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III. NOTES AND NEWS

1. A Report on the International Seminar: *Aspects of Indian Thought*
I. Yuktisastikā's authorship

In general terms, tradition considers that the Yuktisastikā was written by Nāgārjuna (II\textsuperscript{nd} century A.D.), the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophical school of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā, p. 3, 1.15, ed. P.L. Vaidya (= p. 9, 1.4, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin), expressly attributes to Nāgārjuna a pāda that corresponds to a part of kārikā 19 of the Yuktisastikā, and in the same commentary, p. 3, 1.22, ed. P.L. Vaidya (= p. 10, 1.4, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin) he quotes again the same pāda, attributing it to the ācārya, by which word we must understand Nāgārjuna.

In the Subhāṣītasaṃgraha 28, kārikā 19 of the Yuktisastikā is quoted and expressly attributed to Nāgārjuna.

The Madhyamakāsastraṭutī of Candrakīrti, whose original Sanskrit text was discovered by G. Tucci and published by J. W. de Jong in Oriens Extremus IX, pp. 47–56, includes the Yuktisastikā among the eight works which it attributes to Nāgārjuna. The Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakāsastraṭutī was known before Tucci's discovery. It is included at the end of the Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā, but it is not found in any of the Sanskrit manuscripts of this commentary.

Bu-ston, History of Buddhism I. Part, pp. 50–51, considers the Yuktisastikā as one of the six principal treatises of Nāgārjuna.

The colophons of the Tibetan translation of the Yuktisastikā, in the Sde-dge and Peking editions, and the colophon of the Chinese translation of this work, attribute it to Nāgārjuna.

Modern authors generally attribute the Yuktisastikā to Nāgārjuna: cf. A. Barelou, Die Religionen Indiens III, p. 136; T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 88–89 (who follows Bu-ston's opinion); Phil. Schäffer, Yuktisastikā, pp. 2–3;
II. Editions and translations of the Yuktisāṭikā: kārikās and commentary

The Yuktisāṭikā has, as its name indicates, 60 kārikās. It was commented upon by Nāgārjuna himself and by Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna’s great commentator.

The kārikās’ text. The Sanskrit text has not been preserved. Some Sanskrit kārikās from it have come to us, quoted in Sanskrit works like Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, Prajñākaramati’s Pañjakā, and the Subhāṣitasamgraha.

We know this work thanks to its Tibetan and Chinese translations.

Tibetan translation of the kārikās. Tōhoku 3825 = Catalogue 5225. It was done by Mutitaśrī and Pa-tshab Ni-ma grags.

Chinese translation of the kārikās. Taishō 1575. Nanjio 1307. It was done by Dānapāla (?).

The commentaries’ text. Nāgārjuna’s commentary on the Yuktisāṭikākārikās has been preserved neither in its Sanskrit original text nor in any translation.1 Candrakīrti’s commentary has come to us only in its Tibetan translation: Tōhoku 3864 = Catalogue 5265. This translation was made by Jinamitra, Dānāśila; Silendrabodhi and Ye-ses sde.

Now we indicate some modern editions and translations:


publications, Yamaguchi includes the text of the Tibetan translation of the kārikās, the text of the Chinese translation, and the Japanese translation of the Tibetan version.

Uriûtsu Ryûshin, in Daijo Butten (Literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism) 14, Tôkyô, 1974, pp. 5–88. He presents the Japanese translation of the kārikās and commentary from the Tibetan version.

The same U. Ryûshin, in an article, “Nāgārjuna Kenkyû (1)” (“Studies on Nāgārjuna, 1”), published in Meijô Daigaku Jimbun Kiyô (Bulletin of Humanities of Meijo College), No. 14, 1973, pp. 23–40, translates into Japanese the invocation and kārikās 1–3 and gives also a reconstruction into Sanskrit of these four stanzas. His translation and reconstruction is from the Tibetan version.

Finally, U. Ryûshin, in his article “Nāgārjuna Kenkyû (2),” published in Kyoto Joshi Daigaku Jimbun Ronsô (Collection of Treatises on Humanities of the Women’s University of Kyôto), No. 23, 1974, pp. 134–160, presents a Japanese translation and a Sanskrit reconstruction of kārikās 4–12 from the Tibetan text.

III. Kārikās quoted in other Sanskrit texts.

Kārikās 19, 33, 34 and 39 of the Yuktisāṭikā have been preserved in other Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

Kārikā 19: Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā ad I, 1, p. 3, 1.16, ed. P.L. Vaidya = p. 9, 1.5, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin:

tat tat pṛāpya yad utpannam notpannam tatsvabhāvatah /

Subhāṣitasamgraha 28, p. 395, 11.19–20, ed. C. Bendall:

tat tat pṛāpya yad utpannam notpannam tat-svabhāvatah /
svabhāvena yad utpannam anutpannanāma tat katham //


mumety aham iti proktatāḥ yathā kāryavāsāḥ jinaiḥ /
tathā kāryavaśāt proktāḥ skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ //
Karika 34\(^2\): Jñānaśrīmitra, Sākārasaṁgrahasūtra 3.27, p. 545, ed. Anantalal Thakkur:

\[
\text{mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktam samavarudhyate /}
\text{tajjñāne vigamaṇi yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitaṁ //}
\]

Karika 39\(^3\): Prajñākaramati, Pañjikā ad IX, 85, p. 234, 11.20–21, ed. P. L. Vaidya = p. 500, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin:

\[
\text{hetutah saṁbhavo yasya sthitir na pratyayair vinā /}
\text{vigamaḥ pratyayābhāvāt so 'stity avagataḥ katham //}
\]

IV. Sanskrit reconstruction of some Yuktishaṭikā karikās

As we have said, Uriutsu Ryūshin reconstructed the Sanskrit text of the Invocation and of the first twelve stanzas. It has seemed interesting to us to reproduce in this article his Sanskrit reconstruction, considering the non-existence of the original Sanskrit text. We reproduce Uriutsu Ryūshin’s reconstruction exactly as it was published in his two last quoted articles.

