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not easily accessible details and references.

Chapter I is dedicated to the life of Śākyamuni and Chapter II to The True Nature of the Buddha. Chapters III—VIII deal with Buddhist doctrine, giving information about its principal tenets under the following titles: The Buddhist Conception of Truth; the Constituent Elements of Existence; Transmigration, Karma and Mental Defilements; The Path to Enlightenment; Mind: The Agency of Practice. Chapter IX has to do with The Precepts and the Organization of the Community. The last Chapter, X, has as its subject-matter The History of Buddhism not only in India but also outside India. This chapter will be especially useful for the specialist in Indian Buddhism, since it allows him to get, in an easy way, a clear account of the development of Buddhism in China, Japan, etc.

The book ends with two excellent indices, one General (pp. 325–351) and another of Characters which appear in the book, (pp. 352–374) giving the Chinese, Japanese and Korean readings.

The translation from Japanese into English was done by Mr. Rolf W. Giebel, who for several years studied under the tutelage of Professor Takasaki in the University of Tokyo, specializing in the field of late Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is a clear and very readable translation.

In resumé: a first-class contribution to Buddhist bibliography, which, though founded in serious scholarship, will contribute to a broader spreading of the knowledge of Buddhism.

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti


*On Being Mindless* is very far from being brainless. In its logical approach the work is well-crafted. In its expository section Pāli and Sanskrit terms are avoided so as to render the concepts in clear English for a wide audience composed of upper-division students and scholars in religion and philosophy as well as the general (educated) public.

Griffiths correctly perceives that altogether to avoid philosophical judgments about Buddhism would be to do the tradition a disservice (xix). A universal rationality thesis is the
basis for making trans-cultural philosophical judgments about Buddhism (xvii). At several points where one would hope for some development, however, the reader is informed that the philosophical adequacy of this or that view cannot be pursued (83, 95). Although some readers may be thankful for being spared a “digression,” those of a more philosophical bent may feel that Griffiths brings one to a halt just when the exposition becomes interesting.

The main problem tackled in On Being Mindless is how to understand “the attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti, samjnāvedayitanirodha). “Cessation” (for short) is part of the enstacy/withdrawal/isolation complex of thought as distinct from the knowledge/power/immortality complex distinguished by Griffiths (17), and is a topic addressed by most major Indian Buddhist schools. Griffiths focuses on Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika and Yogācāra discussions. Here, I will concentrate primarily on Theravāda.

A major ambiguity in Theravāda tradition is explicated by asking whether “cessation” is equivalent to nirvāṇa (Buddhaghosa’s view) or to nirvāṇa in life with substrate (Dhammapala’s view). Griffiths’ puzzle is: in the second case how could one emerge from “cessation” (30–31)? He offers a complex argument for the claim that the puzzle of how emergence from “cessation” is possible once one enters it is neither answered in Theravāda Buddhism nor is answerable on Theravāda assumptions (41). (For an alternative account of “cessation” according to which it is no monkey wrench in the Theravāda fan requiring disentanglement by scholastics, see Andrew Olendzki’s Interdependent Origination and Cessation, a January 1987 Ph.D. dissertation in Lancaster University, available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor.) Griffiths’ argument is summarized as follows:

(1) for the occurrence of any given event Y, there exists a necessary and sufficient condition X
(2) no mental events occur in the attainment of cessation
(3) all intentions are mental events
(4) the necessary and sufficient cause for emergence from the attainment of cessation is the practitioner’s act of intention immediately preceding entry into that state from which (“the usual Theravādin view”) it follows that
(5) the necessary and sufficient cause X, for any event Y, need not be temporally contiguous with that event such that it follows from (1) through (5) that not (6) and/or (7)
(6) every existent exists only for a short space of time
(7) for any existent X, causal efficacy can be predicated of X only while X exists and since (6) and (7) are "both fundamental postulates of Theravāda metaphysics," there is a contradiction. "A different way of putting this is to say that" either A or B below obtains.

A

(1) through (5) plus (7) entails

(8) the practitioner's act of intention immediately preceding entry into the attainment of cessation still exists at the time of the practitioner's emergence from that attainment but (8) contradicts (6)

or

B

(1) through (6) but not (7) "leads inevitably" to (7') and (8')

(7') for any existent X, causal efficacy can be predicated of X when X no longer exists if and only if there is an (in principle) specifiable causal chain connecting X to its putative effects

(8') the practitioner's act of intention immediately preceding entry into the attainment of cessation is connected to emergence therefrom by an (in principle) specifiable causal chain.

On either horn of the above dilemma there are difficulties, as Griffiths points out. On A there is a contradiction. On B one is required to say "either that the emergence of consciousness from the attainment of cessation is caused by a physical event—which stands in tension with Theravāda dualism about mental and physical events—or that some kind of mental continuum endures within the attainment of cessation—which contradicts the standard canonical definitions of that state." (41)

This is a complex and interesting argument which is likely to occupy the attention of Buddhologists in the future. At the moment I wish to make only two points about it. In order to make the first point I must refer to the following passage (37):

Intentions, in Theravāda theory of mind, just are not the kinds of existent/event which can be properly be said to have as their directly antecedent cause a purely physical event: mental events do not arise directly from the body, though there are, of course, manifold and complex kinds of interaction between the mental and the physical, interaction which is described most clearly in Theravādin analyses of the perceptual processes. The fact that there is no suggestion in Theravādin texts that the mental event of emerging from cessation can have a purely physical cause is,
by itself, a good indication that Theravādins are dualists in the sense that they perceive a fundamental difference between the mental and the physical. The difference is, on one level, phenomenological: mental events and physical events simply appear different from one another and have different specifiable characteristics, but it is also, I think, metaphysical.

