CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Buddhism and Political Power in Korean History, 9
   by S. Keel
2. Mahāmaudgalyāyana’s Sermon on the Letting-in and Not
   Letting-in (of Sensitive Influences), by E. Waldschmidt 25
3. The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgatagarbha, 35
   by A. Wayman

II. SHORT PAPERS

1. Vajrayāna in Gostana-deśa, by H. W. Bailey 53
3. The Story of Vyāsa and Kāśisundarī, by L. Zwilling 65
4. New Areas of Research for Archaeologists and
   Buddhologists, by G. Tucci 71

III. BOOK REVIEWS

1. An Anthology of Buddhist Tantric Songs: a Study of
   the Caryāgiti, by Per Kvaerne 77
2. Tibetan Medicine: With Special Reference to Yogaśataka,
   by Vaidya Bhagwan Dash 81

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

On Buddhist Text Information (B.T.I.) of the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions (IASWR), New York, by R. A. Gard 87

V. OBITUARY

P. L. Vaidya, by P. V. Bapat 91
The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgatagarbha (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 1)

by A. Wayman

Introduction

For the origins of the Mahāyāna we must agree with Hirakawa that while some Mahāyāna doctrines are derived from the Mahāsāṃghika school, some others are derived from the Sarvāstivādin school. I would add that unless some other source can be pointed to, we may conclude that Mahāyāna Buddhism in its various forms, at least leaving out the special development of Tantrism, can be traced to either the Mahāsāṃghika or the Sarvāstivādin schools.

It is well recognized by Buddhologists that the Mahāsāṃghika sect arose by a schism from the previously undivided Buddhist samgha in the second century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (A.N.), leaving the other part of the samgha to be called Sthavira. As to precisely when the schism occurred, there was a difference of opinion as to whether it happened as a result of the Second Buddhist Council (about 110 A.N.) over a laxity of Vinaya rules by some monks, or happened later in the century (137 A.N.) over the five theses about Arhats and which occasioned a 'Third Buddhist Council' sponsored by the Kings Nanda and Mahāpadma. There were some other possibilities, as summarized by Nattier and Prebish, who conclude that the schism occurred 116 A.N. over Vinaya rules, while the argument over Arhat attainment provoked a further split within the already existing Mahāsāṃghika sect. It is immaterial for our purposes whether the 'five theses of Mahādeva' downgrading the Arhat occasioned the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras, or whether this downgrading was an internal argument within the Mahāsāṃghika. What is important here is that...
the downgrading of the Arhat continued into a Mahāyāna scripture called the Śrīmālā-sūtra, and that the five theses are a characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghika, to wit: 1. Arhats are tempted by others, 2. they still have ignorance, 3. they still have doubt, 4. they are liberated by others; and 5. the path is accompanied by utterance. The fifth of these seems explainable by other Mahāsāṃghika tenets, in Bareau’s listing: 3 No. 58 ‘morality is not mental’; No. 59 ‘morality does not follow upon thought’; No. 60 ‘virtue caused by a vow increases’; No. 61 ‘candor (uññāpti) is virtue’; No. 62 ‘reticence (avijñāpti) is immoral.’

Part I of this paper attempts to relate the Śrīmālā-sūtra and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine to the Mahāsāṃghika school. Part II discusses the terms dharmatā and svabhāva so as to expose an ancient quarrel.

I. Mahāsāṃghika school and the Śrīmālā-sūtra

The present writer, in collaboration with Hideko Wayman, has published a translation and study of the Śrīmālādevīśīṃhanāda-sūtra under the title The Lion’s Roar of Queen Śrīmālā; a Buddhist Scripture on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory, 4 in which the position was taken that the Tathāgatagarbha theory, especially as portrayed in this scripture, is a product of the Mahāsāṃghika school. Now, referring to our work as ‘Lion’s Roar’, a correlation will be made to tenets of the Mahāsāṃghika in Bareau’s numbering, with my own captions ‘Tenets on the Jewel of Buddha’, etc.:

Tenets on the Jewel of Buddha:

No. 1 ‘The Buddhas are supramundane (lokottara).’ ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 92: “the Tathāgata does not dwell within the limits of time; the Tāthagata-Arhat-Śamyoaksambuddhas dwell at the uttermost limit.”
No. 2 ‘The Tathāgatas are devoid of flux (anāsrava) and mundane natures (laukikadharma).’ ‘Lion’s Roar’, pp. 88-89: “... the natures to be eliminated, exceeding the sands of the Ganges River, which are all utterly eradicated by the enlightenment wisdom of the Tathāgata ...” ‘Lion’s Roar’, pp. 97-98: “all the Tathāgata-Arhat-Śamyoaksambuddhas eliminate every source of suffering which incorporates any defilement or secondary defilement ...”
Tenets on the Jewel of Dharma:

No. 4 'The Buddha, by a single sound (śabda) expresses all the Dharmadhātu.'
No. 42 'All the Sutras promulgated by the Buddha have a final meaning (nītārtha).' 'Lion's Roar', p. 89: "Then, as a Tathāgata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddha, one gains the unhindered understanding of all natures (dharma) . . .; King of the Doctrine and Lord of the Doctrine; and, having gone to the stage which is sovereign over all natures, utters the Lion's roar . . . 'there is nothing to be known beyond this.' That being so, the Lion's roar of the Tathāgatas has final meaning (nītārtha) and explains this meaning straightforwardly (ekāṁśena, with a single part)."

Tenets on the Jewel of the Buddha as refuge:

No. 6 'The material body is truly unlimited (ananta).' 'Lion's Roar', p. 62: "Homage to you, whose form is limitless".
No. 7 'The power (prabhāva) of the Tathāgatas is also limitless'. 'Lion's Roar', p. 76: "The Lord is omnipotent, is the resort".
'Vest's Roar', p. 106: "The Lord is the omnipotent being. The Lord is the resort."
No. 8 'The longevity of the Buddha is also limitless.' 'Lion's Roar', p. 61: "Your Buddha nature does not perish; so it is right to take refuge in you, the muni."

Special tenets:

No. 9 'The Buddha, upon converting the living beings and making them born among those with pure faith, has no thought of satisfaction.' 'Lion's Roar', pp. 77-78: "Queen, although I have already explained for incalculable eons the merit and benefit of embracing the Illustrious Doctrine, I still have not come to the end of explaining the merit and benefit of embracing the Illustrious Doctrine."
No. 30 'There are Arhats who . . . are subject to ignorance (ajñāna), who have doubts (kāṅkṣā), who are saved by others (paravitīrṇa) . . .' 'Lion's Roar', p. 80: "Lord, the Arhats and the Pratyeka-buddhas not only take refuge in Tathāgatahood, but also have fear
they have many natures to be eliminated.”

No. 44 ‘The self-presence of mind is bright. It is soiled (i.e. dark­
ened) by adventitious secondary defilement.’ ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 106: 
“this intrinsic purity of the Tathāgatagarbha stained by adventi­
tious secondary defilements is the domain of the Tathāgata, who 
is the inconceivable master . . .” “the meaning of the defilement 
on the intrinsically pure consciousness is difficult to understand.”

No. 49 ‘There is no intermediate state (antarābhava).’ Bareau, p. 68,
points out the usual explanation that this concerns the interval 
some Buddhist sects place between the moment of death and the 
moment of birth, and adds that the Māhasamghika argumentation 
on this point is unknown. ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 104: “Since there is 
the Tathāgatagarbha, there is a reason for speaking of ‘cycli­
flow’ (samsāra). Lord, as to ‘cyclical flow,’ no sooner do the sense 
organs for perception pass away than it [the Tathāgatagarbha] 
takes hold of sense organs for perception, and that is ‘cyclical 
flow.’” Thus the Śrīmālā denies an intermediate state between the 
perishing and renewal of sense organs.