Invocation

\[
yena hy utpādabhaṅgābhyaṁ idaṅkramena varjitah /
taṁ pratyityasamutpādaḥ prokto vande mahāmuninī //
\]

1

\[
yeṣāṁ buddhi atikṛṇāṁ bhavabhāvād na tiṣṭhate /
gambhirāṁ pratyayārthaṁ taṁ nirārambham vībhāvyate //
\]

2

\[
sarvadoṣodayasthānā tāvad nāstir nivāritaḥ /
yato yuktiśālitaṁ cāpi vārayeyam śīnuṣva me //
\]

3

\[
yadi satyaṁ bhaved bhāvaḥ yathā bālakalpitaḥ /
vimokṣaḥ tadābhāvena kasmād hetor hi nesyate //
\]
4
astitve na bhavād asmād nāstitve na vimucyate / bhāvābhāva-parijñānād mahātmā tu vimucyate //

5
manyānāstītyeva nirvāṇe loke cātattvadarśīnāḥ / na manyanā tu nirvāṇe loke 'pi tattvadarśīnāḥ //

6
idāṁ bhavaś ca nirvāṇaparībhaya naiva vidyate / bhava eva parijñāto nirvāṇam iti kathyate //

7
naśtasyotpannabhāvasya nirodham kalpitaṁ yathā / tathā māyākṛtāṁ sadbhih ṁpunar nirodham iṣyate //

8
vināśena nirodham na tu saṃskṛta-parijñayā / kasya pratyakṣam etat syād vināśajño 'tra kiṃ bhavet //

9
yadi skandho na nāśyeta kṣīnakleśo 'py anivṛtah / yadā hy atra nivṛttiḥ syāt tadā mukto bhavisyati //

10
avidyā-pratyayotpanne samyag-jñānād vilokite / utpādo vā nirodho vā na kaścid upalabhyate //

11
dṛṣṭadharme hi nirvāṇam kṛtamś ca kṛtyam eva tat / dharmajñānāt tataḥ paścād yady atrāsti viśeṣanāṁ //

12
atyantasūkṣmabhāve 'pi yenotpādo vikālpyate /
tena pratyayabhūtārtham avidvata na dṛṣyate //

Let us indicate also that kārikā 6 of the Pratītyasamutpādahrdayakārikā (in Tibetan Rten-cin-hbrel-bar-hgyur-baṅs sīṅ-poṅ tshig-lehur-byas-pa, in Chinese Yin yuān sin louen song) is identical with kārikā 12 of the Yuktiśāṣṭikākārikā, the only difference being that in the second pāda the Pratītyasamutpādahrdayakārikā speaks
of cessation (chad-pa in Tibetan) while the Yuktiśaṣṭikākārikā refers to birth (skye-ba in Tibetan).

V. V. Gokhale, in his article “Encore: The Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā of Nāgārjuna,” p. 67, gives the reconstruction of kārikā 6 of the Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā into Sanskrit (from Tibetan), which reads as follows:

bhāvasyā 'py atisākṣmasya yenocchedo vikalpitaḥ /
tenā 'viṣpaścita 'dṛṣṭā pratayotpattir arthataḥ //

V. Importance and contents of the Yuktiśaṣṭikākārikā

The Yuktiśaṣṭikā is a small treatise of 60 kārikās. In its beautiful stanzas of succinct, clear and logical expression, being and non-being, liberation, saṁsāra, nirvāṇa, etc., are examined in order to establish that sūnyatā, voidness, is their essence—a central theme of Mādhyamika thinkers, developed in so many of their treatises. Because of these literary qualities and the ample range of topics referred to in this small work, we are not wrong, we think, to consider it as one of the most important expositive treatises of Nāgārjuna.

VI. The present article

We offer in this article the Tibetan text of the Yuktiśaṣṭikākārikā and its English translation, with some simple notes. We thank Professor Robert A. F. Thurman for having read our article and having given us very valuable suggestions.

We have adopted the text of the Sde-dge edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon: Bstan-hgyur, Dbu-ma, Tsa. 20 b¹—22 b⁶ (Tōhoku 3825), comparing it with the text as given in the Peking edition: Bstan-hgyur Vol. 95, Mdo-lgrel (Dbu-ma) XVII, 11—2—2 (22 b²—25 a⁷) (Catalogue 5225), and with the text of the Yuktiśaṣṭikākārikās included in Candrakīrti’s commentary, in its Sde-dge edition: Bstan-hgyur, Dbu-ma, Ya. 1 b¹—30 b⁶ (Tōhoku 3864). In some places, which we indicate in the notes, we have left aside the reading of Sde-dge edition to adopt the reading of the Peking edition of the kārikās and/or the reading of the Sde-dge edition of the kārikās included in the commentary of Candrakīrti.
From kārikā 48, we have followed the verse distribution of the Peking edition and of Candrakīrti's commentary, because in the Sde-dge edition there is an extra verse, which appears at the beginning of kārikā 48 and renders difficult the following distribution of the kārikās.¹

The Tibetan title of the work is Rigs-pa drug-cu-pahi tshig-lehur-byas-pa-shes-by-a-ba, which corresponds to the Sanskrit Yuktisaṣṭikākārikānāma.

