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CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Enlightenment in Dōgen's Zen, *by Francis H. Cook* 7
2. The Place of the Sudden Teaching within the Hua-Yen Tradition: An Investigation of the Process of Doctrinal Change, *by Peter N. Gregory* 31
3. Morality in the *Visuddhimagga*, *by Damien Keown* 61
4. Contemporary Lay Buddhist Movements in Japan, with Special Reference to the *Lotus Sūtra*, *by Tsugunari Kubo* 76
5. Before the Prajñā Schools: The Earliest Known Chinese Commentary on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, *by Whalen Lai* 91
6. The Generalization of an Old Yogic Attainment in Medieval Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature: Some Notes on *Jātismara*, *by Gregory Schopen* 109

II. BOOK REVIEWS

1. The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism, edited and introduced *by Leslie S. Kawamura* 148
2. Contributo allo Studio Biografico dei Primi Gterston, *by Ramon Pratz* 151
3. Gedatsukai: Its Theory and Practice (A Study of a Shinto-Buddhist Syncretic School in Contemporary Japan), *by Minoru Kiyota* 154
4. A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahāyāna Buddhism, *by W. Pachow* 157

5. Zen and Christian: The Journey between, *by John Dykstra Busden* 159

III. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

1. Presidential Address Given on the Occasion of the Fifth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Hertford College, Oxford, England, August 16–21, 1982, *by Walpola Rahula* 162

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

1. A Report on the 5th Conference of the IABS, Hertford College, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, August 16–21, 1982 167

Contributors 180

Morality in the *Visuddhimagga*

by Damien Keown

This paper is intended as an explanatory analysis and summary of Buddhaghosa's discussion of *sīla* in Part One of the *Visuddhimagga*. It was produced originally for my own use but I hope it may be of some benefit to those who, like myself, found Buddhaghosa's layout and discussion of the subject difficult to penetrate. I have commented only on those points which seemed to me to be of interest, and do not dwell on every section, since there is much that can be passed over without comment.

The *Visuddhimagga* contains the longest sustained analysis of *sīla* to be found within the Small Vehicle. It is divided into three parts, one each devoted to morality (*sīla*), meditation (*sa-mādhī*), and wisdom (*paññā*), respectively, and the work as a whole takes the form of a commentary on its opening verse, which is as follows:

When a wise man, established well in morality
Develops consciousness and wisdom,
Then as a *bhikkhu* ardent and sagacious
He succeeds in disentangling this tangle.¹

The first part of the *Visuddhimagga*, the *Sīlaniddeso*, represents in volume approximately only 7% of the whole work,² the remainder being divided almost equally between the *Samādhiniddeso* and the *Paññāniddeso*.

The *Sīlaniddeso* itself consists of 161 paragraphs³ and can be divided into two sections. The first of these extends from vv. 1–15 and is in the nature of a preamble, while the second, running from v.16 to the end, begins the examination of *sīla* proper. Verse 16 poses seven questions concerning *sīla* and the remaining verses consist of answers to these questions. This is

the standard method of analysis that Buddhaghosa also applies to Part Two of the *Visuddhimagga* on *samādhī*, about which he asks eight questions (3.1), and Part Three on *paññā*, about which he asks six questions (14.1).

	Question	Answer in verse	Summary
The 7 questions at v.16	(1) What is <i>sīla</i> ?	17–18	<i>cetanā</i> , <i>cetasikā</i> , <i>saṃvara</i> , <i>avītikkama</i>
	(2) In what sense?	19	Etymology
	(3) What are its (i) Characteristic (ii) Function (iii) Manifestation (iv) Proximate Cause	20–22	(i) Composing (ii) Action to stop misconduct (iii) Purity of body, speech, & mind (iv) <i>hiri</i> & <i>ottappa</i>
	(4) Benefits	23–24	(i) non-remorse (ii) as D.ii.86 (iii) as M.i.33
	(5) How many kinds?	25–142	19 divisions of 1,2,3,4, and 5 kinds. Total of 56 varieties.
	(6) What is the defiling of it?	143–160	tornness, etc. (<i>khaṇḍādibhāva</i>)
	(7) What is the cleansing of it?		untornness, etc. (<i>akhaṇḍādibhāva</i>) (see below p. 72 for an explanation of these 2 terms)

Verses 1–15 are a preamble and verse 161 is the concluding verse.

