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II. CONFERENCE REPORT

"Buddhist Soteriology: The Marga and Other Approaches to Liberation"
A Conference Report, by Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello

Religious Studies, particularly the cross-cultural version thereof which is often known as Comparative Religion, has long promised to liberate scholars from culture-bound categories, perspectives, and methods. This promise has regularly taken the form of an exhortation combined with an invitation—an exhortation to cease relying exclusively on Western (viz., Judeo-Christian) traditions in establishing the major features of religious experience or in determining the general terms in which religion can or should be studied, and an invitation to draw freely upon other traditions for themes and approaches that may be usefully employed in the study of religions generally. This promise, unfortunately, has seldom been fulfilled. It is still all too common to find non-Western religious traditions like Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism treated only in terms drawn from the European heritage, such as prayer, theodicy, transcendence, myth, ritual, eschatology, deity, and so forth. Some such concepts are useful in the study of traditions other than those in which they were generated; others prove often to be quite inappropriate if not utterly untransferable. But this examination has typically been one-sided: where are the Hindu categories used to illumine Christianity, the Taoist concepts employed in analyzing Judaism, the shamanic themes applied to Islam? No doubt such truly cross-cultural studies of religions have been occasionally essayed, but only rarely in a systematic fashion.

This conference on “Buddhist Soteriology” was, among other things an effort, albeit an admittedly modest and limited one, to begin to rectify this situation. The conference was held at the University of California, Los Angeles between the 25th and 30th of June, 1988, under the sponsorship of the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, and the University of California System-wide Grant Program in Pacific Rim Studies. An international group of twenty scholars, who together covered the entire span of Buddhism’s history and geographical extension, gathered for a wide-ranging series of discussions on the problem of soteriology in many of its
most important dimensions. The participants sought to utilize both Buddhism's emphasis on soteriology as the bedrock of its own identity and the potential use of the concept of *mārga*, or "path," as a fundamental category in the field of Religious Studies. All presented original research on the theories and methods of liberation in Buddhism and the general question of the role of soteriology in the array of things that comprise Buddhism; abstracts of the papers presented at the conference follow in this report. Clarification of the nature of the relationship between doctrine and religious experience—in Buddhism and in religions generally—was among the dominant theoretical goals of the conference. The participants were joined by several discussants versed in other religious traditions, including Bernard Faure (Stanford University), Karl Potter (University of Washington), Lee Yearley (Stanford University), and Yoshihide Yoshizu (Komazawa University), who provided a valuable comparative perspective and deepened our appreciation of the potential implications of this topic.

Hoping to address an audience especially of scholars in Religious Studies, the conference sought to undertake a manifold investigation of the primary Buddhist concept or category of *mārga*—"the path"—in order both to clarify the range of that category's meaning in the Buddhist tradition and to suggest its utility in the cross-cultural study of religion. It was our contention not only that *mārga* is a theme central to the whole of Buddhism, but also that it has range and theoretical potential sufficient to allow our speaking usefully of a Christian *mārga*, Jewish *mārga*, Islamic *mārga*, etc. The focus on Buddhism made sense, we felt, because, as a potentially cross-cultural category for the study of religions, *mārga* has been given its most sustained, comprehensive, and subtle explication in Buddhism.

The Western concept to which the Buddhist category of *mārga* is most close related is "soteriology." The equivalence, to be sure, is hardly exact, given, for example, the English term's etymological implication of "savior," but no other more fitting term has suggested itself to us. What we mean by "*mārga*" or "soteriology" is, generally speaking, the transformative dimension of religion, which is often manifest as an explicit pattern of religious behavior leading necessarily to a specific religious goal. While it is certainly true that transformative power—the capacity to alter character, values, and world-views—is implicit in all religions, nowhere is this more clearly the case than in Buddhism. That tradition, throughout the two-and-a-half millenia of its pan-Asiatic career, has been relentlessly explicit in declaring itself to be a soteriology above all else. Its unflagging concentration on "the path" has led not only to the careful and
detailed delineation of numerous curricula of religious practice and to the precedence of such delineation among the various modes of Buddhist discourse, but also to the adoption of just those principles of thought and discourse that would best secure the primacy of soteriology. Thus we have the recurrent motif of the Buddhist as therapist rather than theorist, the repeated assertion of the superiority of analytical and critical thought over synthetic and constructive speculation, the characteristic invocation of pragmatic criteria for the evaluation of doctrines and practices, the pervasive influence of the meta-theory of upāya (expedience), the tendency to choose disciplined experience (e.g., meditation) over reason as the final arbiter of truth or efficacy, and so on.

