

THE JOURNAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS

L. M. Joshi
Punjabi University
Patiala, India

Alexander W. Macdonald
Université de Paris X
Nanterre, France

Bardwell Smith
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota, USA

Ernst Steinkellner
University of Vienna
Wien, Austria

Jikidō Takasaki
University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan

Robert Thurman
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

Volume 4

1981

Number 2

CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. New Buddhist Sanskrit Texts from Central Asia: An Unknown fragment of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* by *G. M. Bongard Levin* 7
2. Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philology and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists by *Paul J. Griffiths* 17
3. Nonorigination and *Nirvāṇa* in the Early *Tathāgatagarbha* Literature by *William Grosnick* 33
4. Multiple Dimensions of Impermanence in Dōgen's "Gen-jōkōan" by *Steven Heine* 44
5. The Autobiography of a 20th-Century Rnying-ma-pa lama by *Alexander W. Macdonald* 63
6. Metapsychology of the *Abhidharma* by *Shanta Ratnayaka* 76

II. SHORT PAPER

1. The Buddhist "Prodigal Son": A Story of Misperceptions by *Whalen Lai* 91

III. BOOK REVIEWS

1. Lustful Maidens and Ascetic Kings (Buddhist and Hindu Stories of Life) by *C. Amore and Larry D. Shinn* 99

2.	The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en by <i>Judith A. Berling</i>	101
3.	The Memoirs of a Modern Gnostic (Parts I and II) by <i>Edward Conze</i>	102
4.	Buddhist Studies by <i>J. W. de Jong</i>	106
5.	Sources for a History of the bSam yas Debate by <i>G. W. Houston</i>	107
6.	Buddhist Architecture of Western India (c. 250 BC–AD 300) by <i>S. Nagaraju</i>	109
7.	The Thousand Buddhas: Ancient Buddhist Paintings from the Cave-Temples of Tun-huang on the Western Front- ier of China by <i>Aurel Stein</i>	112

IV. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

1. Tasks Ahead: Presidential Address Given on the Occasion
of the Third Conference of The International Associa-
tion of Buddhist Studies, Winnipeg, Canada, August
1980 by *Herbert V. Guenther*

Contributors

124

Nonorigination and *Nirvāṇa* in the Early *Tathāgatagarbha* Literature

by William Grosnick

One of the most interesting notions found in the early *tathāgatagarbha* literature is the idea that *nirvāṇa* should be understood as non-origination (*anutpāda*). This idea is explicitly formulated in two texts, the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, the only *śāstra* extant in Sanskrit which is completely devoted to the *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature teachings, and the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra*, the *sūtra* upon which the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* bases its exposition of nonorigination. The *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* itself does not speak of the *tathāgatagarbha* or Buddha-nature doctrines, but the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* takes the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* explanation of nonorigination and links it to the view of *nirvāṇa* found in two of the important early *sūtras* that do speak of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa* and the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*. This interpretation of *nirvāṇa* in terms of nonorigination is of considerable importance in understanding the early *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, for it clarifies certain notions frequently associated with the *tathāgatagarbha* like the “natural purity of mind” (*cittaprakṛtviśuddhi*)—notions which have been hotly debated ever since the doctrine’s inception. It may also tell us something about the conceptual issues which divided the schools of early Buddhism and so hold clues for understanding the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

In order to see how the *tathāgatagarbha* theorists could understand *nirvāṇa* as nonorigination it is necessary first to examine some of their ideas about *nirvāṇa*. It is of course well known that the earliest Mahāyāna literature placed great emphasis on the figure of the Buddha, and urged beings to strive for buddhahood rather than personal liberation. At first glance this would seem to give the impression that buddhahood and *nirvāṇa* were thought of as separate and distinct goals, the understanding being that one should strive for

buddhahood in order to help other beings attain *nirvāṇa*. Buddhahood would be the higher goal because it represents selfless activity on behalf of others rather than selfish striving for personal release. This indeed is how some Mahāyāna Buddhists apparently understood the relationship between buddhahood and *nirvāṇa*, for the authors of the so-called “*triyāna*” texts like the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra* reasoned that certain beings (the *tathāgatayāna-gotraka*) had the superior faculties necessary for buddhahood while others (the *śrāvakayānagotraka* and the *pratyekabuddhayānagotraka*), had only the faculties necessary for attaining *nirvāṇa*.¹

