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YOGĀCĀRA AND THE BUDDHIST LOGICIANS

by Alex Wayman

Introduction

The school of Buddhism known as Yogācāra or alternately as Cittamātra is a standard topic in surveys of Indian philosophy. It is also one of the two main sides of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, the other side being called Mādhyamika. Many scholars have gone deeply into the intricacies of the Indian systems of philosophy, and the Yogācāra school has not escaped their keen considerations. However, the present writer found in the course of his studies over the years that the philosophical position of these texts that emerged while he read the texts of Asaṅga and his followers did not bear out the standard survey explanation of the Yogācāra position. At the same time, it became apparent why some scholars—undoubtedly intelligent and capable—would come to a conclusion not verified by my own delvings into this literature. I allude to the unqualified denial of an external object, attributed to this school. Of course, if indeed the Yogācāra school denies the reality of an external object, it would hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow, since Dignāga and his successors, especially Dharmakīrti, do not deny an external object; rather they call it a svalakṣaṇa (the 'particular') and even sometimes describe it as paramārtha-sat ('absolute existence'), to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception (pratyakṣa). But it has been claimed by Stcherbatsky and others that there is a pronounced influence of Yogācāra philosophy on Buddhist logic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage. If we grant this, and indeed we should, there remains the problem of what
is the nature of the influence and what kind of Yogācāra is most affiliated to the Buddhist logician’s position.

But, then, there appear to be different kinds of Yogācāra. At the sūtra stage, there is the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and its continuation into Asaṅga’s school, and there is the *Lankāvatārasūtra*. As a kind of revealed śāstra, there is the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, attributed to Maitreya, with Vasubandhu’s commentary. Finally, there is Vasubandhu’s *Vimsatikā* and *Trimsikā*. Of course there are Mahāyāna sūtras or sūtra portions besides the above that were authoritative for both the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, and also further exegetical commentaries on the main works, as well as more independent treatises to be included in the general category of Yogācāra; the present paper can barely touch upon this extensive literature. After considering certain texts of the above-named literature, I shall treat the term ālayavijñāna, and, finally, some views about the Yogācāra.

**A. Vījñaptimātratāsiddhi and the Samdhinirmocanasūtra**

The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is the main Yogācāra scripture. Vasubandhu’s two brief treatises are the form of Yogācāra the most known and treated by Western scholars as to attributed Yogācāra philosophical position. The introduction to Tripathi’s *The Problems of Knowledge in Yogacara Buddhism* says: ¹ “Dr. Stcherbatsky has also corroborated the view that Diṇṇāga’s *Ālambanaparikṣā* simply summarizes the arguments of Vasubandhu’s *Vījñaptimātratāsiddhi*. A comparative study of the *Vimsatikā* and the *Ālambanaparikṣā* certainly lends support to the view of Dr. Stcherbatsky.” In further support, one may observe that Viniṭadeva, who wrote several well-known commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s logical works, composed the commentaries, *Prakaraṇa-vimśaka-tīkā* and *Trimsikā-tīkā*, on the two Vasubandhu treatises, perhaps as a preparation for his logic commentaries, including his commentary, *Ālambanaparikṣā-tīkā*, on the small Dignāga work.

It is necessary to treat certain terms. There is the term ālambana, employed in the title of Dignāga’s work, and I render it ‘consciousness-support.’ Then there is the correlative subjective term, vijñāna, which I usually translate ‘perception.’ In the summary of the master Yogācāra commentator Sthiramati, from his commentary on Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*: ²
Now, what is vijnāna? It is defined as representation (vijnāpti) of a consciousness-support (ālambana). A consciousness-support is a sense object of a thought (citta) and a mental (caitta); furthermore, it is of six kinds, from form (rūpa) up to natures (dharma). Besides, representation is defined as apprehension (*graha), ascertainment (*pratipatti), and understanding (*adhigama). It is the six evolving perceptions (pravṛtti-vijnāna) from eye-based perception up to mind-based perception (manovijnāna).

