

JIABS

Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies



Volume 34 Number 1-2 2011 (2012)

The *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (ISSN 0193-600XX) is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. As a peer-reviewed journal, it welcomes scholarly contributions pertaining to all facets of Buddhist Studies. *JIABS* is published twice yearly.

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Print: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne
GesmbH, A-3580 Horn

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Argumentation theory in the early Tibetan epistemological tradition¹

Pascale Hugon

People generally quarrel because
they cannot argue.

Gilbert K. Chesterton

Abstract

This paper examines the argumentation theory of the early Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) based on his presentation of proof and refutation in the fifth chapter of his *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel* and on parallel passages in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. It attempts to circumscribe Phya pa's views in terms of different aspects – logical, formal, situational and functional – involved in the determination of the necessary features of correct proofs. In addition to examining several important modifications of Phya pa's views in the works of his successors, the paper also raises questions concerning Phya pa's and his successors' textual background and the compatibility of some of Phya pa's tenets with Dharmakīrti's rules of debate.

¹ Work on this paper has been generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the FWF-Project P19862 "Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus" headed by Helmut Krasser. My thanks to David Higgins for correcting my English.

1. Introduction

Buddhism has a long tradition of philosophical argumentation. As Buddhism evolved in the pluri-religious context of India, Buddhist philosophers brought their ideas into confrontation with those of rival non-Buddhist systems and also engaged in disputes with their coreligionists, in live debates as well as in treatises. The competition extended to the theoretical domain as Buddhist thinkers came to develop their own theory of argumentation, that is to say, formulated rules of proper reasoning as well as rules pertaining to the presentation of arguments in the context of debate.

As Buddhism spread to Tibet in the 7th and 10th centuries and the Indian Buddhist corpus was translated into Tibetan, Tibetan scholars inherited, along with theoretical works on logic and debate, abundant models of written argumentation. One should also take into account the influence of Indian scholars visiting Tibet who not only provided direct access to the Indian tradition but also living examples of its scholarly practices.² The Indian tradition of philosophical argumentation had a pervasive impact on the development of Tibetan Buddhism and its exegetical and didactical methods, an impact that lasted up to the present days. While occasions of debate with non-Buddhists were rare in Tibet,³ Buddhists scholars debated extensively among themselves, as indicated for instance by the practice of “debating tours” (*rtsod pa'i grwa skor*).⁴ In the

² I am thinking here in particular of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who visited Tibet in the 8th century and of the role played by the latter in the so-called Great Debate of bSam yas.

³ While Tibetan Buddhist scholars continued to address Indian non-Buddhist views in their works, direct confrontation appears to have taken place only exceptionally on Tibetan ground. A famous reference to a debate opposing a Tibetan scholar and Indian non-Buddhist thinkers, involving Sa skya Paṇḍita as one of the protagonists, is dealt with in Hugon 2012.

⁴ The *Deb sngon* (1110,18; transl. ROERICH 1996: 956) mentions in the biographical account of sMra ba'i seng ge (12th–13th c.) that the latter engaged in such a debating tour (*rtsod pa'i grwa skor mdzad*). Roerich speaks of philosophical debating tours on other occasions in his translation, where the *Deb sngon* only reads “*grwa skor*”; see for instance ROERICH 1996: 1012 about Zhang ston (*Deb sngon* 1179,15), and *ibid.*, p. 1016 about sNyang phu pa bSod

13th century, the Tibetan thinker Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) characterized the ability to debate (along with composition and exegesis) as a skill required of any scholar worthy of this name.⁵ Sa skya Paṇḍita was rather critical about the way debating theory and practice had been developing in Tibet.⁶ In addition to specific objections regarding such procedures as the form of proof-statements and the classification of points of defeat adopted by his predecessors and contemporaries, Sa skya Paṇḍita criticized the use of debate for “pedagogical purposes,” namely, as a tool for testing each other’s knowledge, rather than as an investigation of the truth.⁷

Until recently, not much was known about the argumentation theories and debating practices that had evolved in Tibet up to the 13th century apart from the information stemming from Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism and from the traditional association of the name of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) with the development of autochthonous methods of argumentation. According to the indigenous tradition, Tibetan debate took shape under the influence of this logician, to whom is notably ascribed the invention of the use of argumentation by “chains of consequences” (*thal phreng*), a technique typical of post-15th-century dGe lugs pa manuals.⁸

nams dbang phyug (*Deb sngon* 1183,19).

⁵ The triad of “composition, explanation, and debate” (*rtsom*, *'chad*, *rtsod*) is presented by Sa skya Paṇḍita in his *mKhas 'jug*. The chapter on debate is translated in JACKSON 1987.

⁶ His criticism is found in the third chapter of the *mKhas 'jug* and in the eleventh chapter of the *Rigs gter*.

⁷ *mKhas 'jug* III (translated in JACKSON 1987: 330): “But for someone who has no capability of maintaining a doctrine to extract any sort of definition or fragment of texts and to say “Set forth a formal argument!” is the debate by which a childish person tests his knowledge. It is not the debate of scholars who adhere to tenets.” See also *ibid.* 340: “But to debate heedlessly with no wish to uphold a doctrine and with the aim of testing each other’s knowledge, like the argument of fools, is not the debating of noble persons, but it is merely crafty people amazing the ignorant.”

⁸ This association was, to my knowledge, first pointed out in Western scholarship by Stcherbatsky, who appears to be repeating a traditional view: “The first author to compose an independent work on logic is Chabachoiky-

The recent resurfacing of early bKa' gdams pa works, among which are included a number of epistemological treatises by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his successors, gives us an opportunity to examine on a first-hand basis their contribution to the topic of philosophical debate. This paper's primary aim is to present Phya pa's views on this topic. I will attempt to circumscribe different orientations – logical, formal, situational and functional – involved in the features of proof-statements that Phya pa delineates. I will then examine Phya pa's theory in view of the Tibetan Buddhist epistemological tradition, pointing out some important changes in the works of his successors.⁹ Finally, I will reflect on the implicit and/or explicit textual background of Tibetan thinkers when dealing with argumentation theory.

2. Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on proof and refutation

2.1 Sources

In spite of Phya pa's traditional association with debate, no treatise on debate is ascribed to him, nor is any to be found among the eighteen works of Phya pa actually available.¹⁰ However, Phya pa discusses the topic of argumentation systematically in two places:

senge (1109–1169). He is the creator of a special Tibetan logical style..." (STCHERBATSKY 1932: 55), and "A special literary style has been created for the brief formulation of such a chain of reasoning, it is called the method of "sequence and reason" and its establishment is ascribed to the lama Chaba-choiki-senge." (ibid., p. 58). As discussed in HUGON 2008a: 91–92, the *thal phreng* style of argumentation is not illustrated at all in the works of Phya pa, nor in the works of his successors such as gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston. The earliest occurrence traced so far dates to the beginning of the 14th century in a work by Bu ston (1290–1364), although it is prefigured to some extent already in Chu mig pa's commentary on the PVin.

⁹ As for Phya pa's predecessors, the only epistemological works available so far, two treatises by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), do not contain a systematic presentation relevant to this topic. I will therefore limit my references to this author to passing remarks on specific issues.

¹⁰ These works were published in 2006 in the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*. See HUGON 2008a: 37–52 for an introductory presentation of Phya pa's three epistemological works.

(1) The fifth and last chapter of his *Mun sel*,¹¹ entitled “determination of the way to voice a disputation” (*rtsod pa'i ngag gi tshul rnam par nges pa*) and (2) his extensive commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, 'Od zer, when dealing with the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* on “inference-for-others” (*gzhan don rjes dpag, parārthānumāna*). In this commentary, Phya pa glosses on the source-text but also includes extensive excursus, many of which find a parallel in the *Mun sel*. This is the case for the presentation of proof-statements. On the other hand, refutation is only dealt with in the 'Od zer in the form of a (rather dry) commentary on the relevant section of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.¹² In what follows, my discussion will be referring mainly to the *Mun sel*, but I will mention the 'Od zer when it contains pertinent alternative formulations or additional discussions.

2.2 Outline of Phya pa's discussion

Phya pa divides “argumentative speech” (*rtsod pa'i ngag*) into two categories: proof-statements (*sgrub pa'i ngag*) and refutation-statements (*sun 'byin pa'i ngag*), and distinguishes for each of them correct ones (*yang dag*) from fallacious ones (*ltar snang*).¹³ He also

¹¹ For the overall structure of this work, see HUGON 2008a: 39–40. The fifth chapter corresponds to section 244 in the hierarchical structure. Namely, it is the fourth subdivision in the section on inference (24), which comprehends the following five subsections: (i) *rjes dpag gi mtshan nyid*; (ii) *gtan tshigs dang gtan tshigs ltar snang bsam pa*; (iii) *rtags kyi nus yul bsgrub bya'i rang bzhin*; (iv) *sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa'i ngag gi dbye ba*; (v) *ngag de thal 'gyur du dgod pa'i tshul*.

¹² See Appendix 1 for a comparative table of *sa bcad*, and Appendix 2 for the edited passage of the *Mun sel*.

¹³ This structure echoes the order these themes are treated in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3. This is also a standard division already found in the *Nyāyapraveśa* (NP 1): *sādhanam dūṣaṇam caiva sābhāsam parasaṇvide*. This verse is cited by the author of the *De kho na nyid bsdu s pa* (329,7–9), who identifies its source as the “*Tshad ma byis pa'i 'jug pa*,” i.e., **Pramāṇabālāvātāra*, whereas the Tibetan title of the *Nyāyapraveśa* is *Tshad ma rigs par 'jug pa'i sgo*. Unless *Tshad ma byis pa'i 'jug pa* was used as an alternative title for this work, the fact that this verse also occurs in Jitāri's *Hetutattvopadeśa* (translated in the middle of the 11th century) and that Jitāri was the author of

distinguishes two actors in the verbal exchange, the proponent (*rgol ba*) and the respondent (*phyir rgol ba*), and determines what are the conditions for a verbal exchange that qualifies as a correct proof to take place between them and the form that proof-statements must take depending on these conditions. The last and longest part of his discussion on argumentative speech is devoted to the way proofs and refutations can be formulated either in a positive form (or “autonomous” proof [*svatantra*]) or in the form of a “consequence” (*thal ’gyur*). In this section Phya pa deals with the definition and classification of consequences, and pays special attention to the relations between the elements of a consequence and those of the corresponding autonomous proof.¹⁴

Before we look into the details of Phya pa’s theory, it is useful to point out what is *not* found in his presentation in these two works.

- 1) There is no presentation of the larger context of debate as a public event, namely of features such as the spatial setting, the timing, the audience, etc. We will see that the only situational circumstances that Phya pa takes into consideration are of a cognitive nature.
- 2) Apart from the distinction between proof and refutation, there is no detailed presentation of debate as a process or an identification of its various steps. Phya pa’s passing use of the expression “*sgrub byed dri*” (“questioning [about] the probans”) in another section indicates that he presupposes a specific structure of the debating process,¹⁵ but this structure is not presented explicitly.
- 3) Phya pa is silent on the outcome of an argumentative exchange – the questions of who wins, who loses, and on which

a *Bālāvātārātarka* (*Byis pa ’jug pa’i rtog ge*; translated into Tibetan in the first half of the 12th century) might have played a role in the confusion.

¹⁴ Phya pa’s views on consequences will not be dealt with in the present paper but will be the object of a detailed analysis in a forthcoming study.

¹⁵ The place of such a step in the debating process can be approached by considering the structure found in Chu mig pa’s summary of epistemology described below in section 3.

ground(s), falls outside the scope of his presentation. He does not deal with the consequences that the correctness or incorrectness of argumentative statements may have on the process of the debate. In particular, the works considered do not contain a systematic discussion of “points of defeat” (*tshar gcad[/bcad] pa'i gnas pa*, Skt. *nigrahasthāna*).

- 4) There is no mention of a referee (*dpang po*) when defining the participants in the debate. This is consistent with the preceding points: the referee belongs to the broader context of debate and is linked with its outcome, but he plays no role in the formulation of proof- and refutation-statements proper.

