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The Abhidharmika Notion of Vijñāna and its Soteriological Significance*

by Braj M. Sinha

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to articulate the Abhidharmika conception of vijñāna in phenomenological idiom. Our concern here is to bring out the uniqueness of the Abhidharmika understanding of the problem of consciousness and its relationship to the question of subjectivity, temporality and transcendence.

For the Abhidharmika, reification of time, as an abstract category independent of entities and conditioning their mode of being, is a metaphysical presupposition which is not indispensable for an understanding of the phenomenon of temporality. Temporality, then, is not conceived of as adjectival synonym of time as the transcendent condition of our being and cognition. The whole question of temporality in Abhidharmika Buddhism revolves around the nature and structure of vijñāna as a dharma. Vijñāna, from the Abhidharmika point of view, as a dharma, is continually changing, is never self-identical, and as the structure of becoming and phenomenal conditioning it is essentially temporal. Temporality of the vijñāna then implies both the fact of the change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its “subjective” experience.

Within the Abhidharmika scheme, one can discern two modes of the functioning of vijñāna. First is the cognitive mode of consciousness, which implies the claiming of the object as the other by the subject (saṁyoga). The other is the reflective mode of consciousness leading to the disclaiming of this otherness of subject and object (visam̄yoga). First is the temporal mode of becoming, where the vijñāna functions as a dharma, as the structure of world involvement of the existentially finite subject. Later is the mode of transcendence of vijñāna which goes
beyond the subject-object otherness of the world of becoming. However, since world involvement is structural to the very being of vijnāna, the transcendence also implies the dissolution of vijnāna, the empiric consciousness which operates in the realm of otherness. Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the conditioned dharmas (samskrtatva) is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. The consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subjectivity. Thus the eternity of nirvāṇa as the stillness of consciousness (stīta) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cogntional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal

It is in early Abhidharmika literature that we find the first attempt to understand temporality in non-substantive terms. The Abhidharmika tradition disregarded the question of the substantive reality of time as a factor exists as an independent reality which in them was not whether time exists as an independent reality which in conjunction with other realities or events constitutes temporal determinations. Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledging the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā on Jñānaprasthāna declared that everything is real; the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata) are as much real as the present (pratyutpāna). The theory proposed here does not make any distinction between things in themselves such as past and future matter, and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism of Abhidharmikas present in its most pronounced form. It is not the reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by Mahāvibhāṣā; rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determination of things or dharmas as past, present or future. In early Abhidharmika literature we come across an alternative to Kālavādins, when Abhidharmikas point out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā points out:
If all the three samskṛtalakṣaṇas have not yet been active, the dharma is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and thus is just active, then the dharma is called present. If it has already finished its activity, the dharma is called past.¹

It is important to note that early Abhidharmika literature never considered the determination of a dharma’s temporal quality to be a function of transcendental eternal time which somehow contains things in three receptacles of time and is responsible for the temporal designations of past, present and future. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣa clearly rejected the option which would seem to suggest that

the svabhāva of time is nitya, but the svabhāva of the samskṛtadharman is anitya. The samskṛtadharman wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another or as man from one house into another. This is also the case with the samaskṛtadharman: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.²

In this rejection of the receptum notion of time is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of substantiality and permanence, a model set by the Mahāvibhāṣa which is consistently adhered to by Abhidharmikas. All Abhidharmika statements about the reality of past, present and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true that in Abhidharmika literature we come across statements to the effect that “dharmas wander across the three times, that nirvāṇa lies beyond the three times; that there exists a future, a past, etc. . . .” But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement “each dharma exists in the three times as future, present, and past” the term “three times” is “consequently only a synonymous denomination (adhivacana) for samaskṛtadharma.”³

Early Abhidharmika literature clearly rejected any distinction between a dharma and its temporal determination. Temporal determinations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a dharma. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a dharma and its conditionedness (samskṛta). What is given as temporal flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned
dharmas, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional dharmas and conditional dharmas are time, and time is a manifestation of sanskrta dharmas. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned dharmas, apart from which it does not have any reality.

In view of the above articulation of the Abhidharmika understanding of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency among some modern scholars to suggest that the Abhidharmika contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon Pāli sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains that “the Sarvāstivāda represented a school of realism and . . . they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time.”

John M. Roller agrees with Kalupahana’s interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda and maintains that Nāgārjuna’s critique of time is “directed primarily at the Sarvāstivādin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments: past, present and future.”