But “*ekayāna*” texts like the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *tathāgatagarbha sūtras* upon which it relies do not make this conceptual distinction between buddhahood and *nirvāṇa*. Buddhahood is not simply a superior state of wisdom and compassion from which one helps others attain liberation—it is also itself a state of liberation. Thus the *Ratnagotravibhāga* maintains that from the highest point of view “buddhahood and *nirvāṇa* are one and the same”²; and the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*, in a passage quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, says

The *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* vehicles all enter the great vehicle. The great vehicle is the Buddha vehicle. Therefore the three vehicles are the one vehicle. One who attains the one vehicle attains supreme, perfect enlightenment. Supreme enlightenment is the realm of *nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇadhātu*). And the realm of *nirvāṇa* is the Dharma-body of the Tathāgata.³

Thus buddhahood was not simply understood as the attainment of those various powers and kinds of wisdom by which one might aid others to find liberation in *nirvāṇa*—it was itself a form of liberation. Indeed, it was the only form of liberation that there was.

What above all made possible this identification of buddhahood and *nirvāṇa* was the rejection of the notion that *nirvāṇa* represented extinction. This idea was probably implicit in the doctrine of the eternality of the Tathāgata so vigorously expounded in the *Saddharmaṇḍarīka* and the first half of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. But the *sūtras* of the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition do not just speak of non-extinction for the Tathāgata, they also make clear that it is wrong to think of any sentient being attaining extinction. In the *Anūnatvāpūrnatvanirdeśa*, the title of which means the “*sūtra* which expounds neither increase nor decrease,” the Buddha responds to the question of whether there is any increase or decrease in the number of beings

transmigrating through the triple world first by rejecting the questions as ill-conceived, and then by explicitly attacking both the idea that *nirvāṇa* represents a kind of severance, destruction, or non-being (the view of “decrease”), and the idea that it represents a reality over and above the phenomenal life that arises suddenly without cause (the view of “increase”).⁴ The text goes on to say that these two erroneous views of *nirvāṇa* would not arise if beings understood the one *dharmadhātu*.⁵ The *Śrīmālādevīsūtra* follows a similar line of thought in its discussion of the third noble truth, the truth of the cessation of suffering (*duḥkhamirodhasatya*). In a widely quoted passage the *sūtra* says:

By the truth of the cessation of suffering, O World-honored One, is not meant the destruction of a single *dharma*. By the expression “cessation of suffering” is meant the Dharma-body of the Tathāgata, which is beginningless, unproduced, unborn, of no destruction, free from destruction, eternal, pure by nature, free from the covering of *kleśas*, and inseparable from the *buddhadharmas*, which are more numerous than the sands of the Ganges River.⁶

The *Ratnagotravibhāga* comments on this passage by saying that this is how the truth of the cessation of suffering should be understood; it should never be explained that the truth gets its name because of the extinction of something.⁷

What this seems to mean is that the authors of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and other *tathāgatagarbha* texts rejected the idea that *nirvāṇa* was a state of extinction reached when one destroyed one’s ignorance and passions and exhausted one’s rebirths. It is possible that their arguments were directed at the notions of *nirvāṇa* “with a remainder” (*sopādhīśeṣanirvāṇa*) and *nirvāṇa* “without a remainder” (*anupādhīśeṣanirvāṇa*) found in texts like the *Itivuttaka*,⁸ for both of these notions emphasized extinction. *Nirvāṇa* with a remainder (also called *kleśanirvāṇa*), represented the extinction of *āśravas* (“outflows”) like sensual desire, desire for existence, and ignorance and the extinguishing of *kleśas* like greed, hatred, and pride. It represented the attainment of an *arhat* who had not yet departed this life. *Nirvāṇa* without a remainder represented the extinction realized by the *arhat* at death, when the five *skandhas* (the “remainder”) are dispersed. Both of these articulations of *nirvāṇa* suggest that there is a point in time when certain *dharma*s, be they *kleśas* or *skandhas*, are completely extinguished, and this appears to be precisely the kind of extinction which

