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CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra *by John P. Keenan* 7
2. The Dragon Girl and the Abbess of Mo-Shan: Gender and Status in the Ch'an Buddhist Tradition *by Miriam L. Levering* 19
3. The Life and Times of Paramārtha (499–569) *by Diana Y. Paul* 37
4. Studies in Traditional Indian Medicine in the Pāli Canon: Jīvaka and Āyurveda *by Kenneth G. Zysk* 70

II. SHORT PAPERS

1. Sa skya paṇḍita's Account of the bSam yas Debate: History as Polemic *by Roger Jackson* 89
2. The Text on the "Dhāraṇī Stones from Abhayagiriya": A Minor Contribution to the Study of Mahāyāna Literature in Ceylon *by Gregory Schopen* 100
3. A Report on Buddhism in the People's Republic of China *by Alan Sponberg* 109

III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

1. Histoire du Cycle de la Naissance et de la Mort *by Yoshiro Imaeda* 118

2. Theravāda Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation by
Winston King 121
3. Chinese Buddhism: Aspects of Interaction and Reinterpretation by *W. Pachow* 124
4. Buddhism and Society in Southeast Asia by *Donald K. Swearer* 126
5. Tantra in Tibet and The Yoga of Tibet by *Tsong kha pa* 127

IV. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

1. Asoka and Buddhism — A Reexamination by *A. L. Basham* 131

V. NOTES AND NEWS

1. A report on the 4th Conference of the IABS, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, U.S.A. August 7–9, 1981 144
2. Constitution and By-Laws of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 153

Contributors 160

Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra

by John P. Keenan

In understanding the ongoing process of the development of any doctrinal system, isolated insights into particular texts or particular doctrinal themes are not sufficient. No number of monographs on *ālayavijñāna* or *trisvabhāva* suffices, for, although such studies do clarify particular themes, no understanding is gained of the overall purpose for which these themes were developed. What is desired is an overall insight into what the system is trying to achieve. In the case of the Yogācāra system, the question of its basic intent and overall purpose is not easily determined. There are, it would appear, two reasons for this situation. The first is that the complex of questions regarding the dating, authorship, and compilation of the various textual data have not yet received definite answers in many instances, and yet each of these questions bears directly upon the understanding of the lines of doctrinal development. A second reason is that the doctrinal focuses of some of the basic Yogācāra texts appear to differ.

The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, and the *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*,¹ which in its basic verses appears to be quite early, shows close affinities with *tathāgatagarbha* thought. It affirms the original purity of the mind (*cittaprakṛtīprabhāsvarāṭā*) and the adventitious nature of defilement (*āgantukasamkleśa*).

When water, after having been stirred up, settles, the regaining of its transparency is not due to something other than the removal of dirt. The manner in which the mind is purified is similar. It is to be understood that the mind is originally luminous (*prakṛtīprabhāsvaraṃ*) at all times, but blemished by adventitious faults. It is not to be thought that apart from this mind of *dharmatā* there is any other mind that is originally luminous.²

This passage seems to be in full doctrinal accord with the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings and its content is reflected in many *tathāgatagarbha* texts.³ Again, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* states:

Although *tathatā* is not differentiated in regard to all [sentient beings], when it has been purified, it is *tathāgatahood*. Therefore it is said that all sentient beings are that seed [*tadgarbha*].⁴

This seems to be a clear affirmation of the basic theme of the pure *garbha*, and the later prose commentary of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* explains that it means that all sentient beings are *tathāgatagarbha*.⁵

From such passages it appears that the basic focus of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* is upon the mind of original purity, the pure consciousness that is always present, even under the coverings of defilement, and which enables one to attain purification and enlightenment.

In discussing the ultimate realm, *dharmadhātu*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* laments:

Indeed there is nothing else in the world, and yet the world is unconscious of it. How has this kind of wordly illusion come about, whereby one clings to what is not and entirely ignores what is?⁶

Again, this seems to reflect the *tathāgatagarbha* theme that

only the pure *garbha* actually exists, while all else is non-existent.⁷

The focus of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* is then upon the mind of original purity, and not upon an analysis of empirical consciousness. Thus, when it comes to an explanation of the *trīsvabhāva* doctrine, the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* uses this doctrine to explain just how empirical consciousness has devolved from that original purity. The emphasis is not upon consciousness as experienced, but upon the original purity of that now illusory consciousness. The three natures (*trīsvabhāva*) are treated as marks of *tathatā*,⁸ and the reality envisaged is not the everyday consciousness of sentient beings. The three natures are described as follows:

Reality (*tatvam*) is that which is always void of duality, that which is the basis of confusion, and that which can never be verbally expressed, for its being is not conceptualizable. It is to be known, to be rejected, and to be purified, although it is originally undefiled. When purified from *kleśa*, it is like space, gold, and water.⁹

These three categories correspond to *parikalpita*, *paratantra*, and *pariniṣpanna*.¹⁰ The description of *parikalpita* as always void of duality (*dvayaena rahitam*) emphasizes the illusory nature of empirical consciousness, which clings to the dichotomy of subject-object. The description of *paratantra* as the basis of confusion (*bhrānteśca samniśrayah*) identifies the source of the illusions of *parikalpita*. The description of *pariniṣpanna* points to the originally pure mind, which, although undefiled (*amalam*), must be purified from adventitious defilements. Its being is also said to be not conceptualizable (*yaccāprapañcātmakam*), which suggests the *tathāgatagarbha* tenet that only the pure *garbha* actually exists, and also implies that the reason why the world is unconscious of it is because it is beyond the realm of subject-object concepts. The only function of *paratantra* in this explanation is to identify the source of the confusion of *parikalpita*. When one has understood that in fact the duality of *parikalpita* is illusory, then its underlying source, *paratantra*, is to be rejected. The conversion of the basis (*āśraya-parivṛtti*) is then a turning around from the illusions of *parikalpita* to an awareness of the original purity of *pariniṣpanna* that takes place through the rejection of *paratantra*. Because of the basic focus on original purity, the *trīsvabhāva* doctrine is here employed in order to explain

how empirical defilement arises to cloud over that purity. The consistent tension is between the pair of *parikalpita-paratantra* as illusion and its source, and the purity of *pariniṣpanna*.

Thus, in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* the intent of the author appears to be the use of Yogācāra doctrines in order to explain just how there can be both pure consciousness and empirical defilement—for the principal weakness of the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition is its failure adequately to treat the causes of defiled consciousness.

The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*¹¹ presents a different focus, for it does not admit the doctrine of the original purity of the mind. Rather, it focuses upon the seed consciousness (*sarvabījaka*, i.e., *ādāna*, i.e., *ālaya-vijñāna*) as the basis for karmic defilement.

The seed consciousness [of sentient beings in the six destinies] matures, evolves, becomes unified, grows, and reaches its development, because it makes its own two things: the physical body with its sense organs and the habitual proclivities (*vāsanā*) of discriminately and verbally conceptualizing (*prapañca*) images and names.¹²

The initial arising of consciousness results in *prapañca*, is due to the proclivities of *prapañca*, and does not manifest any purity whatsoever. This idea contrasts sharply with the teaching of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. The *Samdhinirmocana* goes on to present an analysis of phenomenal consciousness and offers an explanation of the relationship between the six sense consciousnesses and the base *sarvabījaka-vijñāna*.¹³

In its explanation of the *trisvabhāva*, the *Samdhinirmocana* parallels the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, but the *trisvabhāva* doctrine is here used to explain the characteristics of the *dharma* (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*), i.e., consciousness, rather than as a description of *tathatā*.

The *dharma* [of consciousness] is of three kinds: that which has been totally imagined (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), that which arises in dependence on others (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*), and that which is full perfection (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*).

That which has been totally imagined is the discrimination whereby all *dharma*s are conventionally held to have their

own *svabhāva*, and the verbal expressions that arise consequent upon this discrimination.

That which arises in dependence on others is the nature whereby all *dharmas* conventionally arise. For, if this exists, then that exists. If this arises, then that arises. This includes [the dependent co-arising] of ignorance up to [the dependent co-arising] of this grand mass of suffering.

That which is full perfection is the true nature of the equality of *dharmas* (*samatātathatā*). It is this *tathatā* which *bodhisattvas* come to realize because of their zeal (*vīrya*), and their fundamental mental apprehension (*aviṣarīta-cintana*). By gradual practices until they reach this realization, they finally attain full enlightenment (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*).

