

# The Intertwinement of Temporality and Intersubjectivity. Two Dimensions of the Embodied Human Mind and its Pathologies

## Editorial

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The central role of temporality and intersubjectivity for the subject's relation to the self and to the world has prominently been expounded in the phenomenological tradition (Heidegger 1986; Husserl 1969; 1973a; Merleau-Ponty 2005). However, a question that remains unclear and that shall be explicitly raised in this issue is how temporality and the constitution of the lived world *as shared with other embodied subjects* interrelate. Our experience of situatedness in time is, to a large extent, shaped by the dynamics of embodied interactions and enduring social relationships. A deeper understanding of the temporal structures of human life thus requires a thorough elucidation of their interrelation with intersubjective experiences and processes. Equally, insofar as the co-constitution of the lived world always proceeds in a temporally structured manner and on different time scales, it cannot be regarded as independent of temporality. Therefore, it is not surprising that psychopathological analyses indicate experiential alterations in both temporality as well as intersubjectivity to be prevalent in various mental disorders (Binswanger 1960; Blankenburg 2001; 1971; Bleuler 1911; Minkowski 1970; Straus 1928). The connections between these two domains of disturbance are in need of further and thorough investigation.

As this special issue shall reveal, a deep conception of intersubjectivity and temporality as core dimensions of the embodied mind can enrich the inquiry into subjective and interpersonal phenomena, such as psychopathological disturbances. At the same time, these phenomena raise issues highlighting the necessity of understanding the structural entanglements in intersubjective and temporally organized embodied experience.

In what follows, an interdisciplinary research landscape is outlined which subsumes findings and main concepts provided by phenomenology, embodied approaches to cognition as well as ecological and developmental psychology, which relate to the dimensions of temporality and intersubjectivity of the embodied mind. In particular, the concrete links between aspects of temporality and intersubjectivity are expounded with respect to the various functions and dimensions of the body that they correspond to. The analysis makes reference to (1) the lived and feeling body, (2) the sensorimotor body, (3) the action-oriented body and (4) the body as it appears through self-reflective capacities.

- (1) First it is shown how through the medium of the lived body subjects interactively synchronize with each other. In such processes of synchronization reciprocal intersubjective attunement is continually realized through interbodily interaction structured by the temporal alignment of affective comportment.
- (2) The role of temporality and intersubjectivity in the sensorimotor constitution of perceptual experience of the lived world is explicated. In this context, the horizontal structure of perception in virtue of which entities are perspectively grasped in their entirety, is expounded to imply the intertwining of the two dimensions of subjectivity. It is laid out as necessarily exhibiting a dynamic temporal structure and involving intersubjective bodily aligned, synchronized reference to the world.
- (3) The perceptual constitution of the lived world as accomplished by the action-oriented body is presented and analyzed in view of its temporal and intersubjective dimension. Implied in our perceptual awareness of aspects of the world, is a sense of what meaningful actions they afford. The sense of offered possibilities of action, correlated with

bodily capabilities and dispositions, is pointed out to be understood as an implicitly future-oriented experience enabled by joint sense-making processes as well as the intersubjectively grounded feeling of familiarity and reliability in relation to the world. While in the previous chapter the intertwining of temporality and intersubjectivity is explicated with regard to the structure of perceptual consciousness, it is here spelled out concerning the content of conscious experience.

- (4) Finally, the implicit mode of temporality or the time as it is lived-through in experience, and as it is characterized in the above introduced analyses, is contrasted with the experience of explicit time which is constitutive of human life and associated with the alterity of the body. The explicit or objective time is shown to be interconnected with the dimension of intersubjectivity. It is experienced in disturbances of synchronicity, in which the subject becomes temporally disconnected from others. Furthermore, it structures the subject's narrative of its experiences and actions that are integrated in its overall life history and embedded in social relations as well as traditionally transmitted communal arrangements.

Following this, the insights gained from these analyses are applied to the field of psychopathology and the cases of depression and borderline personality disorder are shortly addressed (5). Depression is shown to be characterized by a disturbance in intersubjective synchronicity and in the implicit bodily sense of afforded actions in the (intersubjective) life world. Compared to this, in borderline personality disorder the temporal constitution of the narrative identity is impaired. Patients suffer from a discontinuity and incoherence of their psycho-social life, lacking the stability of enduring intersubjective meaning giving structures.

Finally, an overview of the special issue is provided, in which its contributions are introduced (6).

## I. Interbodily Resonance and Synchronization

In the phenomenology of embodiment, the body can, first of all, be defined as the subjectively lived body and thus as the medium of experience (Husserl 1973a; Merleau-Ponty 2005; Fuchs 2000). Presupposed for the subject's relationship to the world, it is tacitly given and implicitly lived through from the first person perspective in the subject's engagement with its environment. Its inconspicuous and pre-reflective appearance as an experiential background, while the subject finds itself immersed in its endeavors, qualifies subjectivity as being intrinsically embodied. In intentional experiencing the subject grasps the affective quality of aspects of the world through the lived body that constitutes affective phenomenality by realizing pre-reflective bodily feelings (Colombetti 2011).

Importantly, understood in these terms as a feeling body, the lived body mediates our experience of other people and our becoming affected by them. It is thus immediately involved in taking the second-person perspective. In interpersonal encounters we respond to others emotionally through particular sensations of the body such as intero- and proprioceptive sensations, as well as arousal, tenseness and propensities for action, physiologically regulated via the muscular and the autonomic nervous system (Froese and Fuchs 2012; Krueger 2016). Moreover, certain neuronal activity has been shown to be involved in processes of interpersonal engagement. Research in social and affective neuroscience has demonstrated activation in brain areas related to emotion processing and motor mechanisms, in response to facial expressions directed at the subject (Schilbach et al. 2013).

In phenomenological terms, feelings and sensations experienced when encountering the other can be understood in terms of a bodily resonance, which constitutes empathic sensitivity and enables our attunement with others, i.e. it allows us to experience the state of the other in a bodily manner. This felt *impression* through "intra-bodily resonance" is, at the same time, manifested in and functions as an *expression* in as much as it comprises gestural and postural manifestations, facial and vocal emotional display (Froese and Fuchs 2012; Fuchs 1996). Bodi-

ly perceivable in their nuances, the expressive patterns of affect on the other hand modify the other's state, infusing it as an impression in the form of experienced bodily sensations. This in turn goes along with an expressive response on the part of the other which immediately affects the interaction partner etc. Through such feedback loops of implicit reciprocal bodily resonance the interactants synchronize with each other while their emotional states continually converge throughout the process of mutually shaping interaction. The achievement of "interbodily resonance" (Fuchs 2013a) and synchronized experiencing underlies the feeling of connectedness among the subjects (Hove and Risen 2009; Miles 2009; Rochat 2001) who become attuned to each other in a pre-reflective and dynamic manner.

