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Ayla Noelani Tiefenbach
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien



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Copper as a “green” resource for the energy transition: A post-development analysis of resistance-narratives in anti-mining social movements in Peru

Ayla Noelani Tiefenbach*
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

Abstract

The modern globalized economy is dependent on copper, a resource that is also crucial for renewable energy technologies. With the projected expansion of renewable energy in light of the so-called green energy transition the scale of copper extractivism is expected to multiply. In Peru, the second largest copper exporter after Chile, the projected increase in demand is presented as an opportunity for economic growth and development. However, social movements and critical academics have long criticized extractivism to be the cause of numerous socio-ecological conflicts. Guided by a critical post-development framework and social movement theory that sees transformative potential in Latin American resistance movements this work conducts a qualitative content analysis of resistance narratives in anti-mining social movements and networks in Peru. The critique voiced by resistance actors allows for an understanding of the Peruvian extractive space as one structured by unequal ecological exchange that causes socio-ecological harm at the extractive frontier while reproducing colonially grown unequal power structures. Given their critical understanding of extractivism as a development model in Peru the investigated anti-mining social movements in Peru can be situated within the post-development debate. Guided by the eco-centric vision of *buen vivir* they make a valuable contribution to the discussion on alternatives-to-development, and specifically on post-extractivism by proposing concrete alternative visions and practices that strive towards post-extractivist utopias. Given the novel context of intensifying copper extractivism for the renewable energy transition the look at the extractive frontier demonstrates how the supposedly green energy transition risks perpetuating the colonial legacy of environmentally and socially destructive resource exploitation that works for the benefit of consumers in the global North while undermining possibilities for self-determined, autonomous pathways of development in the global South.

Keywords: Green extractivism, unequal ecological exchange, social resistance movements, post-development, post-extractivism, *buen vivir*, energy transitions

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1. Introduction

The decarbonization of energy systems with renewable energy (RE) is commonly presented as the ultimate solution to tackle the looming climate crisis. However, popular framings of the RE transition as *green*¹ tend to disregard that the production of RE technologies necessitates significantly more metal and mineral-resources than fossil-fuel electricity generation (Hund et al., 2020), thus inducing a dramatic increase of demand for lithium, cobalt, graphite and especially copper (Carlson, 2020). Among Latin American (LA) countries, which accounted for 41% of global copper extraction in 2020 (Carlson, 2020), especially Chile and Peru are expected to significantly increase their exportation (World Bank, 2021).

The economic system of intensive resource exploitation - infamously termed ‘extractivism’ - has long been criticized by social resistance movements and critical academics to cause socio-ecological destruction at the extraction site while reinforcing a colonial global division of labor by maintaining a flow of cheap raw materials from the *global South*² to the *global North* (FDCL & RLS, 2012; Harvey, 2017; Svampa, 2012b). Given this, the framing of mining as *green* should merely be understood as a discursive shift towards a green-washed version of classical extractivism that perpetuates or even exacerbates existing socio-ecological destruction at the extractive frontier. A growing body of research exposes this ‘dirty’ or hidden

side of the RE supply chain (Dunlap, 2021; Kramarz et al., 2021; Rice, 2007). Henceforth, this paper employs the term *green* extractivism as a critique of extractivism that takes place for the RE energy transition and is ‘legitimated’ in the name of mitigating the climate crisis.

Extractivism is deeply entangled with and legitimated by hopes of *development*. On the one hand, the mining of natural resources has long been and continues to be understood as a crucial vehicle for economic growth and increases in living standards in the LA region. For instance, in the case of Peru this rests on a long history of Peru as a ‘mining country’ (FDCL & RLS, 2012; Vela-Leiden, 2022). On the other hand, the post-development (PD) school criticizes the idea of a universal path to *development* as a post-WWII invention of the *global North* that serves to establish and maintain the globalization of the capitalist economic system and with it the economic, cultural and epistemological hegemony of the *global North* and the dependency of the *global South* (Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 2010; McMichael, 2019; Quijano, 2000; Sachs, 2010; Ziai, 2017). PD acknowledges the plurality of alternatives-to-development (A2D) (Kothari et al., 2019b) such as the indigenous-inspired cosmopolitanism of *buen vivir*, that has emerged in the context of LA as a rich political platform guiding multiple social movements resisting the *Western development* model (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018; Villalba, 2013).

To contribute to a critical discussion of *green* extractivism as a form of *development* in the context the RE energy transition this study draws on decolonial and PD thought to explore counterhegemonic narratives of

* E-mail address

Ayla Noelani Tiefenbach: ayla.noelani.tiefenbach@s.wu.ac.at

social resistance movements in Peru that envision and enact alternative practices of development. Following Mayring (2010) an in-depth qualitative content analysis of resistance narratives voiced by anti-mining actors and networks in Peru is conducted. The approach is guided by social movement theory that ascribes transformative potential to grassroots movements in Latin America in the search for post-extractivist futures. The empirical research is guided by the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1: What do Peruvian social resistance movements and networks criticize about *development-as-extractivism*?

RQ2: What alternatives-to-extractivism do they propose?

This research investigates Peruvian anti-mining social movements and networks to shed light on resistance narratives and alternative ideas to *development* by means of extractivism in Peru. The results suggest that, firstly, especially cross-national networks are important in making marginalized resistance voices visible and in creating stronger alliances and thus more effective forms of combat against extractivism. Secondly, the contestation of *green* extractivism as a form of *development* brought forward by anti-mining social movements can be situated within the PD critique. Additionally, by offering concrete proposals for A2D in mining regions anti-mining social movements make a valuable contribution to the discussion on A2D, and specifically transitions to post-extractivism. Hereby, the investigated social movements are guided by the indigenous-inspired cosmo-vision of *buen vivir* (BV) which can be understood as a transitional paradigm that provides both the space for practical alternatives as well as utopian visions of post-extractivist societies.

Applying this to the context of the global energy transition the analysis suggests that the increase in copper extractivism for the purpose of RE production reinforces and even intensifies already existing socio-ecological conflicts and economic issues of extractivism obscured by a *green* agenda while undermining possibilities for self-determined, autonomous pathways to development. This paper claims that, if these problems are not addressed the global *green* energy transition risks continuing the colonial legacy of environmentally and socially destructive resource exploitation and patterns of unequal ecological exchange that reinforces the hegemony of the *global North* and dependency of the *global South*. Consequently, this paper criticizes dominant RE transition plans that depend upon an unprecedented increase of metal resource consumption to be what I tentatively term an 'eco-colonial' instead of a *green* endeavor.

This paper proceeds as follows: the first section informs the reader on the contextual background of the paper by describing the history of extractivism as the dominant economic- and *development* model in Latin America, its socio-ecological and economic repercussions as well as mapping the relevant actors within the Peruvian Mining Sphere. Secondly, by reviewing critical literature on *green* extractivism the increase of extractivism in the name of the RE energy transition is problematized. Thirdly, the theoretical background outlines an overview of PD theory


and discourses on A2D, the indigenous-inspired cosmo-vision of *buen vivir* and discussions on post-extractivism. Thirdly, social grassroots movements are theorized by relying on social movement theory. Altogether these discourses guide this research towards a critical, decolonial analytical stance that motivates the choice of methodology to investigate counterhegemonic resistance movements. Then, the results of the empirical study are presented before embedding them within the broader discussion on PD, A2D and post-extractivism and its implications in the context of the RE transition in the discussion and conclusion.