The centrality within Buddhism of mārga, and of systematic discourse on “the path,” suggests to us the possibility of approaches to the study of both Buddhism and other religions that may be truly novel. It has long been a dominant convention of Religious Studies to focus principally on certain cardinal concepts or archetypal experiences in its efforts to understand particular religious traditions. This approach has had its uses, but it is fraught with perils. All too easily can it lead to purely abstract, reified, and fragmented conceptions of religion in which excessive emphasis is given to the elite and disembodied religion of the scholar—as though the identity of any religion can be reduced solely to its cardinal tenets. As much as being systems of doctrine, however, religions are also axiologies and ways of life, and those facets are more immediately familiar and compelling to the ordinary adherents of a religion than would be any of the scholastic discussions of the elite theoreticians. This is because the truths of a religion are revealed to most adherents not as much through its doctrines as by the structured lifestyle of the monastery or lay community. In the case of Buddhism, for example, even the most unsophisticated of monks unable to list the twelve links of the chain of dependent origination—or any of the other interminable numerical lists of tenets in which Buddhist texts abound—would still know the monastic regimen he follows each day, and it would be that regimen which most directly informs his religious understanding. While the experiences fostered by the monastic discipline and lifestyle may be only implicit in the doctrines of the religion, they are explicit in the mārga itself. As the living context within which all that is Buddhist is defined, the mārga creates a commonality of concern that reticulates all the various strands of its religious endeavor—moral values, ritual observances, doctrinal teachings, and contemplative exercises—into a unified network of practices focused on liberation. The mārga thus incorporates everything from the simplest act
of charity to the most refined meditative experience; it concentrates attention not on the isolated effects of specific religious practices but on the whole pattern of discipline that encompasses the life of the individual adherent.

A specific example of mārga as the ordering mechanism or "deep structure" of religion might well be in order at this point. Consider one of the earliest and simplest statements of the Buddhist path, the so-called "three trainings" (trīśikṣā). In this scheme, the practitioner is instructed to begin his pursuit of liberation by cultivating obedience to basic moral rules (non-violence, avoidance of false speech, etc.) so as to delimit strictly the range of appropriate human action in the physical, verbal, and mental spheres. The rationale provided for such ethical discipline (śīla) at the outset of the path is that morality minimizes present mental anguish, guilt, and uncertainty, leading in turn to more rudimentary forms of tranquility and peace that result from control of the mind. But rather than tranquility being an abstract ideal divorced from the preceding practice of morality, it is actually embodied in the ethical observances of the student. The control over his response to external stimuli that the student thus gains through moral observance and tranquility leads to the development of an introspective focus, which allows him to begin to wield control over the impulses that initiate action in the first place. This internal control regulates in turn the processes of the mind, permitting the student to become still more concentrated and focused. That concentration (samādhi) can then be put to use in investigating the student's world with insight. The wisdom (prajñā) achieved through such investigation finally reveals the nature of the world as being impermanent (anitya), unsatisfactory (duḥkha), and impersonal (anatman)—the fundamental Buddhist dogma of the "three marks of existence" (trilakṣana). This insight ultimately brings a permanent end to the impulses that sustain one's ties with the phenomenal world of suffering, engendering the radical renunciation that is nirvāṇa. We thus see that the program of practice outlined in the three modes of training finally corroborates the most basic doctrinal teachings of Buddhism by bringing them into the whole pattern of discipline that defines the spiritual career of the individual. The path thus weaves all these different facets and stages of Buddhist spiritual endeavor into an organic whole, in which each part incorporates all other parts: morality is the premonition of both concentration and wisdom, concentration the resonance of morality and the anticipation of wisdom, and wisdom the consumation of both morality and concentration and the initiation into liberation.
The value of this approach is especially evident when one considers the goal of the Buddhist path, nirvāṇa, and the notorious difficulty of characterizing, let alone defining, that goal. How better to understand it than by appreciating the sense in which nirvāṇa is implicit and shaped in the very path leading to it? Ninian Smart has offered the useful analogy of the relationship between the goal of a game and the rules of that game. Any effort to define a “home run” would inevitably lead to a systematic statement of the rules of the game of baseball. Similarly, virtually the only feasible description of an ineffable religious goal like nirvāṇa is an outline of the path leading to it. In both cases, the goal is implicit in, and accessible only through, the rules of behavior leading to its attainment. Conversely, the meaning of any one element in the path consists principally in the contribution it makes to the achievement of that goal.

The mārga proves therefore to be that factor which insinuates itself into everything that is Buddhist, uniting not only its various practices and strata of adherents, but also the disparate branches of its diffuse tradition. This is by no means to advocate that there was but a single soteriology accepted by all the schools of Buddhism. While soteriology may be what brings continuity to the Buddhist religion, many permutations occurred as that concept was disseminated and interpreted in different regions of Asia. Thus mārga may also provide a key that will help unlock the distinctive contributions made to Buddhism by its various indigenous traditions.

But we also believe that the potential “revisioning” of religion suggested by Buddhism’s emphasis on the path offers the possibility of a more holistic assessment not only of Buddhism, but indeed of any given religious tradition. Mārga provides a more integrative way of interpreting religion, in which all elements of a religious tradition can be seen to collaborate in the service of the common goal of liberation. Thus a religion’s doctrines can be seen to correspond to its concrete practices and to flow from them; its worldviews and axiologies can be seen as implicit in its regimens of practice; the popular piety of its common adherents can be seen to resonate deeply with the insights that inform the conceptual systems of its elite philosophers. More than cardinal doctrines, then, we believe it to be the mārga that creates within a religion a sense of communality—the Buddhist ideal of sangha—among the various strata of adherents with all their variant concerns and needs. It is this emphasis on mārga that serves to keep religion accessible to all, not simply a small elite. The emphasis on a practical spirituality brings even the highest reaches of religious achievement within the purview of the most humble of adherents. It also demands that even the more basic
of practices be directly preparatory to, if not actually reflected within, the most advanced. By making religious achievement quantifiable in terms relevant to daily life, all the activities of ordinary adherents are made to serve the soteriological process. The statement of the lay Ch’an practitioner, P’ang Yün, may be apropos: “Mystical experience and active service are carrying water and gathering kindling.”

