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Reinterpreting the *Jhānas*

The *jhānas*, the stages of progressively deepening concentration that figure so prominently in Buddhist meditation theory, have recently been the subject of several excellent critical studies.1 Two such studies, those of Griffiths (1983) and Stuart-Fox (1989), have drawn attention to one problem in particular that is demonstrably crucial in any attempt to understand the *jhāna* series. It has to do with the composition of the first *jhāna*. The Pāli Abhidhamma and classical meditation manuals, and with them most present-day accounts of Theravādin meditation theory, consistently state that the first *jhāna* has mental onepointedness (*cittass’ ekaggata*) as one of its component “factors.” Yet the description which appears repeatedly in the first four Nikāyas (and which, therefore, certainly antedates the Abhidhamma version) states that mental onepointedness becomes established in the second *jhāna*, not in the first. Stuart-Fox, who discusses this matter in detail, concludes that the Abhidhamma description of the first *jhāna* is a secondary development, a result of scholastic editing of the earlier Nikāya account.

Both Griffiths (briefly and in passing) and Stuart-Fox (at length and explicitly) draw another closely related conclusion regarding the composition of the first *jhāna* as described in the Nikāyas: *vitakka-vicāra*,

the factor that particularly characterizes the first *jhāna*, is probably nothing other than the normal process of discursive thought, the familiar but usually unnoticed stream of mental imagery and verbalization.\(^2\)

These conclusions conflict with the widespread conception of the first *jhāna* as a state of deep concentration, a profoundly altered state of consciousness attainable only after long and arduous practice.\(^3\) They can be shown also to challenge some long-held notions about the *jhāna* series as a whole. To investigate the further implications of this revised understanding of the first *jhāna* is a major objective of the present study.

As to method, this study employs the kind of text-critical approach adopted by Griffiths and Stuart-Fox, while also taking into account what is known of the practical-experiential side of *jhāna* meditation. It carefully distinguishes the earliest account of *jhāna*, found throughout the Nikāyas, from the historically later versions found in some late suttas, the Abhidhamma, and Buddhaghosa’s *Visuddhimagga*. Indeed, one of its specific aims is to clarify the relationship between the earlier and later accounts.

The inclusion of meditative experience among the data to be used in the interpretive process raises some difficult methodological issues.\(^4\) For present purposes the central problem is that scholars who are non-meditators, and who are therefore in no position to check the accuracy of accounts of meditative experience, are naturally inclined to have reservations about interpretive procedures that draw on such accounts. Adequate discussion of this and related methodological issues is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, so it must suffice here to make just the following point. In the present case the account of meditative experience in question is shown to agree substantially with the relevant description given by Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga*—a situation that should minimize possible concern on the part of non-meditator scholars.

Whereas previous studies have focused on the first two *jhānas*, the present analysis covers the entire series, comprising the four basic

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2. Griffiths 59-60; Stuart-Fox 81-82 and *passim*.
3. For a typical example of that conception, see Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, *Anāpānasati* (Mindfulness of Breathing), trans. Bhikkhu Nagasena, (Bangkok: Sublime Life Mission, 1976). The first 153 pages of Buddhadasa’s book are devoted to the practicalities of attaining the first *jhāna*.
4. Some of the methodological issues raised in this paragraph are noted briefly by Stuart-Fox 94-96. The field of Buddhist Studies will eventually have to come to terms with such issues if it is ever to do justice to meditation.
jhānas (called, in the Abhidhamma and Visuddhimagga, rūpa-jhānas, “material jhānas”) and the four āruppas (ariṣṭa-jhānas, “non-material jhānas”). For convenience, the separate jhānas are henceforth referred to as “jhāna 1,” “jhāna 2,” and so on up to “jhāna 8” (neva sañña nāsaññayatanas). The Nikāya account is examined first, followed by Buddhaghosa’s more elaborate version. The two are then considered in the light of meditative experience. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding the relationship between the two versions, and regarding the identities of the various stages in terms of meditative practices and attainments. These conclusions are seen as indicating a need to revise some long-established ideas about the jhānas.

Analysis of the Nikāya Account
The often repeated jhāna formula or “pericope” may be provisionally, and rather literally, translated as follows.\(^7\)

5. All eight are listed at, e.g., M i 40-41; the first four alone (i.e. the rūpa-jhānas) are listed at, e.g., D i 73-75. (All such source references are to volume and page numbers in the Pali Text Society’s editions of the Pali texts. D = Digha Nikāya, etc.; Vism = Visuddhimagga; Vibh = Vibhanga.) Griffiths states (57) that the shorter listing occurs at least 86 times in the first four Nikāyas. Because the āruppas are often omitted from textual accounts, some investigators have suggested that they were not part of the Buddha’s original teaching; e.g. Friedrich Heiler, Die Buddhistische Versenkung (München: Reinhardt, 1922) 47-51; King 14-15; and Bronkhorst 82-86. That debate is not pursued here. Instead, the jhānas, rūpa and arūpa, are considered together, as they are in many suttas, as constituting a single series.


7. The Pali reads: 1) vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusālehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savidāriṃ pitisukham pathanam jhānam upasampajja viharati. 2) vitakkavicārānaṃ vupasamā ājhattanā sampādāmanaṃ cetasa ekodibhāvan avitakkaṃ avidcāraṃ samādiham pitisukham dutiyaṃ jhānam upasampajja viharati. 3) pittiyā ca virāgā up ekhaṃ ca vi harati sato ca sampajjano sukhaḥ ca kāyena patisamvedetī yan tām arīyā acikkhantī up ekhaṃ satīma sukhowhi rī ti tatiyaṃ jhānam upasampajja viharati. 4) sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhasa ca pahānā up bv eva somanassadomanassanam athagamā adukkham asukham up ekhasatipārisuddhim catuththam jhānam upasampajja viharati. 5) sabbaso rūpasāññaṃ samatikkaṃ patiṣahasanāṃ athagamā nānattasaññaṃ amanasikārā ananto ākāso ti aṅkhānaṅca ṣayatanam upasampajja viharati. 6) sabbaso aṅkhānaṅca ṣayatanam samatikkaṃma anantam vihānaṃ ti vihānaṅca ṣayatanam upasampajja viharati. 7) sabbaso vihānaṅca ṣayatanam samatikkaṃma nathī kiṃci ti aṅkhaṇicāyatananm upasampajja viharati. 8) sabbaso aṅkhaṇicāyatananm samatikkaṇṇaṃ nevasaññaṃsaññaṅca ṣayatananm upasampajja viharati.
Jhāna 1: Quite separated from sense desires, separated from unwhole-
some mental states, he [the meditator] attains and abides in the first
jhāna, in which are present initial thought (vitakka), sustained thought
(vicāra), and separation-born zest (pīti) and pleasure (sukha).

Jhāna 2: Through the suppression of initial thought and sustained
thought, he attains and abides in the second jhāna, in which there is
inner tranquillity and oneness of mind, and in which initial thought
and sustained thought are absent, and concentration-born zest and
pleasure are present.

Jhāna 3: Through the fading away of zest, he abides equanimous,
mindful and discerning; and experiencing pleasure with the body, he
attains and abides in the third jhāna, of which the Noble Ones say
"equanimous, mindful, abiding in pleasure."

Jhāna 4: Through the relinquishing of pleasure, through the relin-
quishing of pain, through the previous disappearance of happiness and
sorrow, he attains and abides in the fourth jhāna, in which pleasure
and pain are absent, and the purity of equanimity and mindfuless is
present.

Jhāna 5: Through the complete transcending of material perceptions,
through the disappearance of impact-perceptions, through non-atten-
tion to variety-perceptions, [aware] that space is endless, he attains and
abides in the realm of endless space (ākāsānācāyatana).

Jhāna 6: Through the complete transcending of the realm of endless
space, [aware] that consciousness is endless, he attains and abides in
the realm of endless consciousness (viññānañcāyatana).

Jhāna 7: Through the complete transcending of the realm of endless
consciousness, [aware] that there is nothing, he attains and abides in
the realm of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana).

Jhāna 8: Through the complete transcending of the realm of nothing-
ness, he attains and abides in the realm of neither perception nor non-
perception (n'eva saññā nāsaññāyatana).