FIGURE 1

Plan of the discussion of *sīla* in Chapter 1 of the *Visuddhimagga* verses 16–161

Figure 1 sets out the structure of the discussion in verses 16–161. Of the seven questions asked, we will only discuss numbers 1, 3, and 5, which deal with definitions and the major classifications. The remaining questions relate to etymology (Q.2), the benefits of morality (Q.4), and the contrast between the sufferings of the immoral and the perfection of the virtuous monk (Q.6&7).

Turning, then, to Q.1, “What is morality?” (*kiṃ sīlan ti*), we find the answer given in the form of a fourfold classification, which also occurs at *Paṭisambhidāmagga* 1.44. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2. The first two divisions relate to the Ten Good Paths of Action (*dasakusalakammapatha*), which are:

1. Abstention from taking life (*pāṇātīpātā veramaṇī*);
2. Abstention from taking what has not been given (*adinnādānā veramaṇī*);
3. Abstention from sexual misconduct (*kamesu micchācārā veramaṇī*);
4. Abstention from lying (*musāvādā veramaṇī*);
5. Abstention from abusive speech (*pisuṇāya vācāya veramaṇī*);
6. Abstention from slanderous speech (*pharusāya vācāya veramaṇī*);
7. Abstention from idle talk (*samphappalāpā veramaṇī*);
8. Non-covetousness (*anabhijjhā*);
9. Non-malevolence (*avyāpāda*);
10. Right views (*sammā-diṭṭhi*).⁴




FIGURE 2
The divisions of *sīla* according to *Vsm* 1.17ff

The first division, *cetanā*, is defined as the volition present in the abstention from infringements against the first seven of these. The second division, *cetasikā*, is the abstinence itself, i.e., the condition of one who observes the final three, thereby remaining in the state of non-covetousness (*anabhijjhā*), non-animosity (*avyāpāda*), and having right views (*sammāditṭhi*). The significance of the split-up of the ten *kamma*pathas into groups of seven (*re:cetanā*) and three (*re:cetasikā*) lies in the division of the *kamma*pathas into groups of 3 of body, 4 of speech, and 3 of mind.⁵ The first seven *kamma*pathas relate to bodily and vocal actions, and an act of volition is necessary to inhibit their performance. The final three *kamma*pathas, however, relate to what might be called dispositions or propensities of character, within which the element of volition is inappropriate. Having right views, for example, is not simply a question of volition. By making this distinction, it seems Buddhaghosa wished to highlight the role of *cetanā* among the other 51 *cetasikadhammas*, to bring out the importance of volition in moral actions.

As well as abstention, it should be noted that Buddhaghosa includes the fulfilment of duty (*vattapaṭipattim*) as part of *sīla*, under the first aspect of *sīla*, as *cetanā*.⁶ The duties he has in mind are referred to later in the *Visuddhimagga* (6.60). These relate to the responsibilities of a monk for the smooth running of the monastery. We may quote the relevant passage:

Also, reception of visitors must be attended to on seeing a visiting bhikkhu, and all the remaining duties in the *Khandhakas* must be carried out, too, that is, the duties of the shrine terrace, the duties of the Bodhi-tree terrace, the duties of the *Uposatha* house, the duties of the refectory and the bath house, and those to the teacher, the preceptor, visitors, departing bhikkhus, and the rest.

We learn from the *Sammoha-vinodanī* (297) that besides these duties there are 82 minor duties (*khuddakavattāni*) and 14 major duties (*mahāvattāni*). It is not specified what these are, but we may assume they relate to activities of a domestic nature, similar to those mentioned above.

