
Francia. Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte
Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris
(Institut historique allemand)
Band 47 (2020)

DOI: 10.11588/fr.2020.1.86544

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FROM CARCASSONNE TO ARGELÈS

The Agency of the Kingdom of Mallorca
during the Wars of the Sicilian Vespers (1282–1298)

I. Introduction

Only 120 km separate the towns of Carcassonne and today's Argelès-sur-Mer, but from the perspective of the medieval kingdom of Mallorca, 16 years of conflict and negotiation lie between them. These 16 years saw three kings of Aragon¹, two kings of Naples², five popes³, two kings of France⁴, but only one king of Mallorca: James II. The Sicilian Vespers, an uprising against Charles I of Anjou that broke out during Easter 1282, marked the beginning of this conflict⁵, during which the king of Aragon, Peter III, intervened and conquered the island of Sicily from its Angevin ruler. With his landing in Trapani on 30 August 1282, the local uprising became a series of conflicts that would come to involve most of Western Europe, temporarily ending

- 1 Peter III (1276–1285), Alfonso III (1285–1291), James II (1291–1327). For their helpful remarks, I would like to thank Jenny Benham (Cardiff), Sven Jaros (Leipzig), Stéphane Péquignot (Paris) and Ludwig Vones (Cologne).
- 2 Charles I of Anjou (1266/82–1285), Charles II of Anjou (1285–1309). I am aware of their problematic denomination as kings of Naples, a term that first appeared in the 14th century. They continued to call themselves *rex Siciliae*. I follow Kieseewetter's argument and use the term king of Naples for the terra ferma parts of the former kingdom of Sicily, and king of Sicily for the Aragonese rulers on the island; see Andreas KIESEWETTER, *Die Anfänge der Regierung König Karls II. von Anjou (1278–1295). Das Königreich Neapel, die Grafschaft Provence und der Mittelmeerraum zu Ausgang des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Husum 1999 (*Historische Studien*, 451), p. 13–14.
- 3 Martin IV (1281–1285), Honorius IV (1285–1287), Nicholas IV (1288–1292), Celestine V (1294), Boniface VIII (1294–1303).
- 4 Philip III (1270–1285), Philip IV (1285–1314).
- 5 For further explanations on the reasons for the uprising and the Aragonese involvement in its preparation, see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 87–88 summarizing the major research before 1999; ID., *Das sizilianische Zweistaatenproblem 1282–1302*, in: Cosimo Damiano FONSECA, Hubert HOUBEN, Benedetto VETTERE (ed.), *Unità politica e differenze regionali nel regno di Sicilia. Atti del convegno internazionale di studio in occasione dell'VIII centenario della morte di Guglielmo II, re di Sicilia (Lecce/Potenza, 19–22 aprile 1989)*, Galatina (Lecce) 1992, p. 247–295; Francesco GIUNTA (ed.), *La società mediterranea all'epoca del Vespro. 11. Congresso di Storia della Corona d'Aragona*, Palermo, Trapani, Erice, 23–30 aprile 1982, 4 vol., Palermo 1983–1984; Michele Amari, *La guerra del Vespro siciliano*, ed. Francesco GIUNTA, Palermo 1969, where Giunta gives an overview of the research on the Vespers since Amari; Steven RUNCIMAN, *The Sicilian Vespers*, Cambridge 1958; David ABULAFIA, *The Kingdom of Sicily and the Origins of the Political Crusades*, in: *Società, istituzioni, spiritualità. Studi in onore di Cinzio Violante*, vol. 1, Spoleto 1994, p. 65–77.

with the signing of the treaty of Caltabellotta⁶ in 1302, but nonetheless significantly shaping the political landscape of the Western Mediterranean for many years to come⁷.

The perspective adopted by both the older and more recent research on the subject has mostly focused on either the Anjou⁸, the Aragon⁹ or of Sicily¹⁰. I want to concentrate here on a minor player in these events: the kingdom of Mallorca. James I, the Conqueror ruled the lands of the Crown of Aragon from 1213 to 1276. During his reign, he not only conquered the kingdom of Valencia, but also the Balearic Islands. In the last version of his will from 26 August 1272, he decided to split his crown between his two surviving sons¹¹. The aforementioned Peter III was made heir to most of the mainland territories, the kingdom of Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia; and Peter's other son James received the so-called kingdom of Mallorca containing the Balearic Islands, the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, as well as the dominion of Montpellier, the barony of Aumelas and the viscounty of Carlat, which according to the Conqueror's testament, was supposed to exist as an independent kingdom. Peter refused to accept this independence, however, and subjected his brother to aggres-

- 6 On the treaty of Caltabellotta, see Stéphane PÉQUIGNOT, *The Treaty of Caltabellotta (1302)*, in: *The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy*, ed. Gordon MARTEL, Chichester 2018, Online-Version, DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0488 (29/11/2019).
- 7 For the different periodizations of those wars, see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 91–92. I follow Kiesewetter who acknowledges the connection between the conflict ending in 1302 and subsequent ones up to the 15th centuries but decides to end a first period in 1302; Christian NEUMANN, *Venedig und Aragon im Spätmittelalter (1280–1410). Eine Verflechtungsgeschichte*, Paderborn 2017, p. 61–76 underlines the role of Venice during the conflict and suggests an approach including all of the Mediterranean.
- 8 E.g. KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 76–217; Jean DUNBABIN, *Charles I of Anjou. Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe*, London, New York 1998. For the relations between the Anjou court and the court of France, see Jean DUNBABIN, *The French in the Kingdom of Sicily*, Cambridge 2011, p. 39–46.
- 9 E.g. Vicente SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Cerdeña y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón. 1297–1314*, 2 vol., Madrid 1956; ID., *El tratado de Anagni y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón*, Zaragoza 1952; Stéphane PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi. Pratique diplomatique et pouvoir durant le règne de Jacques II d'Aragon (1291–1327)*, Madrid 2009 (*Bibliothèque de la Casa de Velázquez*, 42); Otto CARTELLIERI, *Peter von Aragon und die sizilianische Vesper*, Heidelberg 1904; Helene WIERUSZOWSKI, *Politische Verschwörungen und Bündnisse König Peters von Aragon gegen Karl von Anjou am Vorabend der sizilischen Vesper*, in: *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 37 (1957), p. 136–191.
- 10 E.g. Henri BRESCH, *Un monde méditerranéen. Économie et société en Sicile 1300–1450*, vol. 2, Rome 1986, p. 777–864; August NITSCHKE, *Der sizilische Adel unter Karl von Anjou und Peter von Aragon*, in: *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 45 (1965), p. 241–273; ID., *Karl von Anjou und Peter von Aragon. Ihre Stellung zur sizilianischen Bevölkerung*, in: Peter CLASSEN, Peter SCHEIBERT (ed.), *Festschrift Percy Ernst Schramm*, vol. 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 322–333.
- 11 *The Mallorcan copy of the testament is edited in Documents cabdals del Regne de Mallorca. Documents i compilacions legals*, Palma de Mallorca 2003, p. 70–82. Other editions include: Ambrosio HUICI MIRANDA, *Colección diplomática de Jaime I el Conquistador*, Valencia 1916–1922, vol. 6, Nr. 1385; Manuel BOFARULL, *Proceso contra el rey de Mallorca D. Jaime III, mandado hacer por el rey D. Pedro IV de Aragon*, in: *Collección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragon*, vol. 29, Barcelona 1866, p. 15–37; see also Álvaro SANTAMARÍA ARÁÑDEZ, *Creación de la Corona de Mallorca. Las disposiciones testamentarias de Jaime I*, in: *Mayurqa* 19 (1981), p. 125–144.

sive pressure. On 20 January 1279 the two rulers signed an agreement declaring that James would receive all his lands as a fief of the Crown of Aragon¹². This perceived humiliation would prove decisive for James's later actions. In 1283, James of Mallorca joined Phillip III of France in an alliance against his brother. However, the campaign ended in disaster and the new Aragonese king, Alfonso III, used the opportunity to conquer the Balearic Islands and reintegrate them into the Crown of Aragon between 1286 and 1288¹³. It took more than ten years for the situation of 1279 to be re-established by the agreement of Argelès in 1298.