This translation is tentative and subject to later revision, particularly in
respect of the major technical terms. Some of the renderings adopted are
based simply on common western usage, for want of more adequate
criteria at this early stage in the investigation. For example, pīti is
 provisionally given as “zest” because that word is often preferred in
English translations. There are also some syntactic ambiguities in the
Pāli, which will be addressed as the analysis proceeds.
The above standard description of the jhanas will now be examined critically within a purely linguistic-textual-doctrinal framework, i.e. without at this stage making any attempt to link it to meditative practice. Since it is the Nikāya description that is in question, the later interpretations and explanations found in the Abhidhamma and the Visuddhimagga will be referred to only sparingly and with caution. Attention focuses first on the four rupa-jhanas (jhanas 1 to 4).

Each of the first four paragraphs consists essentially in a statement of (a) the mental factors that are present or absent in each jhāna, and (b) the factors that are developed or eliminated in making the transition to that jhāna from the one preceding it. The mental condition of the monk or meditator before beginning the jhāna practice is not described directly. Indirectly, however, the account does indicate that this pre-jhāna condition is characterized by the presence of sense desires (kama) and other unwholesome mental states (akusala dhammas), for it is by becoming separated or isolated (vivicca) from these that the meditator attains jhāna 1.

It is stated that in jhāna 1 there exist initial thought (vitakka) and sustained thought (vicāra), together with zest (piti) and pleasure (sukha), both of which are “separation-born” (viveka-ja). The adjective “separation-born” amounts to a reiteration of the statement that the meditator attains this jhāna through becoming separated (vivicca)—i.e. separated from sense desires and unwholesome states. Its application to “zest” and “pleasure” (which immediately follow it in the sentence) and not to “initial thought” and “sustained thought” (which immediately precede it) indicates that it is above all this separation, with resulting zest and pleasure, that distinguishes jhāna 1 from the pre-jhāna condition. It indicates that the presence of initial and sustained thought in jhāna 1 is not a consequence of the separation from sense desires and unwholesome states; that is, initial and sustained thought are present already in the pre-jhāna condition and merely persist through the transition. The essence of the transition from normal consciousness to jhāna 1 consists,
therefore, in (a) the elimination of sense desires and other unwholesome states, and (b) the arising of zest and pleasure.9

The transition from jhāna 1 to jhāna 2 is achieved through the suppression or stilling (vūpasama) of initial and sustained thought, and the establishing of inner tranquility (ajjhātām sampasaḍanaṃ) and oneness of mind (cetaso ekodiḥāvam). This is reiterated in the statement that jhāna 2 is without initial thought and sustained thought (avitakka, avicāra). Zest and pleasure, already established in the preceding jhāna, are still present but are now described as “concentration-born” (samādhi-ja). “Concentration,” “inner tranquillity,” and “oneness of mind” are evidently synonyms. 10 The essence of the transition to jhāna 2 is, then, the elimination of initial and sustained thought and the establishing of concentration.

The transition to jhāna 3 comes about through the fading away of zest (pīti), as the meditator becomes equanimous or conatively neutral (upekkhako or upēkkhako) and also mindful and self-possessed (sato, sampajāno). Pleasure continues, but is now, for the first time, said to be experienced with the body (kāyena). As Gunaratana points out, the term “upekkhā,” though having many different applications, always signifies a midpoint or point of neutrality between extremes.11 In the present case the reference is clearly to neutrality in the domain of conation, i.e. to a

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9. The vague rendering “states” for dhammehi sidesteps the question which of the many meanings of dhamma is intended here. One important meaning of dhamma is “mental object” or “mental image,” and this could well be the meaning intended in the present context. (See T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, Pali-English Dictionary (London: Luzac, 1959) 336, dhamma.) If it is, then the factors said to be eliminated in the transition from ordinary consciousness to jhāna 1 are sense desires and unwholesome images. This would explain what otherwise appears an unnecessary repetition; for “vivicc’ eva kāmehi, vivicca akusalehi dhammehi” would then be referring to two different mental elements. (In Table 1 they would be in two different columns, “Conation” (kāmas) and “Thought” (akusaladhammas), rather than in the same column as shown.) A further implication would be that the vitakka-vicāra of jhāna 1, being free of unwholesome thoughts, does after all differ from the normal flow of thought.

10. Cetaso ekodiḥāvā is equated at Vibh 258 with cittaṃ sāti (steadiness of mind) and sammāsammādhi (right concentration); it is defined in the Pali-English Dictionary (160) as “concentration, fixing one’s mind on one point.” The term’s equivalence with cittaṃ sāti is self-evident. Sampasādana is explained at Vibh 258 as “saddha (faith, confidence);” the Pali-English Dictionary definition is “tranquilizing” (692). Gunaratana (83) notes these two meanings, “confidence” and “tranquillity,” and opts for the former, though the latter is clearly more appropriate in the context.

state of affective detachment. The meditator becomes upabhakko through the disappearance of piti, a conative factor (placed under saññhāra-khandha in the Abhidhamma classification). Thus, the essence of the transition from jhāna 2 to jhāna 3 is the replacement of piti (zest?) by the conatively neutral sati-sampajañña (mindfulness and self-possession). That the pleasure (sukha) is now explicitly physical appears to represent another significant development.

In the transition to jhāna 4, pleasure (sukha) is relinquished or allowed to disappear. The description states that pain (dukkha) disappears also, though it was not mentioned as present in earlier jhanas. Since jhanas 1, 2, and 3 are all described as pleasurable, this disappearance of pain makes sense only if understood as having been entailed in the establishing of jhāna 1. Such a meaning is the more likely because the next two factors mentioned, happiness (somanassa) and sorrow (domanassa), are explicitly stated to have disappeared previously or earlier (pubbeva).

As Gunaratana points out, analysis of the description is complicated by the existence of two different Nikāya usages of the terms sukha and dukkha:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First usage:</th>
<th>sukha: physical and mental pleasure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dukkha: physical and mental pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second usage:</td>
<td>sukha: physical pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dukkha: physical pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somanassa: mental pleasure (happiness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>domanassa: mental pain (sorrow)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the description of jhāna 4 all four terms occur, whence it is clear that the second usage is being followed. Thus the sukha that is relinquished in attaining jhāna 4 is physical or bodily pleasure, which is in keeping with the fact that the sukha present in jhāna 3 is experienced “with the body.” The description is not explicit regarding the type of sukha present in jhanas 1 and 2.

In the final string of adjectives describing jhāna 4, the pair asukham adukkham (without pleasure, without pain) is followed by upabhakko-sati-

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parisuddhīm (having purity of equanimity and mindfulness). Since upekkhā and sati were already present in the preceding jhāna, the addition of the word parisuddhīm ("purity") evidently signifies that upekkhā and sati are now no longer associated with sukha; that is, parisuddhi signifies absence of sukha, just as (in jhāna 3) upekkhā signifies absence of piti.

The account of the four rūpa-jhanas exhibits a stylistic feature typical of the Pali canon in general: frequent reiteration through the use of synonyms and (in negations) antonyms. For example, the statement that jhāna 2 is attained through suppression of initial thought and sustained thought (vitakka-vicārānaṃ vipassanā) is reiterated in the further statements that that jhāna is without initial and sustained thought (avitakkam avicāram), that it is characterized by inner tranquility (ajjhattam sampasādanam) and oneness of mind (cetaso ekodibhāvam), and that the associated zest and pleasure are born of concentration (samādhi-jam). Accordingly the above analysis has, in large part, consisted in identifying such sets of synonyms and antonyms, a procedure that greatly simplifies the description.

It will be helpful at this point to depict the results of the analysis diagrammatically. This is done in Table 1. Each transition between jhānas is represented by a downward-pointing arrow, and the factors responsible for the transition are indicated by the boxed terms attached to the arrow.

Table 1 draws attention to some further characteristics of the jhāna description. One evident characteristic is inconsistency in mentioning the continued existence of a factor in jhānas subsequent to the one in which that factor first becomes established. For example, equanimity (upekkhā), which becomes established in jhāna 3, is stated to be present also in jhāna 4. On the other hand, the quality "without initial and sustained thought" (avitakkam, avicāram)—otherwise "having tranquility" (sampasādanam), and "having oneness of mind" (cetaso ekodibhāvam)—which is attributed to jhāna 2, is not similarly applied to jhānas 3 and

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14. This seems more likely to be the meaning of the compound than "having mindfulness purified by equanimity," because upekkhā (equanimity) was already present in jhāna 3. However, cf. Path 174; Vism 167-168; Vibh 261.
4, though it is clearly to be understood to apply to them, and indeed always has been by commentators classical and modern.\textsuperscript{15}

Another characteristic evident in Table 1 is that the composition of the \textit{rupa-jh\=an\=as} is specified in terms of three implicit categories. This has been emphasized by providing the three relevant columns with headings: “Thought,” “Conation,” and “Feeling” (i. e. hedonic tone).

