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Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas

by Michael Broido

I. Introduction

The interests of the Oral Transmission traditions of Tibet—the bKa'-brgyud-pas—centred on the Vajrayāna, and their early representatives such as Mi-la-ras-pa (1040–1123) and sGam-po-pa bSod-nams Rin-chen (1079–1153) did not try to develop a unified philosophical view (darsana, lla-ba) systematically exposed in scholarly treatises (śāstra, bstan-bcos); nor did they contribute much to the development of such analytical subjects as Madhyamaka (dbu-ma) or pramāṇa (tshad-ma). They expressed their experiences in mystical songs (vajragiti, rdo-rje'i mgur), in stories which went into their song-books (mgur-'bum) or their hagiographies (rnam-thar), in collections of instructions (zhal-gdams, man-ngag) and of questions and answers (zhus-lan), in compilations of doctrinal and meditational observations for the yogin in retreat (ri-chos) and so forth. These works were on the whole written in an easy style and in popular language, making a direct connection between the experiences of ordinary people and those of yogins (rnal-'byor-pa) and rtogs-ldan; but one would be mistaken in supposing for those reasons that their authors were ignorant of Buddhist thought.¹

In spite of this, bKa'-brgyud doctrinal notions such as the dgongs-pa gcig-pa of the 'Bri-gung-pas² and the dkar-po chig-thub³ drew severe fire from Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga rGyal-mtshan (1182–1251) in his sDom gsum rab-dbye. Especially after the time of Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419), the bKa'-brgyud-pas were often subject to charges of philosophical confusion and incoherence. They responded fairly slowly, but by the middle of the 16th century such writers as Karma-pa Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1507–54), sGam-po-pa bKra-shis rNam-rgyal (1512–87) and 'Brug-pa
Padma dKar-po (1527–92) were reacting not only with defences of bKa'-brgyud positions and attitudes, but also with attacks on those of the Sa-skya, Jo-nang, dGe-lugs and other traditions. (The rNying-ma-pas do not seem to have been much involved in these exchanges.) Since the traditional concerns of the bKa'-brgyud-pas had been with meditative and religious practices grounded in the Vajrayāna, it is not surprising that these writers' views on analysis should have been coloured by their interest in Vajrayāna.

Padma dKar-po is one of the most interesting bKa'-brgyud writers, but his prose style is obscure, his treatment of most topics is very compressed, he rarely makes direct comparisons between his own views and those of others, and his writings are not "elementary." The other two writers mentioned are easier to read, and often discuss others' views at length. Perhaps for such reasons the attention of scholars has recently been drawn to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's very extensive commentary on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. During the IABS conference at Oxford in 1982, Paul Williams presented a paper summarizing some of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, while I tried to place these and other writers on Madhyamaka in a typological framework based on their views on the two satyas. Recently, David Seyford Ruegg has pointed out that the introduction to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work contains interesting materials on the lineages through which the conception of Madhyamaka underlying the whole work descended to its author. In this paper I shall use this work, the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, mainly as a source of background information.

bKa'-brgyud writings of all periods show a great interest in the relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. The introduction to the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta is largely organized around this relation. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje gives his own view of it, that of various opposed schools and writers, and his refutations of their views. The result is a valuable general picture of the situation at the time he was writing.

In Padma dKar-po's main Madhyamaka work, the dBu-ma'i gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, the connection between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna is built into the structure of Padma dKar-po's own exposition: he uses Vajrayāna terms (especially zung-'jug, yuganaddha) to characterize
and classify the main Madhyamaka categories, such as the ground, path and goal of Madhyamaka. Because of the importance of Vajrayāna notions for our authors, then, we will have to spend some time setting out their views on the relation between Madhyamaka and the tantras.

Unfortunately this is not a simple matter. Vajrayāna is a much more complex topic than Madhyamaka, and at the scholarly level we know relatively little about it. In this paper, the relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna will be dealt with in two sections. The first will be about the early bKa'-'brgyud-pas, mainly sGam-po-pa, as he is authoritative for all the bKa'-'brgyud traditions. The second will revolve about the Vajrayāna categories of ltta-ba, sgam-pa, and bras-bu (very roughly: point of view, practice and goal), as these were seen by Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. (Here Madhyamaka as a philosophical system is connected mainly with the ltta-ba part.)

The central topic of this paper is of course Padma dKar-po's view of the two satyas, and my discussion of it will be based in principle on the Ngges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta. However, this work involves special difficulties of its own. It is not possible to proceed simply by quoting and translating key passages. Padma dKar-po expresses his views mainly by giving strings of quotations (not usually acknowledged as such or marked off from his own comments). But quite apart from the propositional content of what is actually said, the choice and arrangement of the quoted materials is of the greatest possible importance. Here my discussion will begin with some remarks on the structure of the Ngges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta; this structure strongly reflects Padma dKar-po's view of the connection of Madhyamaka and the tantras. Then I will deal with some of the key passages from Candrakīrti which are quoted by Padma dKar-po, clarifying some of the presuppositions apparently carried by them (in Padma dKar-po's eyes). This section is called "Padma dKar-po as an interpreter of Candrakīrti." The remainder of the paper will examine these issues by using other (mainly Vajrayāna) works of Padma dKar-po.

The two satyas are rather general notions. For the bKa'-'brgyud-pas, they provide a link between the general theoretical concepts of the Madhyamaka and the more specific, practice-oriented concepts of the tantras. Thus Padma dKar-po says:
As regards their point, the sūtras and tantras have one intention; but there is a difference as regards the way their content is taken: the sūtras are brief, while the tantras are detailed.

Thus, in Madhyamaka there is a single theoretical scheme which is differently instantiated in the different kinds of tantra. For instance, the same passage gives the following correspondences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>father-tantra (e.g., Guhyasamājā)</th>
<th>mother-tantra (e.g., Hevajra)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stong-pa snying-rje</td>
<td>'od-gsal (prabhāśvara) sgyu-lus (mayadeha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bde-ba chen-po (mahāsukha) stong-nyid rnam-par kun-ldan¹⁰ᵃ</td>
<td>stong-nyid rnam-par kun-ldan (sarvākāravāropetatsūnyatā)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, the entire first row corresponds (in Madhyamaka) to pra-jñā and paramārtha, while the entire second row corresponds to upāya and samvṛti. The causal relations which are said to hold in Madhyamaka between these sets of notions, are also said in Vajrayāna to hold between the items in each column. When the goal is reached, the items in each column are said to stand in the relation of zung-'jug (yuganaddha), and for Padma dKar-po this relation holds also between the satyas themselves, even in Madhyamaka. Finally, both Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje are very insistent that neither of the two satyas can be established (grub) by itself, even conventionally (tha-snyad-du). They always arise together (sahaja, lhan-cig skyes-pa), and may never be separated for the purposes of analysis. Our authors criticize their opponents vigorously on this score. Similarly, the pair 'od-gsal and sgyu-lus (the radiant light and the illusory body) and the pair bde-ba chen-po and stong-nyid rnam-pa kun-ldan arise together. Now both of the notions yuganaddha and sahaja originate in the tantras and not in the sūtra or Madhyamaka literature. One could hardly ask for a more dramatic demonstration that for these authors, the tantras influenced the fundamental character of the concepts they employed in Madhyamaka. Thus, Vajrayāna considerations will enter almost every aspect of our discussion. Especially in Padma dKar-po, one looks in vain for the kind of detailed analysis which is so common in the Madhyamaka works of the Sa-skya and dGe-lugs traditions.
Though Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work is detailed and analytic in this way, it is also firmly grounded in the Vajrayāna notions just mentioned. I hope to give an account of his full and interesting exposition of the two satyas elsewhere.

Here, my main concern will be to exhibit general features of Padma dKar-po's thought. The evidence for what I say will be references and quotations (see especially the three Appendices). In choosing these I have to find appropriate illustrations of these general themes; and in interpreting them as such illustrations, I have had to give the context of each its due weight. This attention to the context is connected with our duty to make sense of what our authors write. The notion of "fidelity to the text" is a complex one, but it is not well served by writing nonsense in English. Somehow or other the sense must be reproduced, as well as the words. So I have kept to the surface form of the Tibetan sentence only where I could find a similar English form which, as an English sentence, reproduced what seemed to me to be the point of Padma dKar-po's words. I make no claim to incorrigibility. On the contrary, it is certain that what is done here can be improved (and will be).

Though this paper draws mainly on primary sources, it seems right to say something about the relation of my work with that of Prof. H.V. Guenther, whose books (e.g., Guenther 1963, 1972, 1977) make so much use of Padma dKar-po's writings. Nobody who has studied Padma dKar-po's works himself can fail to appreciate the importance of the problems to which Guenther has drawn Western attention for the first time. Though the importance for Padma dKar-po of yuganaddha (zung-'jug) leaps at us out of the texts and hardly needs discovery, and though I believe much of what Guenther says about it will have to be revised, his priority must be acknowledged. The similar importance of sahaja (lhan-skyes) is far less obvious, and here I believe that the picture offered by Guenther, sketchy though it is, is basically right, and so is the translation by "co-emergent" (though I do not use this word because it is philosophically loaded in the wrong way). On the other hand, I see little basis for the existentialist slant of his writing on Padma dKar-po. In my view, to make use of Western philosophical notions in order to clarify what we are saying about an Eastern writer's views is one thing; to impute those notions to him is something different.
Guenther does not seem to have treated the role of *sahaja* in distinguishing the views of the bKa'-brgyud-pas from those of their opponents, and he has surely not given a systematic treatment of Padma dKar-po's views on the two *satyas*. But there will be other places where my treatment has been influenced by his writings, and since it is not easy to acknowledge every case individually, I should like to make this general acknowledgment here.

II. The Early bKa'-Brgyud-pas on the Difference Between Sūtra and Mantra

In his *Blue Annals* (*Deb-ther sNEG-po*), 'Gos gZhon-nu-dpal (1392-1481) concludes his chapter on the bKa'-brgyud traditions (the longest in the book) with the remarks:¹²

Thus this famous Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud is not a lineage transmitting merely the words, it is a lineage transmitting the real point [of the Buddha's teaching], this point being a stainless understanding of *mahāmudrā*. It is said that the bla-ma from whom one obtains an understanding of *mahāmudrā* is the *rIGS-BA'i BLA-MA*.¹³ Now at the time of Mar-pa and Mi-la-ras-pa this understanding of *mahāmudrā* was ascribed to the *sampannakrama*, for an awareness corresponding to the inner heat was produced first, and by virtue of this an understanding of *mahāmudrā* was produced later. Dwags-po Rin-po-che caused an understanding of *mahāmudrā* to arise also in those beginners who had not received *abhiseka*, and this is the pāramitā¹⁴ method. But he also said to Phag-mo Gru-pa: 'Our *mahāmudrā* text is the *Mahāyāna-uTtaratāntra-sūtra* by the Jina Maitreya.' Phag-mo Gru-pa¹⁵ said the same to 'Bri-khung-pa¹⁶ and so in the tradition descending from him and his pupils there are many explanations of the Uttaratāntra. On this, though Chos-rje 'Sa-skya-pa¹⁷ said that the pāramitā method was not to be called *mahāmudrā*, since any awareness¹⁸ of *mahāmudrā* arises solely from *abhiseka*, [he was mistaken, and indeed] the ācārya Jñānakirti says in his *Tattvāvatāra* that even at the stage of an ordinary person,¹⁹ one who has a sharp intellect²⁰ and who, in the pāramitā system, practices *samatha* and *vipasyāna*, since he can understand *mahāmudrā* properly and with certainty, can attain an irreversible understanding. However, in Sahajavajra's commentary on the *Tattvāvadāsaka* we find: 'The essence is the pāramitās, mantra is a later adjustment. This
is called mahāmudrā and is clearly explained as an awareness which understands suchness having three specific features. Accordingly, rGod-tshang-pa has explained that the pāramitā method of sGam-po-pa is just what was put forward by Maitripa. However it is certain that sGam-po-pa taught his own personal pupils a mahāmudrā whose path is mantra.

The quotations in this passage show a slight divergence between Jñānakīrti and Sahajavajra. The first says that in the pāramitā method one can attain an irreversible understanding, but does not mention suchness or buddhahood, while the second mentions suchness but perhaps only associates it with the mantras. We will see later a similar difference between Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. Now I want to show how such differences appear in the writings of sGam-po-pa himself. sGam-po-pa's general tendency was to insist that different people use words in different ways and so there can be no rigidly fixed definitions. In the Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, a collection of his answers to questions posed by Phag-mo Gru-pa, he is at pains to correct his pupil's demands for over-clear definitions and distinctions. Sometimes he seems ironic; sometimes he gives many different answers (e.g., on the darśanamārga, 5a4); often he refuses to say that things are the same or different (e.g., on snang-ba and sems and on sems-nyid and chos-nyid, 17a); sometimes he seems to treat the question as stupid (e.g., on whether mahāmudrā and sahajayoga are the same or not, 4b4). Other answers are quite straightforward. In this and in the similar Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa'i zhus-lan nothing seems to have been further from sGam-po-pa's mind than propagating a single unified theory about something.

Accordingly, we are not surprised to find different expressions of the relation between the sutras and the mantras. For instance, on one occasion they appear to differ only in the path, and to be similar in cause (rgyu) and effect ('bras-bu).

In the pāramitās, the cause is rig-pa and bodhicitta, the path is the six pāramitās, and the effect is the three buddhakāyas. In the mantras, the cause is rig-pa and bodhicitta, the path is the utpatti- and sampannakramas, and the effect is the three buddhakāyas.

On another occasion, there appears to be a difference in the effect: in the pāramitā case it is the dharmakāya and the
rupakāya, while in the mantra case it is the mahāsukhakāya. Elsewhere, sGam-po-pa says that even a rim-gyis-pa of sharp or medium senses can attain an awareness which understands the essential after a good deal of samatha or one moment of clear viśaya. These two versions are roughly parallel to the two opinions of Sahajavajra and Jñānakīrti quoted above by 'Gos.

'Gos, writing in the 15th century, only hints through his quotations that the early bKa'-brgyud-pas expressed various views on the relations between the sūtras and the mantras. But since sGam-po-pa himself was not wholly consistent on the matter, we will not be surprised to see clearer divergences among the more analytically minded bKa'-brgyud-pa writers of the 16th century. They also had a rather different way of expressing their views, to which I will now turn.

III. Madhyamaka-darśana and Mahāmudrā-darśana: Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje on lta-ba

Tibetan Vajrayāna thought is often organised around the quadruple lta-ba, sgom-pa, spyod-pa, and 'bras-bu. Roughly speaking, lta-ba is the general attitude or outlook with which some system of Dharma is viewed or approached; while sgom-pa (bhāvanā) is the cultivation of this attitude or outlook by means of specific practices (often called sgom-pa too). spyod-pa literally means “action:” in the Vajrayāna, often the performance of fearful rites (drag-po’i las, etc.). 'Bras-bu (phala, lit., “effect”) is the goal: buddhahood in some form, yuganaddha, etc.

