empirische Materialerhebung in den beiden Untersuchungsregionen hier wie dort ein weit-gefächertes Feld von Ein- und Widersprüchen, Beschwerden und Versuchen der Interessenwahrung gegenüber den Belastungen durch Krieg und Militär, das die Bedeutung dieses Konfliktbereichs für das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und Beherrschten im 17. Jahrhundert eindrücklich demonstriert« (S. 265). Diese neue Fragestellung ist in der Tat geeignet, die bisherige Sicht der Historiker auf ›Krieg und Frieden‹ völlig umzukrempeln. Das noch immer dominierende Bild von der Zivilbevölkerung als weitgehend passive, träge, klag- und widerstandslose Masse scheint schlicht und einfach falsch zu sein.

Um den dritten Leitgedanken (»Évolutions«) zu charakterisieren, sind in den Vorträgen vor allem »trois facteurs d'évolution« angesprochen worden: Die technisch bedingten Veränderungen der Kriegskunst, der daraus folgende sozio-ökonomische Umbruch sowie der damit ebenfalls einhergehende tiefgreifende Wandel im sozio-kulturellen Umfeld. Angesprochen wurden diese Bereiche von Philippe CONTAMINE (»L'art de la guerre à la fin du Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance: maîtrise et représentation de l'espace«, S. 35–52), Rolf SPRANDEL (»Die Legitimation zur Gewaltanwendung und Kriegführung. Strafrecht im Wandel vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit«, S. 53–71) und Bernd ROECK (»Diskurse über den Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Zum Stand der Forschung und zu einigen offenen Problemen«, S. 181–193). Zum Abschluß der Tagung und wirklich »en marge du colloque« (S. 317) kam noch Etienne FRANÇOIS zu Wort (»Der Dreißigjährige Krieg und der Westfälische Frieden als Orte der Erinnerung«, S. 297–311).

Trotz der unbestreitbaren wissenschaftlichen Qualität der Aufsätze erfüllt der Band im ganzen die durch Titel und Untertitel geweckten Erwartungen nur teilweise, weil die zentrale Doppelthematik zugunsten mancher Randprobleme ein wenig vernachlässigt wird. Dazu kommen einige formale Kritikpunkte. Eine Aufstellung, wo sich die vier Farbtafeln und 26 Schwarzweißabbildungen (der Rezensent hat 28 gezählt: OHLER 12, CONTAMINE 2, CHONÉ 4, BOUZY 10) befinden, sucht man vergebens. Den Abschluß des Bandes bildet (nur) ein recht ausführliches Personenregister. Auch der komparative Aspekt, der lediglich bei Markus MEUMANN berücksichtigt wird, hätte bei einer deutsch-französischen Konferenz stärker betont werden können. Die Gelegenheit, diesem Sammelwerk eine abgerundete, das weite Thema »Krieg und Frieden« erfassende Bibliographie beizugeben, hat man nicht genutzt. So muß man auf die Anmerkungen derjenigen Aufsätze zurückgreifen, die sich mit den im Titel genannten Kernbegriffen auseinandersetzen.

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Christoph KAMPMANN, Arbiter und Friedensstiftung. Die Auseinandersetzung um den politischen Schiedsrichter im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit, Paderborn (Schöningh) 2001, X–394 p. (Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, N.F. 21).

Ideas of peace amongst early modern European theologians, philosophers and theorists have attracted considerable interest, but comparatively little attention has been paid to how peaceful conflict resolution figured in political propaganda and debate. Though the importance of papal arbitration of medieval conflicts has long been recognised, subsequent attempts to pursue such a role into the early modern era has generally been depicted as an anachronistic relic of the past that failed to take account of the realities of emergent sovereign states. This view is convincingly refuted by Christoph Kampmann's published *Habilitationsschrift* which makes an important contribution to our understanding of early modern political discourse and to the transformation of the European states system.

The concept of a single ›Arbiter of Christendom‹ (*Arbiter orbis Christiani, Arbitre de la Chrétienté, Schiedsrichter der Christenheit* etc.) is rooted in changes in eleventh century legal theory and practice. Initially a way to resolve private civil disputes, peaceful arbitra-

tion became an accepted means of tackling high politics by the thirteenth century. The papacy assumed this position from the time of Gregory VII (1073–1085), based on its claims to superior moral and political authority which gave it both the means and the duty to intervene to preserve peace. The practical difficulties of the late medieval papacy only intensified its attachment to this role as a means of sustaining its international prestige and influence.

Kampmann's fundamental point is that this papal role did not disappear with the middle ages, but was secularised as an element of European monarchy, constituting the ideological counterpoint to the parallel transition from the medieval order of fragmented sovereignty within universal *Christendom* to the post-Westphalian system of sovereign European states. He identifies three main phases in this process which gradually shifted the ideological basis for international peace from the direct action of a single, idealised arbiter, to notions of an impersonal, underlying ›balance of power‹. The Habsburg-Valois struggles initiated the first stage of this transformation during which papal arbitration became compromised by its partisan involvement in the conflict. Both Francis I and Charles V still appealed openly to the pope to mediate a lasting peace, but tried to instrumentalise such involvement for their own objectives. While this rehabilitated the notion of a single arbiter to restore European peace, the pope's failure to stand above the contending parties compromised his ability to fulfil this role.