When the above points are taken into account, Table 1 reduces to the much simpler Table 2. In Table 2 we immediately see the \textit{jh\=ana} series as a process of successively eliminating mental factors. The term below each arrow is functionally the negation of the one above it; e. g. \textit{ekodibh\=ava} is the negation of \textit{vitakka-vic\=ara}.\textsuperscript{16}

Table 2 can in its turn be simplified by replacing each negating term with a dash, on the understanding that a dash signifies the absence or elimination of the factor immediately above it. The result is the maximally economical representation shown in Table 3.

The terms that appear in Table 3 are the first four of the familiar five “\textit{jh\=ana} factors” (\textit{jh\=ana-sa\=ng\=ini}): \textit{vitakka}, \textit{vic\=ara}, \textit{pi\=ti}, \textit{sukha}, \textit{ekaggata}. The practice of summarizing the composition of the \textit{jh\=anas} by listing the relevant \textit{jh\=ana} factors appears sporadically in a few late \textit{suttas}, and becomes well established in the Abhidhamma.\textsuperscript{17}

The odd development whereby the factor \textit{ekaggata} (= \textit{ekodibh\=ava}) came to be attributed to \textit{jh\=ana} 1 is among the problems dealt with by Stuart-Fox.

The analysis can now move on to the \textit{arupa-jh\=an\=as}, the non-material \textit{jh\=an\=as}. The first of these (in our terminology, \textit{jh\=ana} 5) is the realm of endless space (\textit{\=ak\=as\=ana-n\=c\=ayatana}). It is attained “through the complete transcending of material perceptions (\textit{rupa-sa\=n\=i\=a}), through the disappearance of impact-perceptions (\textit{pa\=t\=igh\=a-sa\=n\=i\=a}), through non-attention to variety-perceptions” (\textit{n\=anna-ta-sa\=n\=i\=a}), and it entails the awareness that “space is endless” (\textit{ananto \=ak\=a\=so}).

Of the three terms ending in -sa\=n\=i\=a, the first, \textit{rupa-sa\=n\=i\=a}, is familiar as denoting perception of visual forms, the first of six recognized classes

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Buddhadasa 158: “... it should be understood that anything discarded in a lower stage remains absent in higher stages and is therefore not mentioned again.”

\textsuperscript{16} In choosing such negative terms for inclusion in Table 2, I have intentionally avoided the visually self-evident ones (e. g. \textit{av\=itakka} as the negation of \textit{vitakka}) in order to make the diagram maximally informative. That \textit{ekodibh\=ava} is the negation of \textit{vitakka-vic\=ara} is not immediately apparent and therefore worth stating explicitly.

\textsuperscript{17} In the \textit{suttas} it appears (with \textit{ekaggata} included) at M i 294, M iii 25-29, S iv 263. See Stuart-Fox 85 ff.
of sense perception. However, in the present context it clearly has a wider scope, justifying the usual translation "material perceptions" or "perceptions of matter." (Buddhaghosa explains it as perceptions of the rūpa-jhānas and of their objects—presumably the kasīṇa disks, the breathing, etc.) This ambiguity of rūpa-saññā corresponds to an ambiguity in the word rūpa: rūpa is sometimes "visible form" (the object of visual perception) and sometimes "matter, materiality" (as when contrasted with nāma or with arūpa). In the present context, then, rūpa-saññā covers all but the sixth class of saññā, i.e. all but dhamma-saññā, the type that has mental images (dhammas) as its objects.

The second of the three terms, patigha-saññā ("impact-perception"), is explained in the Vibhaṅga as denoting perceptions of visual forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. This indicates that patigha-saññā is identical with the preceding item, rūpa-saññā. The third term, nānatta-saññā, ("variety-perception") contains in its literal meaning little indication just what type of perception is being referred to. However, the pattern established by rūpa-saññā and patigha-saññā makes it likely that nānatta-saññā is a further synonym, i.e. that it too signifies "sense-perception," an interpretation explicitly affirmed by Buddhaghosa.

18. The six are: rūpa-saññā, sadda-, gandha-, rasa-, phoṭṭhabba-, dhamma-saññā. See D ii 309 and S iii 60.
19. See Path 356, and many other translations of the jhāna description.
20. Vism 328; Path 356-357.
22. Vibh 261. See also Vibh 6 and D ii 62, where patigha-samphassa is contrasted with adhvivacana-samphassa "verbal (or conceptual, i.e. mental) impression." (Definition from Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary [Colombo: Frewin and Co., 1972] 142.) The Vibhaṅga's explanations of rūpa-saññā and nānatta-saññā are uninformative.
23. In such a succession of parallel terms we may expect either that all have the same meaning (appositional relationship) or that all have different meanings (additive relationship). Clearly the former applies here. (An example of the latter occurs at the beginning of the jhāna 4 formula.) Buddhaghosa's support for this interpretation of nānatta-saññā comes in the following statement. "Through the disappearance of impact-perceptions, through non-attention to variety-perceptions": by this is meant the relinquishing of and non-attention to all sense-sphere consciousness and its concomitants (Vism 331). Buddhaghosa implausibly also states that such perceptions were already abandoned in jhāna 1 (Vism 329-330)—evidently in an attempt to reconcile the Nikāya account of the jhānas (which he professes to be explicating) with the Abhidhamma understanding of jhāna 1.
We therefore have here a thrice uttered statement that the transition from jhāna 4 to jhāna 5 entails the cessation of physical sense perceptions. It is appropriate that this cessation of physical or material perception (rupa-jpatīgha-jhānatta-saññā) coincides with the transition out of the physical or material (rupa) jhānas. The first arūpa-jhāna (jhāna 5) can, therefore, be readily incorporated into the condensed table of the jhānas by adding a further column, headed “Sense Perception” (see Table 4).

Jhāna 5 is further characterized by the awareness or realization that “Space (ākāsa) is endless.” In the Nikāyas, ākāsa is occasionally appended to the list of four elements or mahābhūtas, and in later times it assumes the status of a fifth element.24 The four—earth, water, fire, and air—are together equated with rūpa, i.e. materiality or physicality, sometimes more specifically the human body. Ākāsa is what remains when these four are removed. Thus the awareness that “ākāsa is endless” amounts to the awareness that “rupa is non-existent”; and this again is an appropriate concomitant to the transition from the material or rūpa jhānas to the non-material or arūpa jhānas. The contrast between rūpa as earth, water, fire, and air, and arūpa as the realms of endless space, endless consciousness, etc., is apparent in the well known Udāna passage: “There exists, monks, a realm in which there is not earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor realm of endless space, nor realm of endless consciousness, nor realm of nothingness, nor realm of neither perception nor non-perception . . .”25

The transition to jhāna 6, the realm of infinite consciousness (viññāna-cāyatanā), is achieved by transcending the realm of endless space and realizing that consciousness (viññāna) is endless. The type of analysis applied in earlier jhānas is hardly applicable here. By this stage in the series the information given has become so meager that nothing remains to be considered except the significance of the term viññāna.

24. In the Nikāyas the set of four elements occurs frequently, e.g. at D i 55, M i 53; the set of five occurs only rarely, e.g. at M i 413, S iii 227. On the seemingly late addition of ākāsa, see G. P. Malalasekera, ed., Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, vol. 1 (Colombo: Government of Ceylon, 1966) 341.

25. Udāna 80. atthi bhikkhave tad ayatanam yathā neva pāthavi na apo na tejo na vāyo na ākāsānañcañcayatanā na viññānañcayatanā na akāsañcayatanā na nevasañña-nāsaññañcayatanā ... See the Vibhāṅga analysis of jhāna 5, which explains that ākāsa is “untouched by the four primary elements, asamphuttaṃ catuḥi mahābhūtehi” (Vibh 262).
That is itself a daunting problem, discussion of which will be deferred until later in the paper.

The situation becomes even more difficult with the two remaining jhānas, the realm of nothingness and the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, each of which is attained by “transcending” the realm that precedes it. The possibilities of the text-analytical approach, as it can be applied to the Nikāya account, have, therefore, been exhausted for the present. Accordingly, we now turn to other sources, sources that provide information on the techniques and experiences associated with attaining the jhānas in practice.