That which is totally imagined is like the defective vision of one who has cataracts in his eyes. That which arises in dependence on others is like the imagining of those images, such as the appearance of hairs, flies, small particles or patches of different colors before the eyes of one with cataracts. Full perfection is like the true, unconfused objects which are seen by the sound eye of one who has no cataracts.¹⁴

This passage parallels that of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* in that the function of *paratantra* is to account for the delusions of *parikalpita*. Thus the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* later explains that wisdom enables one “to destroy *paratantra*.”¹⁵ Although they do agree on this point, they seem to do so from differing perspectives. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* focuses upon the mind of original purity, describes the three natures as the mark of *tathatā*, and sees *paratantra* as the basis for empirical defilement and confusion. The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* focuses upon the mind of karmic defilement, describes the three natures as the marks of phenomenal, defiled consciousness, and sees *paratantra* as the basis of that defilement.

In these two early texts one can detect a Yogācāra dilemma. If the mind is originally pure, then how is one to account for empirical defilement? If the mind is not itself pure, then, being defiled, how can one ever attain purification?¹⁶

It would appear from the extant fragments that the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*¹⁷ attempted to deal with this dilemma. In what is perhaps one of the most famous passages of Yogācāra, it writes:

The beginningless realm is the common support of all *dhar-*

mas. Because of this, there exist all the destinies and the access to *nirvāṇa*.¹⁸

This passage appears to be an attempt to account for both defiled empirical existence (*gatiḥ sarvā*) and for the possibility of *nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇādhiḡamo'pi ca*). Later Yogācārinś offer different interpretations of this text. Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra*,¹⁹ Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasamgrahōpanibandha*,²⁰ and Dharmapāla's *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhiśāstra*²¹ all interpret *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* to be *ālayavijñāna*. The *Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra* cites it and interprets the beginningless realm to be *tathāgatagarbha*. Paramārtha's translation of Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*, along with the other three Chinese translations of this text, gives the interpretation of *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* as *ālaya*, but then it alone appends the *tathāgatagarbha* interpretation.²²

These explanations all represent later forms of doctrinal development, and it would be anachronistic to follow such interpretations rigidly. Rather, it would seem appropriate to interpret the passage in the light of the problematic current at the time of the composition of the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* and the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. Thus, the *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* of the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* can perhaps best be understood as an attempt to amalgamate the focus upon original purity and the focus upon karmically defiled consciousness into a broader synthesis that might enable one to explain both adequately.

But what precisely are we to understand by this beginningless realm? It would seem that it indicates consciousness as both pure and defiled. In another passage, the *Mahāyānābhīdharma* says:

There are three *dharmas*: that which consists in the defiled aspect (*saṃkleśabhāga*), that which consists in the pure aspect (*vyavadānabhāga*), and that which consists in both at the same time (*tadubhayabhāga*).²³

The text of the *Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra*, which quotes this passage, goes on to identify these with, respectively, *parikalpita*, *pariniṣpanna*, and *paratantra*.²⁴ Thus, *paratantra* is not only the underlying cause for saṃsāric defilement, but also includes a pure aspect.

Although paratantric consciousness does result in the defile-

ment of *parikalpita*, insight into its nature as dependent on others implies awareness that there are no essences (*svabhāva*) to be grasped nor any essence that can grasp (*grāhyagrāhaka*). One and the same consciousness, which, being dependent on others, has no essence that could be pure or impure, gives rise to both the defilements of all the destinies and to the access to *nirvāṇa*. Thus *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* is neither a pure mind of *tathāgatagarbha* nor a basically defiled *ālayavijñāna*. Rather, it is dependently co-arisen phenomenal consciousness as including both.

The *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra* also appears to predate Asaṅga, at least in its verse sections.²⁵ It explains the *trisvabhāva* as follows:

As for the three natures, one is eternally non-existent. [The second] does exist, but is not reality. [The third], since it is reality, both exists and does not exist. This is the explanation of the three natures.²⁶

The second nature, *paratantra*, is here accorded some degree of validity and plays a pivotal role in the development of *trisvabhāva* thinking, for, although it is denied reality, it does exist and is not simply to be rejected, as in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* further describes *paratantra* as unreal imagining (*abhūtaparikalpa*):

Unreal imagining exists, but in it duality [of subject-object] does not exist. However, in this [unreal imagining] emptiness exists, and moreover in that [emptiness] this [unreal imagining] exists.²⁷

Thus, *paratantra* is the source of the duality and illusion of *parikalpita*. It is not to be entirely negated, though, for it does indeed exist, and within paratantric consciousness one can discover emptiness, i.e., the absence of duality. Here again the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is attempting to synthesize the two emphases, on the originally pure mind and on empirical consciousness.

