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Concerning Professor J.W. de Jong's review (JIABS, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 127-128) of my Meditation on Emptiness, I was surprised to find a large number of his points to be unfounded. The ten critical points of his review fall into four groups; he (1) is wrong about my translation of sādhyadharma, 'jigs lta, avyabhicārin, bādha, siddha, and adhyāśaya; (2) has missed the point of my note on rdo rje gzegs ma, (3) has understandably been confused by my inventive translation of the passage from the Ghanavyūhasūtra, and (4) is right about the passage from the Dhāranīśvararājakariparipṛcchāsūtra and the translation of samyaktvaniyāma.

I cannot consider all of these points in the space allotted to a response to a review, but a few will illustrate my countercriticism. For instance, Professor de Jong makes an unsubstantiated re-translation: (p. 126)

"Wrong is Hopkins' rendering of sādhyadharma by 'predicate of the probandum' (p. 508). The sādhyadharma is the 'property to be proved', i.e., the probandum."

This is all he says—he gives no sources; and he could not be more wrong. De Jong's rendition is simply outside the pale of a basic understanding of Buddhist logical terminology. As Masaaki Hattori says in the introduction to his Dignāga, On Perception:¹

"His great contribution to the cause of Indian logic is the invention of the hetucakra, that is, the table which shows nine possible relations between the Reason (hetu) and the sādhyadharma or predicate of the Thesis (pakṣa, sādhyā) to be proved."

De Jong has confused the sādhyadharma (the predicate of the thesis, or predicate of the probandum) with the sādhyā (the thesis to be proved, the probandum). The compound sādhyadharma is not to be interpreted as a karmadhārya, meaning the "property to be proved", but as a genitive tatpurusa, meaning the "predicate of that which is to be proved, i.e., of the probandum". This reading of the terms is confirmed also by the context, but it would
take too much space here to make the point. In an attempt at correction, de Jong shows carelessness and lack of comprehension: (p. 127)

"Hopkins has misread the text in Ngawang Gelek Demo's edition, p. 906.5: 'jig lta sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis . . . Hopkins' text has 'jigs lta, etc., and he translates this as follows: 'through fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed' (p. 604). In this passage the Arhats are compared to those whose Buddha lineage has been severed on account of a false notion of personality ('jig-lta, satkāyadrsti')."

First, de Jong's citation of Ngawang Gelek Demo's edition is flawed; the text reads 'jig lta sangs rgyas kyi gdung bshad pa lta bu de dag gis, not 'jig lla sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis as cited by de Jong. Thus, that edition, if taken at face value, should be translated, in de Jong's vocabulary, as, "The false notion of personality is described as the Buddha lineage," not that the Buddha lineage is severed by such a false notion, as de Jong has it. Though such makes sense in the context of the Vimalakirtinirdesa where this notion does indeed appear, it makes no sense here in the context of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's explaining the meaning behind passages in the Samdhinirmocanasutra that indicate that certain sravakas never attain the highest enlightenment. For, it would indicate just the opposite—that even such a false view can contribute to their eventually becoming fully enlightened, thereby suggesting that these sravakas do indeed attain the enlightenment of Buddhahood. The passage has to be emended to make sense, and de Jong has indeed emended it, but he should have cited the original accurately and indicated his emendation.

Second, four of the five editions consulted read 'jigs lta (though such is to be expected, given that evidence shows that they stem from the same edition) whereas Ngawang Gelek Demo's edition reads 'jig lta, as de Jong prefers. (Indeed, if I had simply read 'jigs lta without it occurring to me that it might be 'jig lta [satkāyadrsti] I would deserve the reviewer's scorn, nevermind criticism.) My decision that the former reading is preferable, either as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's intended meaning or as a more sensible interpretation, was based on an annotation by the Mongolian scholar Ngag dbang dpal Idan, cited in the emendations (p. 968) and in note 555 (p. 871), neither of which de Jong apparently noticed. That note reads, "The bracketed material is from Ann,
"When one forsakes activities for the benefit of others due to viewing the suffering of cyclic existence fearfully, the Buddha line or lineage is severed. ('khor ba'i sdug bsgal la 'jigs par lta ba'i dbang gis gzhan don gyis bya ba dor na sangs rgyas kyi gdung ngam rigs chad bs[ sic]ar 'gyur ro')."