Tibetan text

Rigs-pa-drug-cu-pahi tshig-lehur-byas-pa

(Yuktisaṣṭikākārikā)

Invocation

gan gis⁵ skye dañ ḫhjig pa dag /
tshul ḫdi yis ni spaṅs gyur pa /
rten ciñ ḫhbyuṅ ba gṣuṅs pa yi /
thub dbaṅ de la phyag ḫtshal lo //

1
gan dag gi blo⁶ yod med las /
 rnam par ḫdas mi gnas pa /
de dag gis ni rkyen gyi don /
zab mo dmigs med rnam par rtogs //

2
re ḫzig ḫnes kun ḫhbyuṅ baḥi gnas /
 med ḫnid rnam par bzlog zin gys /
rigs pa⁷ gan gis yod ḫnid yaṅ⁸ /
 bzlog par ḫgyur ba mñaṅ par gys //

3
 ji ltar byis pas rnam brtags bzin /
 dṇos po gal te bden ḫgyur na /
de dṇos med pas rnam thar du /
gan gis mi ḫdod rgyu ci ḫzig //
4
yod pas rnam par mi grol te /
med pas srid pa ḥdi las mín /
dños dañ dños med yoṅs šes pas /
bdag ņid chen po rnam par grol //

5
de ņid ma mthoṅ ḥjig rten dañ /
mya ņan ḥdas par rłom sems te /
de ņid gzigs rnamš ḥjig rten dañ /
mya ņan ḥdas par rłom sems med //

6
srid pa dañ ni mya ņan ḥdas /
gñis po ḥdi ni yod ma ŭin /
srid pa yoṅs su šes pa ņid /
mya ņan ḥdas šes bya bar brjod //

7
dños po byuṅ ba źig pa la /
ji ltar ḥgog par brtags pa bžin /
de bžin dam pa rnamš kyis kyāṅ /
sgu ma byas pahi⁹ ḥgog pa bžed //

8
rnam par ḥjig pas ḥgog ḥgyur gyi /
ḥdus byas yoṅs su šes pas mín /
de ni su la mñoṅ sum ḥgyur /
źig šes pa der ji ltar ḥgyur //

9
gal te phuṅ po ma ḥgags na /
ṉon moṅs zad kyaṅ ḥdas mi ḥgyur /
gañ tshe ḥdir ni ḥgags gyur pa /
de yi tshe na grol bar ḥgyur //

10
ma rig rkyen gyis byuṅ ba la /
ẏañ dag ye šes kyis gzigs nas /
skye ba dañ ni ḥgags paṅaṅ ruṅ /
ḥgaṅ ḡañ dmigs par mi ḥgyur ro //
11
de niid mthoñ chos mya ñan las\textsuperscript{10} /
ḥdas śin bya ba byas pahlān yin /
gal te chos šes mjug thogs su /
ḥdī la bye brag yod na ni //

12
dños po śin tu phra ba la ḥaṅ /
ɡaṅ gis skye bar rnam brtags pa /
rnam par mi mkhas de yis\textsuperscript{11} ni /
ṛkyen las byuṅ baḥi don ma mthoṅ //

13
ñon moṅs zad pahi dge sloṅ gi /
gal te ḥkhor ba rnam ldog na /
ći phyir rdogs saṅs rgyas rnam s kyis /
de yi rtsom pa rnam mi bṣad //

14
rtsom pa yod na ņes par yaṅ /
lta bar ḥgyur ba yoṅs su ḥdzin /
ṛten ciṅ ḥbrel par ḥbyuṅ ba gaṅ /
de la sṅon das tha ma ci //

15
sṅon skyes pa ni ji ltar na /
phyi nas slar yaṅ bzlog par ḥgyur /
sṅon daṅ phyi maḥi mthah bral ba /
ḥgro ba sgyu ma bżin du snaṅ //

16
ɡaṅ tshe sgyu ma ḥbyuṅ že ḥam /
ɡaṅ tshe ḥjig par ḥgyur sṅam du /
sgyu ma šes pa der mi rmoṅs /
sgyu ma mi šes yoṅs su sred //

17
sriding rgyu sgyu ḥdra bar /
blo yis mthoṅ bar gyur na ni\textsuperscript{12} /
sṅon gyi mthah ḥam phyi maḥi mthah /
lta bas yoṅs su slad mi ḥgyur //
18
gaṅ dag gis ni ḫ dus byas la /
skye daṅ ḫjig pa rnam brtags pa /
de dag rten ḫ byuṅ ḫkhor lo yis /
ḥgro ba rnam par mi ṣes so

19
de daṅ de brten gaṅ ḫ byuṅ de /
raṅ gi dṅos por skyes ma yin /
raṅ gi dṅos por gaṅ ma skyes /
de ni skye ṣes ji ltar bya

20
rgyu zad ṉid las zi ba ni/
zad ces bya bar mṅon pa ste /
raṅ ḫzin gyis ni gaṅ ma zad /
de la zad ces ji ltar brjod

21
de ltar ci yaṅ skye ba med /
ci yaṅ ḫgag par mi ḫgyur ro /
skye ba daṅ ni ḫjig paḥi las /
gdos paḥi don du bstan paḥo

22
skye ba ṣes pas ḫjig pa ṣes /
ḥjig pa ṣes pas mi rtag ṣes /
mi rtag ṉid la ḫjug ṣes pas /
dam paḥi chos kyaṅ rtogs par ḫgyur

23
gaṅ dag rten ciṅ ḫbrel ḫ byuṅ ba /
skye daṅ ḫjig pa rnam spaṅs par /
ṭes par gyur pa de dag ni /
ltā gyur srid paḥi rgya mtsho brgal

24
so soḥi skye bo dṅos bdag can /
yod daṅ med par phyin ci log /
ṭes pas ḫon moṅs dbaṅ gyur rṇams /
raṅ gi sems kyis bslus par ḫgyur
25
dnos la mkhas pa rnam kyi s ni /
dnos po mi rtag bslu bahi chos /
gsog dañ stoñ pa bdag med pa /
rnam par dben žes bya bar mthon //

