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Vasubandhu on *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*

by Robert Kritzer

Introduction

The principle of conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is one of the most fundamental and profound of all Buddhist teachings; Louis de la Vallée Poussin points out that it was, in fact, by discovering *pratītyasamutpāda*, that the Buddha became the Buddha (La Vallée Poussin 1913:v). Over the course of time, a formula to express this principle, consisting of gradually increasing numbers of members (*aṅgas*) developed, until finally the 12-membered formula, with which all students of Buddhism are familiar, emerged (for studies of this process, see Aramaki 1986 and 1989). As Takasaki Jikido suggests, we cannot understand this formula in terms of a simple, linear chain of causes, in which each member is caused by a prior member and, in turn, produces a subsequent member. Instead, the members must be divided into groups, and the relationships among the members of each group, as well as the relationships among the various groups, must be examined (Takasaki Jikido 1987:151).

In fact, Buddhist philosophers, from the period of the early *abhidharma* texts onward, have interpreted the formula and explained the relationships among the members and groups of members in various ways, according to the degree of reality they attribute to the constituents of experience and their general understanding of causation. Not surprisingly, thinkers belonging to different schools have come to dramatically different conclusions about conditioned origination; for example, the Sarvāstivādin school, which believes that *dharmas* are real, implies that a real entity is that which has arisen through conditioned origination, while the Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna,

who denies the reality of *dharma*s, says that entities are empty precisely because they arise through conditioned origination (*yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe—Madhyamaka-kārikāḥ* XXIV18ab; *Madhyamakaśāstra*: 220. See also Nagao 1989:5).

Although the Yogācāras, unlike the Mādhyamikas, speak the same abhidharmic language as the Sarvāstivādins in analyzing the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, they too disagree with the Sarvāstivādin interpretation. Again, this is natural, since the Yogācāra school ascribes a greater degree of reality, and hence causal efficacy, to *vijñāna* than to the other *dharma*s, and *vijñāna* is perhaps the most important member of the formula. According to Sarvāstivāda, the members of the formula can be divided into three groups: *avidyā* and *saṃskāra* belong to the past life; *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparsa*, *vedanā*, *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava* to the present; and *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* to the future (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:131). In their “three lifetimes/twofold” (*san shih liang ch’ung*; for a discussion of this subject, see Matsuda 1982a) causation system, the two members from the past life are the cause of the first five members of the present life, which are considered resultant; the last three members of the present life, which are considered causal, are, in turn, the cause of the future life (*AKBh*:134). Thus, the Sarvāstivādins consider *vijñāna* in the formula to be result rather than cause.

The Yogācāras, on the other hand, divide the members differently. According to them, there are four groups of members: the projecting (*ākṣepaka*) group (*avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*); the projected (*ākṣipta*) group (*nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparsa*, and *vedanā*), the actualizing (*abhinirvartaka*) group (*trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*), and the actualized (*abhinirvṛtti*) group (*jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa*) (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*:26). This arrangement is known as the “two lifetimes/single” (*liang shih i ch’ung*) causation system; the projecting group, which belongs to the earlier lifetime, projects the seeds of the later lifetime (namely, the projected group), while the actualizing group, which also belongs to the earlier lifetime, activates these seeds and thus causes the later lifetime to arise (again, see Matsuda 1982a). In this system, *vijñāna* belongs to a causal group of members, and,

although Asaṅga does not explicitly identify it as such here, its function of receiving the impressions of past *karma* and projecting them as the seeds of the next lifetime leaves little doubt that it is, in fact, *ālayavijñāna*.

It is clear, then, that in these two analyses of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, the nature and position of *vijñāna* is particularly significant, and we can suppose, furthermore, that in any similarly abhidharmic discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the treatment of *vijñāna* will give us a clue to the fundamental doctrinal stance of the author. In this paper, I shall examine several conflicting expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in general, and *vijñānāṅga* in particular, all by Vasubandhu, and I shall discuss their broader doctrinal implications.

Part One

In Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa*, Vasubandhu devotes nineteen verses (v. 20-38) to a discussion of conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). During the course of this discussion, we can find two conflicting definitions of consciousness as a member (*aṅga*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is to say, of consciousness conditioned by the karmic forces (*saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*). In verse 21c, consciousness is defined as the *skandhas* at the moment of conception (*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam* — AKBh:131). In his comment in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on verse 28ab, however, Vasubandhu states that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* actually refers to the stream of the “six ordinary kinds of mind” (for translation, see Schmithausen 1987:650) in the intermediate realm, and he cites a *sūtra* definition for support (*karmākṣepavaśāc ca vijñānasantatis tām tām gatim gacchati / jvālāgamanayogenāntarābhavasambandhāt / tadanyasaṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam / evaṃ ca kṛtvā tad upapannaṃ bhavati vijñānāṅganirdeśe “vijñānaṃ katamat? / ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ” iti* — AKBh: 140).

In his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, Louis de la Vallée Poussin does not mention which school accepts the second definition;

in his translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, on the other hand, he attributes it to the Sarvāstivādins: “D’après les Sarvāstivādins, le membre Vijñāna = les six Vijñānas (Manovijñāna, oeil-vijñāna, etc.) de l’existence intermédiaire” (La Vallée Poussin 1929:200). P. S. Jaini makes the same attribution in the introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa*: “The other [i. e., not *pratisamdhivijñāna*] meaning, viz., the six *vijñānas*, although occurring in the *Vibhaṅga-sutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Ābhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibhāṣikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called *antarā-bhava*, where alone the six *vijñānas* could be understood to function” (Jaini 1977:58-59). More recently, Marek Mejer has introduced a translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*’s comment on AKIII28ab, together with the text and translation of the corresponding portion of Sthiramati’s commentary, *Tattvārtha*, as “Vaibhāṣikas on the *pratīyasamutpāda*” (Mejer 1991:96), thus indicating that he, too, considers the six-*vijñānakāya* definition to represent the Sarvāstivādin position.

Although N. H. Samtani has pointed out that the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* identifies another interpretation of the six-*vijñānakāya* definition, in which the six *vijñānas* are described as *saṃskāraparibhāvītāḥ*, as a Sautrāntika view (this is Vasubandhu’s position in another text, the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*; see below), and recognizes that this contradicts Jaini’s opinion, which he quotes, he does not go into the matter any further (AVS, intro.:143-144). Katō Junshō shows that Vasubandhu, in his comment on AKIII28ab, is actually attacking the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation of *pratīyasamutpāda*; according to Katō, Vasubandhu makes this attack in the name of the Sautrāntika. However, he, too, fails to explore Vasubandhu’s interpretation of *vijñāna* in detail (Katō 1989:315-317). In this paper, I hope to show that the first of these two definitions (*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam*) represents the orthodox Sarvāstivādin position, while the second (*vijñānam katamat? ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ*) is Vasubandhu’s own opinion, and I shall try to explain the implications of Vasubandhu’s position.