No. 78 ‘There is a root-consciousness (mūlavijñāna) which serves 
as the support (āśraya) for eye-perception and the other sensory 
perceptions, like the root of the tree is the principle of the leaves, 
etc.’ ‘Lion’s Roar’, introduction, p. 44, in reference to the Tathā­
gatagarbha: It is the “support, holder, base” (niśraya, ādhāra, prati­
sthā). ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 104: “Lord, sāṃsāra is based on the Tathā­
gatagarbha . . . no sooner do the sense organs for perception pass 
away than it takes hold of sense organs for perception . . . ‘Perished’ 
is the loss of the senses. ‘Born’ is the renewal of the senses. But, 
Lord, the Tathāgatagarbha is not born, does not die. . . .” The 
support nature of the Tathāgatagarbha apparently has the Mahā­
sāṃghika mūlavijñāna as its prototype. The connection with vijñā­
na is not lost in the Śrīmālā; confer passage cited partly under te­
et No. 49, above, that begins with mention of the intrinsic purity 
of the Tathāgatagarbha and in the same paragraph switches to the 
intrinsically pure consciousness, where ‘consciousness’ represents 
citta, the Abhidharma equivalent to vijñāna. ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 44, 
the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures have synonyms for the Tathāgata­
garbha, ‘cause’ (hetu) and ‘seed’ (bija), that exactly fit the illustra­
tion of the mūlavijñāna, “like the root of the tree is the principle 
of the leaves, etc.” The Śrīmālā itself emphasizes ‘support’.

In short, the Śrīmālā-sūtra has passages consistent with most
of the first ten of the Mahāsāṃghika tenets, and has passages consistent with the most celebrated characteristic tenets of this sect among the remaining tenets of Bareau’s list.

The Śrīmālā-sūtra happens to be the most frequently cited work in the Indian manual of Tathāgatagarbha theory, the Ratnagotravibhāga (as edited by Johnston; known as the Uttaratantra in the Tibetan canon). Among the various reviews of the ‘Lion’s Roar’, I should not neglect one which is competent and also takes issue with our insisted-upon theory of Mahāsāṃghika origins. This is the review by Takasaki, who translated the Ratnagotravibhāga into English (1966) and has published in Japanese a voluminous study of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures. I am grateful to Takasaki for his criticism in regard to the Mahāsāṃghika. The justification of the Mahāsāṃghika thesis was spread here and there in the ‘Lion’s Roar’; and while convincing to the translators, need not have been convincing to others. Consequently, the foregoing correlation of Mahāsāṃghika tenets with the Śrīmālā has been made to render the thesis more convincing.

But there are further difficulties, since it could be objected that a correlation with the traditional Mahāsāṃghika tenets does not per se prove a relation with attested Mahāsāṃghika literature. Now, I will attempt to answer the most pointed questions in this regard.

1) If the Śrīmālā-sūtra is associated with the Mahāsāṃghika school, should it not be named in the canon of that school? Indeed it should, and indeed is included by Paramārtha (mid-sixth cent.) in the Mahāyāna canon of the Mahāsāṃghika sect, as Bareau explicitly reports.

2) If the Mahāsāṃghika sect is to be implicated in the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, should there not be some passage in a recognized Mahāsāṃghika scripture that can be reasonably identified with this doctrine? Indeed there should be. The most well-known extant work of the Mahāsāṃghika is the Mahāvastu, which contains the passage, ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 43, addressed to the mother of a Buddha: “Today, O queen, you will give birth to a good youth (sukumāra) of immortal embryo (amara-garbha), who destroys old age and illness, celebrated and beneficial in heaven and on earth, a benefactor of gods and men.” Notice the contrast of the word sukumāra (‘very delicate’, perhaps ‘easily dying’) with amara-garbha (‘immortal embryo’), easily identifiable with the Tathāgata-
garbha which is taken as an immortal element in sentient beings, themselves mortal.

