CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. The Buddhist Path to Liberation: An Analysis of the Listing of Stages, by Rod Bucknell 7

2. Temporary Ordination in Sri Lanka, by Richard Gombrich 41

3. The Symbolism of the Early Stūpa, by Peter Harvey 67

4. Reason as the Prime Principle in Tsong kha pa's Delineation of Deity Yoga as the Demarcation Between Sūtra and Tantra, by Jeffrey Hopkins 95

5. Buddhism and Belief in Ātma, by Y. Krishan 117


8. The Rasāvahinī and the Sahassavatthu: A Comparison, by Telwatte Rahula 169

9. A Study of the Theories of Yāvad-bhāvikatā and Yathāvad-bhāvikatā in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, by Ah-yueh Yeh 185

II. BOOK REVIEWS


2. The Buddha, by Michael Carrithers (reviewed by Paul Griffiths) 216
3. *Buddhist and Western Psychology*, edited by Nathan Katz (reviewed by Paul Griffiths) 219

4. *A Lamp for the Path and Commentary*, by Atiśa, translated and annotated by Richard Sherburne (reviewed by José Cabezón) 224

5. *Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka*, edited and prefaced by Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum (reviewed by Peter Claus) 226

III. NOTES AND NEWS

1. 7th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 230

2. L.M. Joshi: A Brief Communication 232

3. I.A.B.S., Inc. Treasurer’s Report 233

OBITUARY

John Brough (1917–1984) 236

Contributors 239
In his introduction to this volume, a companion to the same editor's collection *Buddhist and Western Philosophy* [Delhi: Stirling 1981], Professor Katz claims that the collection of essays he has brought together is "about psychology, not about 'Buddhism'" (p. x) and gives concrete expression to his claim by dedicating the book to the late Rune E.A. Johansson, one of the comparatively few Western psychologists with a respectable historical and philological understanding of Buddhism. Unfortunately, the collection does not, for the most part, fulfill its promise; the dangers in using this kind of cross-cultural approach to explore any discipline are those of superficiality and eclecticism, and the results, all too often, are methodological and conceptual confusion. Hard questions need to be asked: are the standard psychological theories of the West really usefully applicable to Buddhist theory? Do we actually learn anything about either psychology or Buddhism by juxtaposing, say, Jung and Yogācāra without fully exploring their basic conceptual and cultural differences? This not to say that the cross-cultural method is invalid or useless, simply that it needs to be exercised with great care and methodological sophistication, a care and sophistication that is not evident in most of the pieces in this collection.

The volume opens with a brief introduction by Chogyam Trungpa in which we are told that the missing element in Western psychology is "the acknowledgement of the primacy of immediate experience" (p. 7). It is nowhere made conceptually clear just what "immediate experience" is, much less how, other than by practising Buddhist meditation, Western psychologists might acknowledge its primacy. Such language is likely to do no more than contribute to the prejudice of many Western psychological theorists that Buddhism is simply a set of esoteric disciplines.

The substance of the book is divided into four sections: "Psychological Implications of Pali Buddhism" (six essays); "Psychological Implications of Japanese Buddhism" (three essays); "Psychological Implications of Sanskrit Buddhism" (two essays); and "Psychological Implications of Tibetan Buddhism" (two essays).

The first essay, written by Rune E.A. Johansson shortly before his death in 1981, uses the Freudian concept of the defense mechanism to explore and clarify material from the *Nikāyas* concerning various types of psychological and behavioural error (*dosa*) and to suggest that the central Buddhist idea of āsava—
"inflow"—can be profitably understood using a modified Freudian interpretive framework. He concludes by suggesting once again—as previously in his *Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*—that "inflation" (p. 23) might be an appropriate translation for āsava.

