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Notes on the Buddha’s Threats in the 
Dīgha Nikāya

by A. Syrkin

The Pāli canonical texts (and particularly those of the “Longer Sayings,” Dīgha nikāya) provide us with rich evidence on the Buddha’s image. We often find here (DN II.8; III.1.2; IV.6; a.o.) his typical characteristics: “an Arahat, fully awakened . . . abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, the teacher of gods and men” (araham sammā-sambuddho vijja-carana-sampanno, sugato loka-vidū anuttaro purisa-damma-sārathi, satthā deva-manussānam . . .).1 Apart from these characteristics, there are numerous data not only on the Buddha’s activity as preacher and tutor, but on his everyday life as well, on his habits, his relations with different people—monks, laymen, etc. All this evidence has been frequently treated in scientific and popular literature. There is, however, a certain trait of the Buddha’s behaviour which has not been analysed sufficiently. Insignificant as it may seem in the broad context of the cardinal Buddhological problems, it repeats itself more than once in the canonical scripture and is closely connected with the principal function of the “fully awakened” arahat.

The image of the Buddha necessarily presupposes the salutary activity of a preacher. His characteristics, partly quoted above, describe him as an incomparable tutor (sārathi) of men, teacher (satthā) of gods and men, etc. A major part of his life was dedicated to preaching the Dharma, and his teachings, constituting the essence of the canonical scripture, contain rich material for analysing the Buddha’s didactical methods. With respect to these methods, one can stress here the evidently pragmatic character of the Buddha’s approach to his listeners, whose intellect, morals, social position, etc., he usually took into
consideration. It has already been noted, in particular, that the Buddha resorted to different means of instruction, combining "flexibility and order, authority and freedom," etc. Regarding this combination we can note here a peculiar device of the Buddha's argumentation which permits one to speak of some specific traits of the teacher's image.

In the third sutta of DN (Ambattha sutta-DN III.1. 19 sq.), arguing with young Ambattha, who places brāhmaṇas above kṣatriyas, the Buddha threatens his opponent: "If you do not give a clear reply, or go off upon another issue, or remain silent, or go away, then your head will split into pieces on the spot" (sattadhā muddhā phalissati). Ambattha is unable to give explanations (regarding his own family) and the Buddha repeats his question, together with the threat, adding that such is the punishment for those who do not "answer a reasonable question put by a Tathāgata" thrice. Hereupon, as an embodiment of this threat, a godly spirit, yakkha, appears in the sky bearing a thunderbolt and ready to split the youth's head; and Ambattha, "terrified, startled and agitated," seeks protection from the Buddha, acknowledging him to be right. The subsequent repetition and justification of this threat by the Buddha, together with the apparition of the menacing yakkha, evidently makes this idiom not so harmless as T.W. Rhys Davids supposes it. The unprejudiced reader gets an impression that Ambattha does not perish (like Sakalya in BU II 1.9. 26—cf. below) only because he repents at the right time.

A similar use of these words is found in the Cūlasaccakasutta ("Lesser discourse to Saccaka"), MN no. 35. The Buddha thrice asks a certain Saccaka (called also Aggivessana) a question concerning the material shape of the Self (as we see, the dispute is much more abstract here than in DN III), and adds hereupon: "Whoever, Aggivessana, on being asked a legitimate question up to the third time by the Tathāgata does not answer, verily his skull splits into seven pieces." Then, Ambattha's situation is repeated: a menacing yakkha with the thunderbolt appears, confirming the Buddha's threat, and frightened Saccaka also seeks protection from the Buddha. An analogous expression is found in Kūṭadanta sutta (DN V, 21), where the same argument again proves to be effective: the brāhmaṇa Kūṭadanta confirms his approval of the Bud-
BUDDHA'S THREATS

Dha's words "for he who approves not as well-said that which has been well spoken by the samana Gotama, verily his head would split in twain" (muddhā pi tassa vipateyya). A similar threat is mentioned in Pāṭika sutta (DN no. 24), where it appears in a noteworthy context. The Buddha, with evident satisfaction tells here about the disgraceful defeat of certain naked ascetics (acela): Korakkhattiya (1.7 sq.), who behaved like a dog and was reborn among asuras; Kandaramasuka (1.11 sq.), who died an inglorious death in spite of his austerities; and, finally, Pāṭikaputta (1.16 sq.) whom he repeatedly threatened in the same "head-splitting" way alluding to the god's will (1.16; 18: muddhā pi tassa vipateyyāti). He continues to relate mockingly how Pāṭikaputta decided to approach him, saying: "I am coming, friend, I am coming," writhed about then and there and was unable to rise from his seat" (1.21 sq.: 2.2 sq.). This humiliating detail appears here as a result of miraculous power exercised by the Buddha (cf. below, note 25). Ridiculous rather than fatal, this detail is repeated many times in a style typical of Pāli canonical texts, whereupon the Buddha (again, repeatedly) compares Pāṭikaputta to a jackal, who, deeming himself to be the king of beasts and imitating the lion's roar (a usual metaphor for the Buddha's sermon), emitted but "a puny jackal's whine" (2.8 sq.).

