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II. BOOK REVIEWS

Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism, by Frank J. Hoffman. Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1987. 12 + 126 pp.

It often has been remarked that when European scholars “discovered” Buddhism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they tended to gravitate to that form of Buddhism that most closely reflected their own philosophical preoccupations. Thus, the rationalist French initiated the study of Indo-Tibetan scholasticism and metaphysics, while the British, with their long tradition of empiricism, found in the Theravāda of occupied Sri Lanka and Burma what seemed like a perfect mirror of their own concern with ethics, equality and evidence. It is, of course, likely that what the Europeans encountered was not a mirror but something more akin to a projected film image. Nevertheless their interpretations of Buddhism have been influential, not only on subsequent generations of Western scholars, but also on some of the very Buddhists they sought to describe. This has been particularly important in the case of Sri Lanka, where native scholars educated in both their own and British traditions, most notably K.N. Jayatilleke (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*), David J. Kalupahana (*Causality: the Central Philosophy of Buddhism*) and Walpola Rahula (*What the Buddha Taught*), provided interpretations of Buddhism that emphasized its compatibility with modern scientific and empirical approaches to the world. The fact that these interpretations have been proffered by “real Asian Buddhists” gave them an added authoritativeness, and it is probably safe to say that the majority of Westerners have had their understanding of Theravāda (hence what the Buddha allegedly “really” taught) shaped by what is sometimes called “the Buddhist empiricism thesis.”

This thesis, which often entails the correlate assertion that Buddhism is really more a “philosophy of life” than a “religion,” has begun to come under attack in recent years, from both Asian and Western scholars. For example, A.D.P. Kalansuriya, a Sri Lankan, has argued that advanced Buddhist meditative experiences cannot possibly be understood empirically, because they transcend the ordinary senses that are the only meaningful basis for “empiricism”; and David Snellgrove, who is English, devotes considerable effort in the early chapters of his recent *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* to criticizing the notion that the Buddha is “an agnostic teacher of ethics of entirely human proportions who was later divinized by the enthusiasm of his followers,” which is, he argues, simply “a nineteenth-century European creation, corresponding to the similar efforts that were made to find a purely human

ethical teacher behind the Jesus Christ of the Gospel accounts. In both cases the 'mythological' interests are primary, and since they dictate . . . the form in which the story is told, not only does the story become trite when deprived by critical scholarship of its religious significance, but also a gap begins to yawn between the 'founder' himself and his believing followers" (vol.I,p.8). There is, in short, a growing belief among scholars not only that Buddhist philosophy per se cannot easily be subsumed under Western categories, but that the religious context out of which that philosophy emerges makes its identification as "scientific" or "empirical" particularly problematic.

This belief is at the heart of Frank J. Hoffman's *Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism*, which is the most sophisticated and many-pronged attack on the Buddhist empiricism thesis that has yet appeared. In this review, I will briefly lay out, and comment upon, the argument of each of the book's six chapters, then remark on the book's style and structure, and conclude with some general observations.

In his first chapter, "Understanding Early Buddhism," Hoffman carefully qualifies the term "early Buddhism," indicating that it is simply a "shorthand" for "the Buddhism of the five *nikāyas*," which are themselves assumed to be neither of the same chronological stratum, nor necessarily the words of Gautama Buddha. He goes on to describe his general purpose, which is to analyze certain philosophical issues and conceptual problems in early Buddhism. To do so, one must avoid both pure textual exposition—for this approach tends toward apologetics, and is insufficiently critical—and the temptation to "straightjacket" the texts into "an alien and perhaps pre-conceived philosophical framework" (p.2)—approach that fails sufficiently to respect the texts' own words and meanings. Hoffman's own approach, then, is to combine both emic and etic approaches, showing "on the one hand, sympathetic understanding of what is internally coherent and linguistically precise in the language of the Asian texts studied, and, on the other hand, attention to Asian thought from a critical philosophical point of view" (p.7). The "texts" Hoffman proposes to use are the *nikāyas*, *without* recourse to their commentaries; "the critical philosophical point of view" is provided mostly by contemporary Anglo-American philosophers of religion, with a backward glance at Wittgenstein.