By investigating the dynamics of early infant-caregiver interaction involved in the formation of attachment ("primary intersubjectivity" (Trevarthen 1979)), developmental research has demonstrated the sensitivity of young infants to the establishment of synchronization through the temporal alignment of expressive display. Experimental studies in psychology indicate that infants show specific reactions and exhibit disengagement when they perceive time lags or inconsistencies in the caregiver's responsiveness to their actions (Murray and Trevarthen 1985). It is thus revealed that already at the very early developmental stage the experience of time and intersubjectivity are closely intertwined. Immediate intersubjective connectedness presupposes temporal attunement and synchronized exchange, which moreover constitute a tacit sense of temporality.

The sustained unfolding of feeling states in dyadic interaction places the interactants in a shared flow of time that is jointly and pre-reflectively lived through, due to continual interbodily resonance. The sense of time, in terms of the temporalization of bodily experiencing, is construable as the tacit givenness of co-temporality with other embodied agents. It is connected to others and can be understood as the sense of a shared "intersubjective time" (Fuchs 2013b), linked to lived bodily experiences.

## II. The temporality of Sensorimotor Processes and Interbodily Alignment in the Perceptual Reference to the World

Besides the aspects of bodily feeling and expression, the role of temporality and intersubjectivity in the constitution of the lived world can be investigated with respect to the spatial embeddedness and sensorimotor capacities of the lived body (Tewes and Stanghellini 2021). First, let us consider the involvement of the body in the perceptual constitution of temporally extended and spatially located objects. Most fundamentally, in virtue of its bodily existence, the human agent always already occupies a position in space and therefore a certain perspective on aspects of its environment (Merleau-Ponty 2005). This perspectivity is the condition of possibility for the perception of the movement of objects, which in their path of motion continuously change their spatial position in relation to the subject. In doing so, they are presented to the subject as from different angles and distances and thus constantly change their appearance.

According to Husserl, the experience of temporality with relation to objects, i.e. the experience of their persistence over time, requires an experiential synthesis or unification of successive, changing states of perception; it presupposes experience to be temporally structured. His prominent account of the phenomenology of time-consciousness claims that any moment of conscious experience of an intentional object inherently entails an implicit sense of the object's immediately preceding phase – as past – and an, at least vague, tacit anticipation of its future phase, whereby it is temporally presented to the subject (Husserl 1969). In every instant moment of awareness, the presentation of the present phase of a temporally extended object or event, referred to as *primal impression* in Husserl's terminology, is never given in an isolated manner, but is always imbued with the consciousness of the just past experience, expressed by the concept of *retention*, and the anticipation of the ensuing state, termed *protention*. This experiential synthesis of past, present and future, providing our experience with a sense of time

and enabling us to intend objects in their temporal continuity, proceeds in a passive and pre-reflective way, with no involvement of explicit deliberation (Zahavi 2005).

While succession and change in states of consciousness that are synthetically unified in the constitution of temporal extension may be ascribable to the (kinetic) properties of objects, they are also engendered by the sensorimotor performances of the embodied agent. In acts of perception, the subject is actively engaged by means of eye movements, motion of the head and the overall body, through which, in a continuous explorative process, the world becomes accessible (Gibbs 2005). Enabling perceptual accomplishments through agentive movements, the lived body establishes a direct connection with and grasp of the world which the subject is intentionally directed at (Fuchs 2021; Neisser 1993). The succession of sensations skillfully combined with specific movements, for instance when we manipulate objects to gain a perceptual grasp of them, constitutes the perceived identity of objects (Husserl 1969; Gallagher and Zahavi 2007). The appearance of one side of an object is not given in an isolated manner, but precisely as a perspectival presentation of the entire object, since this present impression always already refers to preceding and anticipated sensations that are correlated with particular bodily movements and positions.

Husserl proposes that the fact that our perception of an entity from an adopted perspective, which reveals only a part of it, nevertheless amounts to an experience of the entire object is due to our experience having a *horizontal* structure (Husserl 1989). It is the sense of existing possible percepts from other points of view which enables a givenness of the persisting entity in its entirety. The sum of all possibilities across sensory modalities implied in the perception of an object constitutes an organized structure which Husserl terms the entity's *horizon*. Perceptual possibilities which provide momentary impressions with additional qualities are not to be understood in a static but rather in an active and dynamic sense. Similarly, according to the enactive paradigm, what is perceptually experienced is determined by the subject's capabilities and sense of possible actions associated with particular perceptual sensations. In other words, the content of perceptual intentionality presupposes a previously acquired "sensorimotor knowledge", i.e. practical knowledge of how sensory stimulation changes with particular patterns of bodily movement (Noë 2004). This implicit knowledge is acquired through active perceptual exploration in which sensations are modulated through movement, giving rise to meaningful percepts. With this notion, enactivism subscribes to the tenet, already developed by Gibson (1979) and Merleau-Ponty (2005) in the theory of perception, that perceptual consciousness is essentially a form of action. The conception of perceptual experience as presupposing the "mastery of sensorimotor contingencies" (O'Regan and Noë 2001), which are based on the coupling of movements and corresponding sensations, indicates that impressions are inherently temporal. Referring to possible sensations that are correlated with sequences of movement in space-time, impressions imply an orientation towards the future and exhibit an intrinsic temporal structure.

Besides sensorimotor dynamics involved in the engagement with the environment, the domain of intersubjectivity has been shown to play a central role in the experiential constitution of the objective world, and it shall be suggested that it does so with respect to the temporal dimension of the latter. In fact, the world as perceived has been claimed to be necessarily a common world insofar as it is accessible to others (Merleau-Ponty 2005; Fuchs 2021). Perceptual awareness of objects that we encounter in the world presupposes sociality, since the objects' appearance as that which is opposed to the subject is dependent on a sense of their intersubjective availability which creates a distance from that which is intended and renders it objective. The objectivity of the perceived world is thus based on the fact that the latter has not the experiencing subject as its sole perspectival center, but also encompasses the consciousness of other subjects (Husserl 1973b; Gallagher and Zahavi 2007).

Furthermore, the subject-independence of the object, i.e. its existing irrespectively of the subject's perceptual grasp, is implied in its very definition, precisely in virtue of it appearing as perceivable by and as existing for any other subject. Here, the intersubjective accessibility of things and situations that constitutes the communal world is understood as the implicit

givenness of a potential other's view on them in every moment of experience which is therefore in principle shared (Fuchs 2021). Implied in the presentation of an intentional object, the possibility of an other adopting the specific perspective on the object is thus inherent to the very phenomenality of the subject's perceptual state. Equally, the object's facets which are occluded from the perceiver, given its particular position in space, are simultaneously co-presented by way of their being apprehended as potentially perceivable by others and as potential stimuli that would be immediately experienced by the perceiver if he/she adopted those others' perspectives. The horizontal structure of object presentation in perception thus ultimately includes possibilities which are intersubjective, in so far as it encompasses the sense of a multitude of possible perspectival apperceptions of others.

