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The Violence of Non-Violence: A Study of Some Jain Responses to Non-Jain Religious Practices

by *Phyllis Granoff*

I. Introduction

Jains and Buddhists, often lumped together by their opponents, were acutely aware of their own distinctiveness, though they may not have always been equally concerned with the challenge that each represented to the other. Medieval Jain philosophers would seem to have taken the Buddhists far more seriously than Buddhists did their Jain opponents. While Haribhadra argued extensively in a work like the *Anekāntajayapatākā* against Buddhist doctrine and Akalaṅka in his many writings sought to discredit Buddhist theories of epistemology, no contemporary Buddhist seems to have expended as much energy on any Jain opponent. Medieval Jain story literature similarly attests to the high regard in which Jains held Buddhist teachers of logic, with many a Jain student secretly going to learn from a Buddhist master, and often succumbing to the persuasiveness of the Buddhist teaching.¹ I know of no comparable story material for the same time period on the Buddhist side, and by and large it seems safe to say that medieval Buddhist philosophers appear to have been far more intent upon engaging Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, in effect marginalizing the Jains, whom they do not seem to have taken seriously as partners in philosophical debate.²

The situation is not radically different when we turn to a consideration of actual religious practices rather than abstract thinking. Although scholars have yet to study in any detail Jain objections to Buddhist religious practices, there is no question that medieval Jains were as concerned with the Buddhist concepts of compassion

and self-sacrifice as they were with Buddhist arguments against the existence of a permanent soul or against the existence of external objects of knowledge, the two major philosophical issues that engaged them. In fact, the Jains might be said to have defined themselves as the religion of compassion par excellence in medieval India, and to support their claim they needed to show that all possible rival claimants practiced a false compassion. Given the Buddhist emphasis on compassion and their opposition to blood-sacrifice which they shared with the Jains, it was only natural that the Jains should regard them as a major rival and that Jains would expend considerable energy in trying to show that the Buddhists exemplified a wrong ideal of compassion that was in itself inherently violent. Jains also raised objections to what they regarded as the “easy life” of the Buddhist monks, which the Buddhists quickly countered by accepting the criticism and turning it into a positive virtue.³ Buddhists were in a more difficult position when it came to Jain objections to Mahāyāna ideals, particularly the idea of physical self-sacrifice which dominated both story literature and the prescriptive texts, but it is a curious aspect of this whole debate that the Buddhist response seems often to have been simply to ignore the repeated Jain challenges to their cardinal practices; it is only here and there that we get an occasional glimmer of Buddhist awareness of the Jain criticisms.⁴

Jains sought to show that Buddhist notions of compassion enshrined in stories like the *Vyāghrī Jātaka*, in which the Buddha offers his body to save a living being, in fact involve a degree of violence that makes such compassion tantamount to murder, for the Jains argued that the Buddha’s body like all human bodies was filled with worms, and thus in offering his body the Buddha actually committed numerous murders.⁵ At the same time some Jains clearly found the story so compelling (and no doubt of such widespread popular appeal) that they were not beyond assimilating it into their own tradition despite all the efforts to criticize its underlying lack of morality.⁶ Beyond the *Vyāghrī Jātaka*, which is the one story often specifically cited, Jains attacked the entire notion of self-sacrifice prevalent in so many Buddhist stories in which the Bodhisattva offers himself as food in times of famine as equally

violent; the objection to this act of compassion, which the Jains regard as misguided, also hinges on the fact that it involved sin for the eaters as well as implicating the Buddha in murder.⁷

Most of the Jain objections to the Buddhist understanding of compassion occur in Jain texts on lay ethics, the *Śrāvakācāras*, although the topic can also be treated in a philosophical text as well. While the most widespread objections are to the extreme acts of giving celebrated in stories like the *Vyāghrī Jātaka*, Jain objections to Buddhist concepts of non-violence in fact cover a wide ground and can be understood to refer back well into the Pāli *vinaya*, as we shall discuss below.

Jain objections to Buddhist ethics occur in the context of a more extensive discussion of the duty of *ahiṃsā*, non-violence, incumbent upon all Jains, and they do not always refer to the Buddhists by name, although there is no question in many cases that the Buddhists are meant. The discussions may or may not also include a discussion of the violence of sacrifice and of Hindu practices of offering gifts of meat to guests and in the *śrāddha* ceremony; where they do not include a discussion of the Vedic sacrifice it is because this was so obviously a form of violence and the discussion is focussing on types of “non-violence” that it will show fall short of the Jain ideal.

Invariably, the discussion includes views of other groups as well. The group most frequently treated alongside the Buddhists and usually mentioned by name is the *saṃsāramocakas*. They are identified in one Jain text as “*kuṭīrthikas*”, non-Hindu ascetics but of false belief. The *saṃsāramocakas* are a mysterious group. The majority of references to them occur in Jain *Śrāvakācāra* texts where their views on *ahiṃsā* are countered. For example the *Śrāvakācāra* of Amitagati refutes their views, although it does not name them, while Hemacandra in his *Yogaśāstra* both names them and defines them as *kuṭīrthikas*, “bad ascetics.”⁸ The *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadra argues against their views, verses 38-40, and there is an extensive refutation of the *saṃsāramocakas* in the Malayagiri commentary to the *Nandisutta*.⁹ The section in Malayagiri is clearly a summary of the arguments in the *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, which may well be the earliest extensive refuta-

tion of the *saṃsāramocakas* in a Jain text. It has a commentary attributed to Haribhadra, and it is regarded by the Śvetāmbaras as the earliest text on lay ethics. A recent discussion of the text dates the commentary to the eighth century C. E. and the text itself to some time before the end of the fifth century C. E.¹⁰

Outside the Jains, the commentary of Medatithi on Manu knows the *saṃsāramocakas* as a heterodox or non-Vedic group, and there are references to them as a non-Vedic group scattered throughout orthodox texts.¹¹ Kumārila mentions them in the *Ślokavārttika*, as does Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjari*.¹² There are also a number of Buddhist texts that either refer to the *saṃsāramocakas* by name or at least describe practices that are elsewhere attributed to them. They seem to have been a group that was closely associated with the Jains and Buddhists, probably at least by the time of the present recension of the Pāli *vinaya* and certainly by the time of Buddhaghosa.¹³

Jain discussions of ethics focus on the issue of non-violence, and much of the debate seems to have taken place amongst the non-Vedic groups; in Jain eyes this was a debate between Jains, Buddhists and other “*ūrthikas*” who had all turned from the violence of the Vedic sacrifice, but who nonetheless saw the meaning of “compassion” fulfilled in a variety of diverse religious practices. In the present paper I should like to explore some of the Jain responses to these non-Jain religious practices as they touch upon the issue of *ahiṃsā*. I begin with a translation of a section from the *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti* dealing with the *saṃsāramocakas* and other opponents. I have translated the commentary under the heading “commentary” and where I felt that some comments were required to make the text more easily accessible I have given them under “remarks.” I have attempted to identify the opponents whose views are being criticized in the sections entitled “remarks”; in many cases the available evidence indicates that it is the Buddhists against whom the Jains argue. Following the translation I offer some further general discussion of the Jain understandings of non-violence. Regrettably, I must leave for a future study the challenge of locating the exact Buddhist responses to the Jain objections, and indeed of identifying all the viewpoints represented. At this early

stage of my work my main goal shall be limited indeed: to acquaint scholars with the Jain arguments and call attention to this little known debate so that others may contribute to what I hope will become a comprehensive examination of medieval Indian ethics.¹⁴

II. *The Śrāvaka-prajñapti and commentary by Haribhadra*

133. Others say this: "There are many desperately unhappy creatures who go from birth to birth on account of their sins. Surely one should kill them, to get rid of those."

Commentary: The sentence is to be construed as follows: others, that is the *Saṃsāramocakas*, state thus. And what is it that they state? They state that desperately unhappy creatures, beings like worms and ants, roam around in the cycle of births, that is fall into the cycle of births, on account of sin. "On account of sin" means by reason of their lack of merit. And since that is the case, these creatures should be slain. There is a particle in the sentence that indicates firm certitude: they should always be slain and never allowed to live. And why is that? The verse says, "in order to get rid of those," which means in order to get rid of sins.

134. Thus it is wrong to state that one should abstain from taking life in all circumstances. The rule should apply only to creatures who are happy. Otherwise, to operate under any other interpretation leads to a person's committing a fault.

Commentary: Since what was said above is correct, then one should not abstain from taking life in all circumstances; rather only with respect to those creatures that are happy. That is to say the proscription has as its object only happy creatures, since only killing a happy creature can entail sin. Otherwise, that is, if you do not subscribe to this interpretation of the proscription, you will commit a fault. For, a person desirous of securing for himself the next world has a duty to eradicate the sins of those who are suffering. If he does not do this, then he is at fault, just as is the person who denies others access to renunciation or access to the opportunity to make gifts. This is the statement of someone who objects to our position. Now we begin the rejoinder to his objection.

Remarks: While most representations of the views of the *saṃsāramocakas* attribute to them the practice of killing "miserable creatures," which can mean both suffering creatures and lower forms of life (ants, worms, and such), the majority of rebuttals of

their views specifically name lower life forms as the intended recipients of their compassion. Nonetheless, there are some rebuttals of their views in which higher animals and even human beings are included in the list of people to be released from their misery. The present text and the Malayagiri commentary to the *Nandisutta* in fact include human beings who are dreadfully sinful amongst the list of living beings who should be killed. This may well have been the original doctrine of the *saṃsāramocakas*, for it is in this form that their views are said to have influenced some Buddhists.

The section of the Pāli Buddhist *vinaya* that deals with murder, *Pārājika* 3, opens with an interesting and odd story about some monks who have just heard the Buddha lecture on the impurity of the body. When the Buddha retires from the assembly the monks ponder what they have just learned and become exceedingly disgusted with their bodies and their physical existence. They ask another monk to kill them. A goddess comes from the evil Māra and praises the monk who has done the deed, saying that he is to be honored, for he has released those who were not released (*atiṇṇe tāresi*). Emboldened by this praise, the culprit, whose name is given as Migalandika, kills a number of monks. The Buddha learns of his deeds and proclaims the firm rule that a monk must neither take his own life nor take the life of another.¹⁵

In this story we have a clear example of a practice attributed widely in the Jain texts to the *saṃsāramocakas* that is here said to have occurred amongst the Buddhist monks only to be forbidden by the Buddha. The commentary of Buddhaghosa, the *Samantapāsādikā*, supplies further interesting information. The Buddha withdraws from the monks after instructing them in the impurity of the body and Buddhaghosa explains that he did so knowing that these people were not ripe to understand his teachings and knowing what would happen. He did not want anyone to attribute the practice to the Buddha or to say that the Buddha taught his disciples to murder each other.¹⁶ To me, this reads like a careful attempt to disavow a practice that was indeed attributed to the Buddhists. Furthermore, Buddhaghosa notes that in her wrong view the Goddess was *saṃsāramocakamilakkha viya*, “like the *mlecchas* called *Saṃsāramocakas*.”¹⁷ I deduce from this remark

and from the entire story in the *vinaya* the hypothesis that views attributed to the *samsāramocakas* by the Jains were to be found amongst the various *śrāmaṇic* groups, and particularly amongst the Buddhists. References in the Buddhist literature to practices that are rejected under the rubric of the “*samāsaramocakas*” in the Jain *Śrāvakācāras* can also be found in medieval Mahāyāna literature. Thus, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, citing the *Āryaratnamegha*, says that it is permitted to kill someone who is about to commit one of the five great sins.¹⁸

135. What proof do those who state this view have that when a suffering creature is slain sin is eradicated and further bondage is not created as a result of their constant thinking of evil thoughts? Answer: the proof is to be found in statements that deal with existence in the realm of hell.