Phya pa's silence on these points in the works under consideration should neither be taken as suggesting Phya pa's ignorance on this matter nor as indicating his adoption of debating practices that would exclude such elements. The passing use of key-terms, such as the above-mentioned expression “*sgrub byed dri*” or of the term “point of defeat,” suggests that Phya pa attributes them a place in debate taken in the broader sense of the term. The absence of systematization concerning these themes is meaningful in view of the scope of his project in the *Mun sel* and the *'Od zer*. These texts are better described as delimiting Phya pa's “theory of proof and refutation” than as outlining his “theory of debate.” Proof and refutation are discussed from the restricted angle of proof- and refutation-statements. The focus of Phya pa's presentation, as the title of the fifth chapter of the *Mun sel* indicates, is on what the proponent and the respondent should say in a dispute, not on the consequence that their statement would have on the process or on the outcome of the discussion.

2.3 Analysis of Phya pa's views

In what follows, I attempt to circumscribe Phya pa's views on argumentative statements¹⁶ in terms of logical, formal, situational and

¹⁶ My discussion will focus on proof-statements, which are better documented in the texts at hand. Phya pa indeed does not discuss refutation ex-

functional aspects, and discuss their interrelation.¹⁷

i. The functional aspect

The “functional aspect” of the proof-statement, what a proof-statement is aimed to achieve, is identified in Phya pa’s definition of the two debaters. The proponent (*rgol ba*) is “someone who takes himself to be the agent of the generation of an inference relative to what is apprehended as the thesis, namely the combination of subject and property”; the respondent (*phyr rgol ba*) is “someone who is conceived by the [proponent] as the patient of the generation of the inference pertaining to this [thesis].”¹⁸ Thus, the purpose of a proof-statement by a proponent is that the respondent generates an inferential understanding of the thesis, an “inference-for-oneself” (*rang don rjes dpag, svārthānumāna*). The notion of “proof” must be understood accordingly. It is not about establishing a thesis *in itself*, even less of establishing a thesis *for oneself* (this is, rather, a pre-condition of the proponent presenting a proof-statement; cf. iv).

tensively, and gives no explicit illustration of a refutation-statement. He does not specify whether “pointing out the fault” should consist in naming the fault in the proponent’s proof, or in presenting a formal counter-argument, but the latter is likely to be intended since, as the title of the section 245 of the *Mun sel* indicates, refutations can be formulated in the form of a consequence. Correct refutation (*sun ’byin pa*) is defined as: The statement, to the opponent, that what the proponent posited as established is faulty (*Mun sel* 82b9–83a1. ’Od zer 196a8: *sgrub pa’i ngag du bkod pa gang la nyes pa dang ’brel ba’i nyes pa de nyid rjod pa*); fallacious refutation (*sun ’byin pa ltar snang*) as: The indication of a non-faulty proponent’s proof as faulty (*Mun sel* 83a1. ’Od zer 196b1: *nyes pa ma yin pa skyon du brjod pa*).

¹⁷ These categories result from my own analysis of the text and do not reflect distinctions introduced by Phya pa himself. One can find a distinction that, to some extent, brings out similar ideas in gTsang nag pa’s *bsDus pa*, where the author distinguishes three specificities of argumentative speech in terms of “expression, nature and effect.” (See *bsDus pa* 157a2: *brjod bya dang ngo bo dang ’bras bu’i khyad par gsum dang ldan pa’i ngag*; see also *sGron ma* 61b6.)

¹⁸ See *Mun sel* 81b9. In ’Od zer 143a2 one finds the definitions: *bsgrub bya de la dmigs pa’i rjes dpag skyed ’dod pa’i dpag ’dod dang ldan pa* and *rgol bas rjes dpag skyed par ’dod pa’i yul*.

A proof is all about the respondent's understanding of the thesis. Someone who has by himself ascertained a thesis inferentially, on the basis of proper evidence, wishes to prompt, in the mind of his interlocutor, the arising of a corresponding inference on the basis of the same evidence. Thus, to "prove a thesis" is to be understood, strictly speaking, in the sense of: "to present evidence that allows the respondent to generate a valid understanding of this thesis."

How can a proof-statement fulfill the intended function? Indeed, a proof-statement is by nature verbal, but the function it aims to fulfill pertains to cognition and, moreover, to valid cognition. How can words be the basis of, or the cause of a valid cognition?¹⁹ Words, let us remember, are not recognized as means of valid cognition in Buddhist epistemology. The statement "P" cannot establish a state of affairs P. Even if P is the case, the cognition someone can generate upon hearing the statement "P" does not qualify as a valid cognition. Otherwise, indeed, the proponent could just state the thesis to fulfill his aim. The proof-statement thus does not convey knowledge of the thesis directly, but provides the respondent with the proper conditions to generate an inference-for-oneself that is a valid cognition regarding the thesis. But these conditions themselves are of a cognitive nature – as we will discuss below, they consist in ascertaining the characteristics of the evidence on which the inferential process is based. So we are back to the initial question: what effect can words have on the cognition of the respondent? While words cannot establish states of affairs, they have the capacity to remind someone of something he has once known based on a valid cognition, in other words, to revive some pre-existing ascertainment. Since one condition of a proof-statement taking place is, as we will see in iii., that the respondent has not yet ascertained the thesis, there is no pre-existing knowledge of the thesis likely to be kindled. The indicating capacity of the statement of the thesis is as worthless as its probative capacity. Knowledge of the thesis is to be, for the interlocutor, a new knowledge, arrived at from some previ-

¹⁹ Cf. Dignāga's claim that inference-for-others is only termed "inference" metaphorically, by attributing to the cause (i.e., the statement [*vacana*]) the name of the effect (i.e., the inference-for-oneself). PSV ad PS 3.1ab, cited in PVin 3 ad k. 1ab.

ous knowledge, which pertains to the evidence. A proof is needed when this previous knowledge is not vivid (for instance due to forgetfulness), or when previous elements of knowledge have not yet been combined in a suitable way.

ii. The logical aspect

The logical aspect of the proof-statement is linked with the structure of inference. It is via an inference that the proponent has ascertained the thesis for himself, and it is via an inference that the respondent will ascertain it for himself as well. Phya pa defines inference using the Dharmakīrtian formula: “an understanding coming from a triply characterized logical reason.”²⁰ A logical reason is correct if it is ascertained to qualify the subject of inference (*phyogs chos, pakṣadharmatā*)²¹ and to be pervaded by the property to be proven (*khyab pa, vyāpti*), this second requirement amounting to the two logically equivalent characteristics of “positive concomitance” (*rjes su ’gro ba, anvaya*) – i.e., presence in similar instances (instances possessing the property to be proven) only – and “negative concomitance” (*ldog pa, vyatireka*) – i.e., complete absence in dissimilar instances (instances devoid of the property to be proven).

Thus, what the interlocutor should be made to remember is this triply characterized logical reason, the evidence that warrants the establishment of the thesis.

iii. The formal aspect

The formal aspect of proof-statements derives directly from the logical background in that a proof-statement indicates verbally the characteristics of the logical reason that the proponent has established for himself. Phya pa defines a [correct] proof-statement

²⁰ PVin 2.1a’b: *svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato ’rthadrk; Mun sel 43a8: tshul gsum pa’i rtags las rtogs pa.*

²¹ In what follows I use the Sanskrit term for convenience’s sake to refer to “the fact that the logical reason qualifies the subject.”

(*sgrub pa'i ngag*) as “the indication (*ston pa*), to the respondent, of the combination of pervasion and *pakṣadharmatā*, [two criteria] that one has oneself ascertained, as being established as a non-belying object.”²²

How does one, in practice, “indicate” these characteristics? Tillemans has pointed out that one finds in Indian Buddhist texts two versions of inference-for-others:²³

- 1) Statements of the type “A is B because C, like D, unlike E” deriving from Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha* and Śāṅkarasvāmin’s *Nyāyapraveśa*, for example: “The hill has fire, because of smoke, like the kitchen, unlike the ocean.”
- 2) Two-member statements of the type “All that is C is B, like D; A is C,”²⁴ or alternatively “All that is not B is not C, like E; A is C,” found in Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* and in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Nyāyabindu*, as well as *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. For instance: “Where there is smoke there is fire, like [in] the kitchen; the hill has smoke.”

While both versions are found in Phya pa’s texts, in the section on proof-statements the discussion concentrates on the second type, which clearly distinguishes two members (*yan lag*). As we will see in (iv), a proof-statement does not necessarily have two members, for, along with the logical aspect, it is also conditioned by the situational aspect.

According to Phya pa, there are actually two ways one can formulate a proof-statement. One is the one just mentioned, that is

²² *Mun sel* 82b7; one finds an almost identical definition in *’Od zer* 143b6–7 (with *rang nyid kyis* instead of *rang gis*). A fallacious proof (*sgrub pa ltar snang*) is defined as: What is posited as a means of proof which one oneself accepts (or: for [the thesis] that one oneself accepts), but which is unable to indicate to the respondent the combination of *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion as a non-belying object. *Mun sel* 82b7. *’Od zer* 189a5–6 reads: *rang nyid ’dod pa’i sgrub byed du bkod pa na pha rol la phyogs chos dang khyab pa tshogs don myed na mi ’byung ba’i blo la ’jog mi nus pa*.

²³ TILLEMANS 1984: 74–75.

²⁴ The order of the two members is indifferent.

termed “positive” or “autonomous” (*rang rgyud*). Another form is possible, that of a consequence (*thal ’gyur*). For instance, a proponent who wants to prove that there is fire on a hill when smoke is seen on this hill can use the positive formulation:

Where there is smoke there is fire, like [in] the kitchen; the hill has smoke,

or he can also formulate his proof in the form of a consequence:

Where there is no fire there is no smoke, like [in] the ocean; [according to you] there is no fire on the hill.²⁵

The “consequence,” in this formulation is that the opponent should accept that there is no smoke on the hill, which is contradicted by the present experience.

Both statements have the same function: leading the opponent to an inferential understanding that there is fire on the hill. The former indicates the two criteria of the relevant evidence for this inference directly, while the latter does it indirectly.

One can note here a particularity in the syntax of Phya pa’s formulation of proof-statements. Namely, the member indicating the qualification of the subject by the logical reason – usually the last part of the statement – ends with an instrumental particle. For instance “*gang byas pa mi rtag ste bum pa bzhin sgra byas pas zhes*” (“All that is produced is impermanent; sound is produced, hence...”). This “*pas*” suggests a connection with a subsequent, but unformulated, proposition, which is no other than the thesis (“... hence sound is impermanent”). This practice is also attested in the works of Phya pa’s students gTsang nag pa brTson ’grus seng ge (?–after 1195) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210), but absent from the work of the later gSang phu scholar Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal (13th c.). In the epistemological treatise of gTsang drug pa rDo rje ’od zer (12th c. [?]) one finds the same type of formulation, namely the statement of *pakṣadharmatā* ends with the particle

²⁵ While these examples represent a standard formulation, in both cases the statement of pervasion can be made either by ways of indicating the positive concomitance or the negative concomitance.

“*phyir*.”²⁶ This practice is subject to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism in the *Rigs gter*.²⁷ Sa skya Paṇḍita indeed points out that such formulation using the instrumental or the ablative is syntactically incomplete – the opponent would indeed want to ask “hence what?” But should one want to palliate to this incompleteness, it would require explicitly mentioning the thesis. However, logically speaking, the thesis has no probative force – it is the conclusion of the argument. As mentioned when discussing the functional aspect, the statement of the thesis is useless as a probans. It would thus constitute a superfluous member making the proof-statement fallacious.²⁸

iv. The situational aspect

What we have seen so far does not differ much from standard Dharmakīrtian inference-for-others.²⁹ This is not too surprising considering that in the *’Od zer*, “proof-statement” is explicitly equated with “inference-for-others.” A more original element of Phya pa’s presentation is a detailed inquiry of the “conditions” or “circumstances” (*skabs*) that precede the statement of a proof – this is what I call the “situational aspect.” The circumstances considered by Phya pa are exclusively of a cognitive nature. They are a matter of what the two debaters know or do not know at the time of the dispute. The objects that are relevant here are the thesis and the three characteristics of the logical reason, actually reduced to the two criteria of *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion. Three mental states that can pertain to each of these objects are here distinguished:

- (1) establishment without oblivion³⁰

²⁶ See for instance *gSal byed 71a7*: *gang byas pa tsaṃ yin pa la mi rtag pas khyab ste bum pa bzhin sgra yang byas pa’i phyir ces pa lta bu*. On this text see n. 49.