26
gnas med dmigs pa yod ma yin /
rtsa ba med ciñ gnaś pa med /
ma rig rgyu las śin tu byuń /
thog ma dbus mthañ rnam par spañs //

27
chu śiñ bžin du sñiñ po med /
dri zahi groñ khyer ḡdra ba ste /
rmoons pañi groñ khyer mi bzas pañi /
ḥgro ba sgyu ma bžin du snañ //

28
tshañs sogs ḡjig rten ḡdi la ni /
bden par rab tu gāñ sñañ ba /
de ni ḡphags la brdsun žes gsuñs /
ḥdi las gžan lta ci žig lus //

29
ṛjig rten ma rig ldoñs gyur pa /
sred pa rgyun gyi\textsuperscript{18} rjes ḡbrañ dañ /
 mkhas pa sred pa dañ bral ba /
dge ba rnam lta ga la mñañ //

30
de ṣid tshol la thog mar ni /
 thams cad yod ces brjod par bya /
don rnam rtogs śiñ chags med la /
 phyis ni rnam par dben paño\textsuperscript{19} //

31
rnam par dben don mi śes la /
thos pa tsam la ḡjug byed ciñ /
 gāñ dag bṣod nams mi byed pa /
skyes bu tha śal de dag brlag //
32
las rnams ḥbras bu bcas ņid dañ / ḥgro ba dag kyaṇ yaṇ dag bśad / de yi raṅ bźin yoṇs ŋes dañ / skye ba med pa dag kyaṇ bstan //

33
dgos paḥi dbaṅ gis rgyal ba rnams / ņa dañ ņa yi žes gsunṣ ltar / phuṅ po khams daṅ skye mched rnams / de bźin dgos paḥi dbaṅ gis gsunṣ //

34
ḥbyuṅ ba che la sogṣ bśad pa / rnam par ŋes su yaṇ dag ḥdu / de ŋes pas ni ḥbral ḥgyur na / log par rnam bṛtags ma ŋin nam //

35
mya ņan ḥdas pa bden gcig pur / rgyal ba rnams kyis gaṅ gsunṣ pa / de tshe lhag ma log min žes / mkhas pa su žig rtog par byed //

36
ji srid yid kyi rnam g-yo ba / de srid bdud kyi spyod yul de / de lta ŋin na ḥdi la ni / ņes pa med par cis mi ḥṭhad //

37
ḥjig rten ma rig rkyen can du / gaṅ phyir saṅs rgyas rnams gsunṣ pa / ḥdi yi phyir na ḥjig rten ḥdi / rnam rtog yin žes cis mi ḥṭhad //

38
ma rig ḥgags par gyur pa na / gaṅ žig ḥgag par ḥgyur ba de / mi ŋes pa las kun bṛtags par / ji lta bur na gsal mi ḥgyur //
rgyu yod pa las gañ byuñ žin\textsuperscript{20} /
rgyen med par ni gnas pa med /
rgyen med phyir yañ ḥjig ḥgyur ba /
de ni yod ces ji ltar rtogs //

gal te yod par smra ba rnams /
dðos la žen par\textsuperscript{21} gnas pa ni /
lam de ņid la gnas pa ste /
de la ņo mtshar cuñ zad med //

sañs rgyas lam la brten nas ni /
kun la mi rtag smra ba rnams /
rtosd pa yis ni dðos po la\textsuperscript{22} /
chags gnas\textsuperscript{23} gañ yin de smad do //

ḥdi ḥam deho žes gañ du /
rnam par dpyad nas mi dmigs na /
rtosd pa ḥdi ḥam de bden žes /
mkhas pa su žig smra bar ḥgyur //

gañ dag gis\textsuperscript{21} ni ma brten par /
bdag gam ḥjig rten ṃion žen pa /
de dag kye ma rtag mi rtag /
la sog̣s lta bas ḥphrogs pa yin //

gañ dag brten nas dðos po rnams /
de ņid du ni grub ḥdod pa /
de dag la yañ rtag\textsuperscript{25} stsogs skyon /
de dag ji ltar ḥbyuñ mi ḥgyur //

ngañ dag brten nas dðos po rnams /
chu yi zla ba lta bur ni /
yañ dag ma yin log min par /
ḥdod pa de dag ltas mi ḥphrogs //
46
d↳ños por khas len yod na ni /
ḥḍod chags že sdaṅ ḥbyuṅ ba yin²⁶ /
lṭa ba mi bzad ma ruṅs ḥbyuṅ /
de las byuṅ baḥi spyod par ḥgyur //

47
de ni lṭa ba kun gyi rgyu /
de med ŋon moṅs mi skye ste /
de phyir de ni yoṅs šes na /
lṭa daṅ ŋon moṅs yoṅs su ḥbyaṅ //

48²⁷
gaṅ gis de šes ḥgyur že na²⁸ /
brten nas ḥbyuṅ ba mthoṅ ba ste²⁹ /
brten nas skye ba ma skyes šes³⁰ /
de ŋid mkhyen pa mchog gis gsuṅs //

49
tog paḥi šes pas³¹ zil gnon pa /
bden pa min la bden ḥdsin paḥi³² /
yoṅs su ḥdsin daṅ rtsod sogs kyi /
rim pa chags las ḥbyuṅ bar ḥgyur //

50
che baḥi bdag ŋid can de dag /
ṛnams la phyogs med rtsod pa med /
gaṅ ṛnams la ni phyogs med pa /
de la ḡzan phyogs ga la yod //

51
gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ baḥi gnas rṇed nas /
ṅon moṅs sbrul gdug gyo can gyis /
zin par ḥgyur te gaṅ gi sems /
gnas med de dag zin mi ḥgyur //