The third division of *sīla* is restraint (*saṃvara*), which has five aspects, as shown in figure 2. This consists of restraint, assisted by the four virtues of mindfulness (*sati*), knowledge (*ñāṇa*), patience (*khanti*), and energy (*virīya*), and also by the

important category of the *pātimokkha*. This last item incorporates the 227 rules of monastic discipline into Buddhaghosa's definition of morality, and, in fact, he places it at the top of the list.

The fourth and final division, the non-transgression of precepts of morality that have been undertaken, adds little to the other three, since all of the precepts, whether for a monk or for a layman, are undertaken voluntarily. There seems to be no special technical meaning implied by the compound, *samādin-nasīla*, used here.⁷ In the *Atthasālinī*, Buddhaghosa takes into account those cases where no particular precept has been taken but where, nevertheless, one refrains from performing a bad action because it is not fitting to one's birth, age, or experience, etc., (*jātivayabāhasaccādi*). This is known as restraint in spite of the opportunity being available (*sampattavirati*).

Leaving question 1, we may now consider question 3. This enquires as to the characteristic (*lakkhana*), the function (*rasa*), the manifestation (*paccupatthāna*), and the proximate cause (*padatthāna*) of *sīla*. These four questions represent the standard Abhidhammic strategy for arriving at a taxonomy of entities (*dhammas*). As a system of definition, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids,⁸ they are similar to the post-Aristotelian scheme of genus, species, property, and accident. Each of the four terms is defined briefly by Buddhaghosa in the *Atthasālinī* (63):

Lakkhaṇa means the specific characteristic (*sabhāva*) or the general characteristic (*sāmañña*) of various things (*dhamma*). *Rasa* means function (*icca*) or achievement (*sampatti*). Manifestation (*paccupatthāna*) means mode of manifestation (*upatthānākāra*) or effect (*phalam*). Proximate cause (*padatthāna*) means the preceding cause (*āsannakāraṇa*).

They are defined in slightly more detail by S.Z. Aung in his Introduction to the *Compendium of Philosophy* (p. 13):

Now, in Buddhist logic adequate analysis of any *datum* includes an examination of its (1) characteristic mark (*lakkhana*), (2a) function (*icca-rasa*), (2b) property (*sampattirasa*), (3a) reappearance as phenomena (*upatthānākāra-paccupatthāna*), (3b) reappearance as effect (*phala-paccupatthāna*), and (4) proximate cause (*padatthāna*).⁹

Buddhaghosa applies this fourfold method of analysis to all three parts of the *Visuddhimagga*, in each case as his third question.

The most important of the four defining factors is the characteristic (*lakkhana*). This is subdivided into the specific characteristic, or "own-being," (*sabhāva*) and the general characteristic (*sāmañña*), a feature which can be shared by many different entities. *Svabhāva* came to be used synonymously with *svalakṣaṇa*, and the two are given as equivalents by Vasubandhu.¹⁰ These two terms are then contrasted by the same author with characteristics shared by many different dharmas (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), for example, that all conditioned things (*samskṛtadharma*s) are impermanent (*anitya*), without self (*anātmaka*) and involve suffering (*duḥkha*).

In short, a *sabhāva* may be defined as the unique defining characteristic of a *dhamma*. Within this general definition, different schools formulated their own definitions more precisely as they delineated their philosophical positions. Thus, the concept of *svabhāva* was of central importance for the Sarvāstivāda, playing, as it did, a central role in its thesis of the existence of past and future entities. And, the same notion (*svabhāva*) became the focal point of the attack by the Madhyamaka on the realism of the Small Vehicle.¹¹

For the Theravāda, the recognition of the *sabhāva* of a *dhamma* meant that *dhamma* had been penetrated intellectually and accurately cognised. By being thoroughly comprehended, it was neutralised as a source of delusion or attachment. Dhammapāla tells us that:

When the specific and general characteristics of anything are experienced, then that thing is experienced according to reality.¹²

By recognition of the real constituents of a thing, false conceptions can be dispelled, just as the analysis of the individual into components (*khandhas*) dispells the illusion of a self (cf. *Visuddhimagga* 11.27–119).

