Editorial

Special Issue of InterCultural Philosophy – Phenomenological Anthropology, Psychiatry, and Psychotherapy in Theory and Practice

Daniel Vespermann, Christian Tewes, Thomas Fuchs

When introducing a special issue, the topic of which is the relation between phenomenology and practice, some questions arise which may not easily be answered: Why “phenomenology” at all? What kind of “practice”? What possible relations are, in fact, conceivable between phenomenology and practice? Are we not confronted with a fundamental incompatibility when trying to discover a significant connection between a philosophical method and a “practice”, however we may define it? Or at least when these kinds of practices are essentially confined to a form of pre-reflective sense-making? What could be made of what is, at first sight, a blatant contradiction in terms?

In the following, and contrary to prima facie doubts, we hope to elucidate convincingly the adequacy of an entanglement between a certain sense of phenomenological research and forms of practice, be it scientific or clinical. By being tied back to its philosophical origins, this connection is to be sketched out on the one hand as a particular and qualified instance of the “regional ontology”, to use Husserl’s terms, of a phenomenological psychology. On the other hand, this connection also appears as a contemporary understanding of Husserl’s method-

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1 The notion of “phenomenological psychology” is, first of all, an umbrella term, assembling the various phenomenological approaches to psychological topics in general, but it can also function as an approach in its own terms, a “regional ontology” in Husserl’s words, which focusses on the subjective character of mental phenomena but does not dwell on the transcendental foundation of notions like the “world”, “time” etc., see Husserl 2003.
ological last turn: the desideratum of a “science of the lifeworld” (Husserl 2003). Both an “embodied” phenomenological psychology circumscribing the “eidetic laws” of mental life and the constitutive, pre-reflective dimension of the “contingencies” of the lifeworld can be revealed as intrinsically intertwined in certain contemporary domains of research.

The endeavor to delineate a fruitful relation between phenomenology and diverse forms of practice does not immediately appear promising, at least when considering the recent history of philosophy.\(^2\) Admittedly, there were always phenomenological philosophers throughout the glory days of certain philosophical approaches: Analytic philosophy and all its transformations, critical theory (of a \emph{stricto sensu} Frankfurtian kind), or (post-)structuralism, to give but a few examples. Nevertheless, it should not be too far-fetched to diagnose an increasing tendency of a (certainly rather involuntary) self-historicization\(^3\) as well as institutional marginalization\(^4\) and thus a discursive withdrawal\(^5\) of phenomenological research, beginning in the post-war period and encompassing the more hermeneu-

\(^2\) Indeed, there are not only the rather contingent reasons of a discipline’s historical imponderabilia, but also systematic reservations according to the conceptualization of the \emph{explanandum} “practice” in the so-called “practice theory” which is predominantly influenced by Bourdieu 2012. The conceptual-genealogical and systematic affinity between phenomenology and practice theory is investigated in a recent issue of the journal \emph{Phänomenologische Forschungen} (Bedorf & Gerlek 2017).

\(^3\) What certainly can and should be understood as a bold claim but which seems not to be entirely eccentric (see for example the historical and methodological considerations by Waldenfels 2011) and, of course, which does not implicate a complete conceptual or foundationalist stalemate.

\(^4\) Specific statistical data hardly exist, but the intuitive ratio of professorships which nowadays dedicate themselves to methods subsumable under the family resemblance term “analytic philosophy” to professorships which are identifiable as “phenomenological” should be telling, at least regarding Anglo-American and Continental European universities.

\(^5\) Which might, of course, be a matter of interpretation and also a consequence of a changing academic public sphere likewise resulting from an increasing professionalization of academic philosophy, but the mutual interference of phenomenological research and other disciplines or the involvement with non-foundationa issues is comparatively hard to detect in many phenomenological authors, mainly working in the second half of the 20th century, exceptions, of course, notwithstanding (for example Waldenfels 2000; Merleau-Ponty, in fact, died in 1961, but hardly can be included here).
tical or existentialist approaches.\(^6\) Even if this impression turns out to commit an anachronistic fallacy, there seems to have been an inclination to concentrate increasingly on purely theoretical and conceptual issues, an inclination which began approximately in the 1960s. Since, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s extensive reception of the psychological findings of his day or Karl Jaspers’s earlier and much more direct engagement with clinical (but also political) practice, the phenomenological claim of “going back to the things/phenomena themselves” thus became more prone to interpretation than should have been necessary intuitively.

That is, to be clear, not to dispute the legitimacy of the philosophical aspirations (and accomplishments, if this can count as a parameter of philosophy in general) of phenomenological research in examining purely conceptual and foundational problems. Furthermore this “diagnosis” does not entail any premature conception of what philosophy in general has to accomplish, even less the cheap critique that philosophy is of no use unless its practitioners are able to demonstrate the immediate surplus value of their research.