²⁷ See *Rigs gter XI.30ab* (*yan lag gnyis pa’ang gsum pa dang // lnga pa sbyar na dam bca’ ’dren*) cum *rang ’grel*.

²⁸ The issue of the statement of the thesis is discussed in TILLEMANS 1984: 90–91 and TILLEMANS 2000: 25–36.

²⁹ See TILLEMANS 1984 for a discussion of its central features.

³⁰ The terms used in this situation are *shes pa* or *grub pa*. Phya pa does not specify that the cognition under consideration must be established by a

- (2) oblivion, namely, an establishment by a valid cognition followed (in short or long term) by forgetfulness (*brjed, ma dran*) or by a lack of attention (*blo kha ma phyogs*)³¹
- (3) ignorance (*ma shes*).

There are three different actions adapted to these three situations:

- (1) To a respondent who already knows and remembers something, it is superfluous to state anything in this regard.
- (2) If the respondent has previously ascertained something, but has forgotten it or is not paying attention to it at the time of the dispute, he needs to be reminded of it. This can be done simply by a verbal indication of what was forgotten. This verbal indication cannot by itself establish a state of affairs, but it can bring the forgetful respondent to a mental state where the state of affairs is both established and remembered; this is a state I call “vivid knowledge.”
- (3) If the respondent does not know something at all, a mere verbal indication would be useless. This needs to be proven to him, so that he can acquire via inference a valid cognition pertaining to it.

Let us consider the mental state the proponent should be in. An essential condition pertaining to the proponent is that he should be in a mental state (1) with regard to the two criteria of the logical reason, namely, that he knows them and has not forgotten them (or is not lacking attention in their regard). Without knowledge of the

valid cognition (*tshad ma*), but it is obvious from the context. The specification “not forgotten” or “remembered” (*shes la ma brjed, shes la dran*) distinguishes it from the second mental state (*shes la brjed, shes la ma dran*).

³¹ Of these two expressions – the first predominates in the *Mun sel*, the second in the *'Od zer* – the term “forgetfulness” is better adapted to conceptual knowledge acquired via inference, that of “lack of attention” to knowledge resulting from perception. For instance, if one can easily conceive that a debater has “forgotten” that sound is produced, in the case he has seen smoke on the hill it is more understandable to say that he “is not paying attention” rather than that he has “forgotten” that there is smoke on the hill.

two criteria, he could not be said to have established them himself (*rang la grub; rang gis nges*), and without remembrance (respectively, attention), the proponent would simply not have the idea to present these two criteria in a two-member proof. That the proponent is in a mental state (1) with regard to the two criteria implies that he has performed an inference-for-oneself – the causes for its arising are indeed present and unobstructed – and hence that he is also in a mental state (1) with regard to the thesis. In this sense, the argumentative exchange that takes place does not, in principle, qualify as a “quest for the truth” for one of the debaters has already ascertained the state of affairs that constitutes the thesis.³²

Conversely, for a proof-statement to be relevant, the respondent should be in a mental state (3) with regard to the thesis. But this does not mean that he must be in the third mental state as well with regard to the two criteria of the logical reason that the proponent intends to use in his proof-statement; all three options are there open. Combining the three possible mental states with the two criteria, one can distinguish nine situations based on the respondent, seven of which are taken into account by Phya pa.³³ These seven situations (i–vii) condition the use of eight kinds of proof-statements

³² This is at least the case from the subjective point of view of the proponent, or in the case of an “ideal situation.” In practice, a debate can still qualify as a “quest for the truth” provided one takes into account the possibility that the proponent is mistaken regarding the thesis he supports or the evidence he adduces for it.

³³ Two cases among the nine possible combinations do not appear in Phya pa’s list: (1) *pakṣadharmatā* is not known and pervasion is known and remembered; (2) *pakṣadharmatā* is known and remembered and pervasion is not known. The reason why they are not taken into account could be that the corresponding proof-statements in view of establishing a thesis T would be indistinguishable in the first case from the proof of a thesis P where P corresponds to the *pakṣadharmatā* for T and in the second case from the proof of a thesis V where V corresponds to the pervasion for T. For instance, in the first case, the proof of sound’s impermanence to such a respondent would be “What is occasional is produced by a cause, like a pot; sound also is occasional, hence...,” a statement indistinguishable from the proof that sound is produced to a respondent who knows and has forgotten the relevant characteristics.

(1–8), as listed in the table on the next page.³⁴

In situation No. vii, where the respondent knows and remembers both criteria, no proof-statement is needed at all, for all the conditions are already fulfilled for the respondent to generate an inference-for-oneself pertaining to the thesis at hand.

Situations No. i and No. iii allow for two kinds of proof-statements that are equally correct and adapted to the situation at hand, because the indication of pervasion can be made either in the positive form “the logical reason entails the property to be proven” or in the counterpositive form “the lack of the property to be proven entails the lack of the logical reason.”³⁵

We see from this table that two-member formulations correspond to a specific circumstance: that of a respondent who knows but has forgotten both characteristics. In addition Phya pa accepts one-member proof-statements as well as three- to four-member proof-statements.

³⁴ As mentioned, proofs can take a positive form as well as the form of a consequence. Regarding the latter, the same combinations apply, giving six possibilities analogue to Nos. 1–5 and 7 below. Since in correct probative consequence-statements the logical reason does not really qualify the subject, but is only believed to do so by the opponent, there cannot be a proof pertaining to this characteristic. Therefore there is no correspondence for Nos. 6 and 8. In the *Mun sel*, Phya pa only mentions the six possibilities. A more extensive discussion of the six kinds of consequence-statements based on the opponent’s mental states can be found in *’Od zer* 149a1–5.

³⁵ When V alone is stated, the first form is called “positive concomitance” (*rjes ’gro, anvaya*), the second “negative concomitance” (*ldog pa, vyatireka*). When P also is stated, the first form is termed “homogeneous” (*chos mthun pa, sādharmaavat*), the second “heterogeneous” (*chos mi mthun pa, vaidharmyavat*). The two possibilities are not distinguished in case No. vi, when P is proven; the example for this situation illustrates a statement of V in the positive form. This certainly facilitates the identification of the logical reason and property to be proven of the main thesis for the respondent, given that the main logical reason is not explicit in the first part of the proof-statement, where P is proven rather than stated.

	P (phyogs chos, pakṣadharmatā)	V (khyab pa, vyāpti)	Proof-statement
i	forgotten	forgotten	1 Statement of P and homogeneous statement for V (<i>chos mthun pa, sādharṃyavat</i> ; i.e., V in positive form with homogeneous example)
ii	forgotten	known, remembered	2 Statement of P and heterogeneous statement for V (<i>chos mi mthun pa, vaidharṃyavat</i> ; i.e., V in counterpositive form with heterogeneous example)
iii	known, remembered	forgotten	3 Statement of P alone
iv	not known	not known	4 Statement of V alone in positive form (<i>rjes 'gro, anvaya</i>)
v	forgotten	not known	5 Statement of V alone in counterpositive form (<i>ldog pa, vyatireka</i>)
vi	not known	forgotten	6 Proof of both
vii	known, remembered	known, remembered	7 Proof of V, statement of P
			8 Proof of P, statement of V
			- No need for a proof-statement

One-member proof-statements

The rationale behind Phya pa's acceptance of one-member proof-statements (Nos. 3, 4, and 5) is that one should not state something superfluous. If the opponent already knows something, there is no need to prove it to him; if he already remembers, there is no need to remind him.

This rejection of superfluous elements echoes the *Vādanyāya's* general rule that stating something that is not a probans (*asādhānāṅgasya vacanam*) is faulty, and the more particular discussion, mentioned before, pertaining to the uselessness of stating the thesis in an inference-for-others.

If the principle of non-superfluity indeed finds grounding in Dharmakīrti, one can wonder how Phya pa can escape the charge of incompleteness. There is incompleteness, according to Dharmakīrti, when one of the three characteristics of the logical reason is not stated.³⁶ This must be somewhat nuanced in view of the fact that Dharmakīrti holds that the two characteristics of positive and negative concomitance are equivalent and that only one of them should be stated.³⁷ A proof-statement therefore should include two members: *pakṣadharmatā* and either positive or negative concomitance. The permissibility of a shorter version in Dharmakīrti's system thus appears to be compromised.

As Phya pa strictly applies the principle of non-superfluity but does not invoke Dharmakīrti when discussing one-member proof-statements, he does not directly confront this interpretative difficulty. In particular, he does not make reference to a passage of the *Svavṛtti* (whether he knew it or not remains a question)

³⁶ See PV 4.23cd and PVin 3 10,7–8 (referring to Dignāga).

³⁷ PVin 2 52,12–14: *anvayavyatirekayor niścitavyāptikam ekam api rūpaṃ prayuktam arthāpattiyā dvitīyaṃ gamayatīti*. See also PV 1.28 and VN 17,12–15. Phya pa invokes the uselessness of stating both positive and negative concomitance to indicate pervasion as a case analogical to stating both *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion when one of them is already known and remembered. See the reference given in n. 44.

much discussed in the works of his successors³⁸ that could offer support for one-member proof-statements. Indeed, when discussing the role of examples at the beginning of the *Svavṛtti* (PVSV 17,13–19,22), Dharmakīrti explains that examples are needed only when the proof is formulated for someone ignorant of the pervasion; when debating with a learned person, i.e., one who knows the pervasion, only the reason needs to be mentioned.³⁹ Tibetan commentators unanimously take the phrase “only the mere reason” to mean “only the *phyogs chos*.” As the Tibetan “*phyogs chos*” expresses “[the logical reason that is a] property of the subject” as well as “[the fact that the logical reason is a] property of the subject” (i.e., *pakṣadharmatā*), Dharmakīrti’s statement could be taken to offer support for a one-member proof-statement that does not mention the pervasion if the latter is known and remembered, but only mentions the criterion of *pakṣadharmatā*.⁴⁰ Nothing, however, appears to allow one-member proof-statements consisting of the sole pervasion to escape the charge of incompleteness.

Phya pa, however, does not delineate completeness in view of a

³⁸ It is already mentioned in the *De kho na nyid bsdus pa* 326,11–12. See below section 3.

³⁹ PV 1.27 cum *Svavṛtti* (translated in STEINKELLNER 2004: 238ff., where the verse is numbered k.29. The verse appears in italics in the translation): “Surely in the example (the fact) is conveyed to (someone) who does not know (either of) these (two facts), (namely) that [the property to be proven] is [in reality nothing but] that (reason) or (its) cause. To those, on the other hand, who are already familiar with (the fact that that which is to be proven) is [in reality] this (reason) or (its) cause, (i.e.,) For to those who know (this), only the mere reason needs to be mentioned. The purpose for which an example is stated, that is (already) achieved. Thus, of what avail is its formulation then?”

⁴⁰ Dharmakīrti’s Indian commentators do not elaborate on this issue, at the exception of Śāṅkaranandana, who understands “the mere reason” in the sense of “the mere *pakṣadharmā*.” See PVṬṣ 110b7: *gtan tshigs ni brjod la ’brel pa rab tu ston pa’i thabs dang bral ba zhes bya bas ni phyogs kyī chos tsam ’ba’ zhig brjod par bya’o zhes bshad par ’gyur ro ||* It is unclear whether Śāṅkaranandana would concede that this “*pakṣadharmā*” amounts to one member in a second-version type of proof-statement (i.e., *pakṣadharmatā*, as some Tibetan authors do), or just takes it to be the logical reason in a first-version proof-statement, i.e., allowing for the formulation “A is B, because C” lacking the example.

fixed form of the proof-statement, but in view of its functional aspect. Namely, completeness is granted when the respondent, after hearing the proof-statement, has in his hands the necessary elements to generate an inference. The form of the proof-statement is therefore free to vary in accordance with the situational aspect.