This article is not meant as an exhaustive study of the wars surrounding the Sicilian Vespers. The aim instead is to explore Mallorca's involvement in the negotiations, and the agency it possessed against its powerful neighbours. Using the example of the kingdom of Mallorca to resume questions asked by recent scholarship about the history of international relations, I will show that the initiative taken to enter the conflict by building an alliance with France came from James II of Mallorca and that he repeatedly tried to better his position through diplomatic as well as military means. In most cases, however, it will become evident that James II wasn't even part of the international negotiations and that his efforts evolved into a bargaining counter that was often at the mercy of the more important players' interests. In the first part of this article, I will analyse in chronological order the agreements, treaties and accompanying documents between 1283 (treaty of Carcassonne) and 1298 (treaty of Argelès) in order to extract a Mallorcan perspective on this period of constant conflict in the Western Mediterranean¹⁴. In the second part, I will focus on documents, people and phenomena in order to further emphasize the recurring motives and means employed to support the king of Mallorca. I shall therefore take a deeper look at the composition of embassies, the reuse of certain documents during later negotiations and the application of protest notes after an agreement's conclusion¹⁵. The relationships and docu-

12 Stefano M. CINGOLANI, *Diplomatari de Pere el Gran*, 2 vol., Barcelona 2011–2015, here: vol. 1, n° 158; on the motivation, justification and consequences of this agreement, see Ludwig VONES, *Krone und Königreich. Die staatsrechtlichen Beziehungen der Krone Aragón zum Königreich Mallorca zwischen Emanzipation, Inkorporation und Integration*, in: Werner MALECZEK (ed.), *Fragen der politischen Integration im mittelalterlichen Europa*, Ostfildern 2005 (Vorträge und Forschungen, 63), p. 197–200. On the Kingdom of Mallorca and especially its constitutional situation, see also: David ABULAFIA, *A Mediterranean Emporium. The Catalan Kingdom of Mallorca*, Cambridge 1994; Pau CATEURA BENASSER, *El Regne de Mallorca a l'època de la dinastia privativa*, Palma de Mallorca 1998; Ludwig VONES, *Auf dem Weg in den Untergang: Das Königreich Mallorca und die Krone Aragon*, in: Gisela DROSSBACH, Gottfried KERSCHER (ed.), *Utilidad y decoro. Zeremoniell und symbolische Kommunikation in den »Leges Palatinae« König Jacobs III. von Mallorca (1337)*, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 18; Álvaro SANTAMARÍA ARÁNDEZ, *Enfeudación de la Corona de Mallorca a la Corona de Aragón*, in: *La societat mediterranea all'època del Vespro*, vol. 4: *Comunicazioni*, Palermo 1984, p. 187–211.

13 Miguel FERRER FLOREZ, *La conquista de Mallorca por Alfonso III*, in: *Boletí de la Societat arqueologica lulliana* 30 (1948), p. 274–288.

14 There have been a number of meetings and agreements between parties involved in the conflict that didn't mention the kingdom of Mallorca and won't appear in detail in this article. For a succinct overview of all those agreements, see SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Cerdeña* (as in n. 9), p. 47–113.

15 I therefore base my research on the criteria applied during the 15th International Congress on Diplomacy who centred on »Sources for the History of »International« Relations«. It analysed writings from international negotiations during the three stages of its existence: the development of the final document, the phases of its actual validity, and its afterlife. Besides the treaty itself,

ments discussed in this article present themselves as a series of treaties, concessions, armistices and their breaking, not merely as singular events, and it is as such that they will come into focus here¹⁶. By using the methods and approaches of recent scholarship on the history of international relations, I will shed new light on the influence and agency exercised by a minor player in a greater conflict and on its written records.

II. The Kingdom of Mallorca in the Wars of the Sicilian Vespers

1. *The Treaty of Carcassonne and the Alliance with France (1283–1285)*

The kingdom of Mallorca played no part whatsoever in the events of the Sicilian Vespers. It is only afterwards, when two conflicts merged, that it gained in importance: one over Sicily and the other over Mallorcan independence¹⁷. The latter began as a rivalry between two brothers over their inheritance of title and land and eventually became entangled in the conflict that was encompassing the western Mediterranean. There are different reasons for this: first, the kingdom's geographical position between France and Aragon (especially the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne) made it impossible to remain neutral in the conflict between those two realms. Second, Mallorca's feudal situation placed it between two belligerent sovereigns because the king of France was the overlord of most of Montpellier. And third, by allying himself with France, James of Mallorca saw an opportunity to regain his kingdom's full independence, which had been lost in 1279¹⁸. Due to its intensive trading ties, Mallorca had a further interest in being on good terms with the Anjou and with the Italian sea republics¹⁹, since Philip III would most likely have invaded the county of Roussillon with the pope's consent during his crusade to Aragon. Thus, the king of Mallorca was forced to make a difficult choice, one which, in his uncomfortable position, must have seemed like the best option.

further documentation serving for the preparation or validation of the treaty like letters, notarial acts, etc., were included in the analysis. See the forthcoming conference volume, ed. Wolfgang HUSCHNER et al. For a conference report with a summary of scholarship on treaty documents, see Robert FRIEDRICH, Sebastian KOLDITZ, *Vertragsurkunden zwischen Diplomatie und Diplomatiegeschichte. Ein Bericht zum 15. internationalen Kongress zur Diplomatie in Leipzig*, in: *Archiv für Diplomatie* 65 (2019), p. 165–182, a shorter online version is in: *H-Soz-Kult*, 20.02.2019, <www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-8123> (11/12/2019).

- 16 Georg JOSTKLEIGREWE, *Vom Umgang mit Verträgen*, in: ID., Gesa WILANGOWSKI (ed.), *Der Bruch des Vertrages. Die Verbindlichkeit spätmittelalterlicher Diplomatie und ihre Grenzen*, Berlin 2018 (ZHF Beihefte, 55), p. 13.
- 17 Another territory disputed between France and Aragon is the Val d'Aran in the central Pyrenees. It was also interwoven with the wars in question but cannot be discussed in detail in this article, see Juan REGLA CAMPISTROL, *Francia, la Corona de Aragón y la Frontera Pirenaica. La lucha por el Valle de Arán (siglos XIII–XIV)*, 2 vol., Madrid 1951; PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi* (as in n. 9), p. 14.
- 18 On the relations between the Kingdom of Mallorca and the Crown of Aragon, see CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, p. 36–53; Antoni RIERA MELIS, *La Corona de Aragon y el Reino de Mallorca en el primer cuarto del siglo XIV*, vol. 1: *Las repercusiones arancelarias de la autonomia balear (1293–1311)*, Madrid, Barcelona 1986 (*Anuario de Estudios medievales*. Anejo, 14).
- 19 VONES, *Untergang* (as in n. 12), p. 18.

In the French city of Carcassonne in August 1283, Philip of France and James II of Mallorca signed their alliance. The only surviving copy of this can be found in the French National Archives where it bears the seal and *intitulatio* of James of Mallorca. Therein, James declares that he would support the king of France by providing him with knights but also by letting him pass through his territories and by handing over several fortresses. In building an alliance against the king of Aragon, James knowingly broke the Perpignan agreement of 1279. His justification for this betrayal was that Pope Martin IV excommunicated Peter III for his role in the Sicilian Vespers – which simultaneously freed all of Peter’s vassals from their duties to him. James fully adopted the Church’s view by referring to Peter as *quondam regem Aragonie* in the treaty of Carcassonne²⁰. A corresponding document issued by the French king probably also existed at one point, and there is further possible evidence for it in the chronicle of Bernat Desclot. When describing how Peter III entered Perpignan in 1285, Desclot tells how the king walked straight to the Templar’s house where he found a chest containing his brother’s (the king of Mallorca’s) important documents. In that chest, Peter found a charter sealed by the pope and the king of France that proved Mallorcan treason and promised the kingdom of Valencia to James of Mallorca²¹. The details of Desclot’s description have cast some doubt on his account: he writes of leaden seals, but no such material is known for Philip III of France, and Philip usually didn’t seal together with the pope even when it concerned a common cause²². Yet contrary to Lecoy de la Marche²³, I suggest that a corresponding document must have also existed in James’s archives. The contract from the National Archives, which was only sealed by the Mallorcan king, doesn’t grant any assurances or reward that were likely to have been included in another charter. It is therefore impossible to determine if the kingdom of Valencia was offered as a reward in the way Desclot suggests, but one might reasonably expect that a promise of protection and reciprocal military support was made – indeed, the king of France’s actions throughout the conflict support this suggestion.

To better understand the birth of this treaty we need to look closely at the preceding months. On 18 November 1282, Martin IV first excommunicated Peter²⁴. The ban was repeated multiple times during the following year, and Peter was also deposed of his kingdom²⁵. The pope offered the Aragonese crown to Charles of Valois,

20 Paris, AN, J 598, n° 5, ed. Albert LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Les relations politiques de la France avec le royaume de Majorque*, vol. 1, Paris 1892, Appendix, n° 30; a French translation can be found in Joseph SABLAYROLLES, *Le traité signé à Carcassonne le 17 août 1283 par Philippe III le Hardi et Jacques de Majorque*, in: *Bulletin de la société d’études scientifiques de l’Aude* 61 (1960), p. 149–154.