Decisive in this context is, however, that there has been a nearly complete neglect\(^7\) of approaching the thoroughly holistic project of a “science of the life-

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\(^6\) Phenomenology seems especially prone to invite reductio-like methodological compartmentalizations in the course of which the actual existence, if not the possibility, of a substantive meaning of the term “phenomenology” comes into question (see, for example, Sparrow 2014). A fact which, assumingly, could easily be traced back to the initial Husserlian willingness to permanently question and transform the methodological and conceptual foundations of the phenomenological program. However, the possibility of a sufficient robust family resemblance between the general outlook of Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre etc., is to be affirmed in this context and, moreover, refers to a sociological and institutional fact testified by the existence of several pertinent companions and handbooks (for example Luft & Overgaard 2012; Zahavi 2012) which, presumably, is the best real definition one can get for a philosophical school.

\(^7\) The overall withdrawal of phenomenological approaches from the philosophical landscape in general and the interface of phenomenological theory and other scientific disciplines might, to a certain extent, be attributed to a radicalizing critique of the supposedly “essentialist” elements of (Husserlian) phenomenology. This historical perspective certainly complicates the possible role of the lifeworld as a mediational concept between the reflective endeavor of phenomenology and pre-reflective practices. Nevertheless, this complication does not preclude that the inherent historicity and contingency of the lifeworldly structures can be suitably integrated in a science of the lifeworld, all the more when there is a genuine complementarity to the regional eidetics of phenomenological psychology.

\(^8\) There are, to certain extent, exceptions, which deal with the lifeworld in a comprehensive sense, particular Schütz & Luckmann 1979–1984. You can find also comparable projects which aim to elucidate the foundational structures pertaining to the lifeworld (for example Blumenberg 2010; Brand 1971; Sommer 1989), but these are, and that is the claim here, not “holistic” in the sense emphasized in this editorial.
world.” This project means engaging, to a sufficient extent, with the pre-
conditions, workings and also the results of the empirical sciences. Thus, it tries to evaluate and mediate the respective explanatory and constitut-
tional weight of regional eidetics and the historic and cultural malleability of pre-reflective practices (and, consequently, also their psychological as well as physiological conditions as they are the subject of various disciplines). Certainly, this methodological dependency of a “holistic science of the lifeworld” on the empirical sciences could easily be misunderstood and, of course, has to be qualified: This relationship does not inevitably result in a reversal and, therefore, denial of the genuine phenomenological explanatory order, but rather consists in grasping adequately those scientific results which are able to bring forth a deepened phenomenological understanding of the subject as intertwined with the lifeworld. This would include similarly reflecting on the respective theoretical premises or experimental procedures leading to these results. Such a critical align-
ment to the empirical sciences, then, undoubtedly has to be understood as a challenge for an overly apodictic interpretation of the transcendental status of phenomenology. However, this does not necessarily lead us to give up the aspiration to develop a regional eidetics of a phenomenological psychology which can provide descriptions of necessary experiential structures delineating empirical research. To be sure, this possibility to refine and also to revise phenomenological constitutional relations does not entail any commitment to the existence or non-existence of apodictic

9 The foundational status of this methodological research project and its mediating function between a transcendental eidetics and the facticity of embodied individuals is clearly articulated in Luft 2005. Held’s (2010, 2012) double-sided project of a disambiguation of the “political world” and the “natural lifeworld” also accounts for the specific foundational potenti-
al of a comprehensive approach to the lifeworld. The actual importance of factual or empirical elements for such a research program is doubted by Sowa 2010.  

10 Which does not at all mean sacrificing a, rightly understood, transcendental ambition or making phenomenology the “handmaiden of the sciences” but to come to terms with the “na-
tural”, situated and thus empirical conditions of consciousness, respectively the concrete and at the same time constitutive conditions of the “phenomena themselves”. How this actually plays out and if this is actually possible, figures more or less explicitly in the question of how to naturalize phenomenology, whose answerability itself testifies to the intricate relationship of the transcendental and empirical perspectives, see, i.a., Carel & Mecheam 2013; Petitot et al. 1999; Reynolds 2017. Approaches which aim to merge these perspectives are exemplified in Varela and Shear 1999; Depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003.
eidetic relations, in a strict ontological sense.

All the more, given the specific discursive development, viz. isolation, of phenomenology outlined above, it could come as something of a surprise that there has been a recent reemergence of phenomenologists claiming the legitimate contemporaneity of their approaches, having no worse stakes in debates about topics in metaphysics, ontology (for example Keiling 2015; Schnell 2015; Tengelyi 2014), or the philosophy of mind (see Dahlstrom, Elpidorou & Hopp 2015; Kriegel & Williford 2006; Smith & Thomasson 2005) than their reductionist naturalistic or self-proclaimed “realistic” opponents (see, i.a., Brassier 2007; Ferraris 2014, 2015; Meillassoux 2006, on metaphysics; Metzinger 2003; Churchland 1986; Dennett 1991, on the self and “folk psychology”).