The Nikāya account of the jhānas provides little information for the practicing meditator. Suttas such as the Ānāpāna-sati Sutta do give some guidance; however, the standard source of practical information is the post-canonical manuals, particularly Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (5th century CE), to which we now turn.

Analysis of Buddhaghosa’s Account

The description of jhāna practice that Buddhaghosa presents in his Visuddhimagga is widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as authoritative on Theravādin meditation. It undoubtedly represents an already well established tradition, for essentially the same description is found in the less well known Vimuttimagga of Upatissa, dated a few centuries earlier.26 (I shall nevertheless, for convenience, refer to this description as “Buddhaghosa’s.”) Buddhaghosa’s account has been largely responsible for the widespread understanding of jhāna 1 as a state of deep concentration. In it he indicates that attainment of jhāna 1 entails a long and difficult progression through a series of sub-stages, of which the more advanced clearly do involve deep concentration. His portrayal of jhāna 1 as a deeply concentrated state therefore affirms the Abhidhamma account (which ascribes ekaggatā to jhāna 1), while conflicting with the earlier Nikāya account.

The task of sorting out the relationship between these two accounts, and discovering how the differences may have come about, has already been tackled in a preliminary way by Griffiths and Stuart-Fox. Here it will be dealt with more thoroughly, by first considering certain problems that arise out of the series of sub-stages which Buddhaghosa describes

as leading up to jhāna 1 (and to each subsequent jhāna.) This series is not mentioned in the Nikāyas, nor even in the canonical Abhidhamma texts. Its appearance in the post-canonical Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga is evidently associated with the revision whereby ekaggatā was ascribed to jhāna 1. Consequently, any elucidation of the significance of Buddhaghosa's sub-stages may be expected to contribute to an improved understanding of the entire jhāna series. To that end a summary of Buddhaghosa’s account is now provided.27

In the example given by Buddhaghosa the meditation object is a specially prepared “earth kasiṇa,” a disk of clay about two spans in diameter. The meditating monk begins by gazing with concentrated attention at this disk, which therefore serves as the “preliminary sign” (parikamma-nimitta). After long and persistent effort, he becomes able not only to keep his attention firmly fixed on the disk itself, but also to retain an accurate mental image of it, i.e. to “see” inwardly a clear mental replica of the disk when he closes his eyes. This replica image is the “acquired sign” (uggaha-nimitta). The monk thereafter gives up gazing at the original disk and concentrates on the replica image instead. Through this exercise the replica image is progressively stabilized and reinforced until eventually it gives way to a different type of image, the “counterpart sign” (patibhāga-nimitta). This is an abstract derivative of the preceding image, bearing a general resemblance to it but lacking its “faults” and its specific identifying features. Whereas the acquired sign was a near-perfect mental replica of the original clay disk, the counterpart sign is likely to appear as a pure disk of light, for example resembling the full moon or a well polished mirror. The meditator now focuses on this counterpart sign, seeking to “extend” it progressively. This exercise is carried out in two stages: “access concentration” (upacāra-samādhi) and “fixed concentration” (appanā-samādhi). With the perfection of appanā-samādhi, the meditator attains the first jhāna.

Once he has fully mastered these practices, the meditator may go on to develop the second jhāna. This entails, according to Buddhaghosa, the same series of sub-stages, but preceded by practice of five “masteries” (vasī). These include reflection on the grossness and undesirability of the jhāna factor to be eliminated next, which in this case is vitakka (Buddaghosa here follows the Abhidhamma division of jhāna 1 into two separate jhānas: vitakka and vicāra are eliminated successively.)

27. The summary is based on Vism 118-155; Path 122-161. Also, cf. Vimuttimagga (Ehara et al.) 71-92.
Much the same procedure applies for each of the remaining jhānas in turn. Thus, for every one of the jhānas, rūpa and arūpa, the meditator passes through the same series of sub-stages: concentration on the chosen physical object (parikamma-nimitta), development of the acquired sign (uggaha-nimitta), development of the counterpart sign (paṭibhāga-nimitta), access concentration (upacāra-samādhi), and finally fixed concentration (appanā-samādhi). On each occasion, the perfection of appanā-samādhi marks attainment of the relevant jhāna.

It can be fairly readily confirmed that Buddhaghosa’s account is generally accurate as a description of the meditative practice. Numerous practicing meditators, particularly in the Buddhist countries of southeast Asia, routinely experience many of the stages Buddhaghosa describes. They are well able—though not always very willing—to discuss the process as far as they have experienced it. Such meditators and their teachers do not necessarily use Buddhaghosa’s terminology; however, some of the stages they describe can be readily recognized and correlated with his account. In particular, a sequence of three meditation objects—the original physical object, a replica image of it, and an abstract image derived from the replica image—is well attested. And for competent meditators the process culminates in attainment of an imageless state barely distinguishable from total unconsciousness, which masters identify as “entry into jhāna.”

Researchers wishing to investigate the matter at first hand can do so by taking up intensive meditation themselves. Such experimentation will support the claim that all meditators pass through essentially the same sequence of stages, provided they pursue the practice intensively and persistently enough, in a suitable environment, and with competent guid-

28. A major difficulty in finding out about meditation practice is that meditators are often very reticent about discussing their experiences and attainments. Such reticence is usually enjoined by their meditation masters on various grounds, e. g. that to talk about one’s attainments could generate conceit and thereby hinder one’s further progress. However, for alternative views on this question see Winston L. King, “A Comparison of Theravada and Zen Meditational Methods and Goals,” History of Religions 9 (1970): 313; and Rod Bucknell, “Experiments in Insight Meditation,” The Australian Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 3.2 (1983): 115.

29. Regarding these practical details, I am drawing particularly on a series of verbal communications with the late Chaokhun Rajasiddhimuni, formerly meditation master at Khana 5, Wat Mahathat, Bangkok. Though the style of meditation he taught was purported to be vipassanā-bhāvanā, insight meditation (in the Mahasi Sayadaw tradition), it entailed a large component of samatha-bhāvanā, concentration meditation.
ance. That *kasiṇa* disks are rarely if ever used nowadays is unimportant, because the sequence is largely the same, whether the concentration object is a clay disk, a chanted mantra, or the sensation of the breath at the nostril. (Details are given in the next section.) Buddhaghosa’s account therefore deserves acceptance as a reliable description of the stages in *jhāna* practice as far as the attainment of what he calls “the first *jhāna*.”

However, as an interpretation of those stages in terms of Buddhist doctrine, Buddhaghosa’s account presents several problems. One obvious problem has to do with the above-noted question concerning the nature of the first *jhāna*. Development of a stable mental image as the object of concentration—whether a replica image (*uggaha-nimitta*) or an abstract derived image (*patibhaga-nimitta*)—implies well established mental onepointedness. The final stage, *appanā-samādhi* (which Buddhaghosa identifies with *jhāna* 1—subsequently also *jhāna* 2, etc.) is portrayed as an even more advanced stage of samādhi. It follows that Buddhaghosa’s account is in conflict with the Nikāya account; because, as the Stuart-Fox study makes clear, the *jhāna* 1 of the Nikāya account is a rather preliminary stage in which mental onepointedness has not yet been established. The condition attained by the meditator who has mastered *appanā-samādhi* cannot be identical with the stage which the Nikāyas call “the first *jhāna*” (*pathamaṃ jhānaṃ*).

It could be suggested, in Buddhaghosa’s defense, that perfect correspondence is not to be expected: in his account of *kasiṇa* meditation Buddhaghosa is referring to the first *jhāna* of the Abhidhamma, not the first *jhāna* of the Nikāyas. (The Abhidhamma version states that the first *jhāna* has mental onepointedness as a factor; the Nikāya version does not.) But such an argument would carry no weight, because Buddhaghosa understands the Abhidhamma and Nikāya descriptions of “the first *jhāna*” to be referring to one and the same meditative attainment. He maintains that the verbal discrepancies between the two descriptions are of no consequence, but merely reflect differing perceptions about what was worth mentioning.31


31. On the question whether *ekaggata* was worth mentioning as a factor in *jhāna* 1, see the suggestions by Gunaratana, 67 and 84, and the refutation of them by Stuart-Fox, 88.
Another problem with Buddhaghosa's account is that such details as the uggaha- and patibhāga-nimittas, and upacāra- and appanā-samādhi are nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Nikāyas. There is not even any indication in the Nikāyas that attainment of jhāna 1 entails a lengthy sequence of sub-stages such as Buddhaghosa describes. This raises questions concerning the transmission of the teaching. If this very basic information is genuine, why was it not recorded in the Nikāyas? And how did commentators like Upatissa and Buddhaghosa manage to come by it?