21 *Les quatre grans Cròniques*, vol. 2: *Crònica de Bernat Desclot*, ed. Ferràn SOLDEVILA, *revisió filològica de Jordi BRUGUERA*, *revisió històrica de Maria Teresa FERRER I MALLOL*, Barcelona 2008, p. 270–271.

22 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 198–199.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

24 *Les registres de Martin IV (1281–1285)*. *Recueil des bulles de ce pape*, ed. Félix OLIVIER-MARTIN, Paris 1901–1935, p. 112, n° 276; see also CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, p. 46.

25 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 158. For a discussion of the pope’s rights to dethrone a

Philip of France's brother²⁶. With the growing probability of a French invasion of Aragon, the importance of the geographical situation of the kingdom of Mallorca became apparent. In April, Peter's son Alfonso, later Alfonso III, sent envoys to James of Mallorca to ask for support²⁷, and on 1 May, he named a procurator²⁸. The king of Mallorca's answer has not been preserved for posterity and we might even suppose that he chose not to respond. On 1 June, James of Mallorca sent envoys not to Aragon but to the king of France²⁹. It can be no coincidence that this occurred directly after the pope freed all Aragonese vassals from their obligations towards the king on 27 May³⁰. In the instructions to his envoys, James made no mention of Aragon, speaking solely of *quicumque et quoscumque volentes invadere terras nostras*³¹. As we can see, James was not entirely the object of his neighbours' politics and did make the first move to contact the French king³².

When James of Mallorca didn't respond to Alfonso's call for aid, Peter III sent another embassy to Perpignan on 29 June³³. He instructed his ambassadors to ask a local notary to issue a public instrument containing James's reply, and this instrument was indeed written three weeks later on 20 July³⁴. It is in this document that we can see for the first time the formula *tam ex debito fraternalis dilectionis quam ex debito convencionarum inter ipsos initarum* which refers to brotherly love on one hand and the treaty of Perpignan in 1279 on the other. If we look further, the public instrument also contained the king of Mallorca's answer in which he suggests that it was too complicated a matter to decide and that he would need time to reflect³⁵. This is not a surprising response considering his recent embassy to the king of France. Nevertheless, Peter tried once again to convince James to provide help. In January 1284, another letter was sent to the king of Mallorca which reveals that Peter planned a meeting. When James refused, Peter took a step back, conceding that they could continue their conversation via ambassadors³⁶.

Through the documents discussed here, we can clearly perceive a progression in the Aragonese diplomatic attempts to gain Mallorca's support against a possible, even likely, French invasion: a year earlier, Peter's son Alfonso sent envoys to Perpignan, this was followed by Peter himself two months later. When that effort was unsuccessful, Peter tried to establish a meeting, probably in the beginning of 1284. Up to the point when the crusade finally started in May 1285, we have evidence for

king, see VONES, *Untergang* (as in n. 12), p. 18, note 35 and Othmar HAGENEDER, *Das päpstliche Recht der Fürstenabsetzung*, in: *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 1 (1963), p. 53–95.

26 For Charles of Valois's role as titular king of Aragon, see Joseph PETIT, *Charles de Valois (1270–1325)*, Paris 1900, p. 1–24.

27 CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, n° 517.

28 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, n° 519.

29 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 347.

30 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 46.

31 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 347.

32 Cingolani already mentioned this in the introduction to his edition, *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 47.

33 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, n° 554–556.

34 The notaries were used to give juridical status to James's answer and to avoid the need for a formal contract, a proceeding we can observe throughout the conflict.

35 CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 1, n° 350.

36 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, n° 607.

two other Aragonese attempts to contact the Mallorcan ruler³⁷. Those instances need to be contextualized against the background of Aragonese efforts to put pressure on the Mallorcan population – in this case the merchants of the Balearic Islands. The Mallorcan economy depended heavily on its position as a central trading post in the western Mediterranean and on wheat imports from Catalonia and Sicily³⁸. Thus, in April 1285 Peter III restricted the Catalan merchants' trade with Mallorca and contacted officials of Ciutat de Mallorca in an attempt to win their support³⁹. This approach, continually used by the king of Aragon as a means of forcing Mallorca's support, exposes the kingdom's internal problems. Although, there was resistance to Aragonese attempts to gain control over the islands – especially among nobles – the population was far from united behind James II⁴⁰.

Meanwhile, James II contacted the pope to request two years of the tithe in order to prepare his defence against the excommunicated Peter of Aragon and to help the king of France in his military endeavour against the Aragonese⁴¹. He also asked the pope to send papal bulls concerning Peter's excommunication directly to Peter. Unfortunately, we do not have the pope's reply to this unusual request, and Cingolani suggests that it might have simply been ignored. But besides the specific demand for financial aid, James's letter was likely an attempt to assure himself of the righteousness of his actions⁴². In 1285, Philipp III of France began his campaign and entered the Roussillon in May. Much has been written about the military and strategic aspects of this campaign, making it unnecessary to narrate the full course of events in detail, suffice to say that half a year later the endeavour ended in a defeat of the French army and thus also of the king of Mallorca. On 5 October, King Philip III of France – still in Perpignan – died of an illness. His successor Philip IV immediately ended the Crusade and retired his troops⁴³.

37 A payment instruction for an ambassador's voyage to Mallorca in February 1284 (*ibid.*, vol. 2, n° 632) and another secret messenger in April 1285 (*ibid.*, vol. 2, n° 770, 773).

38 Gabriel ENSENYAT PUJOL, *La reintegració de la Corona de Mallorca a la Corona d'Aragó (1343–1349)*, 2 vol., Palma de Mallorca 1997, vol. 1, p. 92. In general, on the economy of the kingdom of Mallorca, see ABULAFIA, *Emporium* (as in n. 12); NEUMANN, *Venedig und Aragon* (as in n. 7), p. 332–480.

39 FERRER FLOREZ, *Conquista* (as in n. 13), p. 276–278; earlier attempts to influence the Mallorcan population can be found, for instance in CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, n° 605, 632, 774.

40 FERRER FLOREZ, *Conquista* (as in n. 13), p. 277–280; see also RIERA MELIS, *Corona* (as in n. 18), p. 35.

41 CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 2, p. 47–48.

42 *Ibid.*

43 On the military aspects and the events happening during the crusade, see Agnès VINAS, Robert VINAS, *La croisade de 1285 en Roussillon et Catalogne*, Pollestres 2015; Xavier HÉLARY, *La croisade d'Aragon de Philippe III le Hardi (1285)*, *Mémoire de Maîtrise*, Paris IV Sorbonne, 1998; Joseph R. STRAYER, *The Crusade against Aragon*, in: *Speculum* 28,1 (1953), p. 102–113; Ernest DELAMONT, *La Croisade d'Aragon. Ses causes, ses résultats et ses suites: France et Aragon*, in: *Bulletin de la Société Agricole Scientifique et Littéraire des Pyrénées-Orientales* 21 (1874), p. 394–454; for the role of the cardinal legate Jean Cholet and the papal preparations of the crusade, see Pascal MONTAUBIN, *Le rôle du cardinal-légit Jean Cholet dans la croisade d'Aragon (1285)*, in: Daniel BALOUP, Manuel SÁNCHEZ-MARTÍNEZ (ed.), *Partir en croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Toulouse 2015, p. 11–55.

The year 1285 also saw a major change of the players in the conflict: King Peter III of Aragon did not have long to celebrate his victory, for he passed away on 11 November, and his son and successor, Alfonso III, who had been previously involved in the negotiations as well as in the military action, ascended to the throne. Two further major actors in the conflict died before the beginning of the French Crusade: Charles I of Anjou died on 7 January while his son, the later Charles II, was still an Aragonese captive⁴⁴. And the French pope Martin IV died on 28 March and was succeeded by Honorius IV. The latter's two-year pontificate was marked by a clear anti-Aragonese policy and a stated aim of gaining back the island of Sicily for the Anjou⁴⁵. The only one ruler to survive these events was James II of Mallorca who – after the defeat of his French allies – had to face his brother and then his nephew, the new king of Aragon, and answer for his actions. One of the main reasons James gave for entering the conflict on the side of the French was that he hoped to gain back his full independence. The defeat of his ally had turned the tide and Peter III – and then Alfonso III – now saw an opportunity to fully reintegrate the Balearic Islands under the Crown of Aragon. The result was that in November of that year, Mallorca finally surrendered to Alfonso⁴⁶. This did not spell the end of the attacks on the islands, however, for Alfonso also conquered Menorca two years later⁴⁷.

2. *The Negotiations between France, Aragon and Naples (1285–1290)*

Both during and after Alfonso's conquest of Mallorca, negotiations continued, and a series of agreements were signed, broken, renewed and refused. My focus here will be on the role and place of Mallorca in those documents⁴⁸. From the very beginning, we can see two different lines of negotiation that merged over the course of events: first, the negotiations concerning Charles of Anjou's release; and second, the negotiations concerning the armistice between Aragon and France. Both were regarded as prerequisites for the conclusion of a general peace treaty involving all the parties.