I am essentially in sympathy with Hoffman's stated goal and methodology: it seems a prudent and balanced basis for cross-cultural philosophical analysis. The only point with which I might quarrel is his insistence on dispensing entirely with the commen-

arial tradition. Granted, it is naive to suppose that commentaries give us the “true purport” of the texts on which they comment; Buddhaghosa, for example, wrote his commentaries on the *nikāyas* several hundred years after the texts were composed, and brought to his analysis concerns peculiar to his own time and situation. Nevertheless, if commentary is not “pure” exposition of earlier texts, it is usually a part of the same intellectual continuum, and often can provide illumination of the *possible* meanings of the texts. Certainly, it is a “closer continuer” of the original texts than our own efforts are, and while attention to commentaries sometimes can lead us away from the meaning of the original, just as often it will provide contextual insights that enable us to check our tendency to impute our own radically different concerns into texts from another time and culture.

In chapter 2, “Rationality and Logic,” Hoffman focuses on the “fourfold pattern”—often called the tetralemma—employed by the Buddha in analyzing the famous “unanswered questions.” He is particularly concerned to rescue Buddhism from the accusation that it is philosophically incoherent because it invokes a logical “principle of contradiction” and then seems to violate that principle by setting as the third and fourth of the four possible positions, “both X and non-X” and “neither X nor non-X.” Hoffman argues (*contra* Jayatilleke) that early Buddhism has no term for, hence no real concept of, “propositions.” Therefore, the tetralemma and the “principle of contradiction” are not elements of a formal logic, applied to *propositions*, but, rather, heuristic rules to be applied to *utterances*, which “can be understood properly as existential statements” that cannot be “formally symbolized” (p.21). Thus, when we consider, e.g., whether or not the *tathāgata* exists after death, the third position is not that “he both exists and does not exist”—which is self-evidently contradictory—but, rather, that “part of the *tathāgata* survives death and part does not,” and if the surviving part is taken as a “permanent *ātman* surrogate,” it must be rejected (p.21).

I think Hoffman performs a service here by pointing out clearly that the tetralemma must be located within the context of actual utterances and discussions, and that it should not therefore too quickly be homologized to Western formal logic, nor, by the same token, should Buddhist utterances too facily be translated into “propositions” that can quickly be “proved” or “refuted.” I confess, however, that I do not entirely understand the problem he seeks to resolve or agree with his particular solution to it. In the first place, Hoffman does not clearly identify those critics who feel that the third and fourth members of the tet-

ralemma threaten to undermine Buddhism's philosophical coherence. Granted, the third and fourth members are not easily explained, but I do not think that they need to be rephrased in the manner—not clearly explicated in the original texts—that Hoffman suggests. Why should they *not* invoke a principle of contradiction that simply says, e.g., the *tathāgata* cannot both exist and not exist after death because survival and non-survival are mutually exclusive? This may, as some have suggested, involve setting up a philosophical straw-man, but it does not, I think risk the sort of self-contradiction Hoffman is concerned about—especially when we consider that the Buddha consistently *rejects* the “both/and”—as well as the “neither/nor”—alternative.

Further, though Hoffman is probably correct that there is no term for “proposition” in the *nikāyas*, and though there no doubt is a legitimate distinction to be made between propositions and utterances, I do not think that this should obscure the fact that there is considerable interest in early Buddhism in distinguishing between “true” (*sacca*) and “false” (*micchā*), with the former in some sense corresponding to, and the latter straying from, “things as they are” (*yathābhūtam*). Now it may be more proper to regard what is “true” as an utterance than as a proposition, but I suspect that to do so is to underestimate the implicit propositionality of utterances, and to insist on a distinction that is in some ways more semantical than real. Buddhist utterances may exist within a non-propositional, e.g., religious, context, but that does not mean that Buddhists believed their utterances to be relative to their particular context; after all, whether or not *tathāgatas* arise to explain it, the way things are is the way they are. Hence, Buddhist descriptions of the way things are do conform to *some* meaningful sense of the term “proposition,” if not necessarily to the most restrictive one.