In the first place, both Roller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nāgārjuna’s critique of time is directed against the Sarvāstivāda. There is nothing in Nāgārjuna’s kāla parikṣa to substantiate their contention that the view of time criticized by Nāgārjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvāstivādins. As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakīrti’s Vṛtti on the Mūlamadhyamakārikā that the target of Nāgārjuna’s attack is a certain Kalavadin who does not subscribe to the views of Buddha. The Kalavadin (the upholder of the reality of time), under attack of Nāgārjuna’s relentless dialectic, refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents. It is equally interesting to note that while Nāgārjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his critique never mentions the concept of dharma that is so central to Sarvāstivāda articulation of the problem.

In arguing that the Abhidharmika believed in the reality of time both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusion between a view which takes the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future as the ontological givens and a view which accords time a primary ontological status as the container of things or dharmas. That the Abhidharmika position is not the latter will be set forth in the body of the thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Abhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvāstivādins believed in the reality of time. Time as a category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvāstivāda scheme of things. Secondly, as we will
show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of dharmas or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of dharmas as past, present and future rather than the reality of dharmas in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these dharmas.

The Abhidharmikas attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, at the same time retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (sarvam asti), Abhidharmikas insisted that dharmas are the ultimate constituents of all phenomena, meaning by dharma what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglomeration of these dharmas is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience, which consists only of a succession of dharmas. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing “being” or “self,” the ultimate reference point being only the discrete dharmas which constitute as such the nature (svabhāva) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of dharmas (svabhāva) in the three temporal phases. The existence of dharmas as past, present and future is cognized without any mutual contradiction, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is significant that the Abhidharmikas do not recognize the existence of dharmas in past, present and future moments of time, but recognize their existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside. Time is not an empty mould in which dharmas are deposited as they arise, stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental background of our cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities is totally unacceptable to any school of Buddhist thought, Abhidharmikas being no exception in this regard. The Abhidharmika discussions are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The dharmas are temporal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence.

*The Cognitive Consciousness and Temporality*

The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and
future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvāstivāda. A careful review of the arguments offered by the Abhidharmikas in support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricist-realist approach to cognitive experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (nirvāṇa) are reflected in their arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.9

According to Abhidharmikas, all cognitions are contingent on two factors:10 (a) the objective correlate (viśaya, ālambana) and the (b) cognizing consciousness (citta, viññāna). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (viśaya) are denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Abhidharmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the viśaya and the citta.

The Abhidharmika seeks support for this common-sense theory from the “scripture” by referring to the unequivocal statement of Buddha to such effect.11 The postulation of the existence of reals in all three modes is implicit in this contention of the Buddha, and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (āgama-viruddha). The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic conviction that whatever causes mental cognition must have objective existence, or be objectively real.12 There is mental cognition of past and future dharmas. The crucial datum, here, on which the Abhidharmika builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and future dharmas to mental cognition. If they (past and future dharmas) are not objectively real, how could there be mental cognition of them? Were they not real, “knowledge” of them would not be different from fantasy: their cognition will be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object.13

Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate—which is the point of view of Sautrāntika—the Abhidharmika argues: a consciousness (viññāna) can only be defined qua “what cognizes” (vijanati viññānam); if there is no object to be cognized (vijñeyā), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist.

The Sautrāntika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition
may be defined just by the mere fact of its being the “illuminating accompaniment” (*bodhānugama*) of all cognitions. There is no warrant, according to them, for invoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this the Abhidharmika answers in the following way: the “illumination” itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (*vijñāna*) and its objective correlate (*rupa*, *vedanā*, etc.). But the two factors (the subjective *vijñāna* and objective *rupa*, *vedanā*, etc.), according to the Abhidharmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are *dharma*. As *dharma*, they carry their “own nature” (*svabhāva*). The “illuminating” element in the cognition is the “own nature” (*svabhāva*) consciousness (*vijñāna*) which consists of the *dharma* being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (*bodhānugama*) in cognition too is an objective element which has an independent reality as the *svabhāva* or *vijñāna* in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Abhidharmika.

**Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality**

The Abhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of consciousness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (*vijñāna*) as a *dharma* is continually changing, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal. Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a *dharma*. Temporality, therefore cannot be overcome by consciousness as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e., transcendence of the realm of temporal existence implies the overcoming of the fissuration, change and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to consciousness, it follows that its transcendence is its dissolution. *Nirvāṇa*, or freedom, is not the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of consciousness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow.

Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the
overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the
dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction. Losing
sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the basic
orientation of the Abhidharmikas. For the Abhidharmikas, temporality is
essentially an imperfection characteristic of finitude, and ought to be
overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However, the mode of
being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject
as the structure of world involvement. While for Sāmkhya-Yoga, the subject as
pure consciousness retains its individuated identity and recovers its original
mode of being, for Abhidharmikas the subject must give up its original mode of
being and its individuality in order to attain nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa, though eternally
existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that the
subject somehow lost and regains. World (saṁsāra) as the structure of
temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of
nirvāṇa, which for the Abhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond the
operation of the forces of conditionedness (saṁskṛtatva). It is important to be reminded that for Abhidharmika Buddhism, nirvāṇa is not a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of being which is rendered non-existent on conceptual analysis. Rather, nirvāṇa is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is acquired or reached and possessed (prāpti). Nirvāṇa is eternally existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of temporally determined dharmas. Within the Abhidharmika context, it is possible to discern a distinction reminiscent of the Sāmkhya-Yoga categories of permanence (parināmi nityatā) and eternity (kutastha nityatā). Saṁtāna, or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending and is in that sense “permanent,” is not, however, a case of the overcoming of temporality. Endlessness is not conquest of temporality at all, but is, rather, a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality’s defect. Saṁtāna (continuum) may be described as having a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this “permanence” of the continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity, because it is only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection. Nirvāṇa, on the other hand, is described by Abhidharmika as eternal (nitya) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma, or reality, nirvāṇa is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or conditionedness (saṁskṛtatva). Nirvāṇa is unconditioned and eternal
because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditioned-
ness, namely, jati, jāra, sthiti, etc.\textsuperscript{23}

As the realm of eternity, nirvāṇa is fullness of spiritual being, a
completedness that constitutes the horizon into which the individual as
subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is
a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as
consciousness. As reflection, subjectivity is essentially in fellowship
with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness
consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates.\textsuperscript{24}
Contrasted with Sāmkyha-Yoga, which admits the possibility of
consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential
reciprocity of the consciousness and its content.

In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the
essential imperfection of consciousness (samskṛtatva), for consciousness
itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other dharmas.\textsuperscript{25} Reciproc
ity and mutual conditioning also imply reciprocal otherness between the two. While Sāmkyha-Yoga recognizes this otherness as the
very condition for freedom, the Abhidharmika holds that the other
ness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does
not consist in the discerning of an identity overreaching the different,
i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own
(such would be a case of the inveterate tendency to conceptualize in
terms of being, the satkāyadṛṣṭi, which the Abhidharmika rejects). It
consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content
(visamyoGa).\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becoming
ness of the conditioned dharmas (samskṛtatva) is essentially the dissolu
tion of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or
consciousness which loses the other through which alone it can express
itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the objects that become the posses
sion of the consciousness are not mere objects, and must be described
as that which belongs to the consciousness (caitesika),\textsuperscript{27} so consciousness
bereft of its content must completely lose its existing character as
consciousness.

Thus, within Abhidharmika scheme, at least two moments in
consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of
object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming this
otherness. It is the realization that all dharmas as conditioned are
essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization that
consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and
conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably brings about, as it were, a perfect unity of subject and object, but this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of the distinction of subject and object. But it must not be forgotten that this, in turn, entails an overcoming of subjecthood. The eternity of nirvāṇa as the stillness of consciousness (sthita) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness. Consciousness, according to the Abhidharmikas, takes the form of the object that it cognizes. Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes nirvāṇa must also become of the nature of nirvāṇa. Consciousness itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (samskṛta dharma). But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond temporality and becomingness, consciousness necessarily must lose its own conditionedness and temporality. In other words it must lose its character of consciousness.

Eternity of nirvāṇa in the sense of constant presence, or "eternal now," within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Abhidharmika speculation about the structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Sāmkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both systems, freedom is not in the future, but it is in the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process will come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. Freedom, therefore, necessarily lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the nirvāṇa can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping-stone to the "eternal now." The realization of nirvāṇa as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously nonexistent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of
consciousness is performed within the compass of this temporal present.

Concluding Observations

We have attempted to offer a phenomenological perspective on the Abhidharmika articulation of temporality and its implications for consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure of metaphysical transcendentalism as represented in the conception of eternity that the system implies. Of pivotal importance to Abhidharma Buddhism is to analyze the experience of temporality defined as finitude, and to determine whether or not experiencing temporality necessarily implies positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of their limitation, i.e., finitude, or is it an experience of the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of time? We have attempted to show that in the Abhidharmika system temporality is explained in terms of our experience, which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow, exemplifying finitude. From this point of view, temporal differentiation is not an appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world involvement.

Thus, from Abhidharmika point of view, any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for an atemporal consciousness is an exercise in futility. For a proper understanding of the phenomenon of temporality, the possibility of experience of temporality for an atemporal consciousness must be ruled out. The Abhidharmika position implies that the experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (the structure of skandhas, in the case of Abhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity is immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that subjectivity as empirical consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of subject and object or consciousness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disappearance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very
structure of the "disappearance" of consciousness as consciousness, i.e., as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of" (citta, buddhi). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of "disappearance" of consciousness discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also provides the clue for the transcendence of temporality. If empirical consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This latter is accomplished through self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which is intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection.