If defilement did not exist, then all bodily beings would then be [already] delivered. If purification did not exist, then right practice would be without result. Neither defilement nor undefilement exists. Neither purity nor impurity exists, because mind is [originally] luminous, and its defilement is adventitious.²⁸

It would thus appear that the *Madhyāntavibhāga* does admit the notion of the original luminosity and purity of the mind, but only after reworking it in the context of the *trivabhāva*. The original luminosity of the mind does not mean that it has an impure or a pure nature, for both are *svabhāvas* that result from dualistic imagining and therefore do not exist. But, since the unreal imagining of *paratantra* does exist in emptiness, once the dichotomy of *parikalpita* has been understood and rejected, then the original luminosity and purity of the mind becomes manifest.

Thus, in parallel to the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāgasāstra* appears to be attempting a synthesis of the doctrine of original purity within a more empirically oriented emphasis upon defiled consciousness.

The overarching hypothesis that the preceding passages seem to suggest is that early Yogācāra thinkers are indeed concerned with the question of the purity or impurity of consciousness, and this in turn would imply that they developed their thinking in the same doctrinal circles that gave rise to the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition.

Yogācāra is frequently and correctly described as having developed as a resurrection of theoretical thinking in the context of *prajñāpāramitā*, i.e., *śūnyatā*.

In its methodology, the Vijñānavāda was really a successor to the Abhidharma Buddhism, but it was the Abhidharma based upon the śūnyatāvāda of the Prajñā-pāra-mitā, and hence deserves to be called "mahāyāna-abhi-dharma," as shown in the title of one scripture.²⁹

Although such is clearly the case, one should also be aware of the possibility of a very close relationship between Yogācāra and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine. The earliest *tathāgatagarbha sūtras* began to appear shortly after the time of Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 - ca. 250), and thus were contemporaneous with or shortly before the above Yogācāra texts. The *tathāgatagarbha* tradition offered an alternative to what was perceived as the overly negative tone of the Mādhyamika and the *prajñāpāramitā* literature.³⁰ It would thus be natural to assume some kind of connection between *tathāgatagarbha* and Yogācāra.³¹

The fact that the five works traditionally attributed to Mai-

treya,³² the putative founder of Yogācāra, include the *Ratnagoṭravibhāgaśāstra*, as well as the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, shows that this tradition regarded Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha* as coming from the same source. Furthermore, the presence in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* of the famous quotation on the *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* from the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* suggests that the author of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* regarded the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* as being at least consistent with *tathāgatagarbha* themes.³³ It does seem clear that in some instances the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* is dependent on the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*. William Grosnick convincingly argues that the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*'s understanding of *buddhadhātu* as the nonduality of subject and object can be traced to the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*,³⁴ and Takasaki Jikidō holds that the *triyāna* teaching of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* is directly dependent upon the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*.³⁵ Although this directly shows only the dependence of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* on the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, it also suggests that this Yogācāra work was well received within *tathāgatagarbha* circles and was perceived as being consistent with *tathāgatagarbha* themes.

This does not mean that *tathāgatagarbha* is to be reckoned as a defined academic school in contrast to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. As Takasaki has pointed out,³⁶ such an evaluation was a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism and is not found in either India or Tibet. This is further borne out by the complete lack of polemic against *tathāgatagarbha* teachings in Yogācāra works. Thus, while *tathāgatagarbha* and Yogācāra did exist at the same time in India, they were not rival systems.

The reason for this seems to be that the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition did not function on a theoretical, academic level at all, but was rather presented as a practical, religious teaching, expressed in poetic images and metaphors and aimed at the encouragement of practice. In none of the extant *tathāgatagarbha* texts is there a consistent development of that technical language necessary to a theoretical endeavor.³⁷

The foregoing textual data seem to suggest that the initial, pre-Asaṅga Yogācāra thinkers represent a theoretical development from within the same circles that produced the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching. They appear to have taken their initial insights from the notion of the pure mind, as in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*. The exigency for theoretical development demanded a more em-

pirical approach to the analysis of consciousness, as is given in the *Samdhinirmocana*. The *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* and the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* then attempt to synthesize both purity and defilement by stressing the basic Yogācāra tenet of the paratantric nature of the mind.³⁸

NOTES

1. *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*, *Exposé de la Doctrine du Grand Véhicule*, ed. and trans. Sylvain Lévi, 2 vols., (Paris, 1907). *Daijōshōgōnkyōron kenkyū*, Ui Hakuju, Tokyo, 1961.