Commentary: What proof is there that when these suffering creatures are slain, that is killed, in this manner, the only consequence is that their sins are eradicated and that they do not experience further bondage on account of their obsessive thinking of evil thoughts? The author means to say that there is no such proof that this is the case. Here the objector rejoins, there are the statements that are applied with respect to hellish existences; that means the same statements applied to creatures in hell can serve as proof of our assertion. The next verse goes on to say exactly what the objector means here.

136. For, as those creatures are constantly slain by wicked supernatural beings, although they are constantly absorbed in evil thoughts, they do not acquire bondage in the same way as they destroy their sins.

Commentary: “Those creatures” means creatures in hell. To say that they are slain means that they are beaten. And by whom are they beaten? By wicked supernatural beings such as Amba and the others. Constantly means without stop. They are constantly absorbed in evil thoughts. Despite this they do not acquire bondage in the same way as they get rid of their bad deeds through their suffering. This is the gist of the verse. How do we know this to be the case? In response to that question our objector replies:

137. Because they do not have the karma that will result in their falling again into hell, for they are never reborn there right away. And in the absence of those, they still exhaust their sins through the torments that they inflict on each other.

Commentary: Because they do not have the karma that will result in their falling

into hell: a creature in hell never acquires the karma that would make him fall into hell again right away. The reason why we can say this is then given: because no creature immediately, that is to say, as soon as he gets out of hell, is born there, that is to say takes birth again in hell. For the Jains do not believe that a creature, having lived in hell, is immediately reborn in hell once more. And so the objector means that just as this is agreed to be the case, so should it be allowed that when a miserable creature is murdered he does not acquire further bondage on account of his evil obsessions, but rather gets rid of his sins. This is the general intention of the objector. The verse continues: "and in the absence of those." This means in the absence of those supernatural beings who torment the creatures in hell, in the realms known as mud-hell and the other realms in which these supernatural beings are not present, they still exhaust their sins through the torments they inflict on each other, that is, through the pains they inflict on each other, as it is said in the *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, 3.4, "They suffer terrible pains that they inflict on each other." From this statement it is clear that their getting rid of their sins has only that as its cause; even in the *apraṭiṣṭhāna* hell, there is no other cause for getting rid of sin. The objector, in order to make this clear, anticipates an objection to his last point and thus says:

138. Even in the *apraṭiṣṭhāna* hell it is through suffering that a creature gets rid of his sins. For in the absence of that, a god there cannot exhaust those sins.

Commentary: Even in *apraṭiṣṭhāna*, that is to say in the seventh hell, only through suffering, that is to say through the pain born from being raised up and cast down, is the eradication of sin accomplished, and not by any other means. This is so because we see that in the absence of that, which means in the absence of suffering, a god, a divine being, there, in that hell cannot exhaust that karma, the flow of which results in the experience of hell (this means that we allow that a god can somehow be born there; the verse also has a particle "and" meaning that the god when he is elsewhere is always free from suffering, which is also the case when he visits hell).

Remarks: The objector to the Jain doctrine that one should abstain from taking life under all conditions has proposed a restriction to this general rule: one should abstain from taking the life of happy creatures, but one should in fact always take the life of miserable creatures, for this will allow them to be released from their sins. The Jain in turn has objected that creatures when they are deprived of life become absorbed in evil thoughts, *raudradhyāna*. This leads to bondage. It is therefore a moot point whether killing some creature in the end benefits that creature: while the creature may get rid of

some past sins, he acquires new bad karma through his obsessive evil thoughts. *Raudradhyāna* is discussed in many Jain texts; a particularly vivid example is the story of King Brahmadatta told by Hemacandra in his *Yogaśāstra*, II.27ff. Brahmadatta is so obsessed with his hatred of the Brahmins whom he has ordered blinded that he sits fingering a bowl of grapes imagining them to be the eyes of the Brahmins he has had punished. For the sin of such wicked thoughts Brahmadatta goes to hell. *Raudradhyāna* is particularly associated with the moment of death; like many groups in India the Jains stress the necessity of controlling one's thoughts at death to insure a good rebirth.

The objector to the Jain position attempts to argue his way out of the conundrum posed by the Jain by using doctrines familiar to the Jains. He refers in some detail to the Jain concept of hell. The Jains believe that there are seven hellish realms. In all of them creatures suffer terribly. The Jains agree that through their sufferings these hellish creatures are rid of the bad deeds that brought them to hell in the first place; it may also be argued that they may also experience terrible obsessive thoughts, or *raudradhyāna*, but the doctrine nonetheless allows that the eradication of sin is the more powerful influence. This is why no creature is reborn from hell back into hell; all creatures leave hell for another rebirth after which of course there is no bar to their being reborn again in hell.

The last verse is not entirely clear to me. I interpret the text and commentary to mean that it is obvious that suffering causes the eradication of sin because we see in the case of gods who visit even the worst of the hells that nothing happens to their own sins; gods do not suffer, and thus we know that it is the absence of their suffering that entails the absence of eradication of sin.¹⁹

139. Therefore, killing them, even if it leads to their harboring evil thoughts, is the cause of eradicating their sins and should not be considered a wrong doing.

Commentary: Since what is said above is correct, then, killing them, which means murdering those suffering begins, even though it leads to their harboring bad thoughts, that is, even though it causes them to think bad thoughts and produces in them many different types of mental anguish, still, it is the cause of eradicating their sins, that is to say it is the means of putting an end to the sins

of those suffering beings. For this reason it is not to be regarded as a wrong doing. This is the position of the Samsāramocaka, who is opposed to the Jain doctrine being expounded in this text. The response to that position is as follows.

140. For the moment we shall forget all else. What good comes to that one in the eradicating of sins? The end to karma? What caused that in your view?

Commentary: At this point in the discussion let us put aside for the moment whatever else needs to be said. "In the eradicating of sins" means in the eradicating of the sins of those suffering creatures. "To that one" means to the person who causes the eradication, namely the person who kills the suffering creature. What good comes to him? The question is legitimate because no reasonable man acts without considering the result of his actions. Now you might think thus: The end to karma. That is, you might believe that the good that comes to the murderer is an end to his own karma. If that is your view, then I ask you, my opponent, what had caused that karma in the first place according to your doctrine?

141. If it was caused by ignorance, then only from the removal of that can it be removed. What use is that act of murder? Or do you imagine that the absence of that is its cause?

Commentary: If you should think that it was caused by ignorance, that is to say it was brought about by ignorance, well then, only from the removal of that, that is to say, only from the cessation of ignorance can there be removal of it or cessation of it. "It" in all of this refers to karma; it can only be stopped from the removal of its cause for it is generally admitted that a product ceases to appear in the absence of its cause. If this is what you hold, then in that case, what has the act of murder to do with anything? For it does not affect karma in the sense of being opposed to it in any way. Perhaps you imagine that the absence of that, meaning the absence of the act of murder, is the cause of the karma? In that case we reply:

142. In that case there results the unwarranted conclusion that even released souls would have karma and release would be meaningless. Or do you think that such a one gains merit? Even that cannot be, because there is also obstruction.

Commentary: There would result the unwarranted conclusion that even released souls would have karma, since karma is caused by the absence of the act of murder and released souls surely do not commit murder. In this way release would be totally meaningless, as it would be accompanied by bondage as well. Or perhaps you think in this way: such a one, that is, the person who kills a suffering creature, gets as his reward some kind of merit, and not the destruction

of his own karma. Even that cannot be, that is, even that merit cannot be the good that comes to him, for an obstruction is also caused which prevents your view from holding true. This is made clear in the next verse.

143. Killing those he must of necessity create an obstacle to their making merit. How could that one then gain merit, for it cannot have any cause, just as in the case with eradicating sins.

Commentary: By killing, that is, murdering, those, which means those suffering creatures, of necessity, that is, without fail, the murderer creates, that is brings about, an obstacle to their making merit. "Their" means the suffering creatures. For if they had lived they might have made merit for themselves by killing other miserable creatures. And when those suffering creatures are themselves slain, then since they cannot go on to kill others we must admit that an obstacle has been put in the path of their making merit for themselves. Since that is so, how can that one, that is, how can the murderer, have gained merit? The question is meant to imply that he cannot in any way gain merit because there is no cause for such merit. This is the correct way of construing the syntax of the verse. To amplify the logic here, you cannot argue that there is a cause of merit for the murderer, for something that causes an obstacle to merit-making in another being cannot at the same time be a cause of merit to someone else. The verse supplies an example: just as in the case with eradicating their sins. Here "their" refers to the suffering creatures who are being killed. The gist of the verse is this: You maintain that killing suffering creatures is the cause of eradicating your own sins; at the same time, since those creatures who are killed cannot go on to kill other creatures, there will be no cause for the eradication of their own sins and so how can their sins ever be eradicated?

