THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

Volume 6 1983 *Number 2*

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Cittaprakṛti and *Ayoniśomanaskāra* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*: A Precedent for the *Hsin-Nien* Distinction of *The Awakening of Faith*

by William Grosnick

The question of the authorship of the *Ta-ch'êng chi-hsin lun* (*The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*, tr. Paramārtha, hereafter referred to as the AFM), has long been a lively subject of discussion among scholars of Buddhism. Such eminent Buddhologists as Demiéville, Liebenthal, and Mochizuki (to name just a few), have debated the authenticity of the two Chinese translations of the text and discussed the possibility that the original text of the AFM might have been composed in China as part of a controversy between two branches of the *Ti-lun* sect.[1] In recent editions of the *Journal of the IABS* the question of the authorship of the AFM has been raised again. In a couple of intriguing essays, Professor Whalen Lai has presented some new arguments in support of the Chinese authorship of the text.[2]

I do not intend here to try to resolve all of the many questions involved in determining the author of the AFM (such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper), but I would like to address an argument that Professor Lai raised in the first of his articles—namely his contention that the AFM's exposition of the relationship of *hsin*[a] (mind) and *nien*[b] (thought, thought-moment) bears such an "unmistakable sinitic stamp" that it must have been authored in China.[3] I will try to show that the AFM's central conception of an "unmoved," pure mind (*hsin*) existing as the basis of the deluded movement of thoughts (*nien*) has an important Indian precedent in the *cittaprakṛti* and *ayoniśomanaskāra* notions of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*-

mahāyānottaratantraśāstra (hereafter referred to as the RGV), a text with which the AFM's author may well have been familiar. I do not intend this as a criticism of Professor Lai's research—the parallels he finds between Chinese thought regarding *hsin* and *nien* prior to the period of the Six Dynasties and the elucidation of these notions in the AFM deserve serious attention. I simply would like to show that similar parallels—if not direct textual influences–exist between the AFM and the Indian–composed RGV, so that there is no compelling reason to conclude that the AFM theory of mind (*hsin*) and thoughts (*nien*) demonstrates Chinese authorship.

I. The General Influence of the Tathāgatagarbha Literature on The Awakening of Faith

Before examining the connection between the theories of mind and consciousness found in the RGV and AFM, it is worth noting that the influence of the Indian tathāgatagarbha literature—of which the RGV is the primary treatise—can be found throughout the AFM. It is well known that the AFM incorporates the notion of the tathāgatagarbha into its discussion of "Mahāyāna" and the "birth and death of mind" (*hsin sheng-mieh*[c]).[4] What is not so well known is that the author of the AFM knew not only of the tathāgatagarbha notion itself, but that he also was extremely well-versed in may of the other ideas and doctrines expounded in the tathāgatagarbha literature. For example, the author of the AFM shows familiarity with the idea of the identity of *tathatā* and the one *dharmadhātu* spoken of in the *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa*, an early sūtra on the tathāgatagarbha often quoted in the RGV.[5] He also shows familiarity with that sūtra's central idea of the non-increase and non-decrease of the beings transmigrating through the triple world.[6] In several places he shows an awareness of the notion of the non-emptiness of the innumerable virtues of the Buddha, discussed in the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra* and other tathāgatagarbha texts.[7] Elsewhere, he refers to the tathāgatagarbha teaching of the four *guṇapāramitās* (eternality, bliss, true selfhood, and purity),[8] and, as do tathāgatagarbha texts, he characterizes the dharmakāya using the four set expressions *nitya* (*ch'ang*[d]), *dhruva* (*hêng*[e]), *śiva* (*ch'ing-liang*[f]), *śāśvata* (*pu-pien*[g]).[9]

Moreover, not only does the author of the AFM refer extensively to concepts found exclusively in the tathāgatagarbha literature; he also builds on these notions, explaining problems left unresolved in earlier tathāgatagarbha texts. A case in point is the seeming contradiction between the idea that *tathatā* is markless and free from discrimination and the idea that it is replete with innumerable discernible virtues. Authors of earlier texts identified the tathāgatagarbha as "*samalā tathatā*,"[10] or "thusness" hidden by defilements, and they emphasized that *tathatā* lay beyond the categories of conceptual thought. But, at the same time, these authors identified the tathāgatagarbha with the innumerable virtues and powers of the Buddha, apparently without wondering whether these virtues and powers might not be discernible only to a discriminating consciousness. The author of the AFM, on the other hand, shows an awareness of this apparent contradiction, and goes to great length to explain that the essential nature of mind (which is identical with *tathatā*), is really free from all distinctions, and it is only with reference to the discriminating, deluded mind, which is characterized by innumerable illusions and defilements, that it is possible to speak of the innumerable virtues associated with the tathāgatagarbha. It is not that *tathatā* is itself differentiated.[11]