The Sarvāstivādin Definition — pratisamdhivijñāna

Since the exposition of conditioned origination in the *AK* is rather involved, I shall first explain the context in which each definition occurs. In the beginning of Chapter Three, the Exposition of the Universe (*Iokanirdeśa*), Vasubandhu enumerates the various realms, destinies, etc., into which beings are reborn, and he explains *antarābhava*, the intermediate existence between death and rebirth. He then denies that there is any soul (*ātman*) that is reborn; rather, “the *skandhas* alone, conditioned by defilement and action, enter the womb by way of the series (that is given the name) of the intermediate existence, like a lamp” (*nātmāsti skandhamātraṃ tu kleśakarmābhisamskṛtam / antarābhavasamṭatyā kuḥsim eti pradīpavat* — AKIII18; *AKBh*:129). To explain this conditioning process, whereby defilement and action result in rebirth, and birth, in turn, results in defilement and action, Vasubandhu introduces the topic of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The first definition of *vijñāna* can be found at the beginning of this discussion.

In AKIII20, Vasubandhu states that the twelve members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula can be divided among three lifetimes, and in AKIII21-24, he defines each member as being a “state” (*daśā* or *avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*. However, in verse 25, using the word *kila*, he indicates that he personally disagrees with this interpretation, which he attributes to the Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika school (*āvasthikaḥ kileṣṭo ‘yam* — AKIII25a; *AKBh*: 133. See also La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 66, n. 5). It is among the verses that present the *āvasthika* interpretation that our first definition of *vijñāna* is found.

Thus, Vasubandhu, himself, has identified the first definition as being that of the Sarvāstivādins. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, near the beginning of his comment on verse 28ab, he attacks the entire *āvasthika* interpretation, to which, he says, the Sautrāntikas object, questioning whether it accurately reflects the meaning of *sūtra* (*atra*

tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kiṃ khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭiḥ āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ —AKBh: 136). Moreover, at the end of the same section, he again explicitly identifies everything contained in the *āvasthika* interpretation as *Vaibhāṣika* doctrine (*sa eva tu vaibhāṣikanyāyo yaḥ pūrvam uktaḥ* —AKBh:140), a point noted by de la Vallée Poussin in his translation (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 88).

Similar *āvasthika* interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, including definitions of *vijñānāṅga* resembling that found in AKIII21c, can be traced to earlier Sarvāstivādin texts, although not to the earliest group. I have not found such interpretations in the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, either in early texts, such as the *Dharmaskandha* (*A pi ta mo fa yün tsu lun*), which contains extensive discussions of both *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* and *nāmarūpapratyayaṃ vijñānam* (T. 1537:506c—508b; see Schmithausen 1987:464-465, ns. 1114, 1119), or in later texts, such as the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*A pi ta mo fa chih lun*), which is cited by de la Vallée Poussin as the source of the division of members into three lifetimes (T. 1544: 921b; also, see the earlier translation, *A pi t'an pa chien tu lun*, T. 1543: 775b-c; La Vallée Poussin 1971 v. 2:60, n. 1). Nor does the *Abhidharmāmṛta* (*A pi ta'n kan lu wei lun*), one of the earliest Sarvāstivādin manuals, contain an *āvasthika* interpretation, although it does divide the members among the three lifetimes, as well as classifying each member as *kleśa*, *karma*, or *duḥkha* (T. 1553:970c—971c; Aams:70—73). However, at least three *abhidharma* texts prior to the *Abhidharmakośa* claim that the *āvasthika* interpretation represents the correct understanding of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

The earliest source that I have found is the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T. 1545 — *A pi ta mo ta pi p'o sha lun* ; T. 1546 — *A pi t'an pi p'o sha lun*), which is again cited by de la Vallée Poussin in a footnote to the translation of AK III 21a (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2:62, n. 1). The *Mahāvibhāṣā* first distinguishes its own, *āvasthika*, interpretation from the *kṣaṇika* interpretation of Śarmadatta (*She ma ta to*) and the *sāmbandhika* interpretation of the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* (*A pi ta mo shih shen tsu lun* — T. 1539) (T. 1545:118c—119a; T. 1546:93c—94a).

In the *kṣanika* interpretation, all twelve members are present in a single moment, as in the case of someone who harms a sentient being due to passion: his mental confusion is *avidyā*; his volition is *saṃskāra*; his consciousness (i.e., his awareness of the object of his crime) is *viññāna*, etc. (T. 1545:118c; identical to *AKBh*: 133). According to the *sāmbandhika* interpretation, which de la Vallée Poussin explains as “par la liaison des causes et effets” (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65), a number of members can be present in a single moment: for example, when someone conceives of passion for an object, his ignorance (about the true nature of the object) is *avidyā*; his desire is *saṃskāra*; his discrimination of the object is *viññāna*, etc. But these members do not consist of all five *skandhas*. Some members, on the other hand, do consist of all five *skandhas*: for example, the arising of all the *skandhas* in the new lifetime is *jāti*, and their deterioration is *jarāmaraṇa*. But these members do not occupy a single moment (T. 1545:118c).

According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s own interpretation, each member refers to the five *skandhas* at a different moment; this is clearly the same *āvasthika* system described in *AKIII*21-24. Its definition of *viññāna*, however, appears somewhat different at first glance. According to Hsüan-tsang's translation, *viññāna* is the *pratisaṃdhicitta* (*hsü hsin*), together with its accompaniment (*chu pan*), which the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* explains as the remaining four *skandhas* (T. 1545:118c; *KIK*, *Bidonbu*, v. 8: 9, n. 19). The earlier translation (attributed to *Kātyāyanīputra*) has *hsiang hsü hsin* instead of *hsü hsin*, which is not significantly different (T. 1546:94a). Nor, I think, is there any difference in meaning between this *pratisaṃdhicitta* and the *saṃdhiskandhas* of *AKIII*21; according to the *āvasthika* system, the five *skandhas* at this point in the development of the new life can be called *viññāna* (or *citta*, since the terms are synonymous here; see *AKII*34ab; *AKBh*:69), because *viññāna* is the predominant element (*AKIII*25b; *AKBh*:133). Vasubandhu perhaps condensed the expression *metri causa*, and Yaśomitra, judging from his comment on Vasubandhu's second definition (*samskārapratyayaṃ viññānaṃ pratisaṃdhicittam evābhipretaṃ syāt* — *AKVy*: 299), considers the expressions identical.