2. Contextualization

2.1 *The Colonial History and Consolidation of Extractivism as a Development Model in Latin America and Peru*

Rich in metal resources such as copper, gold, iron or lead (Omondi, 2019) Peru's history, like that of many other countries in LA, is characterized by a strong dependency on extractivism (García, 2022). The term 'extractivism' is used as a critique of the export-oriented economic system that relies on capital accumulation on the basis of the over-exploitation, extraction and exportation of natural resources (Acosta, 2013; FDCL & RLS, 2012; Svampa, 2012b)³. These natural resources remain largely unprocessed, as production processes happen elsewhere, thus leading to very little value creation in the extracting country (Acosta, 2013). Far from being a recent phenomenon, the basic logic of exploitation of natural and human resources is argued to date back to colonial times (Acosta, 2013; Svampa, 2019a, 2019b). Aráoz (2013) describes extractivism as a historical-geopolitical product of the hierarchization between colonial territories and imperial metropolises, where the prior are seen as spaces of looting and plundering for the provisioning of the latter. Consequently, the continued dependency on extractivism in LA can be viewed as reinforcement of a colonial global division of labor between resource-supplying countries in the *global South* and consuming countries in the *global North* (Svampa, 2012a).

While the origins of extractivism can be traced back to colonialism it was with the 'mining-boom' of the 1980s and 1990s that the extractive system firstly became the established economic and *development* model in LA. In Peru's case, 'structural adjustment programs' enforced by the 'Washington Consensus' that mandated the opening of LA markets to the *global North* (Svampa, 2012a, 2019b) coincided with the country's long-term authoritarian ruler Fujimori increasingly directing Peru's economy towards the mono-exploitation and -exportation of raw materials (Berrosipi, 2022b). After this, during what has been termed the 'Commodity Super Cycle' or 'resource boom' the LA region saw a new period of unprecedented expansion, intensification and consolidation of extractivism (Arboleda, 2015). Between 2000 and 2014 a combination of high commodity and raw material prices, an increasing demand by industrialized and emerging countries and a "massive inflow of foreign direct investment" (Arboleda, 2015, p. 100) led to a time of "extraordinary profitability and [...] high growth rates of Latin American



Map 1. Mining concessions in Peru in 2021 (CooperAcción, 2021)

economies" (Svampa, 2012b, p. 44). In the case of Peru, the country experienced extraordinarily high growth rates of 4.3% between 1990 and 2019, well above the regional average of 2.6%, largely induced by high investments in mining (O'Boyle, 2021).

2.2 The Intensification of Socio-Ecological and Economic Issues of Extractivism for the Green Energy Transition

Since copper is needed for all RE technologies such as solar panels, wind mills, electric vehicles, and storage- and electricity infrastructure (Church & Crawford, 2018; Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019) Peru is recently seeing a significant increase in demand for copper extractivism (World Bank, 2021). After its neighbor Chile, Peru has become the second largest producer of copper in the world accounting for roughly 12% of global copper exports (Pistilli, 2020; World Bank, 2021). Current numbers show Peru's mining concessions cover an area of 14.71% of Peruvian territory (Lopez-Guio, 2021) (see Map 1) yet expansion is projected to continue steadily (Casey, 2021). For the year 2022 alone 63 new mining projects with a total investment of 586 million USD were planned (Berrospi, 2022a).

Given the dominant role that Peru is expected to play in supplying the world economy with copper it is evident that pressure on Peruvian mining areas will increase in upcoming years. Correspondingly, it is likely that the existing social, ecological and economic issues of extractivism will be exacerbated (Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019). From an economic angle, the framing of mining as a source for economic growth and *development* as criticized to be illusory. In fact, Peru remains one of the poorest and most unequal countries worldwide (Svampa, 2012a, p. 16), with mining regions being the poorest of all (Quesada, n.d.). The richest 10% own 40% of the nation's wealth while spending on education and health has remained proportionally low (Quesada, n.d.). At the same time, the single focus on the extractive sector has led to scarcely diversified economies and a stark dependency on international mining corporations (FDCL & RLS, 2012; Quesada, n.d.). From an environmental standpoint, extractivism is denounced to cause major environmental issues by polluting soils, water and air, leading to the destruction of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and health burdens (Quesada, n.d.; Svampa, 2012a). Especially copper mining consumes a large amount of water and energy, scarce resources that are desperately needed for other economic activities (Svampa, 2012a).

As a response to these issues, the LA region has seen a surge in resistance movements (Lust, 2014; Svampa, 2012b). People engaging in the defense of livelihoods and natural environments are also called 'environmental defenders'. According to Scheidel et al. (2020) they play a vital role in promoting environmental protection and sustainability. However, they often face repression, criminalization, violence and human rights abuses (FDCL & RLS, 2012; Quesada, n.d.; Svampa, 2019b). Affected populations tend to be excluded from decision-making processes and instead suffer displacement and *dispossession of land, resources, and territory* (Hollender, 2015). Correspondingly, LA as a whole is the region with the most assassinations against human rights and environmental defenders

worldwide (Svampa, 2019b). In 2019, Global Witness documented 212 killings of environmental defenders - the highest number reported so far - with two-thirds taking place in Latin America. What is more, mining was the deadliest sector of all, accounting for 50 of the 212 killings (Global Witness, 2020).


2.3 Relevant Actors and Polarizing Attitudes in the Peruvian Extractivism Discourse

Opinions on the necessity and desirability of copper extractivism as a *development* model for Peru diverge greatly. A preliminary media content investigation allows for the categorization of actors along a rough binary of *pro-mining- and anti-mining-actors* (Figure 1). *Pro-Mining Actors include a large majority of Peruvian civil, political and economic actors.* Against the backdrop of the perceived 'need' for copper extractivism for the RE transition, copper extractivism is presented not only as necessary and desirable vehicle for *development* but also to make a valuable contribution to the global RE transition and thus to the mitigation of climate change – a win-win-scenario⁴. Altogether, the history of Peru as a 'mining country' is firmly woven into people's ideas of *development* and *progress*, making a critical discourse or even challenging of extractivism in Peru very difficult (Moncada, 2021; Vela-Leiden, 2022).

