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I. Introduction

During the 1970's, Dōgen studies began to grow in North America. This phenomenon has attracted me for some time, partly because of the transcultural and trans-linguistic aspect of Dōgen's Zen, especially as related to the early Mahāyāna tradition, such as Mādhyamika, and partly because of the significance of the trend growing in the new cultural horizon of North America. Since Buddhism was born in India and was transmitted to Japan by way of China, I have taken it for granted that Buddhist religiosity transcends the cultural and linguistic differences between these countries, and, for the same reason, that Buddhist religiosity can be at home in North America despite its cultural and linguistic differences from the land of its birth or lands where it has been previously transmitted. As part of a philosophical enquiry into religion, therefore, I have attempted in this paper to see how and why Buddhist religiosity transcends such differences and to demonstrate this primary thesis with reference to the insight and method of instruction of Dōgen (1200–1253), as expressed in his major work Shō-bō-gen-zō.

Dōgen, the founding father of the Sōtō Zen school of Buddhism in Japan, left as his magnum opus the Shō-bō-gen-zō, which consists of ninety-two essays written over the period from immediately after his return from China, in 1231, until the end of his life. The essays deal with a variety of subjects, covering every aspect of Dōgen's thought, practical as well as theoretical.
Some of the essays, especially those which deal with philosophical and doctrinal subjects, contain difficult passages, and cannot be understood in terms of the logic of ordinary discourse. I believe that this is because such passages reflect Dōgen’s dialectical thinking. His dialectic, however, as far as I have been able to study it, appears to have an intrinsic affinity with that of the Mādhyamikas, who advocated dialectical negation as the sole method of demonstration of śūnyatā (emptiness). I am, of course, not saying that Dōgen himself engaged in *reductio-ad-absurdum arguments* (Skt., *prasaṅga-vākyā*) like those of the Indian masters, but I do assert that his spontaneous expression can best be analyzed and comprehended on the basis of the “dialectical context” out of which Nāgārjuna and his followers justified the Mādhyamika approach. It is my contention that Buddhist thinkers, whether of Indian, Chinese, or Japanese origin, have invariably made such a dialectical context the basis of their insight into and demonstration of śūnyatā, and hence that it is this dialectical context that transcends every and any form of cultural or linguistic heritage. For the sake of identifying and analyzing this context in Dōgen’s writing, I have chosen a particular essay, entitled “Sky-flower,” (kū-ge) for this paper.

**II. Dōgen’s Instantiation in Terms of Sky-Flower**

Buddhist thinkers in medieval India frequently resorted to the image of the “sky-flower” (i.e., *kha-puspa*) as part of logical and dialectical demonstration. In ordinary logical contexts, the “sky-flower” is used to denote figuratively anything impossible, or simply to instantiate or exemplify a given subjective term as empirically non-existent and thereby to disprove the validity of the proposition that asserts it. The same image, however, conveys an entirely different meaning in the dialectical context. Like the anonymous authors of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, Mādhyamika dialecticians like Nāgārjuna invariably resorted to the use of metaphors, such as “magical entity” (*māyāvat*), “dream” (*svapna*), “mirage” (*mrgatṛṣṇa*), and so forth, to demonstrate śūnyatā, i.e., *the absence of self-identifying essence* (*nirsvabhāva*) in every and all phenomena (*bhāva*). Now, in the essay, “Sky-flower,” Dōgen uses the image in question to embody the ulti-
mate insight attributed to Buddhas and Patriarchs, as well as to exemplify the ultimate reality that manifests itself in any and all phenomena. I believe that Dōgen's usage can be meaningfully shown to parallel that of Mādhyamika dialecticians, and that his metaphorical instantiations, such as "sky-flower," stem from that dialectical context that transcends all forms of linguistic and cultural differences.

There is a problem, however, with his usage, because, despite his perfect accordance with the Mādhyamikas in exemplifying the insight into śūnyatā attributed to Buddhas and Patriarchs in terms of the "sky-flower," he does not repudiate the reality of phenomenal existence or its real occurrence. On the contrary, he asserts the reality of phenomena and their real occurrences in terms of a "sky-flower." This requires some explanation.

Nāgarjuna and his followers articulated the insight of śūnyatā invariably as twofold (1) that every phenomenon, insofar as it is denoted by language (word or name), has nothing but a conditioned existence based on its reciprocal dependence with others (parasparāpekaśatā), and (2) hence, that it has no real essence of its own (nih-svabhāva) which would identify its own being as distinguished from others (parabhāva). It is this twofold insight to which the Mādhyamikas applied "sky-flower" in order to instantiate such an entity which is not only functionally existent but also ultimately non-existent. Dōgen also expresses the same insight of śūnyatā in his essay with an unmistakable emphasis, but his instantiation about it in terms of the "sky-flower" implies something different in intention from that of the Mādhyamikas, which I would call an "affirmative usage."

I say that in the Buddhist tradition we have the image of the "sky-flower." No one other than Buddhists knows this, nor does he ever understand its (true) meaning. It is only Buddhas and Patriarchs who alone know the way the "sky-flower" and the "ground-flower" as well as the "world-flower" bloom and wither, and also the way in which they become the scriptures. This is the standard path through which one learns to become a Buddha. Since the vehicle on which Buddhas and Patriarchs ride is this "sky-flower," not only the world of Buddhas but also their Dharma is the "sky-flower" in itself.⁴

Whatever difference Dōgen might have implied in his usage
becomes more apparent if it is compared to ordinary convention. In the passages which immediately follow, Dōgen tries to explain his affirmative use of “sky-flower” as an instantiation for “ultimate reality,” and this usage especially is in sharp contrast to logical convention. For instance, he quotes the following passage from scripture, but gives it an entirely different reading from that of convention.

Śākyamuni Buddha said: It is like the case that people who suffer from visual affliction perceive flowers in mid-air, but when the affliction is removed, such flowers will vanish from the sky.5

The passage obviously contrasts an illusory perception with a valid one. From the point of view of convention, it is an erroneous cognition if a man with eyes afflicted by disease perceives flowers in the sky, because a man with healthy eyes perceives no such illusion. Dōgen deliberately reverses these cases with an emphasis on the fact that it is the former which yields true insight, whereas the latter does not:

No scholar has ever understood the meaning of this passage. Because he does not know śūnyatā, neither does he know the meaning of “sky-flower.” Because he does not know the “sky-flower,” neither does he know who the man with afflicted eyes is, nor does he perceive him or meet him, nor does he become the one like him.6

The question is twofold: (1) How can we understand his unique reading which totally contradicts logical convention; and (2) can we reconcile his affirmative use of “sky-flower” with that of the Mādhyamikas?

III. Dōgen's Dialectical Principle: Eigen-küge-no-dōri

The concept of kū-ge or “sky-flower” as Dōgen uses it in his essay is contrary to logical convention in a number of ways. While he attributes the vision of sky-flowers to Buddhas and Patriarchs, he introduces the common sense view which he deems to belong to fools (i.e., ordinary men). People are convinced, Dōgen says, that the kha (or kū in Japanese) is the sky
where warm air hovers and where stars hang, and that the "sky-flower" means those variegated, colorful flowers flying east and west, up and down, like clouds in the transparent atmosphere. They only know that sky flowers appear and vanish in mid-air, but they do not know how they appear from the sky. How much less do they know the truth that they also grow from the ground! Moreover, it is a short-sighted view to think, Dōgen claims,

that "afflicted eyes" means the eyes of deluded men seeing things in an upside-down way, that these men whose visual faculty has already been affected by disease and become delirious, perceive and hear about "sky-flowers" even in the transparent sky, and hence that when such affliction is removed, they will no longer visualize the illusory appearance of sky flowers.