The Meaning of Sila in the Magga of the Theravāda Tradition,
George D. Bond, Northwestern University

The Theravāda tradition since at least the time of Buddhaghosa has regarded *sila* as an integral component of the path to liberation. It has alluded to the significance of *sila* by referring to it as “a stair that leads to heaven” and a “door that leads to nibbāna.” This paper examines the meaning and function of *sila* in relation to the path and the goals of the tradition.

*Sila* means behavior or character, and more specifically, good character or virtue. Theravāda defined the content of *sila* through a number of formulations of precepts. The essential formulation was that of *dasa sila*, although the tradition actually had two lists of ten precepts: the *sikkhāpadas*, or training precepts for the monks; and another list termed the *dasa kusala kammapathā*. This second list analyzes *sila* into three categories: body, speech, and mind. It appears that over time the tradition opted for the *sikkhāpadas* as the primary definition for *dasa sila*. Another formulation of the precepts constituting *sila* divided *sila* into the three divisions of *culla*, *majjhima* and *mahā*. This formulation combined both of the lists of *dasa sila* and included other virtues to indicate the ethical perfection of the *arahant*.

To understand the meaning of *sila* for the path and its goal, we must recognize that Theravāda affirms a gradual path that represents a series of soteriological strategies adapted to persons of differing levels of wisdom and spiritual perfection. This path has *lokiya* and *lokuttara* levels that fit the three general types of persons: *puthujjanas*, *sekhas*, and *asekhas*. For the *puthujjanas*, there are mundane formulations (*abhisamācārika sila*) and for the *sekhas*, supramundane (*ādiyācārya*). Lay persons on the mundane level follow the refuges and the five precepts, except on *uposatha* days, when they are expected to observe eight of the *sikkhāpadas* out of veneration for, and in imitation of, the *arahants*. Before being fully admitted to the order, novice monks on the mundane level observe the ten *sikkhāpadas*; after ordination they follow a fourfold *sila*. The tradition also specified the
kinds of sīla to be followed by those on the lokuttara or ariya maggas. This formulation of sīla involves the comprehensive formulation described as culla, majjhima, and mahā sīla.

Just as the meaning of sīla as a component of the path varies according to the level of the person, so also does the relation of sīla to the goal of the path. For those on the mundane level, the abhisamācārika sīla leads to attainments within the round of samsāra, such as faith, learning, generosity and a heavenly rebirth. On the lokuttara path, however, sīla is integral to the process of mental purification, restraining the akusala impulses and eradicating the unwholesome roots and volitions.

No-Mind and Sudden Awakening: Thoughts on the Soteriology of a Kamakura Zen Text
Carl Bielefeldt, Stanford University

Zen Buddhism is often depicted as a religion that seeks to bring about direct, intuitive experience of ultimate reality through the psychological technique of meditation. This paper questions the adequacy of such a soteriological model when applied across the range of historical forms of Zen; it does so by examining the example of a thirteenth-century Japanese text, popularly known as the Zazen ron, that appears to favor a rather different religious style.

The paper begins with distinctions between explicit and implicit systems of Buddhist soteriology and between ultimate and proximate soteriological goals. The argument then attempts to show that the religion of the Zazen ron seeks to mediate between the explicit norms and ultimate ends of the Mahāyāna theology and the implicit values and proximate goals of its Japanese audience; thus the Mahāyāna goal of liberation from the world through the attainment of buddhahood is redefined as consolation in the world through belief in the immanence of the Buddha mind. Under this reading, the key salvific experience is identified not with the mystical awakening of the Zen meditator but with the leap of faith of the Zen convert; similarly, the soteriological role of meditation is less that of cause of awakening than of expression of faith. The paper ends with the suggestion that such a “soteriology of conversion” may be seen as a reflex of the apologetic purposes of the Zazen ron itself.
Despite its own claims to the contrary, Theravāda Buddhism developed the teachings and practices it now considers orthodox over a considerable period of time. Its literature reflects both the early beginnings of this tradition and its later formulations. This study examines the nature of the ideal goal and the path to it according to the Atthakavagga of the Suttanipāta and in both a late canonical and post-canonical commentary on it.

Careful analysis of the Atthakavagga indicates that it represents two different approaches to the highest goal. One of the two soteriologies in the text describes a path that involves developing various specific ethical habits and virtues. The primary virtue within this path scheme is desirelessness. Through seeing and knowing things as they really are, one eradicates desire, selfishness, and attachment. The other path the Atthakavagga recommends takes this notion of desirelessness to its logical conclusion, denying the value of preferring any particular view (ditthi) over any other, eventually expressing disapproval of any preferences for a particular teacher, path or even goal. This latter soteriological view challenges the former with the paradox of desire: how can preference (i.e., desire) for a particular teaching, teacher, path, or goal help one to cultivate desirelessness?

Since these two approaches are in practical terms incompatible (should one cultivate specific virtues, in accordance with a specific teacher’s view, or not?), the Atthakavagga poses a soteriological problem for the Theravāda tradition. The second part of this study examines the two major Pali commentaries on the Atthakavagga, in order to see how the Theravāda tradition has interpreted this potentially problematic text.

