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A Yogācāra Analysis of the Mind, Based on the *Vijñāna* section of Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* with Guṇaprabha's Commentary¹

by Brian Galloway

Buddhist philosophy concerns itself both with the exposition of ultimate reality and the functioning of *samsāra*. For ultimate reality, most Mahāyānists historically have preferred the analyses of the Mādhyamika school; but for the functioning of *samsāra*, the Yogācāra school seems to have the more subtle and complex theory.

Before discussing it, however, we must decide how we are to deal with the many technical terms found in its literature. There are those who feel that technical terms should not be translated at all, and others who translate them in some very idiosyncratic and inconsistent ways, based on a supposedly superior understanding that they alone possess.

As for the first, it only needs to be pointed out that leaving a term untranslated does not guarantee that we will understand it properly. Having said this, it is apparent that our first task is to *understand* the word's meaning, and this can only be done by examining the *usage* of the word in the various contexts in which it is found, and by taking note of the explicit *definition* of the word, if an explicit definition is found in the literature. Then, having understood the word, we may indeed find that there is an accurate English term with the same range of meaning.

Concerning the second group, we may say that their impressionistic and haphazard method of translating might be justified in dealing with texts written cryptically from the standpoint of ultimate reality, provided that the translator shares the profundity of insight of the original author. But it will hardly do in scientific/technical literature of the Yogācāra type. By scientific/technical I mean that this literature is analogous to modern scientific exposition: it uses technical terms

strictly; it analyzes and categorizes; impressionistic or vague ramblings are utterly foreign to it. The difference between it and modern scientific thought is only that the Buddhist technical writing takes as given the thesis that there exists, objectively and in real truth, a state of mind, possible for a human being to develop, that is qualitatively different from and better than ordinary consciousness: different, in that it makes all worldly considerations pale into insignificance; better, in that it makes for true happiness both for oneself and for the others that one helps.

I have gone into the matter of Yogācāra technical terms in a previous article, “*Vijñāna, Saṃjñā, and Manas,*” which was printed in the *Middle Way*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1978). There I argued that the words in the title have been incorrectly translated in the past,² and proposed the translations given in this chart:

	Correct Translation	Formerly Prevailing Tr.
<i>viññāna</i>	perception	(consciousness)
<i>saṃjñā</i>	recognition	(perception)
<i>manas</i>	consciousness	(mind)

To recapitulate my arguments of that article: *viññāna* is what happens when there is a sense organ, a sense object, no obstruction between them, and a mind that functions properly; it is the first mental event that occurs and does not involve any “thinking” of *vitarka-vicara* or *kalpanā*. It is “the naked, unadorned, apprehension of each stimulus” (Conze quoting the *Abhidharmakośa*³); it “grasps the mere object” or “the object alone” (*don tsam ’dzin to*: Guṇaprabha in his commentary on Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*⁴). *Vijñāna* therefore does not correspond to the English word “consciousness”, which always involves an idea of selfhood (as I show by quotation from the Oxford English Dictionary), but to *perception* in its strict, modern, scientific sense, that is, sense-perception. (Thus *viññāna* corresponds to the German *Wahrnehmung*, not to *Bewusstsein*.)

Some may argue that the word “perception” (here I am bringing in new arguments, not present in my earlier article) is properly the translation of the logical term *pratyakṣa*. So it is, but this does not pose a problem here, because *viññāna* and *pratyakṣa* really mean the same thing. In Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* we find that *pratyakṣam kalpanā-*

*poḍham*⁵ which is exactly what is said of *viññāna*. “When the eye comes in contact with a color, for instance blue, visual consciousness [*sic*] arises which is awareness of the presence of a color; but it does not recognise that it is blue. There is no recognition at this stage” (Rāhula in *What the Buddha Taught*⁶). Dignāga, while discussing *pratyakṣa*, adduces this quotation from an unspecified Abhidharma treatise:

*cakṣurviññānasamaṅgī nīlam viññānāti no tu nīlamiti (Daa-2)*⁷

“One who can perceive by the eye perceives blue, but not ‘this is blue.’”