Chapter 3, “Rationality and Pessimism,” seeks to refute the common perception that Buddhism—whose first noble truth, after all, is that of suffering—is “wholly pessimistic and in that way ‘irrational’” (p.27). Hoffman does not specify why a “wholly pessimistic” outlook would be “irrational”; perhaps it is because it would eclipse all meaningful discussion of “better” and “worse.” In any case, he carefully examines the meaning of *dukkha* in a number of *nikāya* passages, concluding that there is a narrower sense in which *dukkha* is “anguish”—i.e., overt suffering—and a broader, more fundamental sense in which it is descriptive of all experience in *samsāra*, where conditions are impermanent, hence unreliable. This, Hoffman observes, “is in contrast to the ‘no

arising' and 'no falling' characteristics of . . . *nibbāna* [which] is not characterized by impermanence" (p. 29). After examining a number of different versions of pessimism, Hoffman concludes that "pessimism admits no consolation," whereas Buddhism, with its belief the possibility of a virtuous life here, a better rebirth in the hereafter, and the ultimate attainment of *nibbāna*, "sees . . . many sources of consolation," and so "cannot accurately be called pessimistic" (p.37). He ends the chapter by arguing (*contra* Radhakrishnan), that the Buddhist assertion that "all is *dukkha*" or "all is impermanent" must be understood as evaluative rather than descriptive and scientific—since "to see the world *yathā bhūtam* is . . . not to see what a video-camera would record but is in part to see in a hopeful manner the possibility of liberation" (pp. 42–43). There is, in short, in Buddhist "descriptions" of reality the deliberate inclusion of an element of *value*, and a lack of concern with issues of "verification" or "falsification," which clearly take those descriptions outside what we could comfortably characterize as "scientific"—and because Buddhism makes no pretense to being "scientific," it cannot be accused of confusing fact and value.

I am in complete agreement with Hoffman's refutation of Buddhist pessimism: it is a careful, lucid and compelling analysis. His analysis of factual and evaluative elements in Buddhism, which serves as a sort of coda to the discussion of pessimism, is important, but less convincing. He argues successfully, I think, that early Buddhism is not "scientific" or "factual" in precisely our sense of those terms: the Buddha is not setting forth "hypotheses" that must stand or fall on empirical evidence, and he clearly informs Buddhist descriptions of "the way things are" with presuppositions that are in turn rooted in "values," such as the hope of *nibbāna*. Once again, however, I think that the fact that early Buddhist assertions do not pretend to be "factual" in a sense that a modern scientist would recognize does *not* mean that Buddhists regard their assertions as, say, context-dependent conceptual schemes or language games; they clearly regard their assertions as universalizable, hence as independent of *their* particular assumptions. This, of course, entails precisely the sort of interweaving of facts and values of which Hoffman seeks to exculpate early Buddhism. I have no simple solution to this problem: perhaps there really is a confusion; or perhaps one could point to the incorporation of "values" and presuppositions into "factual" descriptions as a way of narrowing the apparent gap between the two types of assertions, thereby beginning to undercut the critique

of any set of assertions that overtly contains evaluative elements. I will say a bit more about this in my comments on chapter 5.

In chapter 4, "Mind and Rebirth," Hoffman addresses two major questions: (1) How does early Buddhism describe the rebirth process? and (2) Is there a systematic attempt in early Buddhism to explain how there might occur "reidentification of persons across lives"? (1) In his analysis of *nikāya* accounts of the rebirth process, he is careful to note that "there are several candidates for the rebirth link (*saṅkārā, citta, gandabba, viññāṇa*), and no consistent, technical view about this matter in early Buddhism" (p.51). He also observes that "[i]n early Buddhism there is no 'doctrine of moments' (*kṣaṇavāda*)," no division of perceptions into "distinct existences" as in the later Buddhist Sautrāntika school or, in the West, Hume (p.56). If there is no doctrine of momentariness, then the problem of radical discontinuity—with its potential for vitiating any account of causality—is not posed for early Buddhism. Nor, however, does Buddhism "offer a substitute for the concept of *ātman*"—no permanent substance is asserted (p.54). How then is continuity explained? Hoffman finds the most helpful image in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, where "the strength of a cord does not always depend on there being a single strand which runs from end to end, but sometimes depends on the interrelationship between overlapping and criss-crossing fibers, none of which runs the entire length of the cord. The early Buddhist doctrine of rebirth may be viewed like this: there is no permanent, unchanging *ātman* linking up successive lives with its continuous psychic fiber, but there is nevertheless continuity which is assured by overlapping and criss-crossing fibers" (p.51). (2) Searching the *nikāyas* for criteria for reidentification of persons across lives, Hoffman finds them lacking. He considers in detail a variety of possible criteria, including those of consciousness, memory and body, and sees all of them as problematic: "viewed externally there is no good reason to accept 'there is rebirth,' for it is not clear that the obstacle of providing conditions for the meaning of 'the same person' can be overcome" (p.76). This is not a problem, however, as long as one recognizes that early Buddhism is not interested in providing such criteria, but, rather, regards the doctrine of rebirth as part of its own "conceptual background," a presupposition "against which other beliefs may fit or fail to fit, since the tests are devised in terms of the background" (p.75).