3) Is there some way of associating the Śrīmālāśūtra with the Mahāvastu? The way the ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 19, does it, is to take the four career-phases of Bodhisattvas mentioned at the beginning of the Mahāvastu, namely the ‘natural career-phase’ (prakrti-caryā), the ‘aspiration career-phase’ (pranidhana-caryā), the ‘conforming career-phase’ (anuloma-caryā), and the ‘nonregressing career-phase’ (anivartana-caryā); and to combine these with the traditional divisions10 of the Śrīmālā by the following scheme of the first two chapters (‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 19), whose fuller justification is in the ‘Lion’s Roar’ itself:

Chapter One; “Eliminating All Doubts.” 1. Praises of the Infinite Merit of the Tathāgata, and 2. Ten Great Vows. These are both the ‘natural career-phase’ involving the planting of virtuous roots in the presence of a Buddha.

Chapter Two: “Deciding the Cause.” 3. Three All-inclusive Aspirations. This is the ‘aspiration career-phase.’ 4. Embrace of the Illustrious Doctrine. A. Teaching in the Scope of the Great Aspiration, and B. Teaching the Far-ranging Meaning. These are the ‘conforming career-phase.’ C. Teaching the Great Meaning. This is the ‘nonregressing career-phase.’ That finishes the career-phases of the Bodhisattva, namely, the causal part, aimed at the fruit, which is complete Buddhahood.

Some modern Japanese scholars have discussed these career-phases, as Shindo Shiraishi shows.12 He points out that Ryūshō Hikata in a 1954 work on the Jātakas finds that the four careers, while not the ‘consistent principle’ of the Mahāvastu, must have been the ‘fundamental idea’ of the compiler of the present enlarged recension of the Mahāvastu; and points out that Ryūjō Yamada has found this classification in some chapters of the ‘Prajñāparamitā-sūtra’, suggesting the priority of the Mahāvastu to this ‘Prajñā-paramitā-sūtra’. Shiraishi’s brief article indicates the importance of the ‘prophecy’ (vyākarana) aspect in the early development of the Bodhisattva doctrine, and the Mahāvastu system of four career-phases as a framework of early and later theories.

4) Is there any other evidence of affiliation of the Śrīmālā with
the Mahāvastu? Perhaps the most important one is the Mahāvastu passage (confer, ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 33) in the words of Mahā-Katyāyana that the Jātaka tales start from the Eighth Stage, in which stage the Bodhisattvas renounce all they possess, are regarded as Samyaksambuddhas, and thereafter do not regress. This shows the Mahāvastu position that the fourth career-phase called ‘nonregressing’ is meant to cover the last three of the ten Bodhisattva Stages; and this directly ties in with scriptural words of the Śrīmālāsūtra (‘Lion’s Roar’, pp. 75-76), beginning, “Lord, the good son of the family or good daughter of the family by renouncing his body, thus obtaining the body of a Buddha, is equal to the uttermost limit of samsāra; . . .” The Tathāgatagarbha treatise Ratnagotravibhāga (on I, 2) quotes the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra to show the arising of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Samgha) as the basis for the last three Bodhisattva states, thus Sākyamuni under the Bodhi tree as the Eighth Stage.

5) Well, if the Śrīmālāsūtra as perhaps the most important of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, and the manual of Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, the Ratnagotravibhāga, are related to the Mahāsāṃghika school in the manner you have asserted, why would not Takasaki Jikidō in his monumental study of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures preserved in the Chinese canon and who translated the Ratnagotravibhāga into English, or why would not David Seyfort Ruegg in his monumental study of this topic through the Tibetan treatises (his La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra)13—have found this out? There are many obscure points about the early Buddhist sects, especially since a few, notably the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivādin, have extensive literary remains and have been much studied, while others are known mainly from brief lists of specialized doctrines. Since the main acknowledged treatise of the Mahāsāṃghika school, the Mahāvastu, was not translated into either Chinese or Tibetan, its important fund of evidence could not enter into the considerations of either the Chinese or Tibetan commentators. Hence, it is conceivable that both Takasaki and Ruegg, respectively dealing with the Chinese and the Tibetan works, and also using such Sanskrit treatises as the Ratnagotravibhāga—which do not treat such matters as the early Buddhist sects—could produce works of deserved reference value in given manners, and still not come up with the solution based on a comparison of the Śrīmālāsūtra with the Mahāvastu, carried out in a manner different from theirs.14