There are a number of analogous expressions in Pāli canonical literature, serving here evidently as a common threat, oath, or conjuration. Their idiomatic proverbial character does however, as we have seen, exclude the belief in their efficiency. In most cases these words are pronounced by other people. An interesting example is found in the Sutta-nipāta (V.1). Here, one brāhmaṇa threatens another who will not give him alms: "sace me yācamāṇassa bhavam nārūpadassati satāme divase tūyham muddhā phalatu satadhā" (983; cf. a characteristic device of the number symbolism). It appears, however, that this oath is ineffective in the present case, whereupon the cursed brāhmaṇa seeks its explanation, which can be given by the Buddha alone (987 sq.; 1004 sq.). The Buddha's answer (1026) presents a kind of metaphorical interpretation, seemingly more compatible with his doctrine: "Ignorance (avijja) is the head, know this; knowledge (vijjā) cleaves the head, together with belief, thoughtfulness, meditation, determination and strength" (this
allegory seems somewhat inconsistent with the spirit of the scenes from Ambattha or Patika suttas mentioned above). This explanation has some analogies in Pali canonical tradition—so, according to the Dhammapada, “The knowledge (ṇattam) that a fool acquires, far from being to his advantage, destroys his bright share of merit and cleaves his head” (72). Another parallel is found at Milinda pañha IV.2.25: “If any one, out of jealousy, were to rise up any obstacle in that case, then would his head split into a hundred or into a thousand pieces” (according to the context, the violation of the prescribed order of alms-giving is meant here—cf. Sutta-nipāta, 983 sq.).

There also are examples of the “head-splitting” curse used proverbially—as a punishment for different transgressions but without direct connection with Buddhist teaching. Such are, e.g., conditional conjurations in the Jātakas—in case of a deliberate lie (“if my lips are speaking lies, then burst my head in seven”—J 489); as a punishment for eating a human being (J 513; 519; 537—ogres are meant here); for killing a friend (J 518); etc. In Samyutta nikāya II, 1.9 Rāhu, lord of asuras, is afraid of the Buddha’s exhortation (though containing no threat) to set the moon (Candimā) at liberty (a well-known myth serving as an explanation of lunar eclipses) and says: “Now let my head in seven pieces rive, Ne’er let me happy be while yet I live. If, had I not let Candimā go free, The Buddha’s verse had not demolished me.” In a later text of the Dhammapada commentary (Dhammapadathakathā, ca. 450 A.D.) we find several examples of similar usage—cf. I. 1 (for non-assistance of “a sin-abhorring Law-revering Elder”); I.3 (a mutual curse of two ascetics, one of them, Nārada, being the Buddha himself in his former birth); I.11; etc. It seems, however, that this formula goes beyond the sphere of purely idiomatic proverbial usage and also requires (especially in DN and MN) an “extraphilological” approach. One can be reminded here of some interesting parallels, both verbal and functional, beyond the Buddhist tradition.