The pertinent observation, however, may be that the relevance of phenomenological approaches and their motives also reappears in the context of impasses in empirical research proper: the cognitive sciences, robotics, psychopathology, social sciences, or (evolutionary as well as cultural) anthropology, in the broadest sense of the term. In these disciplines’ cutting-edge domains of research, the conceptual resources of phenomenology are drawn on heavily, even if often implicitly. In all these areas one can see a blockage by what may be called a “blindness for the transcendental”, a neglect of the clarification and foundation of theoretical and conceptual premises.

A methodological explication could, in turn, elicit reflection on the operative

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11 See, i.a., Gallagher 2005; Hutchins 1995; Noë 2004; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991; for an overview see Fingerhut, Hufendiek & Wild 2013; Schmicking & Gallagher 2009.
15 See, i.a., Deacon 2011; Zlatev 2016; resp. Csordas 1990; Desjarlais 1992; Durt, Fuchs & Tewes 2017; Ingold 2000; Laughlin & Throop 2009; Lock 2015; Ram 2015.
16 Therefore, it is not the case that in all these scientific domains all of a sudden phenomenological scrutiny was discovered as an indispensable requirement for taking research further. Rather, a certain “disappearance of the explananda” yielded in each case a return to experiential phenomena which, of course, resembled the phenomenological (re-)focusing on the immediate workings of consciousness.
17 See Husserl’s (2012, p. 286) corresponding diagnosis.
definitions and ontological presuppositions of what could count as a “naturalistic method”.\textsuperscript{18} Also discernible is a desideratum of doing justice to an analytic and explanatory dimension, which is not restricted to an abstract notion of “consciousness” or “qualia” (which is, regarding robotics or AI-research, of course a different story), but which conceives the first-person perspective as necessarily related to an activity of embodied\textsuperscript{19} and often participatory sense-making (Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009).

However, the absorption of phenomenological issues is at best an indication of a science of the lifeworld. In fact, the aforementioned double hindrance of an institutional withdrawal combined with discursive isolation and a strengthened focus on intratheoretical debates about the pre-reflective dimensions of consciousness threatens to render dubious the “worldliness”\textsuperscript{20} of at least some phenomenological traditions.\textsuperscript{21} Fur-

\textsuperscript{18} This certainly has to be relativized in regard to each of the mentioned scientific disciplines. Those disciplines like the cognitive sciences or psychopathology which have been, and in many ways still are, dominated by representationalist, namely, neurobiological, paradigms display different and often more explicit methodological conflicts than the social sciences which are \textit{ab initio} not quite as endangered by the reductive seduction to cross “consciousness” or even an emphatic conception of “practice”, “culture” etc. out of their theories.

\textsuperscript{19} The close relationship between the so-called “4e-Cognition”-approaches (embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended) and phenomenology (but, in fact, even between these different approaches themselves) is not as frictionless as might be expected when considering the importance of the “lived body” for phenomenology. The issues of “(anti-)representationalism”, “(strong) embodiment”, or “(extended) functionalism” are some examples proving the interdisciplinary descent of this (heterogeneous) paradigm: for example, a radical enactivist critique of mental content represents Hutto & Myin 2012; the challenge to determine the coupling between an “extended” and an “embodied mind” already looms large in Clark & Chalmers 1998.

\textsuperscript{20} There are, of course, some affinities between the Husserlian “lifeworld” and the notion of “worldliness” in the sense of its original conceptualization as an “existentiale” of Dasein by Heidegger (2006, §§ 14-18). Nevertheless it is hard to defy the impression that a philosophical lineage which draws heavily on the Heideggerian concept of the “event” at the same time avails itself quite selectively of the further implicated conceptual structures (for an overview of the reception see Rölli 2004). To the extent that sense-making is conceptually conditioned by this kind of “thinking of the event” the correlation to “worldliness” becomes rather vague. The productive instantiation of “worldliness” as an analytic tool for understanding forms of practice, in this case medical practice, is to be found in Svenaeus 2000. Loidolt (2018), however, points to the ethical underdetermination and a neglect of the vulnerability of “worldliness” compared to the homonymous notion in Hannah Arendt’s work.

\textsuperscript{21} There is also a divergent semantic undercurrent of “sense”(-making) in phenomenological philosophy which emphasizes “sense” as a basic unit of consciousness and which is intrinsically related to a much more foundational project and, furthermore, rather orthogonal to approaches conceiving of “sense-making” as an activity of the lived body. This debate is mainly but not exclusively (for example, Gondek, Klass & Tengelyi 2011) confined to a certain strand
thermore, it is clearly suggestive of an unbridgeable gap between phenomenology and the practical sphere of the lifeworld. Yet, the everlasting and unavoidable demand for methodological reflection in the empirical sciences should not be underestimated and might reveal the possibility of a more systematic coupling of phenomenology and empirical research. Despite a recent, and at least implicit, meta-theoretical caution in several disciplines, they might benefit from a suitably implemented and systematized process like phenomenological reduction.