It may be worth considering the correlation between Tibetan, Sanskrit and English as regards lta-ba. In English there exist various concepts expressing a mixture of theory and experience: dogma, theory, attitude, point of view, outlook, insight, etc. Both the Sanskrit words darśana and drṣṭi belong somewhere here; both words derive from drṣ-, to see, but both can be applied also to philosophical points of view, indeed to the same view depending on what one thinks of it. If one is orthodox, the view that there are ātmans is a darśana; for a Buddhist, it is a drṣṭi. Both are translated into Tibetan by lta-ba, and only the context will tell us whether we have a dogma or a viewpoint. However, when the component of insight predominates, darśana may be
translated otherwise, as in *darśanamārga*, *mthong-lam*. (This is relevant here, since it is contrasted with *bhāvanāmārga*, *sgom-lam*). sGam-po-pa has summed up the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa* distinction in an aphorism: 28

\[
\text{ltā-ba ma-bcos-pa gnyug-ma'i shes-pa / sgom-pa mi-rtog-pa thu-mal-gyi shes-pa /}
\]

*ltā-ba* is non-contingent, 29 resting cognition; *sgom-pa* is natural, non-discursive cognition. 30

Clearly, *ltā-ba* here is not “theory,” indeed it is something more like the absence of any theory. No doubt this was why Madhyamaka appealed to sGam-po-pa (who would probably not have called himself a Mādhyamika):

Phag-mo Gru-pa asked: by what is the essential (*ngo-bo*) attained? sGam-po-pa replied: it is attained by the *adhisthāna* of the teacher, by one’s own interest and devotion, and by the power of practice, nothing else. It is not known to learned men and scholars, it is not understood by prajñā, it is not a matter for argument. It arises by itself and is beyond what is an object for the discursive mind. 31 The essential is not to be postulated, 32 as Nāgārjuna and other wise men have said. 33

The context makes it clear that this passage is intended to apply to the Vajrayāna as well as the Pāramitāyāna.

Padma dKar-po organises some of his most important works around the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa/*'bras-bu* distinction. Typical items which fall under these headings in the sūtra- and mantra-yānas are found in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sūtra level</th>
<th>lta-ba</th>
<th>sgom-pa</th>
<th>'bras-bu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Madhyamaka)(^{34})</td>
<td>bden-gnyis</td>
<td>thabs-shes zung-'jug</td>
<td>sku-gnyis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>zung-'jug</td>
<td>(6 pāramitās)</td>
<td>zung-'jug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tantra level</td>
<td>phyag-rgya</td>
<td>Na-ro chos-drug, etc.</td>
<td>sku-gnyis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(bsre-'pho)(^{35})</td>
<td>chen-po</td>
<td></td>
<td>zung-'jug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lam-rim stage</td>
<td>darśanamārga</td>
<td>bhāvanāmārga</td>
<td>aśaikṣamārga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{28}\) This is relevant here, since it is contrasted with *bhāvanāmārga*, *sgom-lam*.

\(^{29}\) *ltā-ba* is non-contingent, resting cognition; *sgom-pa* is natural, non-discursive cognition.

\(^{30}\) sGam-po-pa has summed up the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa* distinction in an aphorism.

\(^{31}\) The essential is not to be postulated, as Nāgārjuna and other wise men have said.

\(^{32}\) sGam-po-pa has summed up the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa* distinction in an aphorism.

\(^{33}\) The essential is not to be postulated, as Nāgārjuna and other wise men have said.

\(^{34}\) Padma dKar-po organises some of his most important works around the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa/*'bras-bu* distinction.

\(^{35}\) Typical items which fall under these headings in the sūtra- and mantra-yānas are found in Table 2.

\(^{36}\) The context makes it clear that this passage is intended to apply to the Vajrayāna as well as the Pāramitāyāna.

\(^{37}\) Padma dKar-po organises some of his most important works around the *ltā-ba/sgom-pa/*'bras-bu* distinction.

\(^{38}\) Typical items which fall under these headings in the sūtra- and mantra-yānas are found in Table 2.
Table 2 contains the first appearance of the two satyas in this paper, and the first row shows how Padma dKar-po saw them as the basis for the lta-ba of Madhyamaka as a complete system of theory and practice. With regard to the first column, one might think that the lta-ba in the sūtras and tantras was here indicated as different. This is a verbal trap. The term mahāmudrā is complex, and stands for different kinds of things, but as lta-ba it is identical with the lta-ba of the sūtras and of Madhyamaka.

Padma dKar-po's views on the relation between lta-ba, sgom-pa and spyod-pa are found (inter alia) in the introduction to the 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad. In the sūtras and mantras, the view (lta-ba), the content (brjod-bya), and the purpose (don) are said to be the same. We find such phrases as don-gcig, lta-ba don-gcig, dgongs-pa-gcig, and lta-ba'i sgo-nas khyad-med. The sūtra and mantra methods are said to differ mainly in speed (the mantras bringing quick results), in the character of the explanations (the mantras being more detailed), and in the choice of methods available (richer in the mantras). Clearly, then, it is the path and the sgom-pa which differ. On the sameness of the content (brjod-bya), he says:

In the Kālacakra- tantra it is said that to distinguish between the sūtras and the mantras in respect of their content is to commit the root-downfall of denigrating the Dharma.

Similarly on the lta-ba:

Mi-la-ras-pa has said: on lta-ba there is no distinction, but in the secret mantras there are special methods.

Table 2 already makes it clear that, like sGam-po-pa, Padma dKar-po held that the goal (bras-bu) is the same for sūtras and mantras. In the Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad he confirms this, saying that it is the view of Nāropa. He rejects a view of Maitripa, according to which the Paramitāyana is only a stage affording entry to the Mantrayāṇa.

The reader might now reasonably hope that I would spell out what particular view (lta-ba) Padma dKar-po himself held. But this will have to wait until the end of the paper, for the phrase bden-gnyis zung-jug (satya-dvaya-yuganaddha) is his clearest
descriptive phrase for it, so we will have to say what the two satyas were, and what was the relation called yuganaddha. (On the latter point, only an outline will be possible here.)

In the introduction to his Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje treats the relation between the sūtras and the mantras at some length. He gives first his own views, then those of a Jo-nang-pa, of Śākya mChog-idan (1428-1507), of a Bo-dong-pa, and of Tsong-kha-pa. These statements have recently been translated by Ruegg (1983). They are followed by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's attempts to refute the views of the other traditions. As regards the path and its practice, the differences between Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and the others seem unimportant beside the obvious similarities: in the Vajrayāna there is abhiṣeka and the upāya-mārga, which are lacking in the Pāramitāyāna.

More interesting are the differences at the level of the ground (gzhi) and the general point of view (lta-ba, darśana). Of all the authors mentioned, only Mi-bskyod rDo-rje himself seems to hold that the lta-ba is different in sūtras and mantras. He says that in the mantras, the lta-ba is that of a spontaneous and non-discursive śūnyatā endowed with all excellent qualities. At the sūtra level this is not present, though there is no difference on the side of non-discursiveness, in that when all attachment to opinions and discursiveness has been repudiated, there is no need to establish anything at all as having any (epistemic) status. This last point, with which Padma dKar-po would certainly have agreed, is the source of all Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's main criticisms of the other authors. (By contrast the point about the difference of lta-ba is more a matter of nomenclature than of substance.) Jo-nang-pa's lta-ba is based on śūnyatā endowed with all excellent qualities both in sūtras and mantras. This śūnyatā is paramārtha-satya and is permanent and asamskṛta. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's main criticism is that this view entails eternalism. Śākya mChog-idan says that in both sūtras and tantras the lta-ba repudiates the origination of any dharma by any of the four alternatives of existence, non-existence etc., but then goes on to say that as applied to the sūtras, this becomes the rnam-brdzun dbu-ma set out in the later works of Maitreya; and here, one should not take the dharmadhātu to be mere negation, as do the niḥsvabhāva-vādins, but rather as the radiant
light, the nature of mind, since our concern here is with ye-shes, the paramārtha aspect of mind, and not rnam-shes, the samvṛti aspect. This is criticised as a confusion between mere cognition (shes-pa) and awareness (ye-shes); for the arrogance of claiming to have established what is really paramārtha by making such verbal claims has been said by Mañjuśrī to be just the failure to understand gnas-lugs.\(^{62}\) (This is only one point in Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s long and detailed criticism of Śākya mChog-I’dan.) Bodong-pa expresses a familiar negative lta-ba for both sūtras and mantras, but considers that it applies only to the person who analyses things thoroughly.\(^{63}\) Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s criticism is directed mainly at the claims related to the lower levels of analysis, which he says show an incorrect understanding of the satyas, and will lead to a Sāṃkhya view of causation.\(^{64}\)

Tsong-kha-pa’s lta-ba for both sūtras and mantras is based on a śūnya lacking in an object truly established in itself and imputed to be external by the discursive mind.\(^{65}\) Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s criticism starts by claiming that here there is too much attachment to satya;\(^{66}\) it is pointless to establish, in a conventional sense,\(^{67}\) the status of something which is later to be refuted. The result would be that one would be stuck with entities whose existence was purely nominal, like the ṣadṛṣṭi of the Hindus. Here there could be no proper sahaja, but only a kind of ṣadṛṣṭi-sahaja which would be inconsistent with what one sees. Such a śūnyata is not a suitable basis for mokṣa. (This last aspect of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s view of Tsong-kha-pa was already noticed by Williams (1983)).

**IV. Padma dKar-po as an Interpreter of Candrakīrti**

Like Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po was a Prāsaṅgika, and commented on the works of Candrakīrti. Unlike Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po was not an argumentative writer and rarely criticized the views of others; and unlike Tsong-kha-pa, he did not differentiate sharply between the Prāsaṅgika position which he mainly followed, and the views of the Svātantrikas, some of which he incorporated into his own work. Such differences show all three authors developing and adapting what they learnt from Indian Madhyamaka. In a sense,
they all did Indian philosophy, but each brought his own flavour to it.

Of Padma dKar-po’s Madhyamaka works, the one containing the most philosophy is the dBu-ma'i gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar 'byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, “The vehicle which establishes nitartha, clarifying the three sources of Madhyamaka.” I shall use the ornamental part of this title, Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, as an abbreviation for the whole. The three sources are Candrakirti’s Prasannapada and Mahyamakāvatāra, and Mi-la-ras-pa’s dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa. The Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta is really a complete summary of Tibetan Buddhism at the sūtra level, containing brief accounts of the three turnings of the wheel of the Dharma, the different Hindu and Buddhist siddhānta, the nitartha/neyartha distinction and other matters (see the sa-bcad given as Appendix C). The Madhyamaka section reviews briefly the varieties of the Svātantra “school” before moving onto the Prāsaṅgikas. The three divisions of this section (cf. table 2 as well as Appendix C), are really concerned with Madhyamaka as philosophy, with the path (the six pāramitās and the ten bhūmis), and with buddhahood. In this way, the connection of Madhyamaka thought with much of the rest of sūtra-level Buddhism is made very explicit. However the connection with the tantras still has to be supplied.

In another respect, the work is very inexplicit. It contains a large number of quotations, usually not acknowledged. It is not only that Padma dKar-po often does not make the point in his own words. Many important points are made in complete silence, by the organization of the subject-matter. Formally, the work is a commentary on the dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa, but each section of comment is very long and the sections are not organized around the order of topics of the other gzhung at all. On the contrary, passages of Candrakirti are broken up and re-formed in a very complex way. For these reasons, it is almost impossible to use quotation from the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta to establish Padma dKar-po’s views (as against those of other interpreters of Candrakirti). Instead, I shall draw on the relationships between the two satyas and other concepts, relationships upon which attention is focussed by the arrangement of the work. This arrangement is summarized in Appendix C. Then I shall then make use of these relationships to illustrate
the functions of the two satyas in other areas of Padma dKar-po’s thought. Thus, the meanings of the two satyas for Padma dKar-po will emerge indirectly and, as it were, structurally. I should stress that I use this indirect method because I find myself forced to, not on any philosophical grounds.

In Madhyamaka, the two satyas are neither items contained in a world external to the observer, nor purely subjective items dependent upon capriciously varying mental states. Since at the goal the satyas are related in a certain way, they must vary systematically with the level of attainment of the subject. We can see roughly how this variation will go from Candrakirti’s own comment to MMV VI.23. This difficult and confusing passage has received numerous interpretations in Tibet, but Padma dKar-po typically does not give any explanation when quoting it. In order to examine the use he made of it, it may be helpful to supply a very crude translation:

Thus the buddhas cognize (mkhyen-pa) without error the svarūpa (rang-gi ngo-bo) of the two satyas, pointing out (nye-bar bstan-te) that all inner and outer things such as samskāras and sprouts have these two svarūpas. They are these: samvrti and paramārtha.

As for paramārtha, it is a self-nature (bdag-gi ngo-bo) grasped by the particular yul (visaya) of those who have a properly cognizing awareness, but it is not established (grub-pa) by means of such a nature (rang-gi bdag-nyid). This is one nature (ngo-bo). As for the other, an ordinary person grasps (rnyed-pa) a self-existing thing (bdag-gi yod-pa) through the power of a vision covered with infinite films due to un-knowing. Now this yul of childish persons is also not established as a svabhava (rang-bzhin) by means of a self-nature (rang-gi ngo-bos). Because of this, all things possess these two svabhāvas. Of these two, suchness is the real yul of seeing, and that is the point (don) of saying “this is paramārtha-satya.” What the svarūpa of this is, remains to be explained. The yul of delusive seeing is samvrti-satya. Thus, having set out the two satyas, we must further explain how for those whose vision is deceptive, there is a further duality of veridical and delusive in respect of the object to be grasped and of the knowing.

The Sanskrit word satya has been used as an ontological category (“reality”), as a property of statements or propositions (“true,” “truth”), and perhaps as an axiological category
"genuine"). Here it is none of these. It obviously expresses some property or feature of sensory cognition. Both in the verse
and in the commentary it is opposed to mṛṣya (brdzun-pa) in relation to seeing (drṣ-, mthong-ba). Now mṛṣa (brdzun-pa)
means "delusive"; the opposite of this is "veridical." It is only with a very great sense of strain that an English-speaker can say of a visual object or experience that it is true or false. A good example is found in Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvali.

It would be wholly pointless to say that they are neither true nor false. The Buddha was not trying to draw attention to an elementary category-error.

For the ordinary ignorant person, the prthagjana, there is no satya. For the Buddha there is no point in distinguishing between two satyas. Accordingly, interest in a distinction between two satyas is mainly at the level of the ārya or the bodhisattva.

Now there is an important Mahāyāna tradition according to which paramārtha-satya is something unvarying, not changing with the individual who experiences it. This tradition is associated with the thought "whether tathāgatas appear in the world or not, the dharmatā of dharmas continues the same for ever." Variants on this theme are scattered profusely through the sūtras and sāstras. It is illustrated in the Laṅkāvatāra by comparing the dharmatā of dharmas with a road leading out of a forest in which the seeker is wandering. "Now do you think, O Mahāmati, that the passage-way leading to that city... [was] constructed by that man?" "No, Blessed One." (This theme deserves a study of its own.)

As a result, the burden of variation during the bodhisattva-stages is thrown upon samvṛti-satya. In this sense, while the characterization of samvṛti-satya in general may be a philosophical matter, the specification of what it consists of in particular cases is not a philosophical matter at all, but rather a soteriological one. Perhaps it is for this reason that Padma dKar-po indignantly repudiates any attempt to pin down the Mādhyamika to any general proposition specifying what samvṛti-satya is.
In any case, the satyas have something to do with veridical sensory cognition. Now we can ask: are they concerned with two different kinds of veridical cognition, or only one? Do the satyas get their veridical character from the same source, or two different sources? Or ontologically: do we live in two different (perhaps interpenetrating) universes? There seems to have been a good deal of disagreement in Tibet over the answers to these questions. When we come to deal with the Vajrayāna aspects properly we will see that in Padma dKar-po’s view there was only one source of satya and that the two satyas are so tightly bound together that they are in effect different facets of one thing. For now we may note that even in the Madhyamaka there are references to the idea that really (vastutas) there is only one satya, viz. *paramārtha*; but this seems to have got mixed up with the idea that ultimately (don-dam-par, paramārthatas) there is only one satya. And if there is sometimes only one satya, one may ask where the second comes from.

This brings us to the very difficult question of the word *yul* (*viṣaya*) in the commentary to MMV VI.23. In many contexts this word is correctly translated by “object.” But here this will not do, because in the definition of *paramārtha* the *yul* grasps something (*yul-nyid-kyis... rnyed-po*). Evidently *paramārtha-satya* has something to do with the subject in cognition. We will see later that this is certainly Padma dKar-po’s view, especially as regards the Vajrayāna.

A more fundamental difficulty affecting the word *yul* is that the notion of *paramārtha* is supposed to apply to buddhas and other advanced beings who possess a non-dualistic cognition. We therefore need a vocabulary general enough to embrace talk both of ordinary dualistic cognition and of non-dualistic cognition. Since here we are concerned especially with the non-duality of subject and object (*gzung-‘dzin gnyis-med*) we want a word (or more precisely, an attitude towards some word or words) which generalizes the notions of subject and object and which reduces to one of them when language is being used in the ordinary dualistic way. The following proposal is motivated partly by Strawson’s notion of a feature-placing language: a level of language more primitive than our own, in which there are no reidentifiable particulars, indeed no objective particulars at all. I suggest that we should think of the artificial word “*featur-
ture" as a word in a feature-placing language, which specialises to "subject" or "object" (or to "feature" without the asterisk, e.g., gold, snow, etc.) when we return to our normal (dualistic) use of language. Then in the context of MMV VI.23, *yul (viṣaya)* can be translated by "*feature" without doing violence either to our conceptual scheme (in English) or to Candrakīrti's text. (For some commentators on Candrakīrti, perhaps including Tsong-kha-pa, this device may be redundant. But even if it is redundant, it does no harm.)

In the Vajrayāna, its non-redundancy seems almost too obvious to need argument. There, "paramārtha-satya" describes things (!!) such as the radiant light ('od-gsal), "mind-as-such" (sems-nyid), and great bliss (bde-ba chen-po, mahāsukha). Even viewed dualistically, it is obvious that these are not particulars but features, and that they belong to the subjective rather than the objective pole in cognition. Elsewhere I have given reasons for thinking that this is an important and general feature of Padma dKar-po’s thought.86

There does seem to be some evidence that Tsong-kha-pa took paramārtha-satya (i.e., for him, śunyatā) in a somewhat more "objective" sense than do our bKa'-brgyud-pa authors.87 If this is right, then it makes the critique by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje much easier to follow.88 It also means that the translation of *yul* uniformly by "object" will be easier to maintain in connection with Tsong-kha-pa than with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje or Padma dKar-po. There should be nothing especially surprising about this unless one believes that the Tibetans did nothing but reproduce what they inherited from India.

In the commentary to MMV VI.23, the word *ngo-bo*89 and its many relatives give rise to difficult problems to which I offer no systematic solution. My impression is that Candrakīrti was confused in the use of these words. Tsong-kha-pa,90 Mi-bskyod rDo-rje91 and Padma dKar-po92 all seem to have found the matter frustrating.

Still on MMV VI.23, Candrakīrti says that the two *satyas* pertain to everything; they are *sva|rūpas* connected with everything. Yet the capacity to be aware of the two *satyas* is not the same for all individuals, as we have noticed already. We might say that it is fully active only in a buddha; in a bodhisattva it is partially activated; in a *prthāgjana* it is merely *latent*. (We need
some such language as this to distinguish between the non-contingency of the relationship between the satyas, as svarūpas or svabhāvas, and the things of which they are the svarūpas, in contrast to the contingency of their relationship with persons. In this language the tathāgatagarbha theory becomes the claim that all beings possess a latent disposition to become aware of the two satyas.)

The picture is filled in a bit more in those passages where Candrakīrti deals with the causal connection between the two satyas. Here the locus classicus is MMV VI.80. The verse contrasts vyavahāra/paramārtha as upāya/upeya, i.e., as means and what results from the means. This is clarified in the commentary, which says that here upeyabhūtam (thabs-las byung-bar gyur-pa) is the effect (bras-bu), or what is to be attained (thob-par bya-ba) or what is to be understood (rtogs-par bya-ba). It is obvious that these passages are not solely about objects and their dispositions to be cognised; they are about actual episodes of cognition on the part of cognising subjects, governed by the contingency just mentioned. We will soon see this tension between the two verses reflected in Vajrayāna usage.

V. The Two Satyas in Vajrayāna

Both in the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rtu and in his more advanced Vajrayāna works (see Table 1 and its footnotes), Padma dKar-po seems to be working with a concept of causation which includes the one just mentioned in connection with MMV VI.80, but is richer. Guenther has called this "circular causation." The ground and the goal mutually reinforce each other; each acts as the cause of the other, so to speak. This conception goes back at least to the Guhyasamājatantra. We already mentioned in the Introduction that, according to Padma dKar-po, the Vajrayāna provides us with particular instances of what is discussed in general terms in Madhyamaka. Let us see how this applies to the two satyas, first individually and then in relation to each other. Paramārtha-satya is relatively straightforward: it is great bliss (mahāsukha), it is the radiant light, it is gnas-lugs. All these are feature-universals.

"Samvrti-satya" applies mainly to items: the items which fall
under \textit{dngos-po'i gnas-tugs}. It especially includes such things as the illusory body\textsuperscript{96} and the \textit{vajra-body}\textsuperscript{97} together with the \textit{mancjalas} which surround them. Now, most of these specific terms are familiar mainly from the meditation practices of the Vajrayāna; for instance "illusory body" is the name of one of the six topics of Nāropa. Here, however, we are not talking of the practices themselves, but of the clarified (\textit{dwangs}) appearances which form the basis for the practices. Indeed, \textit{dwangs-ma} is often used as a sortal universal to refer to specific appearances which partake of \textit{samvrti-satya}, while the feature-universal \textit{dwangs} is closely related to \textit{gdangs}, a word whose use in connection with \textit{samvrti-satya} has already been noted by Guenther\textsuperscript{98} and will be further discussed in a moment.

Now, the relationship between the two \textit{satyas}. The \textit{dwangs-ma} partake of \textit{samvrti-satya} in any case; and it is \textit{because} they are non-delusive that they partake also of \textit{paramārtha-satya}.\textsuperscript{99} This relationship between the two \textit{satyas} is the basis of their \textit{yuganaddha}. At first sight the connection seems to be non-contingent. This non-contingency is related to the tension observed at the end of the last section, between the \textit{Madhymakavatāra} verses VI.23 and VI.80, and in order to understand it better we need to return to those verses in more detail, keeping in mind the application to clarified appearances.

In connection with VI.23, we saw the \textit{satyas} described as \textit{svabhāvas} or \textit{svarūpas}; and these are defined (say, at MK. XV 2–3, and PSP on it) as belonging non-contingently (\textit{akṛtrima}, \textit{ma-bcos}, etc.) to the things to which they pertain. Yet it is obviously a contingent matter whether any particular person cognises things in either of the \textit{satya}-modes. It is for this reason that VI.23, if construed as a claim about dispositions of persons, cannot be more than a claim about latent dispositions. VI.23 tells us nothing about episodes of cognition; they are rather the province of VI.80, which, it seems, has to be construed as saying that one or more \textit{episodes} of \textit{samvrti-satya} cause or bring about one or more episodes of \textit{paramārtha-satya}. We may say that in VI.80, the extent to which the latent dispositions of VI.23 have been actualised is not specified, but that there is a presupposition that they have been actualised to some extent. In this rather special sense, then, VI.23 is concerned with dispositions, while VI.80 is concerned with episodes.
In his Vajrayāna works, Padma dKar-po very often uses the phrases kun-rdzob thabs sa'am rgyu, and don-dam thabs-byung nga'am 'bras-bu, etc.; this is the language of VI.80 and is concerned with episodes. By contrast, the terms gshis and gdangs are used for the corresponding dispositions of objects, e.g., at phyag-chen gam-mdzod (see note 10a) we have the two satyas, described exactly in this language of VI.80, manifesting by the power of gshis and gdangs. The contrast is even clearer in Appendix A, where it is said that the gshis is lacking in satya. Of course don-dam is the very epitome of satya, of the veridical; but the disposition of things to be seen in don-dam is neither veridical nor delusive. The availability of the gshis/gdangs language perhaps explains the rarity of references, in Padma dKar-po's Vajrayāna works, to VI.23, in contrast to the frequency of reference to VI.80. And if gshis and gdangs literally were the two satyas, then one would expect to see the phrase gshis-gdangs zung-jug, in parallel with bden-gnyis zung-jug. The former is not found; and if my analysis is right, it would be illogical, for zung-jug is a form of samādhi in which the satyas actually occur; it has nothing to do with the mere disposition towards them.

Roughly speaking, yuganaddha (zung-jug) describes two things which are united or closely bound together. The most important Indian source for this word is the last krama of the (tantric) Nāgārjuna's Pañcakrama, called Yuganaddhakrama. Padma dKar-po's conception of yuganaddha is complex, and here I will give a sketch only. Earlier, we mentioned the illusory body as a standard example of dwangs-ma. Here the illusory body is the topic of the svādhisthānakrama, while the radiant light is the topic of the abhisambodhikrama. The purification of the illusory body takes place in the svādhisthānakrama, and the agent of this purification is the radiant light. Thus, it is the presence of the radiant light which gives the illusory body its satya-quality. Padma dKar-po simply says that the illusory body is self-purified; this further illustrates not only the inseparability of the two satyas, but what looks like the non-contingency of that inseparability. These are further illustrated in the course of his criticism of Tsong-kha-pa's view of yuganaddha. If in the svādhisthānakrama there is no radiant light and in the abhisambodhikrama there is no illusory body, then the two can have no causal connection, and in the yuganaddhakrama they are merely
placed together like the two horns of an ox;\textsuperscript{104} surely this cannot be \textit{yuganaddha}.

Since this line of argument is so central to bKa'-brgyud-pa thought, it may be worth clarifying the notion of non-contingency in use. I have chosen the word "non-contingent" because it is close to the Sanskrit \textit{akrtrima}, which is important in Madhyamaka texts, and because it expresses the logical structure of the connection better than such words as "inseparable" (\textit{dbyer-med}, much more common in Vajray\=ana texts). The point is that the illusory body depends on the radiant light \textit{for its identity as the illusory body}; were the radiant light absent (says Padma dKar-pa) there would be an appearance but it would not qualify as the illusory body. More generally, nothing qualifies as \textit{samvrti-satya} at all unless accompanied by \textit{param\=arth-satya}; it is so to speak \textit{param\=arth-satya} which gives it its identity as \textit{(samvrti-)satya}. And now we are back once more with the old idea that really there is only one \textit{satya}, one source of the veridical.

In a sense, the non-contingency is just a fact about language, about the \textit{meaning} of "\textit{samvrti-satya}" and the cognate terms; yet in another sense, it is also a fact about the world, in that \textit{param\=arth-satya} and its cognates are not just logical constructs, but are features of experience.

Padma dKar-po's favoured method of developing these distinctions rests on two different descriptions (not conceptions) of \textit{mah\=amudr\=a}: \textit{gns-lugs phyag-chen} and \textit{'khrul-lugs phyag-chen}. The first corresponds roughly to a feature-placing use of language (as sketched in the preceding section). The two \textit{satyas} become one identical *feature. \textit{gNs-lugs phyag-chen} is often described by a stream of metaphors, as by rGyal-dbang-\=rje:\textsuperscript{105}

Thus all the dharmas of sams\=ara and nirv\=\=a are nothing more than the suchness of mind, which has always been pure, which is self-created since no-one has made it, which contains no differences since it is inseparable from everything, and which is not defiled by postulating or negating existence or non-existence; it is unstained by subject and object, it is not a *feature of any action of the mind such as proof or refutation, it is beyond all thought or speech of the eternal or the momentary, it is the essential abode of all the teachings expressing the intentions of the buddhas; it is called \textit{sahajajn\=\=a} or dharmak\=aya but is not obscured by these good names; it is a resting cognition, an ever-
lasting cognition, a natural cognition, an original cognition; and it is the content of all the older scriptures explaining mahāmudrā. Since in it appearances are incessant it is the foundation of dependent origination, since nothing has to be established it is the foundation of voidness, since it is not the abode of differences it is the foundation of yuganaddha, and since it is impartial it is the foundation of that which embraces everything.

'Khrul-lugs phyag-chen describes the same state of affairs, where however one “wanders” or “strays” (khrul-ba) into dualistic distinctions (i.e., one uses language normally). Yet it does not have to be mistaken. Padma dKar-po says of 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen:

On the objective side there are changing shapes which are ascribed to lus-kyi gnas-lugs and to samvit-satya, while on the side of unchanging seeing there is sems-kyi gnas-lugs which is ascribed to paramārtha-satya. The ground may acquire changing shapes, but that is not bad; and at the time of understanding it may become unchanging, but that is not good. Because this remains itself there is no need to separate the two satyas, and so they are said to be inseparable.

More technically but perhaps more clearly, we have:

dNgos-po'i gnas-lugs is divided into two: lus and sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs. Lus-kyi gnas-lugs is ascribed to the errant side, for it has adventitious defilements, while sems-kyi gnas-lugs is pure from the beginning, is purity; often it is said to be pure by nature. Now “adventitious” means that these defilements are not established as gshis or gdangs, but they are said to appear as gshis or gdangs, as on a thang-ka small hard bumps of paint appear to stick out, or as a white conch-shell appears yellow to a man with jaundice. This yellow is not established as the gshis or gdangs of the shell, but for the man with jaundice it arises as appearance; this is consistent with the illness gradually wearing off and the yellow colour disappearing. It would be unintelligible to ascribe yellow to the gshis or gdangs of the shell, since then healthy people would see it. Their not seeing it may not be understood by the sick person, in which case we have a delusion (khrul-snang), or he may understand, in which case it rises as dharmakāya.
Thus according to Padma dKar-po, 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen as it were contains appearances and (dualistic) distinctions, but if these are understood for what they are, there is no harm in them; they “rise as dharmakāya.” But if they are not understood and if one begins to accept and reject them, there is a fall away from paramārtha-satya or from the radiant light. This is the beginning of the process which culminates in rebirth.109 In this sense ‘khrul-lugs phyag-chen may be said to be the source of samsāra; here some authors have even spoken of lhan-cig skyes-pa’i ma-rig-pa.110 But for Padma dKar-po, this is not an essential feature of 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen, which does not have to be something wrong or mistaken.

At the doctrinal level, an absolutely capital point for Padma dKar-po is that one should regard gnas-lugs phyag-chen and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen as expressions of one and the same state of affairs. Especially, one should resist the natural temptation to associate gnas-lugs phyag-chen with paramārtha-satya and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen with samvrti-satya. He seems to have thought that this mistake was made by both the Jo-nang-pas (rather grossly) and by the dGe-lugs-pas (more subtly). In both cases his argument has the following shape. In gnas-lugs phyag-chen the question of a distinction between the two satyas does not really arise. In 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen if either satya has a status or is established (grub), independently of the other, there is not and never can be sahaja or yuganaddha because the relation between the satyas is merely contingent (bcos-pa) in the sense sketched above.

In a long summary of the Jo-nang-pa position on matters related to this line of thought,111 we find such observations as:112

The great parinirvāṇa is an uninterrupted anāsrava-mahāsukha113 which has really transcended all duḥkha and its associated causes. Vijñāna is dark, like thick black darkness, and is to be given up; it is samvrti and rang-stong; while spontaneous jñāna (rang-byung ye-shes) is light with the quality of voidness or like nectar, not to be renounced; it is paramārtha and gzhan-stong.

Padma dKar-po’s objection to this is that it rejects 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen as something intrinsically bad, thus destroying the non-contingent relationship of the satyas. Specifically, it is unac-
ceptable that *paramārtha-satya* is no longer impartial, becoming a form of eternalism, while at the same time *samvrti-satya* becomes a form of nihilism.\(^{114}\) The difficulties of constructing a coherent notion of *yuganaddha* on the Jo-nang-pa view are so obvious that Padma dKar-po has not mentioned them specifically.

One argument against the dGe-lugs-pas has been mentioned already. Another related argument concerns what Padma dKar-po seems to consider to be the dGe-lugs-pas' incorrect conception of *sahaja*:\(^ {115}\)

According to dGe-l丹-pa, if there were no *rang-bzhin*, then at the *paramārtha* level it would be like the barren woman's son, while at the *samvrti* level existing things could never go out of existence. Because of this, by appearance one is freed from the extreme of non-existence, and by voidness one is freed from the extreme of existence. [Padma dKar-po replies:] But to say this is to fall into eternalism and nihilism: *paramārtha* becomes nihilism and *samvrti* becomes eternalism, because unless the two *satyas* are based on a single foundation they can never free anybody from partiality.

This exchange occurs in the middle of a passage about the notion of *sahaja* (*lhan-skyes*) and its connection with *yuganaddha* (*zung-jug*); see Appendix A. Padma dKar-po quotes\(^ {116}\) a verse from the *Hevajra-tantra*, which says (*inter alia*) that the self-nature (*svabhāva, rang-bzhin*) is to be born together (*sahaja*), and he then begins his explanation by saying that the *nītārtha* of this has been variously expressed by such phrases as *snang-stong lhan-skyes*, etc. The exchange quoted above then follows. Later on Padma dKar-po says:\(^ {117}\)

A mountain of evils is dispersed by the *Pañcakrama* verses:\(^ {118}\) "When one renounces the notions of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and they become a single thing, this is said to be *yuganaddha*," and "When the separate aspects of *samvrti* and *paramārtha* are cognised and they are then thoroughly mixed together, this is said to be *yuganaddha*." On the whole, the Sa-skya and dKar-brgyud traditions say that *gshis* is not veridical, while *gdangs* is not delusive; and when the two *satyas* are inseparable like ice and water, voidness is like appearance and appearance is like voidness and there is *snang-stong zung-jug*. 
The passage in Appendix A gives us that part of Padma dKar-po's conception of yuganaddha needed for our present purposes. To summarize his full conception: first, it is a samādhi (in the usual sense and perhaps in the sense of the sādāngayoga); second, it is divided into ground, path and goal, following Nāropa; third, it has a sūtra and a mantra aspect, as in the general treatment of this distinction above; and fourth, it has a logical aspect, uniting the two satyas and other pairs. It is this fourth, logical aspect which is so closely related to sahaja. This word, literally "born together," means that the two items never appear singly, always together; we have here the causal aspect of the connection which we called "non-contingent." Sahaja is a term of the mother-tantras, and indicates a stronger degree of connection than the terms "mixing" or "inseparable" typically used in the Guhyasamāja literature (e.g., in the Pañcakrama, as we just saw). Because of the importance of the full notion of sahaja and the associated non-contingency for the bKa’-brgyud-pas, Padma dKar-po says that a father-tantra explanation of yuganaddha is inadequate. This point is closely related to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, both those briefly reviewed above and those to be mentioned below.

Thus, both Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje thought that Tsong-kha-pa’s conception of the two satyas was insufficient, inter alia, because their connection was not akrtrima in the right way, did not have the right sahaja. But of course to say this is merely to state a problem, not to solve one; we want to know why these bKa’-brgyud-pa writers held the view that they did. Paul Williams (1983, p. 134) notes that according to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje:

... the emptiness of Tsong kha-pa is different from, not as spiritually mature as, whatever notion of madhyamaka emptiness the Karmapa is operating with.

Williams goes on to defend Tsong-kha-pa against some of the specific attacks of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, and I do not want to comment on this defence; for it seems to me that he has missed both the main point of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s attack, and one of the most important lines of defence available to Tsong-kha-pa.

It may make it easier to see the point of the attack if we
consider two imaginary writers, say *Tsong-kha-pa and *Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, with views simpler than those of the real writers. For both our fictitious authors, the gist of the notion of śūnyatā is svabhāva-śūnyatā, the absence of self-essences; but they differ in the status of that which lacks such an essence. *Tsong-kha-pa thinks that the objects of ordinary cognition must have some status at the conventional level, must indeed be established conventionally (tha-snyad-du). Objects thus established can be seen to be lacking in self-essence, and as thus seen, they are (or possess) samvrti-satya. Paramārtha-satya is the lack of the self-essences (or the apprehension of this lack). According to *Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, this gets the whole thing upside-down. The point is to get away from (attachment to) the idea of anything having a status. Paramārtha-satya (or the radiant light, etc.) is just seeing objects without a status or a foundation of some kind. Objects thus seen (or purified appearances, dwangs-ma) are samvrti-satya; but this must not be taken as another status of some kind, raising again the epistemic question of how it is to be established (grub-pa).

Now the self-essences are linguistic entities and their absence is a linguistic fact. But *Tsong-kha-pa stresses the psychological importance of this absence. Without them, the world seems quite different; so different that it is not clear that we can speak of the same world at all, and in the absence of such a world, the distinction between linguistic facts and facts about the world becomes quite hazy. So for *Tsong-kha-pa, there is no contradiction in saying that one can see paramārtha-satya or in taking the connection between the two satyas as contingent, in spite of the apparently linguistic character of paramārtha-satya.

*Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not attach the same importance to śūnyatā as does *Tsong-kha-pa. However, he is much more inclined to accept a world (without ontological status, of course) and with it the distinction (not pressed too far) between linguistic and non-linguistic facts. For him, it is a contingent fact that there is paramārtha-satya at all (Buddhas might not have appeared in the world, there might not be nirodha-satya, etc.). It is also a contingent fact that paramārtha-satya is experienced in the way it is (as the radiant light, etc.). This makes the connection between the two satyas rather complex. As far as the senses of the two terms are concerned, it is a mere fact of language that the
two appear together (sahaja). However, it is contingent that the two satyas appear together taking the forms they do take, i.e., that their referents appear together.

The writings of the actual Mi-bskyod rDo-rje give the impression of a perhaps somewhat Kantian striving after a fact about the two satyas which is a fact about the world and not merely one about language, but is non-contingent in the sense of not depending on any other particular fact about the world. They become easier to follow if one thinks of the sense/reference distinction and drops the notion of contingency (but it seems unlikely that he attained this perspective himself). Seen in the forms it actually takes, paramārtha-satya is called the radiant light or great bliss (cf. Table 1); śūnyatā, which had dropped out of the picture, comes back as just one more *feature in cognition, śūnyatā-endowed-with-all-good-qualities (stong-nyid rnam-pa kun-lidan, Table 1). This śūnyatā is connected with the svabhāva-śūnyatā of the Madhyamaka, but plays a different role in the structure; Mi-bskyod rDo-rje can tolerate this tension because for him, śūnyatā does not have the logically fundamental character which it has for Tsong-kha-pa.

This discussion is of course simplified, but any comparison of our two authors' views in this area leads straight to the two satyas; we need to say something about the function of the notion of śūnyatā, and the satyas provide us with the concepts which we need for this. Here, unfortunately, Williams has misunderstood Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1981, p. 7):

For Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Candrakīrti's conventional truth is simply, and only, what is held to be in pre-critical, non-philosophical worldly commerce.

In fact, his view was quite different from this (Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rtu, 137a3 ff.). The prthagjana sees saṃvṛti-mātra (mere saṃvṛti), while strictly speaking the ārya sees only paramārtha-satya; however, conventionally (tha-snyad-du) one speaks of two satyas for him. At first glance it is easy to misunderstand Mi-bskyod rDo-rje on this point, partly because of Candrakīrti's own equivocation in VI.23 (say, in relation to VI.24–8). As we have seen with Padma dKar-po, the point is easier to understand in Vajrayāna: the ārya sees the illusory
body and the radiant light arising together (sahaja), and only 
conventionally can one speak of them separately; and this was 
just the foundation of Padma dKar-po's own criticism of Tsong-
kha-pa.

Returning to the Madhyamakāvatāra, recall that the verse 
VI.23 (see note 73) says that a certain delusive cognition is called 
śamvṛti-satya. When giving his own views (139b-145a), which he 
claims were shared by the earlier bKa'-gdams-pas, Mi-bskyod 
rDo-rje treats the distinction introduced by Candrakirti at VI.23 
as the distinction between śamvṛti and paramārtha, with only second­ 
ary concern for whether they are satyas or not. Here he often uses 
the phrase don-dam bden-pa (so taking it for granted that 
paramārtha is satya) but it is hard to find an instance of kun-rdzob 
qualified as bden-pa (satya): 120

A thing such as a pot is just one thing, but fools speak of a 
ngo-bo-nyid and specifically ascribe various features which are 
attained and [all this is] kun-rdzob; while the āryas do not see this 
at all, and, seeing as though not seeing, it is said that they see 
don-dam. Only conventionally are there two satyas, for there is 
no difference of reference [i.e., one pot!], the difference is 
whether it is seen by an errant or a non-errant mind. . . . the 
āryas do not see the two satyas as two.

Throughout this discussion, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje insists on the 
importance of a cognition which is spros-bral (nisprapañca), and 
we shall have much to say about this term later. We have seen 
also that Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje both held that 
śamvṛti-satya (as distinct from mere śamvṛti) is a matter mainly 
for the ārya. Our bKa'-brgyud writers were not in dispute with 
Tsong-kha-pa on these points. The difference was over what was 
happening when the ārya had a moment of nisprapañca or of 
śamvṛti-satya. It will be easier to understand these differences 
and the reasons for them from a certain theoretical perspective 
which was carefully developed by Padma dKar-po, but which 
(if I have not missed something) Mi-bskyod rDo-rje only hints 
at now and then, while Tsong-kha-pa seems to have ignored it. 
I will develop this perspective with some care, since it enables 
us to focus on the critical point at which the prthagjana becomes 
an ārya, of which so much is made in some forms of Chinese 
and Japanese Buddhism. In terms of the lam-rim, we are con-
cerned with the transition from the *prayoga-mārga* to the *darśana-mārga*. Since we are to speak of the arising of (non-discursive) understanding, some Tibetan texts label this topic *rtogs-pa'i 'chartshul*; but Padma dKar-po treats it in a much broader perspective and does not use this phrase.

**VI. Padma dKar-po on the Four Yogas and on Nisprapañca**

The 'Brug-pa bKa'-brgyud tradition makes much of a distinction according to which different people move along the path at different speeds. Roughly, the *cig-car-ba* is the "sudden" and the *rim-gyis-pa* the "gradual" type of person familiar from other forms of Buddhism. For certain purposes they also recognised an intermediate type, the *thod-rgal-ba*, for whom there was a certain structuring of *mahāmudrā* practice (or more exactly, of *rtogs-pa'i 'char-rshul*) called the "four yogas" (*rnal-byor bzhi*). One of these four yogas is called precisely *spros-bral* (*nisprapañca*). Since this word is used also for the goal in Madhyamaka, we might hope that Padma dKar-po's treatment of the four yogas would throw some light on our present concerns. This hope is indeed rewarded; but in order to make it clear what Padma dKar-po is talking about, a certain number of historical and doctrinal preliminaries must be disposed of. These are somewhat complex because the bKa'-brgyud-pas worked with two different conceptions of the relation between *mahāmudrā* and the *upāya-mārga*, to which we will now turn.

As a teacher, Mi-la-ras-pa used mainly the methods of the *upāya-mārga*. People who were not mature enough to receive abhiṣeka did not practice meditation with him. So in the tradition descending from his pupil Ras-chung rDo-rje-grags (1083–1161), the entire path of practice is *structured* according to the stages of the *upāya-mārga*. Here, the word *mahāmudrā* is used mainly for the goal (*phala, 'bras-bu*). The word *Ras-chung snyan-brgyud* is used both of the practices as thus structured, and of the lineage which propagated them. They came into the 'Brug-pa tradition quite early, because Gling-ras, before going to Phagmo Gru-pa, was a pupil of Lo and Sum-pa, who had learnt the *snyan-brgyud* from Ras-chung's pupil Khyung-tshang Ras-pa.¹²¹

In contrast with this, Mi-la-ras-pa's other famous pupil,
sGam-po-pa, had practiced Madhyamaka to a high level with his bKa’-gdams-pa teachers before meeting Mi-la-ras-pa, from whom he therefore learnt only the advanced stages of the upāya-mārga. We have already seen how sGam-po-pa was willing to teach a sūtra- or pāramitā-based mahāmudrā to beginners, while reserving the upāya-mārga for the most advanced. So here the path is structured according to the different stages of mahāmudrā attainment, with the upāya-mārga coming in only at the end or for the very gifted. The structuring of the upāya-mārga suitable for such people is found in the bsre-'pho works of Padma dKar-po. Here the upāya-mārga is sgom-pa, the corresponding lta-ba being ground-mahāmudrā, especially the method of sahaja-yoga (thang cig skyes-sbyor). Thus, the main Dwags-po bKa’-brgyud used a functional relationship between mahāmudrā and the upāya-mārga almost the opposite of that used in the Ras-chung snyan-brgyud.

In connection with the upāya-mārga, Padma dKar-po worked mainly with the two-fold distinction of cig-car-ba and rim-gyis-pa, the corresponding structures being given in the bsre-'pho cycle and in the yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum of the snyan-brgyud. But where the structuring relates to the level of mahāmudrā practice, three different kinds of person appear: cig-car-ba, thod-rgal-ba, and rim-gyis-pa. These are not correlated with the yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum at all, and their mahāmudrā practices are respectively sahajayoga, the “four yogas,” and the pāramitā methods of the lam-rim.

Padma dKar-po’s criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa relate mainly to the most advanced stages of the path, and so to the two higher types; he had no doubt that such people occur. If Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, when stressing the need for sahaja, is speaking of the cig-car-ba then no doubt he is right; but then in criticising Tsong-kha-pa he may well be beating the air, since it is not clear that Tsong-kha-pa wrote for such persons or believed that there are any.

From a bKa’-brgyud-pa point of view, it seems more reasonable to suppose that Tsong-kha-pa was writing mainly for the rim-gyis-pa. After all, this type takes the path in graded stages not unlike those of the lam-rim and sngags-rim. The bKa’-brgyud-pas too have a lam-rim, based on the Dwags-po chos-bzhi; in the end both types of lam-rim go back to Atiśa, of course. Now
it is not clear that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s criticisms are relevant to this level; the rim-gyis-pa on the sambhāra-mārga or the prayoga-mārga cannot be expected to experience sahaja. Of course when the bKa'-brgyud-pas teach samatha and vipaśyanā to beginners they are taught separately; and it is not in respect of these methods that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that Tsong-kha-pa’s concept of śūnyatā is inadequate as a basis for mokṣa. So we must look at the darśana-mārga, or rather at what happens or what changes on passage from the prayoga-mārga to the darśana-mārga. In focussing on this particular point, the cig-car-ab is of little interest, since with him “everything happens at once,” while the divisions for the rim-gyis-pa seem pointless and scholastic. The interesting case is the intermediate one, the thod-rgal-ba. His practices are structured according to the “four yogas,” viz. rtse-gcig (ekāgrata), spros-bral (nisprapañca), ro-gcig (ekarasa) and sgom-med. What is characteristic of the thod-rgal-ba is just the division into four; the cig-car-ab takes them all together, while the rim-gyis-pa divides them more finely. The four yogas have a complex history and have been traced back to such Indian works as the Vimalaprabhā (by Padma dKar-po) and Nāropa’s Phyag-chen tshig-bsdus (by Si-tu bsTan-pa’i Nyin-byed). I am not clear that as a single recognisable genre in mahāmudrā they go back beyond gTsang-pa rGya-ras, though quotations on the individual “yogas” are often attributed to earlier writers such as sGam-po-pa, sGom-chung, Zhang Tshal-pa, Phag-mo Gru-pa and others. The individual yogas (rnal-byor) are not themselves particular methods of practice, in spite of the name, but rather aspects of the experiences associated with a range of practices at certain levels; the practices themselves may be taken either from the sūtras or the tantras, though sometimes the first two yogas are more associated with the sūtras and the last two with the tantras.

The thod-rgal-ba who practices the four yogas is assumed to have completed the sambhāra-mārga. Roughly speaking, rtse-gcig corresponds to the (end of the) prayoga-mārga, spros-bral to the darśana-mārga, ro-gcig to the bhāvanā-mārga, and sgom-med to the āśaikṣa-mārga. There is also a correlation with the bodhisattva-bhūtis. The spros-bral stage is of especial interest since this word is a name of the goal in Madhyamaka, but in a sense ro-gcig is simply the stabilizing of what has been reached for the
first time in *spros-bral* (just as suggested by the names of the mārgas, *darśana-* and *bhāvanā-*). Thus, some of Padma dKar-po’s most interesting remarks on *spros-bral* will be found under the heading of *ro-grig*.

Williams (1980) has rightly remarked that in Madhyamaka there is a close relation between *vikalpa* (*rnam-par rtog-pa*) and *prapāṇca* (*spros-pa*). Padma dKar-po does not seem to distinguish clearly between these two terms, which is why I have tended to render both by “discursiveness.” Though Williams’ observations are based on a wide range of Indian sources and not all are congenial to Padma dKar-po, the following seems helpful (p. 30):

... *prapāṇca* ... creates its own referent and thereby introduces the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate referents. All *prapāṇcas* require referents, but necessarily the referents cannot be ultimate. It follows from this distinction that, regardless of the Madhyamaka position as stated in its texts, the absence of ultimate referents is not in itself sufficient to destroy *prapāṇcas*. What it does do is show the absurdity, the arbitrariness of being caught in a net which creates its own possibilities and which lacks any ultimate foundation. It is this absurdity which creates the tension leading to soteriological rather than discursive intellectual activity and which thereby requires the cessation of *prapāṇcas*.

Here, the word “referent” must not be taken too objectively, as Williams recognizes later in the same passage by the use of the word “craving” (for *mgon-par zhen-pa*, a word also used by Padma dKar-po in this connection). Indeed one might say: it is because of this craving that the mere absence of the referents is not enough: one can perfectly well crave for something non-existent. The phrase “net of *prapāṇcas*” (*prapaṇcajālam*) is used by Candrakīrti,133 and we will see Padma dKar-po similarly speaking of a “net of *kalpana*” (*rtog-pa’i dra-ba*), and of the lack of foundation (*gzhi*) or root (*rtsa-ba*) of the errancy (*’khrul-pa*) associated with such *kalpana*.

Padma dKar-po’s *rNal-byor bzhi’i mdzub-tshugs* gives a very traditional view of the “four yogas” and is written for persons of “low intelligence.”134 It associates *rtse-gcig* with *samatha* and *vipaśyāna*; one can see from the *Phyag-chen zin-bris*, a much more sophisticated work, that he had qualms about this because of
the obvious link between *vipaśyāna* and *nisprapaṇca*, but I cannot go into all this here. I shall give his summaries of the four yogas and extracts on *spros-bral*. Letters A, B . . ., a, b . . . in the margin facilitate reference to the Tibetan transcribed in Appendix B.

A: Though *nges-don* (*nitartha*) is experience and is impoverished by mere words, these words must now be spoken.¹³⁵

B: The fleeting is truly known in the stationary; and if the stationary is firmly rooted in the fleeting, it is called falling into the gap between the stationary and the fleeting, and this is the true explanation of *rtse-gcig*.

C: Confidence in freedom is attained in errancy; and if in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between errancy and freedom, and this is the true explanation of *spros-bral*.

D: The presence of mind is recognised in appearance; and if in mind the arising of appearance is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between mind and appearance, and this is the true explanation of *ro-gcig*.

E: *Prsthalaabdha* does not move away from the sphere (*ngang*) of *dharmatā*; and if in *samāhita* the relaxation of compassion appears, it is called falling into the gap between *samāhita* and *prsthalaabdha*; and this is the true explanation of *sgom-med*.

In these passages, “true” and “truly” translate *rang ngo* five times; “errancy” translates *khrul-ba*, “recognise” translates *rig-pa*, and “fleeting” (for *'gyu-ba*) and “stationary” (for *gnas-pa*) are borrowed from Guenther.¹³⁶ The phrase *bar-lag 'gyel-ba* occurring in each of B–E does seem to mean literally, “to fall into the gap,” though Guenther has twice¹³⁷ rendered *'gyel-ba* in B by “to bridge.” Be that as it may, the phrase *bar-lag 'gyel-ba* is here surely a metaphor, and the doctrinal point is surely that *rtse-gcig* is something between or connecting the stationary and the fleeting; similarly for the other definitions. Now, some of Padma·dKar-po’s remarks on *spros-bral*:¹³⁸

a: Second, *spros-bral*: confidence of freedom is attained in errancy; and if in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between er-
rancy and freedom, and this is the true explanation of *spros-bral.*

b: Whatever errancy arises, is cognised as lacking any root or foundation, and so one says that confidence of freedom is attained in errancy. Now an errant thing, different from what is cognised as lacking any root or foundation, is not attained, and so one says that in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised.

c: When one intuitively understands the *gnas-lugs* of everything, all understanding by mere *ente rationis* and all doubts have been destroyed where they stand; and so one says that all imputations have been cut off from within.

d: Further, in all the defiled things of errancy there is no experience of something existing; then understanding that errancy has no foundation is called understanding the *gnas-lugs* of errancy.

e: Now if there is no errancy, there is no reason to free anybody from it, and so there is no attainment of nirvāṇa; and thus there is nothing called errancy and freedom or samsāra and nirvāṇa to be analysed, nor any analysis.

f: Thus, since the *gnas-lugs* of all things from *rupa* to *sarvajñā* is not established by means of a self-nature, they are not non-void; so analysing from the point of view of the non-void [the *Satyadvayāvatāra* says that] voidness is not established even a little by the failure to establish non-voidness. Accordingly it is impossible to give an analysis into anything, and this point of view (*lla-ba*) is said not to postulate anything.

g: The explanation of *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa* is this: nowadays, through many failures of understanding, people think that *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa* turns the mind to evil or to suffering or to the destruction of suffering. This is a great fault which would be avoided merely by paying attention to the science of grammar.

h: [For the Sanskrit] word *prakṛta* becomes *rang-bzhin* or *tha-mal* [and so *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa*] is equivalent to *rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa* [i.e., “natural cognition”].

j: This natural cognition has been given many names, such as *prakṛti-prabhāśvara* and “ground-mahāmudrā”; and in works on the tantras it is known as *svabhāva-sahaja* [cf. Appendix A].
Some people explain this by saying that [this natural cognition] has śūnyatā for its object and prakṛti-prabhāsvāra for the owner of the object and that these two rise together (sahaja). But in the language of experience [which I prefer, natural cognition is] a free-rising awareness (thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa) which just cognises clearly without interrupting the understanding. If this in turn is misunderstood (ngo ma-shes-pa) there is samsāra, while if it is understood there is nirvāṇa; but in itself it is quite impartial. Its basis (ngo-bo) is mahāsukha, while the owner of the object is sarvākāra-varopetaśūnyatā, these two being [related in] yuganaddha.

Thus [natural cognition] becomes the foundation of both samsāra and nirvāṇa. The Hevajra-tantra says [II.iv. 32,34] “This is samsāra, this is nirvāṇa,” and “... it has the form of samsāra since it is obscured, but without obscurcation samsāra is purified.”

So this [natural cognition] is what is explained to be the common referent (mtshan-gzhi) of samsāra and nirvāṇa.

But might it not be thought to be wrong to explain natural cognition (tha-mal-gyi shes-pa) in terms of a free-rising awareness (thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa)?

This free-rising awareness is not something which arises (byung-ba) newly [on each occasion]. The previous kalpana (rtog-pa) has subsided, and before the next one arises (skyes-pa), this awareness can rise (shar-ba) and that is why it is called a [free-rising awareness]. It rises continuously (shar shar-ba) at all times, but generally it is not manifest because it is obscured by the net of kalpana.

This important passage offers considerable difficulties in translation. The last phrase reads rtogs-pa'i dra-bas in all editions, which needs amendment to rtog-pa'i dra-bas in order to make sense. I have translated the causal terms skye-ba and byung-ba by “arise,” but shar-ba “rise,” except that in thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa I have taken Padma dKar-po's explanation into account, following Guenther, in translating skyes by “rising.”

Before gnas-lugs is understood, the mind (blo, mati) affects everything and there is no firmness. When gnas-lugs has been understood, the point (don) is not inconsistent
with the bare words. If it is claimed that now the view \((lta-ba)\) has been established in accordance with things as they are \((ji-lta-ba bzhi\)n), it may be replied that there should be an intuitive \((mngon-sum)\) understanding, with view and understanding [appropriately] connected.

\textbf{r:} But the really important point is that the view should be understood without reference to any scripture or logic; for it is said specifically to rise \((shar-ba)\) from within.

The last of these remarks by Padma-dKar-po explains why he pays so little attention to the status of the obscurations and why he calls them \((more or less indifferently, it seems) r\to\text{-pa (kal\'pana), \textit{rnam-par} r\to\text{-pa (}v\textit{ikal\'pa) and sometimes} spros-pa (prap\'an\'ica). He is concerned with the epistemic status only in that they lack any root or foundation \([b]\); so it would be a step backwards to give them a status of some kind, even provisionally \((drang-don-du)\) or conventionally \((tha-snyad-du)\), which establishes them as \textit{being} something or other \([cf. r]\). On this model the \textit{\'arya} is a person who can see through the gaps between the obscurations (Padma dKar-po frequently\(^{141}\) uses the analogy of the sun shining through gaps in the clouds). The \textit{\'prthag\'jana} has so many obscurations that he cannot see through them at all. On this model it is easy to see why the first moment of insight \((dar\'\textit{\'sana})\) is so important for various traditions of Buddhism.

Following \textit{spros-bral}, the next stage of the “four yogas” is \textit{ro-gcig}, defined in passage D above. This stage stabilises the experience of \textit{spros-bral} as just discussed.\(^{142}\) A quick glimpse at the \textit{ro-gcig} stage will enable us connect the “four yogas” more firmly with the main topics of this paper. Padma dKar-po says:\(^{143}\)

\begin{quote}
How does one practice \textit{ro-gcig}? At the time of \textit{spros-bral}, all appearances either were or were not understood as mind-as-such.\(^{144}\) If they were so understood, then there is no difference between \textit{ro-gcig} and this practice of \textit{spros-bral} . . . At the time of \textit{ro-gcig}, appearance . . . and mind both have the same taste \((ro)\), or one says that appearance has risen in meditation. However, this mixing of mind and appearance is not like the dissolution of salt in water . . . Further, at the time of mere appearance nothing is established, and whatever is not established rises as mere appearance. This is \textit{snang-stong} \textit{zung-\'jug} or \textit{snang-stong \textit{than-skyes} [cf. Appendix A]} . . . \textit{gdangs} or \textit{rtsal} or what has attained the status
\end{quote}
of the illusory body is *samvrti-satya*, while not moving away from *gshis* or *prakrti-prabhāsvāra* is *paramārtha-satya*. The point of *zung-*'jug (yuganaddha) is that these two can never be cognised separately. This is the *zung-*'jug or the inseparability of the two *satyas*, while teaching the "white" Dharma of charity and so forth out of the sphere (ngang) of śūnyatā or animitta is called *thabs-shes zung-*'jug.

While it is easy to understand Padma dKar-po's discussion of *spros-bral* without dependence on Vajrayāna terms, that is not possible with this passage. In this sense, the topic of *spros-bral* can be seen as a bridge between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna or between the more theoretical or philosophical and the more practical or meditational or strictly religious. The further pursuit of this connection will demand a more careful analysis of the Vajrayāna terms for their own sake than is possible here. This paper will have achieved one of its main aims if the reader is now persuaded that in Tibet, Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna go together. The exact way in which they do so varies among the different schools; what is presented here, of course, is mainly the point of view of the bKa'-brgyud-pas, and the way the bKa'-brgyud-pas saw their opponents. The detailed views of the other schools themselves must be pursued elsewhere.

APPENDIX A

The following passage is found in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 49b4–50b6:

b4 /de'i phyir snang-sems gnyis-su 'byed mi-shes-pa snang-sems dbyer-med-kyi don-no/ /gnas 'di-la dgongs-nas brtag-gnyis-su/ (HT 1.x.41–2)

Ihan-cig skyes-pa gang skyes-pa//ihan-cig skyes-pa de brjod-byal/
/rang-bzhin lhan-cig skyes zhes brjod//rnam-pa thams-cud sdom-pa geig/

/phyag-rgya rgyu dang bral-ba-las//yo-gi snying-rje thabs-su 'gyur/
/zhes gsungs-pa'i rhang-pa dang-po gnyis-kyi don ni ji-ltar sna-tshogs-su smras- pa'i nges-dom/ snang (50a) stong/ gsal-stong/ bde-stong/ rig-stong sog-st-snang-ba dang stong-pa lhan-cig-tu skyes-pa'i phyir snang-stong lhan-skyes-sogs-su bzhag-pa'o/ 'di'i don-la zhib-mor dp Yad-pa gnad-du che'o/

a2 /de yang dge-l丹-pa/ rang-bzhin-med-pa'i don-gyis don-dam-par cang med mo gsham-gyi bu la-bu dang/ rang-bzhin med-pa'i don-gyis kun-rdzob-tu dngos-po thams-cud med-par nam yang mi-'gyur-ba zhi stel/ 'de'i rgyu-mishan gyis snang-bas yod-mtha dang/ stong-pas med-mtha sel-lo zhes-zer-rol/ 'di ni rtag-chad gnyis-
ka'i phyogs-su lhung-ba ste/ don-dam chad-pa dang/ kun-rdzob rtag-ltar song zhing phyogs gnyis-su gzung rung bsdad-pas gzhi grig-gi steng-du phyogs-lhung sel-shes-sol/

APPENDIX B

The following passages are taken from the rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs. Passages A-E open the work; passages a-r are taken from the spros-bral section.

A: /nges-pa'i don nyams-su myong yang/ /tshig-tsam-gyis phongs-pa de-dag-lad 'di-skad-du smra-bar bya'i (1b1)

B: /gnas-thog-tu 'gyu-ba'i rang ngo shes/ /'gyu-thog-tu gnas-pa'i rang so tshugs-na, gnas-'gyu'i bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ rtse-grig-gi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-no! (1b2)

C: /'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed/ /grol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i mishang rig-na, 'khrul-grol-gyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ spros-bral-gi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-no! (1b3)


E: /rjes-thob chos-nyid-kyi ngang-las mi-g.yol/ /mnayam-gzhag-tu thugs-rg'e'i klong brdel-na/ mnayam-rjes-kyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ spros-med-kyi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-no! (1b5)
a: 'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed/ etc. as in C. (9a3—4)
b: 'khrul-ta gang shar-gyi thog-tu de-nyid gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pas/ 'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed-pa zhes-byal gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pa de-las phyin-chad 'khrul-pa'i chos gan-mi-nyed-pa ni, grol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i mtshang rig-pa zhes-byal/ (9a4—5)
c: lchos thams-cad-kyi gnas-lugs mngon-sum-du rtogs-pa/ don-stpyi-tsam-gyis go-ba dang/ the-thshom thams-cad rang-sar zhig-pas sgru-dogs rang-nas chod-pa zhes-byal/ (10a4—5)
d: /'gshen yang 'khrul-pa kun-nas nyon-mongs-kyi chos thams-cad 'ga' yang yod ma myong-bas 'khrul-pa gzhi-med-du rtogs-pa-la 'khrul-pa'i gnas-lugs rtogs-pa zhes-byal/ (10a6)
e: 'khrul-pa med-na de-las grol rgyu ci yod-de/ med-pas mya-ngan-las-'das-pa' chos ci yang mi-nyed/ de-nas 'khrul-pa dang grol-ba'am/ 'khor-ba dang mya-ngan-las-'das-pa zhes bszag-bya 'jog-byed dang bra-las de yin-nol/ (10b1)
g: ltha-mal-gyi shes-pa zhes-bya-bal/ deng-sang ma-go-ba mang-pas ngan-pa stug stug-zhig-la blo got-kyi 'dug stel de-'dra sgra rig-pa/ phyogs-tsam-la yang ma-phyin-pa'skyon chen-po yin-te/ (11a3—4)
h: pra-krii zhes-pa rang-bzhin na'am tha-mal-la 'jug-pas rang-bzhin-gyis shes-pa zhes-bya-bal yin-nol/ (11a4—5)
j: tha-mal shes-pa de-la 'ga'-zhig-tu rang-bzhin od-gsal/ lla-lar gzi phyag-rgya chen-po sugs ming mtha-yas mod/ de-nyid sngags-gzhung-du rang-bzhin than-skyes zhes-bya-bar grags-so/ (11a6—b1)
l: de-bas-na 'di ni 'khor-'das gnis-ka'i gzhir gyur-par/ brtag-gnis-las/ (HT II.iv.32, 34)
  'di-nyid 'khor-ba zhes-bya stel/'di-nyid mya-ngan-'das-pa-yin/ /zhes dang/ rmongs-phyir 'khor-ba/gzugs-can-te//rmongs-med 'khor-ba dag-pa yin/ (11b4—5)
m: ldes 'khor-'das mtshan-gzhi gcig-tu bshad-pa'mtshan-gzhi de ni 'di yin- nol/ (11b5)
n: /o-na rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa de-la thol-skyes-kyi rig-pur bshad-pa rigs-pa ma-yin-no, snyam-nai/ (11b5—6)
APPENDIX C

STRUCTURE OF THE NGES-DON GRUB-PA’I SHING-RTA
(principal headings only)

gzung-'dzin gnyis-su med-pa) rang-lugs bzhag-pa-la bzhi

dam-pa’i chos-kyi ’khor-lo ngos-gzung, 6b6
de spyod-pa’i gnyen-por bskor-ba’i tshul bstan-pa-la-gsum
drang-don-du drang-nges thams-cad-du gsungs-tshul, 7v4
nges-don-du ci yang ma-gsungs-pa’i tshul, 11b3
yang-dag-par na de gnyis mi-gal-bar bstan-pa, 12b1
bskor-ba yang theg-pa gsum dang gnas-pa bzhir phy-e-la gnyis
thr-g-pa gsum, 13a6

gnas-pa bzhi
bye-brag-tu smra-ba, 16a6
mdo-sde-pa, 17b3
sem-tsam-pa, 19b5

dbu-ma-pa-la gnyis
sgyu-ma lta-bu, 21b5
rab-tu mi-gnas-pa-la gnyis
rang-rgyud-pa, 23a6
thal’gyur-pa, 25a6
de-las skabs-kyi bshad-bya dbu-ma gan-la phab-pa-la gsum

GZHI DBU-MA BDEN-GNYIS ZUNG-JUG-TU THAG-BCAD la gsum

ghi bden-pa gnyis-su gnas-pa’i tshul, 29b5
gnas-pa lla gnyis-su phy-e-ba’i dgos-pa, 33a6
dgos-pa-can-gyi bden-pa gnyis so-sor gTan-la phab-pa-la gsum
kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa, 35b6
don-dam-pa’i bden-pa, 41b1 (not divided)
de gnyis zung-jug-tu gan-la phab-pa, 66a6

LAM DBU-MA THABS-SHES ZUNG-JUG-TU NYAMS-SU BLANG-BA-la gsum

rien-cing ’brel-bar byung-ba dbu-ma’i lama-du bstan, 68a3
de yang-dag-pa’i gdams-ngag-gi nyams-su bstan-tshul, 69a3
des mngon-par rings-pa’i sa ram-par phy-e-ba, 75b6

’BRAS-BU DBU-MA SKU-GNYIS ZUNG-JUG MNGON-DU BYA-BA, 99a4

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BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP: Pañjika on BCA by Prajñākaramati, ed. Vaidya
Tibetan Works

Each entry is introduced by the Tibetan phrase, in italics, by means of which it is identified in the body of the paper. The name of the author is then given, followed by the full title (if necessary), and some indication of the edition used, if there are several.

'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad by Padma dKar-po: dPal 'khor-lo sdom-pa'i rgyud-kyi rnam-par bshad-pa mkha'-gro-ma'i dga-ba rgyud-sde'i snying-po, gsung-'bum vol. 14

Khrid-yig by Padma dKar-po: Jo-bo Nā-ro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i khrid rdo-rje'i theg-pa bgyod-pa'i shing-rta chen-po, rTsi-bri ed.

dGongs-pa rab-gsal by Tsong-kha-pa (commentary on MMV)

Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta by Padma dKar-po: dBu-ma gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'yi shing-rta, gsung-'bum vol. 9

Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje: dBu-ma-la 'jug-pa'yi rnam-bshad dpal-ldan dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung dwags-brgyud grub-pa'yi shing-rta (commentary on MMV)

rNal-'byor bzhi'i lta-mig by Padma dKar-po: Phyag-rgya chen-po rnal-'byor bzhi'i bshad-pa nges-don lta-ba'i mig, gsung-'bum vol. 21

rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs by Padma dKar-po: rNal-'byor bzhi'i bshad-pa don-dam mdzub-tshugs-su bs tan-pa, gsungs-'bum vol. 21

Dus-gsum-mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung by sGam-po-po-pa, rTsi-bri ed.

Phag-gru'i chus-than by sGam-po-po, rTsi-bri ed.

Phyag-chen gan-mdzod by Padma dKar-po: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan-mdzod, gsung-'bum vol. 21

dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa by Mi-la-ras-pa, printed with the Nges-don grub-pa'yi shing-rta, q.v.

rTsi-bri: rTsi-bri (s)Par-ma, edited during the 1920's by 'Khrul-zhig Padma Chos-rgyal

gZhung-'grel by Padma dKar-po: Jo-bo Nā-ro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i gzhung-'grel rdo-rje-'chang gi dgon-gs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa, rTsi-bri ed.

Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho by Dol-po-po Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan

Lam-bslu by Padma dKar-po: collection of short works on bsre-'pho topics, of which the first is called bsre-'pho lam dbye-bslu; rTsi-bri ed.

gSang-'dus-rgyan by Padma dKar-po: gSang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan zhes-nya-ba mar-lugs thun-mong ma-yin pa'i bshad-pa, gsung-'bum vol. 16
Western Works


NOTES

1. For example, Mi-la-ras-pa is a writer of more philosophical interest and acuity than is sometimes thought. After all, philosophy is not only analysis. As a stylist, he is both a good and a popular writer, and even his most informal writings show a nice grasp of technical Buddhist terms. It is not surprising that Padma dKar-po used one of his works as a gzhung for the Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta. The interaction between philosophy and popular culture is something which we do not yet understand well, even in the Western case. If such questions are ever studied in the Tibetan context, Mi-la-ras-pa is likely to be an interesting subject.
2. The main root-text of the dgongs-gcig yig-cha cycle is the rTsa-tshig rdo-rje'i gsung brgya lnga-bcu-pa, essentially by 'Jig-rten mGon-po. Together with a number of other short root-texts, it is found both in the gDams-ngag-mdzod (vol. 9) and in the yig-cha itself (reprinted, e.g., Bir 1975, tracing from the 16th Cent. 'Bri-gung blockprints). According to BA 604-7, the main commentatorial part of the yig-cha and the reduction of 'Jig-rten mGon-po's original 190 aphorisms to 150 are the work of his pupil (not nephew) dBon Shes-rab 'byung-gnas (1187–1241) who was abbot of 'Bri-gung in 1222–34; the texts were written down in 1226.

3. The standard source of the dKar-po chig-thub idea in mahāmudrā is no doubt the Phyag-chen lam-mchog mthar-thug of Zhang brTson-'grus Darmagrags (1123–93), reprinted in both the rTsi-bri Par-ma and in the gDams-ngag-mdzod, vol. 8. Padma dKar-po shows how the dKar-po chig-thub rests on Indian sources, at the same time refuting Sa-skya Pandita, in Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 40b3 ff.

4. Full and abbreviated titles of Tibetan works mentioned frequently in the text may be found in the bibliography.


6. This was an ancestor of the present paper.


8. This remark is meant to be tautologous. I am using "bKa'-brgyud" to mean just "Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud."

9. This is so even for Candrakirti. It is hard to find specific instances of samvrti-satyā in the Prasannapadā, and though paramārtha-satyā is there closely related to śūnyatā and to pratītyasamutpāda, these are themselves very general notions.

10. 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad, 5b5: don mdo-sngags dgongs-pa grig/ dngos zin-la khyad yod-de, mdo-bstan rgyas-bshad lla-bu/.

