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Even more disquieting is his tendency to homologize bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma thought with Buddhism (or even "Eastern thought") in general. Running through most of these essays (and most of Prof. Guenther's work) is a vital concern with the distinction between Mind with a capital M (rig-pa, sems-nyid) and mind with a small m (sems). The former is a pure, spontaneous, aesthetic, intuitive awareness, ontologically expressible as "Being-in-itself," while the latter is everyday mental functioning: conceptual, rigid and very much "fallen" from the pure state to which, nevertheless, it can return. The parallels between such a view of man and that of Christianity (not to mention Bergson or Heidegger) are startling indeed, but we may at least concede that such a mythos is implied by many bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma works. The suggestion, however, that such a scheme somehow is the heart and soul of Buddhism is, at the very best, arguable, and needs to be demonstrated rather than simply asserted or assumed.

In short, then, Prof. Guenther's greatest strength turns out to be his weakness as well: admirably, he seeks to demonstrate the relevance of Buddhist philosophy to the contemporary crisis of the soul, but in so doing he tends to substitute commentary for translation and philosophical generalization for contextual analysis. In doing that, he draws us far enough away from the work he is discussing that we no longer are certain where we stand, and can, in the end, but report that this does indeed seem to be "Tibetan Buddhism in Western perspective." In that, there may be great psychological value, but the scholarly and historical value often is problematic.

Regardless of the problems endemic to it, Prof. Guenther's is a provocative and sometimes insightful corpus, and his ideas deserve serious discussion. *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective* will provide ammunition for both his supporters and his opponents and for that, in addition to its numerous interesting essays (especially the seminal "The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism," "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," and "The Philosophical Background of Buddhist Tantrism"), it bears reading.

Roger Jackson


Seven years ago, Herbert Guenther published the first substantial English translation of Tibetan grub-mtha' (siddhanta) literature, includ-
ing in his *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* major portions of dKon-mchog ’jigs-med dbang-po’s *Grub-pa’i rnam-bzbag rin-po-che’i phreng-ba* and Mi-pham’s *Yid-bzbin-mdzod-kyi grub-mtha’ bsdus-pa*. Now, Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins have brought out a book that is in many ways an obverse, a mirror image of Prof. Guenther’s. Not only is their title very nearly the opposite of his, but the ordering of material is reversed, too: Prof. Guenther devotes the first portion of his book to “theory,” i.e., to the four traditional schools of Indian Buddhism, and the latter part to “practice,” a discussion of the different levels of Tantra; Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins, on the other hand, give the first half of their work over to translation of the Fourth Panchen Lama’s practice-oriented commentary on Tsong-kha-pa’s *Three Principal Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment*, while the second half is devoted to a complete translation of dKon-mchog ’jigs-med dbang-po’s *Grub-pa’i mtha’i rnam-bzbag rin-po-che’i phreng-ba* ("Precious Garland of Tenets"). (I am not certain what prompted this latter ordering, as the traditional emphasis—certainly in the dGe-lugs-pa school, in which Geshe Sopa was trained—is on the mastery of theory prior to an undertaking of serious meditative (particularly Tantric) practice.)

Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins most markedly differ from Guenther in a more essential way, i.e., in the theory of translation that they bring to bear on the *Precious Garland*. Prof. Guenther, of course, shapes his translations with a complex, frequently-shifting vocabulary drawn largely from recent analytic and phenomenological philosophy. He always has disdained “literal-mindedness” and the one-English-word-for-one-foreign-word equivalency employed by “philologists” who fail to understand that a non-static philosophical system must be translated by “non-static” means. I’m not sure that Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins can be classified as “philologists,” but they *have* opted for a very literal rendering of dKon-mchog ’jigs-med dbang-po’s text.

The two different approaches are typified by the following example. Prof. Guenther (Penguin edition, p. 109) translates a portion of the *yul-can* ("The Owner of the Objective Situation") section of the chapter on *Cittamātra* as follows: "The substratum awareness is as regards its internal experientially initiated potentialities of experience (existentially and ethically) neutral, but is disturbed and divided by the ‘constant’ which as a primary factor [in cognitive life] is accompanied by five ever-present function patterns as its assistants.” Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins (p. 115) translate the same passage from the same “object-possessor” (*yul-can*) section of the Cittamātra chapter rather differently: "The followers of scripture assert that a mind basis of all apprehends [the five senses, the five objects, and] the internal latencies...A mind basis of all has the aspect of not discriminating its objects [it does not identify, ‘This is such and such’] and its entity is undefiled and neutral.
It is a constant main mind, associated only with the five omnipresent mental factors."