Concerning Charles, the negotiations for an eventual release accelerated after his father's death⁴⁹, resulting in the treaties of Cefalù (October 1285), Oloron-Sainte-Marie (25 July 1287) and Canfranc (27 October 1288). It was only once the latter was completed that the future Charles II of Naples was released in exchange for a consid-

44 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 166–167.

45 Marco VENDITTELLI, Art. Onorio IV, in: *Enciclopedia dei papi*, 2000, Online-Version: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/onorio-iv_%28Enciclopedia-dei-Papi%29/ (11/12/2019).

46 FERRER FLOREZ, *Conquista* (as in n. 13), p. 276–278.

47 Those conquests also shed light on the kingdom's internal problems. Historiography has mostly suspected the Mallorcan population of disloyalty as a consequence of their trading ties, but Ferrer-Florez as well as Hillgarth argue that there was much more loyalty to James of Mallorca than previously thought and that Alfonso likely lived in fear of an uprising in favour of James, see Jocelyn N. HILLGARTH, *Un nuevo documento sobre la resistencia de los mallorquines a la ocupación de Mallorca por Alfonso III de Aragón (1285–1291)*, in: *Estudios en honor de A. Mut i Calafell*, Palma de Mallorca 1993, p. 119–122; FERRER-FLOREZ, *Conquista* (as in n. 13), p. 276, 284 and the documents edited in the appendix.

48 For a detailed account, see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 200–239; LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 283–310; SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Cerdeña* (as in n. 9), p. 62–80.

49 Adam KOSTO, *Hostages in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2012, p. 177.

erable number of French, English and Provençal hostages⁵⁰. Two years earlier, Edward I of England had entered the stage as a mediator in the negotiation of a peace treaty and his immediate concern was a general armistice between France and Aragon, which was proclaimed in Paris in 1286⁵¹. Two phenomena that would later become characteristic of Mallorca's role in such negotiations were seen here for the first time. First, the king of Mallorca was not included in the decision-making process and only informed of the result after the fact, at which point he had no choice but to accept the treaty⁵². Second, the armistice provides insight into the extent to which the king of Mallorca depended on France's assurance that the agreement granted him the right to support in case of an attack⁵³. This second point was tested almost immediately. Although Honorius IV confirmed the Parisian armistice, Alfonso's attack on Menorca in the beginning of 1287 was a flagrant disregard of it⁵⁴. Alfonso conquered the island, which was still inhabited by a mostly Muslim population under Christian-Mallorcan rule, sold a significant number of the inhabitants into slavery and integrated it into the Crown of Aragon as he had done with Mallorca⁵⁵.

The reason for embarking on this conquest in the middle of the winter was most likely rooted in a fear that the French might use the island's main port of Mahón as a future base for attacking Aragon⁵⁶. Alfonso also breached the armistice by invading the Roussillon and occupying, for instance, Saint-Laurens-de-Cerdans⁵⁷. Lecoy de la Marche has cited a document from October 1287, a *procès-verbal* stating that this part of the Roussillon always belonged to the kingdom of Mallorca and that Alfonso occupied said places in the middle of an armistice, as the reason for this breach to have been brought to the attention of the kings of France and England⁵⁸. There is also evidence that the author of this document, the abbot of the Arles monastery, frequented James of Mallorca's milieu on many occasions⁵⁹. In other words, the king had the support of advisors who were in contact with the king of France, whether

50 For a detailed analysis of Charles' release and the supplying of hostages, see *ibid.*, p. 177–182.

51 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 177–178; different documents concerning the negotiations ed. Thomas RYMER, *Foedera, conventiones, literae ...*, vol. 1/3, Den Haag 31745, here p. 10–15.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 15; see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 178.

53 *Ibid.*

54 Concerning the conquest of Menorca, see Florenci SASTRE PORTELLA, *La conquista de Menorca 1287: Estado de la cuestión y perspectivas de futuro*, in: XIII Congrès d'història de la Corona d'Aragó (Palma de Mallorca, 27 setembre–1 octubre 1987). Ponències, Palma de Mallorca 1990, p. 137–161.

55 There is a whole volume in the chancery registers in Barcelona containing documents *Supercapcione Minoricae* and the following reorganization of its society, see Barcelona, ACA, Cancilleria Reial, Reg. 70. In general, on Alfonso's rule on the Balearic Islands, see Álvaro SANTAMARÍA ARÁNDEZ, *La política municipal de Alfonso el Liberal en el Reino de Mallorca (1285–1291)*, in: *En la España medieval* 7 (1985), p. 1271–1299. Furthermore, Abulafia suggests that the trade of around 40 000 Muslim slaves was meant to refill his treasury; see ABULAFIA, *Emporium* (as in n. 12), p. 71.

56 SASTRE PORTELLA, *Conquista* (as in n. 54), p. 144. Abulafia suggests, furthermore, that it must be seen as a punishment because the Muslims of Menorca were suspected of having conspired with North African emirs against Aragon (ABULAFIA, *Emporium* [as in n. 12], p. 68).

57 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 296.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 296–297; Paris, AN, P 1353, n° 793.

59 See for example CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 1, n° 350.

they did so on James's behalf or independently is not clear. Either way, Philip of France continued to support James in subsequent years, particularly during Alfonso's repeated attacks on Mallorcan territory and his exclusion of his brother from international agreements⁶⁰. Philip wrote a letter of complaint to the king of England about Alfonso and his treatment of the king of Mallorca⁶¹ and continued to grant James his military support⁶². In September 1289, James took a bold new initiative and proposed a one-on-one duel in Bordeaux with Alfonso, probably in a desperate bid to attain his independence after the failure of military and diplomatic means. The duel never took place⁶³, and his attempts to reconquer the Balearic Islands were ultimately in vain⁶⁴.

Meanwhile, due to the clauses of Canfranc, Charles II of Naples was obliged to agree to return to Aragonese captivity if he was not able to secure a three-year armistice with Philip IV, Charles of Valois and the papacy within ten months of his release⁶⁵. Charles's plan was to double-cross Alfonso by offering to surrender himself at short notice. Thus, he travelled to La Jonquera and the Coll de Panissars between 31 October and 2 November 1289 to present himself, but as Alfonso had no possible way of reaching the meeting point in time, Charles was free to leave and to accuse Alfonso of having breached their contract⁶⁶. The king of Mallorca was partly involved in this affair and seems to have served as a local organizer for France and the Anjou. He asked the seneschal of Carcassonne to send 200 armed men for protection and then accompanied the Angevin to La Jonquera⁶⁷. After 2 November, Charles retired to Perpignan, Mallorca's capital, to plan his future actions⁶⁸. Here we observe a new role for the kingdom of Mallorca, one that would become more relevant in the following years: that of a gateway to the Crown of Aragon. Charles didn't contact James because he saw him as powerful ally but because he needed to pass through his country and be afforded some protection. In the period that followed, meetings often took place in Perpignan, and the anti-Aragonese alliance used the city as a base to negotiate with Alfonso and later James II of Aragon. No doubt James of Mallorca's involvement in the case further aggravated relations with his nephew Alfonso of Aragon⁶⁹.

60 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 185–186.

61 Ed. RYMER, *Foedera*, vol. 1/3 (as in n. 51), p. 22, partially translated to French in LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 301. The text made it clear that James had reported to Philip because he himself was not in the position to address a complaint to Edward.

62 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 217.

63 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 303; *ibid.*, Appendix, n° 32; see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 217. The duel is a clear reference to the one proposed for 1283 between Peter of Aragon and Charles of Anjou.

64 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Les relations* (as in n. 20), p. 304.

65 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 190.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 220–221.

67 *Ibid.*, p. 221.

68 Peter HERDE, *Bonifaz VIII. (1294–1303)*, vol 1: Benedikt Caetani, Stuttgart 2015 (*Päpste und Papsttum*, 43,1), p. 112–113.

69 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 222. For Alfonso's political goals see SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 216–219.