Nevertheless, this requirement certainly has to be distinguished from a direct linkage respectively transformation of phenomenological research (in)to a holistic science of the lifeworld. Hence, these methodological shortcomings cannot be conceptualized as a potential shortcut to the viability of, or even to actual attempts of this scientific project either. However, it seems plausible to discern at least a transitive relation as follows: The successful implementation of phenomenological reflection on methodological and theoretical presuppositions in certain fields of empirical research amounts, cum grano salis, to the implicit operationalization of phenomenological concepts. Those disciplines, in turn,

of the French phenomenological tradition (i.a. Marion 2004; Richir 2000; for an overview see Gondek & Tengelyi 2011). This kind of elaboration on the pre-reflective dimension of sense-making hardly seems to be fruitful for interdisciplinary research, at least not without a considerable amount of conceptual clarification; an argument to the contrary is to be seen in Gozé et al. 2017.

22 This is exemplified in the aforementioned disciplines’ appropriation of phenomenological or at least phenomenologically inspired concepts, which is, of course, not the same as implementing a phenomenological reflection on paradigmatic notions or methods. However, to what extent interdisciplinary and phenomenologically inspired research actually can warrant an integrative account and not merely a cluster of loosely connected disciplines is a matter of debate, see Kotchoubey et al. 2016.

23 To what extent the core ingredients of the phenomenological method are “systematized” or systematizable at all is, of course, far from evident, but there is at least a more refined and more encompassing reflection on central concepts or types of explanations to be expected than under the working conditions of “normal science” (Kuhn 1970) which obviously reigns, despite (or precisely because of?) all claims to interdisciplinarity. Marbach (2009), for instance, proposes a formalization of phenomenological methods in order to demonstrate the viability of a science of “first-person consciousness”.

24 This restriction of scope does not dispute the universal applicability of a phenomenological philosophy of science but rather aims to prescify the meaning of “empirical research” relevant for a deepening of our understanding of the constitutive dimensions of lifeworldly practices. Although it would go too far (and is probably a hopeless undertaking) to elaborate criteria for what counts as “relevant” here, the “lifeworld”, however, circumscribes phenomena which at least “emerge” from subpersonal processes, and whereby, thus, the possible import of a “phenomenological physics” or “chemistry” is questionable. That it is, nevertheless, relatively difficult to balance the risks of resorting to hidden explanatory reductionisms may become clear when trying to integrate, for example, the findings of the neurosciences or evolutionairy psychology into an anthropological theory which adheres to a reality of lived experience beyond epiphennomenality.
which incorporate insights directly or indirectly attesting to their phenomenological antecedent are, broadly speaking, concerned with analyzing the intetwinement of mental phenomena and (especially but not exclusively) pre-reflective interaction, viz.: the physiological, psychological or socio-cultural conditions of embodied sense-making. By probing and proving the fruitfulness of (implicitly) phenomenological concepts, the regional eidetic endeavor of a phenomenological psychology provides the guiding conceptualizations. The possible correlation of these concepts to the pre-reflective entanglement with the contingencies of a comprehensive lifeworld is then to be elucidated. This, subsequently, raises the question of the extent to which these presupposed experiential structures are themselves subject to revision by the examined processes and practices, thus posing the challenge of how to “reintegrate” experiences and outcomes of domains such as cognitive psychology into phenomenological theorizing itself. Thus, we are perpetually confronted with the task of how to conceive of the holistic relation between the claims to (regional) necessity by phenomenological eidetics and the historicity of pre-reflective sense-making emphasized by a science of the lifeworld.25

Indeed, a relationship between phenomenological theory and the pre-reflective practices, conceived in such a way and being “complicated” in multiple and complex ways, need not be an obstacle for fertile research.26 The theoretical possibilities just mentioned are, in fact, already realized,

25 This kind of mutual determination need not necessarily result in a methodological inconsistency since the findings of specific scientific disciplines do not call phenomenological ambition as such into question. Moreover, this inherent revisability of the phenomenological method seems to be projected by Husserl as early as the Logical Investigations, where he introduced the notion of “zig-zag” (“Zickzack”) as a metaphor for the phenomenological logic of research (2013, p. 18). By taking this notion up again in the Crisis, he ties this methodological maxim to a historic dimension mediated by his (then) important conception of the lifeworld. That this does not lead necessarily to a postmodern relativism but can, by tying the “zig-zag” to the lived body, serve itself as sophisticated foundational structure, is shown, for example, by Lotz 2007; Mensch 2000; Taipale 2014 – albeit with different emphases. The possibility of unifying the genuine plasticity of the lifeworld with the initial transcendental eidetics via an inherent teleology is suggested by Aldea 2016.