These commentaries clearly reflect the Theravāda tradition’s decision to opt for the path that follows a particular teacher’s teaching. They interpret the Atthakavagga verses that present the anti-ditthi view as referring only to views and teachers other than the Buddha and his view (the right ditthi), effectively undermining the Atthakavagga’s ditthi polemic with a “present company excepted” interpretation. In the process, the commentaries also resolved the inherent challenge of the Atthakavagga’s raising of the paradox of desire: it may be paradoxical, or perhaps more accurately ironic, but it is in practical fact necessary to desire the ideal in order finally to attain it. The desire to be desireless is what distinguishes the Buddhist adherents from those religious who do not strive to better themselves at all.
The Wholesome Roots and their Eradication:
A Descent to the Bedrock of Buddhist Soteriology
Robert E. Buswell, Jr., University of California, Los Angeles

Buddhism has generally conceived that the "taste of liberation" that pervades its scriptures was something that was accessible to all beings, provided they fulfilled the necessary preconditions to its achievement. This universalistic tendency in Buddhism is perhaps best exemplified in the famous refrain of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra that all beings are endowed with the capacity to achieve buddhahood. While espousing this ultimate goal of enlightenment for all, however, some Buddhist scriptures made the apparently conflicting claim that certain persons could be forever barred from salvation—a claim sometimes found even in the same text, as in our example of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Such individuals, who had engaged in the most heinous of evil actions, were called "those whose wholesome roots are eradicated" (samucchinnakusalamūla), and in the vast majority of cases, were condemned to subsequent rebirth in hell. This paper uses the notion of samucchinnakusalamūla to explore two related questions in Buddhist soteriology: 1) what could cause salvation to become forever out of reach?; and 2) what factor is absolutely essential if people are to retain their capacities for religious cultivation?

Using sources ranging from the Chinese Āgamas and Pali Nikāyas, to the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā of the Vaibhāṣikas (now available only in Chinese translation), and even to Chinese San-chieh chiao and Ch'ān materials, this paper seeks to prove that niggardliness is the quality that leads to the eradication of the wholesome roots while giving sustains and, if need be, regenerates, them. Our examination of the wholesome roots will reveal their association with the concept of merit-making, or puṇya, and take us down to the bedrock of Buddhist soteriology. With the plethora of qualities that Buddhists emphasize in their writings, it is difficult to determine which is most fundamental—which is the "lowest common denominator," as it were, of the Buddhist spiritual equation. We will find in this material that the essential catalyst to cultivation will prove to be not one of the several important philosophical concepts for which Buddhism is often renowned; instead it will be the simple practice of giving (dāna).
Attainment through Abandonment:  
The Sarvástivāda Path of Removing Defilements  
Collett Cox, University of Washington

According to the earliest accounts, the Buddha’s enlightenment experience culminates in the knowledge of the destruction of the fluxes (āsravakṣayajñānā), resulting in an end to rebirth, an end to suffering. The Sarvástivāda, a northern Indian school of Abhidharma, developed a complex and intricate path of religious praxis also directed exclusively toward this ultimate goal: the complete cessation of defilement. Theirs is a path of attainment through abandonment, in which freedom from suffering is reached in progressive stages through the removal of defilements. Though knowledge and insight are integral to this religious process, they do not, in themselves, constitute the final goal; instead, they serve as tools to be used in effecting the abandonment of specific defilements.

The singular importance of the abandonment of defilements in the Sarvástivāda Abhidharma path structure is indicated first by the detail with which the defilements afflicting unenlightened beings are enumerated (e.g., the six or ten basic defilements associated with various states of mind in various meditative and rebirth states, resulting in a total of 98). Further, religious aspirants are differentiated according to their level of attainment, that is, by the number of defilements abandoned and the degree of completeness of this abandonment. The complete abandonment of a particular defilement is designated cessation through application (pratisamkhyānirodha); that is, religious aspirants require disconnection (visamyoga) from particular defilements through the application of vision (dārsana) or cultivation (bhāvānā). The Sarvástivāda equate this complete cessation of each defilement with nirvāṇa. This cessation, disconnection, or nirvāṇa is then acquired repeatedly in progressing along the path; and once all defilements are abandoned, the final goal is attained.

This paper examines the Sarvástivāda Abhidharma path structure using both early Sarvástivāda texts (e.g., the Prakaraṇapāda, Dharmaśāstra, and Saṅgītitaśāstra), and texts representing the developed Sarvástivāda-Vaibhāṣīka perspective (e.g., the Vibhaṅga literature, Abhidharma-saṅghāṣṭikā, and Nyāya-buddhism). I seek to clarify the following questions:

1) What is the nature of defilements (i.e., anusaya; klesa), and what is the mechanism by which they affect unenlightened sentient beings (e.g., bija, prāpti)?

2) What is the specific method by which defilements are to be abandoned (e.g., aprāpti, visamyogaprāpti, and mārga)?
3) What are the relations between this interpretation of defilements and other doctrinal positions accepted by the Sarvastivāda school? How did differing assumptions held by other sects alter their descriptions of the path?