On the other side, anti-mining actors contest the perceived necessity of extractivism and fight for a change in Peru's *development* model. Given the multitude of socio-ecological and economic issues of extractivism and with mining becoming the major cause of conflicts and violence in Peru (see Graph 1) the country has seen a surge of resistance movements (Berrospi, 2022a). As visualized in Figure 1, Peruvian anti-mining resistance actors range from local and peasant communities, indigenous and women's associations, grassroots movements to NGO's and academics that altogether form a vast web of activity operating on local, national and international levels (Berrospi, 2022a; Red Muqui, 2022b). Specifically, Andean indigenous (40% of the 29 million Peruvian citizens) and campesino communities living in many of the mining areas are at the forefront of the struggle (Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 2888; Quesada, n.d.). Especially the cross-national mining-critical network Red Muqui stands out since it connects and unites numerous smaller and more localized anti-mining social movements in Peru under one flag (Red Muqui, 2022a). Founded in 2003, Red Muqui is a collective of anti-mining actors including 30 Peruvian organizations acting on local, national and international levels (Red Muqui, 2022b, 2022e)⁵. Guided by the institutional slogan "Proposal and Action Network" their main works centers on (1) accompanying and advising local, peasant and/or indigenous communities and grassroots movements in their fight against the social and environmental rights violations caused by mining activities and (2) making visible alternatives-to-extractivism in Peruvian mining territories (Red Muqui, 2022b; Red Muqui campañas, 2019). What is more, they propose the revision of regulatory frameworks and public policies in favor of the rights of people and the environment (Red Muqui, 2022d).

PERÚ: CONFLICTOS SOCIOAMBIENTALES POR ACTIVIDAD, FEBRERO 2022

(Distribución porcentual)



Graph 1. Socio-ecological conflicts per activity in Peru February 2022 (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2022)

3. Problematication of Green Extractivism – the ‘dirty’ side of the RE supply chain

The debunking of fossil fuels as ecologically catastrophic and the portrayal of RE as the ultimate solution to tackling climate change has granted copper extractivism a new ‘legitimacy’. However, a growing body of literature points to the importance of critically examining the ‘extractive frontier’ of the RE supply chain, arguing that it problematically reinforces and even intensifies patterns of displacement, environmental degradation and conflict that in turn exacerbate vulnerabilities and inequalities between and within states (Dunlap, 2021; Kramarz et al., 2021; Rice, 2007; Riofrancos, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2020). The term *green* extractivism in reference to and as a critique of extractivism that takes place in the name of solving climate change (Riofrancos, 2017; Voskoboynik & Andreucci, 2022). Put simply, *green* extractivism can be understood as a green-washed version of classical extractivism. Ultimately, it creates what Sovacool et al. (2020) conceptualize as a “decarbonization divide” between those that benefit from the RE energy transition (mostly in the *global North*) and those that suffer from it (mostly in the *global South*).

Whether discursively framed as *green* or not extractivism is criticized to produce numerous forms of displacement. According to Harvey (2017, p. 78), extractivism is sustained through “accumulation by dispossession” which entails the violent appropriation of nature and territories. Building on Harvey, Kramarz et al. (2021) conceptualize three mutually reinforcing

types of displacement of the extraction-based energy system. The first, (a) ‘displacement by dispossession’ refers to “processes of dispossession that displace local populations and communities from land and livelihood through processes of expropriation and resource exploitation” (2). This reduces local communities’ ability to live and work in their respective territory. This relates to Dunlap’s (2018, 632) concept of ‘green grabbing’ based on ‘green violence’ which describes how “land is grabbed and controlled in the name of an environmental ethic to promote sustainable *development* and climate change mitigation programs” (emphasis added). The second conceptualization of displacement made by Kramarz et al. (2021, p. 2) is (b) ‘displacement by degradation’ which is described as “the pollution and degradation of local and global ecosystems at the extraction, production, transportation, and disposal/recycling points of the RE supply chain”. Thirdly, (c) ‘displacement through dependent *development*’ adheres to “systemic patterns of unequal environmental exchange that lock regional and national economies into destructive *development* dependencies of primary extraction, land expropriation, elite capture, and unsafe disposal of toxic and hazardous waste” (2), all of which tend to create low-value for local economies through the creation of capital-intensive export enclaves while creating dependency on profit-maximizing transnational mining corporations (Kramarz et al., 2021). Similar to Kramarz et al. (2021) Dunlap (2021) contends that the extractivist frontier of RE produces “sacrifice zones” where ecological destruction of human and non-human life is traded for false hopes of




Fig. 1. Actors in Peruvian Mining sphere (own visualization on basis of preliminary media content analysis)

development and benefits while local economies are destroyed (87). He argues that this reveals a colonial continuity due to the displacement of the 'dirty' parts of RE to countries of the *global South* where there are often lower environmental standards.

The argument made by Kramarz et al. (2021) is supported by Rice's (2007) "theory of unequal ecological exchange". Building on World System Theory, Rice (2007) postulates that the world system functions along the lines of unequal exchange of ecological resources between core and peripheral countries, where the prior's hegemony is maintained by the exploitation of the latter. Global unequal ecological exchange is characterized firstly, by "environmental cost-shifting or externalization of the social and ecological costs of extraction" (46) that enhance "environmental degradation and depletion" (46) in the respective exporting countries and secondly, by "disproportionate appropriation of limited global environmental space and resources by core countries" (56). Thirdly, this reinforces processes of *underdevelopment*. In other words, instead of peripheral countries simply 'lagging behind' the very world system and the economic *development* of core countries can only be maintained through continued *underdevelopment* of peripheral countries (62ff).

4. Theoretical Background: Post-development Perspectives on Extractivism as a form of development

While extractivism in the LA region can be understood as a specific and structural materialization of the capitalist world economy it rests on the broader discursive imaginary that it will bring *development* to the region. The following section outlines the post-development (PD) critique of *development* before diving deeper into discussions on alternatives-to-development (A2D), focusing specifically on the indigenous-inspired cosmo-vision of *buen vivir*. The main tenets of these discourses guide this research towards a critical, decolonial analytical approach.

4.1 Deconstructing the coloniality of development

Since former US-American president Harry Truman's Inaugural speech in 1949 proclaiming a linear path to *progress* and *modernization* (The Avalon Project, 2008) the idea of *development* has been presented as a universal aspiration (McMichael, 2019; Ziai, 2017). Opposing this, the PD school of thought deconstructs and problematizes the idea of *development* as an imposed ideological and discursive "tool of domination and control" (Esteva & Escobar, 2017, 2567) that serves to establish and maintain the hegemony of the

Western/Eurocentric economic and cultural complex over the *Rest* (Escobar, 1995; Kössler, 2019). Next to the universalization of *Western* cultural values of individualism, consumerism and materialism the narrative of *development* is understood to have been crucial for the globalization of the capitalist economic system, with GDP-growth becoming an almost-obsessive addiction (Esteva & Escobar, 2017; Sachs, 2019). Escobar (1995, p. 4) argues that it demanded of supposedly *underdeveloped* nations to strive for “high levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and the widespread adoption of modern education and cultural values”. Driven by the illusion of ‘catching up’ economies in the *global South* were pushed to open their economies to the globalized ‘free’ market and private foreign investment (Harvey, 2017; Svampa, 2019b). However, instead of eradicating poverty PD argues that it has caused a breakdown of local economies and community ties and has deprived millions of people of access to land, water and other resources, often through violent land-grabbing, while causing immense environmental degradation (Escobar, 1995, 2004; Sachs, 2019; Shiva, 2019).