In this connection we shall briefly touch upon some traits of admonition in Hindu śruti texts—the early Upaniṣads. These traits again look rather unexpected within the framework of precepts intended to lead to the highest bliss. So the words of Yājñavalkya (one of the most authoritative and esteemed
Upanīṣadic sages who, now and then, preaches the highest truth about Ātman are concluded in BU III.9.26 (cf. SB XI.6.3.11) with a curse on his opponent Šākalya, whose guilt consists only of ignorance. Much like the Buddha, Yājñavalkya says that Šākalya’s head will fall off (mūrdhā te vipatisyati) if he does not answer his question (concerning the highest Being taught in the Upanīṣads—_aupaniṣadam puruṣām_). It is not bluster: Šākalya is unable to answer, his head falls off and robbers take away his bones. SB XI.6.3.11 adds some details: Yājñavalkya curses Šākalya, predicting that he will die in an inauspicious place and time, and that even his bones shall not be brought home. Thus it happens. The traditional commentary of Śaṅkara explains that Šākalya was punished for not having respected the Knower of Brahman (cf. also SB XI, 4.1.9), yet the punishment still appears to be unmerited, for it does not befall other opponents who argue with Yājñavalkya during the same dispute (at the court of King Janaka, who promised to give a thousand cows and gold to the wisest brahmana). A similar threat is addressed by Yājñavalkya to another of his opponents, Gārgī Vācaknavi. He warns the woman to be moderate in questioning: “Gārgī, do not question too much lest your head fall off. Verily, you are questioning too much about a divinity about which we are not to ask too much” (III.6.1). This time, curiosity is the crime (Gārgī’s consequent questions lead to the basis of the highest worlds of Brahman); she, however, keeps silent and remains alive. This curse is used in the same dispute against Yājñavalkya himself. Uḍḍālaka Āruṇi (also one of the greatest sages, who preaches particularly the famous _tat tvam asi_—“that art thou” in ChU VI.8.7 sq.) threatens him in the same manner, but Yājñavalkya knows the right answer (BU, III.7.1 sq.). In ChU, Śīlaka Śālāvatyā (I.8.6) and Pravāhana Jaivali (I.8.8) use it in a talk (not a dispute). Later, Uṣasti Cākṛāyaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, poor but versed in ritual, uses it three times (I. 10, 9–11; 11.3–9) while warning the priests not to recite certain texts without knowledge. The curse is variegated in Āsvapati Kaikeya’s (a kṣatriya, like the Buddha) words to six brāhmaṇas, whom he has previously accepted as pupils. He threatens them, respectively, with the loss of their heads, with blindness, loss of breath, dissolution of the body, bursting of the bladder, and the withering of feet, did they not come to him
for instruction (V, 12.2; 13.2; 14.2; 15.2; 16.2; 17.2); among them is Uddālaka Āruni, who has brought to him the five other brāhmaṇas. These curses are motivated by allegorical interpretations of those insufficient definitions, with which the brāhmaṇas try to describe Ātman.

As in Buddhist tradition, tribute here is paid to a common idiom. This idiom was evidently widespread—also irrespective of exposing the Vedāntic doctrine (be it the situation of admonishing a pupil, arguing with opponents, etc.). So, e.g., we read in BU 1.3.24: “Let this king strike off this man’s (my) head (if I say) that . . .”; in ŚB III.6.1.23, it serves as punishment for eating or drinking that which belongs to gods, etc. At the same time, the Upaniṣadic texts show perhaps still more clearly that this usage was not so harmless. Again, we come upon a teacher who tries to frighten or to humiliate his listener—a device rather incompatible with preaching the highest truth, which should lead to perfection and bliss. This “incompatibility,” however, does not seem to be unique. The curse, pronounced by a divine teacher is not uncommon in other religious traditions. Let us be reminded of the Christ’s image, marked sometimes in the Gospels by wrath, condemnation, threats, etc.

Recapitulating the Pāli canonical evidence and some parallels adduced above—the teacher’s evident aggressiveness, on the one hand, and his salutary function (now and then explicitly expressed in benevolent deeds and revelations), on the other—one can speak of a certain ambivalence. As we have seen, it refers not only to mortals (like Yājñavalkya, Satyakāma, a.o.), but, what might appear more strange at first sight, to a higher being, the embodiment of complete perfection—the Buddha and some other saviours as well.

The different aspects of this ambivalence cannot all be treated in the present article. So, e.g., we are not dealing here with its aesthetic function (which is displayed in canonical texts similar to those of “secular” fiction). These inconsistencies can also be interpreted (especially in cases of the divine teacher) in connection with a well-known universal phenomenon testified to with respect to objects of cult—as a particular instance of coincidentia oppositorum. This factor, however, can scarcely be applied to all such cases, for they touch upon gods and mortals as well, and reveal in this respect an evident resemblance between both.
It seems that this evidence relating to the specific atmosphere of the religious admonition can also be connected with another important phenomenon—the process of "Descent" (resp. "humanization"). This act usually concerns the divine (or, anyway, enlightened and wise) creature who is already perfected, has risen above the world's vanity, and is provided with the highest knowledge, but who nevertheless returns to the world to bring salvation to ordinary people—the Buddha, Viṣṇu, especially in his last avatāras (one of which, besides Kṛṣṇa, was that of the Buddha, incorporated by Vaisnava dogmatics), etc. One can assume that this function itself prevents the saviour from indifference towards human values, since by virtue of his aim he cannot disregard them. Descending to a layman's level, he finds himself faced with the necessity to associate, i.e., to use mutual language, with people who feel and think in terms of their level's categories and values. To adjust himself to this level, to be understood by them, and to make his admonitions effective, the teacher—the Buddha, the Upaniṣadic sage, etc.—must adopt a definite strategy of behaviour, a certain pragmatism. He does not neglect, therefore, such devices which seem to him appropriate for the sake of final success, as threats, curses, humiliation, etc., though these devices are sometimes inconsistent with his own doctrine, as, e.g., in the Buddha's resorting to miracles (iddhi), generally denounced by him.²⁵ Even the most eccentric of them (like those of "fools for Christ's sake") have a psychological motivation and a therapeutic value. Fulfilling his mission, the saviour passes thus to the level of profane distinction between the subject and the object, the Self and the not-Self, and other opposites which result from this distinction.²⁶ Compared to his genuine perfection and grace, this transition appears as a kind of spiritual and moral degradation, while corresponding inconsistencies look like the sequence of his "humanization"²⁷ rather than that of the perfect coincidentia. It seems that DN and some other texts present evidence of such "humanization" of the Buddha's doctrine, displayed in an obvious descent to his opponents' level (certain "human" traits were, by the way, observed with respect to the Buddha's former births as the Bodhisattva).²⁸