Wen-tzu Ch’an: Learning, Letters, and Meditation
Robert M. Gimello, University of Arizona

In terms of rhetoric, Ch’an Buddhism eschews verbal formulas or expressions of truth in favor of direct, unmediated experience. Despite this, there have been periods throughout its history when, recoiling from spasms of antinomianism, Ch’an proved itself to be rather more hospitable to textual study and more appreciative of literary expression than its typical rhetoric would have led one to expect.

One such period was that of the Northern Sung dynasty, when the predominant strains of Ch’an advocated the systematic integration of learning and meditation practice. This advocacy not only included a repetition of older calls to “unify Ch’an and the scriptural teachings,” but also the novel contention that the Buddhist contemplative career could even be combined with secular learning and the practice of humane letters. Under the banner of “lettered Ch’an,” many Ch’an figures sought to incorporate Ch’an into the literary and academic culture of the intelligentsia. This effort to harmonize Ch’an with learning and literature was not simply a device for religious propagation, but was seen also as having intrinsic religious merit in the minds of those who fostered it. It was viewed as a way of protecting the tradition from antinomian corruption and as a means of enriching Ch’an spirituality by putting the resources of the literary and learned traditions at Ch’an’s disposal.

The topic of “lettered (wen-tzu) Ch’an” may also serve as a “case study” of the broader issue of the relationship between intellectual disciplines like study and literary composition, on the one hand, and the meditative disciplines of the interior or contemplative life, on the other—i.e., to what Jean Leclercq has called in Christian terms “The love of learning and the desire for God.” It may be especially profitable to raise such questions in respect to China, for there we see Buddhism developing within a cultural context in which literary sensitivity and accomplishment, together with scholarship, were primary measures of piety itself. It is not surprising, therefore, that the question of the soteriological value of learning and letters should have been put especially acutely by Chinese Buddhists.
My discussion of this topic is based especially on the writings of
three major figures of the Lin-chi lineage of Northern Sung Ch’an.
They are Chüeh-fan Hui-hung (1071–1128) of the Huang-lung
branch of Lin-chi, and Yüan-wu K’o-ch’iin (1063–1135) and Ta-hui
Tsung-kao (1091–1157), both of the Yang-ch’i branch. The writings
of these men abound in both explicit and implicit references to the
topic of the relationship among learning, literature, and meditation;
and their views of those relationships greatly influenced later East
Asian religious thought and practice.

The Cosmogonic Basis of Tsung-mi’s Theory of the Path
Peter N. Gregory, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

This paper examines how Tsung-mi derives a cosmogony from
the Awakening of Faith to serve as a map for Buddhist practice. Just as
understanding of the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination
provided a map for earlier Buddhists, so Tsung-mi’s understanding of
the process of phenomenal evolution according to his interpretation
of the Awakening of Faith provided a structured pattern from which he
derived his ten-staged process of religious practice and realization.
The paper explores Tsung-mi’s account of the stages of practice and
realization in his Ch’an-yuan chu-ch’uan-chi tu-hsü, where his theory is
expressed in its most developed form. It also traces the evolution of his
ten-staged theory by looking at its “primitive” expression in earlier
works, such as his commentary and subcommentary to the Yüan-chüeh
ching and his commentary to the Awakening of Faith. These earlier
works clarify the centrality of the Awakening of Faith in Tsung-mi’s
understanding of the Buddhist path. The paper uses its discussion of
Tsung-mi’s thought as a way of exploring the larger comparative
issues of the relationship of cosmogony to ethics and of ontology to
soteriology.

The Development of Early Japanese Tendai Views on
the Rapid Realization of Buddhahood
Paul Groner, University of Virginia, Charlottesville

The definition of buddhahood, the amount of time required to
realize it, and the number of people who can hope to attain it have
often been topics of bitter controversy among Buddhist schools. At
certain points in Buddhist history, these issues have been subjects of
intense scrutiny, resulting in substantial revisions in the definition of buddhahood and the path to it. At the beginning of the ninth century most Japanese monks would have accepted the position that buddhahood was the result of eons of practice that few could attain. By the end of the ninth century, this situation had radically changed due to the establishment of two new schools, Tendai and Shingon. Large groups of monks and lay believers had come to believe that buddhahood could be attained by everyone in a single lifetime.

This paper focuses on the emergence and early development of one of the key concepts employed in the redefinition of these issues by Japanese Tendai monks: namely, the teaching concerning “the realization of buddhahood in this existence” (sokushin jöbutsu). The study will be divided into two parts. In the first, the Chinese origins and the first Japanese usages of the concept will be considered. Saichō, the Tendai monk who introduced the concept to Japan, died before he could define it exactly. The second part of the study will focus on the efforts of his disciples to do so. Their concerns will be examined through a series of letters on doctrinal issues that they exchanged with Chinese monks. Eventually, the Japanese monks formulated their own innovative positions rather than adopt the more conservative positions of their Chinese counterparts. The questions raised by Tendai monks reveal the key issues and concerns that led them to formulate their views on enlightenment in new and distinctive ways.