Complex proof-statements

While superfluous statements are to be avoided, providing the respondent with all the elements necessary to his generating an inference-for-oneself is essential to the functional aspect of the proof-statement. If the respondent does not yet know one characteristic, merely indicating it will not do, as there can be no reminiscence of something that has not been established yet. This characteristic must be proven to him. It is thus assimilated to a thesis to be established by an inference on the basis of its own logical reason. The proponent's proof must therefore include, instead of the mere statement of the given criterion, the presentation of the characteristics of this secondary logical reason that will allow the respondent to gain an inferential knowledge of this criterion.

For instance, when the proponent wants to prove the thesis "sound is impermanent" on the basis of the logical reason "produced," if the opponent does not know that sound is produced, the proof-statement must include the proof that sound is produced. Such proof can, for instance, be based on the logical reason "being occasional" (*res 'ga' ba, kādācitka*): "What is occasional is produced by a cause, like a pot; sound also is occasional, hence...." This secondary proof-statement is to be embedded in the main proof-statement. Now if the opponent does not know that what is produced is impermanent, this, too, must be proven on the basis of a logical reason whose characteristics must be presented. For instance: "What is void of gradual or simultaneous causal efficacy is void of production, like a sky-flower; what is void of momentariness is void of gradual or simultaneous causal efficiency, hence...." There, the secondary proof establishing the pervasion of the main proof can be identified as an inference that negates the presence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instances of the main infer-

ence (*sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*). So in the case of a very ignorant respondent (such as in case No. iv), one ends up with a rather complicated proof-statement (No. 6) where, instead of two members, one finds two secondary proof-statements themselves consisting of two members:

(V1)What is void of gradual or simultaneous causal efficacy is void of production, like a sky-flower; (P1)what is void of momentariness is void of gradual or simultaneous causal efficiency, hence... (V2)What is occasional is produced by a cause, like a pot; (P2)sound also is occasional, hence...

Such complex proof-statement is termed an “[inference-]for-others that proves both” (*gnyi ga sgrub pa'i gzhan don*). P1 and V1 directly prove a thesis T1 which amounts to V “what is produced is impermanent”; P2 and V2 directly prove a thesis T2 which amounts to P “sound is produced”. P1, V1, P2 and V2 thereby indirectly prove the main thesis T “sound is impermanent.” Indeed, the first two statements allow the respondent to know V (the pervasion of the reason for the main thesis), the last two allow him to know P (*pakṣadharmatā* of the reason for the main thesis). By knowing P and V, the *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion of the logical reason “produced,” the respondent is able to generate the inferential understanding that “sound is impermanent.”

Phya pa only discusses cases where a secondary proof is needed for one or both criteria of the main logical reason, but does not proceed to distinguish several ways this secondary proof must be stated depending on the mental state of the respondent regarding the characteristics of the secondary logical reason(s), which would open the possibility for even more complex proof-statements. The examples of secondary proofs that he gives all involve elements that are “known and forgotten” by the respondent, and it might be taken to signify an implicit rule limiting the complexity of proof-statements.

2.4. Correct and fallacious proofs

The aspects that I have distinguished above are interrelated. In particular, the formal aspect, the determination of what members the

proof-statement should consist of, is conditioned by the logical and the situational aspects. The circumstances – the mental states of the respondent pertaining to the two criteria of *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion – influence the composition of the proof-statement based on the principles of completeness and non-superfluity that are conceived in relation to the functional aspect.

How do these various aspects intervene in the determination of the correctness or fallacious character of a proof-statement? In particular, what kind of outcome is to be expected from the statement of proofs that disregard the functional and the situational aspects?

The definition of a (correct) proof-statement (see 2.3.iii) indeed concentrates on the logical aspect in that it prescribes the indication of two members that match the two criteria of a logical reason. The logical aspect is prominent as well in the discussion that follows the definition of a fallacious proof-statement,⁴¹ where the instance of fallacies are identified first as logical fallacies (i.e., use of a logical reason that is not established, inconclusive or contrary), another aspect being fallacies of incompleteness (*ma tshang*) and superfluity (*lhag pa*).⁴² A putative reason that does not conform to the logical aspect by failing to fulfill one or more of the three characteristics does not only invalidate the correctness of a proof-statement, it also prevents the proof-statement from fulfilling its function: the respondent will either not generate any cognition because he objects to the erroneous evidence presented to him, or if he does generate some understanding, the latter will not qualify as an inference because it is not based on a correct logical reason. But the functional aspect itself is not included in the definition of a correct proof-statement, but only involved in the definition of the debaters.⁴³ The definition of a correct proof-statement specifies what

⁴¹ See n. 22 for Phya pa's definition of a fallacious proof-statement.

⁴² These two categories correspond to the distinction made by Dharmakīrti between "objective" and "subjective" faults. PVin 3 47,1–3: *na vai vastudharmasamāśrayeṇaiva parārthe 'numāne sādhanadoṣodbhāvanam, api tu vaktṛdoṣeṇāpi, nyūnatānavayavaparītānvayavat //*

⁴³ See 2.3.i for the definition of the debaters, and 2.3.iii for the definition of a correct proof-statement.

must be stated by whom, but not what can be (or what is aimed to be) achieved by such a statement. As a consequence, failure by the respondent to generate an inference when all the other conditions relative to the proof-statement (in particular the logical ones) are fulfilled would not invalidate the correctness of that statement.

The role of the situational aspect is more difficult to ascertain. The situational aspect pertaining to the proponent is included in the definition of a correct logical reason, which mentions the proponent's previous ascertainment (*rang gis nges*) of the criteria of the logical reason, but the situational aspect pertaining to the respondent is not mentioned either there or in the explanation of incompleteness and superfluity in the context of fallacious proof-statements. There, indeed, incompleteness is explained as "incompleteness of the statement of *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion of a correct logical reason," which suggests deviation from a fixed two-term formula, rather than in functional terms, i.e., in terms of what the respondent needs to hear to generate an inference, depending on the situation.

As discussed above, Phya pa's argument for the acceptance of one-member proof-statements relies on a criterion of pertinence. Phya pa uses the statement of pervasion as a parallel to argue in this sense: reminding someone of the pervasion does not require the statement of both the positive and of the negative concomitance; when one of them has been presented, the other is useless (*don med*), because the pervasion is already remembered. In parallel, if the respondent already remembers the pervasion from the start, any statement pertaining to it would be useless.⁴⁴ One-member proof-statements as well as the other possibilities on the eightfold list are thereby allowed, even recommended. If they thus escape the charge of incompleteness, it would thus appear that Phya pa's definition of a proof-statement gives a rule where the formal aspect is strictly based on a logical criterion, a rule that admits exceptions depending on the situational aspect.

One can wonder what happens if the proponent does not adapt the form of the statement in function of the situational aspect, end-

⁴⁴ See the discussion in *Mun sel* 82b1–4; parallel in 'Od zer 143a8–b2.

ing up saying either too much or too little. Since it is not a requirement that is explicit in the definition of a proof-statement, would it impede its correctness? Such a situation is actually likely to happen frequently, for how can the proponent assess his opponent's mental state? This issue is actually taken up in Phya pa's works, as an opponent raises the objection that the statement of a proof is not even conceivable if the situational aspect is to be taken into account.⁴⁵ One would simply not be able to formulate a correct proof unless one has a special insight (*mngon shes*) allowing one to ascertain the private mental state of the respondent. Indeed, even if the respondent is willing to verbally indicate what state he is in, there remains the possibility that he is faking. In conclusion of this argument, Phya pa affirms that the proponent does not need to have such a special insight to be entitled to make a proof-statement. The sheer possibility of a debate is therefore not nipped in the bud. But Phya pa indicates that a statement of a criterion that is already remembered does not qualify as a proof-statement (*sgrub pa'i ngag ma yin*) anymore than the indication of pervasion and *pakṣadharmatā* to someone who already has an inferential knowledge of the thesis but did not say so. A possibility would be that Phya pa makes a difference between "not being a proof-statement" and "being a fallacious proof-statement." One could surmise in particular that something that is "not a proof-statement" would not be subject to the consequences linked with a fallacious statement; it would notably not be the object of a refutation. However, the parallel passage in the *'Od zer* qualifies clearly the statement of the unnecessary member as "superfluous statement" (*lhag pa'i ngag*), with the consequence that the proof-statement would be, technically speaking, fallacious.

Phya pa's theory is of a prescriptive nature. It is about giving rules to be followed to produce correct proof-statements, rules that also allow identifying deviant, and hence fallacious, statements. It is to be expected that proponents will not, in practice, always state correct proofs. In view of the situational aspect, it is likely that

⁴⁵ See *Mun sel* 82b4–6; parallel in *'Od zer* 148b2–5.

most of the time the proponent will miss the mark.⁴⁶ Phya pa is of the opinion that this should not prevent the debate from taking place, and even states that the absence of special insight is considered not to be a fault for the proponent. Phya pa, as I have noted, is not explicit on what he considers to be points of defeats. But if “not a fault for the proponent” is equivalent to “not a point of defeat for the proponent,”⁴⁷ this would indicate that proof-statements that are technically speaking fallacious do not systematically imply points of defeat. Fallacies related to the situational aspect would in particular benefit from mitigating circumstances.

3. A look at the views of Phya pa’s successors

A detailed study of the views of Phya pa’s successors on argumentation falls outside the scope of this study, but in this section, I would like to point out some important variations that are attested in 12th- and 13th-century Tibetan epistemological treatises that post-date Phya pa.⁴⁸ I base my considerations on the following sources:

⁴⁶ One can note that, unless a referee with special insight is present, the respondent would be the only person capable of identifying the fault of superfluity or redundancy deriving from the situational aspect.

⁴⁷ This is the conclusion arrived at by Blo ldan shes rab in a precedent for this discussion found in the *dKa’ gnas*. rNgog Blo ldan shes rab states that the proponent should not be blamed for not being omniscient and would not incur a point of defeat for stating a logical reason when unnecessary in view of the respondent’s mental state: *de la phyir rgol ba rmongs na de’i tshe gtan tshigs la ma grub par rjod srid pa yang yin pas | de lta bu’i skabs su byas pa bsgrub dgos so || de ma bsgrubs par rgol ba gtan tshigs gzhan ston na | tshar gcad par ’os pa yin no || dang po nas gzhan gyi blo ma rtogs pas byas pa ’god pa yang tshar gcad par bya ba ni ma yin te | mngon par shes pa myed par ni rgol ba pham par ’os pa ma yin no || (dKa’ gnas 244–245).*

⁴⁸ These works are either commentaries on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* or summaries of epistemology, not works dealing specifically with debate. I am aware of a single independent work on debate from this period, which deserves further inquiry: the *rTsod pa’i de nyid*, a three-folio versified text, a copy of which is preserved at the China Nationalities Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing (described in VAN DER KUIJP 1994: 7). According to its colophon, it was composed by “the monk brTson ’grus seng ge.”

the anonymous *De kho na nyid bsdus pa* (wrongly attributed to Klong chen pa), gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge's *bsDus pa*, his student's mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge's *sGron ma*, gTsang drug pa rDo rje 'od zer's *gSal byed*, and the *rNam rgyal* by Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal, a 13th-century author linked with gSang phu monastery.⁴⁹

A major difference between these authors and Phya pa is discernable in the perspective that is adopted when dealing with argumentative speech. The presentation of proof and refutation in the *De kho na nyid bsdus pa*, arguably composed before gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge's work on epistemology, is still in line with Phya pa's presentation, focusing on the restricted scope of "proof- and refutation-statements." But in the work of gTsang nag pa already, the discussion on this topic pays a greater attention to the parts of the debate, the respective roles of the debaters, and to the outcome of debate.