All of this is highly sophisticated, if not abstruse, and shows that the author of the AFM did not merely pull a few terms or concepts at random out of Indian Buddhist texts and then use them to expound a home-grown philosophy. He was, in fact, so familiar with and involved in the tradition of tathāgatagarbha thought that he could address problems arising within the tradition itself. It would not be surprising, therefore, if one found that other ideas in the AFM, such as its theory of mind and thought, showed the influence of the Indian tathāgatagarbha literature.

The question of precisely which sūtras or commentarial works expounding the tathāgatagarbha were used by the author of the AFM is an open one, however. It is possible that the author might have been familiar with one or more of a dozen or so texts, including the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*, *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa*, *Anuttarāśrayasūtra*, *Fo-hsing lun*[h] (**Buddhagotraśāstra*), and the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, all of which seem to have borrowed ideas, images, and terminology from one another. But, it is worth noting that the RGV, besides being the

most central of all these texts, was also well known to some of the principal figures connected with the AFM. Jikidō Takasaki has shown that Paramārtha, to whom tradition accords the first translation of the AFM, was extremely well-versed in the RGV—his interpolation of extended passages from the RGV into his "translation" of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* demonstrates this rather convincingly.[12] And, for those who are inclined to assign the authorship of the AFM to a master of the *Ti-lun* school, it is worth noting that Ratnamati, co-founder of that school, was also the translator of the RGV into Chinese. With the references to the tathāgatagarbha teaching found in the AFM itself, this shows that it was quite possible for the RGV to have exerted a direct textual influence in the AFM.[13]

II. Parallels in the Exposition of Mind and Thought in the Ratnagotravibhāga and The Awakening of Faith

At first glance, the general theory of mind and consciousness of the AFM appears to be quite complex, since part of it revolves around such unique theories as the five types of consciousness.[14] But underlying this complexity is a basic structure that is relatively simple. The central focus of the text is on the actual minds of human beings, what it calls *chung-sheng hsin*,[i] or *sattvacitta*.[15] Because the human mind is capable both of being deluded and of attaining enlightenment, it can be analyzed from two perspectives, and the AFM does this under the two categories of "the mind as thusness" (*tathatā*) (*hsin chên-ju mên*[j]),[16] and "the mind as birth and death" (*hsin sheng-mieh mên*[k]).[17] In Indian Mahāyāna texts the pure side of mind—the capacity of the human mind for enlightenment— was a preoccupation of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature literature; texts like the *Ratnagotravibhāga* spoke of the "pure element of the mental nature" (*cittaprakṛtivaimalyadhātu*), which is found in all beings and which is responsible for their enlightenment. The deluded mind, on the other hand, was a major preoccupation of the Vijñānavādins, and texts like Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* analyzed those mental processes by which such illusions as the mistaken cognition of subject-object duality arise. In its analysis of the human mind as both pure and deluded, the AFM draws

heavily on both of these Indian traditions. Indeed, it is entirely possible that one of the intentions of the author of the text was to harmonize the apparently conflicting perspectives on mind found in the tathāgatagarbha and Vijñānavādin teachings.

To explain the paradoxical fact that the human mind can be both pure and defiled, enlightened and deluded, the AFM brings forward a rather simple and yet ingenious distinction. The text distinguishes between the unevolved state of mind, the state in which no thoughts have arisen, and the state of mind that is bound up in the continuous production of a stream of thoughts. "What is meant by enlightenment," the text reads, "is that the mind itself (*hsin t'i*)[1] is free from thoughts (*nien*)."[18] Ordinary people "are said not to be enlightened because they have a continuous stream of thoughts and have never been freed from them; therefore they are said to be in beginningless ignorance."[19] The "essential nature of the mind," according to the text, "is neither born nor destroyed, things only come to be differentiated because of deluded thoughts (*wang-nien*[m])."[20] If human beings could only free themselves from the incessant chain of thoughts that produces the illusion of "me" and "mine," they would be liberated. But since they are ignorant they do not distinguish the mind itself from its thoughts (they "mistake thoughts for mind," says the text).[21] As a result, they are bound up in the continuous stream of their illusions.