Japanese Tendai views on the realization of buddhahood in this existence profoundly affected subsequent Japanese Buddhist history in both positive and negative ways. On the negative side, the teaching eventually led to a decline in serious practice within the Japanese Tendai school because the final goal was said to be so easy to realize. On the positive side, Tendai arguments that buddhahood was possible for everyone contributed to the spread of Buddhism to all segments of society. Although later Japanese schools eventually rejected much of the Tendai teaching on the rapid realization of buddhahood, all nevertheless had to compete with it and to formulate their respective doctrines and practices in response to it. This paper, which traces the early history of the Tendai view on the rapid realization of enlightenment, thus helps to clarify many aspects of later Japanese Buddhist history.
The Concept of Sudden Awakening in Bodhidharma's Teaching of the Mind Ground
Ki Doo Han, Wŏng'gwang University

To propagate the fundamentals of sudden awakening, such eminent Ch'yan teachers as Hui-neng, Ma-tsu, Po-chang, Huang-po, and Lin-chi all used Bodhidharma's teaching of the mind ground (hsin-ti). The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch provides a disciplinary platform for transmitting the mind ground, through the notion of the nonabiding mind. This teaching, however, was not exclusive to the Ch'yan schools, and this paper seeks to trace the pedigree of this term in both Ch'yan and doctrinal literature.

The characteristics of the teaching of the mind ground in Ch'yan were clarified by Shen-hui as follows:

1) Bodhidharma's teaching of the mind ground was transmitted to successive Ch'yan teachers from Hui-neng to Lin-chi.

2) The Northern school of Ch'yan Buddhism pursued a conceptual form of Ch'yan, as is expressed in such concepts as solidifying mind, abiding mind, and collecting the mind, while the Southern school of Ch'yan pursued a nonconceptual form through its teaching of "no-thought."

3) Northern Ch'yan Buddhism advocated measures to counteract defilements, while Southern Ch'yan Buddhism promoted instead a natural knowledge and an awakening to one's own mind.

4) Northern Ch'yan Buddhism sought to develop prajñā through samādhi while Southern Ch'yan Buddhism sought samādhi from prajñā.

Shen-hui believed that Bodhidharma's teaching of the mind ground could be obtained through knowledge, and also argued for a soteriological program of sudden awakening/gradual cultivation. Because of this, he was criticized as a master of intellectual knowledge. The National Master Nan-yang Hui-ch'ung criticized Shen-hui for his opinion that "only sentient beings can become a buddha," and claimed that insentient beings could also realize buddhahood. This notion was the source of the shift from the moderate subitism of sudden awakening/gradual cultivation to the radical subitism of sudden awakening/sudden cultivation. The evidence marshalled in this paper, however, suggests that the mind ground requires a process of gradual cultivation in order for the sprout of enlightenment to grow, blossom, and bear fruit. The differing treatments of this seminal concept provide important information for explaining the transformation from early to later Ch'yan thought.
In this paper I utilize written and oral Tibetan sources from a genre called "grounds and paths" (sa lam, bhumi-marga) in considering 1) Atiśa's threefold typology of practitioners and paths, 2) the profound experience of the mind of clear light in Highest Yoga Tantra, and 3) the meaning of "path," or spiritual experience in the more general sense. I make use of Tibetan dGe-lugs-pa literature on the Buddhist path to provide a view of what constitutes religious experience in this tradition as well as to suggest a basis for comparison and contrast with nontraditional formulations of aspects of the sacred by Rudolph Otto, Carl Jung, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith.

Due to its exclusionary agenda, this threefold Indo-Tibetan typology is clearly inadequate for categorizing all religious persons and religious experience; nevertheless, it provides an avenue for exploring forms of Buddhist religious experience in general, from which hints about religious experience in general may be gleaned. A central theme of the paper is that three phases of experience of the sacred—inspiring dread, overcoming obstacles, and being totally "at home"—need to be emphasized in order to convey even a minimally rounded picture of the path. Through this, the enormity and momentousness of the religious enterprise can be appreciated.

On the Ignorance of the Arhat
Padmanabh S. Jaini, University of California, Berkeley

Vasubandhu, while commenting in the first verse of his Abhidharmakosa on the words sarvathā sarvahatāndhakārah, speaks of two kinds of ignorance (ajñāna). The first one is called kliśta-sammohā, or impassioned ignorance, which seems to be the ignorance of the Four Noble Truths. The second variety is called aklīśta-ajñāna, the ignorance, not of the Truths, but of things, such as of the infinite variety of objects distant in space and time. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that whereas the Buddha destroys both kinds of ignorance, the arhats, even when they destroy the klesas, are not free from the second variety, the aklīśta-ajñāna. Yaśomitra, in his Sphuṭārtha-vyākhā, illustrates this point by the examples of such eminent śrāvakas as Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, and seeks to explain the apparent contradiction between the arhat's freedom from all forms of duḥkha and the presence of this "ignorance." The paper aims to examine the nature of
the Buddhist arhat's alleged ignorance in the context of the Yoga and Jaina materials on the completion of the path to nirvāṇa.

Parallels to this situation of the arhats can be found in the case of the yogins approaching kaivalya as described by Patañjali in his Yogasūtra. Its commentary, the Vyāsa-bhāṣya, states that the so-called "omniscience," and particularly the knowledge of objects distant in place and time, are results of yogic practices (not dissimilar to the practice of samāpattis in Buddhism), and are not a prerequisite for the yogin's attainment of kaivalya.

