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Éric ROUSSEL, Charles de Gaulle, Paris (Gallimard) 2002, 1032 p. (Biographies).

Just like Roussel's previous biography on Pompidou¹ this is a very long book. Individual chapters do not normally fall below the limit of 20 small print pages. It relies heavily on primary sources; private letters play the prominent role. De Gaulle's personal opinion about fellow contemporaries and vice versa take up the largest part. This biography is written along the lines of historical chronology. The shortcomings of this approach become very clear in this book, because politics does not normally follow just a simple time sequence. Roussel does not use the ordering potential of a book written decades after the actual events, for the benefit of a better understanding of historical developments. Moreover, he often breaks the narrative line by inserting long quotations. As a result some chapters are just a collection of loosely connected primary sources. The line of argument is sometimes hard to see; there is the impression that the author does not mind that his contribution i.e. the historical interpretation, disappears almost completely. On the other hand, this book is very rich in primary sources and anyone wanting to get closer insights into de Gaulle's et al's private correspondence without actually going to the archives will find this an excellent substitute. Roussel's preference and expertise lies definitely with French sources. The accuracy of statements about non-French personalities is not fully satisfactory². What is more critical is that for non-French quotations the original text is not given. I conclude that this biography of de Gaulle is mainly written for a French academic and specialist audience.

Roussel starts his narrative in September 1940, the month France capitulated to Nazi-Germany. There were some who would not accept defeat; for them France's huge colonial holdings were the place to hide out and fight on. General Giraud, for example, escaped to Algeria. He would be a constant rival and critic of de Gaulle (p. 374, 375, 380). De Gaulle chose – rather unwillingly – exile in the British Isles to build up his resistance movement i.e. the Free French³. The struggle for Africa and the Middle-East, however, became most important for the legitimacy (p. 169, also, chapter VII., p. 168–185) and particularly for the capability of the movement to stand up to German occupational forces i.e. Rommel's Africa Corps (p. 292, 293). Politically this struggle also symbolised the competition for prestige and general public support in metropolitan France (p. 186–206). There was a sequence of military encounters, fallen cities, defeats and legitimacy crises which are of no particular interest here. However, this non-European episode of the war gives some general insights. Firstly, the whole French political system was in a legitimacy crisis, after Petain had signed the cease-fire with the Germans. The French nation was torn. On the one hand, the Marshal, the victor of Verdun, stood for the survival and continuity of the French state after the devastating defeat of the French European forces by the Wehrmacht. Last but not least, he promised peace by keeping the Germans in the occupied part of France and preventing the French navy from falling into their hands. This could have tipped the balance against the British (p. 188, 190, 225, 293, 513) and was, therefore, enough to give him a negotiating position with the West. He tried to preserve and protect whatever he could of France for better times to come (p. 191). On the other hand, there was a group of generals who would fight for a free France and claimed to represent it in exile (p. 229). The colonies were not metropolitan France. Each of the colonial commanders had to ask himself which side he was on. The initial struggle was, therefore, not so much a military happening, but a questioning of loyalties and finally of the legitimacy of Vichy (p. 295, 446) or the Free French (p. 200). Secondly, this whole episode shows the development of de Gaulle from a minor general to the resistance leader and finally to the liberator of France (p. 271, see also, chap-

1 Éric ROUSSEL, Georges Pompidou 1911–1974, Paris (J. C. Lattès) 1994.

2 See for example p. 751: Erhard was never German Finance Minister, but Minister of Economics.

3 *France libre*.

ter XIV, p. 311–338). It is the evolution of a character who could not be so sure of himself in the beginning and who had to make his way through the historical calamities of his struggle for a free France. Winston Churchill described him grudgingly as: »A great man! He is arrogant! He is selfish! He considers himself to be the centre of the universe ... He is ... You are right. That is a great man«⁴. Thirdly, the whole struggle about the colonies shows the importance of them to France. This accounts for many quarrels between de Gaulle and the British about their right to interfere in French colonial affairs. He always had the suspicion that the British and the American would use their occupational forces to diminish the French colonial Empire by overriding old legal titles with brute force (p. 287) i.e. Madagascar (p. 293, 294). This also reflects the difficult relationship with the Americans: »There is no co-operation possible whatsoever with the Americans. None at all. I know that very well«⁵.

In those colonial holdings the Magreb played a prominent role. Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were as French as could be and the bridge between metropolitan France and North Africa or perhaps the whole Empire (p. 305). They embodied the Europeanised Africa. In their search for allies against Nazi-Germany the main promise the Free French could make to those colonies was a serious consideration of independence after the war (p. 505).

Immediately after the war de Gaulle was the undisputed authority in liberated France. However, he resigned his post as Premier in 1946, because he would not play along the lines of party intrigues (p. 524, 530, 532, 533). In this he saw the curse that had brought the Third Republic to its knees (p. 517). After a time in the political wilderness he returned in 1958. Under the threat of a military coup d'état by the Algerian parachute regiments he became the first president of his Fifth Republic which featured all the Fourth Republic was not: an independent president, a strong government and the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty (p. 523, 534, 735). The Algerian problem which had taken him back into power would stay with him almost until the end. In many ways it was the epitome of the decolonisation process. Many colonies only wanted full independence – promised in the early 1940s (p. 666). The Algerian letting go was much more difficult. There was French culture, French families who had lived there for generations and there was the French army not wanting to give it up (p. 668). De Gaulle had to put down several revolt, riots and insurrections, by students, freedom fighters, former politicians and generals of which a detailed description can be found in this book. Particularly interesting for this part of the biography is Roussel's usage of formerly unedited diary entries of Louis Terrenoire with his intimate knowledge of Algeria and his closeness to de Gaulle⁶.