The point is that Dignāga quotes this as an explanation of the nature of *pratyakṣa*, though this word never appears there, and the quotation is couched entirely in terms of *viññāna* (the verb *viññānāti* is used). That is, he takes *pratyakṣa* and *viññāna* to be fundamentally the same. The reason for using *pratyakṣa* rather than the older term is probably two-fold: it was desirable to have a special term for use in the context of epistemology//logic (*pramāṇa*); and over the centuries the word *viññāna* perhaps became debased in that there grew up around it a mass of vague impressions (while its fundamental meaning of course remained unchanged).

To return to my former article, I think I have shown that *saṃjñā* means “recognition.” Guṇaprabha states that *saṃjñā*, “having discerned the same object [as in a prior perception], grasps it with sureness” (*‘du shes ni yul de nyid yong su bcad nas nges par ‘dzin pa ste*).⁸ Vasubandhu’s definition of *saṃjñā*, on which Guṇaprabha is commenting, is this: “grasping an object by its sign” (*yul la mtshan par ‘dzin pa*).⁹ Sthiramati, another commentator on this same text, explains that “a sign is the particular of an object, blue, yellow, etc.; it is the basis of classification of a phenomenon. Grasping by a sign is thinking, ‘This is blue, this is yellow’ (*mtshan ma ni yul gyi bye brag sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa dmigs pa rnam par gzhas pa’i rgyu’o. de la mtshan mar ‘dzin pa ni ‘di ni sngon po’o ‘di ni ser po’o zhes rtog pa’o*).¹⁰ Rāhula uses the word “recognition” as a definition of *saṃjñā* (though he translates it differently): *saṃjñā* “recognizes that it is blue.”¹¹ Buddhagosa, in his *Visuddhimagga*, defines it exactly as does Vasubandhu, and compares it to what happens when a carpenter sees a pile of wood that he has previously marked with a sign to indicate what type of wood it is (he recognizes it as previously classified).

As for *manas*, this is explicitly stated in Abhidharma works (including the present one, as we shall see) to be associated with the illusion of self, which means that it is really “consciousness” in English.

This may seem to be a great fuss about a few words; but these are words of absolute and crucial importance. We cannot simply *assume* that we know what they mean. These terms must be *thought* about; they must be investigated seriously on a theoretical level and in a scientific fashion. Of course, there are those who prefer to translate technical terms however they see fit at a given moment, drawing on the latest fashionable jargon of twelve different Western philosophical and linguistic systems; but this sort of impressionist method of translation is simply not accurate, authentic, or appropriate for serious scientific Abhidharma works, however useful it may be when one is pretending to be profound.

We usually think of the mind (the subject of this paper) as the objective correlative of consciousness. But this is not the Buddhist view. In Buddhism, the starting point of any discussion of the mind is not consciousness but perception (*viññāna*); consciousness comes later. The mind is seen as a *group of perception-processes*: sometimes as a group of six, at other times as a group of eight. Vasubandhu, in his discussion of perception, which becomes a discussion of the mind, in his *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (which we shall now examine in detail together with Guṇaprabha's commentary),¹² begins by asking the time-honored question, What is perception? He answers his own question thusly:

viññānam ālambanaviññaptiḥ!

“Perception is the manifestation of a phenomenon.” Now we have two more technical terms to discuss.

In calling the perceived object a “phenomenon” we are avoiding asserting that any *real* object exists; phenomena may be expressions of reality or illusions. This is in keeping with the Yogācāra belief that real objects do not in fact exist philosophically.

For “manifestation” as a translation of *viññapti* see Apte's *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, wherein he defines it as “communication” and “announcement.” The manifestation of course takes place *in the mind*.

Guṇaprabha, in his commentary, now tells us that the phenomena are of *six* kinds. Why only six? Guṇaprabha and Vasubandhu are Yogācārins who intend to elaborate a doctrine of eight kinds, but they wish first to establish the traditional-Buddhist six as a foundation on which to build. Guṇaprabha therefore lists the six; let us list them here

together with the corresponding sense-organs (called “supports” or *āśraya* in Buddhism) and the perceptions.

Perception (<i>viññāna</i>)	Support (<i>āśraya</i>)	Phenomenon (<i>ālambana</i>)
eye-perception	eye	forms (<i>rūpa</i>)
ear-perception	ear	sounds
nose-perception	nose	smells
tongue-perception	tongue	tastes
body-perception	body	tangibles
consciousness perception	consciousness (<i>manas</i>)	elements (<i>dharma</i>)

Concerning these terms, first we observe that it is unimportant whether we use singular or plural forms; in English, plurals are perhaps better here to indicate that we are not dealing with abstractions but with specific realities.