26 Depraz (2012) being one of the rare examples which takes the challenge of uncovering the potentials of phenomenological conceptions for practice tout court seriously. See also Max van Manen’s (2014) overview of the possible impact of the phenomenological method on the human sciences.
which is most notably exemplified by the increasingly recognized fruitfulness of phenomenological approaches in psychiatry and psychotherapy, but also in anthropology in a more general sense. Precisely these disciplines, which are themselves concerned with the examination of established lifeworldly practices as well as the breakdown and reestablishment of the daily forms of practical coping, demonstrate phenomenology’s potential for investigating the multifactorial complexity of the pre-reflective genesis of lived experience.

To what extent, then, does this relationship of mutual challenges in the fields of psychiatry, psychotherapy and anthropology constitute a particularly fruitful area of research for phenomenological approaches? In other words: What are the conceptual constellations and “experimental situations” which turn the aforementioned “intricate hiatus” between the eidetic leaning of phenomenological theory and the contingencies of the lifeworld now into a rather more fruitful resource? The pivotal starting point could be the fact that the question of the relationship between consciousness and the body emerges nowhere else in such an incisive way. What saves this claim from being a mere reproduction of the old Cartesian dualistic confrontation should be clear by the refined concepts put to work: “consciousness”, or “subjectivity”, refers in a substantial sense to a first-personal phenomenal consciousness which is more than the notorious qualia and should be understood as a structured lived experience. The body, too, is conceptualized as always and simultaneously precariously embedded in a surrounding environment and, thus, eludes a purely mechanistic and rigorously individualistic investigation. This means that the question of the causal and constitutive relationship between affective, conative, and cognitive phenomena and bodily dispositions and expressions nowhere else seems more a matter of a detailed, multifactorial, and contextual analysis. On the one hand, phenomenology’s inherent methodical multiperspectivity and its judgment-suspending cautiousness are deployed. On the other, the theoretical perspective of a science of consciousness is provided

27 This is particularly obvious when “anthropology” is understood as transcending the traditional demarcation of biological and cultural anthropology exemplified in the concept of an “evolutionary cultural anthropology”. The latter is at the same time the (inter-)disciplinary focus of the research project “Embodiment as a Paradigm of an Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology” at Heidelberg University.

28 A notion borrowed, and slightly semantically inflected, from Rheinberger 1997.
with a “natural” connection to a genetic perspective on experiences, deeply entrenched in the concrete conditions of a (analytically as well as empirically) circumscribed environment.

Even in the much more theoretical field of phenomenological anthropology – from a phenomenological perspective this being, in a sense, an “impeded” tradition\(^{29}\) – one can find the necessity of conceptualizing the connection between a first-personal approach to subjective experiences and a physiological constitution of humans that conditions exactly this subjectivity. On the one hand, the phenomenological notion of a “lived body” and its intercorporeal embeddedness offers a conceptual solution to circumvent the threat of a Cartesian dualism and a resource to conceptualize the interplay of the peculiarities of human physiology and its corresponding subjectivity (Fuchs 2018). On the other, when pursuing the leading question of anthropology – “What is the human being?” – and equally doing justice to its physical dimension, one has to consider the role of the concrete and thus “worldly” body, if one wants to avoid the pitfalls of an equally metaphysically burdened reductionism.

Not least, contemporary research in evolutionary biology (for example, Donald 2002; Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman 2000; Richerson & Boyd 2005), as well as cognitive archeology (see Malafouris 2013) points not only to the dimension of time but also, with an hitherto unobservable emphasis, to the dimension of space. The human body thus comes to the fore as a type of body, which has developed in time as well as through

\(^{29}\) The first self-proclaimed work of phenomenological anthropology, \textit{Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos} (2010) by Max Scheler, might be regarded as a starting point of the Philosophical Anthropology (with capital letters). However, and disregarding the controversial question of whether this is really a “tradition” or even a unitary philosophical “school”, subsequent references to its phenomenological origins have been rather implicit or incidental (see the main works of Gehlen 2016; Jonas 1973; Plessner 1975; see also Fischer (2008) for a positive answer). Hans Blumenberg’s project by the same name never (and this is perhaps symptomatic of the approach) arrived at its final form, see, i.a., his \textit{Beschreibung des Menschen} (2014). Schnell (2011) revives insights from Blumenberg for his own project of a phenomenological anthropology. Bimbenet (2011) also, albeit in a more direct manner confronting the empirical sciences and thus displaying some methodological affinities with the initial Philosophical Anthropology, develops a genuine phenomenological anthropology, notably influenced by Merleau-Ponty.
being embedded in an environment (Umwelt\textsuperscript{30}).