Similar to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s definition are those of the **Abhidharmahr̥dayasūtra* (*A pi t'an hsin lun ching*) and the **Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya*, or **Kṣudrakābhidharmahr̥daya*, (*Tsa a pi t'an hsin lun*). The **Abhidharmahr̥dayasūtra* defines *viññāna* as the *pratisamdhicitta* (*hsiang hsü hsin*) together with its associates (T. 1551:860c). The **Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya* defines it as the present *saṃtati* (*hsien tsai hsiang hsin*), which here seems to be equivalent to the five *skandhas* at the first moment of the present life, since the next member, *nāmarūpa*, is defined in the following way: "that *saṃtati*, (after) it already (exists), and while the six *āyatana*s are not completely differentiated, is called *nāmarūpa*" (*pi hsiang hsü i liu ju fen wei man shuo ming se* — T. 1552:935b).

The **Abhidharmahr̥daya* or **Abhidharmasāra* (*A pi t'an hsin lun*) also agrees with the *Mahāvibhāṣā* in maintaining that the twelve members of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula refer to twelve sets, or states, of the *skandhas* and that the formula should not be understood in terms of a single moment. Its definition of *viññāna*, on the other hand, is rather surprising; it states that *viññāna* is the *bījacitta* produced by the previous member, *saṃskāra* (*pi sheng chung hsin shih shih* — T. 1550:827a). This would seem to support Mizuno Kōgen's statement that the **Abhidharmahr̥daya* sometimes contains doctrines that diverge from orthodox Sarvāstivāda (Mizuno 1961:73). Although Willemen does not comment on it in his translation, this definition deserves further exploration, especially since the term *chung hsin*, or *chung shih*, is a synonym for *ālayaviññāna* in some *viññaptimātratā* texts (Nakamura 1975:650).

All of the *abhidharma* texts mentioned above define *viññānāṅga* as the initial moment of the present lifetime and as the karmic link between the past life and the present. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, **Abhidharmahr̥dayasūtra*, and **Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya*, moreover, this *viññāna* cannot possibly be the six *viññānakāyas* because, as we discover from the definitions of the following *aṅgas*, the six sense organs are not yet present at the moment referred to as *viññāna*. Furthermore, although the *Dharmaskandha*, which is much earlier than *Mahāvibhāṣā*, defines *saṃskārapratyayaṃ viññānam* as the six *viññānas* (but not in the *antarābhava* — T. 1537:507a), in none of

these post-*Mahāvibhāṣā* texts, to the best of my knowledge, is *viññānāṅga* ever defined as the six *viññānakāyas*, nor is the definition from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* that is quoted by Vasubandhu in his comment on AKIII28ab ever discussed. Thus, I have found no evidence suggesting that the Sarvāstivādins, from the period of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, interpreted *viññānāṅga* as the six *viññānakāyas* in the intermediate existence, while there are a number of Vaibhāṣika texts that present the *āvasthika* interpretation as orthodox, not to mention the fact that Vasubandhu, himself, identifies it as Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Further confirmation can be found in Saṃghabhadra's two texts, **Nyāyānusāra* (*A pi ta mo shun cheng li lun*) and **Abhidharmapitakaprakaraṇaśāsanaśāstra* or **Samayapradīpika* (*A pi ta mo tsang hsien tzung lun*). In both texts, Saṃghabhadra quotes Vasubandhu's gloss on verse 21c and continues with a further explanation: "In the mother's womb, at the time of conception, the five *skandhas* in a momentary state are called Consciousness because, at this moment, consciousness is the most prominent (of the *skandhas*. This consciousness) is only *manoviññāna* because, in this state, the causes of the production of the (other) five *viññānas* (i. e., the sense organs) are not yet possessed" (*yü mu t'ai teng chen chieh sheng shih i ch'a na wu yün ming shih. tz'u ch'a na chung shih tsui sheng ku. tz'u wei i shih yü tz'u wei ching wu shih sheng yüan yu wei chü ku.* — T. 1562:484b; also, T. 1563:841a). Again, in neither of these texts could I find the six-*viññānakāyas* definition.

Vasubandhu's Definition in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*—The Six *viññānas* in the Intermediate Realm

In order to show that the six-*viññānakāyas* definition in fact represents Vasubandhu's own opinion in *AKBh*, I must begin by summarizing his rather long and complicated comment on AKIII28ab: "The origination is the cause; that which originates is the result" (*hetur atra samutpādaḥ samutpannaṃ phalaṃ matam* — *AKBh*:136).

Vasubandhu explains the verse, saying that all the members are both *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpanna*. He then mentions the differing opinion of a Sthavira Pūrṇāśa, who adduces four reasons to prove that that which is *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot be *pratītyasamutpanna* (AKBh:136).

It is at this point that Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the criticism of the *āvasthika* interpretation, mentioned above, according to which nothing of the sort can be found in the *sūtras*. There follows an argument between the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivādin concerning the authority and completeness of the *sūtra* definitions of the members of the formula. In the course of this argument the Sarvāstivādin maintains that they are not complete and the meaning is not clear (*na vai sarvaṃ nirdeśato nītārthaṃ bhavati*). The Sautrāntika, who has the last word in this dispute, states that the *sūtra* is, in fact, complete (*evam ihāpy avidyādināṃ paripūrṇa eva nirdeśaḥ na sāvaśeṣaḥ*), and he proceeds to point out the logical flaws in the *āvasthika* interpretation: “Why do you introduce something of a different kind (other than *avidyā*; i. e., the five *skandhas*) into (your definition of) *avidyā*? Although the five *skandhas* are found in these ‘states,’ only that (entity) whose existence or non-existence determines the existence or non-existence of some (other entity, i. e., the following member) can be established as a member. Although the *arhat* possesses the five *skandhas*, he does not have any *saṃskāras* (that, according to your interpretation would have to be) caused by the five *skandhas*. Why (not)? Because (the *saṃskāras* that constitute *saṃskārāṅga*) are only caused by *avidyā* (which the *arhat* does not have). Likewise, (he does not have) any *viññāna* that goes to good, bad or immovable destinies, or *ṭṣṇā*, *upādāna*, etc. (Therefore,) the meaning of the *sūtra* is just as was stated (in the *sūtra*)” (*jātyantarasya tv avidyāyāṃ kimkṛtaḥ prakṣepaḥ / yady api ca tāsav avasthāsu pañcaskandhā vidyante yasya tu bhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvaniyamaḥ tad evāṅgaṃ vyavasthāpayitum / saty api ca pañcaskandhake saṃskārā na bhavanti pañcaskandhahetukāḥ / kim tarhi / avidyāhetukā eva / tathā puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyopagaṃ ca viññānaṃ na bhavati ṭṣṇopādānādayaś ceti / yathānirdeśa eva sūtrārthaḥ — AKBh:137; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2:76). Yaśomitra explains*

that the *vijñāna* here is *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* (AKVy:293).

