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schools demean the Hinayāna Arhat for cognizing only *pudgalanairūtmya* and not *dharma-nairūtmya* (pp. 98, 99 and 103 in Ms. Pezzali's work), it should perhaps be made clear that not all Mahāyāna tenet schools (*siddhānta*) do so. For example, the Prāsaṅgika school, to which Śāntideva belongs, asserts that Arhantship can only be attained if both of these are realized. They thus make no distinction between the actual nature of these two kinds of "selflessness," although they would of course grant that the referent objects ("self" or "phenomena") are different.

(3) As for Nāgārjuna's critique of *pramāṇas*, it must be understood as a critique of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* having *absolute* power to prove a logical syllogism. He is by no means rejecting the conventional validity of logic, as seems to be suggested by Ms. Pezzali (p. 104).

Yet apart from these few technical points (some of which are controversial in their own right) the author does give a rather good overview of Mādhyamika thought in general, and particularly of Śāntideva's place within it. The text of Ms. Pezzali, which gives us such a long-sought-after compilation of the life, works and thought of this great Buddhist saint is most certainly a welcome sight to the Buddhist Studies community.

José Cabezon


Most people view Yogacāra as a philosophy of idealism. While there have been exceptions, some scholars pointing out that such a characterization may not be applicable to all Yogacārins, this view seems fairly entrenched. Speaking for myself, it is the view I was first taught. I didn't realize that it might be subject to modification until I began to study the subject with some Gelugpa teachers who held differently. Janice Willis, in her welcome book, joins the ranks of those who take exception, and argues a good case.

Asaṅga, a prolific author, wrote the *Bodhisattvabhumi* as one division of a much larger work, the *Yogācārabhumi*. Nearly all of the *Bodhisattvabhumi* is practice oriented. Only one chapter actually takes doctrine as its principal subject, so that chapter is important for understanding Asaṅga's views on reality. This is the *Tattvārtha* chapter, which Dr. Willis has ably translated.

The odd thing about the *Tattvārtha* chapter, as Dr. Willis points out,
is that terms which one usually associates with the Yogācāra, such as cittamātra, vijñaptimātra, etc., are conspicuously absent. Why does the only chapter of a major work dealing with the nature of reality, written by Asaṅga, not discuss things in terms of “mind only”? Perhaps the answer is that Asaṅga did not consider mind as the ultimate mode of existence. Indeed, in this chapter, Asaṅga speaks of śūnyatā, not mind, as ultimate truth.

To be sure, Asaṅga had his own view of śūnyatā, for which he argues in the Tattvārtha chapter against those whom he felt misconstrued śūnyatā as meaning nothingness. Asaṅga’s own view of śūnyatā is like this:

Now, how is voidness rightly conceptualized? Wherever and whatever place something is not, one rightly observes that place to be void of the thing. Moreover, whatever remains in that place one knows (prajanatā) it as it really is, that “here there is an existent.” This is said to be engagement with voidness as it really is and without waywardness. (117)

For Asaṅga, what this means is that there is no dharma identical with its verbal designation as “form,” etc. So dharmas are void of identity with their verbal designations. What remains is the basis for the designation. He who knows the basis as just the basis and the designation as just the designation, neither affirms what is non-existent (i.e. the identity of designation and dharma) nor denies what is existent (i.e. the basis of the identity). This is a middle path and is considered “voidness rightly conceptualized.”

Asaṅga criticized what he considered the realist position (i.e. the identity of dharmas and designations). He says that for each designation, there would have to be a corresponding thing, but since one thing may have many designations, that idea is wrong. He argues against those who say that there are no bases whatsoever for designations by saying that if that were so, “no designations would occur at all.”

It is at this point, Dr. Willis says, presumably following Asaṅga’s own exegesis to the text, that we can understand the three-nature theory of Asaṅga. Parikalpita, imaginary nature, refers to the conception of the identity of designations and dharmas. Paratantra, dependent nature, is the dependent relation between designations and their base. Parinirṇaṇa, perfected nature, is the ultimate mode of the above two. Correct understanding of just what is parikalpita and just what is paratantra constitutes an understanding of parinirṇaṇa.

What then of the terms like cittamātra and vijñaptimātra, and why have many Buddhologists been misled? Prof. Willis deals with these questions in Chapter Three of the Introduction. She says, agreeing with Yoshifumi Ueda’s article, “Two Streams of Thought in Yogacara Philosophy” (Philosophy East and West. 17. pp. 155-65), that there were two
threads of Yogācāra thought. The earlier, represented by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, was not idealist. The later, represented by Dharmapāla and Hsuan-tsang, was. It was a confusion between these two threads that led to the classification of all of Yogācāra as idealist.

As for the term cittamātra, Dr. Willis suggests that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu do not use it to mean “mind only” in the sense that all is mind. Rather, she sees three distinct uses. The first regards meditative experience per se, referring to the yogi’s object of meditation, a mental image. The second regards its use as a device for weaning ordinary beings from materiality. In this, she also accepts the views of Prāsaṅgikas like Tsong Kha Pa. Finally, the third treats the terms as the result of the analysis and description of the cause of suffering. It is this last use that is the most interesting. Instead of understanding cittamātra to refer to the ultimacy of mind, we should understand it to refer to our ideas and cognitions of the world, which are mistaken, non-ultimate—they are “just thought,” and therefore cause us misery.

It is in light of the third usage that Dr. Willis interprets Vasubandhu’s use of the term vijnaptimātra, (here synonomous with cittamātra) in the Trimśika. She discusses also the well-known phrase, cittamātram idam yad idam trādiḥastukam (these three realms are nothing but mind). This phrase is best known from the Daśabhūmikasūtra, where it appears in the midst of a discussion on dependent origination. Dr. Willis points out that the interpretation of the phrase as meaning that there are no external objects would be odd in view of the realistic language of the rest of the sūtra. The same phrase occurs earlier however, in the Bhadrapālāsūtra, where there is less doubt as to its meaning. There the phrase is used in connection with a bodhisattva’s meditation, in which he realizes the illusory nature of the world.

Dr. Willis’ arguments have served to call attention to a different way of looking at Yogācāra in general and Asaṅga in particular. They should provide stimulus to further discussion. The only drawback to the book is that it could have gone into more detail concerning the above questions. Dr. Willis explains in the Preface that the book does not go into the detail that her dissertation (upon which the book is based) did. I, for one, wish that it had. The arguments for her interpretation are good, but more supporting evidence could make them ironclad. For instance, she might have gone into some more discussion on the ālayavijnāna. She points out that it is not to be considered an ultimate, but she neglects to mention its role in the creation of the objects of designation, something which is quite relevant to her thesis. On the whole though, these drawbacks should not deter anyone from reading the book. I recommend it.

E. Todd Fenner

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