While intersubjectivity is tacitly implied in structures of perception, the implicit co-presence of the other as a center of experience can be traced back to developmental processes taking place in immediate interpersonal interactions. From the very beginning infants attend to and perceive elements in their environment in a social context and a joint manner. Through intercorporeal interactions of joint attention (Hobson 2005; Tomasello 1995) in early infancy, aspects of the world are turned towards, encountered and dealt with together with others. In these engagements with the environment that constitute the world as shared with others and that represent what has been termed "secondary intersubjectivity" (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978), the infant directs its attention towards objects in an interpersonally communicative manner. It follows the interactant gazing towards the object, at the same time registering him/ her being aware of the infant attending to him/ her as well as to the object.

Such sequences of interaction in which the infant and its interactant jointly maintain their aligned intentional directedness towards their environment involve the capacity to take account of the other's perspective referring to the particular object (Fuchs 2013c; 2021). The exercise of this capacity in joint perceptual activity is sedimented as the fundamental implicit intersubjectivity of the appreciation of things in the world, and renders perception a socially acquired faculty that involves the orientation of attention to and identification of objects. One can thus speak of an incorporation of the perspectives of others into one's own embodied perceptual acts, amounting to an implicit extension of one's perspectival orientation towards the world. Overall, the presented phenomenological analyses and insights from developmental research reveal that besides bodily processes, the manner in which we perceive objects depends on implicit intersubjective experiencing, developed through early social relations.

In addition to this, temporal aspects of experience can be shown to be interlaced with intersubjectivity. Both primary and secondary intersubjectivity implicate temporal alignment in the reference to the world. Mutually coordinating on what is taken notice of and interchanging about events and objects in the environment via bodily gestures, signs and signals, a contemporaneity of reference to intentional objects is continually established. The mutual attunement and synchronicity of intentional directedness creates a shared temporality of world referentiality. The intersubjective connectedness is not solely an intercorporeal connectedness but one that is mediated by the common directedness towards the object, and whose implicit temporality spans the environment. The object exists for both interactants and is jointly experienced. It is therefore, in its appresented existence, i.e. with its givenness comprising a horizon of possible percepts from other points of view on the object, embedded in the shared lived time as a temporally extended object. In line with this, given the fact that implicit intersubjectivity is implicated in perceptual experiences, tacit intersubjective temporality – as a dimension of secondary intersubjectivity – is implied in perceptual experiences with reference to intentional objects.

### III. The Intersubjective Constitution of Action- and Future-Oriented Perceptual Engagement with the World

The foregoing discussion has addressed the subject's relationship to the world as it is manifested through the senses, inherently involving intersubjective experience and exhibiting an intrinsic temporal structure. Still, a focus on the sensual awareness of perceptual objects per se does not exhaust the world constitutive human capacity of perception which needs to be understood in a broader sense. Phenomenological analyses and work in ecological psychology expound that it comprises the dimensions of purposeful action as well as action possibilities perceived by the subject as it navigates the (social) world. In this respect, perception represents a capacity of the action-oriented body which features again an interconnection of intersubjectivity and temporality. While this intertwining has above been fleshed out with respect to the structure of consciousness, the following elaborations bear on the aspect of content of conscious experience (Rodemeyer 2006).

When we gain a perceptual grasp of objects, they are not presented as merely geometrical spatio-temporal entities. Instead, our experience of them is shaped by the possibilities which they provide, that correlate with and are contingent on our bodily capabilities and dispositions. Things that we encounter are experienced as allowing, for instance, to be acted upon in certain ways and to be useful in different respects and particular contexts. They are not merely present as material entities but available to the subject, evoking the pursuit of actions that serve certain interests and enable the attainment of goals. James Gibson's (1979) notion of "affordance", as coined in his ecological approach to perception, captures the idea that perception is marked by a coupling between the subject and its embodied abilities and intentions, on the one hand, and aspects of the environment, on the other hand. Defining what is offered by an object or situation to a subject, eliciting particular acts, given the subject's bodily endowments, skills and habits, affordances are to be understood in a relational manner. Perception is thus an active engagement with the environment and recognition of, for instance, pragmatic possibilities which it affords and which immediately relate to the perceiver's "body schema" (Gallagher 1986; 2005).

This corporeal structure encompasses movement related properties and faculties of the body, and underlies intentional activities conditioned by environmental contexts. It involves the sensory-motor system, functions that regulate body balance and posture, and mechanisms operating within the locomotor system, which together enable and constrain coordinated motion. The body schema tacitly shapes and articulates states of perception in so far as it functions in volitional intentional actions that constitute the context of or practical possibilities implied in perceptual acts. Our purposive actions thus feature a subtle, pre-reflective awareness of acquired corporeal schemas while we explicitly attend to our intended goals and environmental affordances, that are associated with them, rather than to our motoric bodily processes. Withal, the latter are organized and coordinated by what we are attentively focused on, i.e. by the pursuit of purposeful, goal-directed behavior (Gallagher 2020). When encountering meaningful intentional objects that are pragmatically contextualized, our motoric capabilities, whose exercise is guided by behavioral accomplishments, are already implied in our implicit bodily awareness. These body schematic capabilities, which include proprioception and kinesthesia and enable as well as constrain action possibilities, constitute, in Husserl's terms, the bodily background sense of "I can" (Husserl 1989, ch. 2, § 60), i.e. a sense of the potentiality of effectuating particular purposeful movements.

Due to its anticipatory character, the appreciation of possibilities of action that are body-schematically rooted lends the perceptual engagement with the world an orientation towards the future and thus enables its temporal order and coherency. The very meaning of an object as it is perceived ensues from preceding percepts but importantly also the protentional awareness of possible experiences and actions that appear relevant in view of the subject's endeavors or intentions (see Gallagher 2017). Moreover, the intertwining of temporality and active embodiment in the constitution of significance crucially involves the category of *affectivity* which is understood as the experiential 'pull' (Husserl 2001) effectuated by aspects of the

world 'moving' the subject and inspiring called-for action (Slaby 2008). It is thus claimed that our perception of a meaningful world is contingent on affectivity.

Our being affected by entities that we encounter in the world in turn depends on the relation of environmental actualities to bodily potentialities. The possibilities that entities afford and that ensue from the relations of body and environment are imbued with affect in so far as they matter to the subject in specific ways and have a particular significance for the subject's concerns and strivings. Being affected by an affordance means experiencing it as relevant or salient (Colombetti 2017). More concretely, the way in which we affectively relate to objects and their affordances depends on how far these are relevant to what we care and are concerned about. Therefore, affective states implicate an intrinsic "motivational force" (Slaby 2008, 439–440) and diverse states of bodily responsiveness through which the subject is pulled to particular action. Being integral to the experience of possibilities – or 'enticements', in Husserl's (2001) terminology – they constitute the sense of being drawn to act in order that these are actualized.