52
gnas bcaḥ sems daṅ ldan ṛnams la /
ṅon moṅs dug chen cis mi ḥgyur /
gaṅ tshe tha mal ḥdug pa yaṅ³³ /
ṅon moṅs sbrul gyis zin par ḥgyur //
byis pa bden par ḫdu šes pas /
gzugs brñan la ni chags pa bzin /
dei tar ḫjig rten rmoṅs paḥi phyir /
yul gyi gzeb la thogs par ḫgyur //

bdag ūid che rnams dṅos po dag /
gzugs brñan lta bur ye šes kyi /
mig gis mthoṅ nas yul ūes ni /
bya bahi ḫdam la mi thogs so //

byis pa rnams ni gzugs la chags /
bar ma dag ni chags bral ḫgyur /
gzugs kyi raṅ bzin šes pa yi /
blo mchog ldan pa ūnam par grol //

sdug sṅam pa las chags par ḫgyur /
de las bziṅ pas ḫdod chags bral /
gyu maḥi skyes bu ltar dben par /
mthoṅ nas mya ūan ḫdaḥ bar ḫgyur //

log paḥi šes pas mṅon gdun baḥi /
ṅon moṅs skyon rnams gaṅ ūin de /
dṅos daṅ dṅos med rnам rtog pa/
don šes ḫgyur la mi ḫbyuṅ ūo //

gnas yod na ni ḫdod chags daṅ /
ḫdod chags bral bar ḫgyur žig na /
gnas med bdag ūid chen po rnams /
chags pa med ciṅ chags bral miṅ //

gaṅ dag rnам par dben sṅam du /
g-yo baḥi yid kyaṅ mi g-yo ba /
ṅon moṅs sbrul gis dkrugs gyur pa /
mi zad srid paḥi rgya mtsho brgal //
Invocation

Homage to the Lord of munis, who taught Dependent Origination and by whom, through this method, birth and destruction have been eliminated.

1

Those (men) whose minds, having gone beyond being and non-being, do not cling (to anything), (those men) understand the profound and imperceptible meaning of “condition.”

2

You, who have already completely eliminated non-being, the source of all evils, should listen to the reasoning through which being also will be eliminated.

3

If, as is thought by the ignorant, things are real, then what is the reason why they do not admit liberation by means of non-being?

4

Through being there is no liberation, through non-being there is no (liberation) from this existence; only through the full knowledge of existence and non-existence are great beings (mahātman) liberated.

5

Those men who do not see the truth are infatuated with the world and nirvāṇa; those who perceive the truth are not infatuated with the world and nirvāṇa.
Samsāra and nirvāṇa—both do not (really) exist. It has been taught that the perfect knowledge of samsāra is nirvāṇa.  

In the same way as the superior men consider the cessation of a thing that has been born (to be) when it is destroyed, in the same way they consider the cessation of something created by magic.  

(If) cessation of sāmskāras occurred through destruction and not through their perfect knowledge, where would that (cessation) reveal itself? How could the notion (of) “destruction” occur there?  

(The opponent asserts:)  
If the skandhas do not cease, nirvāṇa is not produced even with the destruction of the impurities. In the moment in which they (the skandhas) cease, in that moment liberation is produced.  

(But we answer:)  
When it is seen through correct knowledge that production is by cause of ignorance, (then) neither birth nor cessation are perceived at all.  

This is nirvāṇa in this world; one has done what has to be done.—If, after knowing the Doctrine, (a person believed) there were still here diversity.  

Such an extremely ignorant person, who imagines production even in the most subtle things, that person does not perceive the meaning of Dependent Origination.
13
If the samsāra of the monk, whose impurities have been de­
stroyed, comes to an end, why did the perfect Buddhas deny its begin­ning?^{255}

14
If there is a beginning (for samsāra), then definitely one would uphold the false view (of ahetuvāda).^{56} But how can there be a beginning and an end in something that is produced depend­ing on causes?

15
How could something, which was formerly produced, cease afterwards?^{257} The states of existence, devoid of the extremes of beginning and end, appear as a magical illusion.

16
When a magical illusion arises or when it is destroyed, those persons who know (what is) the magical illusion, are not de­ceived with regard to it; those persons who do not know (what is) the magical illusion, ardently desire it.^{58}

17
When one perceives with his mind that samsāra is similar to a mirage, to a magical illusion, one is not (any more) corrupted by the extreme views of beginning or end.^{59}

18
Those persons who imagine that there is birth and destruction in things that are composed, those persons do not know the world as (what it really is:) the wheel of Dependent Origina­tion.^{60}

19^{61}
What arises depending on this or that (cause)—that is not pro­duced as a thing with an own being. Whatever is not produced as a thing with an own being—how can it be called “produced”?
20
It is evident that, in relation to somebody who has come to an end through the cessation of the causes, it can be said “he ceased.” In relation to somebody who has not ceased in se et per se, how can it be said “he ceased”?

21
Thus, nothing is produced, nothing ceases. (The Masters) have spoken about the processes of production and destruction (only) by reason of necessity.

22
Knowing production, destruction is known; knowing destruction, impermanence is known; through the knowledge which penetrates into impermanence, the Supreme Truth is understood.

23
Those persons who know that Dependent Origination is deprived of production and destruction, those persons have crossed the ocean of existence, created by false views.

24
Common people, who believe that things possess substantiality, who are mistaken about being and non-being, dominated (as they are) by evil and impurities, are deceived by their own minds.

25
Those persons who know reality perceive that things are impermanent, that their characteristic is fraud, that they are vain and void, un-substantial, lacking of an own being.