41
6) Do you still claim that the Šrīmālāsūtra was composed in South India in the Āndhra district? The 'Lion’s Roar’ sets forth this theory with the stipulation of prior acceptance that the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine has a Mahāsāṃghika origin. If the preceding evidence and reasoning be deemed sufficient for establishing the Mahāsāṃghika association, the further step of determining the provenance is a rather simple matter. The place must be definitely a Mahāsāṃghika stronghold, and one where the Buddhist institution was patronized by prominent ladies, such as queens. According to Bareau,\textsuperscript{15} the Mahāsāṃghika initially had their chief residence in Magadha, well prior to the time of King Asoka. Inscriptions in the 2nd cent., A.D. show their presence at Mathurā, at Karle, and in the area of Kabul. The chief distribution (south of the Nerbūḍa River at Karle, Nāgārjunakonda, etc.) and far north, toward Afghanistan) was still the case at the time of Hsüan-tsang’s travels at the beginning of the 7th cent. It is clear that this must have been the situation at the time of the Šrīmālā-sūtra composition, namely 3rd cent., A.D. For the area near Nāgārjunakonda, there is now abundant data in Rao’s Religion in Āndhra\textsuperscript{16} about the great strength of the Mahāsāṃghika in this region at that time, and the role of the Mahāsāṃghika in promoting the art centers of Āndhra. These centers were especially of stūpas, preeminently Amarāvatī. This is consistent with a thesis that prominent laymen were originally charged with taking care of stūpas, but that later the Mahāsāṃghika monks came in league with these laymen and made theological justifications for stūpa worship.\textsuperscript{17} Besides, the penchant to artistic depiction of Jātaka scenes was consistent with the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine (per Mahāvastu) that the Jātakas start with the Bodhisattva Eighth State, illustrated by Gautama Buddha seated beneath the Tree of Enlightenment;\textsuperscript{18} and it is noteworthy in this regard that the three volumes of the Mahāvastu are replete with Jātakas. There is art historical evidence that about this time (3rd cent., A.D.) the far northern center was taking artistic inspiration from the Āndhra sites. Thus, Rosen mentions “the decorative patterns on the architecture represented at Begram display the entire repertory of motifs appearing in the works of late Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakonda.” And, “Taking into account the stylistic evidence and the vocabulary of motifs employed, we must conclude that the Begram ivories were done in the latter part of the third or early part of the fourth century A.D., by artists fully conversant
with the art of Andhra Pradesh.” To this evidence, we need only add the acknowledged support by prominent ladies; confer ‘Lion’s Roar’, pp. 1-2. Andhra was the most creative site of the Mahāsāṃghika. Accordingly, the ‘Lion’s Roar’ claimed, and the authors still claim, that the Śrīmālādevīśimhanādāsūtra was composed in the Andhra district, and in the 3rd century A.D.

II. The Tathāgatagarbha, dharmatā, and svabhāva

If the foregoing relationship between the Mahāsāṃghika school and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine be granted, it still would have to be admitted that the relationship would have to belong to the Mahāyāna period and cannot be traced back to the early Mahāsāṃghika sect in 2nd cent. A.N. Now we shall come to grips with a disputed point of Buddhist doctrine that is older than the Mahāyāna and apparently also involves the Mahāsāṃghika and in the end leads to the Tathāgatagarbha. Accordingly, we should consider the Buddhist terms dharmatā and svabhāva. Certain modern authors seem alarmed at interpreting the term dharmatā as representing something that could give rise to something else, and willy-nilly they point to an ancient quarrel. Svabhāva is often said to have been denied in the Madhyamika while the Madhyamika commentator Candrakīrti takes it as the goal of the Bodhisattva. We shall see that these are related problems.