Form (*rūpa*) here means objects perceived by the eye, hence “sights”; it should be noted carefully, however, that the same word form/*rūpa* has another meaning, in which it includes all of the above-listed phenomena plus the first five supports (the material sense-organs), plus something called “unmanifest form” (*aviññaptirūpa*). (Aside from this last, *rūpa* in this sense corresponds to the Western concept of “matter” which is based on the idea that tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*) are basic but also can be apprehended also by form, sound, smell, etc.) One has to judge from context whether form/*rūpa* means sight-objects or all manifest and unmanifest form (*viññaptivyaviññaptirūpa*).

The “elements” (*dharma*) in the above chart as objects of consciousness (*manas*) are not *all* elements in the Yogācāra list of one hundred elements. All are grouped into five categories as follows.

- Form (*rūpa*) in the larger sense
- Mind (*citta*), the eight perceptions about to be discussed
- Mentals (*caitta*), certain mental functions, mostly emotions
- Non-Mentals (*citta-viṣrayukta*), certain functions and processes
- Uncompoundeds (*asamskrta*), including *tathatā*


The elements meant in the present instance as objects of consciousness (*manas*) are the mentals, the non-mentals, the uncompoundeds, and *aviññaptirūpa*. Concerning the six phenomena listed, Guṇaprabha now

tells us, “Their assimilation (*khong du chud pa*) is manifestation, is perception. These are the six beginning perceptions (*pravṛttivijñāna*).”

He continues, explaining the exact relationship between a perception, its corresponding “support”, or sense-organ, and its corresponding “phenomenon”, or object. (Rather than translate with painful literalness, “If it be asked, what is eye-perception, it is . . .” I prefer to give, “Eye-perception is . . .”)

“Eye-perception is the various manifestations of which the eye is the support and forms are the phenomena; ear-perception is the various manifestations of which the ear is the support and sounds the phenomena; nose-perception is the various manifestations of which the nose is the support and smells the phenomena; tongue-perception is the various manifestations of which the tongue is the support and tastes the phenomena; body-perception is the various manifestations of which the body is the support and tangibles the phenomena; consciousness-perception (*manovijñāna*) is the various manifestations of which consciousness (*manas*) is the support and [certain] elements the phenomena.”

The next passage is somewhat confusingly written. Vasubandhu tells us that perception “is mind (*citta*) and consciousness (*manas*), because it is variegated (*citra*) and the support of consciousness (*yid rten byed pa*, ?*mana-āśraya*).



What he means is this: “The six perceptions constitute the mind in the traditional Buddhist view; this mind is variegated, or a variety, because there is a sixfold variety of perception-processes, and because (as Guṇaprabha will tell you) within each of the six there is a variety of forms to be perceived. (Also, there is the pleasing pun of *citra* with *citta*.) But the mind is more than this. The six perceptions form the support of a seventh that arises on the foundation of the six. And this seventh is consciousness (*manas*).”

Guṇaprabha tells us exactly how this arising takes place: “As it is said,

Right after the cessation of the six,
Whate'er perception comes is consciousness.

That which occurs right after the stopping of whatever-it-may-be is called consciousness (*manas*). For example, the son of one may be the father of another, the fruit of one [tree] becomes the seed of another, and likewise when the six fruits of the beginning perceptions are stopped, they become supports of the arising of another perception, and hence are called the supports of consciousness. So the mind has been explained as the six beginning perceptions.”

But, we must add, it has been explained as six perceptions giving rise to the seventh, called consciousness (*manas*). And this must not be confused with consciousness-perception (*manovijñāna*).