Nor is it strictly a Buddhist view to think, he warns again,

that sky-flowers are unreal while all other flowers are real, or to reason that flowers, by nature, should not be seen in the sky, or to think that they now temporarily appear there though actually they are non-existent.

All these statements by Dōgen naturally make us wonder about the meaning he is attributing to the use of "sky-flower." Unexpectedly, his meaning has something to do with concrete, actual phenomena, such as flowers blooming and withering in nature, be they of a stalk of wild grass or of plum or pear trees, or in the present season or past or future seasons. Dōgen, in fact, asserts the reality of "sky-flowers" by identifying them not only with every and all flowers of the actual world but also with those flowers of the past as well as of the future:

Perceiving the multiple colours of sky-flowers, one may measure the endlessness of effects arising in space (or śūnyatā); observing sky-flowers blooming and withering, one may fathom their seasons, such as spring and autumn. The spring in which sky-flowers bloom must be identical with the spring in which all other flowers bloom. Just as sky-flowers are many, there are equally many spring seasons.

Dōgen’s concept of ei-gen, which literally means "afflicted
eyes,” does not coincide with literal meaning either, since he attributes such faculties (ei-gen) to Buddhas and Patriarchs as a corollary to his concept of kū-ge (sky-flower). He offers an argument to defend his conception that both ei-gen and kū-ge are equally real in reference to the epistemic structure in which both an active agent of perceiving and its recipient object to be perceived are necessarily involved. It is in this argument that we can witness the presence of Dōgen’s dialectic, which he calls the “eigen kūge no dōri” (i.e., the nature of things in regard to afflicted eyes and sky-flowers). In identifying the man of visual affliction (ei-nin) with the enlightened one, Dōgen develops his argument as follows:

One must not foolishly regard “affliction” (ei) as an illusory (false) entity (dharma) and think that there is a real (true) one other than this. For, such is an (inferior) view held by men of meager capacity. If the flower perceived by the afflicted eyes is a false entity, this subjective assertion and the asserted proposition, both of which are based upon holding that the entity is unreal (false), must necessarily both become (equally) false entities. If all are equally false, there is no way to establish the true nature of things. If there is no way to accomplish this, (even) the assertion to the effect that the flowers perceived by afflicted eyes are false entities cannot be made.

The reason that the dōri to which Dōgen refers is rather of a dialectical nature than a logical one, can be detected within the passages immediately preceding and following, in which he specifically introduces the causality of reciprocal dependence between the afflicted eyes and the sky-flowers. Dōgen suggests that common men are not quite aware of the fact that everything can be identified with sky-flowers, i.e., not only the four material factors (mahā-bhūta) which make up both the active faculties (e.g., visual organs) and recipient objects, but also the totality of things that make up the objective world, as well as the subjective world, such as “original enlightenment,” “original nature,” and so forth. Nor do they realize that not only the four material factors but also the subjective and objective, sentient and non-sentient, worlds are originated and sustained, depending upon multiple psycho-physical elements (dharmas). They think only of the causal factor by which those psycho-physical elements
arise, depending upon the external world, but cannot think of the other way around. Thus laments Dōgen:

People tend to see only the causal factor by which sky-flowers arise, depending upon the visual affliction, but scarcely see the truth (dōri) that the visual affliction also arises, depending upon the sky-flowers.

Here is the most significant parallel between Dōgen and the Mādhyamikas in regard to their common insight, namely, the causality of reciprocal interdependence (parasparāpeksātā) between the faculty of cognition and the object cognized. It is obvious that the nature of this causal reciprocity is the key to an understanding of Dōgen's use of the "sky-flower" as an instantiation.

IV. Nāgārjuna's Dialectical Principle: Reciprocity and Dual Reference

In Classical India the relationship between active faculty (pramāṇa) and its recipient object (prameya) as crucial to every epistemic phenomenon, became one of the central doctrinal issues between Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers. In the simplest terms, their differences can be provisionally specified in reference to the polemics exchanged between the Mādhyamika dialecticians and the Nyāya logicians on the nature of language and the nature of things it denotes. The Mādhyamika critique of the Naiyāyika theory of pramāṇa generally represents the critical Buddhist attitude towards the grammatico-linguistic convention upon which the latter’s system of logic was founded. This is inferable from Vatsyāyana's defense of the validity of pramāṇa in reference to the grammatico-linguistic principles such as the syntactical category (kāraka) and the semantic signification (samākhyanimitta) of words and sentences. It was Nāgārjuna, in the 2nd century, who initiated such Hindu-Buddhist polemics. In Nyāyasūtra (II, i, 8–11), for instance, his dialectic, which appears in Vigrahavyāvartanī, is concisely recorded. It may be rephrased as follows:

Perception cannot be established in the past and future, because
it arises only from the contact of sense-faculty and its objective stimuli, which is confined to the present moment. But if perception and its object are simultaneous, since there is a fixation between cognition and its object, there is no successive occurrence of cognition.\textsuperscript{18}

In defense against this critique, Vatsyāyana argues in his Bhāṣya that the role of pramāṇa need not be fixed to the present moment as long as it is fixed to a syntactical category, such as the instrumental case. A musical instrument, for instance, can be a pramāṇa for producing the sound of a tune, but the sound itself can be a pramāṇa for identifying the instrument which is being played.\textsuperscript{19}

It is a function of the speaker's intention that one thing can become a pramāṇa at one time and a prameya at another time in a different context.

Now, the point of confrontation is twofold: (1) whether pramāṇa and prameya are fixed within a given syntactical context; and (2) whether they reciprocate their functional identities within one and the same context. It is clear that the Mādhyamikas held that the two correlative entities are fixed within a given context and reciprocate between themselves, just as light and dark interact to produce illumination, and that there is an obvious categorical difference between the Mādhyamika and the Naiyāyika positions. In Vigrahavyāvartani Nāgārjuna applies two types of dialectic,\textsuperscript{20} one of which may be called the analytic method since it is based on the Abhidharmist causal concept of hetupratyayatā. This method has as its single purpose reducing every entity to its constituent elements and thereby making known the nominalistic nature of every object and universal. It is designed to repudiate the Naiyāyika notion of śabda (vocal word) postulated as possessing its self-identifying principle (svabhāva) and linguistic efficiency. The other type of dialectic Nāgārjuna applies is the reductio-ad-absurdum argument (prasāṅga-vākyā), especially designed to deal with a categorically deeper dimension than the semantic and syntactical one. Consider the way communication is accomplished between two people. Communication is nothing but a parallel occurrence of similar cognitive processes in the minds of the two people. Nāgārjuna, as a Buddhist thinker, must have considered the ultimate source of linguistic efficiency as residing in such a dimension. Thus, the difference between the Mādhyamika and
the common-sense Naiyāyka positions was (1) whether linguistic efficiency derives from the grammatico-linguistic rules and postulates with which the Nyāya logicians aligned the nature and function of pramāṇa; or (2) whether it derives from the more fundamental epistemic dimension in which sense faculties and incoming external stimuli interact in creating subsequent logico-linguistic mental processes.

As a convention we say that the eye (pramāṇa) sees the object (prameya) and assume that these two entities somehow establish a contact so as to create vision. Nāgārjuna demonstrates here two points: (1) that the spatio-temporal sphere to which such interaction is referred is no longer a logical context as Nyāya logicians insisted, but uniquely a dialectical one; and (2) that in that referential sphere which is dialectical, the pramāṇa and the prameya no longer maintain their self identity but reciprocally exchange their functions.²¹ Ingeniously, Nāgārjuna resorts to a metaphorical analogy of “light” and “dark.” These, though conceptually incompatible, are in convention required to be co-present, precisely because the fact of illumination requires contact, upon which, we say, the light of wisdom dispels the darkness of doubt, and so forth. It is such a convention that the Mādhyamika dialectic repudiates. In Vigrahavyāvartani, especially kārikās 36 through 39, Nāgārjuna argues that wherever light is, dark cannot be, nor can light be present wherever dark abides. It follows that the two entities, though conventionally required to be co-present, find no place to meet. In order to escape this absurdity and ensure convention, it is necessary to accept that light and dark are simultaneously different and yet identical, which ipso facto repudiates the concept of svabhāva, hence nih-svabhāva or sūnyatā follows. It is such an empirically impossible entity, i.e., simultaneously “light” and “dark,” “existent” and “non-existent,” which Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas articulate by means of metaphorical instances such as a magical object, a dream, the sky-flower, etc.

V. Dōgen’s Dialectic and Concrete Instantiation

It is a corollary assumption of this paper that Buddhist thinkers throughout the ages relied equally upon dialectical methods for the purpose of disclosing the aforementioned con-
text which ordinarily transcends our empirical consciousness as shaped by the logico-linguistic forms of expression. Renowned teachers invariably exhibited an accomplished skill to help students acquire the insight into that deeper dimension I referred to at the beginning of this paper as the “Dialectical Context.” The authors of the Prajñāpāramitā literature applied a thoroughgoing negation, while Chinese thinkers, such as Seng-chao as well as notable Zen masters, frequently resorted to paradoxical expressions. As instructional methods, these forms of dialectic exhibited a common intention, namely, to create disquietude in the mind in regard to logical and linguistic convention and thereby to induce in it the dialectical context where both empirical and transcendental aspects of the mind come to play in unison. Such a characteristic can also be detected in the instructional method adopted by Dōgen, and I think that his affirmative use of the “sky-flower” as an instantiation points precisely to that characteristic.

Dōgen’s metaphorical instantiation is not confined to the “sky-flower,” but extends to the use of other instances. For instance, in the essay entitled, “Preaching Dreams within a Dream” (mu-chu setsu-mu), he offers such instances as a “rootless tree,” a “shadowless sunny ground,” b and “echoless valley,” c and praises them as “no region for men and gods as it is inaccessible to common men’s fathoming.” That Dōgen’s instantiation has its affinity to that of the Mādhyamikas can be further confirmed from the fact that he makes “affliction” (ei) identical not only with “enlightenment” but also with its opposite, “delusion”; he identifies the “afflicted faculty” (ei-gen) with the “sky-flower” (kū-ge), and multiple dharmas with “flowers visualized in affliction” (ei-gen). The following passage, which is clearly dialectical, attests my point of view:

When “enlightenment” is identified with “affliction,” all its co-efficient (concurrent) dharmas become the co-efficients (concurrents) of “affliction.” When “delusion” is identified with “affliction,” all its co-efficient dharmas become the co-efficients of “affliction.” Consider the following awhile. When the “afflicted eye” bears universal identity (byōdō, samatā), the “sky-flower” bears universal identity as well. When the “afflicted eye” bears no origination, the “sky-flower” bears no origination either. When multiple dharmas manifest themselves as they are in their own form,
all the flowers arisen from "afflicted vision" manifest themselves in their own form. (This state of affairs) transcends past, present as well as future, for it has neither beginning nor interim nor ending. It arises in mid-air and perishes there; it arises in "affliction" and perishes in it. It arises in "flowers" and perishes in them. And so on in all of other spaces and times. 23

Although Dōgen thus depicts the state of affairs as something transcendent of space and time and something mystical and extra-phenomenal, he does not forget to state at once that it is also extremely concrete and actual like that belonging to our ordinary experience, and that it is variant and multiple in accordance with different individuals, different spiritual attainments, and at different times, such as ancient, medieval, or the immemorial past. 24 Though people may equally perceive the "sky-flower" on all these occasions, what is seen by them varies in regard both to the insight of śūnyatā (kū) and in regard to the actuality of the "flower." Thus, continues Dōgen:

One must know that śūnyatā (kū) is a single stalk of grass; this śūnyatā will bloom without fail, just as flowers bloom in all kinds of grass. In understanding this truth (dōri), one may take it as equivalent to understanding that the path of the Tathāgata is śūnyatā and by nature flowerless, and yet it bears flowers now, just as flowers bloom on peach and pear trees, on plum and willow trees. (This state of affairs) may be compared to that in which the plum tree had no flowers before but then has flowers in the spring. As this is the case, when the time comes, flowers are bound to bloom; this is the time of flowers; this is their manifestation. There has never been any irregularity in the right time for flowers to bloom. 25

Dōgen's use of instantiation as shown in this passage, however, clearly conveys its uniqueness and distinction from the Mādhyamika usage, according to which instantiation never takes the degree of concreteness and phenomenality that Dōgen attributes to his instantiation. For instance, Nāgārjuna's instantiation in Vibrahavyāvartanī is totally bereft of a sense of concreteness and phenomenality. Here he intended to exemplify the way linguistic symbols, though having no real existence or efficiency, still established communication, in assertion and negation, for example:
Just as a person created by mâyā repudiates another as equally fabricated, or a magician may repudiate (whatever object) is created by his magic, just so should this repudiation be considered.  

Perhaps the following passage, taken from the Diamond Sūtra of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, further evidences the marked difference of Dōgen's use of instantiation:

As stars, a fault of vision, as a lamp, a mock show, dew drops, or a bubble, a dream, a lightning flash, or cloud, so should one view what is conditioned (i.e., what is phenomenal).

VI. Buddhist Logical Principles of Dual Instantiation

In Indian Buddhist logic the principle of instantiation was essential to valid inference and hence crucial to efficient demonstration. The principle of instantiation, which was much discussed in Buddhist logic is, however, not confined to the Buddhist system. On the contrary, it is quite universal for the very same reason that language is universal despite its variations in form. Language is a system of symbols semantically agreed upon for their denotation and also syntactically agreed upon for their linkage. What is functionally essential to the use of language is twofold: (1) the classification of the facts of experience by symbols; and (2) the linkage of symbols or their meanings one to another, whether in logic or grammar or causation. Thus, every language contains a vast number of classifications. Every common name expresses the recognition of a class; every word, irrespective of whether in Japanese, Chinese, English or Sanskrit, is the expression of some implicit classification. By the same token, each language comprises a set of grammatical rules, especially the system of syntactical word-order. Some contemporary grammarians have finally reached a similar conception to that of the ancient Sanskrit grammarians in regard to the latter, i.e., that the deep sentential structure is universal irrespective of the differences in the surface structure.