The Jaina position on this issue differs considerably, apparently demanding that persons who overcome the klesas (as the Buddhist arhat does) must proceed further in higher trances (called sukladyāṇas) to remove the ignorance of objects (jñānāvarana-karma) as well. Only then may they become an omniscient (kevala-jñānin) and, as in the case of the Buddha, attain nirvāṇa.

_Beyond Cultural Construction?: Concentration and Indo-Tibetan Claims for Unmediated Cognition_

Anne C. Klein, Rice University

Buddhist and contemporary Western intellectual traditions share a general emphasis on the constructed nature of human experience. Nevertheless, they reach diametrically opposite conclusions regarding the possibility of either an unmediated cognition or a cognized object that lies outside cultural particularity. This paper looks at Indo-Tibetan, and especially dGe-lugs-pa, premises by which such claims are supported. I focus on the role of mental concentration in the purportedly unmediated cognitions of unconstructed emptiness on the first and sixth bodhisattva grounds. These are junctures where traditional texts examine the interplay between concentration and wisdom, that is, between withdrawing the mind in one sense and expanding its horizons in another.

Since the initial direct cognition of emptiness occurs on the first ground, it might seem that whatever reconciliation between calming and insight might be required should take place there. However, the relationship of these functions again becomes an issue on the sixth ground with the development of a new form of concentration, known as the uncommon absorption of cessation (*asādhatu-nirodha-samāpatti, thung mong ma yin pa'i gog snyoms*). This is a category unique to Prāsaṅgika and in Tibet is discussed mainly in dGe-lugs-pa commentaries on Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle Way* (Madhyamakāvatāra, dbU ma la 'jug pa), especially Tsong-kha-pa's *Clarification of (Candrakīrti's)*
Thought (dbU ma dgongs pa rab gsal) and in works by Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba, Jetsun Chos-kyi-gyal-tsen, and Jam-yang-shay-ba. This uncommon absorption is described as quite distinct from the “unknowing” cessation discussed by Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa. Unlike those, this is a wisdom consciousness regarded as crucial to qualities that characterize the higher grounds; it is a major catalyst of the seventh ground’s special mental agility and freedom from conceptual limitations, as well as a contributing factor to the ability to combine universal insight with particular response (wisdom and method) that is associated with the eighth ground and above.

The paper argues that the role of calming and concentration is crucial to understanding the underpinnings of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist claims about unmediated cognition. I also suggest that the mediated/unmediated dichotomy, important as it is, is not the most useful paradigm by which to engage this Buddhist material, and that the role of concentration, which has no clear analogue in most Western thought, is part of the challenge to this model.

Paths Terminable and Interminable
Donald S. Lopez, Jr., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The second of the eight topics covered in Maitreyanātha’s commentary on the prajñāpāramitā, the Abhisamayālāṃkāra, is the knowledge of the paths (mārgajñātā), the bodhisattva’s understanding of the minute structure of the paths of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, conjoined with the realization that all these paths are empty. This paper uses Tsong-kha-pa’s (1357–1419) commentary on the topics of the knowledge of the paths in his Legs bshad gser phreng to consider three problems arising from the Indian Mahāyāna and Tibetan expositions of the paths to enlightenment. The first is the persistence of the complex of defilements, derived by the Abhidharma, after the antidote to those defilements (knowledge of the sixteen aspects of the four truths) had been effectively replaced by the panacea of emptiness. The paper considers several arguments that might account for the continuation of a highly structured system of defilements, including the possibility that they represent Buddhist categories of pollution, analogous to those in the caste system.

The second topic dealt with in the paper is the controversy within the Mahāyāna over the number of vehicles. The arguments for three vehicles and for one vehicle are presented at some length, focussing especially on how the proponents of one position sought to account for statements in the sūtras that seemed to support the other.
position. This leads into a consideration of the strategy of commentary in the Mahāyāna, especially as it sought to account both for the prior tradition, labelled the Hinayāna, and for those who had followed its path, the arhats. The early tradition had to be subordinated in order to establish and maintain the superior position of the Mahāyāna, but the Hinayāna could not be rejected completely.

The final question taken up in the paper is one that follows naturally from the assertion that there is but one final vehicle that all sentient beings will ride to buddhahood: the question of whether samsāra will ever end. Positions on both sides of the issue are discussed at some length, and the doctrinal agendas that underlie those positions are analyzed. Tsong-kha-pa finds a reason to argue that samsāra is endless in the doctrine of emptiness, a position that his most important commentators vigorously reject. The paper concludes by considering several models by means of which the extraordinarily long bodhisattva path might be understood, including the model of narrative.

The Encounter and Mārga Paradigms in Classical Ch’an:
Analysis and Implications
John McRae, Case Western Reserve/Cornell University

This paper states a set of hypotheses and tentative conclusions regarding the creation of a new paradigm for religious practice in the Hung-chou school of classical Ch’an Buddhism.

One important aspect of recent research on early and classical Ch’an is the devaluation of the sudden/gradual and Northern/Southern dichotomies as primary indicators of the development and transformation of the school. The first section of the presentation will reconsider apparent discontinuity between early Ch’an and the classical Ch’an of Ma-tsu Tao-i (709–88) and the Hung-chou school. After describing the unique characteristics of the Hung-chou school of Ch’an, in particular its apparently single-minded devotion to “encounter dialogue,” or spontaneous religious repartee, the paper gives brief details regarding the biographical, doctrinal, and practical continuities between early and classical Ch’an.