As a basis for the PD critique of *development*, decolonial theory demonstrates that *development* and its visions of *progress* and *modernity* are entangled with colonial legacies. Quijano (2000, p. 215) famously conceptualizes this as a “coloniality of power”, arguing that the relationship between the *West* and the *Other* “continues to be one of colonial domination” (169) despite the political ending of colonialism. This expresses itself in form of a cultural and epistemological coloniality (Quijano, 2007) according to which non-*Western* ways of knowing and doing were – and continue to be – undermined as backwards and *underdeveloped* (Quesada, n.d.; Ziai, 2017). According to Quijano (2000) this rests on the racist classification of the colonial *Other* as biologically and structurally inferior that was central to the ‘justification’ of the establishment of a hierarchical world order of white supremacy. At the same time, the coloniality of *development* materializes in form of the economic world order where *Western/European* “dominators” continue to be the main beneficiaries while the formerly colonized continue to be the main victims of exploitation and discrimination (Quijano, 2007). By way of a positive framing of *development* aid via humanitarian goals and the ideals of democracy and freedom the *West* has not only been able to position itself as benevolent giver (Escobar, 1995, p. 21) but it has also problematically erased the role of colonial exploitation in the rise of the *West* as global hegemon in the first place (McMichael, 2019).

4.2 Pluriversal ‘alternatives-to-development’

While PD serves as an analytical tool for the systemic critique of *development* it also opens the space to think beyond *development*. Specifically, the term ‘alternatives-to-development’ (A2D) is increasingly employed by PD scholars in reference to movements, practices and visions that reject the perceived universality and invisibility of *development* and instead demonstrate that alternative, non-*Western* ideas of

prosperity and the ‘good life for all’ exist (Escobar, 1992; Gudynas, 2012; Hollender, 2015; Schöneberg, 2019). They are “other forms of re-existence” that are “non-capitalist, non-liberal and non-modern [and instead] more autonomous, convivial and communal” (Esteva & Escobar, 2017, 2569). Such alternatives have been grouped by the PD-school under the umbrella concept of the ‘pluriverse’ coined by Kothari et al. (2019b) as an expression of the multiplicity of transition visions, narratives and practices of A2D that exist.

While highlighting their plurality and diversity PD nevertheless sees unifying premises among the diverse A2D-movements. For instance, all A2D are radically reject capitalism, economic growth and material expansion, postulating that the appropriation and destruction of nature inevitably goes hand in hand with it (Gudynas, 2012). Following this, Gudynas (2012) contends that they share the four overarching goals of (1) dematerialization, that is the reduction of material consumption, (2) decoupling from economic growth, (3) adaptation of production processes to the capacities of eco-systems and (4) preservation of biodiversity. Additionally, Escobar (2004, p. 16) states that autonomy over territory and culture are understood as crucial for the achievement of food security and the fulfillment of cultural and territorial rights (Escobar, 2004, p. 16). According to Esteva and Escobar (2017, 2569) two principle criteria to achieve this are the re-localization of economies and “re-communalization of social life”. Last but not least, many A2D-movements engage in a critique of patriarchy, racism and other forms of discrimination and oppression (Kothari et al., 2019a).

4.3 *Buen vivir* as a transitional paradigm towards post-extractivist societies

Among the pluralistic visions of A2D *buen vivir* (BV) has emerged as a recent buzzword in South America. Roughly translatable as “the good life” (Villalba, 2013) the concept of BV originates from indigenous cosmovisions in the LA region such as *sumak kawsay* (Kichwa) or *suma qamaña* (Aymara) and has from there developed into an interdisciplinary political platform for different visions and practices of A2D (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018; Gudynas, 2011; Svampa, 2019b).

Fundamentally opposed to the *Western* nature-society-dichotomy that hierarchizes humans above nature the BV philosophy embraces an eco-centric worldview where humans are seen as a part of and dependent upon nature (Chuji et al., 2019; Svampa, 2019b; Villalba, 2013). Nature and non-human life are assigned intrinsic ontological values while community is understood as the interconnectedness of all forms of life, not only humans (Villalba, 2013). As opposed to seeing nature as a commodity and exploitable good, earth is treated as a ‘superorganism’ that is “entitled to dignity and rights” (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018, p. 135). Given this, a central demand that has flowed from the BV discourse has been the recognition of the rights of nature (Villalba, 2013).

In line with decolonial and PD thought *development* is seen as a “*Western* cultural, colonial imposition” (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018, p. 133). Similarly, capitalist

societies and their accumulation of material goods for economic growth are considered exploitative, unequal and predatory (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018). Thus, BV aims to dismantle the universal “productivist understanding of progress and one-dimensional understanding of *development* [based on] economic growth” (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018, p. 132) Recognizing the looming climate and biodiversity crisis caused by the capitalist logic of growth the BV-discourse argues that the “economy needs to be subordinated to ecology” (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018, p. 144). What is more, it proposes a structural reorientation of the economy and society as a whole towards to the principles of solidarity, sufficiency, reciprocity, cultural diversity, equality and relationality (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018; Villalba, 2013). This involves self-sufficiency and autonomy at the community level, democratic and communitarian access to land as well as the decentralization and diversification of the economy. (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018).

4.4 Envisioning a transition to Post-Extractivism

Guided by a BV and PD approach, Gudynas (2012) suggests concrete steps for a transition towards post-extractivist economies that foresees a planned decrease of extractivism. He distinguishes between three forms of extractivism: (1) ‘Predatory/Plundering Extractivism’, which describes the current *development* model based on “intensive extractivism with grand geographical scale, strong social and ecological effects and highly doubtful benefits for national *development*” (Gudynas, 2012, p. 147). The second step is (2) ‘sensible extractivism’. Hereby, a mixture of good governance and CSR ensures that social and environmental standards are met. To do so, the State must impose “effective and rigorous controls” on mining companies “where impact costs are included in costs and prices” as well as adequate taxation and adequate technology that minimizes environmental impacts (Gudynas, 2012, p. 148). However, step (2) can only be seen as an emergency measure to counter ‘plundering extractivism’ (Gudynas, 2012, p. 150) while step (3) - ‘indispensable extractivism’ - is the end goal. This would require a dramatic reduction of extraction and consequently of material and energy consumption (Gudynas, 2012, p. 149). To be concrete, Acosta (2013) adds that post-extractivism can only be achieved with degrowth in the global North, as well as other measures such as the diversification of extractivist economies, the promotion of sustainable economic sectors or the decommercialization of nature

5. Methodology

5.1 Justification of Research Angle

Adopting a decolonial and PD approach that is critical of discursive power asymmetries, this research focuses on counterhegemonic resistance narratives in Peru. Drawing on social movement theory provides a fruitful venture point for informing a critical research approach. Longley (2020) defines grassroots movements as “(self-)organized effort[s] undertaken by groups of individuals in a given geographic area

to bring about changes in social policy or influence an outcome, often of a political issue. [They] are considered bottom-up, rather than top-down efforts”. In reference to grassroots mobilizations by environmental defenders Scheidel et al. (2020, p. 5) state that they “are frequently self-organized local groups, such as local associations, social movements, neighbors and recreational users, driven to action over concerns about local socio environmental impacts”. In the context of LA grassroots resistance movements in mining areas can be understood as “a defense of livelihood” that emerge as a response to the “territorial colonization” and related dispossession and exploitation caused by mining activities (Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 2890). Engaging in counter-hegemonic struggles they openly dispute the modern understanding of *development* (Svampa, 2019b). As stated by Voskoboynik and Andreucci (2022, p. 791) they are “not just struggles over territories and their resources, but nodes within broader contests over knowledges, worldviews, identities and the configuration of development”. According to Alvarez et al. (1998) they act as central vehicles for the exercise of democratic citizenship by contesting dominant meanings and practices around categories such as *development*, *nature*, *race* and so forth.