The principle of instantiation that determines whether the way of classifying an object into a particular class which a given symbol denotes is correct, as well as whether the way of linking
symbols is valid, consists of dual rules, namely, positive instantiation and negative instantiation. Ancient Indian thinkers called these two respectively *anvaya* and *vyatireka*,\(^2^9\) while ancient Chinese thinkers, such as the Mohists, referred to them as the method of agreement\(^d\) and the method of difference\(^e\).\(^3^0\) In the contemporary West, these dual rules are invoked also as essential to the pragmatic principles of verification and falsification. Given a fact of experience, we are ready to determine what it is by applying a name (or predication) to it. We are obliged, however, to compare it to something similar to which we have applied that name in our previous experiences. In order to determine a distant hill, over which we observe a billow of smoke, to be probably on fire, we compare this particular case with some other cases within our familiar experiences, such as a kitchen, where most of us know, smoke and fire are generally found to be co-present. This is the principle of similarity or of positive instantiation. Simultaneously, however, we are also obliged to determine if this classification is correct, and in order to do so, we further compare it to something dissimilar which is neither capable of combustion nor smouldering, such as an iceberg. This is the principle of dissimilarity or of negative instantiation. Thus, the dual principles of similarity and dissimilarity, or mutually contrapositive instantiations, regulate a proper flow of inferential thoughts from a cognition: “There is smoke on the hill” to another: “There is fire on the hill.” In actual operation, a kitchen as a positive instance verifies the two related propositional symbols, whereas a negative instance, such as an iceberg, falsifies them. This is the necessary condition of any rational and logical discourse, which we may call the “Logical Context.” In short, the Logical Context can be defined by means of the dual instantiations: (1) every positive instance (*sapakṣa*) is supposed to verify a given predication or proposition as “position” in regard to its subject term; and (2) every negative instance (*vipakṣa*) is supposed to falsify the same predication or proposition as “contraposition” in regard to the same subject term.

In doctrinal and philosophical polemics, the method of instantiation is a powerful tool to defend one’s own doctrine while refuting the opponent’s. For instance, in order to refute a man’s claim that he has perceived flowers in the sky, the counter-dem-
onstration consists of three steps: First, in order to make the man recognize a common truth that “wherever flowers grow, there is a patch of soil,” one is obliged (1) to invoke positive instantiation in reference to “a patch of soil” in his backyard, and thereby let him accept that flowers and a patch of soil are co-present; and (2) to invoke negative instantiation in reference to “some desert” where neither a patch of soil nor flowers are supposed to be found, and thereby let him accept that “wherever there is no soil, there no flower grows.” These dual instantiations ipso facto accomplish defense as well as refutation simultaneously. The third remaining step is simply to question the opponent as to whether a patch of soil is to be found in the sky, since his negative answer will itself disprove his own claim. It is interesting to note that there is a close parallel between the foregoing procedure and the dual operations of the Western hypothetical syllogism, namely, modus ponendo ponens and modus ponendo tollens. Now, three points of reflection are in order: (1) in our ordinary logical context “sky flower” cannot be used for any empirical instantiation, except for asserting empirical impossibility (2) accordingly, the Mādhyamika and Dōgen’s instantiation is not applied to the ordinary logical context; and (3) thus, the meaning of their instantiation must have been directed elsewhere, namely, the Dialectical Context.

VII. Dialectical Context as Distinguished from Logical Context

The reason that Dōgen’s use of “sky-flower” as an instantiation is not logical but dialectical can be clarified in reference to the necessary condition of Mādhyamika dialectic precisely because the dialectical context is structurally identical with the logical context which I have just explained. The dialectical context is, however, radically different in two major ways. In logic, the dual operations of anvāya and vyatireka are clearly separated from each other in reference to the respective classes of variables. In dialectic, the dual operations are totally juxtaposed over one and the same spatio-temporal sphere, the immediacy context, where the human mind encounters nature in an instantaneous moment and is activated to bifurcate the dual processes. Suppose we are listening to an ongoing speech in which phonemes, words and
sentences are incessantly coming and going. Catching a series of rapid sounds, our mind instantaneously configures them into a word, a series of words into a sentence, and a series of sentences into a unified understanding. It is within this dynamic flow of speech or thoughts that, at each moment, the dialectical context emerges as the linkage point where two consecutive moments are assumed to be juxtaposed. It is this same linkage point which Nāgārjuna ingeniously disclosed by juxtaposing the pramāṇa (cognitive faculty) and the prameya (its object), or their metaphorical counterparts, “light” and “darkness” over it as an ultimate referential sphere.

Although Nāgārjuna is not explicit about the formula of anvaya and vyatireka in his dialectic, it is possible to detect them from the way he manipulates propositions for inducing the dialectical context. For the sake of making my demonstration plain and simple, I shall utilize a set of symbolic notations. It is generally known that the five-membered Indian syllogism can be reduced to a three-membered formula as Dignāga himself theorized, but Buddhist logicians seem to have considered that even this formula can eventually be reduced to that of dual instantiations.32 Buddhist logicians conceptualized the inferential process as widely as possible so that it could include spontaneous thought movements. Given a hetu (Reason) that “the hill ‘bears a billow of smoke’,” Dignāga theorized that this hetu-assertion in turn has already implied its concomitant assertion (sādhyā, thesis) that “the hill ‘may have an outbreak of fire’,” thus revealing the tendential frame of all human mentality.33 Dharmakīrti attributed ultimate efficiency exclusively to instantaneous moments (ksāṇa) alone and not to any universal, such as names and sentential symbols.34 Ratnākara even considered that the inner concomitance (antarvyāpti) can dispense with concrete examples on the basis of universal momentariness (ksāṇikatva).35 Thus, it is based on these theoretical considerations that I have formulated the logical context in terms of dual instantiations. Now, the positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) instantiations can be transcribed respectively as follows:

\[(x)\{P(x).Q(x)\} \text{ and } (y)\{-Q(y)" - P(y)\}\]

provided that “x” and “y” respectively symbolize “similar” and
"dissimilar" instances (resp. sapakṣa and vipakṣa), and "P.Q" and "−Q.−P" stand respectively for "position" (anvaya) and "contraposition" (vyatireka).

The following is a simplified translation for Kārikās 36–39 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī accompanied by my two supplementary arguments in the left-hand column and their symbolic notations based on the formula just explained in the right-hand column:37

Kārikā 36: Anvaya andVyatireka

Where light "x" illumines itself and others "P.Q"
(x){P(x).Q(x)} . (y){−Q(y).−P(y)}

Darkness "y" also obstructs illumination from both "−Q.−P"

K. 37: Anvaya only (Vyatireka negated)

Where there is light there is no darkness;
(x){P(x).Q(x)} . −[(y){−Q(y).−P(y)}]

How can light illumine anything?
= (x,y){P(x,y).Q(x,y)}

Supplement: Vyatireka only (Anvaya negated)

Where there is darkness there is no light;
= [(x){P(x).Q(x)}] . (y){−Q(y).−P(y)}

How can light illumine anything?

K. 38: Anvaya and Vyatireka

Does light illumine darkness at its moment of arising?
(x){P(x).Q(x)} . (y){−Q(y).−P(y)}

No, light does not reach it from the beginning.