Since phenomenology is also concerned with the genetic development of subjective experience within the pre-reflective lifeworld, it can also contribute to the question of how the specificity of the human being\textsuperscript{31} is crucially shaped by its phylo- and ontogenetic engagement with its environment. Similarly, this focus on the "embodied and extended" nature of the human being departs significantly from former definitions, which exclusively correlated this specificity to higher cognitive phenomena such as language, reason etc. The prospect of anchoring the former differentiae specificae of "human nature" via a genuine embodied consciousness in an interactional "niche construction" (see the examples from evolutionary biology above) opens a way to overcome the multiple dualisms and reductionisms pervading anthropological research up to today (see Etzelmüller & Tewes 2016). Granted, a consistent implementation of phenomenological conceptions in such research should also imply an investigation of the plasticity and limits of these very conceptions. However, this should not be seen as a loss of foundational rigor. Rather, it should demonstrate the methodological sincerity and explanatory accuracy built-in to the phenomenological method itself.

In a similar vein, phenomenology can also contribute fruitfully to the more clinically oriented disciplines, namely psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy.\textsuperscript{32} These disciplines analyze, differentiate, and develop techniques in treating mental disorders so as to reestablish sense-making and practical coping in the lifeworld\textsuperscript{33}, and thus seek to diminish psychological strain. In spite of the over-

\textsuperscript{30} This notion is originally to be found in Uexküll 1921.

\textsuperscript{31} This is not a claim to any kind of essentialist definition of the human being, which now, supposedly, could have good reasons to strive for its credibility by coming through the backdoor of a reconcilement of contemporary biology with a sophisticated transcendental phenomenology. The actual status and intertwinment of human's specificity and its culturally diverse "instantiations" is far from clear from the perspective of a phenomenological anthropology.

\textsuperscript{32} Actually, the influence of phenomenological methods on psychiatry has been palpable much longer than a complementary interest of phenomenology in psychiatric or psychological research can reasonably be assumed; for an overview on the impact of phenomenology on psychiatry until the rise of the neurobiological hegemony see Fuchs 2017a; see also the extensive overview by Spiegelberg 1972.

\textsuperscript{33} This characterization is, admittedly, not uncontroversial, at least considered from a historical perspective. A well-known study of the conceptual development and institutional treatment of mental disorders is Foucault's Folie et déraison (1961), which, albeit itself controversial regarding the selection of empirical data, nevertheless points to possible sociopsychiatric reservations aiming at the validity of the de
whelming preponderance of neurobiological and cognitivist paradigms, the conviction persists that the term “psychology” does not refer to the *lo-gos* of epiphenomenal qualia, which are ultimately reducible to physiological mechanisms, but has to deal with a genuine subjectivity that is effective in the world. This strong sense of an undeniable subjectivity is at the same time anchored to a body, albeit a body “infused” with consciousness.

When a patient suffers from a mental disorder he is not able to orientate and “sense” him- or herself appropriately and pre-reflectively in his or her lifeworld. His or her disorder does not manifest itself primarily in a certain dysregulation of neuronal activities (which can, of course, play an important restricting role), but he or she has difficulties in coordinating his or her experiences and in managing the daily routine the way a “healthy” person does. Since the patient’s experiences are based on a pre-reflective and reflexive (sometimes “hyperreflexive”, see Fuchs 2011) engagement with his or her environment as well as with other subjects, the disturbed experiential dimensions have to be considered as mediated by an experiencing, or “lived” body. Hence, phenomenology proves to be a fruitful exploratory framework because it provides the tools needed to investigate these disturbances of experience without presupposing any

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34 For a comprehensive overview and the relation of this methodological development to the progress in neuroscientific methods, particularly techniques of neuroimaging, see Fuchs 2017b.

35 That perspectives formerly belonging to a rather exclusively phenomenological methodology now pervade, in different guises, the philosophy of psychiatry in general, and insofar as it engages with and recognizes a “value-based practice”, is to be seen in Fulford et al. 2013.

36 This being the attempt of a neutral choice of words which itself is a symptom of the highly controversial debate about the exact sense of the basic self- and other-relation which has to be admitted in order to justify the appropriate phenomenological analysis of mental disorders in contrast to mentalistic (prominently Fodor 1975) or narrativistic (for example, Velleman 2005) paradigms.

37 “What constitutes a mental illness?” is certainly a question not answerable in this context, but, indeed, shines through in the contribution by Samuel Thoma to this issue. Of course, no normative judgement is intended by speaking of “healthy” persons in contrast to persons with mental disorders.
theoretical assumptions which could distort the attempt to elucidate the patient’s embodied being-in-the-world.

Aiming at both, namely elucidating the eidetic structures of psychological phenomena as well as their dependence on embodied interactions within the lifeworld, phenomenology may constitute an experiential refinement of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice. Thus, the notions of “vulnerability”, “interaffec
tivity”, or “sensus communis”, to give but a few examples, which occupy central roles in some of the following contributions, exemplify the fundamental dependency of mental health on the intersubjective and social environment. These three notions, furthermore, express the explanatory indispensability and, indeed, primacy of taking into account the fragility of the subject’s pre-reflective relations to the world and to others. The phenomenological psychologists’ ambition to explore the eidetic structures of experience should, therefore, be combined with an analysis of the contingencies and precariousness of human existence.