The point of this argument seems to be that, if the members of the formula are defined as states of the *skandhas*, the *arhat* would still be ensnared in *samsāra*, simply because he still possesses the *skandhas*. However, we know that the *arhat* is able to reverse the samsaric process precisely because he destroys the first member, *avidyā*. Thus, although he possesses the *skandhas* until his death, he does not produce the conditions for rebirth and the continuation of *samsāra*.

Vasubandhu next returns to the four points of Pūrṇāśa, refuting the first of them, and then discusses the question of whether *pratīyasamutpāda* is *asaṃskṛta*. This in turn leads into an etymological discussion of the term, *pratīyasamutpāda*, which is followed by various opinions regarding the question of why the Buddha expressed the principle of conditioned origination in two ways: *asmin satīdam bhavati* and *asyotpādād idam utpadyate*.

Finally, Vasubandhu offers his own interpretation of the formula. As Katō has remarked, although Vasubandhu rejects in principle *āvasthikapratīyasamutpāda* and treats the formula largely in terms of a theory of cognition, his definitions of *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, and the *ṣaḍāyatanas* are not inconsistent with an embryological interpretation, which is how Katō characterizes *āvasthikapratīyasamutpāda* (Katō 1989:315). While Vasubandhu does not define these members as states of the *skandhas*, he does trace the early development of the new being from its beginning as consciousness, mentally projected by the past life, through the appearance of the other three mental *skandhas*, together with *rūpaskandha* (i.e., *nāmarūpa*), to the development of the six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*). However, as I showed at the beginning of this paper, for Vasubandhu, *vijñāna* does not refer only to the moment of *pratisaṃdhi* consciousness; rather, it encompasses the series of *vijñānas* that constitute the intermediate existence between one life and the next, as well as the moment of rebirth into the next life. This interpretation of the definition from the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*, which he quotes here (*vijñānaṃ katamat / ṣaḍvijñānakāyā iti* — *AKBh*:140), can be justified because, according to *abhidharma*, the sense organs are all present in the intermediate existence (*sakalākṣaṇ* — *AKIII*14c; *AKBh*:125), and thus conscious-

ness can include all six *viññānakāyas* (it is to this abhidharmic rule that Jaini alludes in the passage quoted above). If, on the other hand, explains Yaśomitra, the *sūtra* had intended for *viññānāṅga* to refer exclusively to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it would have said, “What is *viññāna*? *Manovijñāna*,” because, at the moment of conception, only *manovijñāna* is present, not the other five *viññānas* (*evaṃ tu vaktavyaṃ syāt / viññānaṃ katamat / manovijñānam iti / na hi pratisaṃdhikṣane pañcaviññānakāyasambhavo 'sti / manovijñānenaiva pratisaṃdhibandhāt — AKVy:299*). Yaśomitra then quotes from AKIII42a-c to support his claim that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* can only be *manovijñāna*, a point on which Vasubandhu and the Sarvāstivādins agree (see Saṃghabhadra’s comment, quoted above).

Curiously, Saṃghabhadra does not, as far as I can tell, comment on this portion of *AKBh*. The Chinese commentator, P’u Kung, on the other hand, does. In his *Chu she lun chi*, P’u Kuang first explains that Vasubandhu’s intention is to include both the stream of *viññānas* in the intermediate realm and the *upapattibhava*, which is equivalent to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, in his definition of *viññānāṅga*: “This *viññāna* passes through both the intermediate realm and the moment of conception. Although the moment of conception is only *manovijñāna*, in the state of the intermediate realm, (this *viññāna*) produces all six *viññānas*” (*tz’u shih t’ung yü chung sheng erh yu. sheng yu sui wei i shih yü chung yu wei t’ung ch’i liu shih.*). Then, after quoting Vasubandhu’s approval of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*’s definition of *viññāna* as the *ṣaḍviññānakāyas*, P’u Kuang states, “If one relies on the Sarvāstivādins, *viññānāṅga* is only the single moment of *upapattibhava* and does not pass through the intermediate realm; therefore, (for them) it is only *manovijñāna*” (*jo i shuo i ch’ieh yu pu shih chih sui sheng yu i ch’a na pu t’ung ch’ung yu ku wei i shih — T. 1821:172c*). Clearly, P’u Kuang believes that Vasubandhu disagrees with orthodox Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

I have puzzled over Vasubandhu’s locating *viññānāṅga* in the intermediate realm, since I have found no other independent text in which it is similarly placed. Perhaps one could say that Vasubandhu here is trying to modify the Sarvāstivādins’ unequivocal identification of *viññāna* with the present life, but his commentators (see P’u

Kuang, quoted immediately above; see also AKVy:299; Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha*, quoted in Mejer 1991:101-102) understand him to include the moment of *pratisaṃdhi* into the present life as well, and it seems to me that, in terms of causation, the intermediate realm is more closely related to the present life than to the past. I can only conclude that his purpose here is simply to provide a rationalization for adopting the *sūtra* definition; as I have mentioned above, placing *viññāna* in the intermediate realm is the simplest way for him to justify the six-*viññānakāya* definition in abhidharmic terms. In the second part of this paper, I shall speculate on Vasubandhu's reasons for adopting this definition.

Vasubandhu's Definition in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* —
saṃskāraparibhāvitāḥ ṣaḍviññānakāyāḥ

Like P'u Kuang, Vīryaśrīdatta, also draws attention to the difference between two definitions of *viññānāṅga*, in a passage of the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*. (This passage corresponds to a portion of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, in which Vasubandhu quotes the view of an opponent whom he will soon refute [Honjō 1989:173]; Vīryaśrīdatta, on the other hand, seems to approve of this view.) The *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, itself, contains the text of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* and hence the six-*viññānakāya* definition, but Vīryaśrīdatta, who, according to Mejer, follows the Kashmirian Vaibhāṣikas (Mejer 1991:18), points out that elsewhere *saṃskārapratyayaṃ viññānam* is identified with *pratisaṃdhiviññāna*, and he quotes AKIII21c (*saṃdhiskandhās tu viññānam*). He also refers to the well-known *sūtra* statement, according to which *nāmarūpa* could not solidify into a fetus if *viññāna* did not descend into the mother's womb (*Dīgha Nikāya* II 63; quoted in La Vallée Poussin 1913:12), and understands it to imply that *viññāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula refers to *pratisaṃdhiviññāna* and hence can only be *manoviññāna*.

He then points out the discrepancy between this interpretation

and the definition in the *AVS*, but he argues that there is no contradiction (*virodha*). According to him, the *AVS* (i.e., the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra*) definition is overly broad and not specific to the context of rebirth; therefore, he says, it is not *lākṣaṇika*. To support this assertion, he compares the *sūtra* definitions of *vijñāna* and the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa* and shows that, in the case of *rūpa*, too, the *sūtra* likewise gives an all-inclusive definition that does not pertain to the specific context of *vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam*. Furthermore, he states that the *lākṣaṇika* definition is to be found elsewhere, i. e., in the verse of *AK*.

However, *Vīryaśrīdatta* is also able to rationalize the *sūtra* definition; that is to say, he is able to understand it in the context of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula. He mentions by name the *Sautrāntikas*, who, he says, believe that the *vijñāna* conditioned by the *saṃskāras* is not *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* but rather the six *vijñānas*, which are permeated by the *saṃskāras* (*sautrāntikamatena tv avirodha eva / yasmāt tasya saṃskāraparibhāvitāḥ ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam iṣṭam na pratisaṃdhivijñānam eveti* — *AVSN*:118-119; Honjō 1989:67-69). This passage is significant because it is the only explicit attribution of a six-*vijñānakāya* definition to the *Sautrāntikas* that I have found. However, the interpretation of the six *vijñānakāyas* here as *saṃskāraparibhāvita* is not identical to *Vasubandhu*'s interpretation in *AKBh*, according to which they are the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate realm; I shall discuss the differences later in the paper. Moreover, as Honjō has noted, there are many passages in *AVSN* that correspond to *Vasubandhu*'s *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*, including the first part of this one (Honjō 1989: 173), and it is to this text, and not to the *AKBh*, that *Vīryaśrīdatta* is referring when he mentions the opinion of the *Sautrāntikas* in the above passage.

In the *PSVy*, which has been studied notably by *Matsuda Kazunobu*, *Muroji Gijin*, and *Lambert Schmithausen*, *Vasubandhu* includes a long (folios 17a5 - 26b5 in the Peking edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*) discussion of *vijñānāṅga*, in which he mentions the view of certain "others" (*gzhan dag*) who maintain that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* in the mother's womb (see above

concerning the correspondence between this passage and AVSN). Schmithausen has identified a passage, beginning with f. 20b4 (Schmithausen 1987:467, n. 1128) and continuing to f. 22b4, in which Vasubandhu refutes this view as being inconsistent with both *sūtra* (*mdo sde dang 'gal* — f. 20b6-f. 21b8) and reason (*rigs pa dang 'gal* — f. 21b8-f. 22b4). Among the several opinions that Vasubandhu attacks is the one quoted with approval in AVSN, to the effect that the *pratisamdhivijñāna* definition is *lākṣaṇika* and the six-*vijñānakāya* definition *abhiprāyika*, and that the *śāstra* definition does not contradict the *sūtra* definition (PSVy:f. 20b7-21a2).

Vasubandhu ridicules this position, saying that the two definitions are indeed irreconcilable. He shows that, in the case of the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa*, the *sūtra* definition, namely that *rūpa* consists of the four *mahābhūtas* and the four *upādāyarūpas*, and the *śāstra* definition, presumably that *rūpa* is the material portion of the embryo, are compatible since the embryonic *rūpa* does, in fact, consist of the *mahābhūtas* and the *upādāyarūpas*. In the case of *vijñāna*, however, the six *vijñānakāyas* are not present at the moment of conception, so *śāstra* contradicts *sūtra* (*nying mtshams sbyor ba na rnam par shes pa gang yin pa de rnam par shes pa 'i tshogs drug ma yin pas / 'dir chos 'dra ba ci yod / 'dir ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa bstan pa brtsams pa yin pas zla la ci 'i phyir bya* — PSVy:f. 21a3-4; see also Wayman and Wayman 1974:55n., where this passage is referred to; however, I am not sure whether Wayman understands it in the same way that I do).

Instead, Vasubandhu here defines *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* as *vijñāna* (i. e., the six *vijñānakāyas*) permeated by the *saṃskāras* (*de ltar na 'du byed kyis yongs su bsgos pa rnam par shes pa de nyid 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis yin gyi nying mtsham sbyor ba 'i rnam par shes pa ni ma yin no* — PSVy: f. 23a1-2). Schmithausen describes this *vijñāna* as follows: “the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impressions of karma and — by continuously propagating itself along with this impression — becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*)” (Schmithausen 1987:253, n. 51).

Furthermore, although Vasubandhu rejects the Vaibhāṣika asser-

tion that the six-*viññānakāya* definition is *abhiprāyika* while the *pratisamdhiviññāna* definition is *lākṣanika*, he, too, as Matsuda points out (Matsuda 1982b:63-64), considers the *sūtra* definition to be intentional: according to him, *samskārapratyayaṃ viññānam* is ultimately the stream of *ālayaviññāna* permeated by the *samskāras* ('*dir don nyid gang zhe na / 'du byed kyis yongs su bsgos pa'i kun gzhi nam par shes pa'i rgyun yongs su gyur pas yang srid 'byung bar nus pa ni 'dir 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis nam par shes pa yin par dgongs pa yin no* — PSVy:f. 24a1-2; Matsuda 1982b:64). The remainder of Vasubandhu's discussion of *viññānāṅga* concerns *ālayaviññāna*, the discussion of which, according to Matsuda, is similar to that found in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, yet another text by Vasubandhu (Matsuda 1982a:44).

Part Two

In all interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the context of rebirth, *viññāna* is the most important member, since it is exactly at *viññāna* that the karmic legacy of one life passes on to the next. However, as we have seen, different interpretations disagree regarding two interrelated questions: to what stage in the rebirth process does *viññānāṅga* correspond; and what is its causal nature — is it cause, result, or both cause and result? All three answers to the second question have been proposed in one text or another during the history of the exegesis of the formula (for an example of a text that takes *viññānāṅga* to be both cause and effect, see Alex Wayman's description of Tsong kha pa's interpretation — Wayman 1984:181-185).

As I have shown above, *viññāna*, in the Sarvāstivādin system, refers to the first moment of the present lifetime, and it is result (*phala*), since it is based on *kleśa* and *karma* (AK III 26ab; AKBh:134). There is some disagreement as to whether or not *viññāna* is *vipāka*. According to the Sarvāstivādins, it is not, because for them, *pratisamdhi* is always defiled (*upapattibhavaḥ kliṣṭaḥ* — AK III 38a;

AKBh:151), while *vipāka* must be morally neutral (*vipāko* ‘vyākṛto dharmah — AK II 57a; AKBh:95). However, as Schmithausen has shown, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is, in fact, considered to be *vipāka* in Theravādin *abhidharma*, in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, and in parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Schmithausen 1987:38;307 ns. 256-257). On the other hand, certain Yogācāra texts, for example *Ch’eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585:19a; La Vallée Poussin 1929:217) and *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* (MS:15; Lamotte 1973:53-54), have adduced the defiled nature of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* as proof that it could not be *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*, which, according to them, must be *vipāka* and hence neutral. Regardless of the moral nature of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, there is certainly nothing about it that suggests the strongly causal and projecting qualities of the six *vijñānakāyas*, permeated by the *saṃskāras*, as described by Vasubandhu in *PSVy*.

In the *PSVy*, Vasubandhu locates *vijñāna* in the prior lifetime, and, by calling it *saṃskāraparibhāvita*, he shows that, rather than being a resultant entity, projected by *karma* into the next life, it is a causal entity, whose ability to project the next life is conditioned by *karma*. As for *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it is, according to *PSVy*, the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the present life (*mdo sde ’di las mam par shes pa’i rkyen gyis phung po lnga pa’i ming dang gzugs bstan pas nying mtshams sbyor ba’i rnam par shes pa de ji ltar de dang lhan cig byung ba’i ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du rung* — *PSVy* f. 21b4; Schmithausen 1987:467 n. 1128).

The general similarities between the explanations of *pratityasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *PSVy* have been noted by Matsuda (Matsuda 1982a:47-48), and the interpretations of *vijñāna*, in particular, coincide in substance. According to the *AS*, *vijñāna*, which is considered a projecting (*ākṣepaka*) member of the formula and hence belongs to the prior life, “supports the bond of beings’ actions” (*sattvānāṃ karmabandhaṃ ca dhārayati* — *AS*: 25); the *ASBh* explains that this is “because it arises simultaneously with the impressions produced by the Karmic Forces” (*saṃskārāhitavāsanāsaḥotpatteḥ* — *ASBh*:32). This seems to be the same function that is implicit in Vasubandhu’s *vijñāna* permeated by the *saṃskāras*. Furthermore, “it is the condition of Individual

Existence" (*pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya* — AS:25), because "Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of consciousness into the mother's womb" (*mātuḥ kuṣṣau vijñānāvakraṅtyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt* — ASBh:32). The consciousness mentioned by the ASBh here must be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and, being associated with the later lifetime, cannot be the same as the *vijñāna* that arises simultaneously with the karmic impressions. In the immediately following description of the function of *nāmarūpa*, which "makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence" (*ātmabhāvaṃ ca sattvān grāhayati* — AS:25), the identification of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* with the initiation of *nāmarūpa*, similar to that in PSVy, becomes clear.

Thus, both Asaṅga in AS and Vasubandhu in PSVy recognize two types of consciousness, a causal one, which is identified (at least provisionally) with the six *vijñānakāyas*, and a fruitional one, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, which is not considered *saṃskārapratyaya* and which is associated with *nāmarūpa*. The idea that the six *vijñānas* can be permeated by the *saṃskāras*, which has been attributed to the Sautrāntikas (see AVSN:118-119, quoted above; also, La Vallée Poussin 1929: 217), is criticized in certain Yogācāra texts that explicitly teach *ālayavijñāna*, for example, *Trimśikābhāṣya* (TrBh:38) and *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T.1585:19a; La Vallée Poussin 1929:217), in order to prove that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* must be *ālayavijñāna*. However, a similar notion appears in the *pratīyasamutpāda* section of an earlier Yogācāra text, the *Savitarkā-savicārabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: "For example, a person in the past has performed and accumulated acts, whether meritorious, unmeritorious, or immovable (*āniñjya*), whether physical, verbal, or mental, which are conditioned by ignorance. His consciousness, accompanied by those acts, continues to exist up to the moment of death and becomes the cause of the consciousness at the moment of conception" (*yathāpīhaikyena pūrvam aviduṣāvidyāgate-nāvidyāpratyaṃ punyāpunyāniñjyaṃ kāyavānmanahkarma kṛtaṃ bhavaty upacitaṃ / tatkarmopagaṃ* [Schmithausen's correction from the manuscript of Bhattacharya's *tatkarmopabhogaṃ*; Schmithausen 1987:472 n. 1153] *cāsyā vijñānam āmaraṇasamayād anuvṛtaṃ*

bhavati pratisandhivijñānahetubhūtaṃ — *YBh*:198-199; also, Schmithausen 1987:178). As for *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it is explicitly called *vipākavijñāna*, and it is said to be conditioned by the causal consciousness. The relationship between this *vipākavijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is explained in terms of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* (*YBh*:199).

Schmithausen, who considers this passage to predate a systematized notion of *ālayavijñāna*, emphasizes that both the causal and the *vipāka* consciousnesses here are the series “consisting of one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of *vijñāna*” (Schmithausen 1987:178). However, he does not suggest that it therefore represents a non-Yogācāra, for example, a Sautrāntika, doctrine. According to Schmithausen, the earliest Yogācāra thought, which he says is found in portions of the *YBh*, does not encompass a fully developed theory of *ālayavijñāna*, explicitly identified as such. This raises the question of the development of Yogācāra doctrine and its relationship to the Sautrāntika school, a question that is very pertinent to the study of texts such as *AKBh* and *AS*. Vasubandhu, whose name is associated with both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, of course figures critically in any discussion of the relationship between them.

There are many different opinions regarding Vasubandhu, especially concerning his dates and to how many people his name refers, but Hirakawa Akira, in his introduction to the Index to the *Abhidharmakośa*, summarizes the most commonly held views regarding his philosophical beliefs: “It is generally accepted among scholars that the author of the *Kośa* was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda School, but his thoughts were closer to those of the Sautrāntika School. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika School is based on ‘the *prajñapti*,’ which includes the teaching of *bija*; therefore, the developed form of this doctrine can be related to the doctrine of *Vijñānavāda*. It does not necessarily mean that the Sautrāntika School itself developed into the *Vijñānavāda*, but it can be easily assumed that the author of the *Kośa* belonged to the Sautrāntika School [and] later changed to the *Vijñānavāda*, for there is a certain common ground between the doctrines” (Hirakawa 1973:xi-xii). According to this way of thinking, Vasubandhu wrote the *AKBh*

when he was a Sautrāntika, the *Triṃśikā* when he was a Yogācāra, and texts like the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and the *PSVy* at some time in between, while he was presumably in the process of conversion from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra. For example, Muroji suggests just such a development (Muroji 1985:[2]), while Matsuda implies something similar when he states that the *ālayavijñāna* that is expounded in *PSVy* and *KS* is different from that of the Yogācāra school since it is “tinged with a Sautrāntika hue” (Matsuda 1982a:44).

This model of Vasubandhu’s literary and philosophical development is largely based on two types of evidence: traditional accounts of his life and the contents of his writings. According to Mejer, the reliable information in the Chinese and Tibetan biographies and historical sources “may be summarized in two points: 1) Vasubandhu’s composition of the *Abhidharmakośa-karikā* and *bhāṣya* and a subsequent controversy with a Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika master, Saṅghabhadra, 2) Vasubandhu’s conversion to Mahāyāna under the influence of his elder brother Asaṅga” (Mejer 1991:7). As for the content of his works, in the *AKBh*, as is well known, Vasubandhu frequently criticizes Vaibhāṣika positions, while supporting positions that he identifies as, or we know from other sources to be, Sautrāntika. In works such as *PSVy* and *KS* (to summarize Lamotte on the latter), Vasubandhu, although he mentions *ālayavijñāna*, does not propose a doctrine of consciousness-only; furthermore, he quotes almost exclusively from non-Mahāyāna *sūtras*, mentions the opinions mostly of non-Mahāyāna schools and teachers, and takes recognizably Sautrāntika positions on a number of important issues (Lamotte 1935-36:176-179). Finally, in *Triṃśikā*, his exposition is clearly and classically Yogācāra.

There may, however, be another way to explain why Vasubandhu asserts a “Sautrāntika” position, at least in our case of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. Before I come to this, it is necessary to discuss briefly two differing opinions regarding the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a text that precedes Vasubandhu and with which he was presumably acquainted (concerning the question of the relationship between *YBh* and *AKBh*, see Yamabe 1990, in which the possibility of Vasubandhu’s *bija* theory being traceable back to

YBh is raised).

In his monumental work, *Ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen, in the course of trying to explain the context in which the Yogācāra concept of *ālayavijñāna* first arose, concludes that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is probably “a compilation consisting of several (or at least two) heterogeneous (or at any rate chronologically distinct) layers” (Schmithausen 1987:13), rather than the work of a single author. He goes on to identify three layers of the text: an oldest layer, in which there is no reference to *ālayavijñāna*; a middle layer, in which there are occasional references to *ālayavijñāna*, but no reference to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*; and the newest layer, in which *ālayavijñāna* is discussed in detail and the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is fully utilized (Schmithausen 1987:14). The assumption that underlies Schmithausen’s view of the stratification of *Yogācārabhūmi* is that, roughly speaking, the less mention of *ālayavijñāna* and reference to Mahāyāna *sūtra* there is, the older the layer. Aramaki Noritoshi, on the other hand, in a personal communication, takes a different approach in determining the strata of the text. Aramaki agrees with Schmithausen regarding the portions comprising the oldest layer, but he takes issue with his identification of the other two layers, locating some portions containing *Samdhinirmocana* material and detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna* in the middle layer and some portions containing scant mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the newest layer. According to Aramaki’s theory, his middle layer contains the Yogācāra exposition of ultimate truth (*paramārthavyavasthāna*), namely the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, while the newest layer contains an exposition of provisional truth (*samvṛtivyavasthāna*), which presupposes *ālayavijñāna* theory. In this layer, Aramaki sees the origin of the Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

In the case of Vasubandhu’s texts, as well as Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*, we are dealing with a different situation. All of these texts belong to a later period than even the newest layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; each is composed by a single, identifiable author, and by the time these works were written, the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* was no longer in the early stages of the process of formation. Nonetheless, Aramaki’s distinction

between *paramārvhavyavasthāna* and *saṃvṛtivyavasthāna* can perhaps help us understand the intention of these texts.

First, let us consider the two works of Asaṅga. The purpose of *Mahāyānasamgraha* is specifically to expound the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, or, to use Aramaki's terminology, the *Yogācāra paramārvhavyavasthāna*, and it contains systematic proofs and elaborations. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, while it occasionally mentions the term, does not expound *ālayavijñāna* in detail. Rather, as I hope to show in forthcoming work on this text, Asaṅga, having already worked out a philosophical system based on *ālayavijñāna*, attempts in *AS* to produce an *abhidharma*, a *saṃvṛtivyavasthana*, consonant with, and supportive of, his *paramārvhavyavasthāna*. In the case of Asaṅga's interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, his two-lifetime (*liang shih i ch'ung*) system, in which the causal *vijñāna* of the past life projects the seeds of the present life, only makes sense if *vijñānāṅga* is really *ālayavijñāna*. However, since his purpose is to explain the twelve-membered formula and not to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, Asaṅga sees no need to mention it by name. This is in contrast to MS I.33, where, as one of a number of proofs of *ālayavijñāna*, he states that *saṃskārapratīyayaṃ vijñānam* can only be *ālayavijñāna* (MS:15; Lamotte 1973:53).

Similarly, although he eloquently expounds *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñāptimatratā* in *Triṃśikā*, Vasubandhu is writing for different purposes in *ASBh* and *PSVy*. *PSVy* is a commentary on a *sūtra*, the *Fen pieh yüan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching* (T. 717; referred to by Matsuda as the **Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* [Matsuda 1982a:42]), the subject of which, as its name suggests, is *pratītyasamutpāda*, and Vasubandhu, in commenting on it, does not have to refer to *vijñāptimātra* theory, even though he uses the term *ālayavijñāna*. The fact that he does not mention the system of eight *vijñānas* need not mean that he does not believe in it, contrary to Matsuda (Matsuda 1982a:44). Nor does his accepting on the level of "intentional meaning" the identification of *vijñānāṅga* with the six *saṃskāraparibhāvavijñānas* a position associated by some (see above) with the Sautrāntika school, while rejecting the Sarvāstivādin

identification of it with *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, prove that he is himself a Sautrāntika, at least in the sense of accepting the doctrines of other teachers, such as Śrīlāta, who are designated as Sautrāntikas. Recently, Honjō Yoshifumi, in an article that explores a number of points raised by Katō Junshō in his book on Sautrāntika (Katō 1989), has suggested the possibility that Vasubandhu was the proponent of a Mahāyāna Sautrāntika doctrine, distinguishable from the “orthodox,” Hīnayāna Sautrāntika of Śrīlāta (Honjō 1990). My own, very tentative, theory is that Vasubandhu espouses Sautrāntika or Sautrāntika-like ideas for the purpose of constructing Yogācāra *abhidharma*; this is, perhaps, not so different from Honjō’s proposal. In any case, by contrasting the *abhipraya* of the *saṃskāraparibhāvita* *vijñānas* with *ālayavijñāna*, Vasubandhu implies that, for him, *ālayavijñāna* belongs to the realm of ultimate truth while the six *vijñānas* belong to that of provisional truth.

To return to the *AKBh*, there is some question in my mind as to whether or not Vasubandhu’s definition of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in his comment on *AK III 28ab* is substantially the same as his definition in *PSVy*. At first glance, they appear somewhat different. In *AKBh*, Vasubandhu does not use the expression *saṃskāraparibhāvita* to describe *vijñāna*, and this expression, with its connotations of *bija*-theory, is one of the most striking features of his discussion in *PSVy*. Furthermore, in *PSVy*, he does not mention the intermediate realm, in which he locates at least a portion of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the *AKBh*. Although Sthiramati, in his commentary on *AKBh*, calls the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate realm *karmaparibhāvita* (Mejor 1991:101-102), he is perhaps, under the influence of what Vasubandhu says in *PSVy*, reading too much into *AKBh*. More important is the fact that, in *AKBh*, Vasubandhu, as I mention above, has been understood by his commentators to include *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, along with the stream of the six *vijñānas* in *antarābhava*, in his definition of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. This would seem to be inconsistent with the causal nature ascribed to *vijñāna* in *PSVy* as well as with the statement that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the later lifetime.