Remarks: The argument in this verse seems to be as follows. The Jain has asked his opponent to explain what benefit the murderer gets from killing miserable creatures. The first response is given in verse 140: the murderer benefits because by killing miserable creatures he gets rid of his own adverse karma. The answer to this is given in verse 141: a product is only terminated by removing its cause. The absence of murder is not the cause of the murderer's bad karma, but ignorance is. Only by removing his ignorance can the murderer in fact remove his own bad karma. In verse 143 the opponent is allowed to suggest that the murderer is benefitted not because he eradicates his own bad karma, but because he gains some good karma, some merit. This is also rejected. The grounds for rejecting this position are simple: when the murderer kills a

miserable creature he not only stops it from doing wrong; he also stops it from making merit for itself. If you assume that murdering an unfortunate creature brings merit, then when some unfortunate creature is murdered it obviously cannot make any merit for itself by killing some other miserable being. To murder, then, prevents merit-making. What is obstructive of merit-making cannot also give rise to merit. A single act or entity cannot be both the cause of something and the cause of that same thing's destruction; this would be contrary to common sense. The commentator then proceeds to apply this exact same logic to the first alternative advanced, namely that the act of murder brings about the eradication of karma for the murderer. The commentary argues that in this case too the murdered creature is prevented from eradicating his own bad karma by murdering other creatures. Thus, the opponent's position implies that murder is both the cause of eradicating karma and an act that prevents the eradication of karma, an obvious impossibility. It also implies that the victim can never accomplish the eradication of his own karma because he is prevented from performing acts of murder himself, and those acts of murder are assumed to be the cause of eradicating karma. The commentary therefore concludes that murder cannot lead to the removal of the murderer's bad karma.

144. Perhaps you think that the cause of it is the act of murder related to the agent; well, then, why bother to kill another creature? Kill yourself if you want to get rid of your karma!

Commentary: Or perhaps you think in this way: Killing, that is the desire to kill, related to the agent, that is, present in the agent, is the cause of it. "It" here means the eradication of karma. If this is your position, then why bother to kill another? For in this case nothing further would be accomplished by killing another creature. You should kill yourself if you want to get rid of your karma, for you acknowledge that the act of killing operating in the agent is the cause and nothing else.

Remarks: With this verse the opponent attempts to get out of the difficult position in which he has been placed. He is given the chance to argue that even if killing a suffering creature prevents that

creature from doing merit or from getting rid of its own bad karma, it still leads to merit or the eradicating of karma for the agent of the murder. The causal relationship is not between killing a suffering creature in general and merit-making or eradication of karma in general. This had led to the problem that A's killing creature B both causes the eradication of karma (in A) and prevents the eradication of karma (in B). In this situation, one act was both the cause of a result and the cause of the absence of that same result. Now the opponent argues with a more restricted causal relationship: the desire to kill in agent A is the cause of the eradication of karma in agent A only. Conversely, the absence of the cause now interpreted as a desire to kill present in agent A, can only lead to the absence of its product, the eradication of A's bad karma. It is no longer acceptable to say that because A kills B and B cannot have a desire to kill some other creature C then the act of killing done by A leads to both the presence of the eradication of karma in A and its absence in B. The desire to kill pertains to A alone: it leads only to the presence of the eradication of karma in A.

What the opponent has forgotten is that this negates the whole enterprise: he began by trying to prove that you should kill suffering creatures to eradicate their sins or bad karma. Now he says that the murder has nothing to do with the victim, only with the agent. In that case, the Jain rejoins, forget the victim, who serves no purpose. Why don't you just kill yourself, putting an end to further sin quite completely?

145. Or do you argue that the murder is the cause for the eradication of karma for both? That cannot be, for it is produced by that. And something that is produced by a cause that is not opposed to the means for that very thing's absence does not cease even in the presence of that something else.

Commentary: Perhaps you think thus: The murder is the cause for the eradication of karma for both, that means for both the murderer and the victim. This is because the act of murder pertains to both the agent and its object and requires both as its cause. The answer to this hypothesis is as follows. This cannot be the case. Why? Because that karma is in fact produced by it; this means to say that the karma is in fact produced by the act of murder which is absolutely opposed to and cannot coexist with that which brings about the eradication of karma that you wish to see happen. So what, you ask? The verse goes on to explain. Consider

the case of an entity that is produced from a cause, where that cause can coexist with or is not opposed to the cause of destruction of that very entity. In such a case that entity does not cease to be, that is to say, the entity in question is not destroyed even in the presence of that something else. By the words "that something else" is meant that which is not opposed to and can coexist with the cause of destruction of that entity. He clarifies this very point in the next verse.

146. The cold of ice goes away in the presence of fire, but heat does not. If you refuse to admit this, then you will be forced to admit some unwarranted consequence.

Commentary: Only the cold of ice goes away in the presence of fire, because the fire cannot coexist with or is opposed to that which causes the coldness. Heat does not go away, since fire is not opposed to and can coexist with that which causes the heat. If you refuse to admit this, namely that a product ceases to be on account of something that is incompatible with its cause, then you will be forced to admit some unwarranted consequence. The unwarranted consequence is that there will be no order to the world; just as you allow what you want to see destroyed to be destroyed even from something that does not block the cause of that thing, so you will have to admit that countless other unrelated entities may vanish. The next verse states this forcibly.

147. In that case, all kinds of things can cease to be on account of all sorts of other things. And in this way it would result that nothing at all would exist, because all things depend on other things.

Commentary: In that case, meaning if you accept the unwarranted consequence, then anything at all might cease to be in the presence of anything else. And this is so because you admit that something can cease to be on account of another entity that is not in contradiction to it. The verse then goes on to say what is wrong with such a situation. In this way it would result that nothing at all would exist; that is to say the absence of absolutely every entity in the world would result. Why is that? Because all things depend on other things. In other words, one thing will cease even on account of something that is not inherently opposed to it and this will go on and on until nothing is left.

Remarks: The argument in these verses revolves around one central principle: if you wish to argue that in the presence of a given act or entity (A) some other act or entity (B) is destroyed or ceases to exist, then you must also admit that a certain special relationship exists between (A) and (B). That relationship is that (A) is

incompatible with the cause of (B). For two entities or acts to be incompatible means that they cannot coexist. The standard example of two incompatible entities is hot and cold, and the Jain makes use of this example in verse 146. Everyone admits that in the presence of fire the coldness produced by ice vanishes. This is because fire is incompatible, that is to say, cannot coexist with the cause of that coldness, which is ice. The fire melts and destroys the ice and because its cause is removed the coldness ceases to be produced. Fire is not incompatible with heat, for example the heat produced by the sun. That is why even in the presence of fire, heat does not vanish.

When this rule is applied to the question at hand, we find that the opponent is arguing that in the presence of murder, (A), bad karma, (B), disappears or ceases to exist. Now the Jain begins by asking, what was the cause of that bad karma to begin with? The opponent must admit that the cause of that bad karma cannot possibly coexist with the act of murder for the opponent to maintain that in the presence of the act of murder bad karma ceases. In my understanding of the verse you now need to supply another step. It was established in verse 141 above that the cause of bad karma is ignorance, *ajñāna*. The present argument now asserts that murder is totally incompatible with the cause of karma, or that murder is totally incompatible with ignorance. This means in effect that the desire to kill can exist only in the absence of ignorance, or in enlightened beings. We now have the absurd conclusion that only enlightened beings are murderers or that released souls would still commit murder, which no one admits.

One possible way out of this absurdity is for the opponent to insist that the act of murder or the desire to murder and the cause of karma, ignorance, are not mutually incompatible. The problem with this is that it violates the rule stated in verse 145 that you cannot maintain that (A) and the cause of (B) are not mutually incompatible and insist that in the presence of (A), (B) disappears or ceases to be produced. If you do admit this then the world suddenly tumbles into chaos. If you admit that in the presence of (A) any other entity, even an entity the cause of which is not

incompatible with (A) disappears, then in the presence of a pen even paper would vanish. Since all entities exist in the presence of other entities and no single act or entity in the world exists in isolation from other acts or entities, then it is easy to see why the entire world would simply vanish from sight.

Another possibility is what is given in verse 148. Karma is not caused by something that is incompatible with murder, nor by something that is compatible with murder. Since no third possibility exists where two entities are the negation of each other, then karma cannot have any cause at all.

148. Or do you maintain that karma is uncaused? In that case how can you say it exists? And how would it cease to be? For entities like the ether cannot be destroyed by anything at all.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think thus: That karma is uncaused, that is to say, has no cause. In response the verse says that in that case it would not exist at all, any more than the horns of a rabbit can be said to exist, because it has no cause. Anticipating the objection that the general relationship, "whatever has no cause does not exist, like the horns of a rabbit" does not hold as a universal proposition since the ether, which has no cause, is accepted as existent, the author of the verse says, "And how would it cease to be?" This means, "and how would it be destroyed?" He clarifies this last statement by saying, "For entities like the ether," which means entities like the ether and *dharmas* in the Jain system, are not destroyed by any means, by axes and the like. They are eternal, because they are uncaused.

149. And for these reasons as well, since it cannot have any result, one should never slay living beings. After all, it is caused by killing living creatures and so how can it be stopped by that very same act?

Commentary: And for these reasons, that is to say, because karma that is uncaused can never be destroyed, since it cannot have any result, that is to say, since it is devoid of any result in the form of eradication of karma, one should never slay living beings. The verse then refutes this possible viewpoint, that karma is both caused by the act of murder and destroyed by that very act of murder. How, that is, by what means, could it be stopped, that is to say, could it be eliminated, through that very same act, meaning through that act of murder? Here "it" means karma. And this is said because it is generally admitted that the same entity cannot both come to be and cease to be from the same cause; in that case it would never come to be at all.

150. Therefore, because it is the cause of eradicating karma that is acquired through the slaying of living beings, one should strictly observe the vow of abstaining from that act. This is known as *saṃvara*.

Commentary: Therefore, that is to say, since karma is caused by murder, then because it is the cause of eradicating that karma acquired through the slaying of living beings, one should strictly observe the vow of abstaining from that act. "That act" means the taking of life. This abstention from taking life is a form of *saṃvara*, and should be done as a fixed duty. That is the meaning of the word "strictly" in the verse. The Jain then goes on to ask the opponent further questions.

Remarks: *Samvara* is a technical term in Jainism that refers to practices that prevent the further influx of karma.²⁰

151. And why do you abstain from committing acts of murder with respect to creatures that are happy? Is it because you think that they have no sin? Well, there still could result the eradication of their merit, for in the presence of it release cannot occur.

Commentary: And why do you abstain from acts of murder, that is why do you desist from killing, with respect to happy creatures? Is it because you think they have no sin, since merit must be the cause of their happiness? The author of the verse anticipates this answer and responds. The act would still have its result in the destruction of their merit. And so why would you abstain from killing with respect to those particular creatures? If you should ask, how is it that the destruction of merit can be counted as a good result of the act of murder, then the answer is that in the presence of it, meaning, in the presence of merit, release cannot occur. Release is the primary goal and it would not exist, since it is caused by an absence of both sin and merit.

