location of public disturbance lay in the border areas of France. Most troublesome, of course, were the zones of military occupation in the East, where small gangs of young rowdies, mostly recent immigrants from Alsace and Lorraine, gathered in local bars and sometimes turned to tormenting German soldiers on guard duty²⁶. These incidents were accompanied by the creation of a number of frankly revanchist organizations – the Ligue de la délivrance d'Alsace-Lorraine and the Ligue anti-prussienne – which brought additional pressure from Berlin on Versailles to exercise measures of restraint: arrests, confiscations, and censorship²⁷. The French cabinet was understandably edgy about the volatility of a radical and germanophobic mixture and hence ordered that the army should »be prepared to repress energetically any attempted disorder«²⁸. Otherwise French authorities had to worry about the appearance of socialist cells in the area of the Jura mountains, adjacent to Switzerland, as well as on the Basque and Belgian frontiers. Yet these scattered activities were too far removed to affect the bulk of the laboring force, which was »still stunned by the repression of the Commune«. The police were therefore able to reassure the Ministry of the Interior that »among the working class, despite the complaints and clamors of radical newspapers, there is complete calm«²⁹.

Eternal vigilance was the price of repression, and the government was prepared to pay it by establishing a network of surveillance both at home and abroad. Besides deploying several dozen secret agents within France, the Prefecture of Police also received regular reports from a score of spies stationed in other European states. Precise numbers cannot be established. But of foreign nations the most closely watched was Germany, where the progress of socialist organizations presented a subject of mutual concern. By the beginning of 1873, however, the French government had virtually abandoned all attempts to coordinate surveillance efforts with Berlin. One exception was a request for at least a minimal agreement on extradition of insurrectionaries known to be affiliated with the International. Bismarck's response

24 Daily police reports (usually written by the prefect of police, Louis Renault), 28 November–22 December 1871, *ibid.*

25 »Note«, 29 November 1871, *ibid.*

26 Saint-Vallier to Thiers, 28 September 1871, MAE Paris, Papiers Thiers, 1.

27 Waldersee to Bismarck, 15 August 1871, Auswärtiges Amt (AA) Bonn, I.A.B.c74. Bismarck to Waldersee, 19 August 1871, *ibid.* Arnim to Rémusat, 20 September 1871, *ibid.* Rémusat promised »de prendre les mesures les plus sévères«. Arnim to Bismarck, 30 September 1871, *ibid.* See MITCHELL, *The German Influence* (see n. 14) pp. 27–34.

28 Directive from Minister of War de Cissey to the commanding generals of the French army, 26 August 1871, Service Historique des Armées de Terre (SHAT) Vincennes, G⁸ 178. In order to tamp down celebrations of the first anniversary of the republic on 4 September, a similar directive had been issued by Minister of the Interior Lambrecht to the prefects, 24 August 1871, *ibid.*

29 Daily police reports of 5 and 9 December 1871, APP Paris, B A/86.

was explained by Rudolf von Delbrück to the French ambassador (as the latter noted) »with his customary coldness«: Germany would take each individual case under advisement and would extradite only those persons who had demonstrably committed acts of violence on French soil. Germany was still contemplating the issue of broader repressive legislation, Delbrück added, but nothing of the sort was on the current agenda of the Reichstag. »For the moment, we will not go further³⁰.«

Rémusat accepted this reproof with ostensible equanimity, rationalizing that France had never really intended to advocate that one nation should interfere in the internal affairs of another. After all, the republic's foremost objective remained »to paralyze the efforts of the International within our own territory«³¹. That goal had apparently been realized, in spite of a few public disturbances. Strikes at mines in the departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais in the summer of 1872, for instance, had been snuffed out after some brief rioting; and another incident at Anvers, in which municipal authorities had been forced to call in army troops from the local garrison, was also contained. Here as elsewhere, police investigators claimed to uncover »the hand of the International«. But if so, its grip was remarkably weak³².

Repression reached high tide in France by the summer of 1873. At that time more than 45 000 criminal dossiers from the Commune had been considered by the courts. A new category had been created that swelled the statistics: »refusal to inform.« Nearly 9000 persons were booked for failure to offer testimony, an average of over one hundred arraignments a day throughout a period of two years for this charge alone. Such numbers – taken straight from court records – may be surprising. But the truth is that the Thierist regime had constructed an elaborate machine of repression. Measured by the more brutal standards of the twentieth century, let it be said, the French republic fell far short of becoming a police state. There was no allegation or evidence of torture. All things considered, nonetheless, one must conclude that the quiescence of the working class after the Commune was enforced by the gavel, the guard, and the guillotine³³.

It is therefore legitimate to inquire whether such harsh measures of repression were to some degree justified by a growing undercurrent of social protest or subversive activity. One indication in this regard was provided by popular cabarets and *cafés-concerts*, which were regularly denounced as dens of »dangerous or unhealthy excitements«. These French speakeasies have seldom been studied with the seriousness they deserve. They were public institutions that served a dual social function: they afforded a gathering place for the amiability of working men and women who met in the evening to chat and carouse; and they provided an outlet for satirical entertainment or expressions of partially veiled political opinion through skits and songs that were performed there. Any modern tourist to Montmartre is acquainted with the commercialized offsprings of such cabarets and can imagine their irrepressi-

30 Gontaut-Biron to Rémusat, 27 April 1872, MAE Paris, Allemagne 5. See A. MITCHELL, *The Xenophobic Style: French Counterespionage and the Emergence of the Dreyfus Affair*, in: *Journal of Modern History* 52 (1980), pp. 414–25.

31 Directive from Rémusat to French diplomatic agents, 10 April 1872, MAE Paris, Papiers Jules Favre, 7.

32 Daily police report, 4 August 1872, APP Paris, B A/86.

33 Judicial statistics indicate 23 288 cases dismissed (*non lieu*), 12 082 convictions, 2275 acquittals, and 8940 refusals to testify, for a total of 46 585 proceedings. Weekly report of 30 June 1873, AN Paris, BB³⁰ 487.

ble ambiance. Understandably the police were alert to the potential of these nightspots for radical propaganda. Covert agents were assigned to frequent them and to gather the texts of chansons that made the rounds. The Prefecture of Police also solicited cooperation of the cabinet in expectation that »the action of the police will be abetted by an attentive and intelligent censorship«³⁴. With evident distaste, the Minister of Public Education and Fine Arts, Jules Simon, agreed to pursue the investigation, despite his initial impression that they would find »nothing that is illegal or dangerous to public order«³⁵. Because of his attention to the matter, we have been left with a remarkable trove of popular culture, which offers an intimate glimpse into the concerns of common people in Paris during the first years of the Third Republic. Although the chansons in question surely merit a more detailed treatment than they can receive in this space, we may at least establish a general typology of their main themes. They were principally four:

1) *Revenge*. Just as one would expect, in the immediate postwar period the recent military defeat still rankled and roused a sense of defiance. The titles tell all: »La revanche« (France will strike back soon); »Lugubre histoire« (grandmother is exhorted to recall tales of German carnage and pillage); »Nous t'élevons pour la vengeance« (a child is told how the Germans killed his father and raped his mother, then he is handed a rifle). Such touching sentiments contained an obvious admixture of xenophobia, which was to be passed on to future generations, as in »La première leçon d'Allemand« (a pupil heroically refuses to learn the language of the conqueror).