Prof. Guenther's rendering of bag-chags (vāsanā) as "the experientially initiated potentialities of experience" is a typical instance of commentary-as-translation, but a literalism that translates kun-gzbi (which denotes but does not translate the Sanskrit ālaya-vijñāna) as "mind basis of all" is not entirely helpful, either. Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins have insisted on translating virtually every Tibetan word as literally as possible into an English equivalent, with occasionally unfortunate results. A minor, if egregious, example is the consistent use of "Foe Destroyer" when referring to those who have reached the highest Hinayana attainment: "Foe Destroyer" is a literal translation of the Tibetan dgra-bcom-pa, but the Tibetan term was chosen on the basis of a false Sanskrit etymology; the term arhat actually refers to "one who is worthy." Other instances of excessive literalism include the translation of yongs-grub (parinispāna) as "thoroughly-established phenomena," of kun-rdzob bden-pa (samvṛti-satya) as "truth for a con­cealer," and of 'gro (gati) as "migration."

Though the translation of the Precious Garland does not read at all smoothly, it should be pointed out in Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins' defense that if they have erred, it is to the preferable side: too much literalism, in my opinion, runs far less risk of significantly distorting a text than does too little. Furthermore, one begins to suspect after two difficult renditions of the Precious Garland that it is not a work that lends itself easily to translation. Grub-mtba' literature in general is highly structured and condensed. Even the longer examples of the genre, such as that of Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa, are nearly incomprehensible for one without a considerable background in Buddhist philosophy and/or a native informant. dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's grub-mtba' is a short one, concise to the point where it is barely more than an outline. Because of this, nearly every sentence requires a page of historical and scholastic elucidation. Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins have interspersed the text with a number of helpful clarifications, but one wishes that there were far more of them, and in a somewhat less technical vocabulary. One wishes, too, that the glossary at the back could have been somewhat more complete and that the Tibetan and Sanskrit originals of some of the more unusual translations could have been indicated parenthetically in the text.

The text that comprises the first, "practice" portion of the book, the Fourth Panchen Lama's commentary of Tsong-kha-pa's Three Principal Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment, had been previously translated in Geshe Wangyal's The Door of Liberation. Its retranslation is justified by the relative unobtainability of Geshe Wangyal's book, as well as by the addition to the text of a number of visualization
details that had been omitted from the earlier translation. The text is an important and interesting one, giving detailed instructions on the procedure to be followed in a meditative sitting. The session described involves visualization, prayer, mantra and a meditation that touches on most of the major points of the lam-rim (a particular arrangement of the "stages of the path" that is, in one form or another, central to the practices of all Tibetan schools): the rarity and importance of human birth, impermanence and the imminence of death, the sufferings of samsāra, the cultivation of bodhicitta, and the meditation on emptiness. Geshe Sopa’s and Prof. Hopkins’ translation is a clear and readable one, prefaced by a detailed background discussion of lam-rim, and one wishes that such detail could equally have been provided for the Precious Garland translation. The difficulties with that translation notwithstanding, though, the Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism provides a tantalizing taste of the vast range of thought and practice encompassed by Tibetan Buddhism, and should—if used in concert with other texts—prove useful to specialist and interested layman alike.

V. Olivetti


Shingon Buddhism is a tightly structured and specialized treatment of Shingon thought in relation to Mahāyāna philosophy. Shingon, or specifically, “Shingon mikkyō,” is the Japanese version of Tantric Buddhism. Although Shingon had its roots in Indian Tantrism and was colored by the Chinese Buddhist tradition, this brand of Buddhist thought was systematized as a distinct school of the Mahāyāna and as an integral part of the Japanese Buddhist tradition by Kūkai (A.D. 774-835) in the ninth century. In terms of its canonical sources, Shingon owes its basic insights to two Indian texts, the Mahāvairocana-sūtra, which transmits the Mādhyamika system of thought, and the Tattva-samgraha-sūtra, which transmits the Yogācāra-vijñānavāda system of thought. In essence, Shingon consists of a systematization of these two doctrinal foundations of Mahāyāna. However, it differs from other Mahāyāna traditions to the extent that it describes its doctrine through symbolic representation, identifies Dharma-kāya Mahāvairocana, the cosmic Buddha, as the embodiment of truth, and develops a new dimension of world order, the dharma-dhātu, which in turn is also identified as Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana.