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between the 12th and the 14th Century**

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GION WALLMEYER

WITH PEN AND SWORD

Knights as Crusade Advisors between the 12th and the 14th Century

For more than a century, scholars of medieval history from Gautier to Huizinga and Erdmann have consistently emphasized the reciprocal relationship between crusading and knighthood¹. Two recent trends that emerged independently of each other in the historiographies of crusades and knighthood suggest that historians should consider this aged couple once again: The first of these trends revolves around the medieval practices of planning a crusade. By investigating the ways and means by which local as well as governmental agents had prepared themselves for the military campaigns in the East, historians have started to focus on the process of planning not only as a precursor to the actual crusade, but rather as a project in its own right². This analysis of crusade planning is not limited to the classical period of the 12th and 13th centuries but complemented by the somewhat older tendency to expand the notion of crusading to the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries³. In the history of knighthood on the other hand, a series of recent studies has examined the diverse social roles of knights as well as their manifold functions in the growing administrations of the 13th and 14th centuries and the knowledge that enabled them to occupy

- 1 Carl ERDMANN, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens*, Stuttgart 1935 (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte, 6), p. 51–106; Léon GAUTIER, *La chevalerie*, Paris ³1895, p. 66–72 and Johan HUIZINGA, *The Waning of the Middle Ages. A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Dawn of the Renaissance*, transl. by Frederick HOPMANN, New York 1954, p. 95–99. For a more recent example see e. g. Jean FLORI, *Croisade et chevalerie. XI^e-XII^e siècles*, Paris 1998 (Bibliothèque du Moyen Âge, 12).
- 2 See e. g. Daniel BALOUP, Manuel SÀNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ (ed.), *Partir en croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge. Financement et logistique*, Toulouse 2015 (Médiennes, Croisades tardives, 4); Alexander BERNER, *Kreuzzug und regionale Herrschaft. Die älteren Grafen von Berg 1147–1225*, Köln 2014, esp. Chap. 5; Xavier HÉLARY, *La dernière croisade. Saint Louis à Tunis (1270)*, Paris 2016, esp. Chap. 2; Jacques PAVIOT (ed.), *Les projets de croisade. Géostratégie et diplomatie européenne du XIV^e au XVII^e siècle*, Toulouse 2014 (Médiennes, Croisades tardives, 1); Stefan TEBRUCK, *Kreuzfahrer und Jerusalemfahrer aus dem sächsisch-thüringischen Raum (1100–1300)*, in: ID., Nikolas JASPERT (ed.), *Die Kreuzzugsbewegung im römisch-deutschen Reich (11.–13. Jahrhundert)*, Ostfildern 2015, p. 41–81, here p. 61–70 and Christopher TYERMAN, *How to Plan a Crusade. Reason and Religious War in the High Middle Ages*, London 2015. This approach is not entirely new; for older examples see e. g. Norman HOUSLEY, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades. 1305–1378*, Oxford 1986 or Heribert MÜLLER, *Kreuzzugspläne und Kreuzzugspolitik des Herzogs Philipp des Guten von Burgund*, Göttingen 1993 (Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 51).
- 3 The seminal works in this field are Joseph Marie Antoine DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle. Expéditions du maréchal Boucicaut*, 2 vols., Paris 1886 and Aziz SURYAL ATIYA, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, New York ²1970. For the second wave of studies in the later crusades see Norman HOUSLEY, *The later Crusades 1274–1580. From Lyons to Alcazar*, Oxford 1992; Sylvia SCHEIN, *Fideles crucis. The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274–1314*, Oxford 1991; Christopher TYERMAN, *England and the Crusades. 1095–1588*, Chicago 1988 as well as the volumes published in the series »Les croisades tardives«.

these positions⁴. In the light of these developments, it seems expedient to combine both approaches and analyse the function of knights in crusade planning.

I will try to tackle at least some part of this extensive undertaking by examining the knights⁵ who advised⁶ crusading rulers on how to conduct a successful crusade⁷ to the East from the perspective of the history of knowledge⁸. Based on the evidence from temporary chronicles, tracts, and chancery records, I will argue that the function of these advisors as well as the social norms that governed their selection underwent a fundamental transformation during the 13th century: In the first half of the 13th century, knights had no distinct field of responsibility in courtly crusade planning but were expected to give their counsel on nearly all subjects that were deemed relevant for crusade preparation. The planning and execution of a crusade were treated as an inseparable unity, which tied a knight's ability to give advice on the crusade to his actual ability to fight in the crusade. Around the time of the second Council of Lyon in 1274, this attitude changed and crusade planning started to become increasingly differentiated. From this point onward, knights tended to specialise in the theoretical aspects of warfare, while other advisors handled matters of finance, legislation, or oriental geography.

In the first part of my argument I will describe the advisory tasks which knights performed in 12th and early 13th century crusade planning and assess what types of knowledge and skills

- 4 See e. g. Christopher CANDY, *A Growing Trust. Edward III and his Household Knights 1330–1340*, in: *The Hundred Years War. Further Considerations*, Leiden 2013 (*History of Warfare*, 85), p. 49–62; Mario DAMEN, *The Knighthood in and around Late Medieval Brussels*, in: *Journal of Medieval History* (2017), p. 255–284 and Xavier HÉLARY, *L'armée du roi de France. La guerre de Saint Louis à Philippe le Bel*, Paris 2012, esp. p. 231–255.
- 5 I will understand »knights« as a social class of noble warriors beneath the barons. Following the recent research on knighthood, I do not assume that they formed a coherent social group until the 15th century, because up until then even kings and princes described themselves as *milites* or *chevaliers*. For the latter assumption see esp. Joseph MORSEL, *L'aristocratie médiévale. V^e–XV^e siècle*, Paris 2004, p. 88–128.
- 6 The ambiguous terms *consilium*, *conseil*, etc. denoted at least two overlapping practices between the 12th and 14th centuries. Firstly, they described the transfer of knowledge from the advisor to the advised in order to inform the latter about a given topic and secondly an informal method of exerting power, because »[...] wer »ratet«, verpflichtet sich damit auch zur Hilfe« (Otto BRUNNER, *Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, Wien, Wiesbaden 1965, p. 270). My analysis will focus on the first meaning of advice and examine the practice of consensual rulership only in the cases when both of them coincide.
- 7 The definition of the term »crusade« has always been a matter of considerable controversy in historical research, because the word itself was not known to the contemporaries of the 12th century. So-called pluralists consider crusades as »[...] wars proclaimed or supported by the papacy, for which crusade indulgences and privileges were publicized and preached and whose combatants included men wearing the crusader's cross and fulfilling vows of crusade [...]« (HOUSLEY, *Later Crusades* [as in n. 3], p. 2), while traditionalists claim that the crusade »[...] était une guerre sainte ayant pour objectif la récupération des Lieux saints de Jérusalem par les chrétiens« (Jean FLORI, *Pour une redéfinition de la croisade*, in: *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 47 [2004], p. 329–349, here p. 349). I will argue from a mainly pluralist point of view but restrict myself to the crusades that aimed at the Holy Land, because the military campaigns against Christian heretics as well as those in the Baltic required other types of knowledge and were met with different levels of success.
- 8 In the following paper, I will understand »knowledge« as a skill, belief, or coherent system of beliefs, which is epistemically justified and believed to be applicable by at least some contemporaries. By focusing on the category of knowledge, I will leave out kinship and clientelism, which also had profound effects on the selection of courtly advisors but have been thoroughly researched in the past, cf. Peter BURKE, *What is the History of Knowledge?*, Cambridge 2016.

they were expected to have in order to be considered as an advisor by crusading rulers. As a second step, I will exemplify the changes that occurred during the latter half of the 13th century and describe how they affected the position of knights in courtly crusade planning. In the third and final section, I will briefly discuss some of the historical causes for this transformation on the basis of current historical research.