It is now evident that the interpretation implicit in Buddhaghosa's account of kasīna meditation is problematic. As a description, Buddhaghosa's account of the sequence of meditative stages as far as appanā-samādhi appears to be accurate; it corresponds with meditative experience. However, as an interpretation, it is demonstrably in conflict with the Nikāya account.

We therefore confront the question: How does Buddhaghosa's description, with its detailed series of sub-stages, relate to the much simpler Nikāya account of the jhānas? This question will be approached initially by considering in greater detail the techniques and experiences actually involved in the practice of jhāna meditation.

**The Practice of Concentration**

*Kasiṇa* disks are rarely, if ever, used by present day meditators. The account that follows therefore describes, instead, the practice of mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpāna-sati*), which is probably the most widely used, and certainly the best documented, Buddhist technique for jhāna.\(^{32}\) The description is based on the standard Theravādin style of practice, but in respect of the resulting experiences and attainments it is probably valid for all styles.

The meditator, having found a quiet spot in which to practice, and having adopted the approved sitting posture, begins by developing an appropriate mental attitude. This may entail reflecting for a few minutes on the value and purpose of the practice he or she is about to undertake, on the virtues of Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, or on any similarly up-

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\(^{32}\) For relevant textual sources, see Bhikkhu Ńāṇamoli, *Mindfulness of Breathing (Ānāpānasati)*, (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1973). For a very detailed discussion of the practice, see Buddhadasa, op. cit. Buddhadasa's monastery (Suan Mok, near Chaiya in southern Thailand) is one of the main centers at which *ānāpāna-sati* is currently taught and practiced on a large scale.
lifting topic. Thus prepared, he or she then closes the eyes and begins concentrating on the breathing.

This involves focusing attention on the fine tactile sensation experienced at the rim of one nostril as the breath passes in and out. That sensation is the concentration object. At each sitting attention must be focused on it and restrained from wandering. Invariably, however, attention does wander. After only a few breaths the meditator realizes that instead of concentrating on the sensation at the nostril rim, he or she is involved in a train of thought having no apparent connection with the practice. He or she immediately returns attention to the concentration object and begins again, but before long the same thing happens. Repeatedly, despite all efforts to keep the mind fixed on the concentration object, thoughts arise; and the trains of mental imagery and inner speech sometimes continue for a minute or more before the meditator realizes the digression and is able to cut them short. Only after long and persistent effort—over weeks or months, depending on individual temperament and the intensity of the practice—does success come. Finally, however, the dedicated meditator does succeed in keeping attention fixed on the concentration object for up to a minute without any thoughts intervening.

With further practice the periods of full concentration and freedom from thought grow longer and more intense. The meditator becomes able to sit fully concentrated for several minutes together. With thought totally absent, there is no sense of boredom; the practice, which had formerly seemed dull and tiresome in the extreme, has now become irresistibly interesting.

During this phase of the practice the meditator often finds the body making strange involuntary movements, for example a pronounced trembling, intermittent jerking, or creeping goose-flesh. The meditation master reassures the student that reactions of this kind are common. They are by-products of the high level of mental energy being developed, and have no importance other than as signs that progress is being made. The meditator must merely note their presence and resume the concentration practice.

Following this advice, the meditator finds that the strange movements do soon cease, and facility in concentration improves accordingly. But now a new effect appears, in the form of various delightful bodily feelings: a feeling of lightness as if the body were floating some distance above the seat, or a pervading warmth as if the body were glowing. The
Meditator may find it possible to bring about an intensification of these effects; however, the master warns against this. The pleasant feelings are once again unimportant by-products of the practice; the meditator must merely acknowledge their existence and return to the concentration object.

With further practice the delightful feelings subside in their turn, leaving nothing in consciousness but the concentration object. Formerly faint and barely discernible, the sensation at the nostril rim is now experienced vividly as a zone of intense tactile sensation. There is now nothing else in consciousness. As far as the meditator is concerned the rest of the body is non-existent.

Further prolonged concentration eventually results in a strange transformation of the object. The zone of intense tactile sensation is replaced by a glowing patch of light of similar shape and orientation, experienced inwardly as a vivid mental image. (The eyes remain closed throughout these exercises.) For example, if the zone of sensation at the nostril was experienced as crescent-shaped, the glowing patch of light that takes its place is likely to be similarly crescent-shaped. This abstract image is of variable color, indeed the meditator may find that its color and brightness can to some extent be modified at will. Its size seems indeterminate, there being no other content of consciousness with which it might be compared. Having once developed such an abstract image, the meditator is instructed to adopt it as the new concentration object. At each sitting he or she must begin by concentrating on the breath as usual; but as soon as the abstract image appears, that must be made the concentration object instead. This has the effect of causing the abstract image to arise more rapidly each time, and, once arisen, to become progressively more vivid and stable.

The meditator continues practicing in this way, until one day, without warning, the abstract image suddenly disappears. Thus deprived of the only content of consciousness, the meditator has the sense of confronting an infinite black vacuum. This strange experience may lead to a loss of composure, with a consequent abrupt return to normal consciousness. However, the master gives reassurance and advises the student to cultivate this state of mental emptiness, entering it at every opportunity. In addition, the master advocates prolonging its duration by making a resolution to that effect at the beginning of each meditation session. Following these instructions, the meditator finds that the state of emptiness stabilizes and, as promised, lasts progressively longer.
In this state of emptiness, as at all previous stages of the practice, the meditator remains conscious of the condition, retaining a detached awareness of the state of zero mental content. However, there eventually comes a time when even this residual consciousness abruptly ceases. The effect is as if the meditator had suddenly gone under total anesthetic, or fallen into deep dreamless sleep. It cannot be said of this state that the meditator experiences it; rather, he or she infers it after the event, perhaps by referring to a clock or some other indicator of the passage of time.

It is said that particularly competent meditators develop the ability to sit in this state of unconsciousness for as long as seven days together. Some masters set up the less ambitious goal of twenty-four hours, and tell their students that when they have achieved that they will have gone as far as this style of practice can take them.

The above account, based on mindfulness of breathing, is broadly applicable for all forms of concentration meditation (*samatha-bhāvanā*), though with some variations in detail depending on the type of object used. For example, concentration on the sound of a clock ticking naturally differs in the early stages. (Some meditators find an auditory object easier to concentrate on than a tactile one; others find it more difficult.) The abstract image develops in much the same way as with mindfulness of breathing, though it is likely to be different in appearance, e.g. exhibiting a rhythmic movement in time with the ticking. Thereafter the sequence of events is identical.

A substantial difference from the course of events described above exists in the case of a visual object or a chanted mantra. With a visual object, the meditator begins with the eyes open, but closes them once the object has so imprinted itself on the memory that it can be visualized clearly “in the mind’s eye.” With a mantra, the meditator begins by repeating the phrase softly, and continues doing so until he or she can “hear” it inwardly after the voice stops. In either case, the mental replica—the image of the visual object or the internalized sound of the mantra—becomes the new concentration object, and in time yields an abstract image as before.

Practice based on a visual object or a mantra therefore differs from practice based on the types of object described earlier (e.g. the breathing) in having a distinct extra stage, that in which the original object is replaced by a mental replica. However, this difference is perhaps more apparent than real. It may well be that concentration on the breathing
does actually give rise to a mental replica of the original tactile sensation; for such a mental replica would naturally be masked by the original sensation, which itself continues. With a visual object, the original sensation can be terminated at any time by shutting the eyes, which makes the replica image clearly distinguishable from it; but one cannot simply stop breathing at will, whence the apparent skipping of one stage. It is the fuller sequence of stages that is presented by Buddhaghosa in his account of the *kasina* practice.

**Correlating Doctrine and Practice**

Despite the overall correspondence between the above description and Buddhaghosa’s account, there are some evident differences. One that deserves mention here has to do with the phenomenon of goose-flesh, trembling, and other involuntary bodily movements, which meditators commonly experience early in the practice. Present day meditation masters identify these effects as *piti*, a component “factor” (*āṅga*) of *jhānas* 1 and 2. The main basis for this identification is a vivid description given by Buddhaghosa. However, that description occurs not in his account of the sub-stages leading to *jhāna*, but rather in his description of *jhāna* itself.