Ngag dbang dpal ldan, in a brilliant display of erudition, has ferreted out the meaning of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's unusual terminology; he corrects not 'jigs to 'jig but (as is indicated in my emendations to the text, p. 968) gdung bshad to bdung chad. I speak of Ngag dbang dpal ldan's "erudition" because 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is addressing teachings in the Samdhinirmocanastra that indicate that certain śrāvakas never attain the highest enlightenment, and although Ngag dbang dpal ldan does not cite the passage, it must be one found in the seventh chapter where it is explained that a śrāvaka who proceeds solely to peacefulness (samathaikayānika, zhi ba'i bgro d pa cigs pa pa) cannot attain full enlightenment because of being deficient in compassion and because of being very afraid of suffering (duḥkhaṭībhayatas, sdug bsgal gyis shin tu 'jigs pa). That such śrāvakas are incapable of the highest enlightenment is depicted in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's text (as corrected by Ngag dbang dpal ldan) by "their Buddha lineage has been severed" (sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa). Also, that the reasons for this include these śrāvakas' being very afraid of suffering is indicated by "fear" or, more literally, "viewing with fear" (jigs lta, i.e., 'jigs par lta ba). Ngag dbang dpal ldan's contextual reading, based on philological analysis (i.e., associating the word 'jigs in the two texts), is most sound. Professor de Jong's criticism, however, turns out to be careless for not pursuing references in a note and an emendation and for mistakenly citing the reading that he prefers. Had he taken greater care, he would have perceived the appropriateness of Ngag dbang dpal ldan's explanation and, thereby, would not have wanted to emend 'jigs to 'jig.

One of Professor de Jong's criticisms speaks directly to the important issue of style of translation, the reviewer disagreeing with my preference for rendering terms more literally. Referring
to my translation of the controversy between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti from the first chapter of the Prasannapadā, he says: (p. 126)

“In part five of his book, Hopkins translates and explains the controversies between on the one hand, Buddhapālita, and on the other, Candrakīrti... For instance, Hopkins translates bādha (Tib. gnod-pa) by ‘damage, harm’ (cf. pp. 502, 526 and note 395), whereas the technical meaning of the Sanskrit term ‘refutation, annulment’ is well-known from Sanskrit philosophical texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist.”

First, the controversy is not “between on the one hand, Buddhapālita, and on the other, Candrakīrti”, but between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, who is defending Buddhapālita.

Since I chose this particular translation-equivalent, despite its obvious awkwardness, after much reflection, the term provides a good instance of what, at least on the surface, appears to be a clash of translation-paradigms. Simply put, I often find that the re-rendering of Sanskrit and Tibetan philosophical terminology into what some contemporary translators have identified as its philosophical meaning loses much of the psychological punch.

De Jong does not consider the fact that the eleventh century Indian and Tibetan translators—Mahāsumati and Pa tshab nyi ma grags—and revisors—Kanakavarman and, again, Pa tshab nyi ma grags—who were well aware of Sanskrit technical terminology, undoubtedly consciously chose to translate the term bādha as gnod, “damage” or “harm”. The interpretation of Buddhist technical terminology by such Indian and Tibetan scholars strikes me as important and valuable because it provides a fascinating source for the understanding of Sanskrit terminology nine hundred years ago. Specifically, the psychological dimension of the Tibetan gnod, “damage” or “injure”, as can be gained from contact with the oral tradition, is that the adherence that a person has to a wrong view needs to be counteracted, to be harmed, to be damaged. The martial imagery is not by chance; the aim of the battle is to be so affected by a good argument that one’s own position is damaged. This does indeed mean to be “refuted”, but such a translation does not convey the implications of the term.