This is not all the AFM has to say about human consciousness, to be sure, but the distinction between mind (*hsin*) and thoughts (*nien*) is a fundamental one and forms the basis of its other discussion. One can perhaps see in the AFM image of a pure mind disturbed by thoughts the basic image of the tathāgatagarbha itself—an innate pure nature that is hidden by defilements. Much more of the AFM discussion is taken up in analyzing the nature of those defilements than one normally finds in texts of the tathāgatagarbha tradition, but this is precisely where the Vijñānavādin influence, with its minute analysis of the incessant stream of thoughts (*nien-nien hsiang-hsü*[n]) that constitutes saṃsāra, is most readily apparent. In any case, one can probably discover the basic tathāgatagarbha theme of a pure mental nature hidden by illusion in the AFM image of the innate pure mind that is hidden by its deluded thoughts.

Lai has argued that this central AFM distinction between

mind (*hsin*) and thoughts (*nien*) is evidence of Chinese ways of thinking. [22] It may be true that this pattern of thought can be found in Chinese Buddhist texts prior to the Six Dynasties period, but it also seems that the author of the AFM felt it was found in Indian Buddhist texts as well. Notice the similarity between the following two passages, one from the AFM and one from the *sarvatraga* section of the RGV:

> AFM: What is meant by enlightenment is that the essential nature of mind (*hsin-t'i*)[a] is free from thoughts. This aspect of being free from thoughts is like the element of space: there is no place it does not pervade.[23]

> RGV: Just as space pervades all without discrimination
> So the mind which is by nature free from defilement
> Pervades all without discrimination.[24]

It appears that the author of the AFM took this particular comparison directly from the RGV,[25] apparently feeling that "freedom from thoughts" was equivalent to being "without discrimination." It is clear that he felt the analogy of mind to space spoken of in the RGV was an expression of the freedom of mind from thoughts. He apparently felt that the Indian text gave direct expression of this; there is no evidence that he thought he was presenting an alternative or variant interpretation. One might add in passing that he also apparently took this particular analogy quite seriously, since he devoted an extended passage (one of the most profound and insightful of the text), to the elucidation of this comparison of mind and space.[26]

If one reads further in the *sarvatraga* passage of the RGV, one can perhaps see why the author of the AFM felt that the analogy of mind to space expressed the mind's fundamental freedom from thoughts. *Kārikās* 15 to 20 of the RGV read:

> The earth is supported by water
> Water is supported by air (wind)
> And air by space, and yet
> Space is not supported by any of the others.
> Similarly the skandhas, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*
> Are founded on karma and *kleśas*,

And *kleśas* and karma
Are founded on irrational thought (*ayoniśomanaskāra*),
And the activities of irrational thought
Are founded on pure mind.

But mind that is pure by nature
Is not founded on any of the others.
The skandhas, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus* are like the earth,
Karma and *kleśas* are like water,
Irrational thought is like the wind,
And the element (*dhātu*) of pure mind is like space.
On the basis of the mental nature
Irrational thought arises.
Thought gives rise to karma and *kleśas*
And because of karma and *kleśas*
There arise the skandhas, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*.[27]

The AFM does not borrow the particular cosmology of the elements found in this passage, but the relationship between mind and thought that is expounded here is basically that of the AFM. Pure mind, like space, is eternal and unchanging, and yet provides the locus or basis (*āśraya*) of irrational thought. Irrational thought, on the other hand, is changeable, like wind, and is the basis of human attachments and deluded activities (*kleśas* and karma). As in the AFM, the nature of mind is seen to be pure, while the activities of thought are seen to be the source of human problems.