I follow Yamaguchi Susumu, Guisepppe Tucci, and Paul Demiéville in denying that Maitreya was an historical person and the actual author of the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*. See P. Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa," *BEFEO*, XLIV (1954), p. 381, n. 4. Ui Hakuju, "Ōn the Author of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra," *Zietschrift fur Indologie und Irāntistik*, VI (1928), pp. 215-225, argues for the reverse opinion.

The Chinese translation of Prabhakaramitra, who came to China in 627, contains a preface by Li Pai-yao, which says that Asaṅga compiled the text, but there is no firm evidence to uphold this claim. As the *Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra* of Asaṅga frequently quotes the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, it seems safe to conclude that the verse section of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* was composed before the time of Asaṅga.

2. Lévi, p. 88: *yathaiva toyē lutite prasadite na jayate sā punaracchatānyataḥ/ malāpakarṣastu sa tatra kevalaḥ savacittaśuddhau vidhīreṣa eva hi/ mataṃ ca cittaṃ prakṛtīprabhāsvaraṃ sadā tadāgantukadoṣaduṣitam/ na dharmatācittamṛte'nyacetasaḥ prabhāsvarataṃ prakṛtau vidhīyate.*

3. On the original luminosity of the mind, see David S. Ruegg, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*, (Paris, 1969), pp. 409-445.

4. Lévi, p. 40: *sarveṣāmvīṣiṣṭāpi tathatā suddhimāgata/ tathāgatatvaṃ tasmacca tadgarbhāḥ sarvadehīnaḥ.*

5. Lévi, p. 40: *Sarvesām nirvīṣiṣṭā tathatā tadviśuddhisvubhāvasca tathāgataḥ/ ataḥ sarve satvāstathāgatagarbhā ityucyati.*

6. Lévi, p. 58: *na khalu jagati tasmādvidyate kiṃcidamyajjagudapi tadaśeṣaṃ tatra sammūdaduddhi/ kathamayamabhirūdo lokamohaprakāro yadasadabhinivīṣṭaḥ satsaman-tādvihāya.*

7. See John P. Keenan, *A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa: The Doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1980, pp. 97-117.

8. Lévi, p. 65: *etena trividham lakṣaṇaṃ tathatāyāḥ paridīptaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ kleśavyavadānalakṣaṇamavokālpalakṣaṇaṃ ca uktaṃ trividham lakṣaṇaṃ.*

9. Lévi p. 58: *tatvaṃ yatsatataṃ dvayena rahiṭaṃ bhrāntesca samniśrayaḥ sakyam naiva ca sarvathābhilāpitaṃ yaccāpraṇācātmaṃ/ jñeyaṃ hiyamatho viśodhyamamalaṃ yacca prakṛtyā mataṃ yasyākāśasurvarṇavārisadīśo kleśādvīśudhirmatā.*