Before discussing the significance of this discrepancy, let us note the potential usefulness of *piti* as a landmark for correlating the practical sequence of meditative stages with the textual sequence of *jhānas*. All accounts of the *jhānas* agree in stating that the *jhāna* factor *piti* is present in *jhānas* 1 and 2, but ceases with the attainment of *jhāna* 3. If *piti* is correctly identified with the goose-flesh and similar reactions, then the ceasing of those reactions in the course of meditation should correspond to the transition from *jhāna* 2 to *jhāna* 3.

In considering such apparent correspondences, one has to be prepared to put aside long-held notions about the nature of the *jhānas*. The old understanding of *jhāna* 1 as a deeply concentrated state has already been rendered dubious, and that means that both scholars and meditators now have to be ready to re-think the entire *jhāna* series. In such an enterprise intellectual flexibility is naturally essential.

33. Vism 143-144; *Path* 149-150. Mahasi Sayadaw, *Practical Insight Meditation* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971) 21, gives the following brief description: “There arises also in him rapture (*piti*), causing ‘goose-flesh,’ falling of tears, tremor in the limbs. It produces in him a subtle thrill and exhilaration. He feels as if on a swing. He even wonders whether he is just giddy.”
Another potentially useful landmark for correlating meditative stages with *jhānas* is provided by the classification of the *jhānas* into two categories: *rupa* and *arūpa*, material and non-material. Common sense indicates that this classification would appropriately be applied to the meditative stages as follows: Those stages in which attention is directed to a physical object—the actual *kasiṇa* disk, the breathing, a chanted mantra, etc.—are *rupa*, material; and those in which it is directed to a mental image, or in which there is no specifiable object at all, are *arūpa*, non-material.\footnote{Present-day writers on *jhāna* often translate the *rupa* in *rupa-jhāna* as “fine-material” (e.g. Gunaratana 108, Nyanaponika 70, 71; contrast Solé-Leris, 57). This addition of “fine,” for which there is no textual justification, has evidently been felt necessary because of the seeming inappropriateness of “material” (let alone “physical”) to describe the very subtle state that *jhāna 1* is widely assumed to be. Similar considerations no doubt lie behind the “explanation” (e.g., Gunaratana 92-93, following Vism 163) that the body referred to in *jhāna 3* (sukhaṃ ca kāyena paṭiṣanvedeti) is actually “the mental body,” i.e. the mind. When “body” has to be interpreted as meaning “mind,” there is clearly something seriously wrong.} On this basis, the arising of the mental replica of the meditation object would mark the transition from *jhāna 4* (the last *rupa-jhāna*) to *jhāna 5* (the first *arūpa-jhāna*).

Here a further conflict with Buddhaghosa’s account becomes apparent. We have already noted that one of the earlier sub-stages listed in his account, namely the arising of the *uggaha-nimitta*, clearly corresponds to the arising of the replica image in the meditation practice. Yet now we have grounds for inferring that the transition from *jhāna 4* to *jhāna 5* corresponds to that same meditative event. This is another problem that will be deferred until later. For the present, the discussion will focus on possible correspondences between the meditative series and the Nikāya *jhāna* series, independently of any connection with Buddhaghosa’s sub-stages.

Two points of correspondence between the meditative series and the *jhāna* series have already been tentatively identified. Application of similar reasoning elsewhere in the two series yields the following tentative pattern of correspondence.
Comparison of Meditative Stages and Jhānas

MEDITATIVE STAGES

Stage 1: The meditator's efforts at concentrating on the assigned object fail to stop the flow of thought, but do bring a pleasant freedom from affective involvement.

Stage 2: The flow of thought ceases, yielding a pleasant stillness. Trembling, gooseflesh, etc. occur.

Stage 3: The trembling, etc. cease, as the power of attention becomes more balanced. Pleasant bodily feelings of warmth etc. are experienced.

Stage 4: The pleasant bodily feelings cease. Balanced attention to the concentration object continues.

Stage 5: Physical sensation ceases, giving way to a mental image which is a replica of the original concentration object.

Stage 6: There develops a derived image, an abstract counterpart of the preceding replica image.

Stage 7: This abstract image disappears, giving way to mental emptiness, and leaving a sense of being suspended in an endless black vacuum.

JHĀNAS

Jhāna 1: Viitakka and vicāra are present, along with pīti and sukha, both of which are born of separation from sense desires and unwholesome states.

Jhāna 2: Viitakka and vicāra cease with the attaining of ekodibhāva. Pīti and sukha are now samādhi-born.

Jhāna 3: Pīti ceases, as upekkhā and sati-sampajāñña are established. Sukha is now felt with the body.

Jhāna 4: Sukha ceases, leaving pure upekkhā and sati.

Jhāna 5: Rūpa-/patigha-/nānattasaññā ceases. There comes the awareness that ākāsa is endless.

Jhāna 6: Endless ākāsa is transcended and there comes the awareness that viññāna is endless.

Jhāna 7: Endless viññāna is transcended and there comes the awareness that nothing whatever exists.
Stage 8: Even the sense of experiencing mental emptiness ceases, as total unconsciousness supervenes; however, the meditator is aware of this only in retrospect.

Jhāna 8: Nothingness is transcended and the realm of neither saññā nor non-saññā is attained.

The reasoning behind this proposed pattern of correspondences will now be spelled out by considering, in order of their occurrence, those Pāli terms whose meanings are of significance in defining the different jhānas.

Vitakka-vicāra. The meaning of these paired terms is a key issue in Stuart-Fox’s analysis of jhānas 1 and 2. Outside of the jhāna context, vitakka and vicāra together mean, as Rhys Davids and Stede note, “just thought, thinking.” The evidence adduced by Stuart-Fox indicates that this is also what they mean in the standard jhāna formula as we find it in the Nikāyas: vitakka-vicāra simply denotes the normal flow of thought, the stream of imagery and verbalizing which, like a television program that is rarely switched off, provides a persistent though vague and unobtrusive background to our everyday waking consciousness. Rarely noticed under normal circumstances, the thought-stream becomes only too obvious to the meditator when he or she tries to bring it to a halt and keep all attention focused on the concentration object. Indeed, as practitioners of concentration meditation well know, stopping the flow of thought is one of the most difficult aspects of the practice. Success in this task represents a major breakthrough; and the resulting state of prolonged freedom from thought (cittass’ ekaggatā) constitutes a radically

35. Pali-English Dictionary 620, vitakka; and 615, vicāra.
36. For details see Bucknell, “Experiments . . .” 103-104. The verbalizing or “inner speech” aspect of the thought-stream is stressed in the textual explanation of vitakka as vaci-saṅkhāra, “speech-activity,” or the precursor of actual physical speech (Mi 301). It is also recognized in the equating of jhāna 2 with “ariyan silence” (Si 273). Reinterpretation of “vitakka-vicāra” as some kind of focused attention was one of the ad hoc adjustments that became necessary once ekaggatā had been attributed to jhāna 1. For an example of the inconsistencies to which this reinterpretation continues to give rise, see Phra Khantipalo, ed., A Treasury of the Buddha’s Discourses from the Majjhima-nikāya (Middle Collection), vol. 2 (Bangkok: Mahamakut Rajavidyalaya Press, n. d.) 62 (translation of Dantabhumi-sutta). There vitakka is translated “thoughts” in one sentence (“Do not think thoughts. . .”), and “initial application” in the next sentence (a description of jhāna). The editor acknowledges the inconsistency (note 4), but claims it is unavoidable.
altered state of consciousness, a most satisfying and encouraging attain­ment.

It is, therefore, to be expected that the thought-stream, and the task of suppressing it, should figure prominently in the textual account of jhāna practice. This expectation is fulfilled once one allows that vitakka-vicāra in the jhāna description has the same meaning it has in other more gen­eral contexts in the Nikāyas. These various considerations support the identification of vitakka-vicāra with the normal flow of thought; the sup­pression of vitakka-vicāra in the transition from jhāna 1 to jhāna 2 is the meditative achievement of bringing the flow of thought to a standstill.