Notice that there is no denial of an ālambana in the meaning of a sense object. Passing to Vasubandhu's two treatises, we can notice references to the ordinary situation of mankind and to the transcendental experience. In the first case, his 'representation-only' (vijnāpti-mātra) as applied to the normal consciousness in sentient beings is somewhat subtler than a simple denial of external things. This is clear from verse 3 of the Sanskrit Vimsatikā, containing the words, “furthermore, like the hungry ghosts (preta), so with all, there is no certainty in the stream of consciousness, upon seeing the stream of pus, and so on.” This alludes to the Buddhist mythological theory of five or six destinies (gati), including the hungry ghosts as those disembodied spirits that are perpetually hungry and thirsty because their own consciousness pollutes what is inherently pure, making it so repulsive as to be uneatable and undrinkable. Jñānagarbha's commentary on the Maitreya chapter of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra illustrates the mis-reported nature of the external object with the standard example of the stream of water which animals, hungry ghosts, men, and gods all see differently, the hungry ghosts seeing it full of pus, the gods seeing it as lapis lazuli, and so on. The stream itself is not denied. What those remarks mean is that the consciousness shared by a particular destiny (gati), say men, or hungry ghosts, agrees on a particular fabrication attributed to an external, and that the external is not the way it was represented. Hence, the point is not to deny an external object, but rather to affirm the representation of it as a group fabrication; and so the common denial of an external object means in these terms that there is no object of which the representation is a faithful copy. In short, Vasubandhu could well argue that his representation-only is the correct way to speak of the nature of consciousness in the light of the Buddhist teaching of five or six destinies (gati), with the position
that the object is the same for all the sentient beings: they only see it differently on account of the destiny.

Once we take this as Vasubandhu's position, it becomes more reasonable to assume a possible consistency with Dignāga's Ālambanapariksā, since this work indeed admits an ālambana.

It is also well to notice that Vasubandhu treats the transcendental experience, since Dignāga also admits a yogipratyakṣa. Thus toward the end of the Trīṃśikā (verse 28):

When perception (vijñāna) does not perceptively reach the meditative object (ālambana), it abides in the state of perception-only (vijñāna-mātra), which lacks an apprehensible by reason of not apprehending that meditative object.

Here again Vasubandhu clarifies that he does not deny the ālambana. The state of vijñāna-mātra is reached when vijñāna does not apprehend the ālambana. Subject and object have become one in samādhi; and Vasubandhu's verse is consistent with Asaṅga's citation of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra (Maitreya chapter) in his Mahāyānasamgraha:

Lord, is that image which is the samādhi-domain different from that mind (which perceives) or is it the same? The Lord answered: Maitreya, it is not different. And why? Because that image amounts to representation-only (vijñaptimātra). Maitreya, I have explained that the meditative object (ālambana) of perception (vijñāna) is distinguished (vibhakta) by representation-only (vijñaptimātra).

This passage again clarifies that there is no denial of the ālambana even in the successful samādhi situation. Indeed, representation-only distinguishes the consciousness-support when it is no longer perceived. This corresponds to the usual situation when, seeing something quite striking and wondering if it is really there, we would turn away from it and not see it, showing that our perception itself was not responsible for the object (here the ālambana), and that the object was distinguished (set apart) by our no longer perceiving it. By the same token, the state of samādhi is distinguished by the yogin's returning to ordinary consciousness.

Now, is the preceding consistent with Dignāga's Ālambanapariksā? Since it is a brief work, I shall translate the eight verses with the help of Dignāga's own commentary.
1. Although atoms are the cause of the sensory representation, they do not appear therein, so its sense object (*viṣaya*) is not the atoms, like a sense organ (has objects).

2. Whatever appears (i.e. in the representation) that way, does not (do so) from them, because it (the representation) is non-substantial, like a double moon. Accordingly, neither of the two externals (atoms and their aggregation) is feasible as the object of cognition.

3. Some persons claim that the aspects (ākāra) of aggregation accomplish (the cognition), and that the aspect of atoms is not the object of representation, like solidity, etc.

4. If it were that way, the cognitions of pot, cup, etc. would be the same. If the differentiation (of cognition) is by virtue of differentiation of aspects, it would exist as atomic substance—

5. because if it were not (so), there would be no differentiation of measure (e.g., roundness). Therefore, it exists (i.e., conventionally) without material. Because if one excludes the atoms, the cognition of an appearance in that place would disappear.

6. The form of the inner knowable, which appears as though it were external, is the object—because it is the form of perception (*vijñāna*) and because it is the conditional state (*pratyayatā*) of that (= ālambana).