I.

From the first crusade onwards, knights have always been heavily involved in planning military campaigns in the East by advising rulers on strategy, recruitment, or finance. In order to discuss these matters, crusading rulers met with each other as well as with their retinue in grand assemblies which consisted to a decent part of knights. One of the first of these planning councils⁹ was a meeting of French magnates in 1096, which was hosted by Hugues de Vermandois (*1057–†1101) at Paris to prepare for the first crusade¹⁰. The second and third crusades involved the same kind of assemblies during the course of their preparation, even though they were organized by kings and not by Princes. Konrad III (*1093–†1152) and Louis VII (*ca. 1120–†1180) held meetings in 1147 at Frankfurt and Étampes¹¹, while the third crusade was preceded by similar meetings at Geddington, London, Paris, and Regensburg¹². This form of planning was especially practiced by the commanders of the fourth crusade, who resorted to »holding regular meetings and deciding issues of strategic importance in apparently open debates, for example at gatherings during the summer of 1200 in Soissons and Compiègne¹³«. Assemblies like these were also held during the respective campaigns in order to debate the further course of action. One year after the crusader's defeat at Dorylaeum in 1147, the kings Konrad III and Louis VII met at Acre to determine the future course of the campaign¹⁴ and Louis IX (*1214–†1270) assembled his army during its stay on Cyprus in 1249 to decide whether they should attack Damietta¹⁵. These councils of magnates remained a crucial part of cru-

- 9 Contemporaries used no homogenous terminology to denote these kinds of meetings. In chronicles, they were called *colloquium*, *concilium* or *congregatio*, cf. De expugnatione Lyxbonensi. The conquest of Lisbon, ed. Charles Wendell David, New York 2001 (Records of Western Civilization, 24), p. 100; Eudes de Deuil, De profectone Ludovici VII in orientem, ed. Virginia GINGERICK BERRY, New York 1948, p. 12 and Guibert de Nogent, Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos, in: Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens Occidentaux, vol. 4, Paris 1879, p. 113–236, here p. 149.
- 10 Guibert de Nogent, Gesta (as in n. 9), p. 149.
- 11 Otto von Freising, Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I imperatoris, ed. Georg WAITZ, Bernhard VON SIMSON (MGH SS rer. Germ., 46), Hannover, Leipzig 1912, p. 1–161, here p. 63–64 and Eudes de Deuil, De profectone (as in n. 9), p. 12.
- 12 Roger of Howden, Chronica magistri Rogeri de Houedene, ed. William STUBBS, 4 vols., London 1868–1871, here vol. 2, p. 358 and vol. 3, p. 19–20.
- 13 Christopher TYERMAN, How to Plan (as in n. 2), p. 238. For a contemporary account of these councils see also Geoffroy de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, ed. Jean DUFOURNET, Paris 2004 (Garnier Flammarion, 1197), p. 60–62.
- 14 This meeting is described in two letters, which Konrad III wrote to abbot Wibald von Stablo, cf. Wibald von Stablo, Das Briefbuch Abt Wibalds von Stablo und Corvey, ed. Martina HARTMANN, 3 vols., Hannover 2012 (MGH Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit, 9), here vol. 1, p. 127–129, 220–222.
- 15 Cf. the letter written by a knight named Gui, who claimed that he had participated in the council. The letter is recorded in Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. Henry Richards LUARD, 7 vols., London 1872–1883 (Rolls Series, 57), here vol. 6, p. 155. Louis' mother Blanche also mentioned this assembly in a letter to king Henry III, cf. *ibid.*, p. 165–166.

sade-planning until its ultimate decline because they provided a mechanism to forge consensus between kings, nobles, and prelates about matters of general strategy and funding¹⁶.

After the initial formation of crusader states, knights who had settled in the East also supplied the courts of crusading rulers with regular information about the geopolitical situation in the Orient¹⁷. The information given in these communications focused mainly on oriental diplomacy as well intelligence about troop movement and strength, while ignoring references to oriental customs. The informants, many of whom were members of the military orders, often established long-standing relationships of intelligence exchange with particular courts. The Hospitaller Joseph de Chauncy (*ca. 1213–†after 1281), for instance, briefed the English court about the situation in the Holy Land for nearly 30 years¹⁸.

Besides giving advice at grand assemblies and informing rulers about Eastern affairs, knights also partook in the much smaller and more reclusive planning sessions that were hosted within the courts of crusading rulers. Louis VII held one of these assemblies in 1147 at Châlons-en-Champagne, two weeks in advance of the general council of French magnates in Étampes, and Henry II (*1133–†1189) convened a small group of his advisors in 1188 at Le Mans to discuss ways to finance the upcoming crusade before he set out to meet with his magnates at Gedding-ton¹⁹. After some practical disagreements in the general councils that preceded the fourth crusade, its commanders even decided to commission six of their knights to plan the route to the Holy Land and negotiate a passage with the maritime city states²⁰. Louis IX also trusted the advice of knights like Guy de Mauvoisin and Jean de Joinville (*ca. 1224–†1317) during his first crusade.²¹ The latter described two planning sessions that took place in 1250 at Acre in his vita

16 These general councils were by no means limited to crusading, but moreover a typical method of medieval rulership, cf. Gerd ALTHOFF, *Kontrolle der Macht. Formen und Regeln politischer Beratung im Mittelalter*, Darmstadt 2016; Jacques KRYNEN, *L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIII^e–XV^e siècle*, Paris 1993 (Bibliothèque des histoires), p. 247–251 and Bernd SCHNEIDMÜLLER, *Konsensuale Herrschaft. Ein Essay über Formen und Konzepte politischer Ordnung im Mittelalter*, in: Peter MORAW, Paul-Joachim HEINIG, Barbara KRAUSS (ed.), *Reich, Regionen und Europa im Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, Berlin 2000 (Historische Forschungen, 67), p. 53–87.

17 See e. g. the letter written by the Templar Armand de Périgord, cf. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora* (as in n. 15), vol. 4, p. 25.

18 *Ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 205–207 and William Basevi SANDERS, *A Crusader's Letter from the Holy Land*, in: *Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society* 5 (1888), p. 1–16. Joseph even became royal treasurer under Edward I and served in this position from 1273 to 1280, when he returned to the East. For a short biography see Zefira ENTIN ROKÉAH, *A Hospitaller and the Jews. Brother Joseph de Chauncy and English Jewry in the 1270s*, in: *Jewish Historical Studies* 34 (1996), p. 189–207, here p. 191–193.

19 Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, *Sancti Bernardi vita et res gestae*, in: MIGNE PL vol. 185, col. 400. The meeting was also visited by ambassadors of Konrad III, cf. Roger of Howden, *Chronica* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, p. 335–338. For a summary of the preparations for the second crusade see Jonathan PHILLIPS, *The Second Crusade. Extending the Frontiers of Christendom*, New Haven 2007, p. 115–135.

20 The six knights in question were Geoffroy de Villehardouin, Milon le Bréban, Conon de Béthune, Alard Maquereau, Jean de Friaize, and Gautier de Gaudonville. The incident has been described by Robert de Clari as well as by Geoffroy himself in their respective chronicles of the fourth crusade, cf. Robert de Clari, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Jean DUFOURNET, Paris 2004 (Champion classiques. Série »Moyen âge«, 14), p. 52–54 and Geoffroy de Villehardouin, *La conquête* (as in n. 13), p. 44–46.