Applying this fourfold method of analysis to *sīla*, then, Buddhaghosa comes up with the following definitions. The characteristic (*lakkhana*) is said to be "composing" (*sīlana*), which is explained as "the co-ordination of bodily action, etc., and the

foundation of good states.”¹³ This characteristic is the identifying feature of *sīla* in all its manifestations, regardless of what categories it may be analysed into, just as visibility (*sanidassanatam*) is the inseparable characteristic of the *rūpāyatana*.

The function of *sīla* is twofold: it is action that stops misconduct (*dussīlya*) and also the achievement (*sampatti*) of the quality of blamelessness (*anavajjaguna*). This distinction amounts to saying only that (1) morality (*sīla*) is opposed to immorality (*dussīlya*), and (2) that morality includes blamelessness as one of its features.

The proximate cause of *sīla* is also twofold, consisting of remorse (*ottappa*) and shame (*hiri*). *Hiri* is defined as that which shrinks away from something, and is said to be synonymous with another word meaning shame, *lajjā*. *Ottappa* is defined as “glowing,” and is a synonym for agitation at evil.¹⁴ The principal contrasts between the two terms are set out below, according to the *Atthasālinī* (trans. pp. 164–7).

<i>Hiri</i>	<i>Ottappa</i>
—Has a subjective origin	—Has an objective cause — fear of criticism
—Influenced by the self	—Influenced by the world
—Rooted in the intrinsic nature of shame	—Rooted in the intrinsic nature of fear
—Has the characteristic of respectful obedience	—Has the characteristic of viewing a fault with timidity and fear

Example

Seeing a worthy person when obeying the calls of nature (<i>uc-cāra-passāvādīni karonto</i>)	Being observed (in a wrongful act) by the clairvoyant powers of monks and brahmins.
--	---

To be avoided out of

Consideration of high birth, the dignity of one's teacher (<i>satthar</i>), the greatness of one's inheritance, and the honour of one's fellow brethren (<i>sa-brahmacari</i>).	Self-accusation, accusation by others, punishment and evil destiny.
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Buddhaghosa also uses the image of two iron balls, one hot and burning, representing *ottappa*, and one covered in faeces (*gūthamakkhito*), representing *hiri*. Neither is to be grasped by the wise man (*paṇḍito*).

The opposites of these two terms are defined in the *Abhidharmakośa* (11.32a). *Ahrī* is disrespect (*ahrīr agurutā*). The *Bhāṣya* expands: "A lack of veneration (*apratīṣatā*), lack of fearful submission (*abhayaśavartitā*) with regard to the qualities of oneself and others." According to 32ab, *anapatrāpya* or *atrapā* is the dharma that causes a man not to see the dangerous consequences of sin (*avadye bhayadarśitvam atrapā*). According to another opinion, which is similar to that of Buddhaghosa, *ahrīkyā* is said to be absence of shame with regard to oneself in the commission of an evil action, and *anapatrāpya* is the absence of shame with regard to others.¹⁵

The emphasis placed upon *hiri* and *ottappa* as the consequences of failure in morality and therefore as incentives to moral conduct is a measure of the pressure exerted on a monk to conform to the ideal. That this pressure is mainly social and not spiritual can be seen from the above table, under the examples and the final section, which lists the reasons for avoidance. There has always existed a well-established ideal of how a monk should behave and conduct himself, as described, for instance, by Buddhaghosa in verse 48:

Furthermore, a bhikkhu is respectful; deferential; possessed of conscience and shame; wears his inner robe properly; wears his upper robe properly; his manner inspires confidence whether in moving forwards or backwards, looking ahead or aside, bending or stretching; his eyes are downcast; he has (a good) deportment; he guards the doors of his sense faculties; knows the right measure in eating; is devoted to wakefulness; possesses mindfulness and full awareness; wants little; is contented; is strenuous; is a careful observer of good behaviour; and treats the teachers with great respect.