3. From Tarascon to La Jonquera (1291–1293)

The next steps on the way to a peace treaty occurred in Tarascon and Brignoles where an agreement was signed on 19 February 1291⁷⁰. It appears that Nicholas IV and Charles had realized that separate agreements were not an efficient long-term solution, and thus the aim was to include all the parties involved in the conflict⁷¹. The treaty could only be preliminary because all the interested parties needed to ratify it, but there was one further reason for this uncertain status: the question of Mallorca had not been evoked. It is probable that Alfonso refused to even discuss the subject in a bid to support his claim to full control over the kingdom. His reasoning for this must surely have been as it ever was: from Alfonso's perspective this was merely a conflict between a sovereign and his vassal⁷². Furthermore, it is likewise probable that Charles, the only ruler personally present in Tarascon, was more interested in the question of Sicily than Mallorca. Nonetheless, he must have been aware that for France and the pope the question held considerable importance, as evidenced in both the treaty itself and in a letter written by Charles to Alfonso on 20 April 1291⁷³. In the treaty document, it is made clear that Charles didn't believe that the king of France would ratify if the question of Mallorca was not discussed or if it was only discussed on Alfonso's terms⁷⁴. Likewise, in his letter of 20 April, Charles further mentioned the pope as a decisive factor in the issue and referred to several documents that they were about to send to the Curia together. In one of Alfonso's documents, he found a passage on the return of Mallorca that would have raised the pope's concern and that of the cardinals in charge, thus inhibiting the peace process⁷⁵. As a consequence, Charles proposed a new meeting to ratify the treaty of Brignoles and to talk about the Mallorca problem⁷⁶. It appears that – despite its position as a minor

70 For detailed information on the clauses, see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 236–237; HERDE, *Bonifaz* (as in n. 68), p. 134–136; Ferràn SOLDEVILA, *A propòsit del tractat de Brignoles dit també de Tarascò (1291)*, in: *Studi medievali in onore di Antonino de Stefano*, Palermo 1956, p. 520–527; the document is printed after Edwards exemplar – the only one surviving – in RYMER, *Foedera*, vol. 1/3 (as in n. 51), p. 77–78.

71 Broadly speaking, they agreed on the following clauses: Charles of Valois should resign from his claims to the Aragonese throne, the pope would reinstall Alfonso to his reign, the treaty of Canfranc should be invalidated, a peace between France and Aragon should be concluded, all the conquered territories since the beginning of the conflict should be returned and Alfonso should go to Rome by himself to present his excuses. Later, he should venture on a crusade as atonement for his sins. Additionally, he won't be allowed to help his brother James of Sicily in any possible war against the papacy or Naples and all his Aragonese subjects shall be relieved of James's service (KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* [as in n. 2], p. 236).

72 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 307.

73 Heinrich FINKE, *Acta Aragonensia. Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen, zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II. (1291–1327)*, 3 vol., Berlin, Leipzig 1908–1922, vol. 3, p. 13–14, n° 8; see also KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 237.

74 Meaning a full integration into his Crown: *ex eo quod, sine restitutione, satisfactione et Securitate praedictis, Rex Sicilie non credebatur Regem Francie ad pacem flecti*, RYMER, *Foedera*, vol. 1/3 (as in n. 51), p. 78.

75 FINKE, *Acta Aragonensia* (as in n. 73), vol. 3, p. 13–14, n° 8.

76 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 237.

player – Mallorca nonetheless became a major sticking point that had the power to derail the entire peace process.

On 7 and 8 May 1291 on the Puig del Varany near La Jonquera, Charles and Alfonso met and ratified the treaty of Tarascon-Brignoles. Although it was essentially the fate of his kingdom that hung in the balance and produced the dissent, James of Mallorca did not participate in the meeting. On that occasion, Alfonso used his full title in a document, including the *rex Majoricarum*, indicating he was clearly not willing to let the territory go. Arbitration by the pope and the two cardinals already present in Brignoles, which included Benedict Caetani, the future Boniface VIII, was agreed⁷⁷. Nevertheless, Alfonso stubbornly excluded all possibility of a full Mallorcan independence: the vassalage established by Peter III could not be touched under any circumstances. Philip IV was reluctant to ratify Brignoles-Tarascon but was convinced to sign an armistice. The king of Mallorca – who couldn't pursue the fight alone – was thus forced to join as well⁷⁸. But, once again the death of one of the main actors blocked the road to a peace treaty: In June 1291, Alfonso III of Aragon passed away and his brother James, up to this point only king of Sicily, became James II, king of Aragon. Within the space of one day, the king of Sicily, who had been previously isolated by the treaty of Tarascon-Brignoles, took Alfonso's place in the negotiations.

The year 1293 saw a new setback to the revival of the negotiations when James of Aragon gave the kingdom of Sicily to his brother Frederick⁷⁹. A pre-meeting that aimed to prepare a general peace congress was held in Pontoise near Paris, and its final document offers two main insights: the clauses put James of Aragon at a disadvantage and the question of Mallorca was only vaguely discussed⁸⁰. However, a compromise re-establishing the vassal-status of 1279 became increasingly likely⁸¹. Now there were only three viable solutions to the continuing problem of Mallorca: leave the Balearics in the hands of the Aragonese, re-establish its status before the war, or restore Mallorca's full independence. As the options on either end of the spectrum were considered impossible for the major parties, the *status quo ante bellum* became the only logical solution. As previously mentioned, the king of Mallorca was not included in the negotiations, and his letters (where he stated his unaltered claims of full independence) were ignored by the others, a problem that the Castilian envoys representing James of Aragon remarked upon. The envoys also noted that the king of Mallorca risked not being returned anything if he didn't consent to the treaty's terms. They saw the Mallorca problem as an insurmountable stumbling block⁸² and feared that James of Mallorca would refuse to comply. According to the Pontoise

77 HERDE, Bonifaz (as in n. 68), p. 137–139.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 239.

79 KIESEWETTER, Anfänge (as in n. 2), p. 241.

80 Kieseewetter sees two reasons for this: Charles II was not really interested in reinvesting James of Mallorca and the relations between France and Mallorca had worsened since Philip IV bought the dominion over parts of Montpellier, *ibid.*, p. 252; LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), p. 311–337 discusses in detail this episode that sheds a light on the kingdom's internal struggles.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 340–341.

82 *Ibid.*

document, the solution was that James of Aragon would place the Balearic Islands in the hands of the kings of France and Naples who would then transfer it back to James of Mallorca.

Another meeting between James of Aragon and Charles of Naples took place between 12 to 14 December 1293, during which they agreed on two treaty concepts concerning the relations between themselves and between Aragon and France⁸³. On 14 December, Charles proclaimed an armistice in La Jonquera in his name and in the name of his allies France and Mallorca⁸⁴ and informed his subjects of the agreement⁸⁵. In this letter, he inserted Philip's acceptance, dated 7 December. Although Charles had organized the king of France's approval before negotiating with James of Aragon, he didn't mention Mallorca as had been the case in the publication of the armistice on 14 December. This may have been because James of Mallorca – despite his geographical proximity – hadn't yet accepted the armistice and was still waiting for Philip's reaction. It was only when James learned that Philip had approved that he ratified as well⁸⁶.

4. *The Treaties of Anagni and Argelès (1295–1298)*

The next important steps were the preparations for what would become the peace treaty of Anagni, concluded in June 1295⁸⁷. At the initiative of the newly elected Pope Boniface VIII⁸⁸, ambassadors – including two sent by the king of Mallorca – gathered for a first meeting in February 1295 in Anagni. Contrary to those efforts, James of Aragon had disrupted the La Jonquera agreement by the end of 1294 in hopes that he might finally conclude an alliance with France. According to Kiese-wetter, this initiative came from Philip IV, and all the preliminary negotiations happened in secret⁸⁹. The outbreak of the war between France and England in October changed the situation significantly. An alliance with Aragon would give Philip one of Europe's best fleets, and at the same time avoid an anti-French Aragonese-English alliance⁹⁰. A successful conclusion to the talks would have seen James II of Aragon marry Philip's sister Blanche, provide him with support in his war against England, and likely result in his gaining control over Mallorca in return. Whether Philip was ready to abandon Mallorca is hard to determine but it was probably due to papal pressure that the project was not realized⁹¹.

83 SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 285, n° 2; the concept concerning the relations between France and Aragon is printed in FINKE, *Acta Aragonensia* (as in n. 73), vol. 1, p. 21–26, n° 16; see also KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 258–259.

84 SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 82–84, n° 3.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 84, n° 4.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 85–86, n° 5.

87 For a detailed analysis of the preparation, see KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 240–276.

88 As Herde points out, Boniface had at least since 1290 a major impact in the negotiations as a papal legate and was familiar with the situation, see HERDE, *Bonifaz* (as in n. 68), p. 97–154, esp. p. 116 on the beginnings of his legation.

89 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 272–273. Kiese-wetter also gives a detailed account of the secret and open diplomatic endeavours of James of Aragon during that period.

90 *Ibid.*; see also the documents edited in SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 86–89, n° 7, 8.