21 Jean de Joinville was the Seneschal of Champagne and Guy de Mauvoisin was a knight from the region of Mantes, cf. Dirk REITZ, *Die Kreuzzüge Ludwigs IX. von Frankreich 1248/1270*, Münster 2005 (Neue Aspekte der europäischen Mittelalterforschung, 3), p. 19–28 and Jean RICHARD, *Saint Louis. Roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte*, Paris 1983, p. 239.

of Saint Louis. Joinville's account illustrates that the hierarchical structure of the court heavily affected the way these councils were organized. Knights like him had to sit in the back of the assembly and were only allowed to state their advice after higher-ranking nobles like the king's brother Charles (*ca. 1226–†1285) or count Guillaume of Flanders (*1225–†1251) had spoken. Moreover, the higher nobility found it unacceptable when nobles like Joinville openly disagreed with their advice and harassed him for days after he had vetoed their plans in the first meeting at Acre. In addition to the hierarchical structure of these small planning sessions, Joinville's account also highlights that the king did not distinguish between the different specialties of his counsellors, since Joinville tended to give him advice on several unconnected topics like crusade funding, troop recruitment, military strategy and diplomacy²².

This lack of differentiation by the king reflects the vague social norms for knights who wanted to become crusade advisors as well as the broad and unspecific function of these advisors in crusade preparation. Instead of specializing in a few types of knowledge or skills, knights had to be functionally polyvalent in order to succeed in courtly crusade planning. This universalist attitude is summed up by a comment that was made in the »Itinerarium peregrinorum«, a chronicle of the third crusade written by an unknown author with intimate knowledge of king Richards' (*1157–†1199) crusade preparations. In the course of his description, he tried to portray Jacques d'Avesnes (*ca. 1152–†1191), a knight from Hainaut, as an example for every crusader by characterizing him as »a man endowed with triple perfection: a Nestor in council, an Achilles in arms, better than Attilius Regulus at keeping his word«²³. According to this triad, the ideal crusading knight should have been excellent in nearly all fields that contemporaries deemed necessary for crusading: Wise and eloquent in command of the military, excellent at fighting in the field, as well as honest and well-versed in diplomacy. These three core functions not only summarized the contemporary norms for crusading knights, but also for those who were involved in preparing crusades, because from the 12th to the early 13th century, the expectations for a knight participating in a crusade and a knight planning a crusade were identical.

Courtly elites thought of military planning and military action as two sides of the same coin. The royal chaplain Eudes de Deuil (†1162) described this attitude explicitly in his account of the planning council held by Louis VII at Étampes. In respect to the king's selection of advisors, he mentioned that »it was his custom to associate in council with himself those who would also be associated with him in action«²⁴. Louis regarded only those crusade advisors worth listening to who would be willing to risk the course of action which they themselves had suggested. For knights, this constraint was tied intrinsically to the ability to fight in combat, which meant that the ability to plan a crusade came down to the individual ability to bear arms. The unknown author of »De expugnatione lyxbonensi«, a chronicle about the conquest of Lisbon during the second crusade, even suggested that planning councils »profited nothing except to beat the air«

22 Jean de Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. Jacques MONFRIN, Paris 1998 (Classiques Garnier), p. 206–214. As Richard has argued, it is very likely that Joinville mixed up the participants of the two assemblies. The first meeting on June 19th was probably a congregation of Louis' inner circle, while the second meeting on June 26th seems to have included a larger part of his retinue as well as the Latin magnates of the Outremer, cf. Jean RICHARD, *Saint Louis* (as in n. 21), p. 239–240.

23 [...] *vir trina perfectione predictus, in consiliis Nestor, in armis Achilles, in fide Attilio Regulo preferendus* (Das Itinerarium peregrinorum. Eine zeitgenössische englische Chronik zum dritten Kreuzzug in ursprünglicher Gestalt, ed. Hans Eberhard MAYER, Stuttgart 1962 [MGH Schriften, 18], p. 310, transl. by Helen J. NICHOLSON, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade. A Translation of the Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, Hampshire 2010 [Crusade Texts in Translation, 3], p. 74–75).

24 [...] *illi mos erat ut socii essent consilii qui forent et laboris* (Eudes de Deuil, *De profectio[n]e* [as in n. 9], p. 12, transl. by Virginia GINGERICK BERRY [as in n. 9], p. 13).

due to the fact that »there is no authority in talk«²⁵. This attitude was by no means limited to the second crusade or the French court because nearly forty years later, emperor Friedrich Barbarossa (*after 1122–†1190) seems to have chosen his crusade advisors according to similar principles. The chronicler Roger of Howden (†1201) wrote about the general council that Friedrich had assembled in 1189 at Regensburg:

»Then he has chosen himself wise men skilled in military weapons and proven many times, [...] and has brought them together with him to destroy the enemies of the cross of Christ. And he has decided to assemble all of them near Regensburg before the feast of Saint George so that they could prepare the departure on the way to Jerusalem at this day²⁶.«

This contemporary notion of a congruence between military planning skills and military fighting skills made those knights, who had already proven themselves in war, vital assets in crusade planning. Especially the veterans of past crusades were frequent visitors of the inner planning circles within the courts of crusading rulers from the late 12th century onwards²⁷. The six aforementioned knights, for instance, which were tasked by the leaders of the Fourth Crusade to negotiate with Venice and plan the route to the East, featured prominent crusading veterans like Conon de Béthune (*ca. 1160–†ca. 1219), Milon le Bréban (†after 1224), or Jean de Friaize (†1205), all of whom had participated in the third crusade²⁸.

The necessity of practical experience in warfare slowly faded during the course of the 13th century, when planners began to perceive advice and action as two distinct parts of a successful crusade. This transformation is well-reflected in the papal legislation on crusading, and its first indication can be found in the decree »Ad liberandam Terram sanctam«, which summarized the decisions of the fourth Lateran Council (1215) regarding the upcoming crusade. Not only did the council promise the crusade's participants the remission of their sins, but extended this remission to those, »who shall suitably minister from their goods toward the aid of that same land, or who shall give timely counsel and aid«²⁹. However, this regulation was obviously not designed for knights, but rather for the participants of the council as well as for the clergymen who

25 *Quid vero in hoc quisque prout animi lingueque facilitas abundabat dixerit, nichilque aliud nisi aerem verberare conferret, cum parum auctoritatis constet in fabula, non inconvenienter pretereundum puto* (De expugnatione [as in n. 9], p. 100, transl. by Charles Wendell DAVID [as in n. 9], p. 101).

26 *Deinde elegit sibi viros sapientes et in armis militaribus doctos et saepius expertos [...] et adduxit eos secum ad destruendum inimicos Crucis Christi. Et statuit eis terminum conveniendi in unum, apud Ravinsburg, ante festum Sancti Georgii, ita quod parati essent illo die iter Jerosolimitanai professionis arripere [...]* (Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici secundi Benedicti abbatis*, ed. William STUBBS, 2 vols., London 1867 [Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages, 51], here vol. 2, p. 56, transl. by Gion WALLMEYER).

27 Jonathan RILEY-SMITH, *The First Crusaders. 1095–1131*, Cambridge 1997, p. 165–166.

28 Jean LONGNON, *Les compagnons de Villehardouin. Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade*, Genève 1978 (*Hautes études médiévales et modernes*, 30), p. 48–57, 99–100 and 146–149.