Certainly Lai is right, generally speaking, in holding that the Indian Buddhist schools do not explain dharmatā as creating phenomena, while he finds this interpretation in Chinese Buddhism. In any case, Indian Buddhism could not have meant by dharmatā the source of such things as rocks and tables. But there must have been Indian theories, even if considered deviant, that dharmatā could give rise to something, for otherwise how explain the inconsistent, even vehement, denials of the possibility, especially in terms of the Pāli equivalent dhammatā.

Thus, Jayatilleke several times alludes to a passage in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (book of tens), cited as ‘A, Vol. 3, 313’; in his rendition, “It is in the nature of things (dhammatā) that a person in the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees what really is. . . . a person does not need to make an effort of will . . .” Jayatilleke stresses that the Buddhist position denies a supernatural intervention; it is ‘natural’ that the next dharma should arise. But note that it is not ‘natural’ for the word dhammatā to be rendered
as an adverbial phrase ‘in the nature of things’ (his italics), rather than as a noun.

Rahula, although not referring to Jayatilleke’s treatment, translates the whole scriptural passage and writes in agreement that when one does what is required, the result is natural and requires no will; and certainly there is no involvement of ‘Grace’. He gives among his examples: a little snake comes to the hermitage of an ascetic attano dhammatāya, by “its own habit”—as Rahula properly renders it; dhammatā is not a supernatural power. Granted that it is not ‘Grace’ and the like; but it is doubtful that an ordinary mentality understands the snake’s ‘own habit’. Perhaps the yogin in the Buddhist attainment called samāpatti can understand it, as Candrakīrti has maintained (see below).

Kalupahana also deals with this issue. He considers a well-known passage which occurs in the Madhyamakavṛtti, “Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, there remains this (esa) dhammatā of dharmas,” and properly disagrees with Stcherbatsky’s rendition of dhammatā, to wit, ‘ultimate realities’. Kalupahana goes on to a curious medley:

As is pointed out below (chapter 5), dhammatā (P. dhammatā) refers to the causal connection between two dharmas rather than an underlying substratum of dharmas. If dhammatā stands for the causal connection, it cannot mean an ultimate reality (dhammasvabhāva) as the Sarvāstivādins understood it, because Nāgarjuna and his followers rejected the conception of svabhāva, using the argument that svabhāva is opposed to causality. Observe that Rahula has himself in that article cited the commentary on the Dīgha-nikāya explaining the word dhammatā as sabhāvo (which is of course equivalent to the Sanskrit svabhāva) and giving illustrations with the term nyamo (‘order of things’). As I have elsewhere shown, Nāgarjuna’s commentator Candrakīrti (hence a ‘follower’ of Nāgarjuna) in that Madhyamakavṛtti and in his Madhyamakāvatāra takes svabhāva (the equivalent of dhammatā) as the Bodhisattva’s goal realized in samāpatti. Hence, Candrakīrti would say that Nāgarjuna did reject (as Kalupahana and many another asserts he did) “the conception of svabhāva,” but having rejected this conception did not necessarily reject svabhāva, any more than in rejecting various conceptions the ancients had about...
blood, one thereby has to reject blood.

It is quite clear that Nagarjuna and his followers denied that anything arises by reason of svabhāva. In doing so, by equating svabhāva and dharmatā, they were agreeing with these followers of the Theravāda tradition, such as now Rahula, who insist that whatever the term dharmatā (P. dhammatā) may have meant in the ancient texts, it does not stand for a certain something that is a source of dharmas. Kalupahana goes further than this by claiming that dharmatā refers "to the causal connection between two dharmas rather than an underlying substratum of dharmas." To assess this, let us first translate the sentence which the above-mentioned Anguttara-nikāya passage uses to summarize the dhammatā statements:

\[
\text{iti kho, bhikkave, dhammā dhamme abhisandenti, dhammā dhamme paripūrenti apārā pāram gamanāyā.}^{27}
\]

Thus you should know, monks, the dhammas flow into dhamma, the dhammas are fulfilled in dhamma—for going from the not-beyond to the beyond."