152. Or perhaps you think that such a creature on his own eradicates that. Why doesn't the other one eradicate that other thing himself, too? They too in time eradicate their karma; the act of murder only hastens the process.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think thus: Such a creature, meaning a happy creature, eradicates that, meaning his merit, on his own, meaning by himself. He does this by experiencing it on his own. In answer to such an anticipated statement by the opponent the author of the verse replies, "Why doesn't the other one eradicate that other thing himself, too?" Here "the other one" means a suffering creature. "That other thing" means sin. The question is meant to imply

that indeed a suffering creature does eradicate his own sin on his own. Next the author of the verse anticipates this reply from his opponent. "In time", meaning, over a long period of time, he does indeed eradicate his sin; nothing untoward is done in our theory. The process is merely speeded up by the act of murder. That sin which can only be experienced and thereby eradicated over a very long period of time is turned into a sin that can be experienced and eradicated in a short space of time by the act of killing. In answer to this anticipated statement of his opponent the Jain replies in the next verse.

Remarks: The answer of the opponent given at the end of this verse refers to the Jain concept of *upakrama*. Initially the term seems to have been applied to the notion of a life-span; every creature is born with a determined or fixed life-span. The determination is accomplished by a special type of karma that controls the length a creature will live in a given rebirth. At the same time, it is often observed that some living beings meet a "premature death," struck down by a murderer, for example in the prime of their lives. This gave rise to the concept of "*upakrama*", an external cause that shortens the time or life-span over which a living being was to live out his karma. The opponent is arguing that while it is true that karma, both good karma (merit) and bad karma (sin) are naturally exhausted as a creature lives out its life span, murdering miserable creatures does have a function. It acts as an *upakrama*, a means to shorten the lifetime of suffering over which the creature would otherwise have exhausted his karma.

153. Why is not the same done for that other thing that happy creatures have by providing them with more and more instruments of pleasure? Because there would be no gain in having it exhausted; for after all it brings them pleasure.

Commentary: "That other thing" means merit. Why do you not offer an *upakrama*, a shortening of the time over which karma is exhausted, in the case of happy creatures, by providing them with more and more instruments of pleasure? By this is meant things like Kashmiri saffron paste and unguents of turmeric with which to anoint themselves. Or perhaps your reasoning is thus: There would be nothing gained by shortening the time for them to experience their karma. There would be no gain in having it, meaning having that merit, exhausted. And why is that? For after all, it brings them pleasure. By this the verse means to say, after all, that merit gives rise to nothing but pleasure. The author of the verse anticipates all of this on the part of the opponent and replies

with the next verse.²¹

154. Release is the ultimate bliss, without comparison. And it cannot take place when there remains merit. And so why is there nothing to be gained? If you think that there exists the suspicion that that one might go on to commit sins, then where is the guarantee for the other case?

Commentary: Release is the ultimate bliss, without comparison. This is because it is the total absence of all obstructions; both of us admit that. And it cannot take place when there remains merit. This is because one of its causes is the destruction of merit. This being the case, why is there nothing to be gained? The author means to imply that there is certainly much to be gained in speeding up the process through which merit is exhausted. Perhaps you would argue that there exists the suspicion that that one might go on to commit sins, for there is no guarantee that after his merit has been exhausted through the process of *upakrama* he will definitely experience release and will not have any further sins. In answer to this possibility the author of the verse says, "then where is the guarantee for the other case?" "The other case" means the case in which sin is eradicated. How can you be sure that the act of murder speeding up the exhaustion of sin will bring about a good result and not an even worse result? He goes on to clarify this last point further in the next verse.

155. It might very well be that a miserable creature, having been slain, would go to hell; if left alive, he might kill many others and not go there ever. Why is there not room for doubt?

Commentary: It might very well be that a miserable creature, for example, a fisherman, having been slain, would go to hell. This is the correct syntax of the verse. On the other hand by your own admission, that karma which results in a sojourn in hell can be brought to a quick fruition through the process of *upakrama*; thus, that same person if left alive, meaning if not killed, might slay many other miserable creatures, and by your own admission those acts would lead to the eradication of his bad karma and to the fact that he would never go to hell. Since this is the case, then why is there not room for doubt? In other words, why is there not room for doubt in the case of eradicating sin as well as in the case of destroying merit? Now the author returns to the example of creatures in hell which was given earlier.

156. Generally speaking, creatures in hell are subject to such severe bodily pain that they do not experience extreme mental modifications, just as is the case with living beings when they are overcome by too much pain.

Commentary: Creatures in hell were adduced earlier as an example. Generally they do not experience extreme mental modifications such as cruel thought since

they are subject to such severe bodily pain, or in other words, they suffer such terrible bodily pain, as a result of their karma, which has resulted in their being reborn in hell. Such is known to be the case with living beings when their consciousness is overshadowed by excessive sensations of pain. This last point is strengthened in the next verse.

157. Here living beings, overwhelmed, confused in mind, exhausted by their experience of pain, thinking of nothing else, do not experience various passions with respect to other objects.

Commentary: "Here" means in the realm of animals. "Overwhelmed" means reduced to an entirely different state by the many sensations of pain. "Confused in mind" means that their minds are incapable of performing their proper specific functions. "Exhausted by their experience of pain" means completely weakened by their knowing so much pain. "Thinking of nothing else" means thinking only of their experience of that pain. To say that such creatures "do not experience various passions with respect to other objects" means that they do not experience such mental modifications such as passionate desires for women. This is because all of their thoughts and mental processes are exhausted in focusing on their pain.

158. Because they lack strong passions or hatreds what bondage they do acquire is slight. Because they are subject to delusion their eradication of karma is also not terribly impressive.

Commentary: Since the above holds true, it follows that because they lack strong passions or hatreds what bondage they do acquire is slight. "They" here refers to those creatures that are overwhelmed by sensations of pain. This is true because the cause of that bondage is a weak cause. And because they are subject to delusion even their eradication of bondage is not terribly impressive. This is because they lack such necessary specific causes as right knowledge. The next verse continues to illustrate how their eradication of bondage is not very impressive.

159. The amount of karma that a creature in hell eradicates over many billions of years can be eradicated by a wise man who is well protected by the three, in no more than the time it takes to inhale a single breath.

Commentary: The verse begins "The amount of karma a creature in hell eradicates over many billions of years"; one should add that in so doing that creature in hell suffers terribly. The wise man, by abandoning all activity, protected by the three *guptis*, watchful of mind, speech and body, eradicates that same amount of karma in no more than the time it takes to inhale a single breath.

This is because the causes of eradicating karma, such pure mental modifications as intense desire for the religious life, exist for him to a very strong degree. In conclusion, the Jain gives the next verse:

160. It is for this reason that creatures in hell, having done wicked deeds, and creatures who are miserable, here, both do not experience bondage to the same degree as they experience eradication.

Commentary: "It is for this reason" means for the reason just given above. In the sentence, "Creatures in hell, having done wicked deeds, and in the very same way, creatures who are miserable, here" the word "here" means in the present discussion. They do not experience bondage to the same degree as they experience the eradication of their sins because for the most part they are not subject to obsessive wicked thoughts.

Remarks: Earlier in the debate, with verse 135, the Jain had asked his opponent how the opponent could be sure that killing a miserable creature resulted in the eradication of that creature's sins and not in further sin. The further sin, the Jain asserts, would come from the fact that when a living being is being slain, he sinks into *raudradhyāna*, obsessive evil thoughts. *Raudradhyāna* is invariably the cause of a terrible rebirth, more painful than the rebirth in which the living being cultivated those bad thoughts. The opponent had answered that the situation could be closely paralleled by the state that the Jain himself believes obtains in hell. The Jain believes that creatures in hell suffer terribly and are beaten and slain but that they do not as a result get worse rebirths in even lower hells; in fact a creature in hell cannot be reborn in hell immediately. He must first be reborn elsewhere and then can fall back into hell. For creatures in hell the dominant experience of pain leads to eradication of bad karma and not further bad karma.

With the present series of verses the Jain seeks to explain why creatures in hell do not accumulate even more bondage. He argues that this is because they are so overwhelmed by their pain they do not sink into *raudradhyāna*; they do not focus on their obsessive hatreds or lusts since their thoughts are fully absorbed with their experience of pain. The opponent must now prove that such would also be the case with a miserable creature that was being murdered. This is the point made in the next verse.

161. Or is it the case that the act of slaying someone and nothing else gives rise to such a state and so it is to be done? This cannot be correct, because its opposite would then constitute bondage.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think thus: “The act of slaying someone,” that is, the act of killing, gives rise to “such a state.” By the words “such a state” is meant a state of confusion, being overwhelmed by pain. This state, given the small amount of bondage involved, is in fact the cause for the eradication of karma. Nothing else can eradicate karma. For this reason “it” is to be done. In this sentence “it” means the act of slaying. Having anticipated this rejoinder from the opponent the Jain now answers, “This cannot be correct, because its opposite would then constitute bondage.” The opposite of slaying is not slaying. That would be bondage. Were that not so, then you would not have the eradication of karma from the act of slaying since in that case the two would not be incompatible with each other.

Remarks: Now the opponent is permitted to argue that the act of slaying some creature produces the same kind of state of mental confusion that creatures in hell suffer and that prevents their sinking into obsessive cultivation of evil thoughts. This would mean that when you slay a miserable creature he does indeed eradicate more bad karma than he acquires and thus there is a net gain to the act. The Jain returns with an argument that he has already used: if slaying a creature puts an end to karma, then one must assume, by the argument given in verses 145 and 146, that the act of slaying a living being cannot coexist with the cause of karma. By a general rule entities do not coexist with their own absence; therefore the cause of karma or bondage is now the absence of slaying. This also returns to the argument in verse 141.

162. And in this way would result the faults adduced earlier, for example, that released souls would suffer bondage; there would surely be nothing to stop the many contradictions to your own doctrine that would flow unchecked.

Commentary: “And in this way” means with the absence of the act of slaying being the cause of bondage. The faults adduced earlier, for example that released souls would suffer bondage, would hold and there would be nothing to stop the many contradictions to your own doctrine that would flow unchecked. By this

last phrase the verse means that there would be many contradictions of the doctrines that you accept once you allow that the eradication of karma can be caused by an act of murder. "Surely" means you could not avoid the contradictions.

163. Thus this false view is beset by hundreds of faults; it is self-contradictory and against what everyone knows to be true. It impresses only fools. Enough then of this discussion!

Commentary: "Thus" means in this way. It is beset by hundreds of faults; it is self-contradictory and against what everyone knows to be true; it impresses only fools, this doctrine proposed by the Saṃsāramocakas. Enough, let us finish with this discussion.

Now we debate another position.

164. Others state that, since unexpected bad consequences might result from abstaining from taking life, both sin. Such people have not understood the true meaning of our doctrine.

Commentary: "Others" means other debaters. Because there is the possibility that unexpected bad consequences result, they say the following: From the abstention of taking life both men, that is to say, both the one who refrains from taking life and the person who orders him to refrain from taking life, accumulate bad karma; they sin. "Such people have not understood the true meaning of our doctrine" means that they have not grasped the real intention of our scriptures.