29 [...] *qui ad subventionem ipsius Terrae de bonis suis congrue ministrabunt aut consilium et auxilium impenderint opportunum* (Ad liberandam Terram Sanctam, in: Giuseppe ALBERIGO, Josef WOHLMUTH [ed.], *Konzilien des Mittelalters. Vom ersten Laterankonzil (1123) bis zum fünften Laterankonzil (1512–1517)*, Paderborn 2000 [Dekrete der ökumenischen Konzilien, 2]), p. 267–271, here p. 271, transl. by Ernest HENDERSON, *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, London 1903, p. 343). The pope obviously issued these regulations to provide non-combatants with a way to participate in the crusade endeavor, while at the same time establishing new sources to fund the crusade, cf. Uta-Renate BLUMENTHAL, *Ad liberandam Terram Sanctam und die Kanonistik*, in: Maria Pia ALBERZONI, Pascal MONTAUBIN (ed.), *Legati, delegati e l'impresa d'Ol-*

wanted to partake in the crusade without perpetrating violence³⁰. In addition, the reference to *consilium* did not stand alone but was tied to *auxilium*, which meant it also required at least some degree of financial or military service to the crusade in order to evoke the promised remission of sins³¹. Overall, this part of legislation seems to have been of minor importance because it was not implemented again until 1245 when the first Council of Lyon made use of a similar concept in its decree »Afflicti corde«, which was issued in preparation for the first crusade of Louis IX³². These regulations were repeated by the second Council of Lyon in its decree »Zelus fidei« after it had debated on the crusade in 1274³³. In the forefront of this council, pope Gregory X (*ca. 1210–†1276) had asked all of his prelates for their advice on how to conduct a successful crusade, a call that spawned a flurry of treatises on the more theoretical aspects of crusading³⁴. After the complete loss of the Outremer in 1291, this papal request for advice was extended from prelates to clergymen and secular nobles: In reaction to the crushing defeat, pope Nicolas IV (*1227–†1292) had issued an encyclical to the major rulers of Latin Christianity, in which he had asked everyone »to explore various and alternate ways and means«³⁵ to recover the Holy Land from the hands of the Egyptian Sultan who had conquered it beforehand. It provided knights with the opportunity to give advice on the crusade without the imminent commitment to fight in the crusade, which allowed them to be advisors without having to use the sword.

II.

The papal calls for advice of 1274 and 1291 marked the dawn of a new era in crusade planning, which initially was spearheaded by clerics and later adapted by knights. In 1290, the Franciscan friar Fidenzio da Padova (*ca. 1226–†after 1292) finished an extensive military treatise on how to conduct a successful crusade. At the time this tract was written, Fidenzio himself was al-

tremare (secoli XII–XIII). Papal Legates, Delegates and the Crusades (12th–13th Century), Turnhout 2014, p. 31–50.

- 30 This thesis is supported by a letter from Innocent III to the archbishop of Canterbury, in which the pope wrote that although clerics would not be able to fight during the crusade they would be useful for the success of the whole endeavor, because they could support the fighters by giving them counsel, cf. Christopher Robert CHENEY, Hubert Walter, London 1967 (Leaders of Religion), p. 129–130.
- 31 BRUNNER, Land und Herrschaft (as in n. 6), p. 269–272.
- 32 »Afflicti corde«, in: ALBERIGO, WOHLMUTH, Konzilien (as in n. 29), p. 297–301. The previous crusade encyclical »Rachel suum videns«, which was drafted by pope Gregory IX in 1234 to prepare the crusade of 1239, included no such regulation, cf. »Rachel suum videns«, in: Les registres de Grégoire IX. Recueil des bulles de ce pape, ed. Lucien AUVRAY, 4 vols., Paris 1896–1955 (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 2), here vol. 1, col. 1181–1183.
- 33 »Zelus fidei«, in: ALBERIGO, WOHLMUTH, Konzilien (as in n. 27), p. 309–312, here p. 312.
- 34 Les Registres de Grégoire X. Recueil des bulles de ce pape, ed. Jean GIURAUD, Léon CADIER, Paris 1892 (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 12), p. 53–55. For the treatises see e. g. Humbert de Romans, *Opus tripartitum*, ed. Edward BROWN, in: Appendix ad fasciculum rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum, London 1690, p. 185–229 and William of Tripoli, *De statu Sarracenorum*, ed. by Peter ENGELS, in: ID. (ed.), *Notitia de Machometo. De statu Sarracenorum*, Würzburg 1992 (Corpus Islamo-Christianum, Series Latina, 4), p. 263–372. Historians have often seen the second Council of Lyon as turning point in the way crusades were planned, cf. HOUSLEY, *Later Crusades* (as in n. 3), p. 7–15 and SCHEIN, *Fideles crucis* (as in n. 3), p. 15–20.
- 35 [...] *vias et modos diversos et varios [...] exquirentes [...]* (*Dirum armatudinis calicem*, in: Ernest LANGLOIS [ed.], *Registres de Nicolas IV*, Paris 1886, p. 902–903, here p. 902, transl. by Gion WALLMEYER). The version of the encyclical, which Nicolas addressed to king Edward I, is cited by the chronicler Walter of Guisborough, cf. Walter of Guisborough, *Chronicon domini Walteri de Hemingburgh*, ed. Hans Claude HAMILTON, 2 vols., London 1848–1849, here vol. 2, p. 27–29.

ready a veteran in crusade planning: He had participated in the second Council of Lyon, conferred with pope Gregory X, and travelled the Levant³⁶. Grounded in two decades of experience, his »Liber recuperationis Terre Sancte« encompassed geopolitical strategies as well as wartime tactics, deliberations on the composition of armies, military intelligence, and a compilation of possible routes to the East. With its large amounts of meticulously collected knowledge, Fidenzio's treatise perfectly reflects the transformation in late 13th century crusade planning. Most of his military knowledge derived from the work of the late antique author Vegetius, whose tactical and strategic theorems he extrapolated for the use in crusade warfare³⁷. Fidenzio's tactical advice did not only consist of a reiteration of the »Epitoma rei militaris«, but also covered typical military stratagems that were employed by the Egyptian armies in order to help the crusaders fight them successfully. In one case for instance, he warned crusaders not to chase Mamluk horse archers who seem to flee the battleground because they tended to use these kinds of feigned retreats as an opportunity to shoot arrows at their unsuspecting pursuers³⁸. Examples like this indicate a courtly demand for knowledge about the enemy that was inexistent in previous centuries. Even in a well-prepared military operation like the first crusade of Louis IX it had not been the case that the commander »ait été bien préparé ou ait même sérieusement songé à se préparer à la connaissance des musulmans auxquels il allait s'affronter«³⁹.

In addition to his remarks about oriental customs of war, Fidenzio also informed the readers of his »Liber recuperationis« extensively about oriental history and geography. He discussed seven different routes to the Holy Land in respect to their drawbacks and advantages such as the position of enemy strongholds, the presence of friendly kingdoms, or the availability of supplies for the army⁴⁰. He additionally compiled the history of the Holy Land, the history of the crusades, as well as the history of Islam in order to help the Latins fight their enemies guided by the *exempla* (and mistakes) of their predecessors⁴¹. Due to the broad scope of knowledge presented, the »Liber recuperationis« reveals a glimpse of the new era in crusade planning in which practical experience in warfare alone was no longer sufficient for being a well-respected crusade advisor. Instead, new types of knowledge like acquaintance with theoretical military literature, cultural knowledge of the enemy's habits, and geographical knowledge of the East had become of increasing importance within the courts of crusading rulers.

Fidenzio's treatise was by no means a single unconnected incident but rather one of the first exemplars of what Schein once called a new branch of crusade literature⁴². From the time between 1290 and 1335 nearly 30 tracts survive that deal with the recovery of the Holy Land in

36 Fidenzio da Padova, *Liber recuperationis Terre sancte*, in: Girolamo GOLUBOVICH (ed.), *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell' Oriente francescano*, vol. 2, Rom 1913, p. 9–60, here p. 9. See also Paolo EVANGELISTI, *Fidenzio da Padova e la letteratura crociato-missionaria minoritica. Strategie e modelli francescani per il dominio (XIII–XV sec.)*, Bologna 1998, p. XL–XLIV and Patrick GAUTIER DALCHÉ, *Cartes, réflexion stratégique et projets de croisade à la fin du XIII^e et au début du XIV^e siècle. Une initiative franciscaine?*, in: *Francia* 37 (2010), p. 77–95, here p. 80–83.