To the proponent (defined as the debater who proves what he himself accepts) and the respondent (the debater who points out the faults made by the proponent) is added a referee (*dpang po*) responsible for deciding on the conclusion of the debate (*gshag 'byed pa*).⁵⁰ Chu mig pa prescribes three kinds of referees, whose respec-

⁴⁹ The *De kho na nyid bsdus pa* was presumably written close to Phya pa's time and does not take into account a number of innovations brought about by gTsang nag pa; the name of the latter also does not appear among the views nominally identified (see VAN DER KUIJP 2003). Dating the *gSal byed* precisely will require a more thorough examination of its contents, but one can safely affirm that it postdate the compositions of Phya pa's disciples such as gTsang nag pa and Dan 'bag pa. The text indeed includes numerous attributions of positions to Phya (Phya pa), rTsang (gTsang nag pa) and Dan (Dan 'bag pa smra ba'i seng ge). I am grateful to Jonathan Stoltz for providing me a copy of this text together with a list of all nominal attributions that it contains. The colophon of this work gives as a title *Yang dag rigs pa'i gsal byed sgron ma* (*gSal byed* 78a7 and 78a8). However, at the beginning of the text, the title given is *Yang dag rigs pa'i gsal byed*, with the Sanskrit equivalent *Samyagvidyāloka* (*saṃ myag bidya a lo ka*). The cover-page identifies the text as a *Tshad ma'i spyi don bsdus pa* composed by gTsang drug pa rDo rje 'od zer.

⁵⁰ See *bsDus pa* 156a5–8; there is a similar account in *sGron ma* 61a3–6.

tive role seems to be, respectively, to repeat the statements of the debaters, to make a decision, and to signal points of defeat.⁵¹

The steps of debate are also made explicit through the enumeration of each debater's statements. Strictly speaking, gTsang nag pa does not enumerate the steps of debate, but categorizes the debaters' statements in view of different phases: for the respondent, questioning (*dri ba'i skabs*) and pointing out faults (*skyon brjod pa*); for the proponent, establishing a state of affairs (*don gyi ngo bo 'jog pa'i skabs*) when questioned, and rejecting faults (*skyon spong pa*) when accused of a fault. The referee intervenes only when proponent and respondent disagree.⁵² A more detailed sequential enumeration of the steps of debate can be reconstructed from Chu mig pa's presentation:

- i) The proponent accepts the role as the one putting forward a thesis (*dam bca' 'jog par khas len pa*).⁵³
- ii) The respondent questions the proponent about the thesis (*dam bca' 'dri ba*): "Is sound permanent or impermanent?"
- iii) The proponent puts forward a thesis (*dam bca' 'jog pa*): "Sound is impermanent."
- iv) The respondent asks about the reason (*rtags 'dri ba*): "Why do you say that sound is impermanent?"
- v) The proponent states the proof in the heterogeneous or homogeneous form (*bsgrub byed 'god pa*): "What is produced is impermanent, like a pot; sound also is produced," or "What is not impermanent is not produced, like ether; sound is produced."

See also *gSal byed* 70a6. In this text, the proponent is defined as the one who takes up the role of defending the thesis (*gSal byed* 70a6: *dam bca' bskyang par khas blangs pa*).

⁵¹ *rNam rgyal* 67b9: *dang po ni rgol phyir rgol 2 / rjes su brjod pa'i dang / bshag 'byed pa'i dang / tshar gcod pa'i dpang po ste gang zag lnga 'tshogs na rtsod pa byed pa yin no //*

⁵² See *bsDus pa* 156b1–4; similar account in *sGron ma* 61a6–8.

⁵³ This stage is mentioned as preliminary to the first statement of the respondent (*rNam rgyal* 68a7: *rgol bas dam bca' 'jog par khas blangs pa'i rjes la dam bca' 'dri ba yin*). It is not exemplified by a statement.

- vi) The respondent presents a refutation if the proponent's proof was fallacious (*sun 'byin brjod pa*).
- vii) The proponent rejects the accusation if the refutation is fallacious (*skyon spong byed pa*).⁵⁴

One can note a number of differences between such an account of the steps of debate and that provided by gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) about two centuries later.⁵⁵ For instance, Śākya mchog ldan adds one question to be asked by the respondent to the question about the thesis and the question about the probans, namely, the question whether the probans possesses the three characteristics of a correct logical reason. In answer to this question, the proponent must “remove the thorns” (*tsher ma 'byin, kaṅṭakoddhāra*), that is, negate the possible faults pertaining to each characteristic. Also, Śākya mchog ldan admits the possibility of short-cuts: if the thesis presented is obviously mistaken, the respondent can refute it right away instead of asking about the probans.

The outcome of debate is dealt with in the work of gTsang nag pa and later works via a discussion of “points of defeat,” which usually includes a citation of the programmatic verse of the *Vādanyāya*.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See *rNam rgyal* 68a6–9. Examples of the different statements are given in *rNam rgyal* 68b2ff. Chu mig pa mentions an objection to the legitimacy of (iv) with regard to Indian practices. He defends it by presenting a passage from Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* in support of it. (*rNam rgyal* 68a8–9: *kha l phyir rgol gyis rgol ba la rtags 'dri ba'i lugs rgya gar na med zer ba ni / mi 'thad de / chos mchog cung du las / grangs can pa dag bdag yod do zhes smra ba na / sangs rgyas pa rnams kyis de ci'i phyir zhes dris pa'i tshe / bsgrub par byed pa 'di smras pa yin te / zhes rtags 'dri bar bshad do //*). The source is NBT 212,12–13 (ad NB 3.88): *ātmāstīti bruvāṇaḥ sāmṅkhyāḥ kuta etad iti paryanuyukto bauddhenedam ātmanāḥ siddhaye pramāṇam āha !*; the canonical Tibetan version is somewhat different from that cited by Chu mig pa: *grangs can dag bdag yod do zhes smra ba na sangs rgyas pa rnams kyis / de ci'i phyir zhes dris pa dang / bdag grub par bya ba'i phyir tshad ma smra ba yin te* (D79b6ff.).

⁵⁵ See JACKSON 1987: 197–199.

⁵⁶ This verse is cited, with minor variations, in *bsDus pa* 156b5, *sGron ma* 61b2, *rNam rgyal* 68b1–2 and *gSal byed* 70b4.

Points of defeat are classified on the basis of the interventions of the respective debaters, but the authors are not unanimous as to the number of points of defeat. For instance, gTsang nag pa enumerates ten points of defeat, three for the proponent, six for the respondent and one common to both. mTshur ston has, instead, sixteen points of defeat: six for the proponent, six for the respondent, three for the referee and one common to all,⁵⁷ and rDo rje 'od zer, who counts nine points of defeat for the proponent, has altogether nineteen of them.⁵⁸

If one considers the positions of these subsequent authors in view of the various aspects that were distinguished above in Phya pa's case, one notes that the logical aspect does not change. Proof-statements remain identified as inferences-for-others. There is on the other hand a difference regarding the functional aspect: the purpose of a proof-statement itself does not change, but in gTsang nag pa's and mTshur ston's presentation, the functional aspect is included in the definition of a correct proof-statement. gTsang nag pa's definition of a proof-statement includes two characteristics: it is (i) "the indication, to the opponent, of a logical reason that one

⁵⁷ Sa skya Paṇḍita criticizes the adoption, by some Tibetan authors, of sixteen points of defeat in *Rigs gter* XI.5 (*rgol ba la ni gsum gnyis drug // phyir rgol la yang gsum gnyis drug // dpang po la gsum kun la gcig // gangs can pa rnams bcu drug 'dod //*) cum *rang 'grel* and *mKhas 'jug* III.2. The commentators do not identify more precisely who are these "Tibetans" (JACKSON 1987: 369, n. 10). mTshur ston, as mentioned above, enumerates sixteen points of defeat. However, in Sa skya Paṇḍita's account, among the six points of defeat pertaining to the proponent, three belong to the context of the "answer to the question" (*dris pa'i lan*) and three to the context of the "rejection of objections" (*skyon spong ba*), whereas in mTshur ston's text this last category is omitted (three faults are relative to the statement of the thesis, three to the statement of the probans).

⁵⁸ See *bsDus pa* 156b3–4, *sGron ma* 61a8–b2 and *gSal byed* 70a9–b5. One can note that the *gSal byed* also mentions three points of defeat relative to the referee (*gSal byed* 70b4–5: *bden brdzun bshag 'byed par khas blangs nas gtan mi 'byed pa dang bden brdzun phyin ci log du 'byed pa dang skabs su ma bab par 'byed pa'o*). These three points are not mentioned by gTsang nag pa, but are introduced by mTshur ston in the form of a citation (*sGron ma* 61b3: *rgol phyir dgol ma mthun pa'i tshe gshag mi 'byed pa dang / phyin ci log du 'byed pa dang / skabs su ma bab pa'i gshag 'byed pa'o zhes gsung ngo*).

has established oneself” and (ii) “the generator of an inference.”⁵⁹ gTsang nag pa explains that the second characteristic is included in view of the definiendum “inference-for-others” that applies to proof-statements, but is not meant to rule out anything. Still, it is an integral feature of the definition. Failure to generate an inference – for instance because the respondent was not paying attention to the proof or is plain stupid – makes the proof-statement fallacious. gTsang nag pa rejects however the consequence that it would entail a point of defeat for the proponent; indeed, failure to fulfill the functional part of the definition is due to a fault relative to the respondent.⁶⁰ There is thus no strict correspondence between the correctness/fallacy of a proof-statement in view of its definition and points of defeats.

The treatment of the situational aspect also undergoes significant modifications. If Phya pa’s successors still proceed to enumerating the various cognitive circumstances pertaining to the respondent, they disagree with Phya pa, and among themselves, first as to which circumstances leave open the opportunity of a proof-statement, and then as to the impact these circumstances have, or not, on the formal aspect.

So far I could ascertain, Phya pa’s successors unanimously reject the possibility of a proof-statement when the mental state of the respondent with regard to either *pakṣadharmatā* or pervasion is one of complete ignorance. They thus discard the complex proof-statements that involve the proof of one or both members, retaining only the first five proof-statements among the eight cases listed by Phya pa.⁶¹ PV 4.20 is sometimes cited in this context to point out that the only function of words is to kindle reminiscence.

⁵⁹ *bsDus pa* 156b7: *pha rol la rang gis grub pa'i rtags ston cing rjes dpag skyed pa*; *sGron ma* 61b5: *phyogs chos khyab pa tshad mas grub pa'i rtags ston cing rjes dpag skyed par byed pa'o ||*

⁶⁰ See the dispute in *bsDus pa* 157a3–5; parallel in *sGron ma* 61b6–8.

⁶¹ See *bsDus pa* 157b8, *sGron ma* 62a5–7, as well as *rNam rgyal* 69a3–5. *gSal byed* gives a detailed account of Phya pa’s eight possibilities (70b7–71a2) and refutes both complex proof-statements (71a2–4) and one-member statements (81a4–5).

Note that this is a point Phya pa would agree with, but he accepts that members of a complex proof-statement, in addition to having a direct effect – kindling reminiscence with regard to the probans for their own thesis (this thesis being either the *pakṣadharmatā* or pervasion of the main thesis) – also have the indirect effect of proving the main thesis. According to gTsang nag pa, there is no such direct or indirect effect: the parts of complex statements only contribute to prove their direct thesis, but cannot be considered to prove the main thesis.⁶²

If complex statements are discarded, one-member proof-statements are included in the lot of the five possibilities based on the respondent's mental state. However, Phya pa's followers are divided on the impact this has on the actual formulation of the proof. Their interpretation of the discussion found in the above-mentioned passage of the *Svavṛtti* where Dharmakīrti suggests that the mere reason needs to be mentioned for those who know the pervasion varies accordingly. Thus the author of the *De kho na nyid bsodus pa* and Sa skya Paṅḍita contend that Dharmakīrti's discussion in the *Svavṛtti* supports the actual use of one-member statements.⁶³ gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston, on the other hand, consider that this passage only indicates what is needed or not for the respondent, not what is required to be uttered by the proponent in the proof-statement.⁶⁴

⁶² gTsang nag pa's argument against complex proof-statements is found in *bsDus pa* 157a6–7 (parallel in *sGron ma* 62a1–2).

⁶³ See *De kho na nyid bsodus pa* 326,11–12 and *Rigs gter* XI.31d (*mkhas pa la ni gtan tshigs nyid*) cum *rang 'grel*. Sa paṅ also accepts the mere statement of the pervasion as a possibility.