In the next verse the Jain explains what is meant by the phrase, "unexpected bad consequences."

165. A lion or other similar creature was not slain by someone who was capable of killing any creature at all but had taken a vow to abstain from killing animals. As a result that lion was left alive to kill the leading monk of the community.

Commentary: The phrase "capable of killing any creature" means that the individual in question was able to kill extremely violent animals like lions; he had taken the minor vow to abstain from killing animals. The phrase "lion or other similar creature" includes such animals as the mythical *sarabha*. Such an animal was not killed, but by that animal the leading monk of the community was slain. The term "leading monk of the community" refers not just to any monk but to that monk, the great teacher, who knows all the scriptures; only one such outstanding monk can exist in a generation. The verse means to offer this as an hypothetical but possible scenario.

166. And from that resulted a total break in the transmission of the Jain teachings, a terrible loss to many living beings. Now explain in what way there would be no fault for those people.

Commentary: "And from that" means from the death of that teacher. A total break in the Jain teachings is a terrible loss, that is a severe loss, to many living beings. This is because those living beings desirous of achieving release would no longer have available to them such requirements as right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. And since this is so, in what way would there be no fault for those people? "Those people" means those who abstain from taking life and order others to abstain from taking life. Since they have become the cause of destruction themselves, they would indeed have committed a sin.

167. Therefore one should not carry out a vow of abstention. Instead one should consider carefully what is appropriate in a situation and act accordingly.

Commentary: Since what has been said above is true then one should not carry out a vow of abstention from taking life. Instead one should consider carefully what is appropriate in a situation, that is, what is appropriate at that particular time, and act accordingly. By this is meant that one should do what is best for everyone else. In response to this the Jain says:

168. Could it not be that the teacher, having been protected from being slain by the lion, somehow or other would commit some sin and in the end turn out to do harm to himself and to others?

Commentary: If you want to include in your consideration the possibility of unexpected bad consequences, then this is also possible. Protected from being slain by the lion, that teacher, somehow or other, that is through the ripening of some bad karma, might commit some sin, for example sleeping with a woman or enjoying something else forbidden. In this way he would do harm to himself, by making karma that would result in his inability to come to know the true doctrine, and to the lay community, by causing them to lose faith. Such a scenario is perfectly possible.

169. And in this way would not the cause of the Faith suffer? And would not that lion, having been slain, go to hell? If it had lived might it not have obtained the right belief?

Commentary: "And in this way would not the cause of the Faith suffer?" means in fact the cause of the Faith would suffer. And that lion, having been slain, that is to say, having been killed, on account of his cruel temperament, will surely

have gone to hell. If it had lived, might it not have obtained right belief? This means that it surely could have obtained the right belief if it had come into contact with an exceptionally righteous person.

170. And is it not possible that that one, not having been killed by it, might be bitten by a snake? Why should not the very fault adduced also result in your view? Thus we may dismiss it.

Commentary: And is it not possible that that teacher, not having been killed, that is to say, not having been slain, by that lion, might become careless in the night and might be bitten by a snake or serpent? All of this is possible. And so why should not the fault that you adduce also result in your view? Thus we may dismiss it; that is we must consider it in your view as well. And since that is so,
...

Remarks: There is some evidence that at least some religious practitioners actually did subscribe to the logic of the *Śrāvaka*prajñapti here and argued that a teacher, having reached the highest state of meditation, should indeed be willfully slain by his disciples to prevent the possibility of his falling from his high level of attainment.²² Amṛtacandra in his *Śrāvakācāra*, the *Puruṣa-siddhyupāya*, speaks out against a student who would cut off his teacher's head as the teacher perfects his meditative state.²³ While the examples from Buddhist literature familiar to me deal with suicide and not with murder, the same logic could indeed apply to both cases.

171. ... One would even have to stop totally from giving food to others; for is it not possible that faults like bad indigestion might result?

Commentary: One would even have to stop totally from giving food, since unexpected consequences are possible. This being the case one would be compelled not to give food. The word "even" is meant to indicate that the same logic would apply to not giving food. And so there result in either case bad consequences; in the case of giving food, "bad indigestion," that is to say a fatal condition, and in the case of not giving food a dire situation in which the person who was denied the food harbors such hatred for the one who failed to give that he steals his money or even kills him. Would not these bad consequences result? They surely would. For ...

Remarks: The Buddhist *Pārājikas* in fact discuss these situations in detail, particularly with respect to medical treatment. Is it not possible that medical treatment might unintentionally result in the death of the patient? The Buddhists would in fact acknowledge just such a possibility and yet they argue that such deaths do not entail the sin of murder since there was no intention to kill. Another example relevant to this verse is given in the *Pārājika* on murder and involves the case where a monk is given poisoned food on his begging rounds. Unaware that the food he has received is deadly, he distributes some to his fellow monks who then die. The conclusion is that this is also not a “culpable murder” in that the agent was an unwitting agent and had no intent to kill the victims.²⁴

The Jain in general disallows such absolution and refuses to tolerate certain acts of violence on the grounds that they are involuntary. Śīlānka’s commentary to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* gives one of the clearest statements of the Jain position and is discussed below.²⁵

The Buddhist emphasis on intentionality is discussed in almost every genre of Buddhist writing. It is the subject of a number of *jātakas*, among them the *Tittirajātaka*, number 319.²⁶ The *Tittirajātaka* is the story of Rahula in a past birth; Rahula is described as being “*kukkuccaka*,” “overscrupulous and overanxious” about his own behavior and the Buddha tells this story to the monks to indicate that this was also the case in Rahula’s past birth. Rahula was once a partridge or *tittira*, with an alluring voice. A bird-catcher kept this *tittira* captive in a cage and made it sing. Other birds were drawn to the singing and the bird-catcher would grab them and kill them. The singing *tittira* realized that he was the cause of the destruction of so many of his relatives and refused one day to sing. The bird-catcher beat him and in pain and sorrow the *tittira* resumed his song. But the bird was troubled, fearing that he was guilty of the sin of murder. Eventually he found the future Buddha, who in that birth was a Hindu ascetic. The future Buddha explained to him that he was not guilty because he had not intended to kill any of the other birds.

Given the number of the *jātaka* stories, it is often not easy to assess the importance to the tradition of any individual tale. In the

case of this *Tittirajātaka*, however, there is some evidence that it was considered to teach a very vital lesson. Traditional accounts of the third Buddhist council include a reference to the *Tittirajātaka*. We read in those accounts of how King Aśoka was troubled by the fact that many *tīrthikas* had infiltrated the Buddhist monastic community. The Buddhists were so successful, that the *tīrthikas* were losing their base of support among the laity. They were no longer receiving alms and could not get any of their necessities, so they became Buddhist monks, but they did not relinquish their former views or practices. The Buddhist monks refused to conduct the rituals of *uposatha* with them, and the community was in turmoil. King Aśoka was distressed with the situation and sent his emissary, instructing him to put a stop to the dissension. The emissary, we are told, was a fool and took counsel with other fools. They decided that the king wanted them to kill the recalcitrant Buddhist monks and they did so without much further ado, until they came to kill Mahinda, the son of King Aśoka. They stopped short of this crime, and returned to the king. When the king heard what they had done he was horrified, and tormented by the thought that although it had never been his intention to put the monks to death, he was in some way guilty of the crime. He eventually discussed his fears with the monk Moggaliputtatissathera. To assure the king of his innocence, the monk told him this *Tittirajātaka*.²⁷

Later Buddhist texts, and texts written in a very different vein, restate forcefully this central Buddhist contention that it is only the intention behind an act that determines whether the agent of that act is guilty or not. Haribhadra's commentary to the *Prajñāpāramitā* has an extensive discussion of this issue.²⁸

172. ... A person would even have to desist from eating food himself; and the same would be true with respect to going and other activities. Nothing would be proper, for one can never totally remove the doubt that bad consequences might unexpectedly result.

Commentary: A person would even have to desist from eating food himself, for this very same reason, that there would surely always exist the possibility of some unexpected bad consequence arising. The same would be true with respect to

going, coming, staying and everything else — it would not be proper to do anything at all, for one can never totally remove the doubt that bad consequences might unexpectedly result. While walking, a person might well step on a thorn and get hurt; there is always the possibility that the house might fall in on him if he stayed home.

173. By the same token, why should one refuse to abstain from activity, on account of the very reasons already given? Even careful reflection will not help since committing sin is always possible.

Commentary: By the same token, why should one refuse to abstain, on account of the very reasons already given? If one refuses to abstain from taking life he might get into trouble by slaying the king's favorite peacock. The reflection mentioned earlier (verse 167) is of no help, since all it does is to stop one from doing any activity at all; and while people are reflecting it is also possible that they could *de facto* be harming others, and thus sinning. Thus reflection is of no use. In conclusion the Jain says:

174. And so what these people who do not understand our doctrine say is contrary to experience, common sense and scripture; it is the cause of delusion and is without any real meaning.

Commentary: And so this is contrary to experience, custom and scripture. It is contrary to experience because we do experience a beneficial change in our hearts when we abstain from taking life. It is contrary to common sense in the same way as trying to swim across the ocean violates common sense. It is contrary to scripture because it allows that anything at all might be done. "It" means the words of our opponent. This is the correct syntax of the verse. The phrase "who do not understand our doctrine" means those who have not comprehended our scriptures. Being the cause of delusion, how could it be good? What is the nature of these words that are the cause of confusion? They lack any real meaning, which means that they are devoid of their intended sense. Since that is the case,

175. Therefore those two are of pure mind, believing only in the words of the Jina, engaged in abstention from taking life, and firm in their minds they both destroy their sins.

Commentary: "Therefore, those two are of pure mind." This phrase means that they have no wants. "Believing only in the words of the Jina" means that they believe in what is said in the words of the Jina. The two of them are the one who abstains from taking life and the one who commands another to abstain from taking life. They are both engaged in carrying out this vow faithfully to the best

of their abilities. They destroy their sins. This means that they eradicate their karma. "Firm in their minds" means that their resolve is unhindered.