37 Fidenzio da Padova, *Liber recuperationis* (as in n. 30), p. 32–34 and Flavius Vegetius Rhenanus, *Epitoma rei militaris*, ed. Michael REEVE, Oxford 2004, p. 120–132. For the reception of Vegetius in the Middle Ages see esp. Christopher ALLMAND, *The De re militari of Vegetius. The Reception, Transmission, and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 2011.

38 Fidenzio da Padova, *Liber recuperationis* (as in n. 36), p. 30.

39 Jacques LE GOFF, *Saint Louis*, Paris 1996 (*Bibliothèque des histoires*), p. 180.

40 Fidenzio da Padova, *Liber recuperationis* (as in n. 36), p. 51–58.

41 *Ibid.* p. 10–21. Fidenzio's history of Islam bears close resemblance to earlier 13th-century dossiers on Muslim history like William of Tripoli's (*ca. 1220–†after 1274) tract »De statu sarracenorum«, which the Dominican friar had composed for crusade-related planning sessions at the second Council of Lyon, cf. William of Tripoli, *De statu* (as in n. 34), p. 266–318.

42 SCHEIN, *Fideles crucis* (as in n. 3), p. 91–111.

a way similar to the »Liber recuperationis«. These *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* memoranda were composed on behalf of popes and kings or recapped the results of orally conducted planning sessions at their courts⁴³. Writing these tracts was not only an ecclesiastical business limited to clergymen like Fidenzio. It was, in fact, also pursued by secular scholars like the Norman lawyer Pierre Dubois (*ca. 1255–†after 1321), members of the aspiring bourgeoisie like Guido da Vigevano (*ca. 1280–†after 1349), as well as by merchants like the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello (*ca. 1270–†ca. 1343)⁴⁴. Aside from the clergy, the second biggest social class involved in compiling these recovery tracts were the knights: Five treatises can be definitively attributed to them, while at least four others were most likely composed with their help⁴⁵. Knights were not only among the composers, but also among the recipients of these tracts. The Venetian crusade advisor Marino Sanudo for instance gave his recovery treatise to some unknown knights during his stay at the French court in 1322⁴⁶. The presence of men like Sanudo nonetheless bears witness of the new social diversity in 14th-century crusade planning, when prelates as well as the veterans of past crusades suddenly had to share their seats on courtly planning councils with merchants, orient-travellers, and university-educated scholars. A letter from Charles IV (*1294–†1328) to pope John XXII (*ca. 1244–†1334) illustrates the broad social scope of crusade advisors consulted by the French king, who stated that he had called to-

- 43 For a general overview of these recovery tracts see Albert LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *La prédication de la croisade au treizième siècle*, in: *Revue des questions historiques* 48 (1890), p. 5–28; ATIYA, *Crusade* (as in n. 3), p. 29–127; DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *La France en Orient* (as in n. 3), vol. 1, p. 11–102; Jacques PAVIOT, *Projets de croisade (v. 1290–v. 1330)*, Paris 2008 (*Documents relatifs à l'histoire des Croisades*, 20), p. 5–51; Franz HEIDELBERGER, *Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, Leipzig 1911 (*Abhandlungen zur Mittleren und Neuen Geschichte*, 31), p. 67–77; Antony LEOPOLD, *How to Recover the Holy Land. The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries*, Aldershot 2000, p. 8–51 and Ludger THIER, *Kreuzzugsbemühungen unter Papst Clemens V. (1305–1314)*, Werl 1973 (*Franziskanische Forschungen*, 24), p. 23–75.
- 44 Pierre Dubois, *De recuperatione Terre Sancte. Traité de politique générale*, ed. Charles Victor LANGLOIS, Paris 1891; Guido da Vigevano, *Le macchine del re. Il texaurus regis Francie*, ed. Guistina OSTUNI, Vigevano 1993 and Marino Sanudo, *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis*, in: Jacques BONGARS (ed.), *Gesta Dei per Francos*, Hannover 1611, vol. 2, p. 1–288.
- 45 For the memoranda composed by knights see Foulques de Villaret, *Mémoire de Foulques de Villaret sur la croisade*, ed. Joseph PETIT, in: *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 60 (1899), p. 602–610; Foulques de Villaret et al., *Un projet de »passage particulier« proposé par l'ordre de l'Hôpital*, ed. Benjamin KEDAR, Sylvia SCHEIN, in: *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 137 (1979), p. 211–226; Jacques de Molay, *Consilium magistri Templi datum Clementi V super negotio Terre Sancte*, in: Étienne BALUZE (ed.), *Vitae paparum Avenionensium*. Nouv. édition par Guillaume MOLLAT, vol. 3, Paris 1921, p. 145–149; *La devise des chemins de Babilloine*, ed. Paul Riant, in: Henri Victor MICHELANT, Gaston RAYNAUD (ed.), *Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions*, Paris 1882, p. 239–252 and Roger of Stanegrave, *Li Charboclois d'armes du conquest precious de la Terre saint de promission*, ed. Jacques PAVIOT, in: ID., *Projets* (as in n. 43), p. 293–387. For memoranda composed with the help of knights see Charles II de Anjou, *Le conseil du roi Charles*, ed. Gheorghe BRĂȚIANU, in: *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen* 19 (1942), p. 291–361; Henri II de Lusignan, *Consilium*, ed. Louis DE MAS LATRIE, in: ID. (ed.), *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols., Paris 1852–1861, here vol. 2, p. 118–125; Henri II de Lusignan, *Consail*, in: Auguste COULON (ed.), *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Jean XXII relatives à la France*, 4 vols., Paris 1906–1972 (*Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 3), here vol. 2, col. 274–278 and *Deux projets de croisade en Terre-Saint*, ed. Charles KOHLER, in: *Revue de l'Orient latin* 10 (1904), p. 406–457, here p. 435–457.
- 46 Cf. the letter in French, which Sanudo wrote to address these knights: Marino Sanudo, *Epistola*, in: BONGARS, *Gesta* (as in n. 44), p. 289–316, here p. 297–298.

gether »many well-known persons, churchmen and laymen, barons, knights, nobles and merchants as well as friars and others from different parts of the world, overseas as well as maritime and also [from] further [places]«⁴⁷.

Despite of these newcomers, knights were still omnipresent in 14th century crusade planning. Charles had indeed gloated over his socially diverse advisory council, but when it eventually came down to joint planning sessions with the pope at Avignon he chose to be represented by Bouchard de Montmorency, a knight, and Pierre de Mortemart, the bishop of Viviers⁴⁸. His predecessor on the French throne, Philippe V (*ca. 1294–†1322), also relied heavily on the advice of knights in crusade planning. In two small meetings, held in December 1319 and February 1320, he questioned a total of 19 advisors, eleven of which were knights. While some of them were well-known individuals like Foulques de Villaret (†1327), the former grand master of the Hospitaliers, Simon le Rat, once Marshal of the same order, or Othon de Grandson (*ca. 1238–†1328), a famous veteran of king Louis second crusade (1270–1272), most of the knights that participated in these meetings are only mentioned once or twice in the royal registers. Like Folques, Simon and Othon, five of them were members of the Hospitallers, whereas another six were secular knights with some connection to the French crown⁴⁹. Contrary to the planning sessions in which Joinville had participated 70 years earlier, only few higher nobles were present, because most of the French magnates were scheduled for a grand council eight days after these small councils had taken place⁵⁰. The way these assemblies were composed suggests that the king wanted to focus on the exchange of information and avoid conflicts of hierarchy similar to the ones that Joinville had described.