2) *Lamentation*. Closely related to the first theme, but concentrating on the tragic fate of the eastern provinces lost to Germany, this group included »La veuve Alsace«, »La paysanne Lorraine«, and »Le Rhin français«. The two major cities of the annexed area were likewise celebrated in »Strasbourg, attends«, »Le drapeau de Metz«, and »Le jour de délivrance« (which concluded: »et Strasbourg reverra le drapeau de la France«). It is noteworthy that the revanchist tone of these early ballads eventually gave way in later years – that is, by 1874 – to a refrain of nostalgia, exemplified by »Alsace adieu«, »Souvenir à l'Alsace«, and »Le dernier refrain d'Alsace«.

3) *Heroism*. It was natural that the war would be remembered not only as a national humiliation but also for the bravery of soldiers and cities that had resisted German aggression, as in »Gloire aux martyrs« and »Paris brûlé«. The Second Empire was recalled only to be ridiculed – »Napoléon III patine« – whereas the struggle for survival by republican France was praised in »Le rossignol de la république« and »Le chant de l'emprunt«, the latter of which was a kind of singing commercial in favor of public loans to pay off reparations extracted by the Germans in the Treaty of Frankfurt.

4) *Pornography*. Café performers did not dwell solely on themes of sorrow or celebration. Undeniably there was a randy component to their compositions, and it

34 Prefecture of Police to Jules Simon, 11 October 1872, AN Paris, F¹⁷ 2514. Attractively presented but not very informative is the account by François CARADEC and Alain WEILL, *Le café-concert*, Paris 1980, pp. 69–75. Anticipating a full-length study of French café life in the late nineteenth century is the essay by Susanna BARROWS, *After the Commune: Alcoholism, Temperance, and Literature in the Early Third Republic*, in: John M. MERRIMAN (ed.), *Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, New York and London 1979, pp. 205–18.

35 Jules Simon to Minister of the Interior Lefranc, 7 October 1872, AN Paris, F¹⁷ 2514.

became increasingly prominent with the passage of time. In 1871 a favorite form humorously combined the sexual and the political: »N'insultez pas une femme qui tombe« and »Ma femme a la migraine«. But later café doggerel tended to be more explicit, with suggestive titles such as »Le cousin de ma femme« and »La femme du pompier«. By mid-decade, moreover, bawdy songs sometimes blended lewdness with irreverence, as in »Fiancée à Dieu«, to accompany anticlerical attacks on the Church³⁶.

Egregiously absent from this survey of cabaret chansons is a pervasive strain of social protest. A more thorough content analysis would almost certainly corroborate the impression that the government had relatively little to fear from the cafés insofar as subversive provocations were concerned. In fact, if there was a lowest common denominator among Parisian chansonniers, it was reconciliation rather than rejection of the republic. Listening to the opening strains of »Je suis Bellevillois«, one might have expected to hear the defiant voice of the working class raised against the oppression of the Army of Versailles or against the Thierist persecution of the communards; but in fact it was another fight song urging labor to persevere for the pride and honor of the *patrie*³⁷. We must of course make allowance for archival or statistical error. It is possible that the extant files have been culled or in some manner corrected; and the censorship and police surveillance of the early 1870s may have imposed their own slanted principle of selectivity. But the available evidence points to the same conclusion as that reached by Jules Simon, when he explained that the government's primary motive for patrolling the cabarets was simply »to protect public morality«³⁸.

Long before the termination of the Thiers presidency and the advent of the so-called «government of moral order» in May 1873, then, the scales of social justice in France were steeply tilted in favor of repression. Police reports may not disclose the innermost animosities or aspirations of a laboring population, but they do record public comportment and private conversation. For the time being, they were unanimous that French workers felt »a kind of terror« and that the government's firmness had made »a salutary impression« on their consciousness³⁹. The disintegration of the First International and the transfer of its Marxist headquarters to New York appeared to confirm that the battle against subversion had been won. These circumstances help to explain why the sudden accession of Marshal MacMahon to the presidency caused so little stir in France. No matter how conservative his inclinations, MacMahon could scarcely be expected to impose more severe limitations on personal liberty than already existed. If anything, some relaxation might now be possible, because the International had retreated and the German occupation was ended. MacMahon was quick to assure the imperial court in Berlin that he could be trusted to preserve the stability of France's foreign relations and also »to maintain domestic peace and the principles upon which society rests«⁴⁰. From all that is known, we can safely decode the true meaning couched in these elevated phrases: in one form or another, the repression was certain to continue.

36 The text and sometimes the musical score of these chansons are to be found in AN Paris, F¹⁸ 1681–1682.

37 Ibid.

38 Jules Simon to Charles Blanc, 14 November 1872, AN Paris, F¹⁷ 2514.

39 Daily police report, 31 January 1873, APP Paris, B A/86.

40 Gontaut-Biron to Bismarck, 29 May 1873, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 78, Bd. 2.

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The war scare of 1875 temporarily forced social problems aside. Even if a vigorous labor movement had existed in France, it would probably have been hard pressed to make headway while so much emotion was being expended on the menace of another military conflict with Germany. But once the alarm was past and a diplomatic thaw became evident late in the year, attention could focus again on domestic affairs⁴¹.

Three developments were occurring that would change the complexion of what was commonly called »the social question«. The first was a notable increase in the number of strikes. It is crucial to retain that in the 1870s French authorities did not possess a convenient set of statistics whereby they could gauge the frequency and intensity of industrial stoppages throughout the land. Rather, information reached Paris in the form of sporadic prefectorial and police reports, which inevitably contained exaggerations, distortions, and a lacing of local preoccupations. Without doing violence to such sources, we can record the rather obvious conclusion that French *patrons* were as yet far better organized than their workers. Time and again factious laborers were bullied into a compromise by the unity of employers who, as one report stated it, »in effect want their complete submission«⁴². Almost invariably the dispute concerned hourly wages – sums as small as 50 centimes a day – and even when concessions were won by the workers, they often proved to be fragile and were subsequently forfeited.

A single example may serve as an illustration. In the summer of 1876 a strike was declared by a syndicate of stonecutters employed in Paris for the construction of sidewalks and streets. They were demanding an increase of their daily wages from five to six francs for ten hours of work, and they wished to have the raise secured in a written contract. In response, employers offered to grant 60 centimes an hour, but without a formal agreement; or they would sign a contract that forced the workers to accept an hourly wage of only 55 centimes. At a gathering of the syndicate, attended by 150 workers, a vote favored continuation of the strike for 60 centimes. The dispute was soon resolved at the figure requested by the workers. But before marking this episode down as a successful test case in the infancy of trade unionism in France, it is well to heed the disabused commentary of the Prefecture of Police: »It is not the first time that the workers request from their employers an augmentation of wages. They formulate the same demands every time that work is plentiful; the *patron* agrees but then withdraws the concessions that he has granted as soon as he can. Everything tends to confirm that it will be the same again this time: the workers will obtain, momentarily, the increase of wages they seek«⁴³. « Labor was on a treadmill, in short, and it required no recondite analyst to realize that the genuine progress of syndicalism would ultimately depend on broader organization and more effective coordination of protest. France was still far removed from the myth of a general strike.