Moreover, often marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples, women or rural/peasant populations spearhead resistance movements (Caparo, 2019; Scheidel et al., 2020). This applies to the case of mining in Peru where it is mostly Andean indigenous and peasant communities mobilizing in response to mining activities who are also those that have been historically neglected, repressed and discriminated against (Berrospi, 2022b; Quesada, n.d.; Vela-Leiden, 2022). The reevaluation of historically suppressed and marginalized epistemologies is a key tenant of decolonial and PD thought (Hollender, 2015). *Relational ontologies in particular can challenge dualisms that have been “exported to many world regions through colonialism, development, and globalization”* (Escobar 1995, 460).

While many grassroots mobilizations emerge locally many of them also work multi-locationally or even transnationally, and are embedded within a broader web of resistance networks (Alvarez et al., 1998; Bebbington et al., 2008). Hereby, the term “social movements webs” best captures the multilayered entanglements of movement actors (Alvarez et al., 1998). This motivates the focus on resistance networks of this research.

5.2 Research Design

On the basis of this theoretical lens this research investigates anti-mining grassroots social mobilizations and networks in Peru. The empirical findings were gathered via an in-depth qualitative content analysis of websites, publications, newspaper articles following Mayring (2010). Additionally, expert interviews were conducted. The research was guided by the following research questions (RQ):

RQ1: What do Peruvian social resistance movements and networks criticize about *development-as-extractivism*?

RQ2: What alternatives-to-extractivism do they propose?

After conducting a preliminary investigation of the web of actors present in the Peruvian mining scene to better understand the webs in which anti-mining actors are embedded, as outlined in the background section, the technique of a "structuring content analysis" (Mayring, 2010, p. 98) allowed for a successive focusing on selected materials. Specifically, the analysis was concentrated on the mining-critical network Red Muqui since it unites several local and national anti-mining social movements and NGOs. Written and visual content such as their website, publications and media content, including posters, videos and pictures were investigated. Additionally, related organizations associated with Red Muqui were investigated, such as the website and YouTube channel of CooperAcción. To systematize the gathered literal and visual content a coding system via an inductive category-building process was designed (Mayring, 2010). Codes were revised, regrouped, reorganized and quantified as well as central keywords identified.

In addition, two expert interviews were conducted. These served the purpose of gaining contextual and process-knowledge as outlined by Meuser and Nagel (2005). The first interview was conducted with Edwin Berrospi, a Red Muqui activist, intellectual and specialist for environmental and Andean ecosystems, who works together with local grassroots organizations and raises awareness about human rights and ecological aspects of copper mining in Peru in mining regions (Berrospi, 2022a). A second interview was conducted with Peruvian lawyer, political scientist and anti-mining activist Talia Vela-Leiden who is well connected and active within German-Peruvian anti-mining networks such as Kampagne Bergbau Peru or Infostelle Peru e.V., who in turn work together with Red Muqui. Following Meuser and Nagel (2005) both interviewees can be seen as actors whom are at once insiders within the Peruvian anti-mining-coalition (since they both work in mining-critical NGOs and networks in Peru and beyond) and outsiders (since they engage in supranational networking and academic work). Both interviews were recorded and transcribed, then coded and analyzed.

5.3 Limitations

While aiming at an in-depth analysis of *development* narratives the present research is subject to several limitations given its restricted time and scope. The mapping of actors in the contextual background section into a simplified binary distinction served as a preliminary step to inform the investigation of anti-mining narratives. Indeed, there seems to be a tendency towards polarization in the Peruvian Public (Berrospi, 2022b; Vela-Leiden, 2022). Nevertheless, the simple binary does not account for the heterogenous opinions on each side nor the historical and contextual complexity of actors present in the Peruvian Mining sphere. In the case of the anti-mining side it should be noted that not all struggles against mining are necessarily directed against mining per se but instead may be about improving labor or environmental conditions (Berrospi, 2022b). Similarly, the analysis may leave the impression that the entire affected Andean Population

is critical of mining. However, Berrospi describes that opinions within affected communities sometimes diverge as for example many young men are attracted by mining companies' claims to offer employment. Yet, Berrospi (2022b) explicitly condemns this as a deliberate strategy of mining companies to generate inner-communitarian conflict and weaken resistance movements from within.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge my positionality as a White, young and female researcher that has been socialized in a Eurocentric context. Despite aiming to take a decolonial lens and purposefully making visible marginalized voices, the fact that I as a White, European researcher am given the privilege of transmitting these voices through academia necessarily limits this decolonial agenda.

6. Results and Analysis

In this section the critique and demands voiced by the investigated Peruvian anti-mining-actors as well as their alternative visions to extractivist *development* is synthesized. Key themes were identified, grouped and visualized on the basis of a code-counting-system visualized in Figure 2 and the Tables in the appendix.

6.1 The critique of Peruvian anti-mining-actors

According to Vela-Leiden, resistance actors realized early on that extractivism was not going to bring them benefits (Vela-Leiden, 2022). Instead, they lament several socio-ecological issues. The most often mentioned critique revolves around environmental degradation and contamination. Anti-mining movements criticize that open-pit mining causes heavy pollution of local soils and rivers due to the release of chemical toxins (Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019). What is more, the water-intensive extraction- and concentration of copper ore threatens the supply of the scarce resource to both rural and urban populations (Red Muqui Noticias, 2022). Instead of being privatized, water is seen as a public good that should be collectively and sustainably regulated for the common good (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). Consequently, they demand the protection of environments from extractive activities, for instance through compliance with environmental standards, sustainable and efficient environmental risk management and cross-scale ecological spatial planning that includes local knowledge (Kampagne Bergbau Peru, 2022; Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019).

A related critique is that mining activities cause heavy health burdens for humans and animals living close-by. According to Kampagne Bergbau Peru (2022) heavy metals in the environment have caused serious health problems in numerous mining areas. The case of copper mining by the Swiss company Glencore in Espinar in South Peru is exemplary. Here, the mostly indigenous population has denounced the spread of intoxications, chronic diseases and cancer due to heavy metals and chemicals toxins affecting livestock and people for years (Corresponsal de IPS, 2021; Niederberger, 2022). A study by Amnesty International revealed that 78% of the population in Espinar had "levels of metals and toxic substances [...] significantly above reference values" (Amnesty International, 2021,




Fig. 2. Visualization of Coding (own elaboration)

p. 5). Similarly, communities in Cotobambas, supported by the organization CooperAcción Perú, criticized the occurrence of respiratory problems in the population and the contamination of water and soils because of a close-by road connected to a copper mine where around 300 large trucks pass per day (CooperAcción, 2016b). The absence of adequate and transparent environmental controls and examination of health risks as a preventive measure as well as the lacking medical attention in mining areas are central points of critique.