⁶⁴ See *bsDus pa* 157b7–8, *sGron ma* 62a4–5. Both authors illustrate their argument by an analogy that I understand as follows: “Even though a guest might not need food, one does not hold a feast without giving [some].” (*drangs* pa la zas mi dgos kyang ma byin par ston mi 'gro ba. *bsDus pa: 'dras*). rDo rje 'od zer, who still includes one-member proof-statements when distinguishing proofs from the point of view of what is useful to the respondent (*gSal byed* 7a18–9, *phyir rgol la don du 'gyur ba'i sgo nas dbye ba*), refutes them when distinguishing proofs from the point of view of the logical reason (*brjod bya rtags kyi sgo nas dbye ba*) on account of their being unable to generate an inference; against the argument of pertinence, rDo rje 'od zer brings forward the problem of knowing what is pertinent and the necessity of

In other words, the formal and functional aspects are dissociated from the situational aspect. A proof-statement should be potent in itself, not in view of this or that respondent. The fivefold division of proof-statements is thus merely indicative of what is relevant to the respondent (*phyir rgol la don du gyur pa'i sgo nas*), but a correct proof should have no more and no less than two members: *pakṣadharmatā* and pervasion.

I have mentioned Sa skya Paṇḍita above. It might seem awkward to include him in this discussion about Phya pa's successors if one considers his critical perspective on the views of his Tibetan predecessors. However, previous Tibetan authors did not only play the role of contrastive influence on Sa skya Paṇḍita, but also had a large amount of positive impact. To a large extent, Sa skya Paṇḍita tends to repeat his predecessors' presentation so long as he does not disagree with it. This process of composition is noticeable in his discussion on debate in the eleventh chapter of the *Rigs gter*. One can discern in this discussion, behind Sa skya Paṇḍita's frequent criticism, a perspective and themes that are constitutive of gTsang nag pa's and especially of mTshur ston's writings, such as the explanation of points of defeat based on the distinction of the participants in the debate, the parts of the debate proper to each of them, and the discussion of the respondent's mental states. Nevertheless, Sa skya Paṇḍita's presentation in this chapter supplements this Tibetan background with a number of Indian sources. In particular Sa skya Paṇḍita quotes liberally from Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*. His presentation extends in particular to a detailed discussion of Indian categorization of points of defeat and of false rejoinders (*ltag chod, jāti*).

4. Evaluation of the textual theoretical background

The development of the Tibetan epistemological tradition, as is well known, was mainly influenced by the foundational works of Dharmakīrti, but only accessorially by those of Dignāga, even if the

a special insight for the proponent (*gSal byed* 71a4–5).

latter is usually named together with Dharmakīrti.⁶⁵ In particular, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* played a primary role in the early phase of its development.⁶⁶ We have seen that Phya pa discussed debate, or rather, argumentative speech, based on the framework of the chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* on “inference-for-others” in the *'Od zer*, and from a similar perspective in the *Mun sel*. But there is another work of Dharmakīrti that more specifically addresses debate: the *Vādanyāya*. This work is already listed in the lHan dkar catalogue among the “translations in progress,”⁶⁷ and was translated around 1050 by Jñānaśrībhadrā and (rMa) dGe ba'i blo gros under the patronage of Zhi ba 'od and rTse lde brtsang. This translation was revised by Dīpaṅkara and Darma grags pa, hence before 1054. A commentary on the *Vādanyāya* by Śāntarakṣita, the *Vādanyāvṛtti*, was translated around 1100 by Kumāraśrībhadrā, 'Phags pa shes rab and 'Bro seng dkar (Śākya 'od) in bSam yas.

Although these two works were translated, and therefore potentially available, by Phya pa's time (and even for the *Vādanyāya* in rNgog Blo ldan shes rab's time), one can wonder about their popularity in the gSang phu school in particular, and in Tibet in general.

The earliest known Tibetan commentary on the *Vādanyāya* is that by Dar ma rgyal mtshan bCom ldan Rigs pa'i ral gri (1227–1305), the *rTsod rigs rgyan gyi me tog* (hereafter: *rTsod rigs rgyan*).⁶⁸ In the colophon of this work, Rigs pa'i ral gri states that he learned the *Vādanyāya* from the logician Śākya brtson 'grus, who himself had been taught the work by Dānaśīla together with a

⁶⁵ Regarding treatises dealing with debate, according to Rigs pa'i ral gri's catalogue (see VAN DER KUIJP AND SCHAEFFER 2009: 258), Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* (*rigs pa'i sgo*) and *Nyāyaparīkṣā* (*Rigs pa brtag pa*) did not find their way into Tibet (*bod na mi snang ngo*). Neither did Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra* (*rTsod pa sgrub pa*). Sa skya Paṇḍita claims in the *Rigs gter* that his presentation of false rejoinders is based on the PS and the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*.

⁶⁶ See VAN DER KUIJP 1989 for a periodization of Tibetan epistemology and a discussion of the role of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* therein.

⁶⁷ See LALOU 1953 and HERRMANN-PFANDT 2008: 409.

⁶⁸ In addition to this commentary, Rigs pa'i ral gri also composed a topical outline (*bsdus don*) and a word for word commentary (*'bru 'joms*); cf. VAN DER KUIJP 2003: 409.

commentary by Śāṅkaranandana.⁶⁹ Dānaśīla was one of the junior paṇḍits that accompanied Śākyaśrībhadrā as he came to central Tibet in 1204; it seems that he never went back to India. According to his biography by bSam gtan bzang po, when he was in his teens, Rigs pa'i ral gri himself studied a few logical texts with Dānaśīla, who must have been quite old at that time.⁷⁰ Rigs pa'i ral gri pursued his studies of epistemology with Tibetan teachers. In particular, his biography states that he studied the *Vādanyāya* with sTon shag, a man from Phu than in dBus,⁷¹ and later with 'U yug pa bSod nams seng ge.⁷² If, as van der Kuijp (2003: 411) suggests, the “shag” in sTon shag’s name stands for “Śākya,” it is possible that he is the “logician Śākya brtson 'grus” mentioned in the colophon of the *rTsod rigs rgyan*. Another one of his teachers whose name recalls that of “Śākya brtson 'grus” is dByar nyi ma brtson 'grus, who was also Rigs pa'i ral gri’s ordination abbot. However, only mTshur ston’s epistemological summary is mentioned among the logical texts he studied with him.

Before Rigs pa'i ral gri, the *Vādanyāya* had attracted the attention of Sa skya Paṇḍita, whose discussion on debate in the eleventh chapter of the *Rigs gter* (a work composed around 1219)⁷³ demonstrates an in-depth knowledge of this treatise. According to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s biographer lHo pa kun mkhyen Rin chen dpal, Sa paṇ studied the *Vādanyāya* both with Saṅghaśrī and Dānaśīla

⁶⁹ *rTsod rigs rgyan* 74a3–4: *phyi nas shar phyogs dzā ga ta la yi // paṇ chen dā na sī la byon gyur te // rigs smra'i dge slong śākya brtson 'grus la // bram ze shang kar nan ta'i 'brel* [read: 'grel] *bzhin bshad // bla ma de la bdag gis legs bslabs nas...* According to this colophon, Dānaśīla taught him this work “according to Śāṅkaranandana’s commentary.” The existence of such a commentary is also alluded to in biographies of Sa skya Paṇḍita (cf. JACKSON 1987 and n. 74 below).

⁷⁰ Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 2003: 410 and *Ral gri rnam thar* 4b3ff.

⁷¹ Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 2003: 411 and *Ral gri rnam thar* 5a3ff. Assuming that the biography adopts here a chronological order, this took place before Rigs pa'i ral gri learned Sanskrit with Śīlaśrī (*Ral gri rnam thar* 5b5).

⁷² *Ral gri rnam thar* 9b5ff.

⁷³ On this date, see VAN DER KUIJP 1983: 101 and 303 n. 293, and JACKSON 1987: 64

and translated it along with two commentaries, by Śāntarakṣita and Śāṅkaranandana.⁷⁴

Before Sa paṅ and Rigs pa'i ral gri, the *Vādanyāya* does not seem to have enjoyed much popularity in Tibet – Rigs pa'i ral gri even affirms that it was previously unknown to Tibetan scholars⁷⁵ – and in particular not in the gSang phu tradition. According to the classification of Dharmakīrti's "Seven treatises" (*sde bdun*) already found in the *De kho na nyid bsdus pa* and in gTsang nag pa's work,⁷⁶ the *Vādanyāya* does not belong to the group of the three essential treatises, identified as the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu*, but is grouped with the four accessory works. If one considers the lists of translations and compositions attributed to rNgog Blo Idan shes rab,⁷⁷ one observes that his contribution in the field of epistemology concentrates on these three essential treatises and their respective commentaries, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* by Prajñākaragupta, and the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by Dharmottara. The *Vādanyāya* was, according to these lists, neither translated, nor summarized, nor commented upon by rNgog Blo Idan shes rab.

It is difficult to evaluate to what extent gSang phu-related scholars knew this work and if it was taught at all in the gSang phu

⁷⁴ According to lHo pa kun mkhyen, at the time of his studies with Saṅghaśrī, Sa paṅ learned the *Vādanyāya* together with two commentaries and even translated these works himself. *Sa paṅ rnam thar* 51a6–b1: *yan lag gi bstan bcos rtsod pa'i rig pa slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho'i 'grel pa dang / bram ze'i 'grel pa dang bcas pa gsan nas nyid kyis bsgyur*. The expression "the Brahman" (*bram ze*) usually refers to Śāṅkaranandana. Sa paṅ presumably had access to the same commentary by this author that is also mentioned by Rigs pa'i ral gri. Later (*ibid.* 52b7) lHo pa kun mkhyen mentions that Sa skya Paṇḍita also studied the *Vādanyāya* with a commentary (*rtsod pa'i rigs pa 'grel pa dang bcas pa*) – he does not specify which – with Dānaśīla.

⁷⁵ See *rTsod rigs rgyan* 74a2–3: *rkang mig lasogs lta ngan 'joms byed rtsod pa'i rigs pa'i gzhung 'di ni // gangs ri'i khrod 'dir mkhas rlom brgya yis sngon chad ji bzhin ma shes so //*

⁷⁶ *De kho na nyid bsdus pa* 2,14–3,16. On the classification of Dharmakīrti's treatises by gTsang nag pa and later authors see HUGON 2008a: 64.

⁷⁷ See KRAMER 2007.

monastic curriculum where the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* obviously predominated. As mentioned before, gTsang nag pa and later authors usually refer to the *Vādanyāya* when enumerating points of defeat. But their citing of the first, programmatic verse of this work cannot be taken as a proof of an in-depth knowledge of this treatise.⁷⁸ One can even discern among gTsang nag pa's positions a view that conflicts with the *Vādanyāya*; indeed, when discussing the definition of proponent and opponent, gTsang nag pa refutes an alternative definition on the ground that it would lead to include master and disciple. But in the *Vādanyāya* Dharmakīrti assimilates the master-disciple relation to the proponent-opponent model.⁷⁹

In spite of such disagreements, the perspective adopted by gTsang nag pa when discussing argumentation is closer to that of the *Vādanyāya* than to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. We have seen also that gTsang nag pa introduces several passages from the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Whether his knowledge of the materials was superficial or not, gTsang nag pa makes explicit reference to a broader textual background than Phya pa.

Phya pa's perspective on argumentation, as in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, is on argumentation as an extension of inference and is restricted to a discussion of the statements that constitute an inference-for-others without including the broader features of debate. If Phya pa's main source is indeed the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, one should not exclude too hastily a possible influence from the *Vādanyāya*. It is true that Phya pa does not mention or cite this text, and that he does not go into the detail of its subject

⁷⁸ See note 56 for the references. gTsang nag pa cites the first three half-pādas of VN 1 in *bsDus pa* 176b1–2 with the variant “*sgrub byed yan lag min brjod cing*,” which renders the second interpretation of the compound “*asādhanāṅgavacanam*.” Another citation attributed to the VN occurs in *bsDus pa* 180b3 when explaining the notion of *anirākṛta* in the definition of the thesis: *bdag myed ces pa lasogs pa mgo' gcig pa'i lan khas blangs par*. I could not trace its source. VN 1 is also cited in *De kho na nyid bsDus pa* 2,20–3,1 when the author enumerates Dharmakīrti's seven works.