Now comes the crucial part. Vasubandhu here defines the mind in a completely different way; but the new view will turn out to be fully compatible with the old; it will supply a deep basis or foundation for the old view. He states:

“In reality, the mind is the storehouse perception (*ālayavijñāna*); because it is the assembly (*cita*, another play on *citta*) of the seeds (*bīja*) of all compoundings (*saṃskāra*).” In this word *saṃ* means *together*, while *kāra* is the *vrddhi* form of *kr* ‘make, do’ plus *a*. Whitney, in his *Sanskrit Grammar* (secs. 1145 and 1148b-c) says that such a formation may be either a *nomen actionis* or a *nomen agentis*; thus our word may be translated either “compoundings” or “compounders”; the Tibetan *’du byed* could stand for either; the first is almost certainly correct and could also have an agentive force. (Cf. *asaṃskṛta*/’*du ma byas*/ uncompoundeds.) The word has at least two meanings: generally, all worldly things, including all the five *skandhas* (See Rāhula, *What the Buddha Taught*, p. 22 & no. 2, p. 57 & n. 2); that is, all things that consist of component parts, hence all things that are subject to analysis (separation into parts); in this sense we are tempted to translate “compoundeds” which is probable and linguistically possible (though this would more specifically be *saṃskṛta*). Excluded are space (*ākāśa*), two kinds of cessation (*nīrodha*), and suchness (*tathatā*).

Specifically, in the Abhidharma, as here, *saṃskāras* are the *caitta-dharmas* other than feeling (*vedanā*) and recognition (*saṃjñā*), plus the *cittaviprayuktadharmas*. Since the *saṃskāras* here are specific elements we are tempted to call them “compounders”, things that make up a compounding; but for both senses “compoundings” may be the best

solution. Psychologically *samskāras* are “unconscious tendencies.”

So Vasubandhu has now defined the mind as the *sarvasamskārabhī-jacita*, the assembly of the seeds of all unconscious tendencies or “compoundings.” Guṇaprabha now tells us, “All compoundings” means the passional elements (*kliṣṭadharmā*). They arise from four conditions (*pratīyaya*.” His next words are more easily comprehended in the form of a chart:

Basic condition (<i>hetupratīyaya</i>)	Perfumings (<i>vāsanā</i>) dwelling in the storehouse perception
Ruling condition (<i>adhipatipratīyaya</i>)	Six sense organs
Immediate condition (<i>samanantarapratīyaya</i>)	Consciousness (<i>manas</i>)
Phenomenal condition (<i>ālambanapratīyaya</i>)	Form, sounds, smells, etc.


Hetu is often translated as “cause”, but a cause *forces* the result, whereas a *hetu* merely provides the *basis* on which the result can occur. It provides, in other words, the context within which the result can occur. It should, therefore, be translated as *basis*. In Buddhist thought there is no real “causation” at all, since events merely take place within a net of interrelationships; they are dependent on each other in a sense (conditioned origination, *pratītyasamutpāda*), but they do not force each other; they merely assist (in the French sense of *being present*): “this present, that occurs.”

It has been suggested that *vāsanā* might better be translated as “experientially initiated potentiality of experience” or some such. But if Vasubandhu and others had wanted to use such an expression, they could easily have done so in Sanskrit: *anubhavasambhavānubhavaśakyatā* might serve. If one translates *vāsanā* literally as “perfuming” the idea is clearer. If one dips a cloth into perfumed water and then hangs it out to dry, the perfume that has pervaded the cloth remains in it after the water has all evaporated. Similarly the experiences and passions remain in the storehouse perception (the Unconscious of Western thought) after the initial stimulus is gone. The mind has been semi-permanently affected (since nothing at all is truly permanent in Buddhism) and thus is called perfumed by the perfumings (*vāsanā*) of former action. The word *perfuming* does make the idea clear, and that is why such a word was chosen by Vasubandhu and others in the first

place, rather than the more complicated phrase given above.

Now Guṇaprabha wishes to explain the *process* of the generation of the compoundings, the perfumings, and the storehouse perception itself. Beginning with the beginning perceptions (*pravṛttivijñāna*), he states:

“Supported on the eye etc. and on form etc., eye-perception etc. arises. Immediately afterwards, the consciousness-perception (*vid kyī rnam par shes pa, manovijñāna*) becomes aware of (*rtog go*) the object (*viśaya*). From completed awareness arises lust (*rāga*) and the other passions (*kleśa*). Then action (*karma*) arises, which is called compoundings (*saṃskāra*) of meritorious (*puṇya*), sinful (*apuṇya*), or neutral character. Compoundings are here to be seen as mentation (*cetanā*). When the action of their birth is stopped, they produce perfumings (*vāsanā*) in the storehouse perception. In this way the passional elements produce perfumings in the storehouse perception. From the greater and greater assembling (*cita*) of all seeds of perfumings comes the mind.” All this can best be seen in a chart (here “6P” means the six beginning perceptions; “SP” means the eighth or storehouse perception):



(Or is *manovijñāna* an error for *manas*, which is stated elsewhere to arise out of the six?)