A second variable of the late 1870s was a revival of the amnesty issue. The possibility of blanket pardon for the communards of 1871 had been a constant topic of speculation among French exile circles in Geneva, Brussels, and London. But while an uneasy republican coalition felt itself embattled within and without, the expectation of

41 See MITCHELL, *The German Influence* (see n. 14) pp. 124–30.

42 Daily police report, 9 March 1876, APP Paris, B A/87.

43 Daily police report, 7–22 June 1876, *ibid.* The quotation is from that of 17 June.

such largesse still seemed remote. Not until 1876 did amnesty again become a controversial topic at extraparliamentary banquets and certain leftist electoral meetings. Radical orators found a reservoir of favorable response among French workers, and they discovered that the demand for amnesty was ideally suited to dramatize further insistence on the need for freedom of association, assembly, and the press⁴⁴. What was thereby gained in urgency, however, was partially lost in unity. More patient and political in his determination to make the long march through republican institutions, Léon Gambetta refused to be drawn into a campaign for complete amnesty and consequently came under fire from many of his erstwhile supporters. Police agents made repeated soundings of Gambetta's »decline in popularity« among his constituents in the artisanal and proletarian quarters of northeastern Paris. His public support was unquestionably slipping, and opportunism was becoming the dirty word of French politics⁴⁵.

When following discussions in strike meetings or debates over amnesty, one must avoid reading the record too literally. It is easy enough to deride the incoherence and immaturity of radical rhetoric, especially as it was presented in the bourgeois press. But we should always remember the censorship and the fact that radical newspapers were unable to print an unabridged account of proceedings at partisan gatherings. These journals, as the police acknowledged, »doubtless find it necessary to soften or suppress certain violences of language that might serve to provoke legal prosecution⁴⁶.« The public record is thus suspect, and police reports frequently prove to be our best source for the actual state of the art. On the occasion of one radical rally, for example, a disguised informer dutifully transcribed the eloquent statement of a worker, identified simply as Daniel, who attempted to enumerate the various reforms desired by the laboring class: an increase in wages, a more equitable distribution of wealth between capitalists and workers, the right of assembly, the emancipation of women, and more permissive laws governing the syndicates. It would be difficult to find anywhere a more cogent summary of the issues that were to preoccupy French socialism in the decades that followed. In spite of the repression, it seems, a new political milieu was slowly and erratically taking shape⁴⁷.

A third development centered on the call for a workers' congress. It began as a brainchild of the Parisian activist, Charles Chabert, who was well known to police agents and radical audiences as an audacious orator and an advocate of amnesty. The launching of Chabert's project to convoke an assembly of workingmen was simultaneous with his founding a new popular journal, »La Tribune«, which promptly made preparations for the congress into headline news. The leftist response was by no means unanimously enthusiastic. A rival daily, »Droits de l'homme«, contested the utility of such a large gathering, in view of the tight security regulations that were sure to be

44 The context is supplied by Jean T. JOUGHIN, *The Paris Commune in French Politics, 1871–1880*, 2 vols. Baltimore 1955.

45 Daily police report, 16 July 1876, APP Paris, B A/87. See J. P. T. BURY, *Gambetta and the Making of the Third Republic*, London 1973, pp. 297–302, 324–26.

46 Daily police report, 15 July 1876, APP Paris, B A/87. A few months later Xavier Raspail received a sentence of eight months in prison and a fine of 1000 francs for publishing a book entitled »Nécessité de l'amnistie«, copies of which were seized by the police and destroyed. Daily police report, 21 September 1876, *ibid.*

47 Daily police report, 20 May 1876, *ibid.*

imposed, and suggested that Chabert's scheme was primarily a publicity stunt to boost the circulation of his newspaper. Likewise, in »Le Rappel« the noted Radical journalist Edouard Lockroy criticized the project as ill-timed. As it turned out, this internicine wrangling had the effect of delaying but not deterring the momentum for a meeting⁴⁸.

Naturally the Prefecture of Police was on the *qui vive* and immediately set about to assess the motives of Chabert and his fellow organizers. The finding of this investigation was that the congress represented an effort to resuscitate a labor movement that was nearly moribund. Workers had begun to tire of constant strike agitation that so frequently proved ineffectual. A symptom of this growing »lassitude« was low attendance at syndicate meetings, which of course were routinely monitored by police agents. Nonetheless, the Prefecture promised that the congress would be »the object of a close surveillance to prevent it from exceeding its legal limits«. Although Chabert publicly promised to exclude political issues from the agenda of the assembly, the police surmised – no doubt correctly – that he intended to encourage clandestine meetings of delegates »to create the bases of an electoral organization«. By its very composition the congress would become a political event and would inevitably raise expectations of reestablishing a rapport with international socialism⁴⁹.

Curiously contributing to these apprehensions were stories, often related in unintentionally comic detail, about recent contacts between French and German workers at the centennial of the American Revolution in Philadelphia. French delegates there had the unnerving experience of being greeted by German-American marching bands playing the »Marseillaise«; and German socialists in attendance took the occasion to pin red buttons on the lapels of their French comrades. Thus it was on the soil of Philadelphia beergardens that took place the first postwar contacts of ordinary citizens from opposite sides of the Rhine. Much of the revelry was meaningless, and some of it ended with hard feelings and fisticuffs⁵⁰. But in Paris French police officials were not amused by what they perceived as a dangerous precedent for the renewal of socialist internationalism. Their concern was buttressed by evidence that certain sections of the International, especially in Geneva, were increasing efforts to establish contacts with syndicalist groups in Paris. Sitting in an office on the Quai des Orfèvres, an avid reader of memoranda might well have gained the impression that a great conspiracy was afoot, of which France was becoming the hub⁵¹.

The congress itself was uneventful. Chabert's »Tribune« printed long excerpts from its proceedings, but one must wonder to what effect, since they were hard to match for sheer boredom. Perhaps with a smattering of sour grapes, »Droits de l'homme« offered only a summary of the opening session on its second page. Some interest was aroused by a discussion of women's rights, but delegates soon had a surfeit of speeches

48 The opening of the congress was postponed from early September to the first of October. Daily police reports, 29 July–1 October 1876, *ibid.* Chabert's importance in this period was pointed out long ago by Maxwell R. KELSO, *The Inception of the Modern French Labor Movement (1871–79): A Reappraisal*, in: *Journal of Modern History* 8 (1936), pp. 173–93.

49 Daily police reports, 4–5 August 1876, APP Paris, B A/87.

50 Daily police report, 12 August 1876, *ibid.*

51 Daily police report, 19 August 1876, *ibid.*

and spent more time in cafés and restaurants. All of this activity was exhaustively covered by the police, who found little cause for alarm and no reason to intervene. The only disturbing note was the announcement of a second congress, scheduled for the following year in Lyon, and of plans to convene an international conference of workers in conjunction with the projected Paris Exposition of 1878⁵².

By November 1876 the Prefecture of Police boasted a compendium of information concerning the first congress and its impact. It had been attended by 332 delegates, of which 237 were from Paris. The formal minutes did not reveal the true character of the congress, which, as advertised, had avoided inflammatory declamations about political issues. Few real workers and no peasants were importantly involved in the proceedings, which had been dominated by newspaper editors and intellectuals; thus the visible effect was virtually nil. But on the fringes of the assembly had met more discreet gatherings, which possessed the potential to spur political activity »to a very high degree«. The International had left no written trace, but it had been implicitly present: many personal addresses, the police noted, had been exchanged. The first workers' congress was therefore not as harmless as it may have appeared; indeed, it symbolized the opening of »a war on religion and capital«⁵³.