⁷⁹ See the discussion on the fault of repetition (*punarukta*), VN 51,3: *pratipādyasya śiṣyatvāt*, translated in MUCH 1991: 91 “weil der zu Belehrende Schüler ist”; see also *ibid.*, fn. 388.

matter, the identification of points of defeat. But let us consider Phya pa's explanation of fallacious proof-statements.⁸⁰ Phya pa identifies instances of fallacious proof-statements as being, on the one hand those that present an invalid logical reason, and on the other hand those that are either incomplete or contain superfluous members.⁸¹ For this last one, Phya pa mentions the statement of "thesis (*dam bca'*), conclusion (*'jug sdud*), application (*nye bar bkod pa*), etc." These three can be identified as the first, fourth and fifth members of the Naiyāyika's so-called five-member syllogism. These three happen to be precisely the examples given by Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya* to exemplify the statement of something that is not part of the probans and generates a point of defeat due to the statement of something useless (*vyarthābhidhānāt*).⁸² I doubt that Phya pa (or any Tibetan scholar at this period) had a direct knowledge of Nyāya and the fault of superfluity is not discussed in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* or in Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭkā*. This strongly suggests that Phya pa's source for this exemplification was either the *Vādanyāya* itself, or some written or oral teaching that relied on this text.⁸³

⁸⁰ *Mun sel* 82b8–9.

⁸¹ See n. 42.

⁸² VN 17,9–11: *athavā tasyaiva sādhanaysa yan nāṅgaṃ pratijñopanayanigamanādi...* In the Tibetan version of the canon, the three terms are translated as *dam bca' ba*, *nye bar sbyar ba*, and *mjug bsdu ba* (D334b2). Phya pa also adds "etc." According to MUCH 1991: 40, n. 195, in the VN, Dharmakīrti hints with "ādi" to the five additional members adduced by the Sāṅkhya.

⁸³ These terms also occur in Dignāga's PSV (D62a1) ad PS 4.5, and in several places in Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭkā* (see for instance PST D149a5–6, P171a4–6 ad PS(V) 3.3; PST D186a4, P212a1; PSTD233b1, P264a8). There appears to have been no Tibetan translation of the latter work prior to the one by dPañ lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa at the beginning of the 14th century (see MEJOR 1991: 179); notably, this text is not mentioned in the 13th-century survey of Buddhist literature by Rigs pa'i ral gri (see VAN DER KUIJP AND SCHAEFFER 2009). Dignāga's PS and PSV were translated at the end of the 11th century already, but these texts do not seem to have had much impact on the epistemological theories of gSang phu scholars. In epistemological works, the name of Dignāga mostly appears in connexion with those of his views discussed in the PVin; it is, on the other hand, frequently mentioned in the Madhyamaka context by rGya dmar pa (12th c.) (see his *dBu ma'i*

5. Conclusion

A feature of Phya pa's theory of argumentation that stands out when comparing it with the presentation made by his successors is the absence of discussion relative to the steps of debate and the points of defeat. That he adopts such a perspective is not entirely surprising in view of the way the two works considered rely on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. If the fifth chapter of the *Mun sel* and the parallel excursus in the *'Od zer* do not constitute a vade-mecum on the practice of debate, Phya pa's discussion in these texts nevertheless represent an approach that is not exclusively theory-oriented – focusing on the nature of the statements – insofar as it takes into account functional and situational aspects of argumentative statements that are relevant to practice. Also, his discussion in this context shows a concern to defend the applicability of the proposed prescriptions pertaining to proof-statements.

Phya pa's views on the more extended context of debate, a context taken into account by his successors, cannot easily be reconstructed on the basis of his texts, nor can they be approximated on the basis of his successors' works in view of the numerous changes and disagreements that can be observed regarding common issues. Of course, there remains the possibility that Phya pa developed a broader perspective on argumentation in another work, but I consider it unlikely in view of the fact that the *De kho na nyid bsdu pa*, that postdates Phya pa, does not point to two different perspectives – one limited to proof-statements, the other including points of defeat – but simply mirrors the one found in Phya pa's two available works. I propose, then, that a shift of perspective occurred with (or shortly before) gTsang nag pa. Thus, that gTsang nag pa does not mention an alternative view when he explains the classification of points of defeat would indicate that there is no earlier systematic presentation to be discussed rather than suggest that his view conforms to earlier presentations.

de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa, bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, vol. 31). That Phya pa is drawing his example from Dignāga's work is possible, but unlikely. Moreover, the formulation that he uses in this context is much closer to that of the VN.

As for the way debate was actually conducted in the 12th century, there is not much we can learn from Phya pa's presentation, nor, I would argue, from those of his successors insofar as they also engage in a prescriptive approach. My examination of Phya pa's argumentative technique in his treatises has shown that Phya pa himself used, in textual argumentation, a type of argument that is far from conforming to the rules pertaining to proof-statements given in the same treatises.⁸⁴ It wouldn't be surprising to discover that argumentation in live debates also presented aspects that exceeded its rigid theoretical format. The various controversies that arise when Tibetan thinkers discuss argumentation theory nonetheless testify that these authors were aiming at a workable model of philosophical argumentation between two debaters. Whether it worked, or was even put to work, is a question that is not likely to be clarified by the examination of epistemological treatises, though it is one on which an examination of other types of sources, such as Tibetan debate narratives, taken with due caution, could possibly shed some light.⁸⁵

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⁸⁴ See HUGON 2008b that examines Phya pa's technique of argumentation "by parallels."

⁸⁵ My 2012 "Clapping hands in sKyid grong?" adopts this approach by studying narratives of a debate involving Sa skya Paṅḍita.

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- PSV – Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. Tib. in D4204, P5701–5702.
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Appendix 1: Sa bcad of Mun sel and corresponding sections in 'Od zer

Mun sel 81b8–96a3	'Od zer
244 sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa'i ngag gi dbye ba 244.1 sgrub pa yang dag	Chap. 3: rtsod pa'i ngag gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa = gzhan la rtogs pa skyed pa'i thabs (142b1) I bsgrub pa'i ngag I.1 sgrub pa yang dag pa I.11 bsgrub pa'i mtshan nyid mdor bstan pa Excursus (143a1–143b7)
244.11 gang la go bar bya ba dang gang gis go bar byed pa rgol phyir rgol gyi mtshan nyid	1 rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba'i mtshan nyid
244.12 sgrub pa yang dag 'jug pa'i skabs	2 de la bsgrub pa'i ngag 'jug pa'i skabs
244.13 skabs de la rten pa'i sbyor ba'i dbye ba i. gnyi ga ma shes pa (→ 32) ii. khyab pa ma shes la phyogs chos shes la ma dran pa (→ 33) iii. phyogs chos ma shes la khyab pa shes la ma dran pa (→ 34) iv. phyogs chos dang khyab pa gnyi ga shes pa (→ 31) iv.1 gnyi ga dran pa iv.2 gnyi ga ma dran pa iv.3 khyab pa dran la phyogs chos ma dran pa iv.4 khyab pa ma dran la phyogs chos dran pa	3 skabs de la rten pa'i sbyor ba'i dbye ba 31 phyogs chos dang khyab pa gnyi ga nges pa 311 gnyi ga la blo kha phyogs pa 312 gnyi ga la blo kha ma phyogs pa 313 khyab pa la phyogs la phyogs chos la ma phyogs pa 314 phyogs chos la phyogs la khyab pa la ma phyogs pa 32 gnyi ga ma nges pa 33 phyogs chos nges la khyab pa ma nges pa 34 khyab pa nges la phyogs chos ma nges pa
244.14 sgrub pa'i ngag gi spyi'i mtshan nyid	4 bsgrub pa'i ngag gi mtshan nyid
244.2 sgrub pa ltar snang ba	I.3 bsgrub pa ltar snang 'chad (189a5–195b6)

Mun sel 81b8–96a3	'Od zer
244.3 sun 'byin pa dang sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba 244.31 sun 'byin gyi mtshan nyid	II phyir rgol ba'i rten can gyi ngag sun 'byin pa II.1 sun 'byin yang dag pa (196a7– 196b1) II.1.1 mtshan nyid II.1.2 mi dgos par rtog pa dgag pa II.1.3 mi nus par rtog pa dgag pa II.1.4 sun 'byin pa'i dus kyi khyad par
244.32 sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba	II.2 sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba (196b1–5)
245 sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa'i ngag de thal 'gyur du brjod pa'i tshul	Excursus: thal ba'i ngag (145a2– 149a5)

Appendix 2: Edited text of Mun sel 81b8–83a1

Remarks

The apparatus that follows each section includes notes numbered with numerals, that concern indications of a diplomatic nature (insertions, deletions, unclear readings) and orthographic particularities of the manuscript, and critical emendations indicated by Greek letters.

The conventions used in the apparatus are:

- .. Illegible character
- { } Contain character(s) deleted by means of erasure
- {{ }} Contain characters deleted by means of parentheses
- < > Contain character(s) or words inserted above or below the line, or in the upper or lower margins of the manuscript
- () Contain character(s) that are unclear in the manuscript
- ⟨ ⟩ Contain emendational additions
- om. Omits
- Ms Reading of the manuscript
- Em. Emendation

The following orthographic particularities have been normalized in the edited text and recorded in the first apparatus: presence of a supplementary 'a-suffix, missing 'a-suffix, notation *lasogs pa* for *la sogs pa*, form *pa* of the particle *pa/ba* after final *-ng* and final *-l*.

The frequent use of the *bindu* (transcribed as ṃ) for “m” in the manuscript has not been recorded independently in the apparatus.

The notation of the enclitics (*'ang*, *'am*, etc.), which appear sometimes as distinct syllables in the manuscript, has been unified.

The numbered *sa bcad* titles in bold and the punctuation are editorial.

Examples of formal applications appear in italics. Terms being defined appear in bold underlined characters.

Text

244 sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa'i ngag gi dbye ba

sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa'i ngag gi dbye ba la gsum¹ ste^a / sgrub pa yang dag dang / sgrub pa ltar snang dang / sun 'byin ltar snang dang bcas pa'o //

¹ Ms gsu{''}ṃ ^a Em. ste : Ms te

244.1 sgrub pa yang dag

dang po la bzhi ste / gang la go bar bya ba dang gang gis go bar byed pa rgol phyir rgol gyi mtshan nyid dang / sgrub pa yang dag pa 'jug pa'i_{81b9} skabs dang / skabs de la rten pa'i sbyor ba'i dbye¹ ba dang / sgrub pa'i ngag gi mtshan nyid do //

¹ Ms dbye'

244.11 gang la go bar bya ba dang gang gis go bar byed pa rgol phyir rgol gyi mtshan nyid

dang po ni chos dang chos can tshogs pa'i bsgrub^a byar bzung ba¹ de la dmigs pa'i rjes dpag skyed pa'i byed pa por rang gi blos 'dod pa de **rgol ba** yin la / des gang la rjes dpag skyed pa'i las su bya bar bsams pa de ni **phyir rgol ba** yin no //

¹ Ms pa ^a Em. sgrub : Ms sgrub

244.12 sgrub pa yang dag pa 'jug pa'i skabs

gnyis pa ni rang gis phyogs chos ma shes na'ang phyogs chos ^{82a1}
rang la ma grub par 'gyur la khyab pa ma shes na'ang khyab pa rang
la ma grub par 'gyur zhing de gnyi ga la'ang blo kha ma phyogs
na'ang gzhan la de gnyis ston pa'i ngag 'jug¹ mi srid pas sgrub
pa yang dag 'god pa la rgol ba rang nyid la phyogs kyi chos dang
khyab pa shes la ma brjed pa yod pas khyab la / de gnyis shes la ma
brjed pa'ang rjes dpag gi rgyu nus pa thogs med yin pas sgrub ^{82a2}
pa yang dag pa 'god pa la rgol ba la rjes dpag skyes pas khyab la /
rang gi rjes dpag gis bsgrub^a bya rtogs pa'i gzhi la dam bca' la bsal
ba² mi srid la / bsgrub bya grub zin na'ang rtags de shes 'dod med
pa'i ma grub par 'gyur bas³ rang nyid⁴ kyis^β bsgrub bya rtogs nas
phyir rgol la grub bsal med pa'i dus na sgrub pa yang dag pa 'god
pa yin ^{82a3} no //