26
(The world,) which is baseless, without objectivity, which has not a root, which has no duration, which has come forth from ignorance and is deprived of beginning, middle and end,

27
which has no core, like the plantain trunk, similar to the city of the Gandhārvas—the world, intolerable domain of error, appears as a magical illusion.
This world, including the Brahmā realm, etc., which appears as true, is declared to the Āryas (by the Buddha) to be false. Which other thing remains there different from it?

Worldly people blinded by ignorance, persisting in the stream of desire, and wise men, free from desire and virtuous, in what respect are they indeed similar?

For the person who seeks the truth it is necessary to say, at the beginning (of his search): "all things exist"; afterwards, when he knows the (nature of) things and is liberated from desire, (for him all things) are devoid of an own being.

Those persons who have not grasped the meaning of voidness, who have come up to a mere hearing (of the Doctrine), and do not accomplish meritorious deeds, those wicked persons are defeated.

The concomitancy of actions and their "fruits" and also the diverse states of existence have been correctly explained; the knowledge of their true nature and also the non-existence of their birth have been taught.

In the same way as the Victorious, by force of necessity, have said "I" (and) "mine," in the same way also, by force of necessity, they have spoken of skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas.

The so called Great Elements, etc., consist only of consciousness; since, by knowing this, they are dissolved, are they (all) not false mental creations?

If the Victorious Ones have said that nirvāṇa is the only true thing, then what wise men could think that the rest is not false?
As long as there is agitation of the mind, (mind) is the domain of Mara; if that is so, why not admit the flawlessness (of the mind) in this (our teaching of emptiness)?

Since Buddhas have said that the world has ignorance as its cause, then why not admit that this world is (only) a mental creation?

How could a thing, which ceases when ignorance ceases, not reveal itself as a mental creation (coming forth) from ignorance?

How it is possible to understand that a thing (really) exists, which having come forth owing to a cause, does not endure when its condition does not exist, and which disappears with the non-existence of the condition?

If realists, (because of) dwelling in that very path (of realism), persist in their attachment to objects, there is nothing surprising in it.

Those persons, who, adhering to the Buddha's path, affirm that all is impermanent and who nevertheless through their discussions persist in their attachment to objects, those persons really are blameworthy!

What wise man will say, discussing, that "this" or "that" is true, since, after investigation, he does not perceive anywhere either a "this" or a "that"?

Those persons who intensely are attached to (the idea of) an unconditioned self or world, those persons alas! are captivated by the false theories of permanence and impermanence.
For those persons, who affirm that dependent things are established really to exist, for those persons how can the evils of (the belief in) permanence, etc., not be produced?

Those persons who affirm that dependent things, like the reflection of the moon in water, are neither real nor unreal, are not captivated by wrong theories.

When there is acceptance of things (as really existing), attachment and hatred are produced, intolerable and pernicious theories are produced, and (evil) actions emerging from them take place.

That (acceptance) is the cause of all (false) theories; when it is absent, impurities are not produced; therefore, knowing them (i.e., things) perfectly (as they really are), one purifies both theories and impurities.

If it is asked how this is known, (we answer:) by seeing Dependent Origination, the Supreme Knower of reality said: "What is produced dependently, is not produced (in reality)."

(In the man) overcome by erroneous knowledge, the (following) series is produced from passion: perception of reality in what is not real, possessiveness (about that false reality), controversies, etc.

The great beings (mahâtman) hold no thesis; they do not debate. For those persons who hold no thesis, how can there be a contrary thesis?

When one assumes any support-point, one is captured by the cunning poisonous serpent of the impurities. Those persons whose mind lacks any support-point, are not captured.
How will not the great poison of impurities originate in those persons who have a mind with support-point, since, living like common people, they are (easily) captured by the serpent of impurities?

In the same way as the ignorant man, believing that a reflected image is (something) real, becomes passionately fond of it, in the same way people, because of error, get imprisoned in the net of the objects.

The great beings (mahātman), seeing with the eye of knowledge that things are as a reflected image, are not captured in the mud that are the objects.

Ignorant persons are attached to forms; mediocre persons become detached; those who possess a lofty mind, who know the true nature of forms, become liberated.

Through the idea that (something is) agreeable, (the ignorant) become attached (to it); separating themselves from that (idea), (the mediocre) are free from attachment; when (the lofty-minded) see (that everything), as the man created by magic, lacks an own being, they attain nirvāṇa.

Those faults, the impurities, which belong to persons afflicted by erroneous knowledge, do not arise when being and non-being are examined and the (true) meaning (of things) is known.

If a support-point existed, passion would exist and so would freedom from passion; but for the great beings (mahātman) who have no support-point there is neither passion nor freedom from passion.
Those persons whose minds, although unstable (by nature),
become stable as they consider that (everything) lacks an own
being, those persons will cross the ocean of the intolerable exis-
tence, agitated by the serpent of the impurities.

Through the virtue (of this treatise), may all beings, having
accumulated the stores of merit and knowledge, obtain the two excellences, which come forth from merit and knowledge.

Notes

1. P. L. Vaidya, *Études sur Áryadeva*, p. 49, affirms that Nāgārjuna's commentary has been preserved only in a Tibetan translation and gives as a reference the Tibetan Canon Mdo XVII, 7, Cordier III, p. 292. Cf. Lalou, *Répertoire*, p. 122, where the title of this work is found: *Rigs pa drug cu pañhi* (*rañ hiгрel*). It is a mistake by Vaidya, since Nāgārjuna's commentary to his own treatise has not been preserved either in Saksrit or in Tibetan. The work mentioned by Vaidya has not been found, and its title has been reconstructed with the help of the *Index*, where it is attributed to Nāgārjuna, without any indication of its translator, according to *Catalogue of Kanjur and Tanjur*, p. 350.