The motivational aspect of affections which can be traced back to the felt value of afforded actions and amounts to the endeavor of actualizing these, indicates the role of affectivity in the protentional awareness of possibilities and thus the temporal structure of the perception of the world. The recognition of affectively governed possibilities amounts to striving towards a meaningful future (see Lenzo and Gallagher 2021). In virtue of being a significant possibility, that which is possible appears in the protentional mode of lived temporality. As it becomes realized it passes into the past and is retended in the present as a fulfilled anticipation – an experience which characterizes the sense of temporality.

There are several ways in which the dimension of intersubjectivity is immediately involved in the temporally and affectively constituted awareness of possibilities for action and experience as it is implied in the perception of states of affairs, situations or objects. That which is implicitly anticipated in an experiential state is already the product of former shared sense-making processes that have occurred in the social world (Durt et al. 2017). Interactive sequences in which the infant and its interactant relate to aspects of the environment in a joint manner, i.e. by means of intercorporeal processes, shape the infant's experience of intentional objects not only in so far as the other's spatial position in relation to them is perspectively incorporated (characterizing the *structure* of intentional consciousness). It also and crucially does so in terms of the way in which the other engages with the objects (which pertains to the intentional *content*). The infant experiences how the other purposively deals with objects in pragmatic contexts, and it comes to understand the meaning of objects and artefacts through the experience of the other's comportment in relation to them (Fuchs 2021; Gallagher and Zahavi 2007). Furthermore, it is immediately involved and encouraged to participate in the corresponding courses of action which it appropriates in this way. By means of intersubjective experiences it gains practical knowledge of entrenched socio-cultural practices which others have mastered and thereby becomes familiarized with and embedded in culturally established social realities. Thus, through socialization and enculturation not only the meaning of afforded actions and experienced possibilities is learned, but these are also understood as being available to oneself as well as to others. They constitute the lived world of the subject as it is shared with others.

While affordances are normatively specified by practices that prevail in social environments and acquirable skills, on a more fine-grained scale, what action an aspect of the environment affords to an individual person depends on the specific skills he or she masters and the personal projects that he or she pursues. At the same time, the individual's repertoire of skillful patterns of comportment is developed within social institutions that it engages with (Gallagher 2020). Equally, the subject's concerns and commitments that constitute the background against which possibilities strike it as significant are always already embedded in and influenced by interpersonal relations (Ratcliffe and Broome 2022) and the broader social structure without being reducible to the latter. Thus, affordances that the individual recognizes as existing for itself presuppose the social sphere and are co-shaped by it. Overall, intersubjective experiences constitute the awareness of particular possibilities and the anticipation of their fulfillment in the engagement with the environment.

More generally, starting from infancy, by being connected to others the subject develops a primal pivotal interest in the world. It perceives the world as accommodating potential enticing experiences and possibilities of fruitful actions. This enables and disposes it to enact, in its conative strivings, a meaningful future (Fuchs 2013b). The subject's orientation towards the future is albeit not only based on the awareness of actual and potential alluring qualities and properties of the world. It is also grounded in the felt familiarity with these and the sense of their reliability, which is established in primary intersubjective interactions.

The process of becoming familiarized with the world as precisely a shared lived world comprises the incorporation and appropriation of courses of action and forms of social intercourse that are taken for granted in everyday life, as well as the experience of self-evident actualities (Fuchs 2015). It includes the cultural dimension: the subject adopts culturally prevalent and commonly held implicit beliefs, assumptions that are taken as unequivocal, certitudes and convictions that it unquestionably relies on and that guide its thinking and acting. The familiarity with and the reliability of the lived world ensues from the exercise of recurrent practices and patterns of comportment and interaction in which the validity of forms of everyday interpersonal intercourse in social relations is manifested. It, moreover, comprises the prolonged availability of jointly explored and handled objects whose properties exhibit permanence and prove reliable in loops of protentions and their fulfillment. However, it is not merely the product of repetitions and routines, but is based on and presupposes a bodily, affectively developed and felt basic trust in others. This fundamental attitude of trustfulness is developed in early infancy via experiences of interaffectivity in interbodily interactions with caregivers. It unfolds in an emotionally warm and welcoming atmosphere created by affective resonance, which gives the infant the feeling of being accepted and recognized. The foundation of interpersonal trust allows the infant to explore and appropriate the world as it is shared with others. The familiarization with the world as a shared lived world, which is based on trust, establishes the background sense of habituation and inhabitation and of being securely embedded.

These feelings of relating to the world, that are based on the experience of the atmosphere of care and regard, entail a tacit conative drive and desiring attitude that directs the subject towards the future (Fuchs 2015). At the same time, the implicit awareness of the reliability of the world that is taken for granted by the subject, enables it to initiate action and to act upon its interests and according to its concerns. On the background of the sense that the world will continue to run its course as usual – i.e., for instance, anticipating habitual processes to take place in courses of interpersonal interaction, or expecting the specific usability of objects, the persistence of their particular properties and the outcome of their manipulation – (ibid.), the subject experiences itself as capacitated to master situations and exercise agency. It finds itself in the position of taking action and pursuing its goals.

### *Interim Summary*

To recapitulate, it has been shown that an intertwining of intersubjectivity and temporality in the constitution of the lived world is manifested in different dimensions of the body. This entanglement has first been discussed with reference *to the body as pre-reflectively lived and a feeling body*, which is the medium of interbodily affective resonance and synchronization. *The sensorimotor body* represents the subject's capacity of producing perceptual sequences through passive synthesis. It dynamically constitutes perceptual horizons of possibility, that are inherent to entities encountered in the world, via temporally structured sensorimotor couplings. Its capabilities involve the intersubjective sphere, which enables the perceptual constitution of the objective world as such. They are realized through bodily coordinative alignment with others in shared intentional directedness to the environment.

Moreover, the subject's perceptual relationship to the world presupposes (and conditions) the *action-oriented body* – purpose- and goal-directed behavior. Perceptual objects understood as affordances are pragmatically contextualized and carry meaning insofar as possibilities of action are experienced in the very act of perception. The subject is affected, moved or experiences a



pull by the environment, due to the possibilities that it provides, and is, in virtue of this, oriented towards the future. These implicitly discerned possibilities are already the product of previous joint sense-making processes and appropriated practices, and are construed by the subject as being available for others, too. In addition to this, the familiarity with and sense of reliability towards what the world affords, is intersubjectively developed in synchronized interaction.

Overall, the discussion hitherto contains a treatment of time as pre-reflectively lived and implicitly shared with others. Temporality has, moreover, above been shown to be understood as the subject's orientation and striving towards the future which it enacts through the medium of its body in the context of social relations and meaning structures. In what follows, another mode of temporality will be addressed which characterizes human life and is intertwined with the dimension of intersubjectivity.