To test this disturbing hypothesis, the Prefecture of Police ordered in late 1876 a survey of radical organizations and activities in several major industrial centers throughout France. Perhaps it is useful to register a representative sample of this information in the same chronological order that it arrived in the capital and was transmitted to the French cabinet. November 7: in Limoges the Paris congress had produced »a considerable impression on the working population«; the labor movement there was beginning to assume »a real importance« and would need to be closely watched. November 13: in Grenoble and the department of the Isère workers were displaying »radical tendencies that become more pronounced each day«. November 18: because of the moderate opinions and sober habits of the working population in Lille, the influence of socialist agents and political agitators in the city had heretofore been only »mediocre«. November 20: Lyon, by contrast, was the scene of numerous labor organizations and »dangerous tendencies«, to which the government should pay special attention. November 22: although the majority of workers in St. Etienne held »radical opinions«, they remained generally nonbelligerent except under the influence of drink, which leads to »deplorable excess«; meanwhile the leaders of the socialist movement were clearly making progress, and a workers' candidate would have »serious chances« in the next general elections⁵⁴.

When multiplied several times, these returns could give no comfort to a government that was drifting inexorably into its own internal crisis and that still felt constant pressure from a formidable neighboring power. To compound the problem of security, the new law of 12 August 1876 had established elective mayoralities in most French provincial cities. Accordingly, the Ministry of the Interior instructed all

52 Daily police reports, 1–20 October 1876, *ibid.*; *Séances du congrès ouvrier de France: session de 1876* (microfiche; Paris, 1975).

53 »La commission spéciale à M. le directeur de la Sûreté générale«, 2 November 1876, AN Paris, F⁷ 12488. See Daniel LIGOU, *Histoire du socialisme en France, 1871–1961*, Paris 1962, pp. 20–21.

54 These reports, passed on to the French cabinet from Prefect of Police Voisin, are contained in AN Paris, F⁷ 12488.

prefects to remind municipal officers that they were, whether elected or appointed, still considered as »representatives of the central authority« and they would therefore be held to account by the cabinet⁵⁵. As for Paris, where security measures were tightest and most obvious, overt agitation was infrequent. But, again, the accumulation of details was disquieting. Jules Guesde had recently returned from five years of exile in Geneva to join the staff of »Droits de l'homme«⁵⁶. At Père Lachaise the burial of the sister of communard Charles Delescluze was converted into a huge but orderly political demonstration. Along the route of the funeral cortege, which included every prominent leftist personality from Gambetta to Clemenceau, cries of »vive l'amnistie« could be heard from the crowd⁵⁷. A national organization of working women was convened; and so was an association for children's rights. Even the Freemasons held a rare public meeting to warn against the »evil influence« of French clericalism on women and the working class⁵⁸.

These were the circumstances inherited by the new premier, Jules Simon, upon taking office in early December 1876. He wasted no time in serving notice that his was a regime of law and order. He immediately suspended publication of »Droits de l'homme« for printing an attack on the Prefecture of Police that contained »outrageous and diffamatory imputations«. The owner of the newspaper escaped into exile, while the unfortunate author of the article, Yves Guyot, was given a swift sentence of six months in prison and a fine of 3000 francs. This conviction had particular significance because Guyot was an elected member of the Municipal Council of Paris, which had long been dominated by radicals and rabid anticlericals⁵⁹.

It is accurate to characterize the totality of these developments as a process of repolarization. In the wake of the civil strife in 1871 and its relentless repression, the possibilities of radical opposition, not to mention subversion, had been severely limited. Repression had everywhere prevailed. But France was now witnessing a revival of dissident opinion, which was still scattered and tentative but nevertheless unmistakable. Before the full consequences could become apparent, however, a spectacular transformation of the political scene was to occur.

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The events that constituted the so-called »crisis of *seize mai*« lasted through the summer and early autumn of 1877, until the electoral defeat of conservative forces behind President MacMahon. During this time it was difficult to distinguish between the general development of repression and the specific measures adopted by the Ministry of the Interior to throttle the republican campaign. Perhaps the single most noteworthy episode was the imprisonment of Edouard Bonnet-Duverdier, president

55 Directive from the Ministry of the Interior to French prefects, 16 November 1876, AN Paris, F^{1a} 2133.

56 Daily police report, 15 Octobre 1876, APP Paris, B A/87. Claude WILLARD, *Le mouvement socialiste en France, 1893-1905: les guesdistes*, Paris 1965, pp. 11-14, notes that Guesde was consciously acting »à l'exemple de la socialdémocratie allemande« in founding his own newspaper, »L'Égalité«, on 18 November 1877. Also see Bernard H. Moss, *The Origins of the French Labor Movement, 1830-1914*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1976, pp. 82-88.

57 Daily police report, 1 November 1876, APP Paris, B A/87.

58 Daily police reports, 1-9 December 1876, *ibid.*

59 Daily police report, 7 December 1876, *ibid.* See A. MITCHELL, *Crucible of French Anticlericalism: The Conseil Municipal de Paris, 1871-1885*, in: *Francia* 8 (1980), pp. 395-405.

of the Municipal Council of Paris, for his suggestion that MacMahon should be summarily executed if he were guilty of violating the constitution. Radicals and republicans were outraged at the arrest, but Gambetta's »République française« wisely admonished them to forego any retaliation lest the entire election be endangered. Clearly the government meant business⁶⁰.

Physical brutality was avoided on both sides. But the regime made ample use of the state's administrative machinery to favor the conservative cause: banning public meetings and electoral banquets, closing cabarets, confiscating newspapers, offering bribes, and the rest. These repressive measures were intended not only to affirm presidential domination of the cabinet and parliament but also to reassert executive control over the national and municipal bureaucracies. The republican opposition, led by Thiers (until his death in September) and Gambetta, struggled mightily to offset the conservative advantage by playing out their own long suit: an increasingly ominous threat that a victory by the conservatives would inevitably bring a military incursion by Germany, whence came charges that MacMahon was merely a front for a clerical-monarchical conspiracy that intended to wage a war of revenge. The extreme sensitivity of French leaders and populace to the German menace in the 1870s can be heavily documented and easily understood⁶¹. Less obvious perhaps was the impact of events in Germany on the social question in France. Specifically, we need to inquire how the appearance of a unified German Social Democratic party in 1875 and then its repression by Bismarck three years later affected French radicalism. Without this strand, the story would be incomplete.

We may begin by eavesdropping on an evaluation of the 1877 elections in France by the Count von Wesdehlen. A perspicacious and exquisitely informed career diplomat, Wesdehlen was a fixture at the German embassy in Paris, where he was, under Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe, the resident expert on French politics. Reporting directly to Bismarck on the crossfire of the electoral contest, he emphasized that the repressive tactics of the government had initially promoted unity among leftist factions but that French »Social Democrats« (*sic*) were becoming more critical of the republican leadership. After all, of the two featured members of the opposition, Thiers and Gambetta, one had suppressed the Commune in 1871 and the other had opposed a plenary amnesty for the communards ever since. The radicals therefore felt themselves to be inadequately represented, Wesdehlen concluded, and their agitation was beginning to assume »a distinctly socialist tenor«⁶².

Two interpretations of this dispatch are plausible: either that a subaltern was obsequiously telling the German chancellor what he wanted to hear, or that he was faithfully reflecting a generally held view of France. All the evidence points to the latter assumption. Within Germany the SPD had already captured several Reichstag seats and had made significant gains in local balloting. The imperial regime was at least as dedicated as republican France to the repression of public disorder, and earlier discussions in Berlin about dealing a drastic blow to Social Democracy had never altogether died. Such talk was common within the Kaiser's court, as the French

60 These general circumstances were summarized in a report from Hohenlohe to the Auswärtiges Amt, 3 June 1877, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c. 79, Bd. 15.

61 See MITCHELL, *The German Influence* (see n. 14) pp. 144–76.

62 Wesdehlen to Bismarck, 11 August 1877, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 79, Bd. 17.

ambassador, Vicomte Elie de Gontaut-Biron, reported back to Paris. In a private note to Foreign Minister Louis Decazes, he added that the resurgence of radicalism was creating a »great, imminent, and universal danger [that] knows no boundaries«⁶³.