2. Cf. D. S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, p. 20 note 44. Ruegg changes *yati* into *yadi*.

3. The Sanskrit text of this *kārikā* quoted by Candrakīrī and Prajñākaramati corresponds exactly to the Tibetan translation of *kārikā* 4 of *Lokākāśastava*, not to the Tibetan translation of *kārikā* 39 of the *Yuktiśāstikā*, although it expresses a similar idea. Nevertheless, Vaidya and L. de la Vallée Poussin, in their editions of the *Pañjikā*, consider that it is a quotation of the *Yuktiśāstikā*.

4. See note 74.

5. *gañ gis*: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: *gañ gi*.


7. *rigs pa*: *Peking* and *Vṛtti*. *Sde-dge*: *rigs pañhi*.


11. *de yis*: *Peking* and *Vṛtti*. *Sde-dge*: *de yì*.


13. *ḥgro ba rnam par mi śes so*: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: *ḥkhor loḥi ḡgro ba rnam mi rtog*.


15. *mnon pa*: *Vṛtti*. *Sde-dge*: *rtog pa*.

17. lta gyur: Vṛttī. Sde-dge: ltar gyur.
22. rtsod pa yis ni dños po la: Vṛttī. Sde-dge: rtsod pas dños rnams mchog ḥbuṅ bas.
27. We suppress the line dños pör khas lén yod na ni, which appears in the Sde-dge edition of the kārikās and does not appear either in the Peking edition of the kārikās or in the Sde-dge edition of the Vṛttī of Candrakīrti, and which is identical to the first line of kārikā 46.
29. sie: Vṛttī. Sde-dge: de.
32. Ḥdsin paḥi: Peking and Vṛttī. Sde-dge: rdsun paḥi.
33. This line is not found in the Sde-dge edition. We take it from the Sde-dge edition of Candrakīrti’s commentary.
34. In the Madhyamaka school, the word pratītyasamutpāda (Tibetan: rten cir ḥbyuṅ ba) principally designates universal relativity and, as a consequence, the non-substantiality of every thing. Cf. C. Dragonetti, Dhammapada, pp. 76–79, Udāna, pp. 19–20 and 37–44; F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, “Nāgārjuna’s conception of ‘voidness’ (śūnyatā),” and “Anādītva or beginninglessness in Indian philosophy,” pp. 8–9.
35. The method developed in this treatise, which is the analytical-abolitive method of the Madhyamaka school. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, “Nāgārjuna’s conception of ‘voidness’ (śūnyatā).”
36. That is to say: established in the Middle Way, which denies equally existence and non-existence and affirms only “voidness,” which is neither something nor nothing.
37. Neither emotionally nor intellectually.
38. We could translate the last two pādas as follows: “(those men) understand, through profound non-perception, the meaning of ‘condition.’ “ The profound non-perception is non-perception of empirical reality. Through the abolitive method of the Madhyamaka school, empirical reality disappears and, consequently, cannot be an object of sensorial or intellectual perception.
39. To affirm not-being, that is to say: to deny reincarnation and the retribution of acts and, consequently, the moral order founded in them, induces man to adopt an amoralist position, (as that of materialists), which causes also the performance of actions that chain one to reincarnation. See C. Dragonetti, “Los seis maestros del error,” in Yoga y Mística de la India.
40. To affirm being means to believe in an eternal, inalterable soul, which constitutes a heresy according to Buddhism, and which is the origin of actions
which chain us to reincarnation. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "La doctrina de los dharmas en el Budismo."

41. If saṃsāra had real existence, the only way to become free from it would be to annihilate it. But since saṃsāra has only illusory existence, produced by an erroneous act of our mind, the only way to end it is correct knowledge of true reality, which eliminates erroneous conceptions.

42. Only knowledge of the true nature of things allows man to adopt a behaviour that does not provoke actions which enchain one to saṃsāra and that permits liberation.

43. The world and nirvāṇa are unreal: the wise man, who has reached to the knowledge that all is void, unreal, has no more erroneous ideas regarding the nature of the world and of nirvāṇa.

44. Knowledge of universal unreality constitutes true liberation, nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is the annihilation of empirical reality, the end of the reincarnation series. About nirvāṇa, see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Saṃsāra, anādītvā y nirvāṇa."

45. The destruction of the things that came forth in some moment (things unreal moreover) is not different from the destruction of something created by magic, and, consequently, it is inexistent. In one case as in the other, birth and destruction are illusory.

46. The conglomerates are illusory, inexistent, because the only things (relatively) real are the parts (cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, Ālambanaparikṣā, p. 103, note 20). The conglomerate ceases when, through a correct act of knowledge, one can perceive its true nature as a mere mental creation, a mere illusion. We cannot affirm that the conglomerate ceases with its destruction, because there cannot be destruction of something illusory, because it is impossible that something inexistent be destroyed; consequently the notion of "destruction" is out of place, because there is nothing corresponding to it.

47. The kleśas, impurities, deprivations, afflictions, are simple adherences to that psycho-physic unity, constituted by the skandhas, that is man; they are adventitious and secondary; their destruction does not produce the skandhas' destruction.

48. The opinion expressed in this kārikā is that of a person who believes in the real existence of the skandhas. The true doctrine is expounded in kārikā 10.

49. When it is said that the skandhas, the impurities, or saṃsāra (kārikā 13) are produced, cease or are destroyed, we must understand that there is not a true production, cessation or destruction, that there is only the appearance or disappearance of the illusory creations that constitute the skandhas, the impurities, and saṃsāra. The knowledge of their true nature, i.e., that they are only illusions, produced by the abolitive analysis that is a characteristic feature of the Madhyamaka school, eliminates the illusions, the illusory mental creation of "birth" and "destruction."