Remarks: Much of the debate in this passage can be interpreted as reflecting Jain/Buddhist differences. The debate began by saying that some people argue that total abstention from the taking of life is a faulty rule in that there are exceptional cases in which the possibility of some living creature's doing harm in the future is so great as to warrant that creature's being put to death before the harm is done. The example is given of a lion who kills an exceptional monk. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* cites a verse from the *Āryaratnamegha* in which permission is given to kill a person who is about to commit one of the five cardinal sins.²⁹ Given that the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* itself takes great pains to redefine the major sins to mean acts that hinder the *bodhisattva* or harm the Buddhist community, it seems possible to interpret the *Āryaratnamegha* passage in a very general sense, as endorsing the killing of any living being who would harm a great religious teacher or hinder the religious community.³⁰ Making these allowances, then, it would be possible to understand the *Śrāvakaṣraṅgāra* as combating a Buddhist position in this section. This is certainly consistent with the argument as it develops; the verses lead us to the conclusion that given the proposition that a harmful creature should be killed to prevent it from doing harm one would also have to stop doing all acts of good since they too might have unwarranted bad consequences. Just as the possibility of an unexpected bad consequence should prevent us from abstaining from the taking of life, so should the possibility of some undesired consequence prevent us from doing good. The initial proposition entails a rejection of the central Buddhist view expressed throughout the *Pārājika* and in some Mahāyāna texts that unexpected bad consequences do not make an act blameworthy.

[Commentary:] And now we debate another position.

221. Some say that in killing a baby, because so much karma must be made to ripen in such a short time, there is greater sin than in killing older people, because the opposite is true.

Commentary: Some debaters argue that in killing a young person, that is to say,

in murdering a baby, a child, or a youth, because so much karma must be made to ripen in a short time through the process of *upakrama*, there is more sin. The opposite holds true in the case of older people, because only a small amount of karma must be made to ripen quickly. The answer to this is given:

222. This is not correct, for sin is said to result from the state of mind. That is why violence is classified by such terms as physical or mental in our doctrine.

Commentary: This is not correct, for sin is said to result from the state of mind. And it is not the case that the state of mind in killing a child is more violent than the state of mind that obtains when the victim is elderly. Violence is classified by such terms as physical and mental in our doctrine, as it is said, "Violence carried out in a physical way is one thing and violence of mental state is another." He explains the first kind of violence as follows:

223. When someone who is carefully controlling his own movements raises his foot to take a step, a lowly creature may be struck and killed from that contact.

Commentary: "Raises his foot" means lifts his foot. "To take a step" means to walk. This is the way to construe the verse. "Someone who is carefully controlling his own movements" means someone who is mindful of everything that he does in the proper way, that is a holy man. What "may be struck", that is to say what might suffer terrible pains? What "may be killed", that is, what may be deprived of life? "A lowly creature": this means a creature with two sense organs. "From that contact" means having come into contact with that holy man.

224. Nor does that one get even the slightest amount of bondage from that in our doctrine. For he was mindful and it is defined as unmindfulness.

Commentary: Nor does that one, that holy man, from that, that is, from being the cause of the death of that lowly creature, get even the slightest amount of bondage in our doctrine. Why is that? It is because he was mindful, which is to say that he has behaved exactly as the scriptures demand that he behave. "It" here means violence. Violence is defined as unmindfulness. It is so defined by the Tirthankaras and their first disciples, the *ganadhara*s. What has happened here is a form of physical violence and not mental violence. In the next case there is mental violence but no physical violence.

225. In a dark place someone sees a rope that looks like a cobra. He unsheathes his sharp sword and strikes the rope, intending in his mind to do violence.

Commentary: "In a dark place" means a dank, low-lying place. "A rope" here

means something made out of straw or some similar material. "That looks like a cobra" means that resembles a cobra. Seeing that, he unsheathes his sharp sword and strikes, that is to say he hits it. "Intending in his mind to do violence" means intending to kill that snake.

226. Let it be known that even though no snake was killed, because that person intended in his mind to kill it, he surely gets further bondage.

Commentary: "Even though no snake was killed" means that in actuality no snake was killed. Nonetheless, because he intended in his mind to kill it, that would-be snake killer "gets further bondage." This means that he acquires the karma that leads to many future rebirths. Now he describes a third type of violence.

227. Intending in his mind to slay a deer, a person makes ready his bow. He lets fly an arrow and kills it in both ways. He is the worst.

Commentary: Intending in his mind to slay a deer, he "makes ready his bow", stretching it back to his ear. He lets fly an arrow and kills it in both ways. This means both physically and in his mind. "It" is the deer. He is the "worst" means the most violent. A fourth type is as follows:

228. That which involves neither of these two is simply a verbal construct and completes the unit of four. Still, describing it is not wrong because it may help sharpen a student's understanding.

Commentary: "That which involves neither of these two" means that which has neither physical nor mental violence. Such violence actually does not exist; it is just a verbal construct without any real object, and is introduced here artificially to complete the foursome. Still, being described, it may sharpen a student's understanding and so there is nothing wrong in bringing it up.

229. And so since bondage results from mental intention, it matters little here if one is a baby or an old man. Even with respect to a baby that might not be strong, but it might be strong in some cases with respect to an old person.

Commentary: And so since bondage results from mental intention, it matters little here if one is a baby or an old man. "Here" means in the consideration of a murder. Why is that so? Because even with respect to a baby that might not be strong. "That" means the mental intention to kill. And in some cases it might be strong even with respect to an old man. This is so because the mental inclinations of those who desire to kill will always be different.

230. But it might then be true that in the absence of the mental intention to kill, even when a murder is actually committed, there is no bondage that results. How could there be no intention to kill when a murder is committed, and in the presence of that how could there be no bondage?

Commentary: Or perhaps you might think the following. In the absence of any mental intention to kill, even when a murder is actually committed, it would turn out that no bondage would result in your doctrine where what is important is the mental intention. Anticipating this objection, the Jain responds. How could there be no intention to kill when a murder is committed? In fact there has to be such an intention, for someone without evil intentions would never engage in such an act. "And in the presence of that" means where that intention to kill is present, and where a murder is committed, how could there be no bondage? There would surely result bondage.

Remarks: This section explains carefully the distinction between the Jain and Buddhist understanding of "intentionality" and the relationship between intention and culpability. On the surface, both Jain and Buddhist seem to be making the same point: a person is guilty of a violent act because he intentionally committed that act; conversely a person is not guilty when there was no intention to commit violence. Much of the Buddhist *Pārājika* centers around this issue and is devoted to determining under what circumstances the taking of life is a major offense. The Buddhists are clear in saying that where a person did not intend to commit violence there is no major crime even if an act results in the death of another living being. Thus the monk who unwittingly offers poisoned food to his brethren is not guilty, nor is the monk who accidentally sits on a baby and suffocates it. The Jains hotly debate the Buddhists on this point and reject categorically Buddhist understandings of the concept "intended violence." The Jains argue that all violence is intended violence; they argue that it is not possible for a person to be so ignorant and yet not guilty. His very ignorance and carelessness constitute an intent to do violence and imply correspondingly his guilt. Only the Jain holy man, who has the right understanding and who is ever mindful of his acts, is truly devoid of the intention to commit violence.³¹

231. Consider this possibility. There is an intent to kill, but it is not a wrongful

intent for the person was acting under the influence of ignorance or of false doctrines. In both cases that very thing is still the cause of bad bondage.

Commentary: Consider this possibility. There is an intent to kill, but it is not a wrongful intent, on account of ignorance. The person doing the killing is subject to ignorance. Or he is acting under the influence of false doctrines, for example where someone performs a sacrifice that involves the taking of life. Anticipating such an objection, the Jain replies, that in both cases that ignorance is what we mean by a “wrongful intent” and it is the cause of further bad bondage. “Bad bondage” means karma that leads to many future rebirths.

Remarks: Again it is possible to refer this verse to Buddhist arguments. The Buddhists contend that the Buddha in a past birth indeed performed blood sacrifices but that because he did so under grave delusion he is not guilty of murder in the same way in which a person who commits such acts but is not confused in mind is guilty. The issue in the Buddhist texts is raised quite explicitly in the *Milindapañha* with reference to the *Lomassakassapa Jātaka*.³² In the *Lomassakassapa Jātaka* (433), Lomassa performs a blood sacrifice (*pasu yajña*) but only after he has been blinded with lust by a maiden sent to him by Indra to disturb his awesome *tapas*. The verdict is that the Buddha was not guilty of his acts because he was in the grips of passion. The Jain answer is that his very passion is what makes him guilty. In the Jain view, only the person who is devoid of passion and totally mindful, possessed of right knowledge, can by definition be free from the intention to do violence.

One of the most informative discussions between a Buddhist opponent and the Jains on the issue of intentionality is the commentary of Śīlānka to the *Suyagaḍaṅga*, which has been mentioned several times above.³³ The Buddhists in Śīlānka’s commentary argue that external rituals are totally insignificant and that the only thing that is important is mental state. One of their more bizarre examples to illustrate how internal states are the only determinants of good and evil actions is a case in which a person roasts a child that is covered up on a fire, thinking the child to be a gourd. The Buddhist verdict is that the man who did this awful deed is not guilty of murder since he was ignorant of what he did and had no intention to commit violence. This in fact corresponds closely to an example given in the Pāli *Vinaya*, *Pārājika* 3, in which

a Buddhist monk accidentally sits on a baby that is covered in a blanket and the baby suffocates. The verdict is that the monk is not guilty of the major crime of murder since he had no intention of killing the baby.³⁴ In Śīlāṅka's commentary the Jains counter the Buddhists by saying that it is this very ignorance that results in bondage and thus it is not possible to argue that ignorance excuses bad deeds. Śīlāṅka adds that if only good intention, even coupled with extreme ignorance, were required in order for a deed to be judged virtuous, then the Buddhists would have to admit that the *saṃsāramocakas* are released from their karma by their unusual deeds. Another discussion of the importance of intention in judging acts is the Pāli *Upāliparipṛcchā*, which offers arguments that the Buddhists regarded as establishing their doctrine over the Jain emphasis on the actual physical act itself as opposed to the thoughts that motivated it. The main Buddhist argument is that the Jains, too, recognize intentionality in allowing that monks, though they kill living creatures, are not at fault. To Śīlāṅka the Buddhists in this and other texts are missing the point the Jains wish to make: it is not just intention, but right knowledge and right behavior as well, that constitutes the definition of non-violence.³⁵

232. Since such an intention to do evil vanishes with the removal of ignorance, therefore someone who desires to do away with it should strive to acquire knowledge.

Commentary: Since the mental intention to kill does not exist when its cause, ignorance and the like, disappears and since it invariably exists when ignorance exists (in fact that evil intention is nothing but ignorance in essence), then "someone desires to do away with it", someone who desires the absence of that mental intention to kill should strive to acquire knowledge. This is because things like knowledge are incompatible with the existence of ignorance. Having stated the nature of reality, he goes on to point out how the reason given by the opponent is not universally true.

233. Nor is it true that in the one case there is far more karma that must be brought to fruition in a short time. For even some children are destined to have short-life spans, while some elderly people will be long-lived.