If such statements reveal little of the social reality, they do disclose something about the myth of subversion and suggest a gradual metamorphosis of it. Conspicuous by its absence in Gontaut's account was any reference to the International, in the past always the putative source of political subversion. Instead, radicalism was now assumed by French and German observers alike to be possibly the product of indigenous movements that were international only insofar as they were mutually infectious and thus »knew no boundaries«. The details of one incident may give this supposition more concrete shape. In the spring of 1878, shortly after the second French workingmen's congress had met in Lyon, the German Socialist leader August Bebel made a supposedly private visit to Paris. At that instant the new French premier, William Henry Waddington, happened to be in the German capital representing France at the Congress of Berlin. There he received a confidential letter from the respected Alsatian senator, Auguste Scheurer-Kestner, who inferred that Bebel was actually on an official mission to stir trouble in France: »The strikes that we are witnessing and that are very troublesome for France are being fomented and supported by suspicious men, some of whom are in contact with the German Socialists.« But what possible reason could Bismarck have for encouraging Bebel? Scheurer-Kestner speculated that the chancellor was preparing a propaganda campaign against the republic in which he would allege that French radicals were responsible for agitating all of Europe. Bismarck would thereby promote a pretext to justify harsh anti-Socialist measures in Germany; and he would leave the French in the lurch by further tarnishing their reputation⁶⁴.

Alarmed by this elaborate scenario, Waddington consulted at once with a veteran specialist on German affairs, the Comte de Saint-Vallier, who had recently succeeded Gontaut-Biron at the Berlin embassy. Saint-Vallier challenged Scheurer-Kestner's conjecture that Bebel's trip was being manipulated by Bismarck. In fact, German authorities had tipped off Saint-Vallier about the voyage well ahead of time and even warned that »a rather large sum of money« was being passed clandestinely into France from Germany for the purpose of stirring labor strikes – presumably not information Bismarck would have shared had he been the source of the funds. Although irrefutable proof is lacking, this version is far more probable than a collusion between Bismarck and Bebel. Still, it could not have been particularly comforting for anyone concerned to learn that cooperation among socialists was becoming a palpable Franco-German phenomenon and that vagrant rumors of subversive activity were not void of substance⁶⁵.

If Bismarck cannot be justifiably accused of abetting subversion in France, he eminently deserved in his own country a reputation for repression. Earlier in the 1870s his wrath had been directed against the Roman Church, while German Socialists were treated with malevolent neglect. With the accession of Leo XIII to the papacy in 1877, however, Bismarck decided to bring his awkward and unsuccessful Kulturkampf

63 Gontaut-Biron to Decazes, 29 August 1877, Bibliothèque Thiers (BT) Paris, Papiers Decazes, 714.

64 Scheurer-Kestner to Waddington, 31 March 1878, MAE Paris, Papiers Waddington, 2.

65 Saint-Vallier to Scheurer-Kestner, 5 April 1878, MAE Paris, Papiers Saint-Vallier.

against Catholicism to an end, and he therefore needed a new public enemy against which to unite a parliamentary coalition and popular support. For this purpose the SPD was ideally suited. Only the occasion was lacking – until a pair of assassination attempts on the Kaiser's life in the spring of 1878. The chancellor acted with alacrity to urge a total ban on the German Social Democratic party and its press⁶⁶.

Germany's anti-Socialist legislation represented an escalation of the precedent set by the 1872 law of the Thierist government in France. Bismarck now held the dubious distinction of taking the lead in persecuting labor. One French agent, repeating the old cliché, reported that the chancellor »had his hands everywhere«. Another claimed to know that Bismarck was pressuring European governments »to decide on the socialist question and to accept or refuse a united league against social revolution«⁶⁷. For such a grand diplomatic design there was and is no proof. But circumstantial evidence gave it some credence when Wesdehlen directly confronted premier Jules Dufaure with an incident that had allegedly occurred during the previous French workingmen's congress in Lyon. According to German sources, a coffeehouse plot was conceived there »to eradicate the sovereign houses of Europe«, beginning with Germany. When given its most literal interpretation, this might mean that French radicals were actually implicated in the attempts on Kaiser William. Wesdehlen demanded that the French open an investigation⁶⁸.

However farfetched such imputations may have been, they could not be ignored by the French at a time when the Paris Exposition of 1878 was in progress and when another gathering of workingmen's delegates was scheduled to assemble in the French capital. To the Ministry of the Interior the Prefecture of Police observed that the forthcoming meeting, unlike the first two labor congresses, was frankly advertised as an »international« event. But surely, »above all after the attacks in Berlin«, the government should not tolerate »a veritable implantation of the socialist International on French territory«. The Prefecture of Police therefore recommended that the convocation be cancelled⁶⁹. Following a fortnight of consideration, the Ministry of the Interior concurred that »the government finds itself confronted by an illicit association«, one which was expressly forbidden by the law of 14 May 1872. Orders were therefore issued to prevent the meeting; and they were strictly enforced in September 1878 by the arrest of Guesde and thirty-eight others, when a rump session of socialist sympathizers attempted to defy the interdiction⁷⁰.

There was no doubt something anomalous about the fact that, under German prodding, the Versailles government invoked its own restrictive legislation at precisely the moment when the French press was deploring with virtual unanimity the passage

66 Bismarck to Bülow, 11 May 1878, in: BISMARCK. Die gesammelten Werke, 15 vols. Berlin 1924–1935, vol. 6c p. 119. See Vernon LIDTKE, *The Outlawed Party. Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890*, Princeton 1966, pp. 70–78.

67 Police agents' reports of [?] May and 11 June 1878, APP Paris, B A/962.

68 Wesdehlen to Dufaure, 2 July 1878, AN Paris, F¹⁷ 12488. Wesdehlen's message was communicated from Dufaure to Minister of Justice Marcère, 4 July 1878, *ibid.*

69 Prefecture of Police to the Ministry of the Interior (*Sûreté générale*), 17 July 1878, AN Paris, F⁷ 12504.

70 Ministry of the Interior to the Prefecture of Police, 30 July 1878, *ibid.* »Le Temps«, 8 September 1878. Measures of surveillance and repression were later summarized in a »Note pour Monsieur le Ministre: congrès ouvriers«, 1 September 1879, AN Paris, F⁷ 12522. See Moss, *The Origins* (see n. 50) p. 88; and WILLARD, *Le mouvement* (see n. 56) pp. 14–15.

of anti-Socialist measures in Berlin. Ambassador Hohenlohe made particular complaint of this inconsistency, pointing out that the German action was criticized in France even by politicians and editorialists who had approved the execution or deportation of communards only a few years before⁷¹. Hohenlohe also reported, not for the first time, that the Bonapartists were actively encouraging radical dissatisfaction with what appeared to be a new round of repression. Still stymied by the electoral process, the Bonapartists continued to imagine that their best chance would be the combination of a destabilized government, an abortive leftist putsch, and then a dramatic reappearance by themselves as the saviors of political sanity. »With the naive, easily excited, and frivolous French nation«, Hohenlohe commented with condescension, »such intrigues find a fertile soil⁷².«

We may be inclined to pass over such a disoblighing remark as inconsequential. Yet German disrespect for France was an essential ingredient of Bismarckian policy, an aromatic spice that gave savor to all the rest. And the chancellor knew how to sprinkle condiments with a generous hand if it served his purpose, as he did in a Reichstag speech on 9 October 1878, when he vociferously denounced the editor of a Frankfurt newspaper, Leopold Sonnemann, for purveying subversive ideas across the Rhine from France⁷³. This episode stands as Bismarck's most conspicuous contribution to the creation of a red scare in the 1870s. His conduct was at the expense of a French nation that was once again accused of being the staging area of European radicalism and an exporter of sedition. The French were brisk to deny the charge of unreliability. In a long personal letter to Hohenlohe, Saint-Vallier expressed his government's »painful surprise« at the chancellor's statement, which must have resulted from a »grave misunderstanding«. Surely, he wrote, French republican leaders would not hearten »our common enemies . . . the enemies of order and of society«. Likewise, Waddington offered a formal disclaimer to Wesdehlen, categorically denying that »the French regime maintains contacts with German Social Democracy or supports it«⁷⁴.