George R. Elder's essay entitled "Psychological Observations on the 'Life of the Buddha'" is actually a neo-Jungian analysis of one section of the *Nidānakathā*, a fifth-century Sinhalese text. Throughout Elder's analysis cosmology is psychologised and dramatic narrative of external events is personalised and internalised. His hermeneutical method seems to consist in the presupposition that every event referred to by the text which, for one reason or another, is judged by Western historians to be non-historical, must therefore be interpreted as pointing to some (more or less) profound psychological meaning. The rather distressing lack of a clearly enunciated hermeneutic means that Elder appears to have no problem with—even to delight in—offering contradictory interpretations of the same event, and to use as a hermeneutical framework a philosophy (that of Jung) which is at many key points simply not compatible with the doctrines of the tradition which he claims to be treating.

Jan T. Ergardt offers an analysis of the concept of mind (citta) in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, and applies Jungian categories to the results he obtains. Ergardt's analysis of the Pali material is, on the whole, careful and thorough; it is perhaps a direct result of the profound obscurity of the Jungian conceptual framework which Ergardt uses to interpret this material that it is difficult to say exactly what his thesis is: it remains questionable whether either a Jungian therapist or a Buddhist scholar can learn anything from this piece.

Peter Masefield's study "Mind/Cosmos Maps in the Pāli Nikāyas" presents a powerful and persuasive plea for a re-evaluation of the significance of the links between cosmology and psychology in the Pali literature. He stresses that nibbāna is described in cosmological terms—as a place—just as often as in psychological terms—as a state of mind—and that this is to be expected given the thought-world of India at the time of early Buddhism. While agreeing with this major thesis, there are many points of detail upon which this reviewer would take issue with Masefield. To note just two: it's not at all clear that the formless jhānas are consistently viewed in the Nikāyas simply as modifications of the fourth jhāna of form, as Masefield states on p. 79; there is in fact considerable evidence that they—and the nirodha-samāpatti to which they lead—are represented in some
The strata of the Nikāyas as independent of the meditations of form and indeed as independently soteriologically valid. Second, it is almost certainly wrong to suggest "the existence of an attā equivalent to Upaniṣadic Atman"; for example, the Alagaddūpamasutta suggests otherwise (see K.R. Norman's paper, "A Note on Attā in the Alagaddūpamasutta" [in Studies in Indian Philosophy, L.D. Series 84, Ahmedabad, 1981. pages 19–29] for some discussion). But these are points which cannot be discussed at length in a review. Masefield's essay is valuable simply because it reappraises an aspect of the psychology of the Nikāyas which is too often undervalued. Work along these lines could be pursued by a close study of the connotations of the term loka in this literature, a word whose meaning Masefield takes for granted in this paper but whose macrocosmic/microcosmic bivalence might actually provide further support for some of the positions he takes.

Mokusen Miyuki's essay—"The Ideational Content of the Buddha's Enlightenment as Selbstverwirklichung"—is hard to make sense of. To interpret him charitably, Miyuki seems to suggest that Jung's concepts of self-realization and individuation provide heuristically useful models for understanding the standard canonical accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment. This may be so, but it can scarcely be said that Miyuki demonstrates it in his study; instead, isolated sections of Buddhist texts are filtered by Miyuki through a fine mesh of orthodox Jungian concepts in such a way that the philosophical meaning(s) granted to the texts by the traditions in which they have their life and meaning are almost always completely obscured. To take just one example: Miyuki appears to think that the Buddha's realization of the truth of the paticca-samuppāda formula during his enlightenment is i) a numinous experience (p. 96) and ii) "... the innate urge of the Self to realize itself" (p. 105). Such conclusions illustrate the absurdities to which the comparative method can lead when not balanced by careful historical, philological and philosophical scholarship.

The concluding piece in the section on Pāli Buddhism is M.W. Padmasiri de Silva's "Emotions and Therapy: Three Paradigmatic Zones," originally presented as an inaugural lecture at the University of Peradeniya in 1981. This is a careful and illuminating study of the Theravādin view of the nature of emotions and of the proper therapeutic approaches to them. De Silva contrasts the Buddhist therapeutic approach, stressing introspective attention, with the two standard "Western" approaches: the behaviouristic and psychoanalytic. Professor de
Silva handles his materials—Buddhist and Western—with care and sensitivity, and thus sheds a good deal of light on the problems inherent in any theory of the emotions, Western or Eastern.