91 FINKE, *Acta Aragonensia* (as in n. 73), vol. 3, p. 44.

The main events leading to the treaty of Anagni occurred in June 1295. On 7 June, Boniface announced his compromise with Aragon, which led to a marriage between James and Blanche of Anjou⁹². This brought the question of Mallorca back into play, as France once again insisted that the Balearics be returned to James of Mallorca⁹³. It was on 20 June, that several notarial instruments were issued to conclude the bilateral agreements. The Mallorcan question was again not directly included in the documents. In order to avoid delaying the negotiations any longer it was declared that the pope should decide Mallorca's fate. One instrument is particularly interesting in this regard⁹⁴. It contained the agreements between the Aragonese and the French envoys as part of the treaty of Anagni. The Val d'Aran, disputed between France and Aragon as well, was also submitted to the pope's arbitration. It is clearly visible that points of dissent between France and Aragon were not decided in order to avoid any further delay. But the pope quickly made his decision and confirmed the agreements in several documents from 20 June onwards. As stated above, Boniface had no choice but to re-establish the *status quo ante bellum* from 1285. James of Aragon had to return all the lands he had taken, but kept suzerainty over them, including the newly Christianized Menorca⁹⁵.

However, Boniface allowed James of Aragon to delay the restitution of Mallorca. The compromise was evident, but it was also likely that neither James of Aragon nor James of Mallorca was satisfied with the solution. It was only on 22 June that Boniface announced his decision to James of Mallorca. The letter is interesting in a number of ways. At first, Boniface informs James that he has resolved the affair with his defenders and warns him not to ask for more, but rather to think about the dangers of a refusal for himself and for the state of Christendom as a whole. He assures him that by giving up his independence, he would secure his power for the future⁹⁶. Clearly, James is not seen as a negotiator on a par with France, Aragon or Naples and can only be presented with the results of negotiations. The envoys he sends to Anagni at the beginning of 1295 might have been a last-ditch attempt to put pressure on the new pope and to take part in the negotiations, but now James was left with no other choice but to accept the compromise. However, two months later, on 23 August, James wrote a protest note, secretly refusing the agreement⁹⁷. James of Mallorca's hopes that the pope might grant him his independence later proved to be in vain. Boniface VIII reconciled with James II of Aragon and promised him two other compensations, which he handed over during James's first voyage to Rome in 1296/97: the titles of gonfalonier, admiral and general captain of the Church as well as the fiefdoms of Sardinia and Corsica⁹⁸.

92 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 29–30, n° 21.

93 SALAVERT Y ROCA, Tratado (as in n. 9), p. 304–305, n° 13.

94 Ibid., p. 310–314, n° 17.

95 The island would remain Christian and the pope also established rules concerning this new Christian and mostly Aragonese population (LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations [as in n. 20], p. 345–346, Appendix, n° 34).

96 Étienne BALUZE, Vitae paparum Avenionensium, vol. 2, Paris 1693, col. 21; on 24 June, Boniface dissolved the union between the Balearics and the Crown of Aragon; see Les registres de Boniface VIII. Recueil des bulles de ce pape, éd. Georges DIGARD et al., vol. 1, Paris 1884, col. 63, n° 165.

97 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), Appendix, n° 36.

98 Stéphane PÉQUIGNOT, Le »premier voyage à Rome« de Jacques II d'Aragon (1296–1297), in: Bernard GUENÉE, Jean-Marie MOEGLIN (ed.), Relations, échanges, transferts en Occident au

For the confirmation and ratification of the treaty of Anagni as well as the marriage between James and Blanche of Anjou, a royal meeting was organized for 29 October to 4 November in Vilabertran and Fort de Bellaguarda⁹⁹. James of Mallorca was represented at this event by Brémond de Montferrier and Ponç de Guardia¹⁰⁰. On 30 October, James of Aragon signed – in the presence of the pope’s representatives – a compromise which would return the Balearic Islands to the king of Mallorca within a year¹⁰¹. In return, the apostolic envoys ended the interdict over the Crown of Aragon. Mallorca’s representatives tried once again, in vain, to bring forth the king’s protest that was written down in a notarial act the following day¹⁰². The last chapter in this conflict concerning Mallorca happened in Argelès, where James of Mallorca and James of Aragon met three years after Anagni on 29 and 30 June 1298¹⁰³. In a series of nine documents and with the support of French ambassadors, they fixed the rules for the return of the territories taken from the other during the war¹⁰⁴. The central document is an alliance treaty in which they symbolically swear *homagium* to each other and promise to help one another in the event of an outside attack¹⁰⁵. The central point of reference in all the documents is the agreement of Perpignan from January 1279 whose regulations were reinstalled. With the treaty of Argelès the long conflict over the Mallorcan independence was ended – at least temporarily. I have shown that the king of Mallorca tried to augment his agency during the long negotiation processes by several means – embassies, letters, and through both secret and open protests – this will form the central point of discussion in the next part of this article.

III. The Agency of James II of Mallorca

In the following, I will adopt a transversal approach and analyse the phenomena, people and documents relevant to and characteristic of the agency exercised by the kingdom of Mallorca and its ruler James II.

1. *Dependence on France and the Papacy*

My first observations concern James’s dependence on France and the papacy, France being his most important ally. This relationship is especially significant when we consider that the king of Mallorca did not participate in most of the negotiations. It is only by virtue of France’s insistence on Mallorca’s rights that the subject was ever

cours des derniers siècles du Moyen Âge. Hommage à Werner Paravicini, Paris 2010, p. 135–164; see also Sebastian ROEBERT, *Die Acta Aragonensia* als Quelle für die Verhandlungspraxis am Papsthof des 14. Jahrhunderts, in: Jessika NOWAK, Georg STRACK (ed.), *Stilus – modus – usus. Regeln der Konflikt- und Verhandlungsführung am Papsthof des Mittelalters*, Turnhout 2019, p. 195–212.

99 For the documents issued during those days, see SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 326–355, n° 27–43; see also PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi* (as in n. 9), p. 426–428, Appendix, p. 197, n° 48; KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 294–297.

100 SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 348–350, n° 38.

101 *Ibid.*, p. 345–348, n° 27.

102 *Ibid.*, p. 348–350, n° 38.

103 PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi* (as in n. 9), Appendix IV, n° 57.

104 For an analysis of the documents, see LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 355–358.

105 *Ed. ibid.*, Appendix, n° 40.

considered. Indeed, the island kingdom's future is often the only thing standing between a Franco-Aragonese convergence¹⁰⁶. By 1294/95 due to the outbreak of war with England, French interests had changed significantly, and an alliance with Aragon suddenly seemed possible. This would most likely have meant letting Mallorca down had not the pope insisted on upholding the alliance, a situation which ultimately led to France choosing Mallorca's side in the Anagni negotiations.

2. Documents

The following observation is linked to my first, but it will also lead our focus to the Crown of Aragon. The Aragonese kings, especially Alfonso III and James II, tried continuously to keep the Mallorca question out of the international negotiations, dismissing it as merely a conflict between lord and vassal. As proof of their position, Aragon often referred to the 1279 agreement made between James II of Mallorca and Peter III of Aragon. This strategy can also be observed on a documentary level. The 1279 contract played an important role in the argument made by the kings of Aragon – underlined by the large number of copies mentioned in Cingolani's edition¹⁰⁷, which were produced during the period in question and up to the 17th century¹⁰⁸. Indeed, Alfonso referred to a number of specific points from the 1279 agreement to support his argument. For instance, instructions for his envoy Guilbert de Cruilles at the Bordeaux meeting of 1287 with Edward I of England, required that Guilbert explain that James, *quondam rex Majoricarum*, had broken an agreement with Peter: first, by not accepting Barcelonese money in his lands; and second, by denying support to his sovereign. Furthermore, Guilbert was tasked to present evidence if necessary (*quidem instrumenta producant, si necesse fuerit*) probably in the form of a copy of the 1279 agreement. To further prove this denial of support (*producantur instrumenta requisicionis dicte valencie et denegacionis ejusdem, si necesse fuerit*), Guilbert probably also brought copies of the correspondence preceding the French Crusade in 1285 to present during the negotiations¹⁰⁹.

For James II of Mallorca, the Perpignan agreement was also used as a point of reference, although for him it represented an injustice that he was forced to agree to out of necessity. Two documents are particularly interesting in determining James's strategy and legal argumentation: the first set of documents were the protest notes that he issued on 23 August 1295 and on 14 August 1302 refusing the decisions of the treaty of Anagni, especially the renewed vassal status to the Crown of Aragon. The first of these was signed directly after James accepted the treaty¹¹⁰ and was written by a pub-

106 See for example HERDE, Bonifaz (as in n. 68), p. 131.

107 CINGOLANI, Dipl. Pere el Gran (as in n. 12), vol. 1, n° 158. On the later use of charters and other administrative documents, see Wolfgang HUSCHNER, Einleitung, in: Nicolangelo D'ACUNTO, Wolfgang HUSCHNER, Sebastian ROEBERT (ed.), Originale – Fälschungen – Kopien. Kaiser- und Königsurkunden für Empfänger in »Deutschland« und »Italien« (9.–11. Jahrhundert) und ihre Nachwirkungen im Spätmittelalter (bis ca. 1500), Leipzig 2017 (Italia Regia, 3), p. 9–10.