As if to make amends, Bismarck accorded Saint-Vallier a rare honor by inviting the French ambassador to his new estate at Friedrichsruh, near Hamburg, where the two men went strolling in the Sachsenwald. The chancellor sought to assure his guest that Germany's anti-Socialist campaign was not intentionally directed against France and that its sole purpose was to restrain »enemies of the social order«⁷⁵. These soothing words were no sooner spoken, however, than news arrived of MacMahon's resignation from the presidency, which was immediately followed by rumors, soon confirmed, that amnesty of the communards would at last be declared and that the French parliament would return from Versailles to Paris. Suddenly the republic seemed in turmoil again and, just as the Germans had long suspected, there was reason to fear a radical or Bonapartist coup. Hohenlohe's unsettling evaluation to this effect

71 Hohenlohe to the Auswärtiges Amt, 20 August 1878, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 79, Bd. 25.

72 Hohenlohe to Bülow, 5 September 1878, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 73, Bd. 2. The record suggests that such fears were in fact unfounded. See John ROTHNEY, *Bonapartism after Sedan*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1969, pp. 230–69.

73 Moüy to Waddington, 10 and 16 October 1878, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871–1914, first series (15 vols.; Paris, 1929–1959), 2:349, 354. Waddington to Moüy, 18 October 1878, *ibid.*, 355.

74 Saint-Vallier to Hohenlohe, 12 October 1878, Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, Hohenlohe Nachlass, X B V 1. Wesdehlen to the Auswärtiges Amt, 12 October 1878, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 79, Bd. 26.

75 Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 6 January 1879, MAE Paris, Allemagne 27.

was sent directly to Bismarck (a sure sign of urgency): everything depended on whether the new president, Jules Grévy, and his cohort in the parliament »would have the courage and energy, if necessary, to do battle in the streets«. The power of repression was intact, in other words, but was the will⁷⁶?

Among those concerned by Hohenlohe's message was the Kaiser himself, whose worries about Grévy and Waddington were communicated in confidence back to Paris. William deplored the concessions recently made to French radicals, above all the declaration of amnesty, and he expressed distress about reports that »socialist refugees« were returning to France from Geneva and London in order to use Paris »as a base for their campaign against all the European monarchies«. This notion, we recall, echoed earlier messages about a café conspiracy after the assassination attempts against William. No wonder the Kaiser was unnerved⁷⁷. To reinforce German criticism, Bismarck demanded another long talk with Saint-Vallier, who was this time personally escorted by the chancellor's son Herbert to an interview in Berlin. There the Frenchman was forced to sit through a trying monologue. Bismarck foresaw the danger of France's passing from a moderate to a radical republic. In such an eventuality, Germany would not intervene (as the chancellor had threatened in 1877) but would allow France to dissolve into civil war. »No, we would abstain«, Bismarck admonished, »and we would end all relations with a country in the grip of communistic passions. In order to prevent the gangrene from reaching us, we would close our frontiers ... because the virus of revolution is far more contagious than that of all other epidemics.« Germany would create a *cordon sanitaire* by stationing as many as 200 000 men on the Vosgesian ridge, and France would thereby be placed in quarantine, a calamity for all of Europe⁷⁸.

If the French were still not sufficiently alarmed by this apocalyptic vision, Bismarck's earnestness was underscored by his personal confidant, Gerson von Bleichröder, a man whose connections among bankers and businessmen gave his opinions an extraordinary resonance. He told Saint-Vallier that Bismarck was indeed losing confidence in the French leaders, who he feared would »soon be sold out to the radicals«. To add to the French embarrassment, these dire predictions were simultaneously confirmed by the resignation of Minister of the Interior Emile Marcère, after a vicious attack on him in the Chamber of Deputies by Georges Clemenceau. It was Clemenceau who had increasingly come to be identified by German onlookers as the French leftist most likely to lead the radicals to power. His success in ousting Marcère, according to Hohenlohe, had »strengthened his position and made him even more dangerous to the moderate republicans and the cabinet than he already was«. Saint-Vallier privately expressed his own worries about »the disaster« of Marcère's defeat, which was immediately seized upon by the German press as proof that the French republic had taken another step along

76 Hohenlohe to Bismarck, 18 February 1879, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 87, Bd. 2. Partial amnesty was voted on 5 March 1879, full amnesty on 11 July 1880. See JOUGHIN, *The Paris Commune* (see n. 44) 1:182–226; 2:444–77.

77 Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 21 February 1879, MAE Paris, Allemagne 27. On German concerns about the revival of radicalism in France, see MITCHELL, *The German Influence* (see n. 14) pp. 193–200.

78 Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 26 February 1879, MAE Paris, MD Allemagne, 166 bis.

the »fatal slope« of radical excess. »It seems to me«, Saint-Vallier despaired, »that since the first of January we have moved from heaven to hell⁷⁹.«

Even if we make allowance for the theatrical exclamation of an overwrought envoy, this perception undeniably touched on at least three elements of the existing reality. First, the imperial regime had manifestly moved into a new phase of repression in Germany, in which the designated *Reichsfeind* was now Social Democracy. Second, Bismarck had maliciously directed a political and press assault against the government of the Third Republic, the intent of which was to discredit and isolate the French nation in Europe by portraying it as the permanent crucible of subversion. Finally, the unsettling effects of German pressure were keenly felt within France because there was enough circumstantial evidence to justify the German allegations, because the labor movement was gathering momentum and self-confidence, and because French republican politicians lacked the unity or invulnerability that might have permitted them to react with serenity to the turn of events.

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After the political spasms of the late 1870s, the succeeding half decade had an unmistakable air of anticlimax. Yet it was precisely in this period that critical changes occurred that would alter the definition of the social question and launch France toward the unanticipated adventure of the Boulanger crisis. To comprehend these connections we need to measure the impact of the amnesty declaration in France, which became visible at the same moment when German anti-Socialist legislation was being rigidly enforced. The syncopated rhythm of European socialism was such that many exiled Frenchmen found the way home just as their German counterparts were hastily packing their bags to leave the Vaterland.

At the outset of this analysis we may recall that the meeting of labor delegates in conjunction with the Paris Exposition of 1878 had been cancelled by the French government on the grounds that it would be international in character and therefore posed a subversive threat to the republic. The same strictures did not apply to national workingmen's congresses, the third of which could be convened in Marseille in late 1879 despite its obvious radical inclinations. True, a proposal to open the congress agenda to discussion of religious and social issues was rejected for fear that such action would only provoke the police and provide them with an excuse to prohibit the entire gathering. Yet informants reported that radical proponents nonetheless gained a place on the program of the congress, which they would not hesitate to use as a forum for their »dangerous theories«. Moderates may have controlled the labor movement at the top, but they were no longer able to stifle militants in the ranks⁸⁰.