NOTES

* The paper was originally delivered at the Second International Association of Buddhist Studies Conference held at Nalanda on 17-19 January, 1980. The paper has been revised for the purpose of publication in The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.

1. Mahāvibhaṣa, 394a, cf. Schayer, Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy, Karkowie, 1938, p. 20.
3. Schayer, op. cit., p. 27.
8. See Y. Kanakura, "The Question of Time in Connection of Milindapañha, Abhidharma and Madhyamakakārikā," Osaki Gakaho, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of the Milindapañha to the Abhidharmika tradition has been well brought out.
9. It is conceivable that Nagarjuna would have opposed the Sarvāstivādin articulation of temporality in terms of the svabhāva and a dharma. (See infra, p. 208). But no explicit rejection of Sarvāstivāda can be discerned in the Kālāparikṣā, nor is there any claim that Sarvāstivādins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: “Nagarjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins’ denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvadā). He drew the conclusion of the nonexistence of time from the Madhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (nīkṣhvabhāvadā), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self.” Shoson Miyamoto, “Time and Eternity in Buddhism,” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo: Vol. 7, No. 2, 1959, p. 824.

10. Thus, the Abhidharmaśika argued that past and future dharmas are real because the Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (ārya-irāvaka) becomes indifferent to past and future material objects (rupa) only by concentrating on their rūpas: Uktam hi Bhagavata atitam ched bhiksavo riṣām nābhavassyāna śruti-vivānāryasvāvako’te rupe’napēkṣobhavisyat. yasmātābhayaṣṭitam riṣam tasmāc āṭhitavānāryavrikṣoṣṭitē rupena[ṃ]peṣko bhavati. anāgatam cetāriṣām nābhavasyāna śruti-vivānārya śrīvaka-nāgatam riṣā nābhayaṇa. uṇḍisyat. yasmātābhayaṣṭitāṅgatam riṣam iti vistarāḥ Abhidharmaśikam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804. Also, see Sphuṭārtha on the above.


12. The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statements is comparable to the Brahmanical use of śabda pramāṇa (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). It is very difficult to decide which particular use is earlier, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the “priority” of the discussion of pramāṇa at the hands of Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The latter gave rise to the preoccupation with pramāṇa in the different sūtra commentarial literature in Brahmanical Hinduism.


14. atitājātayorjñānamanyathā visayam bhavet; Tattvasamgraha, 1788, op. cit., p. 504. Also see Pāṇini on it: pratistat vijnāpyātmakaṃ vijnānam, asati ca niyeṇe na kincidanena jneyamitya vijnānameva syat. Ibid., p. 505.


16. Vijnāna is a samskrta dharma. By definition, samskrta dharmas are temporal (adhva) and impermanent: ta eva samskrta gatacchadhagamisyadbhāvādhyāvādah, adyaṃ nityatayeti vā; Abhidharmaśikam, (1970), op. cit., p. 26, adyaṃ nityatayā bhakryanā ityadhvaḥ iti samskrta evādhvaśabdena bhagvoṭā desitāḥ; Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmaśikā Vyākhyā, 1949, p. 23.

17. “samskrta dharmas are called temporal (adhva) precisely because change or impermanence (anityata) eats them up.” Ibid.

18. This is the connotation of the term vikṛti, characteristic of phenomena as modification of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of phenomena, as constituted of samskrta dharma, is present in the Abhidharma literature.
19. The question of the existence of nirvāṇa as a separate dharma not subject to the forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. While the Sautrāntikas deny that nirvāṇa exists or is real, Sarvāstivāda affirms its reality as a separate dharma. For the details of the argument and counterargument, see Abhidharmako'sam, op. cit., pp. 318-328. Also see Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa Vyākhya, op. cit., pp. 145-152.

20. "Negativism" as a philosophical doctrine (sunyavāda) is associated with Nāgārjuna, though its "negativity" is increasingly questioned in modern times. Śaṅkara criticized it as expressly a negative doctrine (see Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra, 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajñākarmaṭi, the author of the Pañjika on the Bodhicaryavatāra of Śāntideva.

As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vedānta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. see Mandana's Brahmāsiddhi, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press, 1932, p. 136ff.

23. etāni hi samśkrtyasya catvāri lakṣāṇāni. yatraitāni bhavanti sa dharmah samśkrto lakṣyate viparyādasaṃskṛtaḥ. Ibid., p. 253.
27. See Abhidharmakośa, 1970, kārika 23-33 and bhāṣya on them, Ibid., pp. 186-211.