108 Moreover, the document would be central in the process of the kingdom's final reintegration into the Crown of Aragon in the 1340s when it was copied into the case records (ed. BOFARULL, Proceso [as in n. 11], p. 119–124).

109 Barcelona, ACA, Reial Cancilleria, Reg. 64, fol. 193^v; see also LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), p. 297–298, whose transcription is not entirely correct.

110 Ibid., Appendix, n° 36; a 1342 copy is edited in BOFARULL, Proceso (as in n. 11), vol. 29, p. 37–45.

lic notary from Perpignan in the presence of a few chosen witnesses: representatives of the Franciscan and the Dominican orders; Bernat Dalmau, a judge and doctor of law; and the judge Arnau Batlle who, as we shall see, had already been called as an expert on the matter. The document of reference used here was the 1272 version of the testament of James I the Conqueror in which he created the kingdom of Mallorca as an independent realm¹¹¹. The protest note represents a detailed recapitulation of the Mallorcan perspective of the events since the Conqueror's death in 1276. It can be summarized as follows: although Peter III agreed to accept their father's wish, he completely ignored the agreement afterwards by terrorizing James with war. Out of urgency and immediate necessity, James was forced to accept the vassalage and the conclusion of a defensive alliance with his brother Peter. When Peter was excommunicated, the pope liberated all his vassals of their duties. After careful consideration, James denied Peter his support due to the excommunication and the impeachment proceedings that followed in order to act in alignment with the Holy Roman Church. He was then obliged to sign the agreements of Anagni because he would not have been able otherwise to get his kingdom back, but he nonetheless refuses every right the kings of Aragon might claim over his territories. In short, since Peter had not seen fit to comply with their father's testament, James also did not feel obliged to do so¹¹².

The dispute between Mallorca and Aragon was only resolved under pressure from France and the papacy, but the tension remained imminent throughout the kingdom of Mallorca's existence. In 1302, when his son Sancho had to confirm the vassalage, James and Sancho reissued the protest note and referred to the same aspects, especially the Conqueror's last will from 26 August 1272¹¹³. Numerous copies further underscore the long-term importance of the testament as a point of reference: a first one without date was probably issued by Peter III and James II in 1279, a second one in 1281, and a third one in 1319, when the succession of the childless Sancho of Mallorca was heavily discussed¹¹⁴. And, like the 1279 agreement and the protest note itself, it was used as one of the central documents during the process of reintegration in the 1340s and can be found in the case records¹¹⁵.

The protest notes were a way to openly accept the international agreements but also to secretly dismiss them in order to reserve rights later¹¹⁶. Their effect was limit-

111 See note n. 11 for references on the testament and its editions.

112 VONES, Krone und Königreich (as in n. 12), p. 203; LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), p. 348–350; CINGOLANI, Dipl. Pere el Gran (as in n. 12), vol. 2, p. 44–46.

113 VONES, Krone und Königreich (as in n. 12), p. 204; ed. LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), Appendix, n° 42; see note 11 for references on the testament and its editions.

114 Antoni MUT CALAFELL, Los pergaminos reales del reinado de Jaime I del Archivo del Reino de Mallorca, in: XIII Congrès d'història de la Corona d'Aragó (Palma de Mallorca, 27 setembre – 1 octubre 1987), vol. 3: Comunicacions, Palma de Mallorca 1989, p. 311; VONES, Krone und Königreich (as in n. 12), p. 195–196; see also Álvaro SANTAMARÍA ARÁNDEZ, Tensión Corona de Aragón-Corona de Mallorca. La sucesión de Sancho de Mallorca (1318–1326), in: En la España medieval, vol. 3, Madrid 1982, p. 423–495; Stéphane PÉQUIGNOT, Les écrits du »temps de la désobéissance« (Roussillon, 1324–1326), in: L'autorité de l'écrit au Moyen Âge (Orient-Occident). XXXIX^e Congrès de la SHMESP (Le Caire, 30 avril–5 mai 2008), Paris 2009, p. 211–224, as well as Péquignot's upcoming monograph on the topic.

115 BOFARULL, Proceso (as in n. 11), p. 15–37.

116 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, Relations (as in n. 20), p. 350.

ed, but it is possible that James still hoped to avoid being returned to Aragonese sovereignty after he had received back his territories. The general conflict on Sicily hadn't yet been resolved and James wanted to be prepared in case of an Aragonese defeat. The protest notes also show that James could not resort to any of the means that he had used before. Although his military campaigns had shown some success in the preceding years¹¹⁷, his armed forces were not strong enough to continue the fighting without France's support, and so it was impossible to openly reject armistices and compromises signed by France.

3. *The Constitution of the Kingdom of Mallorca*

Another characteristic of the kingdom of Mallorca lies in its complicated constitution which reunited very different territories with particular historical connections and populations¹¹⁸. This can already be seen at the beginning of the conflict when Mallorca initiated the alliance with France. Because of the direct vassalage to the king of Aragon and the indirect one to France (in Montpellier), it depended on two of the principal actors in a greater conflict. I have already discussed examples of this situation in different contexts: before the French Crusade, Peter and Alfonso of Aragon tried to get the population of the island of Mallorca on their side, mainly by appealing to their trade interests. On multiple occasions, the respective popes sent letters to the Mallorcans in order to remind them to stay loyal to their king and not to pledge fealty to the kings of Aragon – those reminders were apparently judged necessary¹¹⁹. The city of Montpellier is a case in itself. In 1293, Philip IV of France bought the dominion over a part of the city which had previously been held by the bishop of Maguelone, and James became a direct vassal to the king of France as well. This development had probably deteriorated Franco-Mallorcan relations, especially when one considers Philip's secrecy during the preparations¹²⁰.

The geographical situation – which is to a great extent responsible for this complicated inner constitution – invites another observation. Over the course of events, it appears that the kingdom of Mallorca, especially the city of Perpignan, served as a gateway to the lands of the Crown of Aragon for the members of the anti-Aragonese alliance. This began in 1283 when Philip III of France concluded the alliance with James in order to pass through his territories and it continued throughout the period. Due to its geographical position, most of the actors involved needed a safe-conduct from the king of Mallorca. Moreover, James's capital of Perpignan served as a meeting place and a location for preparing and organizing travels to and from the Crown of Aragon¹²¹. James also assured the communication between the different members

117 See for example the conquest of La Jonquera in 1289 (KIESEWETTER, Anfänge [as in n. 2], p. 218).

118 See PÉQUIGNOT, *Écrits* (as in n. 114), p. 211–212.

119 See for example the mission of William of Mandagout, sent by Nicholas IV in 1291 after James II became king of Aragon (KIESEWETTER, Anfänge [as in n. 2], p. 239).

120 For a detailed account of those events, see LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 311–337.

121 See for example the negotiations between Alfonso and Charles in Perpignan in 1290 where Charles had waited for safe conduct (KIESEWETTER, Anfänge [as in n. 2], p. 227) or the negotiations in La Jonquera between the same rulers that were prepared by Charles in Perpignan, and where he issued a safe-conduct for Alfonso (SALAVERTE Y ROCA, *Tratado* [as in n. 9], p. 71–76, n° 1).

of the anti-Aragonese alliance in 1289. When Charles II pretended to turn himself over to Alfonso, it was James of Mallorca who accompanied him and who contacted the seneschal of Carcassonne for additional protection in the form of soldiers¹²². When Boniface VIII announced his agreement with James II of Aragon on 7 June 1295, it was also declared that Charles and his daughter Blanche, the future wife of James of Aragon, would stay in Perpignan for the whole month of July¹²³. However, it seems that there would be no future advantage in this situation for James of Mallorca.