#### IV. The Alterity of the Body and the Intertwinement of its Temporal and Intersubjective Dimension in Desynchronization and the Self-Narrative

As bodily beings we exist spatio-temporally in such a sense that we are situated in objective time, i.e. the time that is not pre-reflectively lived but that we are explicitly aware of. This explicit awareness of living in time is associated with the alterity and reflective awareness of the body (Fuchs 2013b). The sense of the body as a tangible object or as it is perceived by others (phenomenologically referred to as "Körper"), is to be contrasted with the body as the medium of experience (signified by the term of "Leib") (Husserl 1973a). In the former mode of its appearance, the body is consciously intended in a self-referential and third-person manner through a system of perceptual, conceptual (including beliefs, attitudes, judgments) and affective (including states of emotional valence) representations of the body. This intentional system of "body image" (Gallagher 1986) that can be contrasted with body schematic functions (see above), operates when the subject pays explicit attention to the body, as is the case when it perceptually focuses on certain areas of it and its movements. The thematization of the body involves a fragmentary awareness of it, since through the reflective stance a local and confined grasp of it is gained, by which components of the body come to the fore of consciousness (Gallagher 2005). It takes place, for instance, in the case in which particular motor processes are attentively monitored in order to deliberately regulate sequences of one's own movements and bodily performances. Moreover, the body becomes reified and an intentional object of experience when the subject undergoes pain, in conditions of illness and physiological dysfunction, as well as in fatigue or exhaustion (Fuchs 2005; Hunter et al. 2004; Sacco 2010; Simeon and Abugel 2006). In these conditions, the body loses its transparency and represents an impediment to urges, the pursuit of activities and the immersion in the world.

With the body becoming an intentional object and the interruption of the immersion in the world (structured by pre-reflectively lived time), the awareness of time becomes explicit, i.e. the objective time is experienced. This change in the mode of experiencing the body and time is given rise to by disruptions and disturbances of intersubjective synchronicity. A disparity between the subject's time (the time of its own experiences and actions) and the common time of the social world, which the subject is thus disconnected from, renders time a distinct external entity opposite to the subject. In such desynchronization, subjective temporality may be decelerated or accelerated relative to processes in the social environment and the relationships to others (Fuchs 2013b). With this shift in the relation between temporalities, the subject experiences itself as being ahead of or behind the social time. It becomes confronted with the objective time that is marked by a division of past, present and future. Not being experientially linked to each other, these three dimensions do not create a continuity as it is characteristic of lived time (in which past, present and future are mutually implicative) (Merleau-Ponty 2005; Fuchs 2013b). The experience of objective time consists in the explicit consciousness of the sequential order of events that are temporally identified in an intellectual and reflective manner (Merleau-Ponty

2005). They are retrospectively as well as prospectively assigned to defined periods of objectively measurable time and thereby temporally ranged. Therefore, objective time can be juxtaposed in opposition to implicit temporality, understood as the always already given temporalization of experiences passively synthesized via protention and retention.

The reified and quantified as well as ordinal sequential time underlies the self-narrative of the subject that represents a reflective awareness of the self as diachronically extended and coherent. From a reflective stance the subject creates a sense of personal identity by consolidating past experiences of its life and what it envisions and aspires for the future into a biographical narrative structured by a timeline (Fuchs 2013b; Tewes 2021). The dimension of temporality thus features in subjectivity in such an extended form and does not merely comprise the stream of immediate experience and sequences of courses of action. This is due to the fact that experiences and actions are conceived in the context of the overall life history and certain life projects. Their temporally extended contextual background shapes present actualities, and defines the subject's motives and goals (Gallagher and Zahavi 2007; MacIntyre 2007). Actions are not merely afforded by a given situation (or aspects of it) and restricted to its timespan. Instead, they are embedded within the broader scope of the course of life that enables and constrains them, and lends them a meaning, rendering them a part of a coherent whole.

Since the subject's conduct of life involves other people and is intricately ingrained in social relations and arrangements, the biographical narrative has an intersubjective horizon. Different threads of the narrative coincide and are interlinked with other people's narratives or emerge as a product of co-narration in the sense of a shared enactment of life scripts. Structurally, these interpersonal intertwinements imply a temporal coupling or synchronicity that is based on explicit time markers such as dates and arranged time intervals, frequencies and schemes through which individuals coordinate and connect to each other (Fuchs 2013b). Moreover, being a member of a generation, the individual is socially placed in a particular period of its life while it is diachronically – as in comparison to other generations – situated in a certain historical episode.

The course of the individual's life story is formed by interpersonal contemporaneity and the practice of stipulating objectively and intersubjectively valid points in time and time scales, which creates social affiliation. However, in addition to this, the biographical narrative is integrated in cross-generationally transmitted traditions (Gallagher and Zahavi 2007) established and sustained in human co-habitation. The subject's comportment, which forms its biographical course of life, unfolds within the social fabric, taking place in and being defined by "social settings" (MacIntyre 2007) that comprise elements of the social sphere such as institutions. These settings have their own historicity or are essentially established through history, to which sequences of the subject's comportment contribute and which they carry on as part of the traditional practices that are implicated in the settings. In this sense, the subject's personal narrative is thus constitutive of and, at the same time, implies a temporality which transcends the timespan of the subject's personal biography. In Merleau-Ponty's words:

As my living present opens upon a past which I nevertheless am no longer living through, and on a future which I do not yet live, and perhaps never shall, it can also open on to temporalities outside my living experience and acquire a social horizon, with the result that my world is expanded to the dimensions of that collective history which my private existence takes up and carries forward. (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 503)

Historically passed on communal arrangements are furthermore rooted in and transmitted through bodies. They subsume embodied agents and their habitual performances, spaces of their encounters that may characterize social settings, as well as spatially located objects of use and engagement or artifacts sedimented in the process of documentation of meaning (see Arnold, this issue).

## V. Pathologies of Intersubjectivity and Temporality. The Cases of Depression and Borderline Personality Disorder

It has been shown above how far temporality and intersubjectivity, as existential, intricately interconnected dimensions of human life, are constitutive conditions of different aspects of the lived world. It has also been elucidated in which ways this intertwinement involves and is enabled by the body. Phenomenological insights concerning these issues can be applied in the area of psychopathology. They can contribute to an understanding of disturbances in subjective continuity and the domain of experiences of sociality, that have been shown to be prevalent and to represent crucial impairments in various mental illnesses. By the same token, pathologies in these subjective structures can additionally shed light on their relationships.