Then we notice that Asaṅga has a passage on this very matter in his Yogācārabhūmi, section on hetuvidyā of which I have edited the extant Sanskrit and here cite in part:²⁸

\[
\]

In the following translation I shall render dharmatā as 'underlying nature', even though Kalupahana claims that the word does not mean this:

What is the inference from a dharma? The inferring of the underlying nature (dharmatā) of its association by an associated dharma that is not obviously related. For example, one infers the state of suffering (duḥkhatā) from one (i.e. dharma) associated with impermanence. One infers voidness and non-self from one associated with suffering; (infers) the underlying nature of old age from one associated with birth,
the underlying nature of death from one (i.e. dharma) associated with old age. . . .

That is to say, when Buddhism explains the Truth of Suffering by the characters, suffering, impermanence, voidness, and non-self, these, suffering and so forth, amount to a metaphysical set of indistinguishable underlying nature to associate seemingly unrelated dharmas. Thus dharmatā as here explained is not the source of any dharma, nor is it the “causal connection between two dharmas”. It is rather the whole relation as set forth in the scripture, “the dharmas flow into dhamma, the dhammas are fulfilled in dhamma,” and this relation is not obvious: it must be inferred.

Now, while granting all the foregoing, it still is the case that the Yogācāra and the Tathāgatagarbha literature use a term that suggests production from dharmatā, namely dharmatā-pratilabdha; and the Tathāgatagarbha literature a further one, dharmatā-nisyanda, as follows.

1. dharmatā-pratilabdha ‘derived from dharmatā’. Ruegg has collected a number of illustrations of this expression from Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, showing that it is ordinarily employed in connection with the gotra (family lineage) and the sadayatana (six sense bases). In the case of the Yogācāra, the texts are Asaṅga’s Śrāvakabhumi and Bodhisattvabhumi. The Tathāgatagarbha treatise Ratnagotravibhāga cites the lost Sadāyatana-sūtra for the passage:

ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣah sa tādṛṣṭaḥ paramparāgato ’nādikāliko dharmatāpratilabdha iti

Derived from dharmatā, and passing from one existence to another since beginningless time, it (i.e. the gotra, the substrate lineage) is specialized by the six sense bases, becoming similar.

The Śrāvakabhūmi near its beginning states: “That seed does not have the characteristics of difference as long as it stays apart from the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana).” Hence, what the Sadāyatana-sūtra meant by the gotra’s being “specialized by the six sense bases, becoming similar” is being channeled through a particular sense perception (in this sense ‘similar’), and thus exhibiting ‘characteristics of difference’, to wit, from its being channeled through a dif-
different sense perception. In the terminology of the Madhyāntavibhāga, being different would be the difference of subject and object, which is brought about by sense perception. The Śādāyatanasūtra passage may well be the prototype of the various other instances, but the interpretation of the gotra would differ. For Asanga, the gotra is that of the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha, or the Bodhisattva, and implicates the ālayavijñāna. For the Ratnagotravibhāga, the gotra is the Tathāgatagarbha.