This promising relationship between the eidetic aspects of phenomenological theory and the practical sphere as it is instantiated in the disciplines of anthropology, psychiatry and psychotherapy, was the motive for a workshop on the topic “Phenomenological Anthropology, Psychiatry, and Psychotherapy in Theory and Practice”, which was held on the 5th of April, 2017, in Heidelberg. Organized by the “Deutsche Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Anthropologie, Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie” (DGAP), it gave early-stage researchers the opportunity to present and discuss their research projects. The topics can roughly be ordered along a dramaturgical frame, beginning with conceptual or methodological issues, followed by questions of concrete, especially therapeutic implementations and, finally, ending with two research proposals that illuminated more basic existential conditions of mental disorders.

The first contribution by Philipp Schmidt, “Über die Genese von Empathie als direkter Wahrnehmung fremdpsychischer Zustände” (“On the Genesis of Empathy as Direct Perception of Other Minds”), tries to disentangle the current debate about social cognition, particularly, empathy, and suggests a more differentiated approach in explaining the phenomenal quality of empathic mental states.
Phrased differently: What are the conditions for the specific “What-it’s-likeness” of empathy? After delineating the discursive landscape with the relevant theoretical options of the Theory-Theory, Simulation Theory, and Direct Social Perception, he lays out the broadly phenomenological premises of the following argument. He then sets out to defend the claim that an explanation of the empathic mental states’ phenomenal content by way of Direct Social Perception is sometimes not sufficient; rather, inferential and simulative processes have to be considered as indispensable preconditions. To illuminate this claim, he develops a fictive case study, in the course of which a genetic, instead of a purely static-descriptive approach becomes the guiding analytic perspective. This genetic perspective on social perception, however, Schmidt points out, cannot so readily lead to a final decision about the primordiality of a certain form of social perception, although there are strong reasons to deny the possibility of a foundation of Direct Social Perception on inferential or simulative processes.

The following contribution by Martina Philippi, “Der ‘Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit’ in Phänomenologie und Psychopathologie” (“The ‘Loss of Natural Self-Evidence’ in Phenomenology and Psychopathology”), proposes that the topic of “self-evidence” claims a central, albeit perpetually challenging position in Husserl’s works and that this re-evaluation enables us to disclose an, at first sight, unlikely relationship to Wolfgang Blankenburg’s Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit (1971) (Loss of Natural Self-evidence). Both the phenomenologist and the psychiatrist, have to deal with the same issue, self-evidence, albeit approaching it from opposing angles: The phenomenologist has to examine, due to his or her scientific ambitions, the realm of experiences, to suspend that which is self-evident, without doubt, in the “natural attitude”, whereas the psychiatrist has to understand how the patient’s evident loss of self-evidence can be compensated, how a feeling of self-evident integration with his or her lifeworld can be reestablished. After analyzing Husserl’s persistent struggles with the possibility of conducting concrete phenomenological exam-
The subsequent contribution by Adrian Spremberg, “Depression and Psychosis – Perspectives on the Body, Enactivism, and Psychotherapy”, also points to the fruitfulness of a revised and refined understanding of mental disorders, namely schizophrenia and depression, as being constitutively embedded in a multifactorial describable environment. These factors are roughly subsumed under the headings of “subjective experience”, “the body/organism” and “the world”. Spremberg traces the functional interconnectivity of these factors back to the initial phenomenological theory of the “lived body” and its “natural anchorage” in an environment, which manifests itself in the situational “plasticity” of the subject’s behavior. An enactivist framework seems to appropriate these fundamental insights by asserting, in a similar vein, an intricate relationship of subjective, bodily, and worldly parameters. However, when it comes to analyzing the constitution of mental phenomena, this framework strives to differentiate in an increasingly fine-grained way what factors (or disturbances thereof) are at play, and to what extent, in the emergence and maintenance of mental disorders. Spremberg demonstrates this in the cases of the disturbed sense of self in
schizophrenia and the intertwine ment of cognitive and affective factors in the impaired sense of agency during depression. He concludes with the prospect of how this enactivist framework could be implemented in psycho therapy. Thus, the ambition to do justice to an integral approach of understanding the patient’s disorder as being situated in his or her lifeworld could be supported by specific therapeutic treatments, which concentrate particularly on the body and movement abilities, with the intention of reestablishing the patient’s “situational fluidity”.