10a. In Table 1 and the remarks following it, we see that in the mother-tantras great bliss (mahāsukha) is taken as paramārtha-satyā, while voidness endowed with all qualities (sāravākaravāropetā-sūnyatā) is taken as samvrti-satyā, according to Padma dKar-po. There can be no doubt at all that this was his view, e.g., (Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 47b): des-na gyis-kyi dbang-du byas-nas 'gyur-ba-med-pa'i bde-ba-chen-po bzhag/ (glangs-kyi dbang-du byas-nas rnam-pa'i mchog thams-cad-dang-ltan-pa'i stong-pa-myid bzhag/ (dang-po don-dam/ gyis-pa kun-rdzob/ desn thems brgyal-thabs/ don-dam 'bras-bu'am thabs-bhun/ . . . That Padma dKar-po held this view has been correctly pointed out at least twice by Guenther, in his essays "The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism" and "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism" [see Guenther (1977) pp. 57 and 66], in both cases on the basis of this very passage. See also Lam-bshu 97b6, 101a2. The idea is fundamental in Padma dKar-po's thought, and is entwined with his views on the role of the two satyas in the Kālacakra-tantra. See his mChog-gi dang-po'i sangs-rgyas rnam-par phy-va gsang-ba thams-cad bshad-pa'i mdzod, especially 145b–155a.

11. Since this paper does not offer a full account of yuganaddha (or even of Padma dKar-po's view of it), it would be vexatious to go into the details of Guenther's account. He has tried to explain yuganaddha independ-
ently of Madhyamaka notions. I have found this impossible, and I believe the matters dealt with in this paper are an essential preliminary to a full treatment of Padma dKar-po’s conception of yuganaddha, which I will give elsewhere (see Broido (1984)).

12. Deb-thér sngon-po 141b3, quoted up to here by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Dwags-brgyud grub-pa’i shing-rta/763/del-ltar dpal dwags-po bka-brgyud ces grags-pa ’di ni tshig-gi brgyud-pa ma-yin-gyi, don-gyi brgyud-pa yin-la/ donyang phyag-rgya chen-po dri-ma-med-pa’i rtogs-pa’i brgyud-pa yin-te/ bla-ma gang-las phyag-rgya chen-po’i rtogs-pa thob-pa dr-la risa-ba’i bla-ma’o zhes rum-par ’jog go! Most of the topics mentioned by ‘Gos gZhon-nu-dpal in the remainder of this passage are also taken up by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, but with some important changes. Roerich’s translation (BA 724–5) is adequate (apart from the misidentification of the Theg-pa chen-po rgyud bla-ma’i bstan-bcos as a tantra).

13. risa-ba’i bla-ma, mūlاغuru, root-guru.


15. Phag-mo Grū-pa rDo-rje rGyal-po (1110–1170) was the principal disciple of sGam-po-pa.

16. ‘Bri-gung sKyob-pa ’Jig-rten mGon-po (1143–1217), the founder of the ‘Bri-gung tradition of the bKa’-brgyud, was among Phag-mo Grū-pa’s principal disciples.

17. The reference is probably to Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ rGyal-mtshan (1182–1251).

18. ye-shes.

19. so-so’i skye-bo, prthagjana.

20. dbang-po rab: the text frequently distinguishes among sharp, average and poor (rab, ’bring, thua-ma) intellect or senses.

21. khyad-par gsum-dang-lAan-pa’i de-bzhin-nyid. The three features are probably bde-ba (happiness), gsal-ba (clarity), and mi-rtog-pa (absence of discursiveness).

22. See note 7.

23. bzhed-pa.


25. Ibid., 31b–32a.


27. sGam-po-pa’s view of the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa distinction is based on differences in the degree of purification (Phag-grū’i zhus-lan, 3a3); see also Broido (1979).

28. Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa’i zhus-lan, 82a4. sGam-po-pa’s very interesting views on the lta-bal/gsom-pa distinction are developed at more length at 77b1 ff.


30. Cognition (shes-pa) is contrasted with awareness (ye-shes); the Skt. for both is jñāna. These English equivalents are quite rough and pre-analytical.

31. blo’i yul-las ’das-pa (cf. BCA IX.2).

32. khas-len-dang-bral-ba (from the verb khas-len-pa, Skt. abhyupagam-).

33. Phag-grū’i zhus-lan, 4a2 ff., extracts. The passage also quotes HT
1.viii.36 and I.v.11. Cf. rNal-byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs, 10b4 (passage f of Appendix B).

34. This row gives the main divisions of the Prāsaṅgika section of the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta (cf. Appendix C).

35. This row gives the main divisions of the cig-car-ba section of the gzhung-grel.

36. 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i ruam-bshad, 5b4 and 8a3 (lit. "one artha").

37. Ibid. 5b4 (lit. "a view with one artha").

38. Ibid. 5b5 and 8a4 (lit. "one intention"); here more comparable with Skt. prayojana than say abhiprāya; cf. Broido (1983)).

39. Ibid. 6a3.

40. Ibid. 6a1.

41. Ibid. 5b5.

42. Ibid. 5b4.

43. Ibid. 8b1; cf. Kālacakratantra III.100 ff.

44. Ibid. 6a3.

45. Ibid. 5b3, 6a3.

46. Ibid. 5a5, 6a3. However Mi-bskyod rDo-rje appears to accept what Padma dKar-po rejects, even quoting the same verse by Maitripa (Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, 5ab). This appearance of disagreement is another trap; Padma dKar-po is here concerned with the claim that the bla-ma's instruction (really: the Vajrayāna) is essential, while Mi-bskyod rDo-rje wishes to uphold the amanaskāra writings of Maitripa. For Padma dKar-po on these writings, see Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 16a3 ff. where they are also listed and classified. However, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not seem to say clearly that the goal-conception is the same in sūtras and mantras or that one does in fact reach the same goal.

47. Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, 9b5.

48. Ibid. 10a3; probably Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan (1292–1361).

49. Ibid. 10a6.

50. Ibid. 11a1: Bo-dong-pa chen-po (Rin-chen rTse-mo? Phyogs-las rNam-rgyal?).

51. Ibid. 11a4.

52. Seyfort Ruegg's interesting paper (Ruegg 1983) concentrates mainly on the lineages, and is less concerned with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's doctrinal summary or with his attempts to refute the competing views of the sūtra/mantra relation in the introduction to the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta.


54. Strictly speaking, this should apply in the mother-tantras.


56. Ibid. 9b4–6.

57. Ibid. 9b5: mtha'-'dzin dang spros-'dzin-gyi dgag-byas bsgrub-byas ci yang mi-sgrub-pa'i spros-bral-gyi cha-nas khyad-par-med.

58. These words are scattered through ibid. 10a3–6, but the position
is well-known from other quotations and from the Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho.

60. Ibid. 10a6.
61. Ibid. 10b2.
63. Ibid. 11a1.
64. Ibid. 29b2 and b6.
65. Ibid. 11a4: blo rto-gpas phar bzhag-min-pa'i yul rang ngo-nas grub-pa'i bden-grub-khis stong-pa'i stong-nyid-la mdo-sngags-kyi dbu-ma'i lla-ba.
66. Ibid. 31a1.
67. tha-snyad tshad-grub, ibid.
68. In “Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta,” “nges-don” may be a comment on the title of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s work (Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta).
69. yuganaddha (zung-'jug) has been differently interpreted. See below.
70. Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 30b5.
71. don-dam-pa ni yang-dag-par gzigs-pa-rnams-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi yul-nyid-khyis bdag-gi ngo-bo rmyed-par yin-gyi . . . Exactly this form is found in the sDe-dge ed. of MMV (34a6); in Poussin’s ed. (p. 102); and in the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta (for once expressly signalled as a quotation, 33a5). In Tsong-kha-pa’s Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho the corresponding passage is again expressly signalled as a quotation, and differs only by the phrase rang-gi bdag-gi ngo-bo for btag-gi ngo-bo (242a4).
72. de-nyid (tattva in the verse).
73. The Sanskrit of MMV VI.23 is quoted in BCAP (174):

    samyagmryadarsanaalabdhabhavam
    rupadvayaambhrati sarvabhavah //
    samyagdrjyam yo visayah sa tattvam
    meyadrjyam samvetsatyam ukta m //

75. Ratnavâlî II.4a, quoted and discussed in Ruegg (1981).
76. MMV VI.28 and bhâsya on it, quoted at length in Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 36b6 ff. As Williams (1979) has pointed out, this absence of satya in the case of the prthâgâjana has been emphasized by Tsong-kha-pa; but it holds equally good for the bKa'-brgyud-pas.
77. MK XXIV.8 and PSP on it, quoted Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta 30b2. Padma dKar-po (ibid.) emphasizes that Mi-la-ras-pa makes the same point (op. cit. 3a3 ff.).
78. Compare Table 2, which relates to the darâna-mårga and levels above it.
vā tatāgatānām sūtaivaśām dharmānām dharmatā dharmasthitī dharmaniyāmātā
dharmatā dharmasthitī dharmaniyāmātā/

80. Lānkh., ibid. What is important in all these passages is the insistence that certain features of experience persist through the changing states of the experiencing subject. Later we will see that the bKa'-brgyud-pas held that a similar kind of persistence can hold for the objects of experience (such as a pot). Now in a general sort of way it is this kind of persistence which is the necessary ground for a distinction between facts of experience or facts about the world, and other kinds of facts (say facts of language). We will see that a distinction of this type, even though expressed unclearly and in quite unfamil iar language, is an important feature of bKa'-brgyud-pa thought.

81. Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 42b3. The repudiation of these claims is said to be found in MMV, but I do not know where.

82. BCAP 175.21: vāstutastu paramārthā eva ekam satyam . . . (and, quoting a sūtra:) ekameva bhikṣavah paramam satyam yaduta apramodadharmā nirvānām, etc. (This is not quite the same as the passage at PSP 41.4.) In the same vein, Padma dKar-po says that ultimately (paramārthatas) there are not two satyas (don-dam-par bden-pa gnyis yod-pa ma-yin-te, etc.: Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 34a1; he ascribes this to PSP too).

83. See note 71. This passage appears in note 17 of Williams (1981) and there seems to be ascribed to Tsong-kha-pa. This does not matter very much, since in the dGongs-pa rab-gsal on MMV V.23 we find (107b3): . . . don-dam-nil yang-dag-pa'i don mngon-sum-du mthong-ba-rnam-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par- gyi yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi rang-gi ngo-bo rnyed-pa yin-gyi/ . . . This is Tsong-kha-pa's own observation and not a quotation. What is important is that in all four versions of the quotation from Candrakīrti (see note 71) and even in Tsong-kha-pa's own adaptation of the quotation, the instrumental yul-nyid-kyis persists. See note 87.

85. Ibid. ch. 3; also pp. 207–8. It seems possible that the notion of a feature-placing language might enable us to describe intelligibly a number of puzzling features of Buddhist thought. Whereas our ordinary conceptual framework commits us to objective particulars, the retreat to a feature-placing language removes this commitment. Yet the feature-placing language does not commit us to the absence of objective particulars either, since it contains the basis for their (re-)introduction (p. 207).

87. See the opening pages of Williams (1981). (However he translates yul by “sphere”). Though Williams quotes the critical passage with the instrumental particle (yul-nyid-kyis, see notes 71 and 83), that instrumental has disappeared in his translation (p. 69, middle). In the same passage he translates chos-can (i.e., dharmin, the mind or cognition which owns dharmas [e.g., Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 55b5]) by dharma (i.e., roughly yul, as sGam-po-pa himself points out [Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, ibid.]). The general effect of these changes made by Williams is to make Tsong-kha-pa's text seem more “objective” than would otherwise be the case. I have not studied Tsong-kha-pa much and if experts say so, I am prepared to accept that the general slant of his thought supports this “objective” interpretation; but this interpretation is not
supported by these particular passages. This is a very complex problem and probably demands detailed study comparing the works of several writers of different schools.

88. See the end of the previous section. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje’s continual references to sahaja (lhan-skyes), e.g., Dwags-brgyud grub-pa’i shing-rta 31a 1, a2 (twice), a4, a5, a6, b1 (twice), b2, b4 (twice) etc. . . . always refer back to sGam-po-pa’s famous lines (e.g., *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa’i zhús-lan* 81b 4):

\[\text{sems-nyid lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-kyi sku/} \\
\text{snang-ba lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-sku’i ‘od/}\]

which are the traditional starting-point (gz/iung) for almost every bKa’-brgyud-pa account of sahajayoga-mahāmudra (phyag-rgya chen-po lhan-cig skyes-shyur) and of which Guenther has rightly made so much (e.g., Guenther 1972, pp. 17, 24, etc.). Mind and appearance are here taken to be inseparable, like sandalwood and its smell, or the sun and its light (sGam-po-pa, ibid.). Here *sems-nyid* (corresponding to paramātha-satya) is not the object of anything, but is the nature of mind (sGam-po-pa, ibid.) or is awareness (ye-shes, ibid. 53b 4); while *snang-ba*, appearance, is also not an object but is the vikalpa which arises from mind (ibid. 81b 5) and corresponds to samvrti-satya. Since they arise together, neither can be established (grub-pa) as a basis for the other (cf. bhāṣya on MMV VI. 23). MMV VI. 80, discussed below, treats samvrti as the cause of paramārtha. One may wonder how vikalpa can be the cause of the dharmakāya; Padma dKar-po’s description of this process will be dealt with later in this paper, while sGam-po-pa treats it at *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa’i zhús-lan* 78b 1.

89. The Sanskrit for *ngo-bo* here is rūpa (see note 73). In the bhāṣya, the Sanskrit for rang-gi ngo-bo was perhaps svāraṇa.

90. In the *dGongs-pa rab-gsal* on MMV VI. 23 (cf. note 83), Tsong-kha-pa repeats Candrakirti’s point that the two satyas are two *ngo-bo*’s, but later says that they have a single *ngo-bo*: *ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad-pa byas-pa dang mi-rtag-pa lha-ba-stel*, etc. In his valuable “Identity and referential opacity in Tibetan Buddhist Logic” (presented at the IABS conference in Oxford, 1982), Dr. T. Tillemans points out that the phrase *ngo-bo gcig ldog-pa tha-dad* is a technical term found in dGe-lugs works on pramāṇa. He also pointed out to me its appearance in the dGongs-pa rab-gsal.

91. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that it is futile to speculate about whether the two satyas have one *ngo-bo* or two: *bden-gnyis ngo-bo gcig dang tha-dad gang-du’ang rtsog-pa ga-la byed, Dwags-brgyud grub-pa’i shing-rta* on MMV VI. 23, 144b 1. He attributes to Tsong-kha-pa the view that they have only one *ngo-bo* (ibid. 143a 1), and criticizes this view at some length.

92. Padma dKar-po’s *Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta* contains a long section on the sense in which the satyas, as foundation (gzhi) are two: gzhi bden-pa gnyis-su gnas-pa’i tshul, 30a 6 ff. (cf. Appendix C). He discusses their *ngo-bo* at some length (based, e.g., on the classical sources MK XV 2–3 and PSP on them), without committing himself to any view on whether there are one or two *ngo-bo*’s. He probably thought, like Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, that the question has no clear answer.

94. In spite of its title, Nāropa's Sekoddēśatikā is a commentary not on the Sekoddēśa, but on the abhisparṣapotyā of the Kalacakratantra. Even so, the verse quoted by Guenther from the Sekoddēśatikā (see note 93) is found in the Sekoddēśa (49.7 in the Lokesh Chandra ed.), but originated in the Guhyasamājatantra (XVIII.78).