The term which has been translated "irrational thought" (following Takasaki) is *ayoniśomanaskāra* (or *ayoniśomanasikāra*), alternately translated *pu-shan ssŭ-wei*[p] ("bad conception"), *pu-chêng ssŭ-wei*[q] ("incorrect conception"), *pu-chêng nien*[r] ("incorrect thought"), or *hsieh nien* ("perverted thought") in the Chinese, and occasionally referred to simply with the single character *nien* (as in the above line, "thought gives rise to karma and *kleśas*"). *Ayoniśo* is derived from *yoni*, the female sex organ, and seems to mean "without true origin" or "generated equivocally." *Manaskāra* comes from the noun *manas* (mind) and the verbal root *kṛ* (to "do" or "perform") and means something like "mental activity." So *ayoniśomanaskāra* is perhaps best translated "mental activity that has no genuine origin."[28]

Some of Ratnamati's Chinese translations of *ayoniśomanaskāra*, especially *hsieh-nien* and *pu-chêng nien*, suggest a similarity

to the idea of *wang-nien* ("deluded thought") spoken of in the AFM. Like *wang-nien* in the AFM, *ayoniśomanaskāra*, and not pure mind itself, it is seen to be the direct source of the human predicament. According to the above passage, *ayoniśomanaskāra* is the basis of actions (karma) and emotional defilements (*kleśas*) and the various elements of phenomenal existence (skandhas, etc.), but the pure mental nature, though always present, remains unaffected by all of these. Interpreted in simpler terms, the passage seems to say that it is out of mental activity that illusions such as that of "self" are generated, and these in turn are the source of those selfish emotional attachments and ego-centered actions that lead to suffering. If one could still this frenetic mental activity and return to one's original state, *kleśas* and karma would disappear as well. This seems to be consistent with the perspective of the AFM.

Moreover, in the above passage, just as in the AFM, thought (*ayoniśomanaskāra*) is characterized by movement, while pure mind (since it is like all-pervading space), is seen to be unmoving. The Chinese translation of the RGV speaks of the "activities" (*hsing*)[1] of irrational thought, and likens *manaskāra* to wind, which is in constant motion. This calls to mind the other famous metaphor of the AFM, possibly taken from *kārikā* 15 of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, which likens pure mind to the water of the ocean and ignorance to the wind that caused waves to arise.[29]

Ayoniśomanaskāra is also spoken of in an earlier prose passage of the RGV:

> Discrimination (*vikalpa*) means irrational thought (*ayoniśomanaskāra*), which is the cause of the origination of karma and *kleśas*. By knowing that these are quiescent, non-dual, and free from dualistic activity, one knows that suffering is ultimately without origination. This is called the truth of the extinction of suffering. It is not because of the destruction of anything that it is called the truth of the extinction of suffering. Therefore the sūtra[30] says: "O Mañjuśrī: Whenever there is no activity of *citta*, *manas*, or *vijñāna*, there is no discrimination, and because there is no discrimination no irrational thoughts arise. Because there is rational thought (*yoniśomanaskāra*)[31] one does not cause ignorance to arise. Because ignorance does not arise, the twelve *nidānas* do not arise. This is what is called non-origination.[32]

This passage gives expression to the important Mahāyāna notion of non-origination,[33] which here seems clearly to mean the nonarising of discrimination (*vikalpa*) and irrational thought (*ayoniśomanaskāra*) through the quieting of the activities of *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*. The human predicament, here expressed in terms of the twelve *nidānas*, is again seen to arise out of mental activity, and the Sanskrit verb, *pravartante*, meaning "rolling onwards" or "set in motion" clearly conveys a sense of the motion that is to be contrasted with the original quiescence of the mental nature. It is not entirely clear whether *vikalpa* and *ayoniśomanaskāra* are to be regarded as equivalent in the above passage (the AFM is also not clear about this),[34] but the point of the passage is clearly that when these two do not arise, then neither does ignorance or the rest of the twelvefold chain of existence, with its attendant suffering.

This emphasis on nonorigination is also found in the AFM. In speaking of the *tathatā* aspect of mind, for example, the text stresses that the essential nature of mind is "unoriginated and undestroyed."[35] In its discussion of the practice of *upāya* the text says that a person should "meditate on the fact that all things are by nature unoriginated, thereby divorcing himself from deluded views so that he does not dwell in samsāra."[36] And, it is clear that at least part of what the AFM means by nonorigination is the nonproduction of thoughts. This is evident from the following passage, which describes the perfect understanding of bodhisattvas who have completed the stages.

> They have realized the characteristics both of mind's inception and birth and of mind without inception. They are free from even the slightest thought and have realized the mind's nature . . . . Furthermore, though we speak of knowing the characteristics of inception, what we mean is being without thoughts.[37]

Since both the RGV and the AFM make the nonorigination of deluded thought the central characteristic of the pure mental nature, it is difficult to find any significant difference between the two texts' basic perspectives on mind and thoughts.