Combining the programmatic question of how phenomenology can be of any immediate use for the psychiatric practice with the investigation of what shape such an instantiation could take, Samuel Thoma, in his contribution “‘Glorieuse inutilité’ der phänomenologischen Psychiatrie? Ein Beitrag zur Therapie des sozialen Raumes” (“‘Glorieuse inutilité’ of Phenomenological Psychiatry? A Contribution to the Therapy of the Social Space”), discusses the possibilities of phenomenologically inspired therapy of the social space. After sketching the rather antagonistic relationship between phenomenological psychopathology and social psychiatry (particularly in an ideological sense), Thoma introduces and elucidates the concept of the “sensus communis” which, following his approach, functions as a refinement of the notion of “common sense”, stemming from Stanghellini (2004). He presents a tripartite analytical structure of the sensus communis, differentiated along the degree of implicitness or pre-reflective internalization of “interactional dispositions”, which serves as the framework designed to investigate modes of “insanity” (“Verrücktheit”). These modes are relative to types respectively parts of social space, which are themselves always spaces affording a different kind of participation. How this intertwine ment of (social) spatiality and psychological deviation manifests itself is then exemplified by schizophrenic patients who

38 The hidden ambiguity of the German word “verrückt”/“Verrücktheit”, unfortunately, does not have an adequate English counterpart: neither “mad”, “insane”, “crazy”, nor “lunatic”, and so on, capture the very literal sense of “verrückt”. The meaning exploited here, refers to a “displacement”, or a “shifting”, a “ver-rücken” (maybe “dis-moving”), such that the German term exhibits an etymological relation to the semantic field of spatiality.
experience a collapsing of socio-spatial borders, often caused by a fundamental shift in the social landscape and resulting in an “interactional crisis”. A therapeutic intervention seems to be delineated by a “socio-spatial niche construction”, exhibited by the patients themselves. The patients thereby try to regulate the interactional complexities of the diverse social spaces in a way not necessarily to be interpreted as defective but rather to be seen as disclosing an adaptive capability of reestablishing “resonance”, a technique of “positive withdrawal”. Therapeutic frameworks now could, for example, try to facilitate this kind of “self-induced” re-adaptation by building onto the concept of a “space of acquaintance” (“Bekanntschaftsraum”). Due to its inherent participatory volatility, a “space of acquaintance” makes it possible to practice the balancing between the respective ways (public or private) of social interaction. This, Thoma concludes, indicates how phenomenological-anthropological concepts can inform social psychiatry in a “useful” way and, at the same time, are enriched by considering the far-reaching social embeddedness of supposedly purely mental phenomena.

Valeria Bizzari shows in her following contribution, “A Phenomenological Approach to Psychopathologies: An Embodied Proposal”, how psychopathological research and therapeutic applications can profit from understanding the constitutive bodily dimension of intersubjective processes. Bizzari also points to the several shortcomings of the orthodox approaches in theorizing about intersubjectivity, namely Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. She emphasizes how phenomenological concepts can elucidate what occurs in the different ways of intersubjective encounters more holistically, thus claiming that corporeality has an irreducible explanatory function. She continues to elaborate the explanatory need of this basic dimension of corporeality by means of the phenomena of “disembodiment” or “analytic perception” in schizophrenia and by examining the significance of the different levels of intersubjectivity in autism-spectrum disorder. These different layers of intersubjective capabilities, as suggested by developmental psychological evidences, have to be understood as being dependent on more basic affective and thus intercorporeal processes. Building on this phenomenologically inspired conception of the fundamental role of intercorporeality, Bizzari presents a phenomenological interview which is to assess the “capacity of taking
another’s point of view” and which in the case of an 18 year old male with Asperger’s syndrome seems to prove the centrality of a pre-reflective corporeal dimension. Concluding, and following from the explicated, bodily perspective on autism-spectrum disorder, she proposes an extension of the otherwise already adequately “phenomenological” D.I.R.-model (Green-span & Wieder 1998) with the complementary factor of embodiment (“E”, thus D.I.R.E.), resulting in a strengthened attention to therapeutic forms which focus on body awareness and movement.

Finally, Leonor Irarrázaval outlines in her contribution, “Vulnerability in Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Anthropological Approach”, a proposal for a fruitful diagnostic and, particularly, psychotherapeutic implementation of a decisively anthropological approach which centers around the notion of “vulnerability”. Irarrázaval strengthens its genuine anthropological dimension, seeing it as a necessary disposition of all human beings. She elaborates on three distinct types of symptoms which accompany severe cases of schizophrenia (“de-personalization”, “de-synchronization”, and “de-contextualization”) and shows the extent to which these amount to a disorder of coping with intersubjective encounters, thus exposing the reliance of personal experience on a fundamental vulnerability. Doing justice to this anthropological condition in the psychotherapeutic setting would result in considering the patient’s biography as a personal history of meaningful engagement with his or her life situations. This dialogical reflection, then, should foster the patient’s self-understanding as a responsible agent, defying the “passifying” experiences of being diagnosed as mentally ill.

We hope to have indicated that the contributions to this special issue may exemplify future perspectives on the link between phenomenology and practice in the domains of anthropology, psychiatry, and psychotherapy. They attempt to form this link by taking into account both empirically informed investigation of the engagement of embodied subjects with their lifeworld and the bracketing of any premature theoretical assumptions.
science of the lifeworld, understood in this holistic manner, may prove the most promising when the philosophical scrutiny of eidetic analyses has to deal with the factual sense-making processes of enworlded lived bodies.

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