the *tathāgatagarbha* texts were arguing against. Moreover, the idea that *nirvāṇa* is attained or entered at a particular point in time is also something argued against in the texts. The *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* says that:

It is impossible to see the Tathāgata enter *nirvāṇa*, though sentient beings give rise to such a notion and say that the Tathāgata has attained ultimate *nirvāṇa*. . . . The Tathāgata's true, all-pervading knowledge is unborn, undying, unoriginated, and undestroyed. . . . From beginningless time he realizes eternal *mahāparinirvāṇa*.⁹

The view of *nirvāṇa* brought forward in the early *tathāgatagarbha* texts as an alternative to the idea of extinction was the rather remarkable notion of nonorigination. The authors of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* (and perhaps the other *tathāgatagarbha sūtras*), seemed to believe that true attainment is to be found not in the extinguishing of ignorance and passion, but in their nonorigination. This rather ingenious notion is clearly brought forward in the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* where it is said that:

Where there is neither origination nor extinction, mind, intellect, and consciousness do not take place. When mind, intellect, and consciousness do not take place, there is no false discrimination by which incorrect thought would arise. One who arouses correct thought never originates ignorance. Nonorigination means the non-arising of the twelve parts of existence.¹⁰

The idea seems to be that correct practice consists of not generating those mental activities by which illusory realities are conceived. Correct thought seems to be thought which does not originate those notions of “me” and “mine” that in turn give rise to desire, craving, hatred, and the other passions that plague human existence. Correct thought is the nonorigination of any false and foolish conceptions of reality (*prapañca*). And the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* clearly associates this nonorigination with *nirvāṇa*, the liberation from *samsāra*:

One who has been able to reach the truth does not give rise to vain imaginings (*prapañca*). One who does not give rise to vain imaginings does not act in accordance with falsely posited realities. One who neither imagines nor acts in such ways does not dwell in *samsāra*.¹¹

In the analysis provided by the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, human bondage (*vibandha*) is “the origination of desire, hatred, and ignorance” which is preceded by superficial thought (*ayoniśomanasikāra*). Superficial thought is thought which conceives of and grasps after illusory realities because of its attachment to what are really only the conceptual characteristics (*nimitta*) of things. When one understands that this thought is extinct by nature one ceases to originate duality and discrimination and the suffering associated with them. Therefore the text says, “there is absolutely no origination of suffering.”¹² The text seems to be saying that human suffering is the illusory product of mental activity. When one understands this one’s proper response is not to try to destroy suffering, but simply not to originate it. Those practitioners whom the *Ratnagotravibhāga* characterizes as *śrāvakas* do not understand this and therefore seek to destroy suffering. This is probably why the text claims that the obstacle of *śrāvakas* is the notion of suffering (*duḥkha-samjñā*) and the fear of suffering (*duḥkha-bhīrutva*).¹³ Suffering is not a *dharma* one should extinguish, but an illusion one should not produce. In the words of the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra*,

If the *bodhisattva* does not originate mind he does not effect the extinction of *dharma*s or the origination of *dharma*s. . . . He sees that *dharma*s are extinct from the outset and that they are not extinguished.¹⁴