Similar notes, with corresponding modifications, can be made with respect to Upaniṣadic teachers endowed with highest wisdom. So, apart from the "head-splitting" motif, one of
them, Satyakāma Jābāla (who suffered once from the strictness of his teacher, Haridrumata Gautama—ChU IV. 4 sq) himself behaves with a strictness which looks more like cruelty, driving his pupil Upakosala almost to suicide (ChU IV.10). In the same chapter (ChU IV. 1–2), we find another sage, Raikva, who displays coarseness, avidity, and voluptuousness before he agrees at last to accept a pupil. The Upaniṣadic evidence thus “lowers” the image of some preceptors which, by the way, cannot always be justified by the pupils’ behavior—the latter, on the contrary, are far from opposing the doctrine and are full of respect and humility.

We come here upon another aspect of the situation (more typical, perhaps, of the Hindu than of the Buddhist tradition). The teacher’s “descent” is correlated to the adept’s humility; a self-denying, suffering pupil meets with an illuminated though sometimes rude and merciless teacher. This situation partly corresponds to the traditional regimentation of the brāhmaṇcārin’s status. His way of life in the house of his teacher—respecting the latter like a deity, serving him, tending his house, begging for him when necessary, waiting upon his relatives, etc.—is manifoldly reflected in ancient smṛti literature. The law explicitly prescribes him to avoid praise and strive for contempt (Mānavadharmaśāstra, II, 162). Even divine or semi-divine creatures are subject to these rules (cf. the trials of the god Indra and asura Virocana while living as pupils with Prajāpati, ChU VIII. 7 sq.). The idea of humble, respectful approach is evidently reflected in the name of the genre we are dealing with: upaniṣad from upa-ni-sad; “to sit down at” (i.e., at the feet of another, to listen to his words).

Returning to the Buddhist tradition, we can speak likewise of certain rules and restrictions defining the humble status of the devotee, the bhikkhu. The Pātimokkha (Pārājika, Śamghādisesa), Cullavagga (V, X), Brahmajāla sutta (DN, 1. 1. 18–27), etc., contain a number of characteristic details concerning obedience, begging, etc. (the rules for women, bhikkhunī, being still more strict and humiliating). We also find here the device of premeditated denigration of one’s own body (DN XX. 5, etc.; cf. Maitrī Upaniṣad 1.3), though in a manner typical of his “middle-way” approach the Buddha generally used to rebuke excesses of this kind practised by certain ascetics. One can sug-
gest that the bhikkhu's behavior, combining social degradation and spiritual ascent, is also correlated here with the teacher's "descent" to man's weak nature. This Hindu-Buddhist parallel needs, however, substantial reservations, especially with respect to the evidence adduced above. The cases we are dealing with pertain not to obedient pupils, but to stubborn opponents (Ambattha or Pātika before the Buddha; Śākalya or Gārgī before Yājñavalkya, etc.). Some of them who, like Ambattha's teacher Pokkharasādi, pronounce in the end the traditional formula: "Gotamaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi . . ." and become lay disciples (upāsaka) or bhikkhus, are far from being treated like Upakosala in ChU IV. 10. On the other hand, the Buddha can be compared in this respect to Yājñavalkya or Uddālaka rather than to Raikva, or even Satyakāma.

