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schafts- und Sozialpolitik beraubt sich Bloch der Möglichkeit, eventuell vorhandene Wechselwirkungen bzw. mögliche Hintergründe aufzuzeigen. In Anbetracht des auf diesem Gebiet gerade in den letzten Jahren nicht nur in Deutschland erreichten Forschungsstandes stellt sich die Frage, ob der von Bloch benutzte Ansatz nicht von vornherein zu eng gewählt war. Für Frankreich handelt es sich dennoch um ein wichtiges Buch, denn mit dieser Arbeit liegt nun erstmals eine Chronik der Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches in französischer Sprache vor, die in vielen Bereichen Handbuchcharakter für sich in Anspruch nehmen kann. Charles Bloch, der im Juni 1987 gestorben ist, hat mit diesem Werk eine Brücke zwischen deutscher und französischer Forschung geschlagen.

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Hans-Jürgen DÖSCHER, *Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im Schatten der »Endlösung«*, Berlin (Siedler Verlag) 1987, 333 p.

Two aspects of Hans-Jürgen Döscher's book trouble me. First, the subtitle, »Diplomacy in the shadow of the Final Solution,« is misleading. The book is not about diplomacy and the Final Solution but rather about diplomats and the personnel policies of the Foreign Office in the shadow of the SS. Foreign Office Jewish policy occupies only 70 pages of the book, 21 of these being facsimile reprints of documents. Even here the focus is on the personnel, not Jewish policy per se.

Second, as a study of the nazification of Foreign Office personnel during the Third Reich, Döscher's book has a distinct »exposé« quality. So-called »official apologists« (Heinz Günther Sasse in particular) and self-serving memoirists are attacked and disproven (with considerable justification). The pillars of the old order in the Foreign Office, especially Neurath and Weizsäcker, have their skeletons hauled out of the closet once again. Much of this may still be sensational in Germany; for foreign scholars, however, Döscher is much of the time belaboring the obvious, and his zeal to name names seems often to get in the way of a deeper analysis of why the traditional professional diplomats and zealous young recruits behaved as they did.

Having said that, however, I must emphasize that there are many positive qualities in Döscher's book which deserve recognition. First, his study is based on important new sources, above all the 1944 personnel questionnaires of some 300 officials that were gathered to replace the Foreign Office personnel records destroyed by bombing. These questionnaires are not available to researchers in the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (contrary to the agreement made with the Allies when these files were returned to Germany in 1958), but Döscher consulted the four rolls of microfilm available from the National Archives that were made prior the return of these documents. Other important new sources include Bernd Gottfriedsen, one of Ribbentrop's adjutants, who provided Döscher with interesting information on the internal politics of the Wilhelmstrasse, and the diary of Curt Prüfer, which is particularly revealing on the question of widespread knowledge among the diplomats by 1942 of the mass murder of the European Jews by shooting and gassing.

Secondly, Döscher begins his study with an interesting and useful summary of the continuity of Foreign Office personnel from the Kaiserreich and its immunity to reform during Weimar. If there was little change among Foreign Office personnel in the 1933–37 period, Döscher notes, it was in no small part because there were virtually no liberal democrats, socialists, or Jews to be purged. The Foreign Office had successfully remained the exclusive preserve of the aristocracies of birth and finance – conservative, nationalist, authoritarian, and often anti-semitic. Hitler had no need for an immediate change of Foreign Office personnel because the old guard likewise sought aggressive revision of the Versailles

Treaty and provided useful camouflage for Hitler's subsequent, more far-reaching foreign policy aspirations.

Thirdly, Döscher makes a useful quantitative analysis of Foreign Office nazification, with proper attention to chronology. In January 1933 there were 10 NSDAP members and one SS man in the Foreign Office. By late 1937 the number of party members had grown to about 200 (out of 500); by 1938 there were at least 50 members of the SS, including all three State Secretaries (Weizsäcker, Bohle, and Keppler). Many more officials applied for membership, he notes, but were rejected. By 1943, nine of the ten division heads were party members, seven of whom were also in the SS.

Fourthly, Döscher sets out as one of his central arguments that despite occasional jurisdictional disputes, Ribbentrop was consistently devoted to aligning the Foreign Office with Himmler and the SS. The result was not only nazification of personnel but also of policy. Increasingly, SS men gained key positions to determine policies concerning culture, ethnic Germans, propaganda, intelligence-gathering, and above all treatment of the Jews. The notorious Undersecretary Martin Luther of »Abteilung Deutschland« tried to stem growing SS influence in 1940–41, but even he changed sides, unsuccessfully trying to gain Himmler's support for Ribbentrop's ouster.

Finally, Döscher rightfully concludes in my opinion that the SS newcomers were not »outsiders« imposing Nazi policies despite the resistance of traditional diplomats who valiantly clung to their positions to prevent worse. Accommodation, not resistance, characterized the traditional diplomats, who out of careerism, fear for their jobs, bureaucratic docility, and their own national-conservative ideology aided the frictionless implementation of Nazi policies. Most, as Döscher notes, were already too implicated by 1941 to do otherwise.

It is on this point that Döscher could have made a stronger case than he does. For instance, on the ticklish Weizsäcker issue, he belabors the point that Weizsäcker joined the SS in late April 1938, too late to be part of the »necessary price« he had to pay in March (party membership) to gain the position of State Secretary in order to work for the prevention of war. Döscher concludes, in disagreement with Leonidas Hill and Weizsäcker's own memoirs, that the latter's SS membership was evidence of accommodation. What Döscher does not include, and what in my opinion is much more important, are the many occasions (in addition to the deportations from France which are discussed) on which Weizsäcker displayed gross insensitivity if not criminal complicity in Foreign Office Jewish policy. However sincere Weizsäcker was in trying to preserve peace, almost nothing charitable can be said concerning his reaction to the persecution and mass murder of the Jews.

Likewise, Döscher's emphasis on Emil Schumburg as the Foreign Office »Judensachbearbeiter« in the 1930's and early SS-joiner causes him to pass over the key roles played by Bernhard von Bülow and his cousin Vicco von Bülow-Schwante. Döscher discusses the 1934 Foreign Office »Runderlass«, drafted by Schumburg, defending Nazi Jewish policy. He omits discussion of the even more vulgar 1933 »Runderlass«, composed by Bülow-Schwante at the instigation of Bülow, that first established the Foreign Office as apologist for Nazi racial persecution before Schumburg and other early NSDAP and SS-joiners were even on the scene. In general Döscher seems much too willing to take the dubious Bülow-Schwante at his own word.

In summary Döscher has written a useful book based on new source material, though not without flaws, it contains many defensible and judicious conclusions.

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