Armed with assurances of public security from the prefect of the department of Bouches du Rhône, the republican cabinet affected a pose of insouciance. After all, the transcript of the congress documented that a certain decorum was maintained throughout, and accounts in the leftist press were appropriately tame. But German

79 Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 4 March 1879, *ibid.* Hohenlohe to Bismarck, 4 March 1879, AA Bonn, I.A.B.c 87, Bd. 2. See Fritz STERN, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire*, New York 1977, pp. 318–35.

80 »Note pour Monsieur le Ministre: congrès ouvriers«, 1 September 1879, AN Paris, F⁷ 12522. See LIGOU, *Histoire du socialisme* (see n. 52) pp. 32–36; and Moss, *The Origins* (see n. 56) pp. 89–95.

observers remained unconvinced, and the Count von Wesdehlen held to his critical interpretation: »The social revolution, through peaceful means if possible but by use of force if necessary, is openly preached.« The unruffled surface notwithstanding, he argued, the Marseille meeting therefore confirmed »the revival of a socialist revolutionary spirit«⁸¹.

That spirit was the subject of a third lengthy conversation between Bismarck and Saint-Vallier, held this time at the chancellor's old family estate of Varzin in East Prussia, to which the French ambassador was summoned. There he was treated to another trenchant soliloquy on the state of the republic. Germany hoped to regain confidence in France, Bismarck declared, but everything now depended on the vigor of President Grévy in holding a moderate political course. Otherwise he would soon be »swept away like a dead leaf by Gambetta, Clemenceau, or a communard«. A new danger was posed by Gambetta's motion for electoral reform: to substitute a *scrutin de liste* (which would favor popular national candidates like himself) for the current *scrutin d'arrondissement*. The chancellor was convinced that this amendment of the constitution, when combined with other »disastrous or dangerous measures« such as amnesty and the return of parliament to Paris, would quickly slide France in a radical direction: »Mark my words, Gambetta will be in the Elysée within a few months.« Bismarck repeated the threat to quarantine the French, and he then reached what was surely the real message for which his interlocutor had been brought such a long way: Germany had concluded a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary. This pact, he attempted to persuade Saint-Vallier, was strictly a mutual security arrangement regarding Russia and was by no means directed against France (not, of course, an explanation he offered elsewhere). But a deterioration of the moderate republic could alter the present circumstances: »Things would change their aspect with the French radicals in power; the danger would be from that direction, and we would need to take precautions«⁸².

A commentary on the Varzin interview can only underline the obvious. For one thing, Bismarck provided an exemplary instance of the inextricability of foreign and domestic affairs. For another, he displayed what can best be described as a penchant for blackmail. The French were faced with a master at the confounding German game of *Zwickmühle*: either they would strengthen their suppression of subversive activity, or else the combined strength of Central Europe would be turned against them on the charge that they were soft on socialism and were therefore too unreliable to be trusted. We cannot quantify the impression that such admonitions actually made in France, but there is no question that they were recorded by Saint-Vallier and received in Paris with an aura of apprehension.

The extreme importance attached by Bismarck to the French declaration of amnesty in 1880 can be surmised from the fact that he dispatched his personal emissary, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, to sound out the situation. The return of the radicals from exile was bound to infuse some ferment and much vitality into leftist activities, but how

81 Wesdehlen to the Auswärtiges Amt, 31 October 1879, AA Bonn, Europa Generalia 82, Nr. 5, Bd. 1. Séances de la 3^{ème} session du Congrès ouvrier de France: Marseille, 20-31 octobre 1879 (microfiche; Paris, 1975). Even the surface was not in reality so calm if judged by the simultaneous increase in labor strikes. See PERROT, *Les ouvriers en grève* (see n. 2) 1:89-91.

82 Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 14 November 1879, MAE Paris, Papiers Waddington, 6.

great was the menace of subversion? It cannot be deduced from Radowitz's reports back to Berlin in the late summer and early autumn that he detected the makings of a major conspiracy against the republic. What struck him most, in fact, was »the increasingly evident disunity in the extreme radical and socialist camp«⁸³. Equally apparent, however, was a more rapid tempo in French political life. Within a few months the number of socialist journals had doubled, syndicates and workers' clubs were burgeoning with new recruits, and radical centers in industrial cities were cultivating political contacts with one another and abroad. Bonapartists and monarchists were meanwhile reveling in the confusion, as usual, in anticipation that their own opportunity would soon come. Without being unduly alarmist, Radowitz told Bismarck, one should admit that the socialist movement in France was now well underway. Yet he concurred with other German agents that, for the time being at least, the army still possessed more than enough power to crush a popular revolt and would do so at the bidding of the present regime. Gambetta himself had stressed that conclusion to Radowitz, arguing that amnesty had at least brought one distinct advantage: subversive activity by absent or unknown radicals was much more insidious than agitation by those present and known, who could be easily apprehended whenever the occasion warranted⁸⁴.

Neither Gambetta nor the Germans, however, had any accurate means to calculate how widely socialism had spread in France or how deeply it had penetrated. They remained dependent on agents, sometimes of dubious reliability, who frequented the cafés, clubs, and clandestine meetings in working-class districts. Consequently, it is only from such sources that we can gain a notion of the estimates that were assumed to be correct and upon which the politics of repression was founded. One striking example will afford a sense of magnitude. In 1880, in order to chart the progress of socialism during the preceding decade, the German embassy in Paris employed an anonymous French informant, whose documentation was awarded the supreme distinction of being transmitted directly to Bismarck in Berlin. According to this agent, the »insurrectionary faction« (*branche des violents*) could claim about 450 000 activists throughout France, in addition to another 300 000 moderates. These leftists were mostly concentrated in Paris and a half-dozen provincial centers: Lyon, St. Etienne, Marseille, Bordeaux, Le Havre, and Lille. Heretofore their electoral clout had been minimal but their numbers were still impressive. All in all, an estimated one-third of France's industrial labor force was »infested with socialist ideas«⁸⁵.

Although such information was speculative and approximate, it was sufficient to sustain a longstanding German distrust of the French and to reconfirm the need for repression. That imperative was compounded by the appearance of a new term in the European political lexicon: anarchism. Initially, as we have seen, strikers, troublemakers, and insurrectionaries had been automatically categorized as instruments of the International. But the passage of anti-Socialist laws in France and Germany had restricted Marxist organization there without at the same time preventing the spread of social agitation and wildcat strikes. For the undeniable presence of this indigenous

83 Radowitz to the Auswärtiges Amt, 30 July 1880, AA Bonn, Europa Generalia 82, Nr. 5, Bd. 1.

84 Radowitz to Bismarck, 26 October 1880, *ibid.*

85 »Documents demandés concernant l'organisation du parti socialiste en France«, forwarded from Hohenlohe to Bismarck, 11 December 1880, *ibid.*

unrest the omnibus label of anarchism was perhaps more useful than appropriate. It was not less sinister or menacing than the International, yet it required less evidence of a centralized and tightly controlled political structure. The point was amply illustrated in late 1882 when a strike in Montceau-les-Mines (near Le Creusot) dissolved into rioting and had to be quelled by French army troops. Mass arrests were followed by well publicized trials, which resulted in the conviction of nine »anarchists«. Manifestly, repression would thrive with or without the International to combat⁸⁶.