K. 39: Anvaya only (Vyatireka negated)

If light here illumines darkness without reaching it,
(x){P(x).Q(x)} . −[(y){−Q(y).−P(y)}]

This light illumines all the world.
= (x,y){P(x,y).Q(x,y)}

Supplement: Vyatireka only (Anvaya negated)

If darkness here destroys light without reaching it,
= [(x){P(x).Q(x)}] . (y){−Q(y).−P(y)}

This darkness here destroys light in all the world.

The formulas expressed in Kārikās 36 and 38 may equally be read as: Wherever light "x" illumines itself and others (which means "P.Q"), darkness "y" also obstructs illuminations from both (which means "−Q.−P"). It is obvious that the predica-
ment is created by an unexpected contradiction implied in our logical and linguistic convention, and that this is suddenly disclosed in the dialectical context when two mutually contrapositive entities, i.e., light and darkness, are juxtaposed over the same sphere and moment of illumination. Since an interaction of pramana and prameya is an a priori condition for any form of cognition, there is no sophistry in this dialectical context, which, however, efficiently demonstrates the fact that our linguistic expressions, such as "light illumines darkness," have no independent referential objects, apart from the two entities totally identified. This empirical absence of a referential object is further demonstrated in the subsequent Karikas. From Karikas 37 and 39 as well as my supplements, it is logically correct to think that, being mutually exclusive, light and darkness cannot be found at the same space and time, and yet this leads to the absurdity that the phenomenon of illumination is unaccounted for. Although it is not detectable in linguistic expression, the symbolic notation for these Karikas reveals two significant insights behind their apparent absurdity:

(1) that the affirmative formula: \((x,y)\{P(x,y).Q(x,y)\}\), and the negative one: \((y,x)\{-Q(y,x).-(y,x)\}\), are both derived from the negation of their respective contrapositions;

(2) that despite the fact that the variables "x" and "y" are identical while at the same time different. It is this dual natured reference which, made apparent by the juxtaposition of dual instantiations, is the second point of difference which pertains to the Dialectical Context.

VIII. Dōgen's Instantiation as Compared to that of Bhāvaviveka's Syllogism

Both features of the dialectical context, as distinguished from those of the logical context, have a natural consequence in the manner of instantiation. Such differences can best be analyzed in the syllogistic demonstration of śūnyatā adopted by Bhāvaviveka, the forefather of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika school. Though it is in syllogistic formula, his method of demonstration is clearly dialectical in terms of the above two features,
and hence, it is possible to compare Dōgen's method of instantiation with it. In his *Karaṇalaraṇa*, for instance, Bhāvaviveka gives two syllogistic arguments as specimens to repudiate respectively empirical (*samskṛta*) and transempirical (*asaṃskṛta*) entities (*dharma* *s*) in regard to their real existence, and in fact, applies the image of the “sky-flower” in the second argument as its instantiation: 38

\[ \text{samskṛta-dharma} \text{ (phenomenal entities) are empty (śūnyāḥ) from} \]
\[ \text{the transcendental point of view (paramārthatas);} \]
\[ \text{because they are composite (pratyaya-bhāvāḥ);} \]
\[ \text{like a magically created entity (māyāvat).} \]

\[ \text{asaṃskṛta-dharma} \text{ (transempirical entities) are unreal (asadbhūtah);} \]
\[ \text{because they have no origination (anuṭpādāḥ);} \]
\[ \text{like a sky-flower (kha-puspavat).} \]

A few formal peculiarities regulate these syllogisms: (1) the thesis (*pratijñā*) is invariably negation; (2) it is controlled by an adverbial term *paramārthatas* (from the transcendental point of view or transempirically); and (3) it has the *sapakṣa* but no *vipakṣa*, or *vipakṣa* but no *sapakṣa* (depending upon whether one takes the predication in terms of “emptiness” as affirmation or negation), for, in the Mādhyamika insight, there is nothing that is not empty. These peculiarities are corollary to the “logical concomitance” (*vyāpti*) between *hetu* (reason) and *sādhyā* (thesis), and are designed to establish not only that every empirical entity (that arises from causes and conditions as a *sapakṣa*), but also every member of the *vipakṣa* class (that empirically does not arise), is equally “empty.” 39

Bhāvaviveka, of course, invariably indicates by means of an adverbial term *paramārthatas*, that his syllogism is not totally logical but dialectical, and that though the subject term of his proposition is empirical, its negative predication is transcendental. It is my contention that Dōgen’s method of instantiation can be seen as parallel to this state of affairs. For the sake of demonstration, I shall simplify Bhāvaviveka’s concomitance (*vyāpti*) and its respective instantiation as follows:
Whatever (samskṛta) is composite is empty, like a magical entity.
Whatever (asamskṛta) has no origin- is unreal, like a sky-flower.

The fact that the two subject terms refer to mutually contrapositive classes (phenomenal and transphenomenal), and yet are predicated by similar predicables, such as "being empty," "unreal," "without a self-identifying principle" (niḥsvabhāva), and so forth, evidences logical violation on two accounts: (1) that the class boundary between sapakṣa and vipakṣa is vitiated; and (2) that the nature of both instances (māyāvat and kha-puspavat) is peculiarly dual, because they simultaneously instantiate every samskṛta and asamskṛta dharma as existent and real and yet also as non-existent and unreal.

Now, Dōgen's method of instantiation can be seen as parallel to the foregoing analysis. Along with convention, Dōgen fully knows the ordinary meaning of the "sky-flower" as an instantiation for anything empirically impossible, and yet, rejecting this usage, he emphatically asserts that common men do not know the true meaning of it as embodying transcendental reality which is neither obstructed by space nor by time, neither by origination nor by cessation. He identifies the "sky-flower" not only with those empirical flowers blooming and withering in nature in accordance with their appointed seasons, but also with doctrinal entities, such as enlightenment, original nature, and so on. He deliberately violates the class boundary of "sky-flower" and "flowers on the ground" (ji-ge) by stating:

It is the "sky-flower" that ultimately makes all flowers bloom both in mid-air and on the ground.40

It follows that insofar as the predication of "being empty" is concerned, his instantiation in terms of "sky-flower" has no contraposition; namely, there is nothing that is not a "sky-flower" either in mid-air, or on the ground, or in the entire world (sekai-ge). This extensive identification of the "sky-flower" with empirical as well as trans-empirical entities, which constitute the total-
ity of the universe in Buddhist thinking, is undoubtedly identical with the Mādhyamika instantiation as formulated by Bhāvaviveka.

There still remains an unresolved question with Dōgen's method of instantiation, namely, how and why his instantiation in terms of the "sky-flower" takes a singularly affirmative expression, which puts it in marked contrast to that of the Mādhyamikas. More than once, Dōgen praises the "sky-flower" which activates the "afflicted faculty" (ei-gen) as an embodiment of supreme truth:

It is a pity that people such as they (common men) do not know the beginning and end of the appointed season in which the sky-flower blooms as an embodiment of the path of Tathāgatas. For, the truth (dōri) of "afflicted eyes" and "sky-flowers," which is embodied in the path of Buddhas has never been accessible to them. Buddhas and Tathāgatas all received their seats in the patriarchal room of transmission through practicing the path of the "sky-flower" and realized the path and its goal. Sākyamuni Buddha's raising a stalk of flowers and twinkling his eyes, all this certified the fact that the truth of "afflicted eyes" and "sky-flowers" was realized.41

It is the heart of this paper to render intelligible how and why Dōgen could justify his method of instantiation such as it is expressed in this passage by having recourse to the Nagarjunian insight of the reciprocity (parasparāpeksatā) and juxtaposition of anvaya and vyatireka as explained above.