On the level of the pre-reflectively lived and feeling body, for instance depression is marked by a disturbance in interbodily affective resonance and mutual attunement (Fuchs 2013a) and thus in processes of intersubjective synchronicity. More precisely, as an experience of desynchronization in the relation to others, a retardation of subjective time relative to the environment is present, and the explicit time dominates the subject's consciousness (Fuchs 2001; see Bülow, this issue). Furthermore, in depression the initiation of action is inhibited (Fuchs 2000; Slaby and Stephan 2012). The body is experienced in a reified manner and as impeding agentive activity. There is a lack of the felt value of actions which the world would afford. This amounts to an impairment of the motivational and conative aspect of the action-oriented and future-enacting body. Being actively involved in and moved by meaning structures of the intersubjective life world presupposes the capacity of sharing experiences through basal and explicit (socially arranged) contemporaneity – a capacity which is diminished in depression.

As a form of mental illness which concerns the time and course of the life story, borderline personality disorder, by contrast, is characterized by an impairment of the reflective stance towards the self and others, through which the narrative self is temporally constituted. Patients suffering from the disorder, which can be understood as a disturbance of personal or narrative identity, experience an incoherence of the self and the world, which is associated with a temporal discontinuity of their psycho-social existence.

The incoherent sense of self is based on the incapability of reflectively viewing and relating to oneself and thereby integrating contrasting states, experiences and modes of behavior, consecutively occurring over the course of time (Fuchs 2007). The subject thus fails to achieve a higher-order unified self-conception. In connection to this, an impairment in the capacity of taking a reflective stance towards others can be observed, which usually enables the subject to perceive and grasp other people (their affective states and behaviors) in an integrated and holistic manner. The borderline patient is incapable of unifying differing, alternating impressions and actions of the other. Failing to negotiate possible experiences of divergence in the way the other appears, the patient is incapable of coping with the felt precariousness inherent to prolonged social relationships.

The other is, however, not merely what the subject is intentionally directed at in lifeworldly experience. He or she is also implied in the subject's self-referentiality which is presupposed for the unity and continuity of the self. The reflective awareness of one's own experiences implicates an implicit relatedness to others: we adopt the others' perspective on us when we take a distanced stance towards ourselves, and recount our acts and intentions to them. This implicit other-relatedness, or internalization of the other, is developed in early interpersonal interactions characterized by affective resonance and an atmosphere of trust. In these interactions caregivers empathically express and identify the infant's emotional states, which enables it, in the course of maturation, to register and gain a, more or less, discerning insight into processes of its mental life (Gergely and Watson 1996). Individuals with borderline personality disorder tend to have a deficiency in such intersubjective experiences (Bradley et al. 2007; Stanghellini and Rosfort 2013) that are crucial for personal development, and thus lack corresponding capacities. Due to the lack of interpersonal trust, the reliability of others is questioned, whose attitudes, inten-

tions and actions are often perceived as obscure, confusing and malevolent (Stanghellini and Mancini 2017).

The incohesiveness of the self in borderline personality disorder has, furthermore, been argued to stem from a lack of an integrated, temporally structured lived world, which in turn can be ascribed to disturbances in intersubjectivity (Ratcliffe and Bortolan 2021). Patients suffer from deficiencies in the constitution and preservation of consistent long-term projects, commitments, values and concerns. They therefore lack the stability of meaning giving structures. What concerns and matters to us relates, to an extent, to other people (specific others and others in general) with whom we share endeavors, aspirations, beliefs or attitudes, whom we depend on and care for. Impairments in interpersonal relations (as they are manifested in borderline personality disorder) thus render the world as it is experienced unstructured and lacking in principles of orientation. With the absence of reliable and diachronically continuous contemporaneity with others, processes of co-narration and thus the common constitution of meaning are obstructed.

Inconsistencies in the experiential world as it is shared with and endures through relationships to others can be regarded as being evident in identity-related abrupt alterations. The latter pertain to adopted roles, upheld beliefs, attitudes and convictions as well as objectives, actions and habits (Westen et al. 2011). Moreover, these inconsistencies are in line with instabilities of emotional life which lacks an existential temporal horizon (Ratcliffe and Bortolan 2021). Subjects show incoherent patterns of affective response and have inconstant emotional experiences. Single evaluative and emotional states especially reactions to other people lack entrenchment: they are not integrated in a system of broader personal orientations towards the world (in terms of being expressive of or shaping these) and are not subject to this system's regulatory functions.

Emotions are thus high in intensity, while being experienced as empty and lacking depth. Disruptions in intersubjectively formed long-term temporal structures, that usually characterize a person's life, render affective states (not being embedded in such structures) devoid of their self-defining and identity shaping function. Furthermore, they impede their temporal integration into the subject's experiential life. Instead of being related to prior experiences and the, on this basis, anticipated and aspired experiences, the borderline patient's instantaneous, momentary fluctuating affects are detached from the past and the future (Fuchs 2007; Stanghellini and Mancini 2017; Stanghellini and Rosfort 2013). Patients are affectively engrossed in the present in such a manner that their current and transitory mental states are not meaningfully embedded in life-shaping structures which are usually continuously developed (involving reflective capacities). It can be concluded that borderline personality disorder is characterized by a discontinuity in psycho-social life and thus a lack of unity of the narrative identity.

Overall, these psychopathological analyses show that an investigation into the intricate interconnections between the intersubjective and the temporal dimension of embodied subjectivity proves to be crucial not only for understanding the fundamental constitution and workings of the mind, but also for giving an account of its disturbances. Insights gained through these research efforts can aid to the description and conceptualization of patients' experiences. They can, furthermore, inform the identification of differential criteria for the delineation of certain mental disorders, and the development of a theoretical basis for considerations of approaches of clinical practice.

## VI. Overview of the Special Issue

The present special issue aims to investigate the dimensions of temporality, intersubjectivity and embodiment with respect to psychopathological and other interpersonal but also collective phenomena of the constitution of the life world. The collection of contributions is interdisciplinary, comprising work in the areas of phenomenology, embodied approaches to cognition as well as social philosophy. The issue begins with two articles which lay out the concept of *affectivity* in interpersonal terms. An exploration of bodily mediated interaffectivity is undertaken in

the first contribution. This paper pursues a transcultural approach drawing on the Japanese notion of 'ki'. The second paper propounds an embodied approach to a category of feelings which however, in interpersonal respect, epitomize the deontological aspect and normative dimension of affectivity. It investigates a kind of feelings that are thus to be specified in the societal context.