As is obvious, oral traditions are often wrong and thus cannot simply be accepted at face value. However, in this case, we have the evidence that nine hundred years ago Indian and Tibetan scholars (not just those who translated this text but many other translators, too) avoided the many possible Tibetan equivalents
for “refute” and chose to stick with “damage, injure”, which we know to be one of many meanings of the Sanskrit. Thus, given the obvious connection with “refute” but in an earthier way, “damage” or “injure” is a better translation, for it at least has a chance of conveying (or contributing to conveying) the cultural background of the term. I am not putting forward a general theory that we should return to older, non-technical meanings of technical terms; I am asserting that it is helpful to check these supposedly non-technical meanings in order to overcome prejudiced adherence to translation-equivalents that, no matter how much we have become used to them, are actually sanitized versions that fail to communicate cultural dimensions. Thorough-going philology needs to take account of cultural context.

In conclusion, though I appreciate the corrections that are valid, I have been disappointed by the many errors and the frequent lack of substantiation, these being surprising in work by such an eminent scholar.

NOTES

2. In another criticism without substantiation, de Jong says:
   (p. 126)

   “Also, in other instances Hopkins’ renderings of technical terms are not very satisfactory, for example, ‘unmistaken’ (p. 485) for aubhabicarin (21.5).”

This is hard to answer since this is all the reviewer says! Suffice it to cite Vaman Shivaram Apte’s The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary on vya-bhicdrin, the term without the negative prefix a; Apte gives “straying or deviating from, going astray, erring, trespassing; irregular, anomalous; untrue, false; faithless, unchaste, adulterous; profligate, wanton; departing from its usual meaning, having several secondary meanings; changeable, inconstant.”

In another undocumented criticism that is a mere quibble about choice of translation terms: (p. 127)

“In the translation of this text, Hopkins is careless too in his renderings of technical terms. Probably nobody will recognize in ‘unusual attitude’ Tibetan thag-bsam, Sanskrit adhyāsya” (p. 604).

Suffice it to cite (1) Franklin Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary which for adhyāsya gives “mental disposition; (strong) purpose, intent determination (esp. religious)” and, in connection with
lhag pa'i bsam pa, gives “superior (adhi) thought, will, inclination” and (2) Etienne Lamotte’s L’Enseignement de Vimalakirti (Louvain: 1962), p. 406, which, in a classic note, gives “haute résolution”, “pensée profonde”, and “haut sentiment”. These are all very close to “unusual attitude”!


J.W. de Jong Replies to Jeffrey Hopkins

I am sorry that I have not been able to convince Professor Jeffrey Hopkins on a number of points. Let me begin by correcting an error of mine. The controversy in the Prasannapadā is between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakirti, and not between Buddapālita and Candrakirti.

Hopkins goes into much detail in order to defend his translation of the following passage on p. 604 of his book 'jigs lta sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis. Hopkins rightly remarks that Ngawang Geleg Demo’s edition has gdung bshad pa, not gdung chad pa. Having read the Tibetan text at the end of the book (p. 26) and the correction on p. 969, I corrected the text of Ngawang Geleg Demo’s edition without pointing this out because we both agreed on this reading. As to the confusion between 'jigs lta and jig lta this is so common that it is almost unnecessary to draw attention to it. Hopkins uncritically follows Ngag dbang dpal Idan’s fanciful explanation based on his failure to correct the wrong reading 'jigs lta. Hopkins refers to the seventh chapter of the Samdhinirmocana but this does not say anything about “viewing with fear”.

According to Hopkins I am wrong about his translation of sādhyadharma, avyabhicārin, bādhā, siddha and adhyāsaya. I remain unrepentant and continue to find it inadmissible to use such Tibetan Hybrid English renderings as “renowned” for siddha, “being renowned to the other [party]” for parataḥ prasiddhi, and “harm, damage” for bādhā. As to sādhyadharma, Hopkins has not taken into account the ambiguity of the term sādhyā.¹ The context has to be taken into account. Candrakirti declares that if, as does Bhāvaviveka, one rejects a subject or substratum (dharmin), one cannot prove the existence of a quality (dharma) such as anutpāda.²