IX. Dōgen's Instructional Method of Instantiation as Compared to that of the Āstasāhasrikā-Prājñāpāramitā

Although Dōgen does not present his dialectic in the manner of logical refutation as the Indian masters did, his dialectical thinking can be recognized in the way he uses the "sky-flower" and expresses his insight of the causal reciprocity between the "afflicted eye" and the "sky-flower" consistently in reference to that dialectical context upon which this paper has focused. The Mādhyamika dialectic was initially introduced by Nāgārjuna as a method of refutation, but simultaneously served as an instruc-
tional method for realization of the ultimate insight. Dōgen's dialectic apparently bears more strongly the instructional nature along with the age-old tradition of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The anonymous authors of this literature earnestly advocated the practice of samādhi as corollary to the insight of śūnyatā, and in some texts, inculcated the practice of samādhi which was designed to induce the vision of the sublime image of the Buddhas. What was intended is not a mystical vision itself, but a particular experience in which two different levels of consciousness, empirical and trans-empirical, come to play in unison.

In the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Chaps. 30—31), for instance, Sadāprarudita, the hero bodhisattva, is said to have experienced an ecstatic vision of the Buddhas, but coming out of it somehow he felt gravely distressed about the disappearance of those Buddhas. Then a question arose in him, which, thereafter, became the primary source of his drive in his search for ultimate insight; namely, “where did those Buddhas come from, and where did they go?” There lies beneath this question the dialectical context created in his consciousness. For the linkage between the vision of the Buddhas at one moment and that of their disappearance at another moment became the primary concern for Sadāprarudita. In this way the dialectical context was created in him, since conceptually there is a singular spatio-temporal sphere of reference to which his question refers the two incompatible phases of his experience (i.e., presence of Buddhas and their absence).

There are two major reasons why Dōgen's instructional method is parallel to the aforementioned example. First, throughout his essay, Dōgen consistently asserts the trans-empirical status of the “sky-flower” as incomparably superior to its empirical status as generally held in convention, and toward that end he identifies the vision of the “sky-flower” with that of the Jippō-butsus, i.e., the Buddhas of Ten Directions.

I say that the vision of the Jippō-butsus cannot be said to be “not real,” as it is essentially identical with the vision of “flowers in the eye” (gen-chū-ge). It is “within the eye” (alone) that the Jippō-butsus reside. Unless it is within the eye, it is not the abode of the Jippō-butsus. “Flowers in the eye” are neither non-existent nor existent, neither unreal nor real, but themselves are the Jippō-buts-
sus. This is like the case in which when one earnestly wishes to see the jippō-butsus, they are no longer “flowers in the eye,” whereas when he wishes to see “flowers in the eye,” they are no longer the jippō-butsus.43

Thus, his tactical exhortation creates a tension in his student’s mind concerning two different meanings of the “sky-flower,” one belonging to common men, another to the enlightened. A passage that follows immediately further confirms Dōgen’s instructional intention:

Even though scholars of the scriptures, masters of doctrines, may hear about the name of the “sky-flower,” no one other than Buddhas and Patriarchs would have the occasion to see and hear about the vital life line of “ground flowers.”44

Secondly, though Dōgen’s instructional method refers to concrete actuals to instantiate them by the “sky-flower,” he does not fail to state, along with Bhāvaviveka, that the “sky-flower” has no empirical origination and, hence, no cessation, extending the same negation to actuals as well:

Flowers have neither originated, nor have they perished. This is the truth (dōri), that neither have the flowers been the flowers, nor has the sky been the sky. One must not look for a before and after of the appointed time of the flowers and thereby elaborate one’s thought as to whether they are or they are not. Flowers are, as it were, necessarily dyed by variegated colours, but these colours are not confined to flowers. It is the same with appointed times which are as variegated as blue, yellow, red, white, etc. Spring invites flowers, and flowers invite Spring.45

By variegated colours Dōgen obviously refers to the aggregates, the ultimate basis, where a given spatio-temporal sphere or the dialectical context is to be configurated, and where he expresses his causal insight of reciprocity in concrete terms: “Spring invites flowers, flowers invite Spring.” It is here also that we can read Dōgen’s insight, that the “sky-flower” (kū-ge) creates the “afflicted eye” (ei-gen) and vice versa.

The dialectical context which Nāgārjuna metaphorically demonstrated as an interaction of “light” and “darkness” re-
vealed its structure to be open to two directions: *phenomenalization* and *dephenomenalization*. In one direction “light” and “darkness” create total incompatibility, leading to mutual negation; the expression naturally appears as “neither ‘light’ nor ‘darkness’” over the singular spatio-temporal sphere of juxtaposition. In another direction, however, this bi-negation opens a new horizon, precisely because the dialectic is double edged. The negation of the ascribed principle of existential identity (*svabhāva*) from “light” as well as “darkness” *ipso facto* enables both to simultaneously co-exist through reciprocation. The author of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* let Bodhisattva Dharmodgata, the great teacher and mentor of Sadaprarudita, answer the latter’s question with a precisely similar negation:

Oh, son of good family, those Buddhas did not come from anywhere, nor did they go anywhere. Why, because things as they are do not move. This state of things as they are is the Tathāgata. Son of good family, nothing is born, nor coming. Nothing is leaving nor born. This is the Tathāgata. Supreme truth is neither going nor coming. This truth is the Tathāgata. Emptiness is neither coming nor going. This emptiness is the Tathāgata.46

It is now apparent that Dōgen uses the image of the “sky-flower” as an instance to exemplify that Tathāgatas and Buddhas, the embodiment of supreme truth, and Emptiness such as it is expressed by negation. For the author of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the use of images like the “dream,” “magical entity,” or “sky-flower,” was an instance of *skill-in-means* (*upaya-kausalya*) used to instantiate actuals and ideals qua *śūnyatā* (i.e., in regard to their empty nature), but whereas Dōgen uses the same *skill-in-means* he uses it to instantiate *śūnyatā* qua actuals and ideals. Like the author of the Prajñāpāramitā text, Dōgen does this, however, exclusively in reference to that dialectical context in which causal reciprocity holds and hence in terms of affirmative expression:

Therefore, I say that when the (image of) the flower created by visual affliction (*ei-geri*) falls away, it is the moment when the (truth of) the Buddhas (i.e., *śūnyatā*) is realized. The image of the flower and its concurrents (*ke-kwa*) is what the (truth of) the Buddhas (i.e., *śūnyatā*) sustains. On the basis of visual affliction
(ei), the visual faculty (gen) is activated to function and to visualize the (image of) the “sky-flower” or to realize its function within the (image of) the “sky-flower” (ku-ge-chu) . . . No matter when or where, once a visual faculty is activated, there necessarily co-exists (the objective image of) the “sky-flower” and the (image of) the flower within the subjective vision (gen-ke). Here the flower within the eye (gen-ke) is called the “sky-flower” (kū-ge).47