Nevertheless, the manner of treating the opponent in both traditions appears to be rather similar, and in our opinion can be better understood in the context of the pragmatic behavior which marks the beneficial salutary function of the teacher. One can add that the saviour's "humanization" is transitory by nature; it is limited by the sphere of corresponding "lower" contact. The enlightened teacher does not cause damage to his own perfection—already present (the Buddha, Kṛṣṇa, etc.) or implicitly achieved by him upon the end of his earthly existence (Upaniṣadic sages). On the contrary, such intentional profane contacts, necessarily accompanying the mission of preaching, magnify this perfection. As we know, the state of complete illumination (sammā-sambodhi), which the Buddha displays in his last earthly existence, assumes his function of proclaiming to others the truth which he, himself, has discovered and realized. This distinguishes him from another kind of Buddha—the "individual," "silent" pacceka-buddha, who has also grasped the truth, but is unable to proclaim it to mankind (cf. Puggalapaññatti, I.29) and is inferior to the preaching Buddha. We have already cited (see note 2) an example of the Buddha's words concerning the manifold ways which he had to follow for the sake of his high mission. It may be worth while to note here another parallel, the words perhaps still more heartfelt, acknowledging and justifying this "humanization"—those of the apostle Paul (I Corinthians 9. 19–22; cf. ibid. 10.33): "For though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to
all, that I might win the more. And to the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might win Jews; to those who are under the Law, as under the Law, though not being myself under the Law, that I might win those who are under the Law; to those who are without law, as without law, though not being without the law of God but under the Law of Christ, that I might win those who are without law. To the weak I became weak, that I might win the weak; I have become all things to all men, that I may by all means save some.”

Notes


2. See e.g. Saddharma-pundarika II. 36: “For in elucidating the law, Sāriputra, I use hundred thousands of various skillful means, such as different interpretations, indications, explanations, illustrations . . . I myself also, Sāriputra, . . . am preaching the law to gods and men with able means, such as several directions and indications, various arguments, reasons, illustrations, fundamental ideas, interpretations, paying regard to the dispositions of creatures whose inclinations and temperaments are so manifold”; II.42: “I know the disposition and conduct, the various inclinations of kotis of living beings in this world . . .”; cf. below II.43; 48; etc.—The Saddharma-pundarika or the Lotus of the True Law, transl. by H. Kern. Delhi, 1974, pp. 39 sq.


4. DR I, pp. 116 sq. cf. ibid., note 3 for some parallels from other sources.

5. “Curious threat—which never comes to anything, among the Buddhists, and is apparently never meant to”—ibid. note 3.


18. PU, p. 223. Corresponding evidence of BU is found respectively in SB XVIII (rec. Kāṇva) or SB XIV (rec. Mādhyananda).

19. Cf. a similar conditional threat by a teacher to his pupil in SB XI, 5.3.13: “I will become thy pupil, reverend sir.” He replied, “If thou hadst not spoken thus, thy head would have flown off: come, enter as my pupil!”—*The Satapatha-brāhmaṇa*, pt. V, p. 85.


22. Cf. also some “negative” traits of the Viṣṇu’s embodiment, Krṣṇa, compatible with his salutary function: W. Ruben, *Krishna, Konkordanz und Kommentar der Motive Seines Heldenlebens*, Istanbul, 1944, S 253 sq.; 284 (a lack

23. Regarding the combination of threats and salutary admonitions in DN, BU, ChU, etc., (cf. also the interwoven motifs of curse and grace in the Naciketas history of *Katha upanisad*) one can suggest that such contradictions, brought forward by a literary text, can lead to the “short-circuit” of opposite emotions and serve thus as an instrument of aesthetic effect (like “catharsis”). Cf. L. Vygotskij, *Psixologija iskusstva*, Moskva, 1968 pp. 270 sq.; A. Syrkin, “Zametki o stilistike rannix upanisad,” *Vestnik Drevnej Istori, 1971, N: 2, pp. 99–100.


25. Cf. DN XI. 3 sq.: “I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders that I loathe, and abhor, and am ashamed thereof” (DR, I, p. 278) and, on the other hand—the Buddha’s attitude in *Padhaka sutta* (DN XXIV, 1.4 sq.).


27. Cf. above, note 21, on the “humanized” image of Christ as a substantial detail of his earthly apparition. Cf. also notes on the “divine-become-human” with respect to Kṛṣṇa’s image in: Hospital, “Paradox,” p. 67.


32. The Buddha’s traditional biographies speak of his decision to stay with people and to instruct them though he himself is freed and can leave this world (MN I.26, etc.). According to *Mahāvagga* I.5, having reached the bliss of emancipation, the Buddha first doubts whether other men will be able to understand him and he becomes “inclined to remain in quiet and not to preach the doctrine.” However, afterwards, touched by Brahma’s repeated entreaties, he changes his mind (Cf. *Vinaya Texts*, tr. from Pāli by T.W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, pt. 1, Delhi, 1974, pp. 84 sq.).