There is a certain reciprocity in this causal chain. Guṇaprabha states, “As the storehouse perception is the basis (*hetu*) of all the passional compoundings (*kliṣṭasaṃskāra*), so do they in turn form the basis (*hetu*) of the storehouse perception.” This might be represented by an arrow going back from “SP” to “Action/Compoundings/Mentation.” But Guṇaprabha does not say that the storehouse is the *immediate* basis of action etc., so really the arrow should probably go from SP all the way back to the six organs and phenomena; in that way the SP would form the basis of Action, etc., through the causal chain. Now Guṇaprabha explains:

“The storehouse perception becomes transformed into two parts,

called basis (*hetu*) and fruit (*phala*); the basis being the perfumings, the fruit being the ripening (*rnam par smin pa*), which means production (*skyed*) by the perfumings of former action (*pūrvakarmavāsanā*). Thus we should see that on the basis of one, the other arises. For example, the blazing of an oil lamp and its burning of the wick arise mutually at the same time, and when there is a tent supported on three poles, one supports another by means of the third so that they do not fall; so the basis of arising, whatever it may be, should be understood to be the storehouse perception.

“Since the storehouse is a perception, what is its phenomenon and what is its mode?” Its phenomenon, of course, is the object that it perceives; since the ear perceives sounds, the nose smells, etc., what does the storehouse perceive, since it is said to be a perception? Further, what is its *mode* (*rnam pa, ākāra*)? This term apparently replaces *support* (*āśraya, rten*), since a support must be something material, and the storehouse has no material support. Vasubandhu answers both questions by essentially not answering them:

“Its phenomenon and mode are undiscerned (*aparichinna, yongsu ma chad pa'o*.)” Nor does Guṇaprabha comment. The matter is covered, though none too clearly, in Sthiramati’s commentary to Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśika*; but it is a matter for another paper.

Vasubandhu now tells us that the storehouse is “of one class and continually produced” (*rigs cig pa dang rgyun chags par 'jug pa'o*). “Of one class” means, according to Guṇaprabha, that it is morally indifferent (neither good nor bad in its essence); while being continually produced means that it is momentary (it is produced again every moment). “That it has one nature (*rang bzhin, svabhāva*) is known by authority (*āgama*) and reason (*?nyāya*). The authority is the Blessed One’s verse in the [now lost?] *Abhidharmasūtra*:

The realm of time without beginning is
 The place where all the elements reside.
 Since this exists, the realms of sentient beings
 And also Blessed Rest, have been obtained.

Guṇaprabha takes “the place where all the elements reside” to be the storehouse perception.

He has adduced this quotation in order to show an authority for the morally neutral character of the storehouse perception. But the same quotation serves equally to show that the storehouse exists in the

first place, as against those who do not believe in one's existence. Vasubandhu and Guṇaprabha now try to demonstrate its existence by means of reason.

First, they point to the meditational states called cessation attainment (*nirodhasamāpatti*), non-recognition attainment (*asamjñīsamāpatti*), and (plain) non-recognition (*asamjñā*). When one is in these states, the six beginning perceptions "also known as object-manifestation (*viśyavijñapti*)" are stopped; when one leaves these states, the six arise again. They must have been stored somewhere; that somewhere is the storehouse perception. Guṇaprabha asks: "If we do not accept a storehouse perception, from what basis (*hetu*) will the six beginning perceptions arise? Therefore we must accept a storehouse perception."

Further, it is maintained that without a storehouse perception it would be impossible to enter, or more importantly to leave, the round (*samsāra*). This is also supported by the scriptural verse quoted above. Finally, it is maintained that the storehouse is the basis even of the material body. Guṇaprabha states: "Since these various (*gang yin pa*) seeds of all passionate elements (*samkliṣṭadharmā*) dwell in it, it is called the storehouse perception. Again, it dwells in them as the actuality of the basis (*yang na de dag la rgyu'i dngos por gnas pa'o, ?hetuvastu*)."

