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events and then applying antidotes to increase benefit and decrease suffering. These categories of moment-events are then discarded for the more advanced theories of the Yogācāra, which are seen as being based experientially in meditation. This allows for a non-fixed base of viewing and a dynamic approach to the human situation. Thus, the use of the word "psychological" must be understood in light of Buddhist notions, and not tied to Western theories.

I have two minor reservations about this work. The first is that the general index is so short as to be nearly useless. Some of the problem is corrected by an extensive index of proper names. However, more should have been added to the general index.

The second is Dr. Anacker's tendency to employ hyphenated and multi-hyphenated words to express technical terms. Although this cannot at all times be avoided, there are definite examples of abuse. A case in point: "A Discussion of the Five Aggregates," one will find the term "kusala mūla" translated as "root-of-the-beneficial" (e.g., p. 66). Certainly there must be alternatives to translating a term with three hyphens separating the elements.

Overall, this is an outstanding contribution to the field of Buddhist Studies in general and to Yogācāra studies in particular: scholars interested in Mahāyāna developments and later Indian philosophy/psychology will find considerable information here that should prove most useful.

A.W. Hanson-Barber


As Prof. Thurman points out in his introduction to this book, "Even in recent times, great critical scholars such as Stcherbatski (sic) and Murti were misled . . . into thinking that the Centrists were 'metaphysical absolutists' who repudiated all forms of logic whatsoever, along with the meaningfulness of all language." (p. 57) An outstanding testament to the contrary is this fine
translation and study of Tsong kha pa's *Legs bshad snying po* along with the versified *rTen 'brel bsod pa*, a milestone in the study of Mādhyamika philosophy and in particular of the significant contribution of the Tibetan exegetes in that field.

The *Legs bshad snying po* (the "Essence"), a detailed examination of some of the most subtle notions in Buddhist philosophy, is famed in the Tibetan scholastic community for its rigorous, finely tuned arguments and, for that reason, its great difficulty and profundity. The work is primarily a presentation and defense of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika position (here rendered "Dialectic Centrism"), and it considers in depth the implications and flaws in the assertions of the Svātantrikas ("Dogmaticist Centrists"), Yogācārins ("Experientialists"), Sautrāntikas ("Traditionalists"), Sautrāntika-Yogācārin logicians, Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, and various Tibetan predecessors of Tsong-kha-pa, including the Jo-nang-pas. (Criticism of these teachers, however, is handled delicately and with all due respect by Tsong-kha-pa; for example, it is implied that Asaṅga, in true Buddhist upāya-kauñśīya-style, taught Yogācāra to accord with the inclinations of his disciples, even though his own understanding was of the highest Centrist sort.)

The *Essence* opens with an examination of the varying statements in the Buddhist texts concerning *svaḥaśasānāsaiddhi* ("intrinsic identifiability") and its relevance to the three *niḥsvabhāvas* ("unrealities": lakṣaṇa, utpāda and paramārtha) and the three *svabhāvas* ("natures": parikalpita, paratantra and parinīstapana). From the start, the hermeneutical question is raised as to which of the three turnings of the wheel are *nītārtha* ("definitive") and which are *neyārtha* ("interpretable"), and statements from the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* and many other scriptures are cited throughout. The discussion elicits an investigation of such key Buddhist issues as the differing Mādhyamika interpretations of *paramārtha* and *sāṃvrti sātya* ("ultimate" and "superficial reality"); the role of the *pramāṇas* ("validating cognitions") and of *yukti* ("analytic reason") in establishing existence; the validity of the *svatantrānumāṇa* ("private syllogism"); the nature of *samāropa* ("reification") and *apavāda* ("repudiation"); the Sautrāntika theory on the unreality of universals and the Yogācārin position on *svabhāva* and *viśeṣa vikalpāṇa* ("ascriptive" and "descriptive designation"); the implications of positing an *ālaya-vijñāna* ("fundamental consciousness") and *svasamvedanā* ("apperception"); the reality status of external objects; the distinction between *prasajya* and *paryudāsa pratiśedha* ("absolute" and "implicative neg-
ation”); and differences in the understanding of dharma and pud-gala nairātmya (“objective” and “personal selflessness”).

The author of this dense treatise, the 14th-century Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang Grags-pa, is famed as a reformer and as founder of the dGe-lugs-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, which has since become the largest school in that country and the formal sectarian affiliation of the Dalai Lamas. In his introduction, Thurman provides us with a detailed biography of Tsong-kha-pa (along with shorter accounts of the lives of the other philosophers mentioned in the book), and this allows us a glimpse of Tsong-kha-pa’s impressive training in Buddhist thought and practice.

Thurman, Associate Professor of Religion at Amherst College, is in fact one of the principal scholars who have been endeavoring to bring this master’s work to light in recent years. Alex Wayman (whose Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, New York, 1978, translates a major part of the Lam rim chen mo) and Jeffrey Hopkins (whose Tantra in Tibet and Yoga in Tibet, London, 1977 and 1981, present the first sections of the sNgags rim chen mo) are the other Buddhologists known for their work on Tsong-kha-pa, in addition to such competent philosophers as Paul Williams, Michael Broido, Tom J.F. Tillemans, and a number of Tibetan and Western scholars publishing translations with the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala. Thurman himself has already edited a collection of translations of Tsong-kha-pa’s work (Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, Dharamsala, 1982, including a section from the Lam rim chung ngu).