The second stage saw the secularisation of the role, replacing the pope with the king of France as Europe's arbiter. This started during the French Wars of Religion when the papacy's partisan position on the question of the royal succession rendered it suspect in the eyes of French royalists and Gallicans. Royalist pamphleteers transferred the pope's traditional role in settling secular disputes to their own king. Jean Bodin advanced the most sophisticated of these arguments, citing the papacy's recent failures as grounds to pass this essential function to another European monarch, leaving readers in no doubt that the king of France was the only worthy successor. Henry IV tried to assume this role after 1598, relating his bid to restore France's international influence to his domestic position, allegedly standing above selfish, rival factions. The king's murder in 1610 conveniently silenced discussion of his actual intentions and paved the way for his posthumous glorification as a benevolent pacific monarch. This image was inherently contradictory since the king's ability to arbitrate rested not only on his own virtue, but on France's military might. It proved so powerful because it served the interests of both the subsequent regency regime in France and its domestic opponents after 1610. Both believed that French foreign policy should be directed at recovering what was now held to be the king's ›rightful‹ European role. This only became problematic during the Thirty Years War, since the monarchy had to decide between siding with Catholic Spain or collaborating with Protestants. The latter course laid the crown open to charges of Machiavellianism from the Catholic *Dévots* who believed that active involvement would simply exacerbate Europe's woes and reopen France's internal divisions. The so-called *Bon Français* countered this with appeals to the French monarchy's ›traditional‹ arbiter status, arguing it was necessary to oppose the spectre of Spanish universal monarchy in order to save not only European peace, but also French prestige.

Throughout this phase, French conceptions of their monarch's arbiter role still implied a measure of solidarity with other monarchies. While French leadership was portrayed as essential to European peace, the actual process of arbitration could be achieved in tandem with well-disposed allies. This vision was projected in the official portrayal of the Peace of the Pyrennes in 1659, where the settlement of Franco-Spanish difficulties was depicted as the first step towards lasting general peace. The assumption of personal rule by Louis XIV in 1661 initiated a shift towards the third and last stage in the arbiter's image; that of a more exclusive role, which the French king claimed for himself alone. This was underpinned by a resurgence of official historical interest in Henry IV whose work Louis was now sup-

posed to complete. Whereas these claims had been largely confined to domestic debates on royal foreign policy, Louis' greater belligerence after 1667 forced foreigners to take greater notice. By 1673 Louis was being criticised for having usurped the role in order to legitimise his aggressive bid for universal monarchy. The attack was projected into the past, modifying Henry IV's generally positive image and depicting him as the instigator of the corrupt and coercive practices that now made Louis so despicable. Significantly, the position of arbiter was not questioned, merely that it was currently occupied by the wrong monarch clearing the ground for an alternative claimant.

This vacancy was eagerly seized by the Stuart monarchy in England. Like France, there was a connection between the debates on royal foreign policy and the crown's desire to assert itself after domestic strife, indicating the close connection between the ideology of international arbiter and the recharged monarchical pretensions of absolutism, or would-be absolutists. Again, like their French counterparts, later seventeenth-century English publicists invoked memories of an earlier king to substantiate claims to a ›traditional‹ international role for their king portraying Henry VIII as already ›holding the balance‹ between France and Spain in the early sixteenth century. Charles II's French alliance compromised his ability to assume this task in the eyes of many Englishmen who believed his reluctance to oppose Louis endangered Protestantism's survival. This aspect assumed a central place in the official justification for the abandonment of longstanding neutrality after 1688. By opposing the unacceptable growth of France, William III was celebrated as fulfilling England's duty to preserve both Protestantism and European peace.

These arguments became less convincing after 1702 as the European order was transformed by the War of the Spanish Succession and as Anglo-French tension gravitated to new world colonial rivalries. The 1713–1714 peace settlement also helped usher in new attitudes to conflict resolution, since the scope of the conflict encouraged the belief that international questions were the proper concern of all great powers and not only the immediate belligerents. This was underpinned by the growth of the balance of power concept which portrayed the international system as self-regulating and dependent more on material forces than direct human action.

As in his other work, Kampmann's book is distinguished by its exceptionally clear organisation, and its concise and succinct argumentation. In a work that analyses 402 pamphlets drawn from 12 archives across five countries, it is perhaps rather unfair to ask for more, but then like all good history, this is a book that provokes questions as well as providing answers. It would be interesting to extend the discussion to other monarchies to see how such arguments featured in the rhetoric of kingship elsewhere. Kampmann does consider the reception of French and English pamphlets within the Reich, but does not relate this specifically to German debates on the traditional imperial role, or the language of the ›third party‹ which interposed itself between combatants to bring about a peaceful resolution to conflict. One of the most intriguing aspects of Kampmann's discussion are the sections which connect the ideology of the arbiter with actual political action, demonstrating that contemporaries not only deployed these arguments as justifications for action, but also took particular steps because they believed in the validity of their own convictions. There is considerable scope for more work here, particularly given the centrality of issues of legitimacy to early modern political actors.

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