Hoffman's discussion in this chapter is impressively detailed and generally convincing. I find his description of the processes

of change and rebirth in terms of the strands of a rope quite striking, and I suspect that it probably does capture the spirit of the early Buddhist attitude. I would be more comfortable with it if there were an exactly equivalent image in the *nikāyas*, but I do not think Hoffman provides one: the closest parallel he can find is the image of the flame, which *does* express the concept of continuity within change, but does *not* account for the problematic interaction of various impermanent elements in the way that the rope image does. I am in general agreement with Hoffman's analysis of the problem of establishing criteria for identifying persons across lives, though I am not entirely in accord with his rejection of the memory criterion. He argues that the memory of past lives is problematic in part because it is available to so few, in part because the lives one can in principle remember are infinite, hence the memory incapable of supplying "all the data," leaving Buddhism with, at best, a "weakly quantified law" (p.70). The fact that the memory of past lives is available to so few, however, does not mean that it is not accessible *in principle* to everyone; while the absence of "all the data" on rebirth, *karma*, etc., should not (problems of subjectivity aside) prevent supernatural perceptions of them from acquiring the same kind of evidential force as other inductive generalizations. This may still leave unresolved problems about the precise mode of reidentification, but it would seem to leave the *possibility* open in principle. Finally, I agree with Hoffman that "proving" rebirth is not a major concern of early Buddhism. It should be noted, however, that not all Buddhists have considered it an unassailable presupposition: under attack from materialist critics, later Indian Buddhists, such as Dharmakīrti, provided elaborate rational defenses of the doctrine of rebirth—and thereby implicitly recognized that the "factuality" of what might otherwise be relegated to the "evaluative" realm had *become* a concern of Buddhists—even if those concerns were, as Hoffman insists, latent or nonexistent in Buddhism's early period.

It is in chapter 5, "Mind and Verification," that Hoffman most directly attacks the Buddhist empiricism thesis. His discussion is threefold, dealing in turn with the role of *saddhā* ("faith"), the function of *abhiññā*, and the degree to which early Buddhism fulfills the criteria for "empiricism." He argues first of all against those—most notably Jayatilleke—who claim that *saddhā* is invariably a "faith" in the Buddha *subsequent* to checking the truth of what he teaches, a "rational" faith that is to be contrasted with the "blind" faith of brahmins. Hoffman marshals textual evidence

for the view that there are at least some instances where *saddhā* precedes and, indeed, facilitates one's understanding of what the Buddha teaches. "Thus," concluded Hoffman, "there is an affective element in *saddhā* which is ignored if one treats believing in the Buddha as equivalent to believing that what he says is true" (p.83). If *saddhā* is in many cases affective and prior to understanding the teaching, it loses the purely rational, *a posteriori* quality with which Jayatilleke sought to invest it. Hoffman continues by arguing that neither the specific, paradigmatic event of the Buddha's enlightenment under the *bodhi* tree, nor *abhiññā* in general, should be seen simply as experiences that serve to confirm beliefs, but must be understood as informed by doctrinal assumptions and issuing in inspired activity in the world. Thus, *abhiññā* does not verify propositions, for "it is a mistake to think that there is a body of propositions which can be rightly labeled 'religious knowledge', in a sense even remotely analogous to scientific knowledge. Unlike 'religious knowledge', there may indeed be 'religious wisdom', but if there is, it is to be found embodied in the lives of religious people, and as with 'philosophical wisdom', cannot be embodied in a set of propositions but is embodied in practices" (pp. 95–96). Finally, Hoffman directly attacks the Buddhist empiricism thesis, arguing that "empiricism" requires criteria of falsification, and that early Buddhism simply does not provide these: even the Buddha's famous invitation to "come and see" (*ehi passako*) "will not be falsified by the assiduous meditating monk who meditates and yet does not 'see' rebirth At no point will the meditation teacher agree that the student has falsified the doctrine in case the student came and did not see" (p. 98).