However, *AKBh* is again quite a different type of text than either *Trs* or *PSVy*. Although in verse VIII40ab Vasubandhu claims to have presented an *abhidharma* system largely in agreement with the Vaibhāṣika school (*kāśmūravaibhāṣikanūṭisiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṃ kathito 'bhidharmaḥ* — *AKBh*:459; quoted by Mejer, who takes this verse to mean that Vasubandhu's own doctrinal standpoint agreed with that of the Vaibhāṣikas [Mejer 1991:19]), it is well known that he rejects the Sarvāstivādin position on many crucial points. Nevertheless, even if the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* is correct in assuming, as Jaini puts it, that “the *Kośa* is not an authentic Vaibhāṣika treatise but only a mouth-piece of the Mahāyānist Vasubandhu disguised as a Vaibhāṣika āchārya” (Jaini 1977:129), his intention in writing *AKBh* is not to expound Mahāyāna, specifically Yogācāra, doctrine, even less so than it is in *PSVy* or *KS*. In the case of his discussion of *pratīyasamutpāda*, Vasubandhu seems mostly concerned with undermining the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation and with promoting the *Pratīyasamutpādasūtra* as scriptural authority. Having established in the *AKBh* that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the six *vijñānakāyas* without using any suspiciously Yogācāra terminology such as *paribhāvita*, he is free to interpret this six-*vijñānakāya* definition in a more overtly Yogācāra fashion in *PSVy*. It thus seems possible that Vasubandhu, in the *AKBh*, is adjusting the *abhidharma* system so painstakingly worked out by the Vaibhāṣikas, in order to make it consonant with his Yogācāra beliefs.

In his introduction to *Abhidharmadīpa*, Jaini identifies sixteen points on which the author of *AD* attacks Vasubandhu for departing from orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrine. In a significant number of these cases, the “*Sautrāntika*” position taken by Vasubandhu is either virtually identical to that of the Yogācāra school (for example, regarding the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*) or, as Jaini puts it, “fore-shadows the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna*” (Jaini 1977:110), for example, regarding the *anuśayas*. Jaini draws attention to the fact that the Dipakāra accuses Vasubandhu of being a *vaitulika*, i.e., accepting Mahāyāna, (see above; also, Jaini 1977:128), and, in a discussion of the controversy about *sarvāstivāda*, states: “Although the main attack

on the Sarvāstivāda comes from the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, the Dipakāra's reference to the *ālaya-vijñāna* and to the *abhūta-parikalpita* unmistakably shows that his real opponents were Yogāchāra-Vijñānavādins..." (Jaini 1977:121). However, Jaini takes the Dipakāra's accusations as confirmation of the traditional, and still commonly accepted, assertion that Vasubandhu was a Sautrāntika when he wrote *AKBh* and later converted to Mahāyāna and Yogācāra.

I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that the Dipakāra may have been right, that Vasubandhu, when he wrote *AKBh*, may already have been a Yogācāra, and that the Sautrāntika views that he espoused provided a better abhidharmic infrastructure for the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* than did the Sarvāstivādin positions that he attacked. I believe that what he says about *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in *AKBh* and *PSVy* supports my speculation.

Conclusion

Thus, we have seen that the orthodox Sarvāstivādin definition of *vijñānāṅga* from the time of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, is *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* (consciousness at the moment of conception). This interpretation is compatible with the Sarvāstivādin "three lifetimes/twofold" (*san shih liang ch'ung*) system of causation. Although Vasubandhu presents the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation of the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, which includes this definition of *vijñāna*, in the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*, he indicates that he personally disagrees with it, and, in the *Bhāṣya*, he gives his own opinion, that *vijñānāṅga* consists of the stream of the six *vijñānas* in the intermediate realm, as well as *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*. In a later work, the *Pratīyasamutpādavyākhyā*, he takes the *sūtra* definition to mean that *vijñāna* refers to the six *vijñānas*, perfumed by the *saṃskāras* (*saṃskāraparibhāvita*), in the past life. Furthermore, he states that this definition is only provisional and that *vijñāna* in the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula must ultimately be identified with *ālayavijñāna*. My opinion is that Vasubandhu, at the time he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, may have already held the beliefs that he expressed in later works such as the

Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā and *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, beliefs that can perhaps be better characterized as Yogācāra than as Sautrāntika.

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Chinese Terms

A pi ta mo fa shih lun	阿毘達磨發智論
A pi ta mo fa yün tsu lun	阿毘達磨法蘊足論
A pi ta mo shih shen tsu lun	阿毘達磨識身足論
A pi ta mo shun cheng li lun	阿毘達磨順正理論
A pi ta mo ta pi p'o sha lun	阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論
A pi ta mo tsang hsien tzung lun	阿毘達磨藏顯宗論
A pi t'an hsin lun	阿毘曇心論
A pi t'an hsin lun ching	阿毘曇心論經
A pi t'an kan lu wei lun	阿毘曇甘露味論
A pi t'an pa chien tu lun	阿毘曇八犍度論
A pi t'an pi p'o sha lun	阿毘曇毘婆沙論
Ch'eng wei shih lun	成唯識論
chu pan	助伴
Chu she lun chi	俱舍論記
chung hsin	種心
chung shih	種識
Fen pieh yüan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching	分別緣起初勝法門經
hsiang hsü hsin	相續心
hsien tsai hsiang hsin	現在相續
hsü hsin	續心
jo i shou i ch'ieh yu pu shih chih sui sheng yu i ch'a na pu t'ung	若依說一切有部。唯生
chung yu ku wei i shih	有一剎那不通中有。故唯意識。
liang shih i ch'ung	兩世一重

pi hsiang hsü i liu ju fen wei man shou ming se

彼相續已六入分未滿說

名色

pi sheng chung hsin shih shih

彼生種心是識

P'u Kuang

普光

san shih liang ch'ung

三世兩重

She ma ta to

設摩達多

Tsa a pi t'an hsin lun

雜阿毘曇心論

tz'u shih t'ung yü chung sheng erh yu. sheng yu sui wei i shih yü
chung yu wei t'ung ch'i liu shih.

此識通於中。生二有。

生有雖唯意識於中有位通起六識。

yü mu t'ai teng chen chieh sheng shih i ch'a na wu yün ming
shih. tz'u ch'a na chung shih tsui sheng ku. tz'u wei i shih yü tz'u
wei ching wu shih sheng yüan yu wei chü ku.

於母胎等。正結生時。

一剎那位五蘊名識。此剎那中。識最勝故。此唯
意識。於此位中。五識生緣。猶未具故。