4. *Envoys and Embassies*

The next point of interest concerns James's use of embassies and envoys. His choice of ambassadors was not arbitrary but adapted to the situation¹²⁴. We can see, for instance, that the combination of a noble and an expert in law was very common for negotiations concerning Mallorcan independence. During the first embassy to France in 1283, James appointed the nobleman Guillem de Canet and the Montpellier judge Arnau Batlle, who had already defended the king's interests in the conflict over Montpellier in 1281/82 and will appear again on multiple occasions¹²⁵. The third member of this mission was Ponç, the bishop of Mallorca. In 1279, while still archdeacon of Mallorca, Ponç testified the election of procurators by the Universitat de Mallorca in order to pledge fealty to Peter of Aragon¹²⁶. Guillem de Canet as well had already been part of the negotiations in 1279 and had witnessed several ratifications of the Perpignan agreement¹²⁷. Like Ponç, he also testified the multiple elections of procurators on the islands of Mallorca, which indicates that he had accompanied the king on his way to the island¹²⁸. Both Ponç and Guillem were fully aware of the situation and were clearly chosen to represent the king for this reason. But it was, in fact, Arnau who was present at the conclusion of the treaty of Carcassonne and signed *in presencia nostra per fidelem iudicem nostrum Arnaldum Bajuli*. When Peter of Aragon's ambassadors came to Perpignan in July 1283 to ask for James's support, the notarial instrument summarizing the results of the meeting was issued in the presence of Guillem de Canet, Ponç de Guardia (who would succeed the former as the lord of Canet), the nobleman Jaume de Mura and the abbot of Arles¹²⁹. During the meeting in Perpignan in February 1290, the king was represented by five *speciales procuratores*: Arnau Batlle; Jacques de Bernis, *utriusque juris professor* and the king's lieutenant in Montpellier¹³⁰ and *Albertinu(s) de Camariis legum doctor* formed the legal expertise¹³¹. For the nobles, Guillem de Canet had died around

122 KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 220–221.

123 FINKE, *Acta Aragonensia* (as in n. 73), vol. 1, p. 29–30, n° 21.

124 On the choice of ambassadors and envoys, see Jean-Marie MOEGLIN, Stéphane PÉQUIGNOT, *Diplomatie et «relations internationales» au Moyen Âge (IX^e–XV^e siècles)*, Paris 2017, p. 374–417 and esp. for the Crown of Aragon PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi* (as in n. 9), p. 191.

125 CINGOLANI, *Dipl. Pere el Gran* (as in n. 12), vol. 1, n° 347.

126 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 201, 202, 209, 210.

127 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 158, 159, 160, 163, 201, 202, 347.

128 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 201, 202, 209, 210.

129 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, n° 350.

130 See, for example, *Archives de la Ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents*, vol. 1/3, ed. Joseph BERTHELÉ, Montpellier 1899, p. 161, n° 2153, p. 297, n° 3384.

131 RYMER, *Foedera*, vol 1/3 (as in n. 51), p. 61–66, esp. p. 63 for the Mallorcan representatives; see

1286¹³² and was replaced by Berenguer de Calders, *Vicarium Rossillionis*; and Jaume de Mura¹³³. The latter made a regular appearance in the king's entourage, for instance as a witness in James's confirmation of the 1293 armistice of La Jonquera¹³⁴ where we also find Ponç de Guardia, now as the new lord of Canet replacing Guillem. His most prominent mission would be the confirmation of the treaty of Anagni in Vilabertran/Fort de Bellaguarda in 1295 which he attended together with Brémond de Montferrier¹³⁵. In spring 1295, two of the aforementioned – Jacques de Bernis and Berenguer de Calders – travelled to Anagni to take part in the preparations of the treaty of Anagni¹³⁶. In 1298, when the decisions of Anagni were about to become reality, a meeting between the envoys of the kings of Aragon and Mallorca, mediated by the bishop of Carcassonne, representative of the king of France, took place in Panissars in January to prepare the later treaty of Argelès. The three Mallorcan envoys are already well known to us: Arnau Batlle, Jaume de Mura and Brémond de Montferrier¹³⁷. Indeed, the latter united two qualifications as both a nobleman and as doctor of law at the University of Montpellier and lieutenant of the king in the same city¹³⁸. Arnau Batlle is the only one who accompanied and represented the king during the whole period – from Carcassonne to Argelès. Furthermore, James of Mallorca seems to have trusted actors on the level of the engrossments, mostly conducted by public notaries of Perpignan. The fact that Miquel Rotlan did not just write official documents but also wrote the protest note of 1295, reveals that a public notary could also be one of the king's advisors.

Several observations can be made in this analysis of ambassadors and envoys. It is clear that James II of Mallorca chose them specifically. Most of the embassies were composed of at least one noble and at least one doctor of law¹³⁹. For the latter, all had an affiliation to the University of Montpellier and in some cases also held political positions in the kingdom of Mallorca. This observation underlines the importance of the Faculty of Law in Montpellier to Mallorcan independence, which until recently has not been a subject considered by historical research¹⁴⁰. I have also demonstrated that James trusted a small group of actors who appeared on multiple occasions and possessed expertise on the subject. This confirms recent research in diplomatic histo-

also Ludwig KLÜPFEL, *Die äußere Politik Alfonsos III. von Aragonien*, Berlin, Leipzig, 1911–1912, p. 73–74; KIESEWETTER, *Anfänge* (as in n. 2), p. 226–227.

132 Robert SAUT, *Canet en Roussillon. Regards sur 3000 ans d'histoire*, Canet 1991, p. 83.

133 A *Jacobus de Muredine* also appeared as envoy for James III of Mallorca to Alfonso IV of Aragon in 1333/34 on the occasion of the war against Genova, but it is difficult to determine whether they are the same person; see Josefina MUTGÉ VIVES, *Política, urbanismo y vida ciudadana en la Barcelona del siglo XIV*, Barcelona 2004, p. 128–129.

134 SALAVERT Y ROCA, *Tratado* (as in n. 9), p. 293–294, n° 5.

135 *Ibid.*, p. 348–350, n° 38.

136 LECOY DE LA MARCHE, *Relations* (as in n. 20), p. 344–345.

137 *Ibid.*, p. 354.

138 André GOURON, *Un juriste montpelliérain chef d'école: Brémond, Seigneur de Montferrier*, in: *Provence historique* 93/94 (1973), p. 109–115.

139 This was also true for other negotiations concerning territorial problems; see for example Charles BAUDON DE MONY, *Relations politiques des comtes de Foix avec la Catalogne jusqu'au commencement du XIV^e siècle*, vol. 2, Paris 1896, p. 264, n° 142 where Berenguer de Calders is again sent to negotiate with James II of Aragon.

140 ABULAFIA, *Emporium* (as in n. 12), p. 16 suggests this but does not cite any sources.

ry that dates the development of diplomatic experts to the 13th century. Nevertheless, James's envoys were not specialized in diplomatic missions¹⁴¹. Rather, they appear in a number of ways to form part of the king's inner circle – as witnesses in charters and in official positions as procurators, lieutenants and veguers. In other words, they were trusted advisors.

IV. Conclusion

In 1282, a local uprising known as the Sicilian Vespers initiated a period of conflict that directly involved most of the major political powers of Western Europe, among them the kingdom of Mallorca. When Pope Martin IV excommunicated Peter III of Aragon and freed his vassals from their obligations, James II of Mallorca saw an opportunity to gain back the full independence he had lost to his brother and to build an alliance with the king of France in order to conquer the Crown of Aragon. This crusade failed and with it Mallorcan hopes of independence. This article has shown that during the negotiations that followed between France, the papacy, the kingdom of Naples and the Crown of Aragon and England (as mediator), the agency of the kingdom of Mallorca was fairly limited. It depended almost entirely on the interests and intentions of James's allies – France and the papacy (and the kingdom of Naples to a lesser extent) – and didn't allow for Mallorcan participation in international negotiations, the results of which James was forced to accept. I have also shown the different means – both diplomatic and military – that James used to eventually improve his position. He tried to participate in negotiations by sending envoys, and he protested those decisions that he had not taken part in. The claims of Aragon and Mallorca were situated on the far ends of the spectrum: the Aragonese wanted to fully reintegrate the kingdom of Mallorca into the Crown, whereas the king of Mallorca demanded his independence. James of Mallorca's claim to independence rested on the illegitimacy of the 1279 agreement and the excommunication of his brother Peter III of Aragon, which allowed James to take up arms against him. The French failure to defeat Peter in 1285 started a series of negotiations which made it unlikely that James's maximal claim would ever become a reality. His allies supported him to an extent – also in order to avoid a Crown of Aragon that was too powerful – but ultimately had to accept compromises. One such compromise was the reestablishment of the vassalage of the kingdom of Mallorca. In the end, it must have been counted as a success that, at the insistence of France and the popes, Mallorca was not (yet) fully integrated into the Crown. In secret, however, James protested these agreements on multiple occasions. It is possible that he was still hoping for an Aragonese defeat, as by 1295 the main conflict concerning the island of Sicily had not yet been resolved. The same was true for the conflict around Mallorcan independence, a subject that came up regularly on both sides of the debate in subsequent years until Peter IV of Aragon finally conquered the kingdom in 1343.

141 On the compilation of embassies, see MOEGLIN, PÉQUIGNOT, *Diplomatie* (as in n. 124), p. 411–417 and PÉQUIGNOT, *Au nom du roi* (as in n. 9), p. 222–238.

James II of Mallorca had started a dangerous game in signing the treaty of Carcassonne in 1283. After 16 years of conflict and negotiation, of concluded and broken armistices and treaties, he was forced to return to the *status quo ante bellum*. As regards the political situation of his kingdom, the distance between Carcassonne and Argelès had been very short indeed.