Lai has pointed out the difficulty translators and scholars of the AFM have had in reconstructing a possible original Sanskrit term for *nien*, the Chinese term for "thought."[38] *Smṛti*,

with its positive connotations, and *vikalpa*, which is generally translated *fen-pieh*,[w] a term already frequently occurring in the AFM, clearly are not suitable, and this is one reason why Lai suggests Chinese authorship of the text. But, the use of *ayoniśo-manaskāra* in the RGV (and its frequent translation as *pu-chêng nien* and *hsieh-nien*) seems to present another possible Sanskrit alternative. As with *wang-nien* in the AFM, *ayoniśomanaskāra* is more or less synonymous with *vikalpa*, though both texts still use both terms. *Ayoniśo* is sufficiently vague to be translated *wang*,[x] and, as we have seen, the Ratnamati Chinese translation occasionally leaves out this prefix altogether,[39] which suggests a possible precedent for the AFM use of *nien* without the prefix *wang*.[40] There also remains the possibility that *manaskāra* alone might have been used in the original "Sanskrit manuscript" of the AFM, but this is highly speculative, and the point is not so much that the AFM is an actual translation from the Sanskrit as that it faithfully reflects Indian Buddhist precedents. In either case, the way the RGV uses the term *ayoniśomanaskāra* in contrast to *cittaprakṛti* shows there was enough Indian precedent for the AFM use of *hsin* and *nien* that is is not necessary to assume Chinese authorship of the AFM.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat that I am not arguing that the AFM was necessarily composed in Sanskrit. In fact, there are some better reasons for concluding that the text was composed in Chinese than the supposed sinitic character of its theory of mind and thought. Among other things, one might cite certain linguistic characteristics of the text. For example, the explanation of *chên-ju*[y] (the Chinese translation of *tathatā*) in terms of its component characters *chên* ("true") and *ju* ("thus"),[41] is obviously something that could never have existed in Sanskrit. And, there is another passage which seems to explain the *tsang*[z] ("store") of *ju-lai-tsang*[ab] (the usual Chinese translation of *tathāgatagarbha*), rather than the *garbha* of *tathāgatagarbha*.[42] So there is textual evidence which argues that the AFM might have been composed in Chinese. But this does not mean that the ideas of the text depart from Indian Buddhist precedents.

Nor does it even mean that the AFM was composed by a native Chinese. The style of composition is typical of Buddhist translations and (with the possible exception of the problemati-

cal triad of *t'i*,[ac] *hsiang*,[ad] and *yung*[ac]),[43] typically Chinese conceptual categories like *li*[af] and *shih*[ag] or *pên*[ah] and *mo*[ai] simply do not occur. There are no allusions to any Confucian or Taoist classics and no highly literate rhetorical flourishes. This would leave open the possibility that the text was composed in Chinese by a foreign-born translator. This is pure speculation, of course, but given Paramārtha's great familiarity with the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and Vijñānavādin treatises, he clearly had the background to undertake the project of synthesizing the two traditions. He is said to have composed commentaries, though unfortunately these are now lost.[44] More important, it has been demonstrated that he was not particularly scrupulous in his attributions, interpolating passages from the RGV right into the middle of Vijñānavādin treatises and claiming that Vasubandhu was the author of the *Fo-hsing Lun*, even though the text is largely a rewriting of the RGV. Takasaki suggests he even forged the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra*.[45] At least it would not have been out of character for Paramārtha to have composed the AFM and attributed it to Aśvaghosa.

NOTES

1. For a selected bibliography of articles on the authorship of the AFM see Yoshito Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Aśvaghosa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 119–22.

2. Whalen W. Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the *Awakening of Faith:* Śikṣānanda's Redaction of the Word '*Nien*,'" *JIABS*, 3, No. 1 (1980), pp. 34–53 and "*Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i* (Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness," *JIABS*, 3, No. 2 (1980), pp. 42–59.

3. Cf. Lai, "Clue," p. 49.

4. T.32, p. 575c, 576b.

5. T.32, p. 576a (AFM). For quotations of the *Anūnatvāpūrnatvanirdeśa* (T.16, No. 669) in the RGV see Jikidō Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* (Rome: IsMEO, 1966), pp. 66–133.

6. T.32, p. 575c, 579a.

7. T.32, p. 576a, 579a (AFM). T.12, p. 221c (SMS). See also T.31, p. 840a (RGV).

8. T.32, p. 579a (AFM). See also T.12, p. 222a (SMS), T.31, p. 798b (*Fo-hsing Lun*), T.16, p. 471c (*Anuttarāśrayasūtra*), T.12, p. 617a, b (*Nirvāṇa-sūtra*).