Subsequently, the domain of *mental illness* is addressed by two articles, which specifically inquire into the conditions of depression (third paper) and autism (fourth paper). These contributions explicate the phenomenology and nature of disturbances in these conditions. In doing so, they point to prospects of overcoming interpersonal desynchronization through (inter-)bodily therapeutic experiences – with respect to depression –, and in a participatory hermeneutic manner underpinned by scientific insights – with respect to autism. Following this, the fifth paper is devoted to the domain of *interpersonal relations on the institutional level* and, more concretely, in the institution of psychiatry. It normatively evaluates the specific institutional structures from a historical perspective, analyzing their temporal development as a social process. Finally, the sixth article expounds the intertwinement of temporality, intersubjectivity and embodiment on the collective level with regard to the Husserlian concept of *tradition*. A closer introduction to the contributions of this special issue shall now be provided:

“Phänomenologie des Fühlens im Horizont der Interaffektivität aus dem japanischen *Ki*-Wortfeld” (“The phenomenology of feeling in the horizon of interaffectivity from the Japanese *ki*-word-field”) by **Yukiko Kuwayama** examines the concept of affectivity from the point of view of the Japanese notion of 'ki'. By means of a linguistic analysis of 'ki' the author shows that it serves to express feelings in terms of atmospheres and is to be understood as having an “aerial [...] quality”. The *ki* as an atmospheric phenomenon can assume a variety of phenomenal characters. Furthermore, as a term syntactically used with no “*acting* subject” in the sentence, 'ki' does not ontologically presuppose a subject and an object or a dichotomy between the subjective and the objective (i.e. the internal and the external sphere). In this regard its rationale is shown to be mirrored in an embodied approach to interaffectivity, which does not assume “linear causality” with respect to emotionality, and is further explicated in terms of affective intercorporeal dynamics. It is thus shown to be construable as the intersubjective dynamics of concomitant “affecting and being affected” (as expressed by Mühlhoff (2019) whose approach the author relies on), unfolding in immediate bodily interactions and forming a unity of affective resonance. In the situative context of the interpersonal encounter, which is defined by this resonance, the involved subjects' dispositions enter in such a manner that they are not merely present as individual characteristics. Instead, these constituents of the individuals' specific bodily affectability, that are the product of a temporally extended biographical process of experiences, create through their interplay an emerging atmospheric aggregate totality. In this way the mutual effect of the subjective dispositions constitutes a temporal presence as an experience in which the interacting subjects' dispositional constitution is modulated. This indicates that the experience of *ki*, moreover, implies the temporal situatedness of subjects.

In the second paper, entitled “Deontological Feelings As Normative Affective Backgrounds: The Case Of Profound Boredom”, **Henning Nörenberg** proposes a concept of bodily-affective background orientations that he expounds to be constitutive of the normative stance of the subject engaged in the social world. These 'deontological feelings' express our sensitivity to particular deontic powers and demands. They are pre-intentional bodily predispositions to feelingly recognize intelligible reasons for action, obligations, rights and responsibilities. In virtue of their affective nature, these bodily experiential structures constitute the backdrop against which emotional evaluative states (such as shame) arise or are explicitly avoided through action within situational contexts. Such intentional states in relation to demanded actions are taken to describe the phenomenology of recognizing deontic power. Deontological feelings, that shape the experience of felt demands, are argued to be structurally analogous to the affective background of experiencing significant practical possibilities or “soliciting affordances”.

In order to flesh out this conceptual framework, the author discusses the attunement of profound boredom in terms of deontological feeling. In doing so, he initially explicates the bodily dimension of this specific kind of affective background orientation, referring to three

interrelated aspects. First, profound boredom is described as being characterized by “*radical unrest*”: this fundamental bodily tendency is manifested in the subject’s perpetual restless activity which is, furthermore, symptomatic of a shift in the temporality of the subject’s life. The subject’s conduct of life is marked by acceleration and a sense of haste and impatience (amounting to a “narrowed temporal horizon”). Second, in the condition of profound boredom, the subject experiences a “*sense of decreased self-efficacy*”: while the profoundly bored individual shows increased activity in everyday life, its agentive performances lack meaning and effectivity which can in fact be seen as the source of the excessive preoccupation with a large variety of activities. Third, the lack of a sense of self-efficacy correlates with an experienced oblivion to and “*muteness of the world*”. The world does not enable the fulfillment of tacit bodily anticipations of “meaningful resonance”.

The author shows these aspects of the phenomenology of profound boredom to be associated with a shift in the subject’s normative background orientation – more precisely, with a receding felt sensitivity to ‘usual’ deontological demands. At the same time, the subject is claimed to show receptivity to and specifically yearn to devote itself to deontic power that is bound to an authority “marked by atmospheric qualities such as severity, rigidity, tremendousness, powerfulness”. With respect to these, the subject experiences a sense of ‘oughtness’ and recognizes the potential of effectuating a noticeable difference that it strives to attain so as to overcome its meaningless, restless activity. Henning Nörenberg’s article contributes to the above discussed notion of the temporality of bodily mediated experience of possibilities for action that the social world provides. Focusing on specifically the obligatory (as compared to enticing) character of socially afforded actions, he specifies the experience of deontological power as a factor in the scope of the subject’s temporal horizon. With reduced deontological sensitivity, the subject moves towards the future via bodily restlessness and activity (striving for achieving meaningful resonance with the social world) – albeit a foreshortened future that characterizes the temporality of its acceleration and lack of efficacy in the interpersonal realm.

In his paper “Subjektive Zeiterfahrung und Körperwahrnehmung bei depressiven Erkrankungen: Welche Modelle des Zeiterlebens sind hilfreich?” (“Subjective experience of time and bodily awareness in depressive illnesses: which models of the experience of time are helpful?”) **Frederic Buelow** relates ‘cinematic’, ‘extensional’ and ‘retentional’ models of time consciousness to three phenomenological aspects of temporality (explicit, implicit and intersubjective time) that have been shown to be affected in the psychiatric illness of depression. Based on this, he argues that, as opposed to cinematic and extensional models, retentional temporal models are qualified for serving as a basis to give an account of certain pathological experiences which occur in depression. These experiences concern time but also, immediately connected to it, the subject’s body and other people.

In the presentation and juxtaposition of the mentioned models, the author discusses the problem of experiential temporal continuity in the stream of consciousness that they address in different ways. Cinematic models of time consciousness fail to satisfactorily account for this problem, due to their denial of the idea that single percepts already imply the sense of change or succession. This idea is adopted by extensional and retentional models. The former however necessarily implicate the paradoxical presupposition that several succeeding stimuli need to “appear at the same time simultaneously and successively in awareness”. The latter, as is shown, do not face this problem, due to their use of the notion of ‘retentional awareness’. The retentional view of time consciousness, paradigmatically represented by Husserl’s theory of ‘inner time consciousness’, furthermore, includes the experiential reference to the future. According to the author, this aspect of the theory is of great value for analyses of psychopathological phenomena. Furthermore, it is argued that extensional temporal models lack consistency with the notions of implicit (lived), explicit and intersubjective time, while cinematic models can be applied to the former two and not to the latter. In contrast, retentional models are in line with the three presented phenomenological notions of time. They are thus compatible with the conceptualization of depression in terms of desynchronization. The relevance of these aspects of temporality in the field of psychopathology – in particular with respect to depression – is demonstrated on

the basis of a case example. In this context it is illustrated how in the process of recovery restoration of synchronization with the (social) environment may be achieved through bodily and interpersonal therapeutic interventions.