X. Dōgen’s Instructional Method of Instantiation as Compared to that of Chao-Lun

Dōgen’s instructional method of instantiation can further be paralleled with the paradoxical method of dialectic which Seng-chao (374-414), one of the early Chinese Mādhyaṃkās, applied to create the dialectical context. His work Chao Lun⁴, which consists of several essays, can be regarded as an authentic specimen of Mādhyaṃkā dialectic developed by the Chinese mind on two accounts: (1) it creates the same effect as created by the juxtaposition of anvaya and vyatireka; and (2) it also creates thereby the dual natured reference as instantiated by metaphorical instances. The two passages below are chosen from among many to show the form of his paradoxical method. The first one is quoted from his essay “Things Do Not Move,” in which the concepts of movement and non-movement are paradoxically matched in regard to the passage of time:

If we want to express the real⁸, we go against convention⁹. If we follow convention, we fail to express the real¹. Because past things did not reach the present state, people say that things change, thinking that past things changed and hence, did not stay unchanged. For the same reason, however, I say that things do not change, thinking that past things are in the past and did not come to the present. When people say that things are “abiding”[i], I say that they are “gone”⁴. When they say that things are “gone,” I say that they are “abiding.” Although “gone” and “abiding” are different in expression, what they mean has one reference.⁴⁸

As a corollary to this juxtaposition feature of the “Dialectical Context,” I shall now quote a passage from the essay, “Whatever Is Unreal Is Emptiness,” in which the dual-natured reference is
instantiated by a metaphorical instance, in this case, by a "magically created being":

We want to say that dharmas exist, but their existence is not a real production. We want to say that dharmas do not exist, but phenomenal forms are already configurated. Phenomenal forms cannot be said to be "identical with nothing," but we only say that anything unreal is not a real existent. It follows that the meaning of "Emptiness of Whatever Is Unreal" is thus revealed. Accordingly, the Pañcaśati-sahasrika-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "Dharmas are called metaphorically 'unreal' just as a magically created man is. For, we cannot say that there is no magically created man, but that such is not a real man."49

Seng-chao's awareness of the "Dialectical Context" can be confirmed also in his essay, "Prajñā Is No-knowing," where he deals with the reciprocal dependence of the knowing (pramāṇa) and that to be known (prameya). The point to be noted is that Seng-chao tried to resolve the dualized factors of the knowing and the known into the unconfigured totality of the aggregates, and that such is the basis of our phenomenally configurated consciousness, being simultaneously the unconfigured transcendent from it. Dōgen also dealt with this state of affairs in terms of eigen kūge no dōri, but depicted the reciprocity of the "afflicted eye" and the "sky-flower" as the essential insight of the Buddhas and Patriarchs and yet also at the same time as concrete actuals such as flowers in nature.

Analysing man's symbolic systems such as language, we are aware of three different categories that are indispensable to our thinking and epistemic processes. Linguists and philosophers analyze these three respectively as "word," "meaning," and "object," or "symbol," "concept," and "referent." The most crucial is, however, the use of words or symbols itself, without which the human mind just cannot operate. Convention holds that the use of symbols relates subject form (i.e., concept) and object form (i.e., referent) in terms of correspondence. Buddhist thinkers saw, however, that human cognition or thinking depends rather upon the way we apply symbols than upon the way things really are. This means that we superimpose our thought forms onto objects by way of names and sentential symbols, while these in turn determine only subjective images with no corresponding
objects, as such, externally. Dōgen's demonstration in part points to this same insight, but indeed, more than that. In ordinary usage no one expects the afflicted eye (ei-gen) to yield any corresponding object for its visual form, because the object, such as the "sky-flower," is only a subjective image. Nevertheless, such cognition significantly shares a common feature with healthy vision, namely, the use of symbols.

The author of the Astasahasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra indicates that ordinary language creates attachment because people do not know things as they really are, whereas the man of prajñā insight creates no such attachment in himself since he knows things as they really are. Seng-chao distinguishes the prajñā faculty from the ordinary faculty of knowing by defining it as "no-knowing". This means that the prajñā faculty has no empirical reference as required by the dual rules of anvaya and vyatireka. He tries to explain this transcendental faculty as (1) "only specifying marks without an external projection of reference;" and (2) "only mirroring, as it were, reflecting objects which are actually not there." The tendential mind, expressed in convention as "referential" and "inferential," represents the forms of attachment and defilement (klesa). If the insight of śūnyatā is concerned with the use of symbols or with the symbolic process of the mind, Dōgen is certainly justified in using metaphorical instances, such as the "sky-flower," to demonstrate the insight of śūnyatā qua actuals and ideals.

In dealing with the primary subject, such as Reciprocal Causation, in parallel with Nāgārjuna and Seng-chao, Dōgen, however, does not rely on the method of reductio-ad-absurdum argument, nor does he apply the method of paradoxical assertion and negation, but he spontaneously uses the method of instantiation very efficiently and successfully. His awareness of the Dialectical Context and his method of instantiation in terms of the "sky-flower" and the "afflicted eye" are clearly seen in the following passage which is to be found in the first paragraph of his essays. Without such a criterion (i.e., the dual features of the dialectical context), it is almost impossible to make such a passage intelligible:

It is like the case where the spatio-temporal sphere where the uhatsura-ge (i.e. utpala, a red lotus flower) blooms is identical with the space and time of fire. A blazing fire, a rising flame, all this
arises (exclusively) in the space and time where and when the \textit{uhatsura-ge} blooms. If it is outside such appointed space and time, no single spark comes forth, nor is its life possible. I say that within a single (instantaneous) spark, hundreds and thousands of lotus flowers spread open not only in mid-air and on the ground but also into the past as well as into the present. Learning (i.e., perceiving and listening to) the instantaneous spatio-temporal sphere of fire means to learn the same space and time of the lotus flower \textit{(uhatsura-ge)}. Do not miss the spatio-temporal sphere of \textit{uhatsura-ge}, but learn it.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{XI.}

In reading Dōgen's essay, most difficulties result from technical terms, especially those bearing epistemic significance; for instance, \textit{ei-gen} (the eye with cataract or with affliction), \textit{ei-ge} (the flower created by visual affliction), \textit{gen-chū} (literally, "in the eye"), \textit{gen-kū} (the sphere or space of the eye), \textit{gen-ke} (the flower in the eye), \textit{kū-ge-chū} (within the sky-flower). The term \textit{gen-ke} is obviously identical with \textit{gen-chū-ge}, and yet a question remains as to what "the flower in the eye" is supposed to mean in contrast to the meaning of \textit{kū-ge}, since Dōgen identifies them in the final analysis. In Dōgen Studies, I think that there are two possible methods for disclosing the dialectical thinking that underlies his expressions: (1) analysis of his language, such as sentential forms, expressions, terms, etc.; and (2) analysis of his philosophy or thought in parallel with Buddhist logic and dialectic. Calling these methods respectively the "formal" and the "structural" approaches, I believe that my attempt is in the line of the latter, i.e., \textit{structural analysis of the Dialectical Context}. This, at least, has proved its feasibility as complementary to the former method.

\textbf{NOTES}


2. Cf. S. Ichimura: "Buddhist Dialectical Methods and their Structural
Identity," presented at the 31st Orientalist Congress in Tokyo; will appear in Dr. S.V. Sohoni Felicitation Volume, JBRS issue, 1983.


4. DZZ, p. 109 (10–13) / See (°) in the attached glossary.

5. Ibid., p. 110 (3) / (°).

6. Ibid., (4–6) / (°); The term kū, which I render there as śūnyatā, means also "sky," or "vacuous space." Dōgen obviously plays on the double meanings of the Chinese character".