9. T.32, p. 579a (AFM). See also T.12, p. 221c (SMS), T.31, p. 824a (RGV), and T.31, p. 801c, (*Fo-hsing Lun*).

10. Cf. T.31, p. 826c ff. (RGV), Takasaki, *Study*, p.187ff.

11. T.32, p. 579a, b.

12. Jikidō Takasaki, "*Shindai-yaku Shōdaijōron-Seshin-shaku ni okeru Nyoraizōsetsu*," in *Yūki-kyōju Shōju-kinen Bukkyōshi-shisōshi Ronshū* (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 241–64.

13. The AFM is not the only "translation" of Paramārtha that shows the influence of the RGV. Scholars of the *Fo-hsing Lun* have long noted that text's close similarity to the RGV, and it is possible that it was the *Fo-hsing Lun* (which, like the AFM, also shows Vijñānavādin influence), and not the RGV, that directly contributed to the composition of the AFM.

14. T.32, p. 576b.

15. T.32, p. 575c.

16. T.32, p. 576a.

17. T.32, p. 576b.

18. T.32, p. 576b.

19. T.32, p. 576b, c.

20. T.32, p. 576a.

21. T.32, p. 579c.

22. Cf. especially "Clue," pp. 34, 47, and 49.

23. T.32, p. 576b.

24. T.31, p. 832b.

25. This comparison is also found in the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* (T.16, pp. 469c–470a) and the *Fo-hsing Lun* (T.31, p. 806b), though both of these speak not of the *cittaprakṛtivaimalyadhātu* but of the *tathāgatadhātu* (*ju-lai-chieh*) pervading all.

26. T.32, pp. 579c-580a.

27. T.31, p. 832c.

28. The Waymans translate it "improper mental orientation." *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 98.

29. T.32, p. 576c.

30. The sūtra quoted is the *Jñānālokalaṅkāra*, T.12, pp. 247a, 251b.

31. The Chinese translation of *yoniśomanaskāra* is *chêng-nien*, which, interestingly enough, is also the usual translation of right mindfulness (*samyak-smṛti*).

32. T.31, p. 824a.

33. For a discussion of the important connection between nirvāna and non-origination see my short paper, "*Nirvāṇa* and Non-Origination in the Early *Tathāgatagarbha* Literature," *JIABS*, 4, No. 2 (1981).

34. The AFM uses both *fen-pieh* and *nien* in a negative sense, but never expressly equates or distinguishes the two.

35. T.32, p. 576a.

36. T.32, p. 580c.

37. T.32, p. 576a.

38. "Clue," pp. 35–36, 50.

39. Cf. T.31, pp. 824b, 832c.

40. Cf. Lai, "Clue," p. 36.

41. T.32, p. 576a.

42. T.32, p. 579b.

43. Walter Liebenthal has argued that the *t'i-hsiang-yung* ordering of the text reflects a grafting of the neo-Taoist categories of *t'i* and *yung* onto the

Indian *svabhāva* (*t'i*) and *lakṣaṇa* (*hsiang*) distinction ("New Light on the *Mahāyāna-śraddhotpādaśāstra*," *T'oung Pao*, 46 (1958), pp. 165–66. The problem may be more complex than that, however, and it should be noted that a couple of the basic categories of analysis used in the RGV and many Vijñānavādin texts, *karman* and *vṛtti*, could conceivably be assimilated into *yung*, or "function." This is a problem worthy of further investigation.

44. Cf. Paul Demiéville, "*Sur l'Authenticité du Ta Tcheng K'i Sin Louen*," *Choix d'Études Bouddhiques (1929–1970)*, (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 20–21.

45. Takasaki, "*Shindai-yaku*," p. 253.

Glossary of Chinese Terms

GLOSSARY

a 心
b 念
c 心生滅
d 常
e 恒
f 清涼
g 不變
h 佛性論
i 衆生心
j 心眞如門
k 心生滅門
l 心體
m 妄念
n 念念相續
o 心體
p 不善思惟
q 不正思惟
r 不正念
s 邪念
t 行
u 邪念
v 心性
w 分別
x 妄
y 眞如
z 藏
ab 如來藏
ac 體
ad 相
ae 用
af 理
ag 事
ah 本
ai 末