I think that Hoffman's arguments succeed in refuting the Buddhist empiricism thesis—at least in the strong form that Jayatilleke, Kalupahana and others have presented it. There clearly is in early (as in later) Buddhism a place for *a priori* "faith": not only is "confidence" not always "subsequent to checking," but one's checking may not "verify" doctrines if one does not possess that *a priori* faith. By the same token, "religious experiences" (as Steven Katz and others have argued) cannot be isolated either from their informing assumptions nor from the "life" of which they are a part, and so cannot be regarded as having quite the same evidential status as scientific, empirical studies do. Nor do we see many (if any) instances where religious doctrines are "falsified" on the basis of experience. For all these reasons, it seems safe to say that early Buddhism is not "empiricism" as that term is used in Western philosophy. However, the fact that early

Buddhism involves *a priori* assumptions and attitudes, is not overtly propositional, and may not fulfill the definition of empiricism, does not—as I have indicated before—mean that early Buddhists were not making truth-claims of any sort. They were not and did not claim to be philosophical rationalists, but they did believe that their doctrines accurately described things as they are, that happiness depended on seeing things as they are, and that understanding of the way things are—while no doubt embedded in religious aspiration and practice—was in some sense verifiable by examination, whether through the senses or the *abhiññā*, of actual conditions in the world. This may not be “propositional” or “empirical” in the strong sense, but I think that it is an outlook that *entails* certain propositions and a certain confidence in “checking” those propositions.

Hoffman fears, I suspect, that if we concede that early Buddhism is attempting to be propositional it too easily may be shown to be irrational. No doubt the admission of philosophical motives does raise problems about presuppositions, coherence, etc., but they may not be insurmountable. Hoffman seems to me to have an exaggerated notion of the purity of scientific and empirical inquiry—as if *they* were not themselves informed by presuppositions and embedded within ideological (and even cultural) contexts. I am not trying to argue for a strong Kuhnian position, or maintain that “religion” and “science” are simply two alternative conceptual schemes, each valid in its own domain; I do think, however, that the degree to which we now appreciate the contextual nature of *all* understanding, including the scientific, has altered our notion of the conditions under which truth-claims may be made: because we are more modest about the “purity” of any and all evidence, we may, paradoxically, entertain truth-claims (even-shudder!—propositions) of more various types than we could, say, during the heyday of logical positivism. There are, of course, many issues left undecided about the commensurability between and relative merits of various types of truth-claims, but I do not feel that religions—early Buddhism included—require the “protection” afforded by the assertion of their non-cognitive, non-propositional nature. The relationship between “belief” and “understanding” is a complex and undoubtedly problematic one, but it is thus in *all* realms of “knowledge,” and I think we may do religions as much of a disservice by understating the seriousness of their religious truth-claims as we do by overstating them—for if the latter results too often in oversimplification, the former risks trivialization.

The sixth and final chapter is devoted to “The Deathless (*Amata*),” i.e., to *nibbāna*, of which “the deathless” may be both a synonym and a quality. Hoffman argues first (*contra* Kalansuriya) that *parinibbāna* is not a transcendental state of immortality, on the grounds that such a view is *not* entailed by the Buddha’s denial of the materialist *uccedavāda*. He goes on to defend (*contra* Peter Masefield) the meaningfulness of the distinction between *nibbāna* and *parinibbāna*, arguing that the occasional application of the latter to a living *arhant* does not vitiate the distinction, but simply indicates a variant usage that is an exception to the general rule, i.e., that *parinibbāna* is applied after the death of an *arhant*. Finally, Hoffman analyzes the meaning of *amata* as it applies to both *nibbāna* and *parinibbāna*, arguing that when applied to the former, it simply means “the destruction of what defiles,” i.e., greed, hatred and delusion (p.113), and that when applied to the latter it indicates “the limit of a Buddhist stream of life, not an experience in that stream” (p.114). The Buddhist view thus becomes that one lives not an “endless life” but an “eternal life” in which “it is possible to live in such a way that one is not limited by, but independent of, death” (p.115). Since death, for Buddhists, is inextricably bound with rebirth, once one has achieved a state where rebirth no longer will occur, one is, by definition, free from death, for one’s passing will not be like the death of unenlightened beings. Returning to the conundrum of the *tathāgata*’s survival after “death,” Hoffman concludes that from an emic perspective, there simply is no thesis that can be found, while from an etic perspective “the Early Buddhist position does suggest that there is no question of anything surviving in *parinibbāna* once the conditions for rebirth are gone” (p.116). He ends by suggesting that Buddhists denied that *parinibbāna* is extinction as vociferously as they did (a) to avoid speculation on what did not yield to speculation, (b) to avoid confusion with materialism’s *uccedavāda* and (c) because one’s own extinction cannot be experienced, hence cannot be asserted on philosophical grounds.