Thus, rather than understanding the noble truth of the extinction of suffering as a state of nonbeing or extinction, it would appear that the early *tathāgatagarbha* thinkers regarded it as a kind of practice—namely the practice of nondiscriminative wisdom (*avikalpa-jñāna*). Nondiscriminative wisdom is not a practice aimed at deliverance (*virāga*), but a practice that is already deliverance,¹⁵ for ignorance and its attendant passions and sufferings are simply not originated. It is also a practice that does not involve the application of correctives (*pratipakṣa*) for specific ills (as, for example, in the case of a man prone to hatred who might consciously cultivate benevolent thoughts toward his enemies). The mind of one who practices correct thought (i.e., nonorigination), is “pure by nature,” and as the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* puts it, “because mind is pure by nature in one who practices correct thought, there is no need for *pratipakṣa*.”¹⁶ This rejection of *pratipakṣa* would suggest that the understanding of practice found in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* may have more in common with certain Sino-Japanese views of practice (like the Zen Master

Dōgen's "enlightenment-based practice")¹⁷ than it does with more traditional Indian Buddhist understandings of practice like the five path system of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*.

Since the nonorigination of ignorance is an activity, rather than a state of extinction, it is not surprising that the *tathāgatagarbha* texts portray it using the dynamic, personified figure of the Buddha's Dharma-body rather than using the traditional term *nirvāṇa* with its connotation of stasis. It is probably because of this active sense of nonorigination that the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* literally identifies the extinction of suffering with the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata.¹⁸ Indeed, the active nonorigination of ignorance is so central to the *tathāgatagarbha* theory that some of the texts seem almost to make nonorigination into the defining characteristic of the *dharmakāya*. The *Śrīmālādevīsūtra* defines the *dharmakāya* as beginningless, unproduced, and non-arisen.¹⁹ And the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* says that the pure Dharma-body

is unmoving, does not originate mental actions, does not engage in pointless speculation, and does not reason dualistically. It does not discriminate; it is free from discrimination. It does not speculate; it is free from speculation. It does not imagine; it is free from imagination. It is tranquil and quiescent, of neither origination nor destruction.²⁰

In another passage of the *Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra* that is quoted by the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, the text says that "he who is said to be of neither origination nor destruction is called the Tathāgata."²¹

The understanding of *nirvāṇa* and the *dharmakāya* in terms of nonorigination has several important implications for understanding the *tathāgatagarbha* theory. One of the most obvious of these implications concerns the proper interpretation of the notion of the "natural purity of mind" (*cittaprakṛtīviśuddhi*) or the "natural luminescence of mind" (*cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvarata*).²² Some scholars of Buddhism, most notably Obermiller,²³ seem to have felt that these notions imply a sort of Brahmanical monism—that underlying the constant flux of mind-produced illusions there is a sort of pure mental substratum that remains eternally the same. This interpretation would have it that the natural purity of this mental substratum serves as an ultimate refuge from the uncertainties and sufferings of transitory human existence.

It is clear, however, from the idea of the nonorigination of

ignorance that there is no need to go so far as to posit a mental substratum in order to understand the theory of the natural purity of mind. The natural purity of mind can be thought of simply as the awareness of one who does not originate thoughts of “me” and “mine” and other illusory realities. Nothing special is being said about any kind of mystical penetration into an absolute or universal mental nature. The natural luminosity of mind is only the natural purity of one who does not generate foolish thoughts. It is completely unthinkable, unlocalizable, and indescribable,²⁴ and thus fully compatible with the *prajñāpāramitā* teaching of emptiness.