Piti. The jhāna description indicates two different varieties of piti: separation-born and concentration-born (viveka-ja and samādhi-ja). Accordingly, the “Conation” column of Table 1 presents the following series:

- pre-jhāna: sense desires and unwholesome states
- jhāna 1: separation-born piti
- jhāna 2: concentration-born piti
- jhāna 3: equanimous mindfulness and self-possession

Concentration-born piti, the phenomenon of trembling, gooseflesh, etc., is easy to identify; and indeed for an experienced meditator, particularly one who has also done some insight meditation, the progression through the entire series is fairly readily perceived, as follows. The practice can begin only if the meditator is able to curb for a time the mind’s habit of reacting emotionally to the contents of consciousness, i. e. to external sense objects and mental images. Such affective reaction—endless in its variety but adequately covered by the broad opposing categories “liking” and “disliking”—represents a pointless squandering of the energy that is indispensable for attentive focusing, and thus for the establishing of mental onepointedness. The beginning meditator, struggling to block the flow of thought and keep attention fixed on the prescribed concentration object, applies considerable mental effort, sometimes so much as to cause sweat to stream from the body. This blocking and fixing, once achieved, can be maintained with a much lower level of effort; however, inexperienced meditators usually fail to make the appropriate adjustment. Having achieved onepointedness, they continue to put out the same high level of effort, with the result that the excess manifests in the form of un-

37. On these two types, cf. Buddhadasa 157, 159.
controlled physical movements. With practice, meditators learn to diminish the intensity of the attentive focusing, yielding a state of equilibrium which, because it entails no wasteful loss of energy, can be maintained for long periods. 38

This view of the process indicates that the relevant jhāna terms are to be understood as follows: "Sense desires and unwholesome states" are the varied affective reactions that characterize the pre-jhāna condition, i. e. ordinary consciousness. "Separation-born piti" is the high-powered attentive focusing on the concentration object which the meditator brings to bear by redeploying the energy normally expended in affective reaction. "Concentration-born piti" is the phenomenon whose outward manifestation is physical trembling, etc., and whose cause is the maintaining of this high level of attentive focusing after it is no longer needed, i. e. after one-pointedness has been established. And "mindfulness and self-possession" is the condition of balanced attention that is ultimately achieved by reducing the intensity of the focusing and establishing the appropriate equilibrium (upekkhā).

Sukha. As noted in the textual analysis, sukha is said to be present in jhānas 1, 2, and 3, but is stated to be felt with the body only in jhāna 3. This tallies with the meditator's experience of delightful bodily feelings following the cessation of the physical forms of piti. In addition it suggests, though not unequivocally, that the sukha of jhānas 1 and 2 is to be understood as purely mental pleasure (i. e. somanassa). This again is in keeping with experience: freedom from affective involvement (jhāna 1) is a pleasurable state of mind, and so too is steady mental one-pointedness (jhāna 2). It is doubtful, however, if a phenomenological distinction between "separation-born sukha" (jhāna 1) and "samādhi-born sukha" (jhāna 2) can really be drawn.

Ākāsa. We have already noted the appropriateness of the term ākāsa ("space") in the title of the first arūpa-jhāna: space is all that remains following cessation of the four material elements (earth, water, fire, and air), i. e. following the cessation of rūpa. "Realm of endless space" is therefore appropriate as a term for the meditative state in which all input

38. If one may invoke a simile worthy of Buddhaghosa, it is like cooking a stew. The cook at first turns the gas up high in order to bring the contents of the pot to boiling point. If, being inexperienced, he leaves the flame high after that point has been reached, the pot boils over. He then learns to turn down the flame to a level just sufficient to maintain a steady simmer. The flame in these three situations corresponds to separation-born piti in jhāna 1, concentration-born piti in jhāna 2, and sati in jhāna 3.
from the five physical sense organs (rūpa-saṅñā, patigga-saṅñā, nānatta-
-saṅñā) has ceased. For the meditator in this state there exists only the
replica image (dhamma-saṅñā). Here it is well to recall that ākāsa is not
emptiness or nothingness, a fact emphasized by the contrast with the
"realm of nothingness" (jhāna 7).

Viññāṇa. Given the very incomplete state of research into the actual
identities of Buddhist psychological categories, any attempt at interpret-
ing the term viññāṇa in the jhāna context is necessarily speculative. 39
Nevertheless, some useful observations are possible, especially as re-
gards the distinction between viññāṇa and saṅñā. Buddhaghosa likens
saṅñā to a child's perception of a coin (awareness of its color, shape,
texture, etc.), and viññāṇa to an adult's perception of the same coin
(awareness of its purchasing power and usefulness). 40 This explana-
tion, if valid, indicates that viññāṇa is a processed, more abstract deriva-
tive of saṅñā. Such an understanding of the relationship between saṅñā
and viññāṇa makes good sense in the case of jhānas 5 and 6, for those
two stages can now be interpreted as follows. The awareness of the
replica image (jhāna 5) is an example of the sixth class of saṅñā
(dhamma-saṅñā), while the awareness of the derived abstract image
(jhāna 6) is an example of the sixth class of viññāṇa (mano-viññāṇa). 41
The steady persistence of each type of image, as the only content of the
meditator's consciousness, makes good sense of the phrases "[aware]
that ākāsa is endless" (jhāna 5) and "[aware] that viññāṇa is endless"
(jhāna 6).

Ākīncaṅña. This word, meaning "nothingness," indicates a meditative
state having zero content. The description of jhāna 7 includes the state-
ment "n'atthi kīci tī, [aware] that there is nothing," which, like the
parallel "tī" clauses for jhānas 5 and 6, implies that the meditator is con-

39. For an example of such research, see Rune E. A. Johansson, "Citta,
Mano, Viññāṇa—a Psychosemantic Investigation," University of Ceylon
40. Vism 436-437; Path 480.
41. The six classes of viññāṇa are: cakkhu-viññāṇa, sota-, ghana-, jivhā-, kāya-, mano-viññāṇa. See D ii 308, S iii 61; and cf. the corresponding six
classes of saṅñā at note 18. In many contexts the words viññāṇa and saṅñā
appear to be used loosely and almost interchangeably to denote a general,
non-specific awareness or consciousness. Examples are the usage of viññāṇa
at M i 293 (cited by Johansson 196), and the seeming interchangeability of
viññāṇa, saṅñā, and vedanā at M i 293 (Johansson 202). Nevertheless, it is
clearly appropriate to focus on the distinction between saṅñā and viññāṇa in
the case of jhānas 5 and 6, where the two stand contrasted.
scious of the condition. This is, therefore, an accurate description of the meditative state in which, following the disappearance of the abstract image, consciousness is empty of all content and the meditator is left only with a sense of an endless void.\(^2\)

\textit{Neva saññā nāsaññā.} Buddhaghosa states that "neither \textit{saññā} nor non-\textit{saññā}" implies also "neither \textit{vedanā} nor non-\textit{vedanā}," "neither \textit{citta} nor non-\textit{citta}," and "neither \textit{phassa} nor non-\textit{phassa}."\(^3\) If he is right, then the expression "\textit{neva saññā nāsaññā}," though specifying only \textit{saññā}, actually covers all mental components.\(^4\) Now, this expression ("neither \textit{saññā} nor non-\textit{saññā}") has the form of the fourth member of the Indian tetralemma. To the question "Is there \textit{saññā}?" Indian logic allows not only for "There is" and "There is not," but also for "There both is and is not" and "There neither is nor is not." A connection with the meditative practice can now be made. In the eighth and final stage the meditator becomes totally unconscious, but can know this only by inference after the event. Consequently, it can be argued, the presence of consciousness, or of any specified mental factor, can be neither affirmed nor denied. Any question about whether there is consciousness can be answered, strictly speaking, only with "There neither is nor is not." But


\(^3\) Vism 337; Path 367.

\(^4\) The four expressions effectively cover all four mental \textit{khandhas}: \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saññā}, \textit{saṅkhārā} (\textit{citta}), and \textit{viññāna} (\textit{phassa}). In any case, we have the fact (see note 41) that \textit{saññā} is sometimes used in a very loose sense to refer to any consciousness. Also cf. Nyanaponika 164: "\textit{Saññā} stands sometimes for consciousness in its entirety, e. g., in \textit{neva saññā-nāsaññā' ayatana . . ."
to non-Indian minds this is philosophical hair-splitting; by generally accepted standards of logicality and phenomenological accuracy, the final meditative stage would be quite correctly described as a state of total unconsciousness. It is therefore noteworthy that there does exist (in the Pūṭhapāda-sutta, belonging to the earliest stratum of the Nikāyas) a single variant version of the account of the eight jhānas in which the eighth stage is described straight-forwardly in terms of cessation of saññā (saññā nirujjanti). 45

Implications

The above discussion has shown that the series of eight jhānas described at numerous places in the Nikāyas, correlates well with the series of eight stages experienced by practitioners of concentration meditation. One can hardly escape the conclusion that the eight jhānas are the eight meditative stages.