Vasubandhu now identifies the storehouse with certain other technical terms that were perhaps current in certain circles in his day: "The storehouse perception is itself the ground (*gzhi nyid; ?ādhāra, ?adhiṣṭhāna*) of all seeds, is the storehouse of the body, is the basal (*hetuka*). [The two sentences of Guṇaprabha quoted just above occur here.] It is that which resides in the body; again, it is appropriating (*ādāna*) perception because it appropriates a body." Here Guṇaprabha quotes the *Sandhinirmocanasūtra*:

Appropriating perception is profound and fine,
And all the seeds flow onward like a river:
It is not right to view it as a self;
I did not teach it to the immature.¹³

Guṇaprabha's comments are of little philosophical interest here, and he does not explain how an immaterial storehouse perception can give rise to a material body; one assumes that to the Yogācārins, materiality itself is an illusion anyway.

Here the exposition of the storehouse perception *in itself* is finished; but Vasubandhu takes an extremely important step here. He

goes back to the seventh perception, “consciousness”, *manas*, for another look at it. We saw it before as arising out of the six beginning perceptions. Now we shall see it as rising out of the storehouse, or eighth perception; we shall see it in its relation to the storehouse.

“In reality, the consciousness (*manas*) has the storehouse perception for its phenomenon.” Guṇaprabha: “This means that it phenomenalizes [sees] the storehouse perception as a self.” (“*dn̄gos su na yid ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la dmigs te*” *shes bya ba ni, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la bdag tu dmigs zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go.*) Vasubandhu: “It is that which is associated with the constant delusion of self (*ātmamoha*), view of self (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*), egoism of self (*ātmamāna*), and lust for self (*ātmārāga*), and so on.”¹⁴ Guṇaprabha: “It is explained as operating always, and arises as good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*), and indifferent. His saying ‘It is of one class’ means [in contrast to what it means for the storehouse perception] that it has a passionate (*kliṣṭa*) nature (*rang bzhin, ṣvabhāva*). ‘It is continually produced’ means that it is momentary. It operates always, but ‘It is not present in an Arhat, on the Noble Path, or at the time of the cessation-attainment.’ In the last two it is prevented from producing perfumings; when one rises out of them, the seeds arise again from it. In Arhatship they cease completely.

“With that, we have explained the eight perceptions that constitute the perception aggregate, [to wit] the six beginning perceptions, the storehouse perception, and the passionate consciousness (*kliṣṭamanas*). The perception-aggregate has been explained.”

So our chart of perceptions above requires these two additions:

Perception	Mode (<i>ākāra</i>)	Phenomenon
Consciousness (<i>manas</i>) aka <i>kliṣṭamanas</i>	(not specified)	Storehouse Perception (falsely seen as self)
Storehouse Perception (<i>ālayavijñāna</i>)	Undiscerned (<i>aparichinna</i>)	Undiscerned (<i>aparichinna</i>)

This has been only one section of a very elementary Yogācāra treatise, and the kind of problems that we encounter here should warn us against the error of thinking that we can fully understand this doctrine quickly or easily or without rigorous scientific analysis.

Of course, such a treatise as this may raise more questions than it answers: for instance, how to reconcile the *three* views of *manas* presented: as a sense organ giving rise to *manovijñāna*; as arising from the six

beginning perceptions; as arising from the storehouse perception. But before studying this treatise we did not know enough even to ask the question.

NOTES

1. I have used the edition of the Derge Tanjur. I have not been able to obtain the Sanskrit of the Vasubandhu, and in any case I do not know whether it is the original or a retranslation from the Tibetan; if the latter, there would be no advantage in using it. In most cases, the Sanskrit equivalent of a given Tibetan term is known; in a few cases above I give the Tibetan where I am unsure of the Sanskrit.

I have translated or paraphrased essentially everything that Vasubandhu and Guṇaprabha say here; a few minor points are passed over cursorily. In a couple of places their writing is not as clear as it might be (they at one point seem to be trying to talk about two things at once); I have tried to straighten things out a bit in my exposition, but certainly I have not changed any of the ideas or technical terms, and all important points are translated *verbatim*.

2. *Vijñāna* has been occasionally translated as perception, but never so far as I am aware with any explanation of why this is correct and the more usual translation wrong. I think it better to bring the whole matter out into the open.