A second important implication of nonorigination involves the sister concept of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the Buddha-nature (*buddhadhātu*). An important problem confronting scholars of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* was how to reconcile the various assertions made in the *sūtra* that the Buddha-nature is both a cause and a result; the idea of nonorigination may show how this is possible. For example, in the “Kāśyapa” Chapter of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, the Buddha says that before enlightenment the Buddha-nature is a cause but that after enlightenment it is a result.²⁵ Later in the same chapter the Buddha says that when he speaks following his own volition (i.e., not adapting his thought to the capacities of listeners), he explains that the result lies in the cause and the cause in the result.²⁶ Unfortunately, the *sūtra* itself does not do much to clarify these rather confusing statements; but if one were to identify the Buddha-nature with the active non-origination of ignorance, this apparent contradiction between cause and result might be resolved. As noted earlier, the practice of not originating ignorance is not simply the means to liberation (cause), it is also liberation itself (result). By not originating false notions of reality, beings actualize their innate purity. All beings are said to possess the Buddha-nature because they possess the capacity to practice nonorigination—this is the Buddha-nature as cause. When they practice it becomes result.²⁷

It is also interesting to note that the identification of liberation with nonorigination that is found in the *tathāgatagarbha* literature may hold some clues for understanding the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism, or at least for understanding the philosophical questions which divided them from their so-called “Hīnayāna” opponents. For it is clear from the *tathāgatagarbha* literature that the early Mahāyāna thinkers had some strong views regarding the nature of *nirvāṇa*. The *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*, as we have noted, is most adamant in asserting that

the truth of the cessation of suffering (*duḥkhanirodhasatya*) should not be thought of as extinction. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that one of the philosophical issues that led Mahāyāna Buddhism to distinguish itself from other Buddhist schools of thought was the proper understanding of *nirvāṇa*. How far back can one trace the notion that *nirvāṇa* should be thought of as nonorigination rather than extinction?

If one examines what the historical Buddha is purported to have said about *nirvāṇa*, it is clear that there was plenty of room for disagreement right from the start. Certainly there are plenty of references to extinction in the Buddha's utterances—allusions to the extinguishing of a lamp or flame, to the extinction of desire, hatred, and illusion, and even to the "stopping of becoming."²⁸ There are also, however, some important qualifications of the idea that *nirvāṇa* is extinction, perhaps foremost among them being the refusal of the Buddha to answer questions like whether or not the Tathāgata exists after death²⁹ or whether or not a monk who has destroyed the *āśravas* exists after the dissolution of the body.³⁰ It is certainly clear from this that he did not lay down as dogma the notions of *nirvāṇa* with and without a remainder. Moreover, because of the Buddhist rejection of the reality of the self, or *ātman*, it is apparent that there is nothing that ever really needs to be extinguished in the first place. In an early discourse attributed to Śāriputra it is concluded that "a Tathāgata cannot be held to be perceived as existing even in this life in truth and reality."³¹ Assertions like these suggest that extinction is in a very real sense already attained, and it is only the illusion of self that could present a problem. The question might well then have become, should one extinguish such illusions or simply not originate them? And finally there is that curious quote from the *Udāna*, which almost seems to suggest that *nirvāṇa* should be understood as existing:

There is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an uncompounded; if there were not, there would not be an escape from the born, the become, the made, the compounded. But because there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an uncompounded, there is therefore an escape from the born, the become, the made, and the compounded.³²

It would be stretching things to suggest that this quote expresses the view of nonorigination that is found in the *Jñānālokaṅkārasūtra*, but it is nevertheless clear that even in those statements attributable to the

Buddha, nonbirth and nonorigination were important notions. Debate over extinction or nonorigination could have begun even during the lifetime of the Buddha.

As a sidelight it is worth noting that the idea of nonorigination might have also figured in the dispute over the backsliding of an *arhat* that apparently divided some of the splinter schools. Schools like the Theravādins and the Vibhāgyavādins, which rejected the idea that an *arhat* can fall back from his attainment, almost always based their arguments on the idea of extinction. The Theravādins, for example, asserted that an *arhat* cannot backslide because he has destroyed the roots of *kleśas*.³³ And the Vibhāgyavādins compared the *arhat's* destruction of *kleśas* to a fire reducing a tree to ashes—nothing remains of the original that could grow back.³⁴