Another central theme is access to territory. According to Berrospi (2022a) the expansion of the mining frontier has caused land-grabbing, displacement and expropriation especially of communities in the Peruvian Highlands. Territory is seen as the axis of dispute and basis for A2D (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 26). Red Muqui states: We dream of a Peru where peoples and communities fully enjoy access to their territories and natural resources (Red Muqui, 2022e). It is criticized that the expansion of the extractive frontier has been unprecedented in recent Peruvian history, implying pressure on ecosystems, common goods and natural resources (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022)

Given these numerous social and environmental problems, anti-mining actors engage in various protest forms. However, as a response, resistance actors face criminalization, repression, violence and even assassination (Berrospi, 2022b; Kampagne Bergbau Peru, 2022). According to Red Muqui the influence of mining interests on Peruvian politics through corruption of politicians is a latent issue (Berrospi, 2022a, 2022b; Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). In fact, criminalization is understood as a “State Strategy” to silence anti-mining voices (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). In a recent campaign titled ‘Defensoras y Defensores del Perú’ Red Muqui makes human rights abuses visible and thus aims to create pressure on the Peruvian

making and the lack of prior free and informed consultation and consent (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). CooperAcción (2016a) points to emblematic cases of discrimination against indigenous peoples where round tables to achieve informed consent were carried out without a translator although 90% of the population only spoke Quechua. Similarly, in their campaign “Cuando #TodoEstáAmarrado nada sirve” Red Muqui criticizes that dialogue mechanisms are insufficient, not institutionalized and if carried out they do not guarantee compliance. Consequently, they demand the establishment and institutionalization of functioning dialogue and conflict-solution-mechanisms (Berrospi, 2022a; Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019).

6.3 Lived and envisioned practices of alternatives-to-development

Anti-mining social movements propose and practice concrete alternatives-to-extractivism. These are prevalent both in local, indigenous and peasant struggles, as well as organizational processes in urban neighborhoods or the formation of cooperation networks in cities (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 26). In their work, Red Muqui mainly focuses on making visible territorially and locally based struggles of indigenous and peasant communities resisting the dispossession of their material conditions by mining activities (Red Muqui, 2022e). Practicing what they call “regional and community development” or “sustainable development experiences” they put into practice autonomy and self-management, emancipation and democratic forms of decision-making (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 25).

According to Red Muqui Propuestas (2022) and Berrospi and Tempelmann (2021) BV is a central



Image 2. Poster of Campaign “Cuando #TodoEstáAmarrado nada sirve” (Red Muqui campañas, 2022a)

State to improve the protection of whom they call “environmental or territorial defenders” (Red Muqui campañas, 2022).

What is more, numerous collective, community and indigenous rights violations are lamented. These include the lack of effective participation in decision-

principal guiding anti-mining resistance movements. They criticize the *Western* nature-society dichotomy and embrace the idea of living in harmony with nature instead of exploiting it (Berrospi, 2022b). In other words, they understand the protection of nature as paramount to economic interests (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 27). Moreover, by preserving cultural and social ties

through values such as reciprocity and solidarity they aspire convivial, cooperative and collective forms of coexistence (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). Marking patriarchal or xenophobic behaviors as destructive, they call for the strengthening of social organizations of the marginalized, for example, of women's associations (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 24).

The most prominent and concretely practiced alternative promoted by Andean resistance movements is that of collective and family agriculture. According to Red Muqui, the importance of it for the Peruvian economy generally and local food sovereignty specifically is greatly underestimated (Red Muqui campañas, 2019). Historically and until today family farming is one of the most important economic sectors in Peru yet it is increasingly under attack by the mining industry due to territorial dispossession and displacement (Berrospi, 2022b). However, with roughly 70% of the food consumed in Peru produced by small and family farming the sector contributes significantly to the country's food security. What is more, agricultural practices are the main source of employment and income for Peru's often very poor rural population (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). In fact, family agriculture provides a source of income for "more than 3 million workers, representing 83% of the economically active population in the agricultural sector" (Red Muqui campañas, 2019). Consequently, Red Muqui demands a greater valuation and recognition of the importance of family agriculture for the Peruvian economy and greater support of it by the State. For instance, in their campaign 'El Agro para la Olla' they argue that many rural families are falling into poverty due to the health and consequent economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, worsening the already precarious situation of small-scale farmers, especially in mining areas. To better protect such vulnerable populations by the State, the campaign promotes the implementation of a Family Farming Law (Red Muqui campañas, 2019).

Additionally, in line with BV principles, it is argued that family and collective agriculture, as it is often practiced by indigenous and peasant communities in the Andes, preserves and re-values ancestral Andean culture and knowledge that has historically been marginalized and repressed. Next to family/collective farming this translates into ancestral techniques such as agroecology, organic agriculture, water and nature conservation or afforestation, all of which enable a food supply while preserving ecological biodiversity (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021, p. 27).

Instead of the single focus and dependency on mining a diversification of the economy is proposed. As opposed to the long-standing national identity of Peru as a 'mining country' Red Muqui sees Peru as a megadiverse, pluricultural and multilingual country that has abundant climatic and natural conditions for

a diversified economy and great potential to generate alternatives-to-extractivism (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). Red Muqui states that for example Peru's worldwide famous cuisine owes most parts of its richness to this diversity (Red Muqui campañas, 2019). Next to collective agriculture, the sectors of tourism, surveillance, handicrafts, local commerce and so forth should be supported (Berrospi, 2022b).

"For us the question is whether we want to live dependent on mining all our lives or if we rather want to protect the resources we have, the biodiversity, the water and the seeds that will sustain future generations. We have understood that the activity of family farming, the provision of food is irreplaceable by any other activity, because that is what generates the source of life, the life that is elementary for the survival of humanity and ecosystems" - Berrospi (2022b)

7. Discussion and Conclusion

In the following, the empirical findings are analyzed and situated within the PD and BV discourse, asking specifically how the investigated resistance

movements contribute to the discussion on post-extractivist transitions. Then, the findings are discussed in the context of the global RE energy transition.



Image 2. Poster of Campaign "El Agro para la olla" (Red Muqui campañas, 2019)

7.1 The importance of cross-national networks in forging effective alliances

Peruvian anti-mining social movement webs are made up of numerous self-organized, localized resistance movements at the grassroots, mostly led by indigenous and peasant communities, that are united in networks under the banner of contesting mining as a *development* model in Peru. The investigation of

Red Muqui points to the importance of cross-national networks in supporting and connecting localized and marginalized resistance movements. Their experience and expertise allows for an effective assistance and strengthening of communities in the defense of their human and territorial rights through diverse proposals, actions and knowledge-sharing (Berrospi, 2022b; Red Muqui, 2022e).