In addition, almost one-third of the 227 *Pātimokkha* rules (the 75 *sekhiyā dhammā*) are devoted to matters of dress, deportment and general etiquette. In the context of such formalised patterns of behaviour, there always exists the fear of making a

faux pas or failing in some way to live up to the ideal, with the consequent embarrassment this entails. This fear manifests itself in various ways: on an unconscious level, loss of face may be symbolised in dreams of appearing undressed or improperly dressed, or being discovered in some other kind of embarrassing situation. We have seen that Buddhaghosa mentions catching sight of a worthy person when obeying the calls of nature. In his study of Sinhalese Buddhist monks, Michael Carrithers records a dream by one monk in which he found himself bathing in the presence of young women and was overcome with shame (*lajjāva*).¹⁶

We may also note here the connection between moral impurity and physical impurity, a connection now well established in anthropological literature.¹⁷ Biological metaphors for intellectually based schemata, such as purity versus impurity, are very common, and the association between excrement and sin was made several times by one of Carrithers' informants (a monk).¹⁸ We have already noted Buddhaghosa's image of an iron ball smeared with faeces representing *hiri*.

We turn now to the final question that concerns us here, namely question 5, which asks "How many kinds of *sīla* are there?" (*katavidhañ c'etaṃ sīlan ti*). The answer is given in 19 paragraphs, consisting of groups of from one to six units following the customary *Abhidhamma* method, giving a total of 56 varieties. We will deal with the points of interest in these in order.

The first dyad, "keeping and avoiding," ties in with the twofold division of function (*rasa*) mentioned above (1.21). "Keeping" (*cāritta*) is accomplished by faith and energy, while "avoiding" (*vārita*) is accomplished by faith and mindfulness (*sati*). The second dyad brings in the rules of the *Pātimokkha* and Vinaya, and the third harks back to the definition of *sīla* as volition (*cetanā*).

The fourth dyad deals with morality that is practised through craving (*taṇhā*) for rebirth as a god, or that is practised in the mistaken belief that *sīla* produces purification (*sīlena suddhīti*). The fifth dyad refers to temporary and lifelong morality (*kālapariccheda / yāvajīva*), perhaps referring to the last item in the fourfold division of Figure 1 (*avūṭikkamo*).

The sixth dyad introduces the distinction between morality

that is limited by gain and that which is not; that is to say, in the former category a person will transgress a training precept if he stands to gain materially from so doing, whereas in the latter category even the thought of transgressing does not arise.

The seventh dyad introduces an important distinction, which is, unfortunately, not pursued very far by Buddhaghosa. He introduces two classifications, namely mundane (*lokiya*) and supramundane (*lokuttara*). The former is subject to defects (*sā-sava*), whereas the latter is not (*anāsava*), and while the former brings about an improvement in future lives (*bhavavisesāvaḥa*), the latter brings about escape from becoming (*bhavanissaraṇa*). The *lokuttarasīla* belongs to the plain (*bhūmi*) of "reviewing knowledge" (*paccavekkhaṇāṇāṇa*). We learn from *Visuddhimagga* 22.21 that there are 19 kinds of *paccavekkhaṇāṇāṇa*, made up of five types possessed by each of the three candidates for enlightenment (*sotāpanna*, *sakadāgāmin* and *anāgāmin*) and four possessed by the Arhat. The five things reviewed are the Path, the blessings obtained by it, the defilements abandoned, those still to be abandoned, and nibbāna. The Arhat lacks the category of defilements yet to be abandoned, which gives a total of 19. The process of reviewing takes place after passing from one *jhāna* to another.¹⁹

The contrast here is between the four stages of the supramundane path (*lokuttara-magga*) of the *sotāpanna*, etc., and the other three spheres of the *kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *arūpāvacaras*. The four higher types of person (the *sotāpanna*, etc.) have turned their backs on the three lower worlds of sense, form, and the formless, and direct themselves steadfastly toward nibbāna. They are engaged upon a higher ideal (*lokuttaram cittaṃ*) and, consequently, their morality is of the higher kind (*lokuttaram sīlam*).²⁰