7. Ibid., (9–11) and p. 115 (6–8) / (°°). Here, Dōgen again plays on the double meanings of kū, as he says: "People do not know even how flowers appear from the sky." In part he obviously refers to the insight of śūnyatā, on account of which even an illusory appearance of sky-flowers bears transcendental significance.

8. Ibid., p. 109 (14–17) / (°°°).

9. Ibid., p. 112 (3–4) / (°°°°).

10. See the passage quoted below (Note 25); (ibid., p. 111 (12–16).

11. Ibid., p. 111 (19)—p. 112 (1–3) / (°°°°).

12. (°°°); See the passage immediately following and also the passage (Note 16).

13. Ibid., p. 110 (18–19)—p. 111 (1–2) / (°°°°°).


15. Cf. Ibid., p. 110 (14–16) / (°°°°°°°).

16. Ibid., (15–16) / (°°°°°°°°).


\[
\text{pramāṇam prameyam iti ca samākhya samāveśena varṣate}
\]
\[
\text{samākhyaānimitāvādāt / samākhyaānimittam tūpabalodhasādhanam}
\]
\[
\text{pramāṇam upalabdhaśīyataś ca prameyam iti /}
\]

NBh. II, i, 16 (Ibid., p. 57):

\[
\text{tathā kāraṇaśabdā nimūtavaśāt samāveṣena varṣata iti /}
\]
\[
\ldots \text{kāraṇaśabdāś caiva samāṇam pramāṇam prameyam iti / sa ca kāraṇa-}
\]
\[
\ldots \text{dhammaṁ na ārtīm arhati /}
\]

18. Nyāyasūtra II, i, 8–11 (Ibid. pp. 52–3):

\[
\text{pratyakṣādānaś apramāṇyam traikāryasiddheḥ // 8}
\]
\[
\text{pūrvaḥ hi pramāṇaśiddhau nendriyārthaśanniktāḥ pratyakṣot-}
\]
\[
\text{pattih // 9 paścāśiddhau na pramāṇeśhyah prameyaśiddhiḥ // 10 yugapaddattāḥ pratyārthiṇyatvatvāt kramaśvīrttāvibhāvo}
\]
\[
\text{buddhīnām // 11}
\]

19. NBh. II, i, 15 (Ibid., p. 56):

\[
\text{śabdāḥ atodyasiddhiḥtuḥ iti / yathā paścāt siddhena śabdena}
\]

21. Cf. Section VII here where an elucidation is given on Nāgārjuna's arguments (Kārikās 36–39) as to how and why these two points of demonstration can be reached.

23. Ibid., p. 111 (2–7) / (ak).
24. Cf. Ibid., p. 111 (8–11) / (a).n
25. Ibid., p. 111 (12–16) / (am).

\[
\text{nirmītako nirmītakāṁ māyāpurusah svamāyāyā srśam/}
\text{pratīṣeṭhayeta yadvat pratīṣeṭho 'yam tathāvya syät} \]


30. Cf. Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, Shanghai: the Oriental Book Co., 1928; pp. 102–4. It is this Neo-Mohist method of inference, with which the Indian, especially, Buddhist inferential method, consisting of anvaya-vyatireka operations, can be paralleled in terms of the pragmatic principles of verification and falsification. Also, see C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1978, p. 102 and p. 130; Here, the principles of agreement and difference are translated as "Having respects in which they are the same is being of the same kind. Not having respects in which they are the same, is not being of a kind." an.. ao means more literally "having some thing by means of which they are (judged to be) the same."

31. The hypothetical syllogism based upon the antecedent "p" and the consequent "q" has its position and contraposition respectively as "If 'p' then
'q,' but 'p,' therefore 'q.'" (modus ponendo ponens) and "If 'p' then 'q,' but '¬q,' therefore '¬p.'" (modus ponendo tollens). Here, the position and contraposition: "'p' therefore 'q,'" and "'¬q' therefore '¬p,'" can be paralleled with the anvāya and vyatireka operations, provided that the Indian formula is concomitance relation (vyāpti) rather than conditional one.


33. Dignāga defined the object of inferential knowledge as "a pakṣa (substratum) marked by reason (hetu) which implies theses (śādhyā)." Cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, p. 280. For further reference, see Dignāga's refutation of the Naiyāyika notion regarding the object of inference, Pramāṇasamuccaya II: the three kārikās are quoted in Vidhyabhusana's A History of Indian Logic (Calcutta Univ.: 1921), pp. 281–2.

34. Dharmakirti used the term arthakriyākārin for "causal efficiency" as exclusively pertaining to an instantaneous moment (ksana). In fact, Dignāga and Dharmakirti equally used both svalaksana and paramārthasat synonymously for designating such ultimate reality. Hence, the idea was already in Dignāga. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 557.


tat tena vyāptam yat yatra dharmini tatra kṣāṇikatvam/

36. For Buddhist logicians, such as Dignāga and Dharmakirti, real members of a syllogism, the necessary members of the logical processes, are only two, the general rule or universal concomitance (vyāpti) and its application to an individual instance (ṛṣṭānta). The first establishes a necessary interdependence between two terms or propositions, the second applies this general rule to the point in question (pakṣa). The definition of inferential rules (anvāya and vyatireka) by Śaṅkarasvāmin can be transcribed into the following notation:

1. pakṣa-dharmatva (hetu-position) \[ P(a) \quad "a" = "a hill" \]
   \[ "P" = "is smoky" \]

2. sapakṣa sattva (position) \[ (x)[P(x),Q(x)] & P(b),Q(b) \]
   \[ "b" = "a kitchen" \]
   \[ "Q" = "is fiery" \]

3. vipakṣe asattva (contraposition) \[ (y)\{¬Q(y),¬P(y)\} & ¬Q(β),¬P(β) \]
   \[ "β" = "an iceberg" \]

Here both instantiations can be dispensed with for the inner concomitance (antarvyāpti internalized universal) by making the value of "x" and "y" the instantaneous moments which ultimately underlie our mental process to regulate the tendential imputation such as "P and Q" or "P then Q."

37. This chart is duplicated from my previous articles. Cf. "An Analysis of Mādhyamika Dialectic in terms of anvāya and vyatireka," op. cit.; "A Study
on the Madhyamika Method of Refutation and its Influence on Buddhist Logic," loc. cit.

38. Sanskritized by N. Aiyaswami Shastri from the Chinese Chang-chen-lun¹p; Visva-Bharati Annals, II (1949), p. 34:

\[
\text{tattvataḥ sanskṛtāḥ śānyā māyāvat prayayābhāvat/}
\text{asamskṛtāsv asadbhūta anutādāh khaṇḍaspavāt/}
\]


40. DZZ., p. 115 (10–1) / (aⁿ).
41. Ibid., p. 109 (17–19)–p. 110 (1) / (aⁿ).
42. Hsiao-p’īn-pan-jo-polomi-ching, Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (Vol. 8), p. 582a (10–18) / (aⁿ).
43. DZZ., p. 114 (13–16) / (aⁿ).
44. Ibid., p. 114 (19)–p. 115 (1) / (aⁿ).
45. Ibid., p. 112 (6–9) / (aⁿ).
47. DZZ., p. 114 (4–8) / (aⁿ).
49. Ibid., p. 152c (15–20) / (bᵃ).
52. DZZ., p. 108 (7–11) / (bᵈ).

Japanese Terms and Passages in Japanese and Chinese

h. g. f. e. d. c. b. a.

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