7. And it is the condition (*pratyaya*) because a single part (āmsa) is not delusive. Because it establishes capacity (*sakti*), it is in sequence. Whatever is the form of sense capacity that is an associated cause (*sahakārin*), is the sense organ (itself).

8. Besides, that does not contradict the representation. Accordingly, these (three) pass (as valid):

1) the form of the sensory object (*viṣaya*);

2) the capacity of mutual cause (i.e., capacity of eye, and based on inner form the perception, *vijñāna*, to wit, the ālambana appearing as objective thing);

3) immemorial time.

Later, we shall see by a passage of Dharmottara's that Dignāga has a kind of nominalism here. He distinguishes between the atoms and the form of atoms. What causes sensory representation is atoms, not an aggregation of 'form' of atoms. In his summary (verse 8, 2), he shows that this cause is further treated by an associated cause, to wit, the sense-organ capacity.
These are taken together as one item. Left over 1) is the 'form' (the so-called 'aggregation of atoms') attributed to the object; this is added by the mind, and is another item (which he calls "the form of the sensory object"). A third item is 'time,' since this is necessary for sequence, as in the discussions on various causes.

So far I detect no divergence from that part of Vasubandhu's two treatises, Asaṅga's citation in the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, and Sthiramati's passage, as presented above. In this kind of nominalism* (though called 'idealism' in Indian Philosophy surveys), what is real is the atomic object, called in other logic texts the svalaksana, and the real is causal and has the sense organ as a cooperating capacity. On top of this the mind adds the 'form,' more comprehensible by the word 'shape,' meaning that the aggregation of atoms was not what caused the perception: this aggregation is a representation-only (vijñapti-mātra) of a consciousness-support (ālambana) and makes up a picture in the mind, which the mind attributes to the external world. It is impossible that this picture or aggregation could exist in the external world, since it is representation-only. The vulgar interpretation—that this denies external objects—is nonsense. It fails to get Vasubandhu's point, or Dignāga's either.

When Vasubandhu says, "like the hungry ghosts (preta)," he intends that when they see the river as full of pus and other unclean matter, this is their representation-only; he does not deny the external object. He here appears consistent with the Maitreya chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. However, Vasubandhu and Dignāga show a different emphasis. Dignāga attempts to give equal weight to the real object and the unreal object. Not particularly in this treatise, Ālambanaparikṣā, but, rather, in his Pramāṇasamuccaya, he sets forth the object of pratyakṣa (sensory perception) as the svalaksana; and the object of an appropriate cognition called 'inference' (anumāna) as the sāmānya-laksana.

B. Madhyāntavibhāga and two 'reals'

This treatise obtained a reverence tantamount to that of scripture by the legend that Asaṅga received it from Maitreya, understood as the Bodhisattva; and Vasubandhu's commentary...
has a derived lustre thereby. I have cited Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaparīkṣā for a passage on color and shape to show a consistency with the Madhyāntavibhāga’s first chapter, in an old review article of mine in Philosophy East and West. Here the philosophical position is evidently a kind of nominalism, and as was previously indicated, is apparently consistent with Dignāga’s Alambanaparīkṣā. Dharmottara is a well-known commentator on Dharmakīrti. This is Dharmottara’s passage.  

Of those, the efficient entity is the subtle atom, and color (varṇa) is the nature of the subtle atom, but shape (samsthāna) is not. Thus, shape exists conventionally (samvṛttitas) while color exists in the absolute sense (paramārthatas). The latter serves for an effect while shape does not. Consequently, while one ordinarily sees something efficient as a multiple, when one understands the nature of this and that, it is not distinct, for example, a moment. [It is objected:] “Shape is that way. Its existence in a distinct manner pervades as an adjunct to an entity in the sense of a distinct configuration. Just as in the absence of a thesis there is no reason, it would contradict this were the adjunct to an object (viśaya) (to be) without distinctness.” Now we have explained that shape is not an adjunct. Therefore, the shape, or the ‘state of a given thing’ (dnos po niid, S. vastutva), or a moment, are dependent on something, whatever the something else.

Here, Dharmottara takes the ‘color’ out there, ‘shape’ in the mind; the realist takes the shape and color out there. In my review article on Chatterjee’s The Yogacara Idealism, I pointed out that the Madhyāntavibhāga has two reals, the void Dharmadhātu and the Imagination of Unreality. Here, the void Dharmadhātu is on the side of the efficient entity, the color, where the Buddhist logician puts the svalaksana; and the Imagination of Unreality is on the side of constructive imagination, discursive thought, which adds the dimension, the shape, where the logician puts his sāmānyalaksana. For example, the clay is the atomic portion in the void Dharmadhātu, and the shape impressed upon it—consequently the ‘pot’—came from the potter’s mind, a vestige of the Imagination of Unreality.

C. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Cittamātra

This sūtra is frequently taken to be in the Yogācāra tradition,
since it uses freely the term ālayavijñāna (though in conjunction with the Tathāgatagarbha), a characteristic term of the Asaṅga-Vasubandhu Yogācāra (which, however, does not appear to accept the Tathāgatagarbha theory), and frequently employs the term cittamātra. Suzuki, in his Studies in the Lankavatara-sutra,\textsuperscript{11} states that this sūtra never employs the term viññanamātra (employed by Vasubandhu in an above citation), although it uses cittamātra and viññaptimātra interchangeably. In terms of the previously-mentioned two situations from Vasubandhu's two treatises, namely, the ordinary situation of mankind, and the yogin's samādhi situation, it appears that the Laṅkāvatāra uses the term cittamātra in terms of the ordinary situation. At least, this is the conclusion of passages cited in Tsoṅ-kha-pa's commentary on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (a work in the Mādhyamika tradition). Thus, the Laṅka, Chap. III, verse 33:\textsuperscript{11}

There is nothing manifested outside, for the mind manifests the multiplicity. Body, sense experience, dwelling place—I call mind-only.

Tsoṅ-kha-pa explains:\textsuperscript{13} 'body' means the material (rūpin) sense bases (āyatana) of eye, etc.; 'sense experience' (bhoga) means the five sense objects, form, sound, etc.; 'dwelling place' means the receptacle world (bhājana-loka). While they are all manifested by the mind, they appear as though external. Tsoṅ-kha-pa calls this a sūtra of 'provisional meaning' in the Mādhyamika meaning of the terms neyārtha (provisional meaning) and nītārtha (final meaning). He claims that such sūtra passages as this one were taught by the Lord to divert sinful beings from their attachment to sense objects; and so they are provisional. He bears this out by citing another verse from the Laṅka, Chap. II, 123:\textsuperscript{14}

In the way that a physician offers a medicine to one patient and a medicine to another patient, in that way the Buddhas teach mind-only for the sentient beings.

Thus the teaching of mind-only is subservient to the particular sentient beings that are taught. This application of the Mahāyāna 'skillful-means' (upāya-kauśalya) approach, in contrast to what is actually the case, would hardly be inviting to the Buddhist logicians.

On the other hand, it is possible to take the term cittamātra
in a meditative context. Perhaps consistent with those 
_Lañkāvatāra_ verses is what Sthiramati says in his subcommen-
tary on the _Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra_, Bodhipakṣa chapter, verse 
66: “The halting of thought on such a single area of thought 
as ‘Mind-only is the three worlds; they are nothing but the 
mind,’ constitutes calming (of the mind) (_śamatha_).”¹⁵ That is, 
he here counts the passage “Mind-only is the three worlds” as 
a meditative object in the form of an aphoristic sentence, rather 
than as a philosophical tenet of ordinary discursive thought. 
This meditative sense of the term _cittamātra_ is also in the 
_Sūtrālaṃkāra_ itself, Chap. XIV, verses 24-25, during an expla­
nation of the four degrees of yoga—warmth, summits, for­
bearances, and supreme mundane natures:¹⁶

So as to expand the light of _dharma_, he begins striving in 
earnest. And having expanded the light of _dharma_, he stands 
fast in mind-only (_cittamātra_). Then he discerns the appear­
ance of all objects in the _citta_. At that time there are cast off 
his shifting objects of perception.

In these meditative passages, it could be argued, the sense of 
_mātra_ in _cittamātra_, i.e. ‘only,’ as excluding external objects, is 
not to do away with external objects, but to disregard them, since this situation of samādhi is purely an interior movement.