Passing on to the triads, the first (VSM 1.33) divides *sīla* into inferior (*hīna*), medium (*majjhima*) and superior (*paṇīla*), by reference to four factors: (i) the enthusiasm with which it is undertaken, (ii) the motive for its practice, whether fame, merit or nibbāna, (iii) whether defiled by self-praise, and (iv) motive once again, this time for continued existence (*bhagabhagatatthāya*), for one's own deliverance (*vimokkhatthāya*), or for the deliverance of all beings (*sabbasattavimokkhatthāya*).

The second tetrad (VSM 1.140) divides *sīla* into the four

groups of precepts, for bhikkhus, *bhikkhunīs*, novices (*sāmaṇera*), and the laity.

The third introduces an interesting fourfold division, which unfortunately is not discussed at length. The first classification is “natural morality” (*pakatisīla*), which is the non-transgression (*avītikkamo*) on the part of the people of Uttarakuru.

Uttarakuru is the mythical Northern continent, which, with the other three great continents (*mahā-dīpa*), viz., Jambudīpa, Aparā-Goyāna, and Pubba-Videha, and the 4 x 500 smaller *dīpas* surrounding the great ones, constitute a *cakka-vāla*, or world system. Uttarakuru is described at length at D.iii.199 as a land of peace and plenty whose rulers honour the Buddha. Thus, *pakatisīla* must refer to the ideal condition when there is no immorality among the whole of the population, and, consequently, no need for moral precepts and instruction.

How the inhabitants of Uttarakuru achieve their moral character is not clear, and we are given no clue as to whether it is innate or learned. We learn from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* IV.3 that there is no undertaking (*saṃādāna*) of moral rules there, and hence no Prātimokṣa discipline, but neither is there the intention to commit offences. The Kurus, along with hermaphrodites and eunuchs, form an anomalous group who are insusceptible to indiscipline. Greed, hatred, and illusion exist in Uttarakuru, but are infrequently encountered, since there is no private property, the people are gentle (*snighda*) because there is no reason for displeasure (*āghāta*), and there is nothing to give rise to demerit (*apāpāsayaṭvāt*) (IV.82d). Nor is there any occurrence of the ten *akuśalakarmapathas* (IV.83a). Despite this, according to *Aṅg.* iv.396, the Kurus are inferior to the men of Jambudīpa in courage, mindfulness, and in the religious life. On the other hand, however, they excel even the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods in four things: they have no greed (*amamā*); no private property (*apariggahā*); they have a fixed term of life (*niyatāyukā*) of one thousand years, after which they are reborn in heaven; and they possess great elegance (*viśeṣabhuno*).

The second classification is “customary morality” (*ācārasiḷa*), i.e., the particular rules of conduct of a locality (*desa*), a clan (*kula*), or a sect (*pāsaṇḍa*). Thirdly there is “necessary morality” (*dhammatāsīla*), e.g., when the *Bodhisutta*’s mother feels no sexual desire during pregnancy (D.ii.13). Finally, there is “mo-

rality due to previous causes" (*pubbaHetukasīla*), which is morality acquired by pure beings, such as Mahākassapa and the *Bodhisatta* in previous births.

The fourth tetrad (1.42) deals with *sīla* as restraint (*saṃvara*) to be practised by the monk in accordance with the *Pātimokkha*. It is the lengthiest section devoted to any single topic, and accounts for 89 of the 161 paragraphs of the *sīlaniddesa*. The four main divisions of *sīla* under this section are (i) *Pātimokkha-saṃvara*, (ii) restraint of the senses (*indriya-saṃvara*), (iii) livelihood purification (*ājīva-pārisuddhi*), and (iv) concerning requisites (*paccaya-sannissita*). There follows a lengthy explanation (*vinicchaya-kathā*) of these four items, which lists in detail various kinds of conduct to be avoided by the monk, including all those censured in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (Vsm 1.83).