This corresponds to the theorization of social movements since, according to Tetreault (2015, p. 58), crosscutting networks “provide a space for participants to exchange information, share experiences, strengthen alliances, coordinate strategies, and articulate collective demands”. At the same time, networks like Red Muqui inhibit an important place in the discourse on alternatives-to-extractivism within the Peruvian public as well as internationally (Red Muqui, 2022b; Vela-Leiden, 2022). While working with local social movements and NGOs they also engage with the broader civil society and academia and cooperate with like-minded networks internationally (Red Muqui, 2022c; Vela-Leiden, 2022). Given the globalized nature of the economy, especially Vela-Leiden highlights the importance of international cooperation to promote policy changes on an international level (Vela-Leiden, 2022). Similarly, Svampa (2019b) states that cooperation between local grassroots mobilizations and social networks gives rise to new and more effective forms of combat against extractivism. In sum, this paper argues that cross-national networks seem to be of crucial importance for making visible and supporting marginalized resistance voices, creating stronger alliances and thus enabling more effective forms of combat against (*green*) extractivism both on a national and international level.

7.2 Anti-Mining Social Movements in Peru at the Forefront of the Struggle towards Post-Extractivist Alternatives-to-Development

Based on their critical understanding of the current extractivist economic system as a single *development* trajectory for Peru and their proposal of concrete alternatives the social resistance movements investigated can be situated within the PD approach as well as the broader discourse on A2D. This aligns with the theorization of social movements according to which grassroots movements in LA have long been ‘beyond *development*’, redirecting their efforts towards a reaffirmation and struggle for autonomy and cultural difference instead of imposed *development* (Escobar, 1992, 1995; Esteva & Escobar, 2017). In PD, counterhegemonic resistance movements are seen as a central source of inspiration for the pursuit of A2D. In line with visions of a ‘pluriverse’ Peruvian anti-mining actors reject one-size-fits-all solutions and instead narrate their “sustainable development experiences” as processes of experimentation and collective learning of communities (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021).

Specifically, the investigated social movements position themselves within the political platform of *buen vivir*. Based on the radical rejection of *Western-style development* due to its “obsession with economic growth, consumerism and commodification of nature” (Chuji et al., 2019, p. 112) promoters of BV argue that *development-as-growth* has “cause[d] the greatest

inequality and leads to the planet’s destruction through environmental exploitation and degradation” (Acosta & Martínez Abarca, 2018, p. 138). This is mirrored in the empirical findings given the centrality of environmental protection and preservation that is proclaimed to be paramount to economic growth (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021). Explicitly referring to a BV worldview, Red Muqui disputes the ongoing commodification, exploitation and domination of nature and instead propose a (re-)valuation of nature (Berrospi, 2022b). Next to environmental degradation, territorial dispossession for mining is condemned to destruct social and economic ties within the affected communities. Based on the BV values of collectivity, solidarity and conviviality the capitalist notions of individualism, materialism and competition are rejected and instead collective forms of coexistence promoted that improve the quality of life for all (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). All in all, this motivates concrete alternatives such as more democratic, decentralized economic and cultural practices, for instance the collective management of common resources such as land and water as well as agro-ecology, organic and collective or family farming (Red Muqui, 2022e; Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). Especially collective farming is seen as a central alternative-to-extractivism which better serves the benefit of the people than extractivist *development* by ensuring food security while contributing to environmental preservation via sustainable land use (Berrospi & Tempelmann, 2021). Overall, BV as a guiding principle of anti-mining movements can be understood to provide both the space for the practice of concrete alternatives as well as utopian visions of post-extractivist, post-capitalist and post-modern societies.

On the basis of their BV-inspired alternatives this paper argues that anti-mining movements offer a relevant contribution to the discourse on post-extractivist transitions. Locating Peruvian anti-mining-actors on a spectrum from ‘sensible extractivism’ to ‘indispensable extractivism’ as outlined by Gudynas (2012) they firstly offer concrete ideas for steps that enable a more environmentally and socially compatible ‘sensible extractivism’ (Gudynas, 2012, p. 148) for instance by demanding the transparent implementation of social and environmental standards at extraction sites (Kampagne Bergbau Peru, 2022; Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019) or economic diversification (Red Muqui Propuestas, 2022). Secondly, by virtually practicing alternatives and self-sufficiency they show that mining is not the only option for Andean areas to be ‘useful’ to the Peruvian economy and thus demonstrate the possibility for a different economic system that functions with only ‘indispensable extractivism’ (Gudynas, 2012, p. 149). What is more, they also contribute to the discourse on post-extractivism on an international level through the engagement with international actors that jointly work towards post-extractivist transitions (Berrospi, 2022a; Niederberger, 2022; Ritter-Choquehuanca, 2019). In sum, it is argued that social resistance movements and networks in Peru bear transformative potential with regard to post-extractivist utopias.

7.3 Copper as a Green Resource for the Energy Transition or a form of Eco-Colonial Exploitation of the global South?

In the context of energy transition plans that pin RE as the main vehicle to achieve climate-neutral economies, the extraction of natural resources like copper has gained a new 'legitimacy' or is even perceived as a 'necessity' for the purpose of tackling the climate crisis (Riofrancos, 2017). However, this study shows that the framing of copper as a "green mineral" (Cardozo, 2021) pushes under the rug the negative socio-ecological consequences suffered by communities at the extractive frontier of the RE supply chain. In other words, *green* extractivism presents a perpetuation of the social and ecological destruction going hand in hand with classical extractivism and its violent appropriation of both human and natural resources in the name of the *green* energy transition. The approach taken in this study to listening to resistance actors reveals this 'dirty' side of the energy transition.

Guided by a decolonial PD lens this paper contends that the critique of resistance actors reveals a coloniality of *green* extractivism as a *development* model in several regards: Firstly, it seems likely that the intensification of copper extractivism will lead to a reinforcement of displacement procedures of historically marginalized peoples, thus reinforcing a colonial legacy of violent territorial displacement. Resistance actors in Peru lament that territorial dispossession due to mining leads to environmental contamination and degradation, health risks, destruction of local cultures, community ties and economic structures. This can be applied to Kramarz et al.'s (2021) conceptualization of displacement. Firstly, affected peoples suffer from 'displacement by degradation' due to the contamination of water, soils and air, loss of biodiversity and destruction of ecosystems. Moreover, they face 'displacement by dispossession' due to land grabbing that encompasses both the "immediate process of being physically removed or displaced from one's land, home and community and the less-immediate, less-tangible processes of losing one's livelihood, health, culture, and identity" (7). In other words, copper extractivism in Peru maintains patterns of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2017, p. 78) on the basis of (*green*) land grabbing and (*green*) violence, as outlined by Dunlap (2018, 632). Both forms of displacement can be situated within the PD discourse as Escobar (2004, p. 16) argues that *development* via extractivism creates massive displacement and impoverishment. What is more, resistance actors face repression, criminalization and violence (Berrospi, 2022b; Kampagne Bergbau Peru, 2022), thus confirming the violent nature of extractivism (Escobar, 2004).

Secondly, the repression and criminalization of resistance actors trying to implement autonomous visions of A2D continues the cultural and epistemological coloniality of *development* (Quijano, 2007) whereby the *Western/modern* scientific and technocratic transition pathway is postulated as the universal solution to decarbonization while non-*Western* knowledge forms, in this case of indigenous and peasant communities in the Andes, are systematically undermined and devalued.