10. See Lévi, p. 58.
11. *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, *Explication des Mystères*, ed. and trans. Étienne Lamotte, (Louvain, 1935). For an analysis of the composition of this text, see pp. 17-24. Also confer Ui Hakuju, *Tōyō tetsugakushi*, p. 37 for an alternate opinion.
12. Lamotte, p. 55 and p. 184. T. 16, p. 692b.
13. See Keenan, *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, pp. 131-142.
14. Lamotte, p. 60 and pp. 188-189. T. 16, p. 693a-b.
15. Lamotte, p. 73 and p. 197. T. 16, p. 695a.
16. In his *Sesshin yuishiki no kenkyū*, Tokyo, 1956, pp. 168-169, Yūki Reimon argues that one of the specific characteristics of Vasubandhu was that, in contrast to earlier Yogācārins, who maintained the strict purity of the Yogācāra position in their contacts with *tathāgatagarbha* thought, he was influenced by *tathāgatagarbha* thought in a much greater degree. I rather think that, as in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, *tathāgatagarbha* influence can be seen in the earliest texts of the Yogācāra tradition. This does not negate the fact that Vasubandhu was influenced by such teachings in evolving his "new understanding," but it does stress that there were already precedents available for Vasubandhu to work upon.
17. The *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* is extant only in fragments quoted in other texts. These have been collected in Yūki Reimon, *Yuishikiron yori mitaru yuishiki shisōshi*, (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 240-250. Six quotations appear in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra*, one in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and one in K'uei-chi's *Wei-shih erh-shih lun shu-chi*. The text is clearly before Asaṅga.
18. Quoted in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*; T. 31, p. 133b. Sasaki Gessho, *Kanyaku shihon taishō Shōdaijōron*, (Tokyo, 1931), p. 5. *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, ed. and trans. Etienne Lamotte, 2 vols., (Louvain, 1973), II, 12.
19. Lamotte, *La Somme*, II, 12.
20. P. Mdo hgral LV1, 238b-8.239a-6.
21. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Huian-Tsang*, trans. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, (Paris, 1929), p. 169. Here Poussin gives the Sanskrit, which has been preserved in Sthiramati's commentary on the *Trimsika: anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāstrayaḥ tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo'pi ca*.
22. T. 31, pp. 156c-157a. For an English translation, see Keenan, *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, pp. 256-257.
23. Lamotte, *La Somme*, II, 125.
24. Lamotte's translation correctly does not include this section, which identifies the three *dharma*s with the *trivabhāva*, in the quotation from the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*. Yūki Reimon, *Yuishiki shisōshi*, p. 249, argues that the entire passage is from the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*. But, as my friend and colleague, Professor Hakamaya Noriaki, has pointed out to me, the Tibetan text clearly refutes Yūki's interpretation.
25. For a discussion of the authorship of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, see Yamaguchi Susumu, *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Exposition systématique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda*, (Nagoya, 1934), pp. X-XVII.
26. *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya: A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise edited for the First Time for a Sanskrit Manuscript*, Nagao Gadjin, (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 37-38: *svabhāvas trividhaḥ asac ca nityaṃ sac cāpy atavataḥ/ sad-asat tatvatas ceti svabhāva-traya iṣyate*. Also confer, Yeh A-Yüeh, *Yuishiki shisō no kenkyū*, Tokyo, 1975, pp. 79-84.

27. Nagao, p. 17: *abhūtaparikalpo'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate/ sūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate*. Yeh A-Yüeh, pp. 1-4.

28. Nagao, pp. 26-27: *samkliṣṭa ced bhaven nāsau muktāḥ syuḥ sarva-dehinaḥ/ viśuddha ced bhavan nāsau vyāyāmo niṣphalo bhavet/ / na kliṣṭa nāpi vākliṣṭā suddhā'suddhāna caiva sāl' prabhāsvaratvāc cittaśya kleśasyāgāntukatvataḥ*. Yeh A-Yüeh, pp. 69-74.

29. Takasaki Jikidō, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, (Rome, 1966), p. 59.

30. See Takasaki, *Study*, pp. 305-306 for the section from the *Ratna* that treats this issue. Also confer, Keenan, *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, pp. 97-100.

31. Thus, I agree with the basic idea of E. Frauwallner, "Amalavijñānam und ālayavijñānam. Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnislehre des Buddhismus," in *Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde: Walter Schubring zum 70. Geburtstag dargestellt von der deutschen Indologie*, (Hamburg, 1951), pp. 148-160, in emphasizing the importance of the question of the purity of the mind, against P. Demiéville, but there seems to be no firm evidence specifically to identify *amala* with Sthiramati, nor *ālaya* with Dharmapāla, nor to locate the center of each with respectively Valabhī and Nalandā.

32. Bu ston, *History of Buddhism*, tr. E. Obermiller, I, 53-55.

33. Takasaki, *Study*, p. 230.

34. Willaim Grosnick, *The Zen Master Dogen's Understanding of the Buddha Nature in the Light of the Historical Development of the Buddha-Nature Concept in India, China, and Japan*, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1979, pp. 91-92.

35. Takasaki Jikidō, *Nyoraizā shisō no keisei*, (Tokyo, 1974), p. 338.

36. Takasaki, *Keisei*, p. 3.

37. See Keenan, *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, pp. 96-116.

38. For a discussion of Asaṅga's thinking on original purity and that of the classical Yogācāra tradition, see Hakamaya Noriaki, "The Realm of Enlightenment in *Vijñaptimātratā*: The Formulation of the Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas," in *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1980), pp. 21-42.