On the other hand, it would seem that if one thought of practice not as the extinction of *kleśas*, but as the nonorigination of *kleśas*, practice would be endless, and would never bring one to any sort of final state. Backsliding would either always remain a possibility, or else it would remain a possibility as long as one had the mistaken idea that at some point in time one's *kleśas* would be extinct (then, conceivably one might erroneously relax his vigilance). This might have been the reasoning of the Sarvāstivādins, for there is some evidence that they felt that the possibility of backsliding was tied to one's understanding of nonorigination. According to Vasumitra, one of the theses of the Sarvāstivādins was the rather surprising contention that streamwinners (*srotāpanna*) cannot backslide but *arhats* can—a contention that is strange because it seems to reverse the traditional order and place streamwinners above *arhats*. The very next Sarvāstivādin tenet listed by Vasumitra asserts that all *arhats* do not obtain the wisdom of nonorigination (*anutpādayñāna*),³⁵ and though no connection is made between these theses in Vasumitra's enumeration, one might conjecture that the second was originally put forward as an explanation for the first. That is, the reason that some *arhats* slide back is that they have not obtained the wisdom of nonorigination.

All this is highly speculative, and there is no indication that the Vātsīputriyas or Sammitayas followed similar reasoning when they argued for the backsliding of *arhats*. But it does show that the issue of nonorigination was central to some of the doctrinal disputes among the splinter schools. Mahāyāna Buddhism might well have developed from doctrinal disputes like these.

NOTES

1. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* (Paris: Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1969), pp. 73–74, 78.
2. *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*. XXXI, 835c and Jikidō Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* (Rome: Serie Orientale Roma, 1966), p. 261.
3. T. XII, 220c. RGV quote: T. XXXI, 821a, b and Takasaki, p. 144.
4. T. XVI, 466a, b.
5. T. XVI, 466c.
6. T. XII, 221c. RGV quote: T. XXXI, 824a and Takasaki, pp. 167–68.
7. T. XXXI, 824a and Takasaki, p. 167.
8. Edward Conze et al., *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 96–97.
9. T. XII, 241c.
10. T. XII, 247c. RGV quote: T. XXXI, 824a and Takasaki, p. 167.
11. T. XII, 244b.
12. T. XXXI, 824a, b and Takasaki, pp. 167–69.
13. T. XXXI, 829a and Takasaki, p. 205.
14. T. XII, 247b.
15. The RGV explains that deliverance has the common feature of both *nirodhasatya* and *mārgasatya*. T. XXXI, 823c and Takasaki, p. 164.
16. T. XII, 244c.
17. Cf. *Shōbōgenzō* "Muchūsetsumu," ed. Fumio Masutani (Tokyo: Kadogawa-shoten, 1975), IV, 162.
18. T. XXXI, 824a and Takasaki, p. 168.
19. T. XII, 221c.
20. T. XII, 240c.
21. T. XII, 242b. RGV quote: T. XXXI, 823a and Takasaki, p. 159.
22. Cf. T. XXXI, 824c–825a and 833a, b and Takasaki, pp. 172–74 and 238–40.
23. Cf. Y. Y. Obermiller, *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism* (Copenhagen: Acta Orientalia IX, 1931) (Reprint: Shanghai, 1940).
24. Cf. the following quote from the JAA: "The Tathāgata's Dharma-body is markless and free from any discernible aspect. It is without location and cannot be localized." T. XII, 241c.
25. T. XII, 571b.
26. T. XII, 580c.
27. This may be why the *Nirvānasūtra* devotes so much space to discussing the *icchāntika*, a being whose current practices represent the antithesis of correct Buddhist practice.
28. Conze et al., pp. 92–93.
29. *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I, 157. Quoted in E. J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1951), p. 124.
30. *Samyutta-Nikāya*, III, 109. Thomas, p. 125.
31. *Samy.*, III, 109. Thomas, p. 126.
32. *Udāna*, VIII, 1–3. Conze, et al., p. 95.

33. André Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon: Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1955), p. 212.
34. Bareau, p. 174.
35. Bareau, p. 140.