Thirdly, the increased exportation of raw materials for the purpose the RE transition continues the colonial legacy of unequal ecological exchange inherent to the globalized capitalist economic system. Following Dunlap (2021, p. 87) *green* extractivism involves the

displacement of socio-ecological "sacrifice zones" to countries of the global South. Applying this to the present investigation of the Peruvian case, copper mines can be understood as such 'sacrifice zones' since it is mostly the previously colonized and historically neglected indigenous populations affected by mining concession, suffering repression, criminalization, epistemic and physical violence and displacement (Berrospi, 2022a, 2022b; Red Muqui, 2022a). This is reflected in Kramarz et al.'s (2021) concept of 'displacement through dependent *development*' that describes the process of unequal ecological exchange by which socio-ecological costs of extractivism are externalized and thus not mirrored in raw material prices (Lambert, 2012; Rice, 2007), allowing rich countries to (mis)use poorer countries "as resource taps in order to subsidize their own rates of material consumption" (Rice, 2007, p. 59). This reinforces patterns of colonial exploitation, accumulation and appropriation of nature for the material consumption of the *global North* while reinforcing the dependent position of the *global South* as supplier of cheap raw materials to the global economy (Lambert, 2012). All in all, this leads to a "decarbonization divide", as termed by Sovacool et al. (2020), whereby end-consumers (mostly in the *global North*) benefit from the RE transition while others (mostly marginalized peoples in the *global South*) are harmed by it.

To conclude, copper can thus certainly not be considered a *green* resource for the energy transition given the environmental and social destruction it produces. Instead, the supposedly *green* energy transition relies on what I tentatively term 'eco-colonial' exploitation of mining countries in the *global South*, such as Peru, that reinforces colonially-grown economic inequalities on a global level and socio-ecological destruction on the local level of the extractive frontier, while impeding efforts for post-extractivist transitions.

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Notes

¹ The contemporary buzzword green is highlighted in italics to underscore its highly contested and socially constructed meaning in reference to the supposedly green energy transition. By highlighting it, this paper pinpoints the danger of it green-washing exploitative structures of the extractive economic system in the context of the energy transition

² Henceforth, this paper highlights terms such as global North/global South, development, the West, progress or modernity in italics to acknowledge their contested and socially constructed character. From the theoretical lens of post-development, these terms entail practices and ideologies that maintain global inequalities and hegemo-

nic power relations through the global capitalist economic system.

³ The modern extractive industry does not only include traditional mining activities (oil, metals and minerals), but also intensive agriculture, infrastructural expansion and deforestation, as outlined by Svampa (2012b, 2019b). This paper focuses on mining as one form of extractivism.

⁴ Exemplary is the statement of IIMP's vice president Dr. Miguel Cardozo who believes that mining for the "green metal copper" is a major opportunity that "will mean greater dynamism for [Peru's] economy, greater income for the Peruvian State, more employment, more health and education, more infrastructure and an opportunity to undertake territorial development in an effective manner" Cardozo (2021).

⁵ The following institutions and organizations are part of the Red Muqui (2022b):

- Asociación Arariwa - Cusco
- Asociación Marianista de Acción Social (AMAS) Otuzco - La Libertad
- Asociación para la Investigación y Desarrollo Sostenible SUMA MARKA - Puno
- Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH)
- Asociación Proyecto Amigo de Huamachuco - La Libertad
- Centro Andino de Educación y Promoción (CADEP) José María Arguedas - Cusco
- Centro de Cultura Popular Labor (Pasco)
- Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario (CEDAP) - Ayacucho
- Centro Pastoral de Diócesis de Chulucanas - Piura
- Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES)
- Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social (CEAS)
- CooperAcción - Acción Solidaria para el Desarrollo
- Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CND-DHH)
- Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras (DHSF) - Cusco
- Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente (DHUMA) - Puno
- Fe y Derechos Humanos (FEDERH) - Puno
- Fundación Ecuménica para el Desarrollo y La Paz (FEDEPAZ)
- Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible (GRUFIDES) - Cajamarca
- Grupo para la Promoción del Desarrollo de los Andes (GRUPO ANDES) - Pasco
- Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana (GPC)
- Huñuq Mayo Asociación para el Desarrollo Andino Amazónico - Apurímac
- Instituto Ambientalista Natural, Chimbote - Áncash
- Instituto de Estudios de las Culturas Andinas (IDECA) - Puno
- Pastoral Social de la Dignidad Humana Arzobispado de Huancayo (PASSDIH) - Huancayo
- Pastoral Social del Vicariato Apostólico San Francisco Javier de Jaén - Cajamarca
- Programa Democracia y Transformación Global (PDTG)
- Red Uniendo Manos Perú - Junín
- Red Regional Agua, Desarrollo y Democracia (REDAD) - Piura
- Instituto de Investigación y Acción Solidaria - ISAIAS - Puno
- Centro para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Ayllu - CEDEP Ayllu - Cusco.

Appendix: Tables

	CODES	AMOUNT
rights violations	rights of indigenous peoples	9
	respect of collective community rights	10
	human rights	8
	rights of nature	2
	recognition	5
	respect	8
	lack/destruction of trust	2
	lack of consent	4
	lack of free, prior consultation	5
	lack of dialogue	5
	lack of participation	6
	lack of information	3
	criminalization of protesters	13
	repression	9
	violence	8
	lack of compliance with agreements	6
	lack of transparency	5
	exploitation	5
	weakness of State	6
	pressure on media	2
need for institutional reform	2	
corruption	10	
privatization	3	
social issues	lack of (local) benefits	6
	culture	4
	access to territory	13
	land grabbing	4
	conflict	9
	health risks	9
	discrimination against indigenous peoples	4
environmental issues	environmental ills (contamination, pollution)	18
	soil pollution	7
	water pollution	10
	deterioration of ecosystem	5
	biodiversity	5
	toxic chemicals	4
	climate change	3

Note: codes are organized by content, not number of occurrences, both horizontally and vertically.

Table 1. CODING - Critique of extractivism

CODES	AMOUNT
sustainable development	6
alternatives to development	13
regional/local/community development	2
Buen vivir	10
diversity	3
diversification of economy	5
sustainability	2
defense of communitarian rights	5
defense of rights of nature	5
family agriculture	14
cooperativism, collectivity, community, conviviality	10
strengthening social organizations	2
strengthening of women	6
participatory planning	4
democratic decision-making	3
autonomy	4
indigenous/ancestral & peasant knowledge	4
collective action	4
communal/participatory territory management	4
food security	5
defense of territory, water, ecosystems	10
organic agriculture /agroecology	5
sustainable & collective water regulation	10
reforestation	2
sustainable tourism	4

Table 2. CODING - Alternatives to extractivism

As an interdisciplinary scientific institution, the Heidelberg Center for Ibero-American Studies (HCIAS) is committed to the dissemination and transfer of knowledge on the social, cultural, ecological, and communicative complexity of Ibero- America. HCIAS Working Papers publish peer-reviewed works from differing perspectives and research fields such as Geography, Communication Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, Linguistics, Theology, and Cultural Studies. The published contributions present the findings of ongoing research which aim to provide a better understanding of Ibero-American societies within a global and polycentric framework, and point to new theoretical and methodological perspectives.



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