50. After realizing that there is neither production nor destruction, one obtains nirvāṇa, and nothing else remains for him to be done in this world.

51. From the point of view of "relative truth" (i.e., before one knows the Doctrine) it is possible to speak about "obtaining nirvāṇa" in this world, etc., but it is not so from the point of view of the "absolute truth" (i.e., after one
knows the Doctrine and realizes its profound meaning: that there is neither birth nor destruction. Then, one cannot speak any more about “entering nirvāṇa,” about “having done what has to be done.” Since with the true wisdom, diversity disappears and there is no difference between samsāra and nirvāṇa (doctrine of samatā, see kārikā 6): both are equally “void,” lacking an own-being, unreal. To say that one “goes out” from samsāra to “enter into” nirvāṇa is an approximate, metaphorical, conventional way of expression, imposed by the empirical reality to which we and our language belong.

52. Cf. Pratityasamutpādatādayakārikā, attributed to Nagarjuna, kārikā 6, whose reconstruction into Sanskrit by Gokhale has been given in the Introduction of the present article. The fact that this kārikā 12 appears in the Pratityasamutpādatādayakārikā 6, complete and independent, leads us to believe that this kārikā 12 has in itself its own complete meaning and that there is no need to unite to it the two last pādas of kārikā 11, as is usually done.

53. We think that the expression “the most subtle things” designates the atoms.

54. The principle of relativity and conditionality, expressed by the term “Dependent Origination,” has a universal application, and does not admit an exception.

55. Samsāra does not really exist; it is a mere mental creation, produced by ignorance. Therefore it cannot have either a real beginning or a real end. When the Buddhas said that samsāra has no beginning, implicitly they were denying that it has an end, since how can a thing cease that did not begin? Samsāra, as something illusory, ceases only through knowledge of its true nature.

56. The meaning is that, if a beginning is accepted for samsāra, then nothing can be admitted before that beginning and, consequently, such a beginning has to be causeless. This is a wrong view, the ahetuvāda, opposed to the Buddhist conception of causality.

57. If something did come forth with an own being, it could not lose it and, therefore, it could not end. See Candrakirti, Prasannapadā ad XXI, 17; Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakāśāstra XXIII, 24 and commentary of Candrakirti.

58. Persons who do not know what magic is desire the woman magically created, enjoy seeing her, and suffer when the magical creation comes to an end. In the same way, those who do not know the true nature of empirical reality can love the beings and things that belong to it and can suffer with their destruction. It does not happen thus with persons who know that everything is unreal, illusory.

59. One does not fall any more into either the affirmation of being (eternalism) or the affirmation of not-being (destructionism). See kārikā 2.

60. They do not perceive that the world is only a process, an eternal chain of causes and effects.

61. See III. Kārikās quoted in other Sanskrit texts. The last two pādas of the Sanskrit quotation of the Subhāṣita-samgraha express an idea different from that of the Tibetan version.

62. The causes, whose cessation produces nirvāṇa, liberation, are ignorance of the true nature of oneself and of the world, the affection for beings and things, and actions inspired by that ignorance.
63. He obtained nirvāṇa, was liberated.
64. To be able to communicate with other beings.
65. The idea is that they have not gone beyond the “letter” of the Doctrine, they have only “heard” the words, but they did not grasp its meaning or act according to its precepts.
66. See III. Kārikās quoted in other Sanskrit texts.
67. See III. Kārikās quoted in other Sanskrit texts. The second line could be translated: “they are entirely contained in consciousness.” Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, p. 20 note 44, adopts the meaning of “to contain” for hdu.
68. Everything is unreal and, consequently, deceptive and illusory. Nirvāṇa is the supreme reality (voidness) and, as such, the only thing that in our language can be called true. Cf. Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā ad XIII, 1.
69. If, according to the Madhyamaka central teaching of emptiness, mind is not really produced, it cannot be the domain of Māra, and cannot be afflicted by faults.
70. See III. Kārikās quoted in other Sanskrit texts.
71. One must not be surprised when one sees that realists feel affection for themselves and for the other beings and things, because for them everything has real existence. They act logically.
72. Because there is a contradiction between what they sustain (the unreality of all) and their behaviour and their discussions, which keep them attached to things as if they did really exist.
73. When one attributes reality to beings and things, then feelings of attachment and aversion arise, the theories of eternalism and destructionism are developed and one acts according to those feelings and theories.
74. As we have said in note 27, we suppress the first line of this kārikā, which appears in the Sde-dge edition. We add as a fourth line of this kārikā the fourth line that appears in Peking edition (de ndi mkhyen pa mchod gi sguñs).
75. One knows that things do not really exist by seeing that they are produced in dependence, as the Buddhas have taught. When there is the acceptance of things as really existing, all evils, indicated in previous kārikās, arise.
76. “Form” (Tibetan gzugs, Sanskrit rūpa) indicates visible form, the object of sight, but the other sense objects in general are also understood.
77. Those that have gone half the way of spiritual progress.
78. In the present case, the “support point” is the person or thing that is the object of our passion.
79. They cannot be liberated from something that does not exist.


Ed. Sde-dge (of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon, Tanjur): Sde dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan Ḫgyur—preserved at the Faculty of Letters of Tokyo—Tokyo, 1977–.


V. V. Gokhale, “Encore: the Pratityasamutpādahrdayakārikā of Nāgārjuna” See: Pratityasamutpādahrdayakārikā.


YUKTIṢAṬTIKA KARIKA 123


Subhāṣita-saṃgraha, An anthology of extracts from Buddhist works compiled by an unknown author, to illustrate the doctrines of Scholastic and of Mystic (Tāntrik) Buddhism, edited by C. Bendall, Le Muséon N.S. IV, 1903, pp. 375–402, V, 1904, pp. 5–46 and 245–274.