The two remaining questions, 6 and 7 from VSM 1.16, relate to the defiling and purification of *sīla*. The image of a cloth is introduced at 1.143 by way of illustration. The defiling of *sīla* is said to be like a tear in a piece of cloth. This relates to the breaking of any of the training precepts (*sikkhāpada*), meriting the imposition of any of the seven penalties, from expulsion for life (in the case of *pārājikā* offences) downwards. Repeated offences are compared to blotches or stains on the cloth. The motives for committing the offences are gain and fame, etc., (*lābha-yasādi*); or else they are committed under the influence of the seven bonds of sexuality (*sattavidhamethunasamyoga*). The untornness (*akhaṇḍādibhāva*) of *sīla* is accomplished by the complete non-breaking of the training precepts, by making amends for those that have been broken, by the absence of the seven bonds of sexuality, and by the non-arising of vices such as anger (*krodha*), enmity (*upanāha*), and contempt (*makka*), etc. (1.151).

The image of stained or torn cloth provides a contrast with Buddhaghosa's description of the robes of the ideal monk, which are carefully arranged and, one might imagine, clean (above p. 11).

Summary


Let us attempt to draw some brief conclusions from Budd-

haghosa's discussion. His original definition (VSM 1.17f), as illustrated in Figure 2, relates in large part to the non-performance of certain actions. These actions are classified either as paths of action (*kammaṭṭhā*) or the code of rules of the community of monks (*pātimokkha*). As well as actions that must not be performed, there are duties to be fulfilled (1.17). What all this boils down to is a list of rules to be followed from motives of remorse (*ottappa*) and shame (*hiri*). The various classifications Buddhaghosa introduces relate not so much to *sīla* as to the variety of practitioners and motives, which constitutes the major part of the answer to question 5, "How many kinds of morality are there?" At the core of Buddhaghosa's conception of *sīla*, therefore, there exists the idea of specific actions; these may be (i) avoided if evil (the first seven *kammaṭṭhā*s), (ii) performed if good (the duties), or (iii) become the object of a disposition towards avoidance or performance (the final three *kammaṭṭhā*s). This conception of *sīla* is in line with that found in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, as particular actions that are (there) to be avoided.

We have been able to move at some speed through the *Sīlaniddeso*, since, despite the detail provided by Buddhaghosa, the harvest in terms of a deeper understanding of *sīla* is disappointingly sparse. He skimps on what are for us the most promising areas, and goes into great detail, e.g., from verse 42 onwards, about minute monkish matters of deportment and trivial infringements of the Vinaya, amplified by anecdotes and etymologies. Of other classifications we are given only the bare bones. However, from the dry and disconnected classifications Buddhaghosa gives us we can assert the following facts about *sīla*:

1. It is the volition (*cetanā*) not to perform certain actions, or the abstention from performing them.
2. It involves both restraint (*saṃvara*) and fulfilment.
3. It is motivated by *ottappa* and *hiri*.
4. It is of different kinds according to the motives of its practitioners and their state of development.

Reduced to its most basic form, it would appear as in the following diagram:



It is clear that Buddhaghosa is concerned almost exclusively with the morality of the monastic life. He makes no specific reference to the *pañcasīla*, which are the standard observances of a lay Buddhist, and the duties he includes as part of *sīla* relate only to monastic duties. Furthermore, he brings the 227 rules of the *Pātimokkha* underneath the umbrella of *sīla*, thereby effectively excluding the lay practitioner. It must be remembered, however, that the *Visuddhimagga* is primarily a meditation manual, and is therefore directed at the monastic and not the lay community. Accordingly, Buddhaghosa's analysis must be seen as relating not to the entire category of *sīla*, which would also include the lay ethics so frequently discussed in the *Nikāyas*, but only to the moral requirements of the monastic life.

1. *Sīle patitthāya naro sapaṇno, cittaṃ paññāṇ ca bhāvaṃ, ātāpi nipako bhikkhu, so imaṃ vijāṭaye jaṭaṇ* (S.i.13). I have relied on Nāṇamoli's translations throughout, sometimes, as here, with slight modifications.