In “Neurogradualism: Neurodiversity Without Categorical Difference, A Case Study Of Autism” **Jo Bervoets** explores the link between embodiment (in the phenomenological as well as cognitive scientific sense) and social understanding (in the enactive and hermeneutical sense) with reference to the condition of autism. He postulates and defends the thesis that disruptions of mutual understanding in interpersonal exchange which can more specifically be observed in connection with autism cannot be reduced to characteristics of the so diagnosed individual. These characteristics are however clinically and diagnostically considered in terms of (social) dysfunction. Intersubjective pathologies, the vulnerability to which characterizes “autistic lived experience”, are instead to be understood as the result of the bodily differences between the persons involved in the interpersonal dynamics. These differences correspond to distinct interaction tendencies of the two individuals.

Furthermore, it is argued that, explaining interpersonal disturbances which can occur in relation to autism in terms of neurological diversity can facilitate a better reciprocal understanding between autistic and non-autistic individuals. Accompanied by accumulating scientific insights into this diversity, it could therefore lead to the resolution and prevention of desynchronization. In accordance with this line of thought, the author proposes the notion of ‘neurogradualism’, which is based on a predictive processing approach. It represents a position which asserts a gradual conception of bodily differences between individuals with respect to a neuro-cognitive process that correlates with “atypical” intersubjective tendencies in autism. This notion aims at the suspension of the stigmatizing and segregating attitude which is associated with a strictly categorical conception of autism. It therefore encourages the negotiation of interindividual differences and the achievement of intersubjective rapport while (or precisely in virtue of) acknowledging and studying these differences that are anchored in specific bodily characteristics.

Based on Axel Honneth’s social-philosophical theory of recognition, **Lukas Iwer** conducts an analysis of the relations of recognition prevalent in the institution of psychiatry. “Zu den normativen Grundlagen der Psychiatrie aus anerkennungstheoretischer Perspektive” (“On the normative foundations of psychiatry from the perspective of the theory of recognition”) comprises a discussion of Honneth’s theory of recognition, its implementation to the establishment and normative foundations of psychiatry, and a reflection on its applicability to the psychiatric context. It is pointed out that in Honneth’s theoretical framework recognition is treated from the perspective of a normative theory as a “transcendental predisposition of freedom” but also as an empirical phenomenon. Freedom and mutual recognition which it predisposes are posited as a normative aim and thus serve as a guiding criterion for specific analyses of structures of society. The line of reasoning is put forth that the condition of possibility for freedom and personal flourishing is mutual recognition understood as an acknowledgment of the other’s value, manifested as a limitation of one’s own freedom. The standard of the establishment of relations of recognition and thus the actualization of freedom is justified by and originates from modern and democratic societal values. The empirical method of analysis established by Honneth, termed ‘normative reconstruction’, consists in the “normative” evaluation of the actualization of relations of recognition (and thus freedom). Social normative maxims prevailing in particular historically situated sectors of society are identified and their historical implementation is laid out.

Iwer applies this method to the establishment and normative structures of psychiatry. In this context he discusses the psychiatric canon which evolved with the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (and in line with Enlightenment thinking) accompanied by the progression of psychiatry as a specialized medical discipline. It attributed the patient the potential of recuperation as a recovery of reason – achieved by means of specific therapeutic approaches. The author claims that this view undermines the recognition of the patient and involves a deficiency in the realization of freedom. He moreover presents the development of movements and initiatives instituted by

(former) patients and/ or their relatives in the German history of psychiatry and the present age, which he discusses in terms of Honneth's notion of "struggles for recognition". Amendments related to psychiatric practice, which are achieved by these initiatives, are analyzed in respect of the realization of relations of mutual recognition posited as a "normative ideal". The specific focus here lies on the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and the dialogue approach as a discursive practice in psychiatric clinical and research environments. These developments shall serve the principle of participation and equality of expertise in the relation between professionals and patients within psychiatric institutions as well as public discourse. Finally, the author critically evaluates the limitations of Honneth's approach to recognition with respect to proposals of instituting relations in psychiatry that, as he explicates, are supposed to systemically and processually enhance social freedom. He concludes that this social-philosophical perspective lacks in taking into account the specific legal, political and economic implementation of such proposals.

The final contribution of this special issue – "Tradition – An Ambiguous Conjunction of Time, Body and the Other" by **Thomas Arnold** – discusses the phenomenology of the dimensions of temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity as they are intertwined in the domain of tradition. It, moreover, considers the differentiation between *authentic* and *inauthentic* forms of the latter. Arnold draws on Husserl's notion of tradition, and explicates the therein implied link between time and embodied intersubjectivity as a "*triple threefold or conjunction of time, body and the other*". He pursues the definition of tradition as "the transmission of meaning and validity over time and between subjects", who thereby are historically constituted in their relationship to the world.

Based on this definition, the author points out that meaning is intersubjectively passed on, preserved and interchanged over the course of time substantially by means of documentation (representing a central element of tradition). The entanglement of temporality and intersubjectivity is asserted to require to be analyzed primarily in noematic (rather than noetic) respect, due to the fact that the constitutive role of intersubjectivity pertains to the shared life world and objectivity. Correspondingly, the time of the subjects (actually or potentially) involved in an interpersonal encounter or the indirect interpersonal contact mediated via for instance objects such as documents, is objective, i.e. it is the mundane- or 'world time'. It is shown that this temporality related to objective artefacts is a component of the "triple triad" or conjunction of time, body and the other, characterizing tradition as it proceeds through documentation. The "bodily triad" comprises the body of the person accomplishing the documentation, the document itself as a material artefact, and the embodied subject encountering and engaging with this object. Due to their bodily nature, these are situated in space-time, while it can be differentiated between the objective time of the producer, of the act of producing, and of the subject dealing with the respective product.

Besides this, and having a threefold configuration, the temporality of tradition includes subjective temporal awareness that structures the realization of a document, on the part of its originator, and its appreciation, on the part of the person engaging with it. Lastly, it entails the time inherent to the documented content itself. The triad of the intersubjective aspect of the transmitting process that constitutes tradition encompasses (i) the other as the producer of the artefactual object's content, (ii) as well as the implication of the other in the established technique or methodology of documentation, and (iii) the other as implicated in the linguistic and perceptual capacities required to grasp the content (when dealing with the traditional object). The second part of the paper is concerned with the ambiguity inherent to tradition. It is pointed out that tradition can take an authentic and an inauthentic form. A necessary condition for the former (tradition proper) is the constitution of meaning. In the case of the latter, while the transmission over time and between subjects succeeds, tradition fails in so far as no meaning is transmitted but merely 'empty' conventional practices. These are mentioned to be observable in for instance the sciences, strands of philosophical thought, or the political realm. It is concluded that the conjunction of time, body and the other can constitute an authentic 'mode of tradition' or imply a lack of validity and thus authenticity.



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