_D. The ālayavijñāna_

In the Siddhānta book of the Tibetan author Dkon-mchog-
jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, the Yogācārins (_sems tsam pa_) are divided 
into two: those who follow scripture (_āgama-anusārin_), and 
those who follow reason (_yukti-anusārin_). The former are those 
who follow the five divisions of Asaṅga’s _Yogācārabhūmi_. The latter are those who follow the seven treatises of logic (by Dhar­
makīrti). Worthy of note is the difference attributed to the two 
regarding their theory of the ‘subjective’ (_viṣayin, T. yul can_): 
“The followers of scripture accept the ālayavijñāna as the per­
sonality (_pudgala_) because they believe in the eight kinds of 
vijñāna. The followers of reason believe in the mano-vijñāna as 
the basic characteristic of the personality.”¹¹⁷ I have pointed out 
in another study that the Buddhist logicians apparently re­
placed the ālayavijñāna with the kind of _pratyakṣa_ called ‘in-

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trospection' (svasamvedana).^{18}

However, Dharmakirti, in his Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa chapter, verse 522, refers to the ālaya, which Prajñākaragupta in his commentary explains as the ālayavijñāna. The commentarial passage is quite difficult, and here I shall just give the gist of it. First, there are verses 521 and 522 by Dharmakirti:^{19}

521. When capacity ends for the previous cognition, there is no cognition in the absence of the prior cognition, because one does not understand the arising of a cognition in the event the cognition loses the capacity for another object.

522. Although the two, unaffiliated, have arisen simultaneously by means of a single perspicacious thought (= evolving perception), since loss of capacity has set in, there is no arising of another from the ālaya.

Dharmakirti here refers to the situation where a cognition of an object is dissipated and there is a problem of accounting for the next cognition. But do we have to bring in the help of a 'store-consciousness' (ālayavijñāna) to get the next cognition? It seems that Dharmakirti denies any need of the ālayavijñāna. However, Prajñākaragupta concludes: "Let this thought (cintā) of ālayavijñāna stay! Besides, since it is imagined as the basis of 'habit-energy' (vāsanā), there is no fault."^{20}

This reference to vāsanā recalls the discussion earlier in this paper about Vasubandhu's 'representation-only' in terms of the destiny distortion, e.g. the hungry ghosts. Standard Buddhist tenets relate this to the karma theory. Thus, Tsoṅ-kha-pa, in his Tibetan commentary on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, which refutes the ālayavijñāna, mentions four theories to account for effectiveness of karma. In brief, the four are: 1. that of certain 'mind-only' (cittamātra) followers, who resort to the ālayavijñāna to account for it; 2. that of a Vaibhāṣika school outside of Kashmir, as is explained by Avalokitavrata (a voluminous commentator on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa), crediting the samskāras (motivations) with an indelible record of the debt to be paid; 3. that of the standard Vaibhāṣika school, which claims that the dharma called 'reach' (prāpti) has the capacity to reach the fruit; 4. that of a number of persons, both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, who held that the stream of
vijñāna is suffused (from Chinese texts one would say 'perfumed') with the habit-energy (vāsanā) of karma (the volitional act). In short, some Cittamātra followers appealed to the ālayavijñāna alone for effectiveness of karma. Some others took samskāras alone. Some decided on a special force called 'reach'. Finally, some combined vijñāna and samskāras, without an ālayavijñāna, for the karma role. Prajñākaragupta apparently means that the Buddhist logicians treat the problem of perception and inference without bringing in the notion of ālayavijñāna; and for all that, not necessarily rejecting it in terms of the karma theory.

E. Do the Yogācārins deny an external object?

Japanese scholars have in recent years published a number of books dealing with the Yogācāra, usually by the name Vijñaptimātra, as a topic in itself, or in comparison with the Mādhyamika. When I was in Kyoto in 1970, I spoke with one of these authors, Professor Masaaki Hattori, who had recently published such a book, in collaboration with a philosopher, Professor Shunpei Ueyama. I mentioned that I had failed to find any denial of an external object when I read the mirror simile passage in the Maitreya chapter of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and as it was taken over by Asaṅga in his Mahāyānasamgraha along with Vasubandhu's comment; or when I read the extensive material on that simile passage in Yūn-ts'ē's great commentary on the Samdhinirmocana that was translated into Tibetan; or when I read Jñānagarbha's commentary on the Maitreya chapter. It seemed to me that these authors took the external entity for granted, but were silent about it because the sūtra itself was concerned with the samādhi image, which is not derived from the reflex in consciousness of an external object. Dr. Hattori agreed with me that the Samdhinirmocana there was silent about an external rather than in denial of it. But he added: the later Yogācāra school stems from the Vijñaptimātratā after Vasubandhu, and in this developed school there is definitely a denial of the external object. I am pleased to mention this agreement on the thesis I have been advancing in this paper, since my own considerations of the Yogācāra in comparison with the Buddhist logicians go up
to Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati; and so far, anyway, there is no denial of the external object, but rather a stress on its mis-reported nature. Professor Hattori’s book is called *Ninshiki to Chōetsu (yuishiki)* (Tokyo, 1970). In response to a later inquiry, he wrote me, among other things, that the terms ‘Ninshiki’ (cognition) and ‘Chōetsu’ (Transcendence/The Act of Transcending) in the title of his book “stand respectively for the theoretical and the practical aspects of the Yogācāra-vijñānapāda.” After writing the foregoing, I found a corroboration from a work of Tsoṅ-kha-pa, founder of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. He said, referring to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, “In that sūtra it is clearly stated that the denial of an external is in the phase of calming (the mind).”  