Thurman’s current book represents close to fifteen years of research, and he deserves much credit for his extensive personal contacts with the living Tibetan tradition, which inform this translation throughout. His learned notes to the text itself, in which he provides copious citations from the Sanskrit works referred to therein, and his lengthy introduction to the doctrinal and historical background of the text, are tributes to Thurman’s own abilities. He finds that most Western commentators have fallen either into the trap of making an overly mystical interpretation of Buddhism, or an overly relativistic and nihilistic one, in both cases failing to appreciate the sophisticated philosophical developments in Buddhist logic, epistemology, etc. Thurman, on the contrary, wants to conceive of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein as the modern representatives of the lineages of Maitreya and Mañjuśrī. Thurman has been particularly struck by the appropriateness of giving a Buddhist reading to Wittgenstein. This has already been advanced in a general
way by Chris Gudmunsen (Wittgenstein and Buddhism, London, 1977), who equated that philosopher's critique of Bertrand Russell with the Mādhyamika critique of the Abhidharmaists. Thurman refines the parallel by asserting that it is the Svātantrika admission of a real "intrinsic identifiability" on the conventional level that entails the most subtle and thereby most problematical version of a private language doctrine. I am not qualified to pronounce upon how closely the Prāsaṅgika refusal to posit any sort of independently real status, conventional or absolute, is analogous with Wittgenstein's thinking, but certainly this sort of comparison, if approached cautiously and with adequate grounding in both traditions, facilitates a modern evaluation of the relevance of Buddhist philosophy.

On only a few points must Thurman's statements be questioned. One of the most noteworthy is his claim that the rNying-ma-pa philosopher Klong-chen-Rab-'byams-pa preserves the "Idealist Dogmaticist Centrism of Sāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla" (p. 62): in fact it is generally accepted that Klong-chen-pa puts forth the supremacy of the Prāsaṅgika view, in particular in his Yid bzhin gyi mchod and its commentary Padma dkar po (Gangtok, 1966). It should also be pointed out that the dust jacket's assertion that Tsong-kha-pa is "universally acknowledged as the greatest Tibetan philosopher" would not be assented to by members of the several Tibetan schools other than that of Tsong-kha-pa, despite the high regard in which he is held.

The translation itself is an admirable rendering of a very difficult text: if at times the English locutions seem wordy and complex, this can confidently be attributed in most cases to the original Tibetan itself. Thurman is to be thanked for his numerous explanatory notes, where he restates some of the more obscure arguments (usually in a simpler way) and fills out the many ellipses where Tsong-kha-pa assumed the reader's familiarity with the subject matter. Comparing two passages of the translation with the original for clarification on points of my own interest, I found Thurman's comprehension of the text to be consistently sound. Apart from such lapses as the dropping of phrases (discovered, however, in both of the passages I consulted), mostly to be remarked upon are the inevitable questions concerning the translation of technical terms. Thurman's renderings are usually ingenious and innovative, such as his ubiquitous "intrinsic identity" for svalaksana; the simple "technique" for ṣāpāya; "fundamental consciousness" for ālayavijñāna, following the Tibetan; and even his "thing" for dharma. Other choices seem
rather strained, e.g., "truth-habit" for satyagraha which suggests a positive connotation for what in this context is a wrong mental attitude, or "evolution" for karma. I would also like to remark that "Centrism" for Mādhyamika, while reading well in English as the name for a philosophical view, seems to lose some of the wonderful sense of unspecifiability that a more literal translation using "middle" could retain.

More serious, perhaps, is a certain lack of rigorous consistency in the rendering of the same technical term: admittedly such terms can have different connotations in different contexts, but when the same word appears several times in a single passage and with the same meaning, to vary its translation adds unnecessary confusion and is inexcusable. Examples are yang-dag, which is translated both as "authentic" and "reality," the latter actually being Thurman's term for don in this passage (p. 283); bsam-pa, which becomes "mental habits" and "habitual thoughts" in the same section (p. 284); and mngon-par brjod-pa, which appears alternatively as "verbal formulation," "verbalization," and "formulation" in a single passage (p. 215 ff.).

A final point concerns the lack of Tibetan-English and Sanskrit-English glossaries, which would have been easy enough to generate, since an English-Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary has been prepared. This absence makes it difficult, for the reader who lacks a grasp of Thurman's conventions, to use the index to locate passages discussing technical subjects of interest, and is the reason why it seemed useful to resurrect some of the principal Sanskrit terms at the beginning of this review.

It is a pleasure to note that the useful footnotes to the translation are placed at the bottom of each page, and that twelve Tibetan paintings of the philosophers represented in the text have been reproduced in this first-rate publication of Princeton University Press.

Janet Gyatso