The next section analyzes the “encounter paradigm” for religious practice implied in classical Ch’an in terms of its extremely personalist and anti-ritualist internalization of the norms of spiritual teaching. This is followed by a description of the highly rationalized (i.e., hierarchical and progressive) “mārga paradigm” attributed to traditional Chinese Buddhism and rejected by classical Ch’an.
The conclusion offers a hypothesis regarding the implications of the emergence of the encounter paradigm within the context of Chinese social and intellectual history. Specifically, the paper argues that the theories of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (as argued especially in *Natural Symbols*) regarding religious cosmology and social structure provide an excellent starting point for understanding the role of Ch'an Buddhism in the T'ang/Sung transition.

*The Sudden and Complete Path of T'ien-t'ai Chih-i*
Daniel B. Stevenson, Butler University

The sixth and seventh century in China have traditionally been regarded as a watershed in the history of East Asian Buddhism, a period of great systematic change out of which emerged the basic patterns of thought and practice that have stood as a hallmark of East Asian Buddhism down to the present day. One of the most significant trends to take shape during this era was a shift towards a "speedy" (chi) or "sudden" (tun) model of the bodhisattva course. Far from being solely a matter of doctrinal interest, of concern only to the scholastic élite, the vision of a "sudden" enlightenment was above all a vision of a religious path. As such, it initiated responses throughout all aspects of the Buddhist tradition—practical and institutional, as well as intellectual—and became a pivotal structure around which entire programs of religious culture were forged. This paper will discuss one such program—that described in the writings of Chih-i (538–597), the great architect of T'ien-t'ai Buddhist thought and practice.

Chih-i is the author of one of the most comprehensive and widely read statements of the "sudden" approach to Buddhist practice ever produced in Asia—the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (*Treatise on the great calming and discerning*). This work delves into all areas of religious life, and thus offers priceless insights into both the conceptual models that informed T'ien-t'ai practice and the network of spiritual disciplines through which these models were actualized in the T'ien-t'ai community.

Relying primarily upon the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*, the paper sketches a holistic picture of Chih-i's "sudden" program of spiritual development, which above all strives to convey the ways in which this model resonated with, and helped to integrate, all dimensions of T'ien-t'ai religious life.

The paper begins with a discussion of Chih-i's views regarding the enlightened mind and its relation to the ordinary human condi-
tion. Having elicited the basic framework upon which his vision of the sudden approach is structured, it then takes up his subitist path itself. The various stages of spiritual development on that path are outlined and junctures considered to be crucial are pinpointed. By working into the discussion such basic formula as the Twenty-five Preliminary Expedients and the Ten Modes of Meditative Discernment (shih kuan-fa), the paper treats in detail the integrated program of spiritual disciplines designed to affect these transformations. The paper concludes with observations on the various ways in which these models of religious practice were reflected in the institutional structure and patterns of religious life seen in the early T'ien-t'ai community.

**Vision and Cultivation on the Path to Liberation in Early Buddhism**

Alan Sponberg, Stanford University

One of the most innovative contributions to systematization of Buddhist soteriology was the introduction of the distinction between a path of vision (darśanamārga) and, following it, a path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). This bipartite model of the path to liberation originated with the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda school and was subsequently expanded by the Yogācārins to become the core of the mature five-stage path theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Louis de la Vallec Poussin was perhaps the earliest Western scholar to note the peculiarity of this development, discussing it in the context of a broader survey of documents reflecting the tension between what he interpreted as a “rationalist” faction and a “mystical” faction among earlier Buddhist soteriologists. Following Poussin’s lead, Erich Frauwallner, for example, took a much stronger position on the question, asserting that the division represents the Vaibhāṣika commitment to a rationalist soteriology in juxtaposition to the “mystical” tendency he sees to prevail in the Pali Abhidhamma.

In examining the Vaibhāṣika theory, this paper suggests that the inclusion of the path of cultivation is more significant and innovative than the notion of a specific moment of cognitive insight (ñāṇa-dassana), the latter having clear precedent in important canonical versions not considered by Frauwallner. This, in turn, suggests that the real question to be raised here is what led the later Abhidharmikas to insist on a path of cultivation subsequent to the moment of insight into the Four Noble Truths that had been the culmination of the standard early accounts of the path, a question all the more intriguing
given the fact that the Vaibhāṣikas do indeed demonstrate a marked tendency towards rationalism in many other respects.

This issue becomes less problematic if seen not in terms of "rationalism" versus "mysticism," but as a Buddhist attempt to mediate a long-standing dispute between those South Asian wanderers (parivṛṭakas) who sought deliverance in a moment of liberating cognitive insight and those who pursued instead a process of redemptive purification. Historically, it is this division between vision and purification that reemerges throughout early Buddhist soteriology, a process independent of movement towards rationalism. In this context, the Vaibhāṣika innovation of cultivation after liberating insight indicates the strength of the purification theme in Buddhism, despite injunctions against extreme psychological asceticism. It also reflects the increasingly psychological turn in which the liberating value of insight required a period of deeper cultivation to fully extirpate greed, hatred, and delusion. Even more striking then than the appreciation of rationalism evident in this phase of Buddhist soteriology is the appreciation of the unconscious levels of affliction not immediately accessible by even the most direct insight into reality.