2. I am confining myself here to Chapter 1 of the *Sīlaniddesa*, i.e., the chapter that deals specifically with *sīla*. Chapter 2 is devoted to a description of the ascetic practices (*dhutaṅga niddesa*).

3. In the edition of the Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 41, ed. H.C. Warren and revised by Dharmanda Kosambi, published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

4. There is another list of ten good deeds (*dasa-kusala-kamma*), which, although not of canonical origin, is widely known in Śrī Lāṅka (see R.F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice* [Oxford: OUP, 1971] p. 74, p. 251 n. 9). This list begins with the three *puñṇakiriyavatthūni* (*dānaṃ sīlaṃ ca bhāvanā*) and includes the whole of morality under the second item (*sīla*). The final item, right views, is common to both lists. The canonical list of *kammaṭṭhānas* can be found at various locations, e.g. D.iii.269, Vin.v.138, S.ii.168, etc.

5. See *Nettipakaraṇa* 43 for the division of the *kammaṭṭhānas* into two groups of seven and three.

6. . . . *vattapaṭipattin vā pūrentassa cetanā*. (1.17)
7. The only occurrence of the word *samādinna* listed by the PTS Dictionary is at A.ii.193, where the meaning of “undertaken” is identical.
8. Quoted by S.Z. Aung in the *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 213 n. 3.
9. Cf. Part IX.7,3 of the *Compendium*.
10. *Abhidharmakośa* VI.14.
11. For a full discussion of the term *svabhāva* and its relation to cognate terms, such as *bhāva*, *abhāva* and *niḥsvabhāva*, see P.M. Williams, *Language and Existence in Mādhyamika Buddhist Philosophy* (unpublished D.Phil. thesis: Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1978), Chapter 3.
12. *Paramattha-maññūsā* 276, quoted by Nāṇamoli in *The Path of Purification*, p. 309 n.62.
13. 1.20. “. . . yad etaṃ kāyakammādīnaṃ samādhānavasena kusalānañ ca dhammānaṃ paṭiṭṭhānavasena . . . ”
14. *Atthasālinī* 124: “*Hiriyatī ti hiri, lajjāy’ etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Tēhi eva ottappaṭi ti ottappam, pāpato ubbegass’ etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.*”
15. These two terms are included as two of the Seven Noble Treasures (*ariya-dhana*), the list being: faith (*saddhā*), morality (*sīla*), *hiri, ottappa*, learning (*suta*), self-denial (*cāga*), and wisdom (*paññā*). They are also said (*Atthasālinī* 124) to be the last two of seven strengths (*bala*), the first five being faith, energy (*virīya*), mindfulness (*sati*), meditation (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*paññā*).
16. M. Carrithers, *The Forest-Dwelling monks of Lanka; an historical and anthropological study* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis: Bodleian Library, Oxford 1977) pp. 239–243.
17. See Mary Douglas’ classic work, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).
18. P. 198. “. . . I grew filthy from the excrement of these transgressions.” P. 199. “. . . I committed innumerable *saṅghādisesa* faults as well as minor ones: like one stuck deep in a pit of excrement.” Carrithers writes: “. . . the preoccupation with *sīla* has great psychological consequences. The theme of cleanliness and dirt plays a great part in monks’ dreams, as it does in their daily lives: village temples, as well as hermitages, are conspicuous by their cleanliness and tidiness. (. . .) It is not surprising that cleanliness, and fastidious observance of the rules of discipline — metaphorical cleanliness — sometimes become ends in themselves.” (p. 67)
19. There are several references to *paccavekkhaṇāñāṇa* in the *Visuddhi-magga* (see Nāṇmoli’s index) and also in the *Compendium* (see Introduction p. 58 on *paccavekkhanā-vasitā*).
20. The states (*dhammā*) of the *sotāpanna*, etc., are described in the final section of the first part of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (trans. pp. 74–89), dealing with states that are good (*kusala*).