Although the early 14th century saw knights still deeply involved in crusade planning, the expectations of their courtly audience had changed. Some of them tried to keep up with the changing circumstances by widening their personal knowledge and thereby preserving their functional polyvalence. An example for this strategy is the Hospitaller knight Roger of Stanegrave (*ca. 1265–†after 1332), who wrote a recovery treatise for king Edward III (*1312–†1377) in

47 [...] *cum de diversis mundi partibus tam transmarinis quam maritimis, quam etiam aliis, multos homines circumspectos, ecclesiasticos et seculares, barones, milites, nobiles et mercatores ac religio[sos] et alios convocasset [...]* (COULON, *Lettres* [as in n. 45], vol. 2, col. 259, transl. by Gion WALLMEYER). Housley has argued that mentioning these deliberations explicitly should have demonstrated the seriousness of French crusade preparations to the pope, which was necessary because the king wanted to tap ecclesiastical budgets for his crusade. Taking this argument for granted, a socially broad and diverse listing of crusade advisors in the manner cited seems to have been a proof for the quality of the king's advisory council on crusading, cf. Norman HOUSLEY, *The Franco-Papal Crusade Negotiations of 1322–23*, in: *Papers of the British School at Rome* 48 (1980), p. 166–185.

48 COULON, *Lettres* (as in n. 45), vol. 2, col. 256. Bouchard was lord of Saint-Leu, Nangis and Deuil as well as grand panetier of France, cf. André DU CHESNE, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Montmorency et de Laval*, Paris 1623, p. 548–549.

49 Paris, Archives nationales, JJ 58, fol. 37r and 50v. The five Hospitallers who participated in these meetings were Foulques de Villaret, Simon le Rat, Othon de Grandson, Thierry de Liège and Eudes de Montagu. The secular knights were named Herpin d'Erquery, Kalle de Neuville, Bertrand de Soyoles, Sauce de Boucey, Bertrand de Quillon and Bertrand de Rouge Negade.

50 Paris, Archives nationales, JJ 58, fol. 37v and *Chronique parisienne anonyme de 1316 à 1339*, ed. Amédée HELLOT, in: *Mémoires de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Île-de-France* 11 (1884), p. 1–207, here p. 43. The only higher-ranking nobles on the small council were count Louis de Clermont, the designated leader of the preliminary crusade, and bishop Guillaume Durand of Mende, the French candidate of choice as papal Legate of the crusade, cf. Christopher TYERMAN, *Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319–20 and the Crusade*, in: *Historical Research* 57 (1984), p. 15–34, here p. 20–21.

the early 1330s⁵¹. Being a veteran of the Outremer who was kept as prisoner in Egypt until 1315, Roger tried to include nearly all types of knowledge that were considered relevant in 14th century crusade-planning. Similar to Fidenzio, he tried to adapt the writings of Vegetius for military purposes⁵², while also utilizing the knowledge of the East, which he had acquired during his captivity in Egypt. Not only did he describe the route to Cairo for the crusaders, but he also realized the relevance of a regular Nile flood for the sustenance of the Egyptian army and advocated an attack in times of its absence⁵³. Like his predecessors in the 12th and 13th centuries, Roger shared information about the political situation in the East and the numerical strength of the Egyptian army⁵⁴. Contrary to these earlier informants, he also commented on the organization of the enemies' armies as well as on their tactics in combat – for instance, that Mongols as well as Egyptians leaned towards picking a wide open space for battle in order to exploit their numerical superiority and excellent cavalry⁵⁵. Similar to the treatise Fidenzio had written 40 years earlier, Roger also supplemented his tract with a history of the crusades and the Holy Land. In contrast to the Franciscan friar, he added tales of chivalry from the Arthurian cycle to his historical narrative and supplemented them with pseudo-Aristotelian philosophy to incite his readers to chivalric deeds⁵⁶. This resemblance between the knowledge employed in Rogers' and Fidenzio's tracts reflects a tendency towards academization within courtly crusade planning that did not stop short of knights.

Apart from increasingly rare veterans like Roger or Othon, only few 14th-century knights could draw from a lifetime of experience in the East. Most of them instead specialized in a few areas of knowledge and relied on other crusade planners to round out their advice. This assumption is supported by three memoranda on the recovery of the Holy Land that Foulques de Villaret, the grand master of the Hospitallers, composed between 1306 and 1308 on behalf of pope Clement V (*ca. 1260–†1314). The first of these three texts was written in the latter half of 1306 as an answer to a direct request that the pope had made in June of the same year⁵⁷. This tract consists of two thematically distinct parts: The first part is concerned with history, military strategies, as well as army composition, and the second part focuses solely on ways and means to finance the crusade out of ecclesiastical funds, a topic that advisors like Fidenzio and

- 51 The treatise was presumably finished and given to Edward III in late 1332, but certainly not later than 1334, when the kings crusading efforts ended. The only surviving copy of the work in the British Library, Ms. Otho, D V, fol. 1r–15r was severely damaged by a fire in 1731 and has been edited recently by Jacques Paviot, cf. Roger of Stanegrave, *Li Charboclois* (as in n. 45). For short biographical notes on Roger see Timothy GUARD, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade. The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century*, Woodbridge 2013 (*Warfare in History*, 38), p. 32–33 and Jonathan RILEY-SMITH, *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant*, Basingstoke 2012, p. 213–214.
- 52 Roger of Stanegrave, *Li Charboclois* (as in n. 45), p. 361–364, 371–372 and Vegetius, *Epitoma rei militaris* (as in n. 37), p. 126–128, 152. The »*Epitoma rei militaris*« had been translated into French in 1284 and was received by knights since then, cf. Martin AURELL, *Le chevalier lettré. Savoir et conduite de l'aristocratie aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, Paris 2011, p. 47–49.
- 53 Roger of Stanegrave, *Li Charboclois* (as in n. 45), p. 316–319 and 353–359.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 323. Although his assumption that the Egyptian Sultan had 100 000 Mamluks to his disposal seems to have been exaggerated, cf. David AYALON, *Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army I*, in: *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 15/2 (1953), p. 203–228.
- 55 Roger of Stanegrave, *Li Charboclois* (as in n. 45), p. 372–373.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 340–342, 377–381. Paviot has argued that the parts of the text in which Roger reproduces Aristotle are derived from the pseudo-Aristotelian tract »*Secretum secretorum*«, cf. PAVIOT, *Projets* (as in n. 43), p. 40–41.
- 57 Clement V had asked the grand masters of the Templars and Hospitallers for their advice on the recovery of the Holy Land. The respective letter is dated to the 6th of June 1306 by the papal chancery, cf. *Regestum Clementis papae V*, ed. Luigi TOSTI, 9 vols., Rom 1885–1888, here vol. 1, p. 190–191.

Roger left out completely. While the first part was clearly composed by the grand master and his advisors, the second part was most likely the work of external specialists. Foulques himself stated in respect to crusade finance that »the pope should find others, who know better than us to instruct and teach him how these funds can be acquired«⁵⁸. This reference to financial experts in conjuncture with the homogeneity of the second part hints at the participation of specialists with a financial and bureaucratic knowledge that Foulques and his advisors obviously lacked⁵⁹.