Throughout this paper I engage in discussion of the meanings of individual Sanskrit words: this is not mere "philology" because we investigate the words not for their own sake, but in order to understand the *philosophical* ideas they express. One cannot understand an idea unless one first understands the words used to explain it! Dereliction of this principle is widespread, because people prefer to avoid the difficulties (and they are genuine difficulties) of dealing strictly with these technical terms; and this enables them (in some cases) to read *their own* ideas into the texts.

The reader will note that my translations of technical terms are often quite literal (when I think that the literal meaning most clearly expresses the idea, as it often does), and sometimes a modest departure from literalness (when it seems better to translate the meaning than the word, so to speak). Always I give the Sanskrit original if it can be ascertained—unlike certain people, I am bound to say.

I do not believe in translating words inconsistently, but hold to the principle of one English word for one Sanskrit word in the overwhelming majority of cases. Some maintain that the profundity and complexity of Buddhist philosophical thought constitutes an excuse for their own terminological inconsistency and obfuscation (a hyper-intellectual but essentially frivolous point of view, in that it does not meet the real requirements). On the contrary, the more profound, subtle, and complex the thought, the more necessary is terminological exactitude.

3. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1973), p. 189.

4. Guṇaprabha's commentary on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*: Derge Tanjur si lbl-31b7. Unfortunately, when working on this text, I neglected to take down the specific page numbers. Nevertheless the quotation will be found to be accurate.

5. M. Hattori, tr. *Dignāga on Perception, being the Pratyakṣa pariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1968), sec. C. of Skt. text (pages unnumbered in Skt.). *Pratyakṣa* like *viñāna* is named after sense organs (*akṣa*) (sec. Daa-1). The two are not *exactly* identical, since *viñāna* appears within the discussion of *pratyakṣa* as its specificity (where *viñāna* has at least two aspects [according to the logicians in general], object-cognition [*viśayaviñāna*] and the cognition of that cognition). But it is clear that they both are within the range of meaning of the English word perception. At any rate, they bear much closer resemblance to each other than either does to "consciousness", which is something else entirely.

6. W. Rāhula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 23. In case anyone wonders why Theravāda sources are used in the discussion of a Mahāyāna text, it is because the meaning of standard Abhidharma technical terms is the same in both traditions. The Mahāyānists after all built their Abhidharma thought on the same early-Buddhist foundations.

7. Hattori, *op. cit.* Sec. Daa-2.

8. See n. 4 above.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. Derge Tanjur shi 195b6 ff.

11. Rāhula *loc. cit.*

12. See n. 4 above.

13. This quotation also warns us against seeing the SP as a self. It is a kind of continuity (*santāna*), to be sure, that plants for instance are continuities without selfhood (a supposed self in plants is one of a number of wrong views refuted by the Buddha in one of the Hīnayāna Sūtras). In the *Ratnarāśi Sūtra* quoted by Śāntideva (*Śikṣasamuccaya*, Bendall, p. 201, Vaidya p. 111, Eng. trans. p. 195) plants are stated to be *asvāmika* and *amama* (without "I" or "mine"). As Rāhula says, "If we can understand that in his life we can continue without a permanent, unchanging substance like Self or Soul, why can't we understand that those forces themselves can continue without a Self or Soul behind them after the non-functioning of the body?" (*Ibid.*, p. 33. He also points out, p. 65 n. 1, that the *Laṅkāvatāra* emphatically denies selfhood in the *Ālayaviñāna* or *Tathāgatagarbha*, p. 68 ff. of Suzuki, pp. 78–79 of Skt.) That a continuity is not a self is implicit in the *Vajracchedikā*, which denies *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, and *pudgala*, but not continuity, or functioning entities in general. The accusation that the Yogācārins tend towards a self-theory is simply without foundation.

14. *Moha* or *mūḍhi*, *drṣṭi*, *māna*, and *rāga* or *sneha* are four of the six passions, a subdivision within the mentals (*caittadharmā*). These four *dharmas*, then, when associated with the illusion of *ātman*, are the constant accompaniments of the *manas*. Five other elements also accompany it, according to Sthiramati in his commentary to Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā*: the five "everpresents" (*sarvatraga*) [that I have listed in the List of Technical Terms].