However, even granted that the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the basic scripture of Yogācāra, did not deny an external object except for in the *samādhi* situation, it should be acknowledged that various scholars have understood Vasubandhu’s *Vims’tātikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* to have denied an external object without reference to the *samādhi* situation. But the opening gloss, which seems to indicate such a denial, can be understood differently. Explaining the term “representation-only” (*vijñaptimātra*), it defines the “only” this way: *mātram ity arthapraṭisēdhaḥāram* (“only” means negation of an object). Here the word *artha* is properly taken as “external object.” The word *pratisedha* is known in Indian logic, including Buddhist logic, to have two kinds, “simple negation” (*prasajya-pratisedha*) and “qualified negation” (*paryuddāsa*). The interpretation that this treatise of Vasubandhu’s has denied an external object without qualifications opts for the “simple negation.” In the light of passages previously cited from his two treatises, it is reasonable to opt for the “qualified negation.” It is qualified because for the ordinary situation of life Vasubandhu indicates that the representation differs for the various destinies of men, hungry ghosts, etc.; and because for the special case of the yogin, “representation-only” concerns the *samādhi* situation.

**Conclusion**

As I long ago pointed out in the review article on the Chatterjee book, the belief of some that the Yogācāra system admits
a sole reality, called Mind-only, does not prevent Chatterjee or any number of other authors of East and West from writing good books on the topic, with refined philosophical sentences. But problem-solving is of a different nature. It should have been intriguing, to say the least, that the Buddhist logicians should be classified as 'Yogacārins' if these Yogacārins deny an external object and those logicians affirm it, insisting on the reality of the momentary object of direct perception (pratyakṣa).

Because Ratnakarasanti comes near the end of the Buddhist period in India and follows the Yogacāra position in certain independent treatises, while having also written a little text of Buddhist logic, I should like to close with a passage from a commentary of his on the Guhyasamājatantra: "Because the mental burnt-offering (homa) is 'mind-only,' one should understand it as not dependent on an external thing."24

NOTES


3. . . . pretavat punah / saṃtānāniyamah sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādīdarśane //


5. yadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ naiḥpabalbhate taddā / sthitam vijñānamātratve grāhyābhave tadagrahat //

6. Étienne Lamotte, Samādhinirmocana Sūtra (Louvain, Paris, 1935), pp. 90-91, 211; also Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga (Mahāyānasamgraha) (Louvain, 1938, 1939), Chap. II.

7. Translated from the Tibetan texts (in transcription) contained in N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti by Dīn̄nāga with the Commentary of Dharmaṇḍa (The Adyar Library, 1942). However, Sastri's reconstructed Sanskrit and other materials were not employed for my translation.


12. The Lankavatara Sūtra, ed. by Bunyiu Nanjio (Kyoto, 1956), p. 154:

13. Tson-kha-pa, the Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bdad pa ’Dgons pa rab gsal’ žes bya ba, PTT, Vol. 154, p. 74-1-7,8.

14. The Lankavatara Sūtra, p. 49:

15. PTT, Vol. 109, p. 61-1-3:


18. The article “Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic,” n. 8, above.


22. This mirror simile goes with the passage cited above, per n. 6.

23. Tson-kha-pa’s Draṅ nes legs bdad shin po (Sarnath ed., 1973, p. 73): mdo de las ži gnas kyi skabs su ni phyi rol dgag pa gsal bar gsuns so /