The second and third memoranda were written in 1307 or 1308, when the Orders' conquest of Rhodes had already begun. In current research it is assumed that both of these tracts belong together, because they feature nearly the same *intitulatio*, which makes it very likely that they were given to the pope simultaneously⁶⁰. One of these two tracts is very similar to the first part of the memorandum that the Hospitallers composed for Clement V in 1306. Whereas the other treatise, known to historians by the name »La devise des chemins de Babilone«, was basically an itinerary that should have disclosed the best possible way to Cairo to the crusaders. Therefore, it consisted to a large extent of geographical information about the distance between cities or landmarks, the possibility to acquire food for the army, and good places to give battle or seek shelter as well as providing intelligence on the strength, position and quality of the Egyptian troops. Irwin has argued conclusively that the latter information stems from a cadastral survey (*Rawk*) made by the Mamluk administration in 1298, which means that the authors of the »Devise des chemins« must have had informal ties to the Egyptian bureaucracy as well as the ability to understand written Arabic⁶¹. It seems rather obvious that the Orders' knights themselves did not possess these abilities and had to rely on external specialists to acquire this kind of knowledge. This assumption is bolstered by a comparison of the *intitulatio* to both of the memoranda. At the beginning of the second treatise it is stated that the work below *fu pieça acordé entre la mer par le mestre de l'Ospital et par autres preudes homes*, while in the third treatise it is asserted that the following tract *fut pieça fait oultre la mer, ordené par le mestre et par le couvent de l'Ospital*⁶². This evidence suggests that the Hospitallers supplemented their second tract with a geographical treatise that had been composed by unknown advisors with innate knowledge of the East, most likely because they knew that their original tract lacked this kind of background.

These three Hospitaller memoranda shed light on the practice of specialization that resulted from the changing social norms which guided the selection of crusade advisors. Knights like Foulques de Villaret decided to outsource financial knowledge as well as knowledge of the East

58 [...] *dominus Papa inveniat alios qui melius nobis ipsum instruhere et erudire scient quomodo thesaurus iste congregari poterit [...]* (Foulques de Villaret, *Mémoire* (as in n. 45), p. 605, transl. by Gion WALLMEYER).

59 This thesis is further supplemented by a memorandum written by Jacques de Molay, the grand master of the Templars, as an answer to the same papal request. Aside from the assumption that the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa could bear the complete costs for the passage to the East, the Templars' piece of advice is completely devoid of financial planning, cf. Jacques de Molay, *Consilium* (as in n. 45), p. 147.

60 Robert IRWIN, How many miles to Babylon? The Devise des Chemins de Babiloine redated, in: Malcom BARBER, *The Military Orders. Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick*, Aldershot 1994, p. 57–63. Previous historians have proposed widely different dates for the text. Riant dated it to 1289–1291 and Delaville le Roulx to 1323–1328, cf. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *La France en Orient* (as in n. 3), vol. 1, p. 80 and *La devise* (as in n. 45), p. XXXI–XXXII.

61 IRWIN, *Devise* (as in n. 60), p. 59–62. For an overview of Mamluk cadastral reports see Hassanein RABIE, *The Financial System of Egypt. AH 564–741/AD 1169–1341*, London 1972 (London Oriental Series, 25), p. 52–56.

62 Foulques de Villaret et al., *Un projet* (as in n. 45), p. 221 and *La devise* (as in n. 45), p. 239. Both quotations stem from the versions of the texts that survived in the Ms. 1654 at the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève (Paris).

and instead focused on what best can be described as military knowledge supplemented by historical exempla and military theory. By the time of the Council of Vienne in 1311, the notion that there are experts for the military part of crusade planning had already become widely accepted in the circles of crusade advisors. When Clement V asked Guillaume le Maire (*ca. 1240–†1317) to comment on all three topics of the council the bishop of Angers stated in respect to a future crusade:

»I will report on the second [point], namely the subsidiary of the Holy Land, in good obedience [and] how it seems fitting to me on the first sight, even if it would rather concern men [that are] highly knowledgeable in worldly matters and highly experienced in warfare, and even if [I am] unacquainted and in this very difficult undertaking highly inexperienced [...]»⁶³.

In negating his own competence in respect to warfare, Guillaume implicitly acknowledged that it takes individuals with special knowledge and experience to comment adequately on the military part of crusading. In negating being an expert in this field, he presupposed that such experts existed.

The military orientation of their recovery tracts suggests that knights tried to accommodate their roles as experts in crusade warfare that Guillaume referenced in his remarks for the pope. Contemporaries consciously realized this role and intentionally questioned well-respected knights like the aforementioned Foulques de Villaret in order to become acquainted with their position on military topics. The Venetian crusade advisor Marino Sanudo, for instance, wrote in his »Istoria del regno di Romania« that he had consulted Foulques de Villaret, *che sapeva meglio metter guerra e discordia trà li Turchi infedeli*⁶⁴, during his stay on Rhodes. Some of the advice Foulques gave him might have become part of the second iteration of the »Liber Secretorum«, which Sanudo was composing at the time⁶⁵. His remarks indicate that Foulques' expertise alone must have been in great demand at the beginning of the 14th century. King Philippe V even invited him to the planning sessions at Paris in December 1319 despite his violent dismissal as grand master of the Hospitallers two years earlier⁶⁶. This evidence illustrates that knights successfully managed to carve out their own niche in courtly crusade planning, although some knights such as Roger of Stanegrave still tried to include different types of knowledge in their advices. It further

63 *De secundo, videlicet de subsidio Terre Sancte, licet ad sapientissimos viros in mundanis et expertissimos in rebus bellicis tractatus hujusmodi amplius pertineret [...] mihi, licet imperito et in tam arduis negociis maxime inexperto, quod prima facie videtur, propter bonum obediencie, referam [...]* (Livre de Guillaume le Maire, ed. Célestin PORT, Paris 1874, p. 290, transl. by Gion WALLMEYER).

64 Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania sive regno di Morea*, in: Charles HOPF (ed.), *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, Berlin 1873, p. 99–170, here p. 167. The »Istoria« itself did only survive in an 18th-century Italian translation, whereas the original Latin version of the text is lost. The meeting with the grand master, which Sanudo mentioned in his »Istoria«, must have taken place between the Hospitallers' conquest of Rhodes in 1309/10 and Foulques' final departure from the island in 1317.

65 E. g. the chapter in which Sanudo explains how to ally with some of the Turks in Asia Minor, cf. Sanudo, *Liber secretorum* (as in n. 44), p. 67.

66 Paris, Archives nationales, JJ 58, fol. 37r. Some brethren of the Hospitallers' convent at Rhodes tried to kill Foulques de Villaret in mid-1317 and elected Maurice de Pagnac as their grand master in his place. Foulques fled from the island and formally resigned his position in early 1319, when pope John XXII appointed Hélión de Villeneuve as new grand master of the Order, cf. Anthony LUTTRELL, *Notes on Foulques de Villaret. Master of the Hospital, 1305–1319*, in: *Des Hospitaliers de Saint Jean de Jérusalem de Chypre et de Rhodes de hier aux chevaliers de Malte aujourd'hui*, Paris 1985, p. 73–90, here p. 77–78.

indicates that crusade planning within 14th century courts experienced the first signs of what Luhman called functional differentiation while at the same time preserving some of the universalist attitudes of the 13th century⁶⁷. With hierarchy and practical experience in warfare becoming less important than different types of specialized knowledge, knights assumed the role of military advisors and left topics such as finance, legislation, or geography to other experts. So even though knights eventually began using the pen, the sword was always on their mind.

III.

On grounds of the current historical research in crusades, knighthood, courts, and the history of knowledge, at least five closely interconnected explanations for the transformation that occurred in crusade-planning during the 13th century can be identified.

(1) A classical way to explain the phenomena described above is attributing them to the crusader's constant defeats in the 13th century as well as to their ongoing inability to secure the Holy Land for the Latin Christianity, which led the contemporaries to question their traditional approaches and made them search »alternate ways and means« to conduct a crusade⁶⁸. While common in crusade historiography, this assumption might not be sufficient to explain the transformation in question, because military defeats against Muslim armies were also common in the 12th century and the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 had provoked an outcry in the Latin world, which in many respects was similar to the one caused by the loss of the Outremer in 1291⁶⁹.

(2) Another possible cause of the transformation in question may lie in the process of centralization and institutionalization that crusading underwent in the course of the 13th century. After the fourth crusade had gone astray and captured Constantinople in 1204, pope Innocent III (*ca. 1160–†1216) tried to tighten papal control over crusading through legal means, which made crusade preparations an increasingly bureaucratic endeavour⁷⁰. To justify the use of church funds and indulgences, the papal administration demanded more and more detailed explanations from crusading rulers, who changed their approach to crusade planning in return. This Weberian process of rationalization was matched by similar developments within the French, English, and Neapolitan courts in the latter half of the 13th century⁷¹. With the rise of increasingly rationalized governments emerged a class of warrior-bureaucrats, whose members were more prone to writing treatises and explanatory statements than their predecessors.

67 Niklas LUHMANN, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, 2 vols., Frankfurt am Main 1998, here vol. 2, p. 707–776.

68 Dirum armatudinis calicem (as in n. 35), p. 902. Historians of the crusades have especially seen the complete loss of the Outremer in 1291 as such a turning point, cf. Antonio GARCIA ESPADA, *The Geographical Enlargement of the Crusade Theory after 1291. Its Subaltern Roots*, in: PAVIOT et al., *Projets* (as in n. 2), p. 109–124 and LEOPOLD, *How to Recover* (as in n. 43), p. 16–24.

69 Sylvia SCHEIN, »The Terrible News«. *The Reaction of Christendom to the Fall of Jerusalem (1187)*, in: EAD., *Gateway to the Heavenly City. Crusader Jerusalem and the Catholic West (1099–1187)*, Aldershot 2004 (*Church, Faith and Culture in the Medieval West*), p. 159–188 and Annette SEITZ, *Das lange Ende der Kreuzfahrerreiche in der Universalchronistik des lateinischen Europa (1187–1291)*, Husum 2010 (*Historische Studien*, 497), p. 39–42.

70 James POWELL, *Anatomy of a Crusade. 1213–1221*, Philadelphia 1986 (*The Middle Ages Series*), p. 15–47.

71 David CROOK, Louise WILKINSON (ed.), *The Growth of Royal Government under Henry III*, Woodbridge, New York 2015; Isabelle HEULLANT-DONAT, *La cour des Angevins de Naples sous la première maison d'Anjou (1268–1382)*, in: Murielle GAUDE-FERRAGU, Bruno LAURIOUX, Jacques PAVIOT (ed.), *La cour du prince. Cour de France, cours d'Europe, XII^e–XV^e siècle*, Paris 2011, p. 515–531; William Chester JORDAN, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade. A Study in Rulership*, Princeton 1979, p. 35–64 and KRYNEN, *L'empire du roi* (as in n. 16), p. 69–84.

(3) Some part of the transformation in crusade planning may be explained by the new geographic knowledge that poured into Latin Europe in the wake of the Mongol invasion. Fried has argued that this encounter with the Mongols caused a fundamental revision of the traditional, biblical depictions of Asia, which led to the systematic acquisition of knowledge about the East⁷². When the new geographical knowledge, which had been created in this process, spread through the courts of Latin Europe, contemporary western rulers quickly began to consider it to be an indispensable asset for crusade planning⁷³. As a result, knights who participated in crusade planning had to bolster their advice with their very own eyewitness accounts of the East or resort to consulting external specialists with this kind of background.

(4) The change in the way crusades were planned can also be traced back to the so-called »renaissance« of the 12th century, which was the invention of new scientific methods based upon Greek classics within the schools of cathedrals and monasteries as well as at the newly emerging universities⁷⁴. Aurell has shown that the epistemic progeny of this »heroic age« trickled down to knights during the course of the 13th century when clerics educated secular nobles, which often were their family members, in the academic *trivium* and *quadrivium*⁷⁵. Equipped with scholasticism, knowledge of classical texts, and able to write in the vernacular, these lettered knights started to tackle military problems not only as practical hindrances that could be overcome with the right amount of martial skill, but also as analytical questions that could be answered via the application of academic knowledge.

(5) The new geographical and academic knowledge were just two parts in the 12th and 13th century differentiation of knowledge that gave rise to »einer Art von wissensmäßiger Arbeitsteiligkeit« and ultimately led to the emergence of a new social role – the expert⁷⁶. This role rested upon the notion that special knowledge »dadurch sozial verfügbar gemacht wird, dass man es an Experten delegiert, die es dann im Auftrag Anderer [...] verwalten und anwenden sollen«⁷⁷. Courtly elites had started to cultivate the idea that for each problem there existed a specific kind of knowledge, which allowed its bearers to tailor a specific solution for the

- 72 Johannes FRIED, Auf der Suche nach der Wirklichkeit. Die Mongolen und die europäische Erfahrungswissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert, in: Historische Zeitschrift 243 (1986), p. 287–332.
- 73 Antonio GARCIA ESPADA, Marco Polo, Odorico of Pordenone, the Crusades, and the Role of the Vernacular in the First Descriptions of the Indies, in: Viator 40 (2009), p. 201–222 and Felicitas SCHMIEDER, Europa und die Fremden. Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert, Sigmaringen 1994 (Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters, 16), p. 109–122.
- 74 Charles Homer HASKINS, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Cambridge 1927; Jacques LE GOFF, Les intellectuels au Moyen Âge, Paris 1985, p. 9–69 and Richard SOUTHERN, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, 2 vols., Oxford 2001, here vol. 2, p. 3–147.
- 75 AURELL, Chevalier lettré (as in n. 52), p. 47–80.
- 76 Frank REXROTH, Das späte Mittelalter und die Anfänge der europäischen Expertenkultur, in: Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen 27 (2006), p. 319–325, here p. 322. See also Jürgen SARNOWSKY, Expertus – experientia – experimentum. Neue Wege der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis im Spätmittelalter, in: Udo FRIEDRICH, Hedwig RÖCKELEIN (ed.), Experten der Vormoderne zwischen Wissen und Erfahrung, Berlin 2012, p. 47–59.
- 77 Frank REXROTH, Systemvertrauen und Expertenskepsis. Die Utopie vom maßgeschneiderten Wissen in den Kulturen des 12. bis 16. Jahrhunderts, in: Björn REICH, Frank REXROTH (ed.), Wissen, maßgeschneidert. Experten und Expertenkulturen im Europa der Vormoderne, München 2012 (Historische Zeitschrift, Beihefte, 57), p. 12–44, here p. 20. On the social role of the »expert« see also Ronald HITZLER, Wissen und Wesen des Experten. Ein Annäherungsversuch, in: ID., Anne HONER, Christoph MAEDER (ed.), Expertenwissen. Die institutionalisierte Kompetenz zur Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit, Wiesbaden 1994, p. 13–30 and Alfred SCHÜTZ, Der gut informierte Bürger. Ein Versuch über die soziale Verteilung des Wissens, in: ID., Studien zur soziologischen Theorie, Den Haag 1972, p. 85–101.

problem in question. Therefore, crusading rulers looked out for counsellors that possessed a certain type of special knowledge, which would allow them to draft a specific solution for conducting a successful crusade.

These five processes combined seem to be the key in explaining the transformation of the social norms that guided courtly crusade planning between the 12th and 14th century. They help to clarify why a knight like Foulques de Villaret refrained from giving his own advice on geography and crusade funding to pope Clement V, while Jean de Joinville willingly counselled king Louis IX on several of these topics 50 years earlier.