Commentary: That there is more or less karma to be brought to fruition in a short

time in the case of children and the elderly is by no means certain. For even some children are destined to have short life-spans while some though elderly may be long-lived. For this is what we in fact observe in the world.

231. Therefore the sinless declare that the murder of any living being entails sin. The degree of sin in most cases is related to mental intention.

Commentary: Since what was said above is true, then the murder of any living being, child or elderly, entails sin. This is proclaimed by the sinless, that is by those who are devoid of passion. The degree of that sin is said in most cases to be related to the mental intention. The qualifier "in most cases" is added to allow for such differences as "being an ascetic" and such factors.

III. Conclusions

In the sections from the *Śrāvakaṣrajñapti* that I have translated here the Jains refute a number of challenges to their general rule that total abstention from the taking of life is the ultimate act of virtue, and indeed the only way for a person to achieve spiritual liberation; conversely all taking of life entails sin. The basic argument of the Jains is that any attempt to create exceptions must in the end totally undermine the entire structure of moral behavior; to create any exception (A) allows room for exceptions (B) ... , in an infinite series and thus totally destroys any possibility for moral action. While this is implicit in the *Śrāvakaṣrajñapti*, it is made explicit in other Jain texts.

The *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadra states firmly that the source of morality must be scripture and that only the Jain scriptures are valid; they enjoin total abstention from taking life and so it must be accepted that the abstention from taking life brings merit and the taking of life entails sin. Haribhadra stresses that this is an absolute rule to which no exception is permitted. In his own commentary on the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, verse 119, Haribhadra glosses his comment "And so one who would use various arguments is in terrible trouble" with the following remarks: "One who would use various arguments" means "one who would seek to make subtle distinctions with respect to sin." Thus, the correlation is simple and complete: violence is sinful and abstention from violence is meritorious.³⁶

Jain arguments in the *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti* and other texts are directed against three main groups who sought to make exceptions to the general rule that violence is wrong. The group best known to Western scholars is the orthodox Hindus, the Mīmāṃsakas, with their sacrifice of animals; Jain arguments against the Vedic sacrifice appear in a variety of guises, in philosophical texts, texts on lay behavior and in stories.³⁷ The second group that forms a standard opponent for the Jains was the *saṃsāramocakas*, who argued that it was meritorious to kill sinful or suffering creatures. I have tried to show above that their views in turn had also influenced the Buddhists, the third and perhaps most important group to offer a challenge to the Jain ethical teachings.

The Buddhists challenged the Jain doctrine of total abstention from violence in a number of ways, but behind all their challenges may be seen an alternative explanation of mental intention, a concept that was critical to the Jains as well as to the Buddhists. Whereas the Jains confined right mental intention to the Jain holy man and maintained that an absence of the desire to do violence could never really exist in someone who was ignorant of the true (Jain) doctrine or was swayed by the passions, the Buddhists understood “intention to do violence” in its ordinary and obvious meaning and allowed that its absence meant that there could be a variety of cases in which even a murder committed did not necessarily entail bad karma.

The Jain rejection of all of these viewpoints in its turn also revolves around one central assertion that brings us back to Haribhadra: to make any distinction with respect to sin is to undermine the entire moral order. And this is what the *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti* was intended to demonstrate. To the *saṃsāramocaka* the Jains says that a duty to kill unhappy creatures could equally apply to happy creatures as well; thus if you allow the commandment to abstain from taking life to refer to only some creatures, namely happy creatures, you end up by denying its validity altogether. To the Buddhist who would kill a living creature who might commit a major sin the Jain says that one can never know the future consequences of any act. Again, this ends up

in undermining all moral behavior: you would never save a life either, for you cannot know what evil deed the person saved might later perpetrate. To those who would argue that only intended violence entails sin, the Jain answers that all violence is intended in the sense that it is done out of ignorance and passion, and both ignorance and passion in any case result in sin and in the prolongation of participation in the cycle of rebirths.

At the same time, the Jains must acknowledge the inevitable violence of living and breathing, walking and moving, and they do admit that monks who must do these things must also act in such a way that living beings are deprived of life. It is here and here alone, with regard to the behavior of monks and nuns that the Jain utilizes a concept of intentionality. The Jains do not apply the notion of intentionality to restrict the applicability of their general prohibition against taking life which would thereby undermine moral order, but they make it a direct component of the definition of violence. Violence is the intention to harm or the harm done when one is in a state of carelessness; by definition, a monk, careful and mindful of his every act, cannot commit violence and the general applicability of the universal prohibition not to do violence is preserved.³⁸

By contrast, in a text like like the *Śrāvakaṣraṅgānandīya*, the Buddhists and *sāṃsāramocakas* argue that the notion of a general prohibition is itself faulty since violence does not always result in sin; they do not redefine “violence” as the Jains do, but they reject the concept of a universal prohibition against the taking of life. Similarly, Mīmāṃsakas argue in Jain texts that the general prohibition must be restricted in sphere by specific injunctions that tell us that we are to kill animals in the context of the sacrifice.³⁹ The central issue of the debate for the Jains is not what restriction is permissible, but showing that no limitations on universal moral laws can ever be tolerated.

In closing, I would stress that this translation and analysis should be seen as a preliminary investigation into the debate over moral injunctions in ancient and medieval India. The many questions that remain are as significant as the few that this paper

may have answered. It remains to identify the Jain opponents in many of the arguments in this single text, the *Śrāvakaṣrajanāpti*, to assess their responses and above all to assess the validity of the Jain assertion that they alone of all the participants in the debate argue from a deep conviction that moral law must apply uniformly and without exception.

It is also important to extend the study down through history, for the Jains remain a major party in a discussion on ethics, although their fellow debaters change in identity. The Hindu *Vallabhadigvijaya*, written in Sanskrit by the grandson of Vallabha (d. 1530 C. E.) tells a story of Vallabha's encounter with a Jain and a barbarian, typically in Indian literature representatives of the two extreme positions possible in the issue of violence and non-violence. Vallabha chooses to instruct the two by reference to another barbarian and another Jain from times long past; that barbarian is now a crow and the Jain is now a dove, and the two birds are sitting together on a tree. Vallabha asks the birds about violence and non-violence, and the crow speaks first. It had been a barbarian in a former birth and true to form had killed wantonly, particularly by enjoying the royal hunt. Himself wounded in one of his ventures, he had died and experienced terrible rebirths, eventually being reborn as the crow who is made to speak by Vallabha. The crow also tells us the moral we are to deduce from his experiences: the taking of life when it is not specifically enjoined by the authoritative Law Books (*dharmaśāstras*) is a sin. The dove then speaks up. The dove had been a Brahmin, who had converted to Jainism after becoming disgusted at all the violence he had committed within the context of the many sacrifices he had once performed. As a Jain monk he had once come to a village and spent the night just outside the village limits. A devastating fire had broken out and the villagers had begged the monk to open the village gates from the outside, for they were locked in the village, which had become an inferno in which men and beasts were being consumed by the flames. The monk had refused to comply with their request, for he feared that he might take the life of some living being if he walked in the dark, unable to see the insects and tiny

creatures in his path. The dove also explains what he had done wrong and how he came to be born as the dove: he had sinned, because abstention from the taking of life is invalid as a general rule. Only those acts of abstention from taking of life that are specifically enjoined in the Law Books in particular contexts are meritorious.⁴⁰

And so the debate continues and the question remains consistent: Is a general more law moral, or to be moral must it be flexible and accommodate the needs of the moment? The Jain voice is strong and unmistakable, and its challengers were many. Much more work is needed to uncover the many details of the debate and disclose its many changing parameters.

NOTES

1. On Jains studying with Buddhists see my article on Haribhadra, "The Jain Biographies of Haribhadra: An Inquiry into the Logic of the Legend," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 16, 1988, pp. 109-125.

2. I make this sweeping statement fully aware of the existence of Buddhist refutations of Jain doctrine amongst medieval Buddhist philosophers. These refutations are not of the same scope and breadth as Jain refutations of the Buddhists and are in my mind evidence of their very unequal mutual preoccupation. The same statement could not be made with reference to the Pāli *suttas*, of course, where the Jains are often depicted in argument with the Buddhists, nor with reference to some of the *avadāna* material, for example the *Vīṭaśokāvadāna* of the *Divyāvadāna*. I am in the process of studying Buddhist references to the Jains and hope to return to the question in greater detail at a later date. I have further comments on Jain reactions to the Buddhists in my paper, "Being in the Minority: Medieval Jain Reactions to Other Religious Groups," forthcoming in the *festschrift* for J. C. Jain that is being edited by N. Bhattacharya.

3. See the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 1.7, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, vol. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960, p. 7, where the term *sukhena* applied to the practice discovered by the *buddhas* is glossed in the commentary of Prajñākaramati as "*na śīroluñcanādīnā mahatā kaṣṭhena*," "And not by such painful rituals as pulling out the hair from one's head." This is clearly a reference to the well-known Jain practice. The accusation against the Buddhist monks that they lived the good life is not by any means confined to the Jains. Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Āgamaḍaṃbara* makes fun of the Buddhist monks because they lead a life of ease and pleasure. See *Āgamaḍaṃbara*, edited by V. Raghavan and Anantalal Thakur, Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text no. 7, 1964, chapter 1.

4. Thus the *Abhisamayāṅkāra* seems to counter the Jain objection to the *Vyāghri*

Jātaka, discussed below, that if his body was full of worms and the Buddha fed it to the tigress, in effect he murdered those countless worms and the guilt of those murders must far outweigh his rescuing the tigress from eating her cubs. The *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* offers that after a certain stage of religious practice the Buddha's body no longer has any worms in it. This of course directly contradicts the *Vyāghrī Jātaka* as it appears in a text like the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra*, *vyāghrī parivarta*, verse 8, where the Buddha describes his body as "*kṛmiśatābharitam*" filled with hundreds of worms. It would seem that this was the version most familiar to the Jains. See the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama*, edited by S. Bagchi in the Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, no. 8, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1967, p. 109; *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, Tokyo: Sankibo, 1971, reprint of the 1932 Toyo Bunko edition by U. Wogihara, p. 671. I have studied some of the Jain responses to the *Vyāghrī Jātaka* in my paper, "The Sacrifice of Mañicūḍa: The Context of Narrative Action as a Guide to Interpretation," published in the *Festschrift for H. Nakamura*, edited by V. N. Jha, Delhi: Indian Books Centre, 1990, pp. 225-239. Unfortunately the paper has many misprints. I should also take this opportunity to correct an error that I made there on page 226; the story of Sukosalamuni does not speak of the monk giving his life to a tigress as the Buddha did in the *Vyāghrī Jātaka*, but of a monk who was tormented to death by a tigress who had been his mother in a former birth. I still suspect that the stories are related, but surely not in the direct way I stated in that paper. The story of Sukosala is told in great detail in the *Bṛhatkathakośa* of Hariṣeṇa, no. 127, pp. 305-314, ed. A. N. Upadhye, Singhi Jain Series, no. 17, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1943.