95. gZhmig-'grel 14b1, Khrid-yig 7a6. Here, gnas-lugs as paramārtha-satya is to be distinguished from dngus-po'i gnas-lugs which includes both satyas; see below and Broido (1979).

96. māyādeha, sgyu-lus.

97. vajrakāya, rdo-rje'i lus, especially regarded as containing the system of nādi's through which move vāyu and bindu.

98. Guenther (1977), p. 67. Here he is right in correlating gshis and gdangs with the two satyas. I find his use of the words “being,” “reality,” “true,” “false,” “refer,” “item,” “thing,” etc., in this and similar contexts totally confusing.

99. E.g., Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 66b5: 'yang-dag-pa'i kun-rdzob nil gnyug-ma lhan-cig skyes-pa 'gro-ha-thams-cad-kyi rgyud-la rang-chas-su gnas-pa yin-lel de yang 'gro-ba kun-gyi lus-la gzung-dzin-gyi 'khrul-pa mi-'har-zhing! mi-rig-pa yang-babs-su gnas-pa'i rtsa dbu-ma zhes-pa dwangs-shing thogs-pa-med-pa'i 'od-khyi rang-bzhin-du gyur-pa'i risa rgyen gang-gis kyang gzhom-du-med-pa gtsos-ba spyi gisg-nas ghang-gnas-khyi bar-du khyab-ring!, etc. “samyaksamvrti: in itself it is at rest, it is sahaja, it abides in the santāna of all beings; then in the body of all beings the straying into subject and object does not rise, and this is called the central channel which abides in non-discursiveness and letting go (lit. falling by itself, rang-babs). This channel which is clear and which has the nature of unimpeded light and is not conquered by any pratiyāya, penetrates right from the top of the head to the secret place, etc.” Later in the same passage: “these three dwangs-ma are called ‘the middle’ or ‘at rest’ because they have not fallen into the extremes of nihilism or eternalism or of subject and object, and because in the end they are non-deceptive they are called samyag or paramārtha.” In the oral tradition I have heard this samyaksamvrti explained as an obscured paramārtha (bsgribs-pa'i don-dam).

100. The notion of yaganaddha in the tantras derives from the Guhyasamāja cycle; though it does not seem to appear in the main tantra or its uttaratantra, it is common in the ākhyā-tantras such as the fiānavajrasamuccaya and the Vajramālā. As Wayman points out in his Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra, the Vajramālā is probably the original source for the five kramas whose theory is systematized in Nāgārjuna's Pañcakrama; they are vajrajāpa, cittavisuddhi, svādhiśthāna, abhisambodhi, and yaganaddha. (Poussin has confused matters by starting his ed. of the Pañcakrama with the pindikrtasādhana, which is a separate work.) Various Indian views on the naming and numbering of the kramas are reviewed in detail in Tsong-kha-pa's Rim-lnga rab-gsal sgron-me (79a2) and briefly in Padma dKar-po's gSang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan (16a3).

101. Pañcakrama 11.5–6, V.20, 26, all quoted Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 157a6 ff. Here bhūtakoṣṭha (yang-dag-mha) stands for the radiant light.

102. Ibid. 157b6.
103. Ibid. 155a5 ff.

105. Padma dKar-po quotes this passage at Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 84a6 and says himself that it is on gnas-lugs phyag-chen.

106. Ibid. 93a4.

107. Ibid. 92a5.

108. Guenther seems to have had this passage in mind when discussing the gshis and gdangs of a conch-shell (1977, p. 69 and fn.). Unfortunately, his explanation operates with a very confused notion of sensa.

109. gZhung-'grel, 24a5 ff. But even here it is important not to give “appearance” and “rebirth” any ontological status. A person who, in the bar-do between death and rebirth, cannot rise straight into the dharma-kaya (ibid. 284a4) or less directly into the sambhogakaya (ibid. 287b6) but who is still capable of recognising appearances for what they are, can pass through the rebirth process without getting tangled up in it and can be reborn in the nirmanakaya (spral-sku) state (ibid. 288b4). These observations of Padma dKar-po are perhaps the doctrinal foundation for Guenther's apparently bizarre translation of nirmanakaya by “authentic being-in-the-world” (e.g., 1963, p. 47 n.5). One might put it this way: the three buddhakayas are associated with the two satyas in the way described by Padma-dKar-po, and the latter have an axiological component which I think is evident to many Buddhologists, thought it does not seem clear how to “get it out of the texts.” There is something “genuine” or “authentic” about the satyas. (I am indebted to David Seyfort Ruegg for a conversation on this important but rather confusing topic.)

110. Yang-dgon-pa, Ri-chos yon-tan kun-byung, sec. sha, sa. Now at lam-bsdu 101a3, Padma dKar-po attributes the distinction between gnas-lugs phyag-chen and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen to Yang dgon-pa, and Guenther, in reference to this passage, translates these phrases by “authentic” and “inauthentic” mahamudra. From the Ri-chos yon-tan kun-byung one can see that these translations are not wrong for Yang-dgon-pa himself, but they miss the point of the distinction as made by Padma dKar-po. Roughly speaking, while Yang-dgon-pa concentrates on the “errant” aspect of 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen, Padma dKar-po recognises it as the source of both authenticity and inauthenticity (in Guenther's terms). This point is quite clear in the Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, but it is possible to miss it in the lam-bsdu, especially if one does not have Yang-dgon-pa's own account to hand. Thus in Broido (1979, p. 62 and fnn. 6.2, 6.3), while realising that Guenther's translation is not consistent with the gan-mdzod account, I offered a version which was still confused by the failure to distinguish properly between Padma dKar-po's view and that of Yang-dgon-pa.

111. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 84b6—91a1.
112. Ibid. 85a4.

114. Ibid. 91b2–3.

115. Ibid. 50a1 (see Appendix A: /de yang dge-ltan-pa/ . . .).

116. Ibid. 49b5 (see Appendix A: . . . brtag-gnyis-su’i . . .).

117. Ibid. 50b3 (see Appendix A, rim-lnga’i . . .).

118. PK VI.2 and 13. With minor variations these verses appear also in the *bk’a’ yang-dag-pa’i tshad-ma* and so receive considerable commentary in the *gZhung-’grel*, 370b4 and 375a3.

119. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 156b2. The connection between *sahaja* and *akṛtima* was appreciated by the early dGe-lugs-pas, as one can see from extracts from the *sNgags-rim chen-mo* of Tsong-kha-pa and the *rGyud-sde spyi’i rnam-bzha* of mKhas-grub-rje, printed by D. Seyfort Ruegg in his *Life of Bu ston Rin-po-che* (Rome: ISMEO 1966), p. 62 etc. Padma dKar-po’s point is that they did not make the connection between *sahaja* and *yuganaddha*; this is certainly born out by the (quite extensive) extracts on *yuganaddha* printed by Seyfort Ruegg. Similar remarks apply to the extracts from Tsong-kha-pa’s *mchen-’grel* on PPD printed by Wayman in his *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra*. On the other hand, Thu’u-bkvan Blo-bzang Chos-kyi Nyi-ma (1732–1802) was certainly aware of the *sahaja/yuganaddha* relation (Ruegg, op. cit., p. 59), but in connection with the Sa-skya tradition.


121. According to some sources (BA 660–1; *’Brug-pa’i chos-’byung* 283ab; *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* (23b2), Gling-ras went first to Khyung-tshang Ras-pa, but his real teachers for the *snyan-brgyud* were the latter’s pupils Lo and Sum-pa. Other sources such as Padma dKar-po’s *gsan-yig* and the mss. of the *Yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum* give a different picture. The complexities of the early transmission history of the *snyan-brgyud* would repay independent study.

Among the specialities of the *snyan-brgyud* are the 13- and 62-deity- Mandalas of Cakrasaṃvara; these did not come to the *’Brug-pas* till later (*gsan-yig* 51a3). The root-text for the *snyan-brgyud* practices is Nāropa’s *Kāraṇajñānavajra-pada*, with its *sa-bcads* and commentaries by both gTsang-smyon and Padma dKar-po. Padma dKar-po taught the *snyan-brgyud* widely, and his *sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum* was the subject of subcommentary by Jam-dpal dPa-bo (c. 1780: *sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu’i rnam-bshad yang-gsal-gyi zin-bris*, 2 vols., twice republished recently). Many of the *snyan-brgyud* practices are still followed today in Bhutan, Ladakh, etc.


123. *gZhung-’grel* 176b–179b; *Khrid-’yig* 19b4. See also Broido (1979), p. 61.

124. *gZhung-’grel* 179a1, *khrid-’yig* 20a2.

125. At *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 96b5 ff., Padma dKar-po criticises at some length Tsong-kha-pa’s claims to teach a *sgom-rim* which will reach *nges-don* (*nītārtha*). [The difference here is a matter of substance, and not merely of differing interpretations of the word *nges-don*, on which Tsong-kha-pa and
Padma dKar-po were fairly much in agreement, as against, say, Bu-ston. For Bu-ston on the *niitártha/neyartha* distinction, see his *bDe-gshegs snying-po mdzes-rgyan* (e.g., 11b2) as regards the sūtras. The three authors were more in agreement in regard to the tantras. For detailed references, see Broido (1983).]

126. Padma dKar-po describes Gling-ras as a *cig-car-ba* and rGya-ras as a *thod-rgal-ba* (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 23b4, 24a1); other examples are found in his *chos-'byung*.

127. As bibliographical terms, the phrases *Dwags-po chos-bzhi* and *Lam-gyi mchog rin-po-che'i phreng-ba*, while not identical, seem to overlap a good deal. See vol. 11-12 of Padma dKar-po's *gsung-'bum*. However, the collection of aphorisms in 28 sections, also called *lam-mchog-gi rin-po-che'i phreng-ba*, has nothing to do with the *Dwags-po chos-bzhi*.

128. Williams (1953) as quoted above (referring to *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta* 67b4 ff., quoted extensively in his note 17). All Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's opponents are there said to be working with concepts that cannot lead to *moksa*: "Jo-nang-pa dang Shākya mchog-idan-sogs bod phal-cher ... thar-lam-lus log-par zhugs-pa . . . ."

129. rNal-'byor bzhi'i lla-mig, 7ab.

130. See Padma dKar-po's rNal-'byor bzhi'i r'r u mig, a 1-folio chart summarizing the divisions of the "four yogas," printed together with the *mdzub-tshugs* in all the usual editions.

131. See the *Phyag-chen zin-bris*, and Si-tu bStan-pa'i Nyin-byed's *Phyag-chen smon-lam 'grel-pa*, 45b-47a.

132. Part of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism of Tsong-kha-pa's notion of the two *satyas* is formulated in terms of the claim that Tsong-kha-pa's *paramārtha-satya* is not *spros-bral* (*nisprāṇa*): see *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 138b1 ff.

133. PSP on MK 18.5 (quoted by Williams (1980), note 135). Also for Parma-dKar-po, this is the most important Indian Madhyamaka source on *nisprāṇa*.

134. blo dman-pa rnams: rNal-'byor bzhi'i *mdzub-tshugs*, 17b3.

135. In this remark, the word *niitártha* connects the subject-matter with *paramārtha-satya*, probably with *nisparāṇa-paramārtha*, a connection made explicit in the parallel passage *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 96b5. See note 125. For Padma dKar-po's use of the term *rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam* and similar terms, see Broido (1983).


138. A portion of this has also been covered by Guenther (1977, pp. 77-8). However, the passage on his p. 77 comes from the *lla-mig* (not the *mdzub-tshugs*). The passage on his p. 78 translates passage k: of Appendix B (up to . . . zur-nu 'jug-pa yin-nu/). Some of Guenther's renderings of individual terms are very idiosyncratic, e.g., "conateness" for *lhan-cig skyes-pa*; "forbid every formulation by concept or by speech" for *spros-bral*; "unique kind of whole" for *rLse-gcig*, etc. For reasons given below, I also think his translation of *tha-mal-gyi 'shes-pa* by "primordial knowledge" does not pay enough attention to what Padma dKar-po himself says about this phrase in this very context.
In spite of these details, however, Guenther seems to have got the gist of what Padma dKar-po was saying.

139. Very unusually, Padma dKar-po has given the definitions B-E in the sa-bcad and then repeated each at the beginning of the relevant section; I have followed him for the case of spros-bral.

140. don spyi. This really means a mental object postulated purely to serve as the referent for an otherwise non-referring term, as T. Tillemans has shown (in his paper mentioned in note 90).

141. E.g., rNal-’byor bzhi’i mdzub-tshugs, 12a.1.

142. Ibid. 13b1.

143. Ibid. 13b-14a (extracts).

144. spros-bral-gyi dus-su snang-ba thams-cad sems-nyid-du rtogs sa’am/ martsogs/, etc. Of course, this use of sems-nyid is not ontological in any way and does not commit Padma dKar-po to some kind of mentalism. The bKa’-brgyud-pas thought that mind and mental processes are important. That is another matter from being a mentalist. Guenther recognizes this distinction in his essay “Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy” (1977 pp. 162-177) and yet sweepingly ascribes a mentalistic position to the bKa’-brgyud-pas in general (top of p. 166) on the basis of just such quotations (from the Phyag-chen zla-zer) as support merely the view that mind and mental events are important. He is right in saying that the bKa’-brgyud-pas used sems-nyid in a different sense from the rNying-ma-pas, but mistaken in saying that the later bKa’-brgyud-pas did not distinguish between sems and sems-nyid. (On the other hand there appears to be some mentalism in the thought of the early bKa’-brgyud-pas).

145. dBang-phyug rdo-rje’s account is mainly directed to the rim-gyis-pa. It contains (140b6) the following summary, which may be compared with passages B-E of Appendix B: zhi-lhag zung-du ’brel-ba’i rgyun-la rise geig-tu gnas-pa de rise-geig/ /sems-kyis sems-nyid skye-med-du gsal sing-gi shar-ba de’i rang-ngos-nas ’khor gsun-gyi spros-pa dang bral-ba spros-bral/ /snang-ha sna-tshogs-su snang yang rang-gi sems-nyid-du ro geig cing bdag-zshan ’khor-’das-sogs gnyis chos thams-cud ro geig-tu gyur-pa ro-geig/ /rin-min phan-tshun gang-du blas kyang rang-gi sems-nyid de’ang bsgom-bya sgom-byed-la-sogs-la gang-du’ang ma-grub-par ’od-gsal-du cham-cham ’char-ba sgom-med-kyi rnal-’byor zhes-bya’o/ Roughly speaking, these remarks explain the references of the four terms for one who already knows their senses, while in B-E of Appendix B, Padma dKar-po explains their references without making use of their senses.