France had to become a great power, again. Therefore the Algerian problem had to be solved and, there had to be a French A-bomb. The *force de frappe* was designed to re-establish *la grandeur* of France (p. 685). Only with a nuclear strike force of its own, France would be able to conduct its foreign policy freely (p. 740, 793). This policy aim also stands behind the French withdrawal from NATO integrated command. It impaired French freedom to act in the international sphere. After this move the relationship to the US finally turned sour. De Gaulle, however, kept assuring the US that in case of a general war France would be the first to come to its western allies aid (p. 687). However, this was an unlikely scenario and for all other foreign policy situation France reserved the right to act according to its own national interest (p. 542, 659, 793).

4 Ibid., p. 309, original: »Un grand homme! Il est arrogant! Il est égoïste, il se considère comme le centre de l'univers ... Il est ... vous avez raison: c'est un grand homme«, Churchill in 1944.

5 Ibid., p. 300, original: »Il n'y a rien à faire avec les Américains. Rien! Je le sais bien«.

6 Minister of Information 5.2.1960–24.8.1961; Minister for the Sahara, colonial affairs (DOM-TOM) and nuclear affairs 24.8.1961–14.4.1962.

Europe was another matter. Unlike the UK, de Gaulle saw France as the only remaining great and wholly European power. On a world level only France could stand up for European interests (p. 437). Internally France was to be the leading power in Europe. His Fourth Republic predecessors had committed France to the European integration process and de Gaulle actually saw some benefits in it (p. 736). Political integration had been proven to be unworkable, not least because of his predecessor's rejection the European Political Community and the European Defence Community. With those two supranational and politically highly contentious projects down de Gaulle had another prove, if he needed one, that the nation state was the only entity which could wield political authority (p. 809). Therefore, the remaining European projects – Euratom, EEC and ECSC – had to be put to use for French national benefits. His *Realpolitik* did not prevent de Gaulle from carrying on some of the idealistic projects of the Schuman brand for example (p. 551). Reconciliation and cooperation with Germany remained important and it found its culmination in the Élysée treaty (p. 658, 739, 741). However, France was meant to take the lead, again. There is, therefore, a very strong realist motive in de Gaulle's angle on European integration, which is mingled with an almost naïve and nostalgic concept of Europe reaching up to the Ural. Reflected in de Gaulle's European Europe policy (p. 806, 807, 810), this visionary Europe would be the counterpart to the Anglo-Saxon world, a great power in its own right. It would, of course, be led by France.

Thomas HÖRBER, Lauf

Adolf KIMMEL, Pierre JARDIN (Hg.), Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1963. Eine Dokumentation. In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Deutsch-Französischen Institut, Leverkusen (Leske & Budrich) 2002, 541 S. (Frankreich-Studien, 6).

Das deutsch-französische Freundschaftsabkommen vom 22.1.1963, so wetterte Gilbert Ziebura 1970 in seiner Studie über »Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen«, sei nicht nur »ein totgeborenes Kind«, sondern auch ein »überflüssiger Vertrag«. Vierzig Jahre nach dem Abschluß des Élysée-Abkommens ist klar, daß auf seiner Basis ein Netz von Kontakten entstanden ist, das in seiner Spannweite und Intensität unter souveränen Staaten einmalig sein dürfte. Passend zum 40. Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung bieten Adolf Kimmel und Pierre Jardin nun in leicht veränderter, aktualisierter Form die deutsche Fassung einer vor zwei Jahren herausgegebenen französischsprachigen Quellensammlung zu den seit 1963 initiierten Gipfeltreffen. Die Dokumentation enthält keine Archivalien, sondern Texte, die aus Anlaß der Zusammenkünfte von den Regierungen publiziert worden sind: Verträge, Kommuniqués, Pressekonferenzen, Interviews, Ansprachen, Toasts.

Nach einer instruktiven Einleitung präsentieren Kimmel und Jardin die meist in Auszügen und mit sparsamen Anmerkungen versehenen Quellen in acht z. T. höchst unterschiedlich umfangreichen Abschnitten, die jeweils mit einer knappen Einführung eingeleitet werden. Teil I enthält den Élysée-Vertrag nebst den ergänzenden Protokollen von 1988 sowie die Niederschriften der Ratifikationsdebatten im Deutschen Bundestag und in der Assemblée Nationale von 1963 und 1988. Teil II behandelt die noch in der Kanzlerschaft Konrad Adenauers ausbrechenden und erst mit dem Rücktritt Präsident de Gaulles endenden »schwierigen Anfänge« (S. 97) der deutsch-französischen Gipfeltreffen bis 1969. Teil III beleuchtet die Phase der »vorsichtigen Fortschritte« (S. 151) zur Zeit der Regierung Willy Brandts und der Präsidentschaft Georges Pompidous 1969 bis 1973. Teil IV zeichnet die Politik der »Europäischen Priorität« (S. 197) des Tandems Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d'Estaing von 1974 bis 1981 nach. Kapitel V widmet sich der »Wiederbelebung der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit« (S. 237) vom Amtsantritt François Mitterrands 1981 bis zum Fall der Berliner Mauer 1989. Der bei weitem ausführlichste Teil VI geht der »neuen Lage«