¹ Ms ngag {'} 'jug; ² Ms pa; ³ Ms bas {{phyir rgol la grub bsal med
pa rtogs nas}}; ⁴ Ms <nyid> ^a Em. sgrub : Ms sgrub; ^β Em. kyis
: Ms gyis

244.13 skabs de la rten pa'i sbyor ba'i dbye ba

gsum pa ni phyir rgol ba la mu bzhi ste / phyogs kyi chos dang
khyab pa gnyi ga shes pa dang / gnyi¹ ga ma shes pa dang / khyab
pa shes la phyogs chos ma shes pa dang / phyogs chos shes la khyab
pa ma shes pa'o //

¹ Ms gnyi'

244.13.i gnyi ga ma shes pa

de la¹ gnyi ga ma shes pa ni gnyi ga la rjes dpag bskyed^a nas rtsa
ba'i bsgrub^β bya la rjes dpag skyed^γ dgos pas gnyi ga sgrub^δ pa'i
gzhan don te / skad cig ma sgrub^ε ^{82a4} pa na sgra byas pa dang byas
pa la mi rtag pas khyab pa gnyi ga ma shes pa na gang² rim dang
cig char gyis don byed pas stong pa de ni byas pas stong pa yin te
nam mkha'i ud pa la bzhin / skad cig mas stong pa'ang^ε rim dang
cig char gyis don byed pas stong pas / gang res 'ga³ ba yin pa de
ni rgyus byas pa yin te bum pa bzhin / sgra'ang res 'ga⁴ ba yin pas
zhes brjed pa lta bu ste / dngos kyi bsgrub^η ^{82a5} bya rtag pa la khyab
pa khegs pa dang sgra byas par sgrub pa la ltos nas gnyi ga chos
mthun pa'i sbyor ba yin yang brgyud nas sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa

la ltos te gnyi ga sgrub pa'i gzhan don yin te 'o ma zho la ltos nas
dngos kyi rgyu yin yang zho 'dzin pa'i mig gi shes pa la ltos nas
brgyud pa'i rgyu yin pa bzhin no /

phyogs chos dang khyab pa la tshad ma skyed pa sgrub pa'i ngag
^{82a6} ma yin na dran pa skyed pa'ang sgrub pa'i ngag ma yin no /

des⁵ pha rol la rjes dpag mi skyed par thal lo zhe na /

thal ba de tshad ma skyed pa la'ang mtshungs so //

¹ Ms <la>; ² Ms <gang>; ³ Ms 'ga; ⁴ Ms 'ga; ⁵ Ms des {(na)}

^a Em. skyed : Ms skyed; ^b Em. sgrub : Ms sgrub; ^c Em. skyed

: Ms bskyed; ^d Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^e Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub;

^f Em. 'ang : Ms dang; ^g Em. sgrub : Ms sgrub

244.13.ii. khyab pa ma shes la phyogs chos shes la ma dran pa

khyab pa ma shes la^a phyogs chos shes la ma dran pa la ni khyab
pa sgrub la phyogs chos ston pa ste / *gang rim dang cig char gyis
don byed pas stong pa de ni byas pas stong ste nam mkha'i pad ma
bzhin / rtag pa'ang rim dang* ^{82a7} *cig char gyis don byed pas stong
pas / sgra ni byas pas zhes so //*

^a Em. la : Ms pa

244.13.iii. phyogs chos ma shes la khyab pa shes la ma dran pa

phyogs chos ma shes la khyab pa shes la ma dran^a pa la ni phyogs
chos sgrub la khyab pa ston pa'i gzhan don te *gang*¹ *res 'ga*² *ba ni
rgyus byas pa yin te bum pa bzhin / sgra'ang res 'ga*³ *ba yin pas /
gang byas pa mi rtag ste bum pa bzhin zhes so //*

¹ Ms <gang>; ² Ms 'ga; ³ Ms 'ga ^a Em. <la ma dran> : Ms om.

244.13.iv. phyogs chos dang khyab pa gnyi ga shes pa

phyogs chos dang khyab pa gnyi ga shes pa la mu bzhi ste / gnyi
ga dran pa dang / gnyi ga ma dran ^{82a8} pa dang / khyab pa dran la
phyogs chos ma dran pa dang / phyogs chos dran la khyab pa ma
dran pa'o //

244.13.iv.1 gnyi ga dran pa

dang po la ni pha rol la rjes dpag gi rgyur sngar nas tshang bas¹

sgrub pa'i ngag 'god^a mi dgos so //

¹ Ms pas ^a Em. 'god : Ms dgod

244.13.iv.2 gnyi ga ma dran pa

gnyis pa la ni khyab pa dang phyogs kyi chos gnyi ga dran du 'jug dgos pas yang na rjes 'gro dang phyogs chos ston pa chos mthun pa'i sbyor ba ste *gang byas pa mi rtag ste bum pa bzhin* ^{82a9} / *sgra byas pas zhes so //*

yang na ldog khyab dang phyogs chos ston pa chos mi mthun pa ste *gang mi rtag pas stong pa de*¹ *byas pas stong ste nam mkha' bzhin* / *sgra byas pas zhes so //*

¹ Ms { ' }

244.13.iv.3 khyab pa dran la phyogs chos ma dran pa

gsum pa la ni phyogs chos tsam brjod pa'i gzhan don te^a / *sgra byas so zhes so //*

^a Em. te : Ms ste

244.13.iv.4 khyab pa ma dran la phyogs chos dran pa

bzhi pa la ni khyab pa tsam brjod pa'i gzhan don te^a *gang byas pa de ni mi rtag ste bum pa bzhin* zhes pa rjes 'gro brjod ^{82b1} pa dang *gang mi rtag pas stong pa de ni byas pas stong ste*^b *nam mkha' bzhin* zhes ldog pa brjod pa gnyis te rang rgyud la brgyad do //

sgrub pa'i thal 'gyur la ni chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa dang / rjes 'gro brjod pa dang / ldog pa brjod pa dang / phyogs chos brjod pa dang / phyogs chos ston la khyab pa sgrub pa drug ste / sgrub pa'i ngag bcu bzhi yin no //

gal te khyab pa shes la ma brjed^v pa la phyogs ^{82b2} chos tsam brjod pa'i gzhan don khas mi len na / khyab pa shes la ma brjed pa la sgrub pa'i ngag gtan mi 'god dam 'god kyang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa nyid 'god / dang po ltar na gnyi ga brjed pa la'ang sgrub^b pa'i ngag mi 'god ces sgre'o /

de la rjes dpag skyed mi nus nas mi 'god dam mi dgos nas mi 'god / dang po mi 'thad de chos mthun pa'am mi mthun pa bkod na rjes ^{82b3} dpag skye ba'i phyir ro / gnyis pa'ang mi 'thad de sngar rjes dpag ma skyes pas so zhe na /

phyogs chos 'ba' zhig ma dran pa la'ang sgrub pa'i ngag mi 'god
na rjes dpag skyed mi nus sam / mi dgos nas mi 'god^e / dang po mi
'thad de phyogs chos brjod pas rjes dpag skye ba'i phyir ro / gnyis
pa'ang mi 'thad de sngar¹ rjes dpag ma skyes pa'i phyir ro /

sgrub pa'i ngag bkod kyang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun ^{82b4} pa
'god do zhe na /

'o na rjes 'gro dang ldog pa'i khyab pa gnyi² ga ci'i phyir mi brjod /
gang yang rung bas³ khyab pa dran pas gnyis pa don med do zhe
na /

snga nas khyab pa dran pas brjod pa don med do //

'o na sngar phyir rgol gyis khyab pa dran na mi⁴ brjod pas mngon
shes med pas sgrub^c pa'i ngag mi 'jug par 'gyur ro zhe na /

'o na pha rol po la rjes dpag ma skyes na sgrubⁿ pa 'god la ^{82b5} skyes
na mi 'god pas sgrub⁰ pa 'god pa la yang mngon shes dang ldan pa
dgos par 'gyur ro /

pha rol po bsgrub bya khas mi len pa la 'god kyi len pa la'ang mi
'god do zhe na /

'dir yang khyab pa snga nas khas len pa la mi brjod kyi khas mi len
pa la⁵ brjod pa yin no /

khyab pa dran bzhin du ma dran par ston pa'i bcos ma srid do zhe
na /

rjes dpag skyes pa'am ma skyes par ston pa'i bcos ma'ang srid do /
de ^{82b6} la khyab pa dang rtags ston na sgrub⁴ pa'i ngag ma yin yang
mngon shes med pa rgol ba'i nyes pa ma yin no zhe na /

khyab pa dran bzhin du ma dran par ston pa la'ang khyab pa brjod
pa sgrub pa'i ngag ma yin yang mngon shes med pa rgol ba'i nyes
pa ma yin no //

'dis ni phyogs chos shes la ma brjed^x pa la rjes 'gro dang ldog pa
brjod pa la'ang rgya cher sbyar ro //

¹ Ms <sngar>; ² Ms gnyi'; ³ Ms pas; ⁴ Ms <mi>; ⁵ Ms <mi brjod kyi
khas mi len pa la>

^α Em. te : Ms ste; ^β Em. ste : Ms te; ^γ Em. ⟨b⟩rjed : Ms rjed; ^δ Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^ε Em. mi dgos nas mi 'gos : Ms mi 'gos nas; ^ς Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^η Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^θ Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^ι Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^κ Em. ⟨b⟩rjed : Ms rjed

244.14 sgrub pa'i ngag gi spyi'i mtshan nyid

bzhi pa sgrub^α ^{82b7} pa'i ngag gi spyi'i mtshan nyid ni rang gis nges pa'i khyab pa dang phyogs chos tshogs pa phyir rgol la mi slu ba'i yul du grub par ston pa ni **sgrub pa'i ngag gi spyi'i mtshan nyid** yin no //

^α Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub

244.2 sgrub pa ltar snang ba

gnyis pa **sgrub pa ltar snang ba**¹ ni rang gi zhe 'dod kyi sgrub byed du bkod pa la phyir rgol la phyogs chos dang khyab pa tshogs pa mi slu ba'i yul du ston mi nus pa ste / dang pos ni sun 'byin dang sun ^{82b8} 'byin ltar snang la sogs² pa sgrub^α par ma bkod pa'i ngag gcod la / gnyis pas³ sgrub pa yang dag pa gcod pa yin no //

de yang sgra mi rtag par sgrub^β pa la mig gi gzung bya ltar ma grub pa dang rtag pa sgrub pa la byas pa ltar 'gal ba dang gzhal bya ltar ma nges pa ste don la skyon chags pa 'god pa dang blo'i yul du ma grub pa dag 'god pa ste mdor na ma grub pa bdun dang ma ^{82b9} nges pa dgu⁴ dang 'gal ba 'god pa'am / yang dag pa'i rtags nyid khyab pa dang phyogs chos brjod pa ma tshang ba⁵ dang dam bca' dang 'jug sdud dang nye bar gtod pa la sogs⁶ pa lhag pa brjod pa thams cad kyang sgrub pa ltar snang yin no //

¹ Ms pa; ² Ms lasogs; ³ Ms pa<s>; ⁴ Ms dgu'; ⁵ Ms pa; ⁶ Ms lasogs

^α Em. sgrub : Ms bsgrub; ^β Em. ⟨s⟩grub : Ms grub

244.3 sun 'byin pa dang sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba

gsum pa sun 'byin pa dang sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba¹ la

¹ Ms pa

244.31 sun 'byin gyi mtshan nyid

sun 'byin gyi mtshan nyid ni rgol ba grub pa'i gnas su bkod pa nyes pa nyid pha ^{83a1} rol la brjod pa ste / sngar don dang blo dang sgra'i nyes pa bshad pa gang yod pa rgol ba la bstan pas rgol bas ngas

sgrub byed bkod do snyam pa'i rlom pa zhi bar byed pa'o //

244.32 sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba

sun 'byin pa ltar snang ba¹ ni rgol ba'i sgrub pa nyes pa dang ma
'brel ba² la nyes pa dang ldan pa lta bur ston pa ste de la ltag^α chod
zhes bya'o // //

¹ Ms pa; ² Ms pa ^α Em. ltag : Ms lhag