Akihisa Kondo brings together Yogācāra psychology with the ideas of Karen Horney in his piece on “Illusion and Human Suffering”; while both Horney and the Yogācāra are interesting in their own right it is not clear that either is illuminated by this study. It is also unclear why this piece is included in the section on Japanese Buddhism since the only Buddhist ideas to which the author refers are standard Indian ones.

Steven Heine ambitiously contrasts psychoanalysis, Dōgen and existentialism in “The Meaning of Death in Psychoanalysis, Existential Phenomenology, and Dōgen Zen.” More specifically, he analyzes Freud, Heidegger, Sartre and Dōgen on death in fifteen pages. Despite the brevity and necessary superficiality of his discussion, Heine’s piece does benefit from its methodological sophistication and does point the way forward for further work in this area.

The section on Japanese Buddhism concludes with a revised version of Richard J. DeMartino’s impressionistic study of “The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism,” a piece which, according to its author, (p. 192) was first written in 1957 and appeared in print in 1960. Even in its revised form DeMartino’s study now has little more than historical interest and it is difficult to see why it was chosen for inclusion in this volume.

The section on the psychological implications of “Sanskrit Buddhism” opens with a comparison of the paradigmatically Madhyamaka prasānta “therapeutic argumentation” (p. 200) and the Western “double-bind” analysis of schizophrenia. This study, by Gustavo Benavides, is so condensed that it is difficult to assess: it remains unclear to this reviewer, for example, that either Nāgārjuna or the Western double-bind theorists offer any solutions to the logical/psychological problems they discuss, and still less clear that those who hold the philosophical (non)-views of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka (evidently Benavides is among them) have any business writing about them, since to do so is merely to intensify the double-bind in which their unfortunate readers necessarily find themselves.

Stephen Kaplan offers a piece on Yogācāra epistemology and holographic psychology. He analyzes the Yogācārin discussion of the perceptual process—involving the trisvabhāva theory—using Karl Pribram’s holographic psychology. Perceptual
images are likened to holographic images: fabricated, without form and without location. This is how Kaplan understands the notion of parikalpita-svabhava, the nature of existents as constructed by the mind. In this study it seems that the interpretive framework used to discuss Yogācāra actually does illuminate it; the idea of a hologram is a useful tool for coming to an understanding of Yogācārin epistemology of perception. The major drawback, though, is the author's extremely cavalier treatment of some extremely problematic philosophical issues: the causal theory and the identity thesis do not exhaust the philosophical options where perception is concerned, and they are not in any case discussed with the rigour that they deserve.

The volume concludes with two pieces on the psychological implications of Tibetan Buddhism. Herbert Guenther discusses rdzogs-chen and Daseinsanalyse with his usual unfathomable profundity; enough has been written by now about Professor Guenther's translation methods and literary style to make further discussion otiose. All that need be said is that this piece, like most of Guenther's work, will speak only to the narrow circle of his aficionados.

The volume's editor, Nathan Katz, concludes the collection with a study of the “feminine” in tantric hagiography and in Jungian psychology. Katz is clearly more aware than most of his fellow contributors of the problems involved in applying Jungian categories to Buddhism—or Buddhist categories to Jungian theory—and claims that he simply wants to develop dialogue between the systems rather than to undertake the interpretation of one through the categories of another (pp. 242–3). This methodological point is well taken, and Katz's careful comparison of the Jungian anima with the tantric dākini embodies his method well. There do indeed appear to be profound and significant parallels between these two sets of symbols, and a full discussion of the reasons for this is one of the more profitable avenues along which cross-cultural psychological theory could beneficially proceed.

This collection, then, has its moments: perhaps the best pieces are those by Masefield, De Silva and Katz himself. But it remains unclear whether the volume makes any significant contribution to either psychological theory or the history of Buddhism; even the groundwork in this field has not yet been done.

Paul Griffiths