5. On this concept of the body as filled with worms see the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* chapter 5 on verse 85 where the commentary cites the Āryaratnarāśi which advises the Buddhist aspirant to contemplate the following thoughts when he eats: "This body of mine has eighty thousand different species of worms. May they all live happily with the strength that they get from this food. Now I please them with this food, and when I have achieved enlightenment I shall please them with the *dharma*." See the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, vol. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960, p. 70.

6. See my paper on Mañicūḍa cited above.

7. The Buddhists repeatedly stress such acts of compassion; the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 3.8, p. 38, which is part of the vow the Bodhisattva makes is a plea that he might become "food and drink to all creatures in time of famine." There are many *avadāna* stories that reflect this same theme. For some references see Jampa Losang Panglung, *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivādinaya Analysiert auf Grund des Tibetischen Übersetzung*, Tokyo: Reiyukai, 1981, p. 47.

8. *Śrāvākācāra* of Amitagati, 6.39ff, p. 316 in the edition *Śrāvākācāra Saṃgraha* vol. 1, ed. Hiralal Siddhantalankar, Sholapur: Sri Jivaraj Jaina Granthamala, 1976. Hemacandra, *Yogaśāstra*, 2.19.13ff, in the edition published from the Jaina Sāhitya Vikas Mandal, 1981.

9. This is reproduced in full in the *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa*, vol. VII, pp.154-455.

10. See R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Medieval Śrāvākācāras*, London

Oriental Series, vol. 14, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 2-3. My edition of the text is edited by Muni Rajendra Vijaya from Disa: Samskara Sahitya Sadan (Gujarat), 1971.

11. Manu, 2.6

12. These references are from Wilhelm Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, Albany: State University of New York, 1991, pp. 98-129, which has the best discussion of the *samsāramocakas* that I have read. My references to Buddhist texts are also from Halbfass.

13. Wilhelm Halbfass, who has discussed some of these references in detail, concluded that there was no evidence for the existence of any such group and that they represent in fact more of a "theoretical possibility" than an historical actuality, based on a rewriting of foreign, perhaps Zoroastrian practices. (Halbfass, *op. cit.*, p. 111.) Halbfass did not mention the *Śrāvaka-prajñapti*, although he was familiar with the Malayagiri commentary as given in the *Abhidhānarājendrakōśa*. Given the detail of the argument in the *Śrāvaka-prajñapti* I am inclined to give the *samsāramocakas* a bit more credence. My own view is that the *Śrāvaka-prajñapti* with its complicated argumentation and fully developed *pūrvapakṣa* for the *samsāramocakas* suggests that in fact they did exist as a coherently defined group that had a well-defined position. This would also be consistent with the fact that in Jayanta, for example, what is attacked is not their behavior as such but the notion that their scriptures are valid. I would argue that had they been a hypothetical *pūrvapakṣa* their views might indeed have been raised and defeated but with far less detail and there would not have been the references to their texts as a body of literature. Some of their practices are also mentioned in the Buddhist texts, where they are said to have filtered into the Buddhist monastic community as well, as we shall see below, and Buddhaghosa when commenting on the appearance of *samsāramocaka* practices amongst the Buddhists allows us to deduce with some conviction that they were a real group of ascetics. Finally, I would argue that it seems natural that the *samsāramocakas* figure most prominently in the Jain texts since their main doctrine was an obvious challenge to the Jain doctrine of *ahimsā*; at the same time since they were non-Vedic they must have travelled in the same circles as the Buddhists and their influence on the Buddhist monastic community seems to me to be a real possibility rather than just a convenient fiction for the sake of argument. To argue as Halbfass does that the *samsāramocakas* are merely a convenient device that the Jains use to bolster their arguments against the legitimacy of the violence of the Vedic sacrifice seems to me to ignore the very context in which the *samsāramocakas* appear, namely a larger effort on the part of the Jains to define themselves as the non-violent religion par excellence in India in which the debate against the violence of the sacrifice may even be omitted. It also does not make sense of Buddhist references to the *samsāramocakas* in Buddhaghosa and the *Pārājika*, which will be treated later in this paper and which Halbfass did not mention.

14. There is a small but useful monograph on non-violence in Jainism that summarizes some of the material from another important *Śrāvakācāra* text, the *Puruṣasiddhyupāya* of Amṛtacandra. This is *Jain Moral Doctrine* by Hari Satya Bhattacharya, Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1976. See in particular pp. 51-56.

15. Nalanda Pāli Series, pp. 84-88.
16. *Samantapāsādikā*, Nalanda Pāli edition, vol. II, 1965, p. 396.
17. See page 399, line 7.
18. *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, ed. Cecil Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Company, 1957, p. 168. See also Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, New York and London: Routledge, 1989, p. 145 for reference to a story from the *Upāyakaṣālyasūtra* in which the Buddha kills a person who is about to kill others. A different viewpoint comes through in the *Mahīśajātaka*, no. 278, in which the Buddha is a bull and a wicked monkey is tormenting him. The goddess of the forest, the *vanadevatā*, suggests that the Buddha put an end to the troublesome creature, at least to prevent him from torturing other bulls in the future. The Buddha prefers to gain merit by enduring the suffering; he says that the monkey will soon be killed by another bull anyway.
19. For my understanding of Jain hells I have relied on the discussion by Pandit Sukhlalji in his commentary to the *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* and the *Śrī Jaina Siddhānta Bola Saṃgraha*. See *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute Series, vol. 44, 1974, pp. 130-140 and *Śrī Jaina Siddhānta Bol Saṃgraha* by Bhairoda Sethiva, Sri Sethiya Jaina Granthamala, vol. 97, Bikaner: Jaina Paramarhika Samstha, 1941, vol. 2, pp. 314ff.
20. For definitions and explanations see the *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* with Pandit Sukhlalji's commentary, p. 320ff.
21. For *upakrama* see the *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, p. 127.
22. There are examples in the Buddhist literature of *arhats* who commit suicide so as not to backslide. See the article by Per Arne Berglie and Carl Sunesson, "Arhatschaft und Selbstmord — zur buddhistischen Interpretation von *cetanabhabba/cetanadharmā* und *atmasamcetana/atmasamcetana*" in Elvind Kars, *Kalyānamitrārāganam*, Norwegian University Press, 1986, pp. 13-49.
23. See verse 87, page 108 in the *Śrāvakācāra Saṃgraha*, vol. 1, edited by Hiralal Siddhantalankara, Sholapur: Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, 1976.
24. Nalanda Pāli edition, p. 99.
25. See the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* with commentary of Śīlāṅka, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Indological Trust, 1978, pp. 264-265.
26. This is pp. 64-66 in volume III of Fausboll's edition in the Pāli Text Society, London: Luzac and Company, 1963. There is a second *jātaka* by the same name, pp. 536-543 of the same volume, but it is unrelated.
27. I am summarizing the account by Buddhaghosa in the *Samantapāsādikā*, Nalanda Pāli Text Series, vol. 1, pp. 33-53. The *Samantapāsādikā* account of the third council was also used by the Burmese author of the *Sāsanavaṃsa*, edited in the Nalanda Pāli Series, pp. 7-9. Although the *Sāsanavaṃsa* gives only the briefest summary of King Aśoka and his fear of his own culpability, it retains the reference to the *Tittirajātaka*.
28. See pp. 728-738 in the reprint from Sankibo, Tokyo.
29. See p. 168.
30. See the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, pp. 59ff.
31. See the references to Śīlāṅka's commentary on the *Suyagaḍḍaṅga* cited earlier and see below. In this way the Jains do at least absolve their monks of the inevitable violence

associated with being alive. There are further cases in which an exception is made for pious acts among the laity, for example building temples, but the Jains remain deeply ambivalent about temple building at least in some of their prescriptive texts as opposed to their story collections, because temple building involves a great degree of violence to living creatures as the ground is broken and the temple stones are laid. See the *Śrāvakaṣraṅgānukāṅkī*, verse 346, and the *Syādvādamañjari*, edited by Jagadiscandra Jain, in the Srimadrajendra Jainasastramala, Varanasi, 1970, p. 90.

32. It is dilemma 45, in the translation p. 16 of vol. II, in the Dover Edition of 1963.

33. Edited by Acarya Sagarānandasuriji Maharaja in the Lala Sundarlal Agamagrāthamala, vol. 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Indological Trust, Delhi, 1978, p. 265.

34. Nalanda Pāli edition p. 98.

35. The *Upālipariṣṭhā, Majjhimanikāya*, Nalanda Pāli edition, vol. 2, p. 43.

36. Bombay, 1929, p. 17.

37. See for example the *Yaśodharacarita* translated by Friedhelm Hardy in the book that I have edited, *The Clever Adulteress and Other Stories*, Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1990.

38. Yaśovijaya in his commentary to Haribhadra's *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, vol. 2, p. 62, explains that this is why the willful abstention from food resulting in death (*sallekhana*) which is the preferred way in which a monk or nun or pious layperson may die is not "*ātmaḥimsā*," or "violence to the self." The person engaging in the fast to death is totally mindful of his or her acts and thus the death fails to meet the definition of violence, in which "unmindfulness" is a key word. The issue of to what extent suicide was considered violence by any of the groups in our debate is an interesting one; there are a number of excellent studies on suicide in Buddhism in contrast to the paucity of good literature on murder. For an overview see the article by Per Arne Berglie and Carl Sunesson, "Arhatschaft und Selbstmord — zur Buddhistischen Interpretation von *cetanabhabba/cetanadharmā* und *attasamcetaṇa/atmasamcetaṇa* in Elvind Kars, *Kalyānamitrārāganam*, Norwegian University Press, 1986, pp. 13-49. There are a number of indications that suicide or voluntary death was not considered by the Buddhists to be an act of violence in the same way that murder was; several monks are described as eager to terminate their lives when they reached a certain stage of attainment, and in some cases the Buddha praises the death as a pious act. Jain criticisms of stories like the *Vyāghrī Jātaka*, as we have seen above, do not focus on the issue of *ātmaḥimsā*, which is not even mentioned, but on the unintentional murder of all the worms in the Buddha's body. I should like to return to this issue in the future.

39. See the *Syādvādamañjari* cited above for just one example.

40. *Śrī Vallabhadigvijaya*, by Gosvami Sri Yadunathji Maharaj, edited in the Sri Vallabha Studies Series, no. 16, Baroda and Delhi: Shri Vallabha Publications, 1985, pp. 39-40.