Hoffman’s arguments and textual analyses in this chapter are generally solid. He gives a sound defense of the *nibbāna-parinibbāna* distinction. His interpretation of *amata* is persuasive with regard to *nibbāna*, and I am almost prepared to go along with his rather ingenious reading with regard to *parinibbāna*, too. Certainly, when we consider that *parinibbāna* entails the elimination of the aggregates, and the aggregates are the only comprehensible basis for experience, there seems little room left for the continuation of “anything” after the passing of an *arhant*. This does not,

however, it seems to me, completely rule out the possibility that *parinibbāna* is an endless transcendental condition—as long as we recognize that “transcendental” means “incomprehensible in terms of either existence, non-existence, both and neither,” and that the specification “endless” could have very little meaning *within* such a transcendental state (any more than “temporal” is a meaningful characteristic of the Judeo-Christian God prior to creation). Some light might be shed on the issue by further examination of the meaning of *amata* (or *amṛta*) in early Indian culture.

Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism is a detailed and highly nuanced book, and I cannot claim to have explicated or understood it in its entirety. Part of the fault lies with my own limited powers of comprehension, but part, I think, must be attributed to Hoffman. The book covers a great many topics of great importance, yet Hoffman's style is so compressed that he is sometimes difficult to follow. He refers continually to people and positions (including some of his own, in articles) that the reader is somehow expected to know. For example, he talks in the last chapter of defending Kalupahana's view of *parinibbāna* against Jayatilleke's, but never clearly states what those two views are. By the same token, he refers in his discussion of falsifiability in early Buddhism to his own “parable of the *bhikkhu*,” but never sets it forth explicitly. In a work of serious philosophical analysis like Hoffman's, this sort of omission is a disservice to the reader, who needs as clear and complete an exposition of the positions under consideration as the author can afford. The book also would have gained a bit more coherence had Hoffman (who clearly understands Pāli) himself translated the *nikāya* passages he cites, rather than relying on a variety of extant translations, which inflict upon the non-Pāliglot reader an avoidable bewilderment as to the meanings of terms. My final stylistic criticism is that the book—ranging both as wide and deep as it does—needs a unifying conclusion. It's not that Hoffman's points don't come through, or that a careful reader will not be able to construct his or her own sense of Hoffman's overall position; it is simply a matter of authorial helpfulness to provide for the reader who has followed him through dense philosophical thickets a concluding view from on high that provides a perspective on the terrain that has been covered.

My stylistic and philosophical criticisms notwithstanding, I want to make it clear that I regard *Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism* as an important and insightful advance in our understanding of the ideology of the *nikāyas*. Hoffman makes a vital

contribution with his analysis of the importance, in Buddhist doctrine and experience, of conceptual and affective presuppositions; he is quite correct in locating Buddhist doctrines and experiences within a particular *lebenswelt*; and I think he effectively demolishes the strong form of the Buddhist empiricism thesis, demonstrating that early Buddhism is *not* simply reducible to propositions that can be verified or falsified in the way that scientific hypotheses traditionally can. Although, as should by now be clear, I feel that Hoffman underestimates the degree to which (a) Buddhists are making universalizable truth-claims and (b) those claims can—very cautiously—be treated propositionally, I am very much indebted to him for helping to clarify my own views on the complex problems he tackles, and I cannot conceive that any further discussions of the philosophical standpoint of early Buddhism (or even Buddhism as a whole) could proceed without reference to his book.

Roger Jackson