2. dharmatā-nisyānā ‘flowing from dharmatā’, as in ‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 94, in the Śrīmālā-sūtra: “they have faith flowing from true nature (dharmatā).” Observe that this is the same role that the Madhyāntavibhāga, I, 15, and Vasubandhu’s commentary, attributes to the dharmadhātu: ārya-dharma-hetuvād dharmadhātuḥ, “(called) ‘Dharmadhātu’ because it [voidness, śūnyatā] is the cause of the dharmas of the nobles.” Śrīmālā uses similar terms for the Tathāgatagarbha (‘Lion’s Roar’, p. 105): “Lord, if there were no Tathāgatagarbha, there would (not be) . . . aspiration towards Nirvāṇa . . . Whatever be these six perceptions . . . these are unfit for aspiration towards Nirvāṇa . . . the Tathāgatagarbha experiences suffering; hence it is worthy of . . . aspiration towards Nirvāṇa.” In this case, the Madhyāntavibhāga appears to be an ally of the Tathāgatagarbha position.

In short, it appears that the old quarrel between the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sthavira schools was carried on in many ways. In the old days it was over the status of the Arhat. Later, when the Sthavira had itself divided into sub-sects, giving rise to the Sarvāstivādin, the argument was continued among followers of the Mahāyāna. It appears that the Mahāsāṃghika, or at least some of its sub-sects, had given rise to the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, the theory of Bodhisattva stages, and art representations, especially of the Jātakas. The Sarvāstivādin came up with its own scriptures such as the Mahāyāna biography of the Buddha, the Lalitavistara, and perhaps had a hand in the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, although the situation here requires much research. In any case, both major Mahāyāna philosophical schools, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra, appear to have arisen in the Sarvāstivādin tradition. However, of these two, the Yogācāra in its several forms has been variously influenced by the Mahāsāṃghika-type Buddhism, but was careful to keep a distance. If one stays in the Mādhyamika works, there is a harping on the denial that dharmas arise from svabhāva or from
dharmatā, thus in agreement with the Theravāda. The position of the Yogācāra is more subtle: It does not care to make the denials of the Mādhyamika, but neither would it take dharmatā as a permanent, substantial entity, since the ālayavijñāna itself must disappear for Nirvāṇa without remainder. One may also refer to Asaṅga’s statement in the Hetuvidyā section, as cited above. One must move entirely to the other side, the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, stemming, as we believe to have established, from the Mahāsāṃghika, to get a reinterpretation of dharmatā as ‘thusness’ (tathatā), the permanent Tathāgatagarbha.

But since the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine was much appreciated in China, perhaps fortified by accompanying the impressive artistic representations of the school, it is reasonable that the novel interpretation of certain terms—such as dharmatā—would get a sympathetic hearing. While Lai is not strictly correct in claiming that the interpretation of dharmatā as a source of phenomena is something worked up for the first time in China, we should agree that the theory was amplified in China in a manner that had not been done in India.

In conclusion, while the deviant interpretation of important Buddhist terms understandably inspired denunciations from followers of the ‘elders’ (the ārya-sthāvira), if one will give fair credit to the Buddhist currents that were most instrumental in conversion to the Buddhist faith outside of India it may well be that we should give the nod to those ancient schismatics, the Mahāsāṃghikas.

NOTES

10. Namely the ‘chapters’ 1 through 4 in the Guṇabhadra Chinese version of Śrīmālā-sūtra.
11. Compare Mahāsāṃghika tenet No. 60, cited above (Introduction), ‘Virtue caused by a vow increases’.
14. A reviewer of the ‘Lion’s Roar’ in *Philosophy East and West* doubted the Mahāsāṃghika origin because Ruegg’s book does not mention it—an unfortunate disservice to Ruegg’s own work.
24. Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp. 75-76. Although I disagree with him at this point, may I add that he has many fine observations in this book.
28. I have edited with translation the hetuvidyā section as a part of a


34. Esho Mikogami makes an intriguing point in "The Problem of Verbal Testimony in Yogācāra Buddhism," *Bukkyogaku kenkyū*, Vols. 32-33, 1977, p. 3, about the passage in the *Daśabhūmikā-sūtra* that whether Tathāgatas arise or not, the dharma-ta is permanent and unchanging:—the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are limited to the world of dharma-ta. This is consistent with the Tathāgatagarbha taken as the basis of saṁsāra, and as the potentiality of Buddhahood, and the not-yet Buddhahood.