The last three sentences of the passage just quoted above are supported by footnotes 80, 81 and 82 respectively. The penultimate sentence (concluding with note 81) is what logicians call an “argument from ignorance.” It makes the absence of information seem to be a virtue in saying that the absence of information points to a particular conclusion. In fact, one cannot infer that Theravādins are dualists from the putative fact, “by itself,” that they do not deny that “the mental event of emerging from cessation can have a purely physical cause.” This is purely a logical point. In addition, there is a question as to whether the alleged fact really is a fact. For, as Griffiths himself points out in the footnote (Ch. One, # 81):

It is not quite true that there is no suggestion of a purely physical cause for the re-emergence of consciousness. Such may in fact be suggested by the possibility of the practitioner’s death (a physical event) directly causing the re-emergence of consciousness (on which see Section 1.5). But this is not a possibility treated with much seriousness by the tradition.

Hence it is clear that Griffiths is willing to admit that there is counter-evidence to his claim.

More important than my first point that the argument above is logically unsound and factually inconclusive, however, is the second of my two points about the complex dilemma offered by Griffiths against Theravāda. This point can be stated with reference to the sub-argument above (37), but it has serious implications for the complex argument in the form of a dilemma (A or B) also stated above, and perhaps for the work as a whole. This second point may be put in the form of a question as: what is the justification for thinking that there is a form of dualism in Theravāda?

Griffiths holds that there is both a phenomenological and a metaphysical dualism in the Theravāda idea of mind. He supports this claim with note 82 which refers to the nāma-rūpa (“name-form”) distinction and says “opposed to nāma is rūpa, physical form” (160). Since the Pāli term, rūpa, is ambiguous, it is problematical to construe it specifically as physical form and
then to use this construal as evidence for a controversial interpretation of Theravāda as dualistic. For this construal of rūpa as specifically physical form presupposes (and hence cannot be evidence for) a dualistic view.

Despite some difficulties which make his case less than entirely convincing, Griffiths gives considerable thought to the topic of "cessation" so as to repay careful reading. His conclusion is: "In sum, we have a non-substantivist, event-based interactionist psycho-physical dualism" (112). Some passages, e.g. as in Griffiths' note 80 discussed above, do suggest that a mind-body dualism is presupposed in Sutta Piṭaka Buddhism (SPB), but SPB does not univocally assert a mind-body dualism overall. To follow Griffiths on this point without reservation would be to superimpose a (basically Western) mind-body distinction over alien texts which do not accept the distinction wholesale.

The dualistic reading of Theravāda philosophical psychology fits in with Griffiths' general position that "it is more difficult than it seems to dispose of mental substances, and the debates among the Indian Buddhist schools concerning the attainment of cessation make this especially clear" (113). He reads their dualism as "non-substantivist," but maintains that it ought to have been substantivist: "without a substance-based ontology, without postulating an entity of which the mental and physical events described by Buddhist theorists can be predicated. . ." can one explain identity and continuity, memory, character traits, and the like (113)? One reply is that even with a substance-view it is far from obvious how these problems can be solved. Not only are there unclarities in the notion of substance (sva-bhāva) itself, a point that was certainly not lost on the Theravādins, but in this reader's view of the development of Western philosophy the solution to the problems Griffiths mentions has not been forthcoming even within a predominantly substance/attribute tradition.

Griffiths thinks "it is indicative of a significant intellectual weakness within the tradition that the tradition itself perceived the necessity for construction of a (mental) category which is very much like a substance: the store-consciousness" (113). That is indeed one way to see it. Another is to see the store-consciousness development as unnecessary and perhaps confused. That is, to see the idea of anattā ("non-substantiality") in SPB as coherent in its own terms, not requiring (logically) a substance-view of any sort. One may say that a substance-view is not the answer to philosophical problems of personal identity and continuity with-
out presupposing that SPB is always preferable to later commentaries or schools. As Griffiths himself shows, the store-consciousness idea itself is not immune from philosophical criticism (93).

Overall this is an excellent work. Although there is considerably more to Buddhist meditation and its philosophical psychology than “cessation,” this book is one of the most careful studies of a narrowly defined area of Buddhism ever to come to light. Griffiths is a philosopher’s philosopher and a Buddhologist’s Buddhologist. It is difficult to be even one of these; Griffiths is truly both. The main text is well-written, the production standard is high, and the backmatter (translations of key passages from Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya in appendices, notes, bibliography, and index) quite useful. Without hesitation this volume can therefore be rightly recommended as a significant contribution to both philosophy and Buddhology.

Frank J. Hoffman


In spite of Buddhism’s rejection of an enduring essence anywhere in the phenomenal world, Buddhists and Buddhist scholars alike seem forever to have been intent on finding in Buddhism itself just such a core—a svalaksana, perhaps, on the basis of which to unify the vast disparity of traditions that go under the name “Buddhist.” One of the more intriguing of recent attempts to find such a svalaksana—at least in terms of Buddhist meditation—is The Twilight Language, in which Roderick Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox employ a methodology “bringing together...phenomenological description of meditation, and the analysis of textual-historical data” (p. 197) in order to demonstrate that “the most advanced [Buddhist] meditation practices [were] not recorded in the Tipiṭaka, but [were] transmitted through a secretive, élite tradition,” that “that tradition may have continued unbroken during the millennium between Gotama’s death and the composing of the tantras,” and that “the Vajrayāna [was] a surfacing of the hitherto hidden élite transmission which Gotama had initiated” (pp. 33–34). Such a thesis, if proved, would