The recognition of anarchism as the major source of subversion had an ulterior explanation linked to Germany. Carefully scrutinized by French security officers was a new radical impetus emanating from Switzerland. The exile community there had been dominated in the 1870s by former French communards. Many of them naturally chose to return to their native land after the amnesty, but some preferred to remain in Switzerland, especially in Geneva, where they had been settled for a decade. During the early 1880s these French radicals thus came into contact with a large contingent of German Socialists who were recent refugees from Bismarck's witchhunt. The result was a restructuring of radical groups in Switzerland, where the exiled Germans henceforth provided the greater proportion and the principal thrust. Emblematic was the central importance of the German-language newspaper, »Die Freiheit«, whose columns were stridently hostile to the existing European order and whose editors could therefore be considered »anarchists«. The French counterpart, »La révolte«, became similarly identified through securing translations of German articles, printing and smuggling them through the Juras (a Bakunist stronghold) into Paris, and distributing them to provincial capitals. This direct Franco-German connection was further cemented at an international gathering of radical delegates in London in 1881, a meeting – as the French Ministry of the Interior gathered – which constituted »the point of departure of the entire contemporary organization of anarchism«⁸⁷.

French radicals, under German influence, thereby received a fresh impulse. There was more talk of public violence, and a slogan began to circulate that the time had finally come »to resume the work of the Commune«. Because of the government's undiminished capacity for retaliation, radical cells were frequently camouflaged as anticlerical organizations. But the police were not deceived about the identity of what they stigmatized as »revolutionary committees«, whose membership included such notorious personalities as Louise Michel, Emile Gautier, Jules Guesde, and Edouard Vaillant. Again, police reports were fragmentary. Yet by the mid-1880s it was clear that »anarchy . . . had definitively taken its place in the revolutionary vocabulary.« Indeed, the final version of an extensive investigation by the security branch of the Ministry of the Interior stated categorically: »It is now the anarchists who are gradually assuming a preponderant role in the revolutionary party.« Fifteen years after the fall of the Paris Commune, subversion was back in business⁸⁸.

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86 »Le Temps«, 18–29 August, 14–24 October, 15 November, and 12–23 December 1882. Thielemann to Bismarck, 23 December 1882, AA Bonn, Europa Generalia 82, Nr. 5, Bd. 1.

87 For the background see Jean MATTRON, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France*, 2 vols. Paris 1975, vol. 1, pp. 111–30.

88 »Les menées anarchistes«, 25 February 1886, AN Paris, F⁷ 12504.

More than a decade was thus required for the regeneration of a laboring-class consciousness in the early Third Republic. Stunned by the swift suppression of the Commune and intimidated by the government's repressive measures thereafter, French workers were slow to begin organizing for the purpose of protest against low wages, indecent housing or schooling, and general social injustice. Not until the 1880s did scattered agitation coalesce into national movements that could properly be identified as socialism and syndicalism.

The political leadership of the young republic cannot be correctly characterized as an unscrupulous and brutal clique of capitalists bent on the systematic oppression of the proletariat. They seemed instead to be divided, baffled, and above all fearful. Accordingly, they were ultrasensitive to rumors of seditious activity and to menaces from a militarily superior neighbor. It was a time of rapid transition for France, suggested by the presidential succession from Thiers to MacMahon to Grévy. Through it all, nevertheless, thrived a governmental organism of security that proved capable of holding a tight grip and yet able to adjust it. Although allegations of subversion often depended more on paranoia than proof, the police were unrelenting in their surveillance of potential public disturbance; and behind them stood the uncontested authority of the army. Republican leaders may have been politically disunited, then, but they were uniformly determined to preserve domestic tranquility – and they possessed the means to do so.

An important element of this dialectical development was the German influence on France throughout the 1870s. We have observed how this phenomenon took a number of forms. The military campaign against the Commune in 1871 was quickly brought to a decisive conclusion because of German cooperation with the Thierist cabinet. Thereafter the French Foreign Office became caught in Bismarck's web of extortion by vainly seeking to contrive multilateral countermeasures against the International. The result was that France preceded the other powers in adopting antisocialist legislation in 1872 but without gaining admittance to a conservative coalition of European states. German pressure on the fragile republican government to curb radical agitation, whether revanchist or socialist in origin, was constant. Meanwhile the defeat by Germany and the desire to restore lost pride and territory remained present in French folklore, exemplified by cabaret chansons of the period. After 1875 a red scare succeeded the war scare, to both of which Berlin made deliberate and demonstrable contributions. Bismarck's objective was not difficult to define: he hoped to isolate France by portraying the republic as a breeding ground for radical groups. This motive became all the more patent once Germany adopted its own anti-Socialist law in 1878, when speculation circulated that the two attempts on the Kaiser's life might actually have been perpetrated from France. The subsequent declaration of amnesty for the communards and the return of the parliament to Paris lent circumstantial credibility to German charges that France was slipping into a radical phase and would soon be infested by anarchism.

After plotting this trajectory, we can easily extend some lines into the future. German harassment and efforts to quarantine France would continue, as the conclusion of the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy made evident. The French thus found it difficult to shake their reputation for political frivolity. Nothing could have enhanced that image more than the Boulanger crisis of the late 1880s, when an

army officer, at first sponsored by Georges Clemenceau, was adopted by rightist elements bent on a kind of Bonapartist putsch. These tumultuous events closely followed a scenario of public disorder that German observers had long predicted; and Bismarck promptly exploited them to conjure yet another war scare and therewith to obtain for the German army a second military septennate⁸⁹. In the end, we know, Boulangism collapsed ingloriously and the republic managed to muddle on. But the impression that the French political system was inherently flawed and ever vulnerable to radical subversion would endure⁹⁰.

While radicalism in one guise or another was thus reviving, new problems were necessarily posed for what the press indiscriminately called »la surveillance«. As the Prefecture of Police conceded, the public had always tended to exaggerate the extent of the state's security apparatus by imagining that secret informers stood on every street corner and in every factory of France. With the expansion of socialism, syndicalism, and anarchism, this kind of saturation became all the more infeasible. Hence the police began in the 1880s to modify their *modus operandi*. Instead of attempting to maintain a constant guard on entire working-class districts, security personnel were instructed to compile lists of known radicals and suspicious persons. The police would then deliberately show themselves to such individuals on a regular basis, thereby conditioning them to the fact that law enforcement was close at hand. Under this revised procedure, the minions of repression would come into direct contact with the harbingers of subversion in order to remind them that »the police are watching them and will not lose them from sight for a single day«⁹¹.

From this point we can trace the origins of the aliens-and-enemies files, later known as Carnet A and Carnet B, which became the basis of French police surveillance and counterespionage until the First World War. The revelation that the name of Jean Jaurès, at the time of his assassination in 1914, was inscribed on such a list later created a public scandal⁹². But we are now able to see more clearly that this fact followed logically from a pattern of repression that had persisted at least since the Paris Commune.

89 See Frederic H. SEAGER, *The Boulanger Affair: Political Crossroad of France, 1886–1889*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1969, pp. 50–57; and MITCHELL, *Bismarck and the French Nation* (see n. 18) pp. 99–105. The Boulanger episode is described as »the Bonapartists' last fling« by ROTHNEY, *Bonapartism after Sedan* (see n. 72) p. 280.

90 For the sequel to Boulangism, see BARROWS, *Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France*, New Haven and London 1981, pp. 11–16 and *passim*; and Zeev STERNHALL, *La droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme*, Paris 1978.

91 »Note sur les opérations faites par la Préfecture de Police contre les anarchistes«, [1894], AN Paris, F⁷ 12504.

92 See Jean-Jacques BECKER, *Le Carnet B. Les pouvoirs publics et l'antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914*, Paris 1973, pp. 105–16.