This conclusion has serious implications for Buddhaghosa’s series of sub-stages. That series is said to precede attainment of each jhāna; but, as already noted, some of the sub-stages appear to be identical with cer-

45. D i 184-5. According to this sutta, the monk who has attained the realm of nothingness recognizes that he is at the peak of saññā, but that to be without saññā would be a still higher attainment. He therefore practices further until he “touches cessation” (nirodha phusati). This phrase provides a link with a common variant of the jhāna description, according to which jhāna 8 is followed by a yet higher attainment wherein the meditator “touches cessation” (e. g. M i 455-456). As described in the texts, this ninth attainment, “cessation of perception and feeling” (saññā-vedayita-nirodha) or “attainment of cessation” (nirodha-samāpatti), tallies well with the state of total unconsciousness already identified with jhāna 8. For several good reasons, including its frequent anomalous association with “destruction of the āsavas” (e. g. M iii 28), this ninth attainment is under suspicion of being a later addition to what was already a complete list of the stages in concentration meditation—see Paul Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem (La Salle, Ill.: Open court, 1986) 16-31; also Bronkhorst 77-78; and King 17. The evidence, particularly the existence of the Pūṭhapāda version, suggests that the description of jhāna 8 and the description of nirodha-samāpatti, though usually made to follow each other in accounts of the jhānas, were in origin two alternative descriptions of one and the same meditative attainment. (The Chinese counterpart of the Pāli Pūṭhapāda-sutta [Taishō vol. 1, 110 b 12-16] does recognize a discrete ninth stage, its description being identical in wording with the above-mentioned descriptions of jhāna 8 followed by nirodha-samāpatti. This discrepancy between the Pāli and Chinese versions of the Pūṭhapāda is most readily explained on the premise that the unique Pāli version preserves the “original,” since the Chinese version can then be attributed to editing designed to yield conformity with the stereotype.)
tain of the jhānas. For example, Buddhaghosa’s sub-stage characterized by the *patibhāga-nimitta* clearly corresponds to the meditative stage in which an abstract image becomes established; and that meditative stage has been shown to correspond also to *jhāna* 6. The first three of Buddhaghosa’s sub-stages can be fairly positively equated with *jhānas* in this way, which points to the pattern of correspondences shown in Table 5. Thus, Buddhaghosa’s series of sub-stages duplicates the series of *jhānas*. What Buddhaghosa portrays as steps on the way to the first *jhāna* (and to each subsequent *jhāna*) are in fact steps on the way to the last *jhāna*.

It is now evident that Buddhaghosa’s account is not, as generally supposed, merely a more detailed and precise formulation of the account found throughout the Nikāyas. Rather, it is a fundamentally different version which is in serious conflict with the Nikāya account. By Buddhaghosa’s day the *jhāna* doctrine had been drastically modified. The first and crucial modification, already introduced, it seems, by the earliest Abhidhammikas, consisted in equating the final stage of the meditative sequence (i.e. the state of total unconsciousness) with attainment of the first *jhāna* rather than the last (*jhāna* 8). Once this new equation had been set up, two further things became necessary: (1) a set of terms for the meditative stages passed through on the way to this new “first *jhāna*”; and (2) a description of a series of further meditative practices whereby the remaining *jhānas* could (allegedly) be attained. Accordingly, the new set of terms, *uggaha-nimitta*, etc., was created and brought into association with a practice consisting in systematic reflec-

46. The correspondence shown in Table 5 is less secure for *upacāra*- and *appanā-samādhi* than it is for the three *nimittas*. It is based in part on the sequence of sub-stages as described in the texts, and that sequence is not entirely clear. The *Vimuttimagga* (79) states: “And if the (after-)image [*patibhāga-nimitta*] appears in his mind, he gains access-meditation [*upacāra-samādhi*]. And if access-meditation appears in his mind, he, by means of this, accomplishes fixed meditation [*appanā-samādhi*].” This indicates the sequence: *patibhāga-nimitta, upacāra-samādhi, appanā-samādhi*. The *Visuddhimagga* appears to indicate the same sequence, but with some overlap: “. . . he should besides extend the counterpart sign [*patibhāga-nimitta*] . . . for it is possible to extend it on reaching access [*upacāra-samādhi*] and on reaching absorption [*appanā-samādhi*]” (Vism 152). However, at another point (Vism 126) the *Visuddhimagga* refers to “. . . the counterpart sign, which arises together with access concentration [*upacāra-samādhi*] . . .,” suggesting that the *patibhāga-nimitta* arises simultaneously with *upacāra-samādhi* rather than before it. The resulting slight uncertainty is acknowledged by the query marks in Table 5.
tion on the need to eliminate the next jhāna factor, or (in the case of the arūpa-jhānas) to move on to the next, more subtle object.

These developments must have been fairly directly linked with the developments discussed by Stuart-Fox, whereby ekaggatā was attributed to jhāna 1, and vitakka-vicāra was reinterpreted as some kind of attentive focusing. Only on the basis of such a revised description of jhāna 1 would it have been plausible, and therefore possible, to identify that jhāna with a deeply concentrated meditative state. Indeed, it may well be that the seemingly minor step of attributing ekaggatā to jhāna 1 was what initiated the entire process.

That such modification of the jhāna doctrine could come about may seem to raise doubts about the meditative credentials of those responsible for it; it suggests that the authors of the Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga had little practical acquaintance with meditation. However, this does not necessarily follow, because it is only the interpretation of the jhāna doctrine that is at fault in Buddhaghosa’s account; the description of the practice (as far as the first attainment of appanā-samādhi) is generally satisfactory. Indeed, the fact that a new set of names for the meditative stages was developed, centuries after the correspondences with the original set of jhānas had been lost sight of, indicates rather that the tradition of jhāna practice had survived intact down to Buddhaghosa’s day, and that he at least knew about the stages it entailed.

That the original correspondences between jhāna practice and jhāna doctrine were lost sight of in the first place is in keeping with the now widely acknowledged development of an early split, within the Sangha, between meditator-monks and scholar-monks.47 The Abhidhamma-like statements about the jhānas contained in the Saṅgiti, Dasuttara, and other late suttas, are consistent with this split having begun to develop not long after the founder’s death.48 Already in the early days of the Sangha meditators and Dhamma-expounders were going their separate ways; a serious communication gap was developing.


48. See D iii 219, D iii 274, where vitakka and vicāra are said to be lost successively; also cf. M i 294, M iii 25-29, S iv 263, where ekaggatā is said to be present in the first jhāna.
One negative consequence of Buddhaghosa's complex account of *jhāna* was that mastery of the higher *jhānas* was made to seem a superhuman attainment. With the entire series multiplied by itself, as it were, the total number of stages was greatly increased; and no genuine instructions were available for the attainment of any *jhāna* beyond the supposed first one. This effect continues to the present day. To most Buddhist meditators, even "the second *jhāna*" seems hardly a realistic goal, while "the arūpa-*jhānas*" appear impossibly remote. The present revised understanding of the *jhānas* should, therefore, give encouragement to practicing meditators. The path of concentration practice is not nearly as long and arduous as Buddhaghosa made it seem.
Table 1. Diagram of jhānas 1 to 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>CONATION</th>
<th>FEELING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-jhāna condition:</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 1:</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 3:</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 4:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**THOUGHT**
- vitakka-vicāra (initial and sustained thought)
- vūpasama (suppression)
- avitakka, avicāra (absence of thought)
  - sampasādāna (tranquility)
  - cetassā ekodibhāva (oneness of mind)

**CONATION**
- kāma (sense desires)
- akusaladdhammā (unwholesome states)
- viveka (separation)
- piti (concentration)
- virāga (fading away)
- upekkhā (equanimity)
  - sati-sampajañña (mindfulness & self-possession)

**FEELING**
- sukhā, dukkha (pleasure, pain)
- somanassā, domanassā (happiness, sorrow)
- sukha
- kāyasukha (bodily pleasure)
- pahāna (relinquishing)
  - upekkhā, sati
  - asukha (absence of pleasure)
  - pārisuddhi (purity)
Table 2. Summary of *jhānas* 1 to 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>CONATION</th>
<th>FEELING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jhāna 1</td>
<td>vitakka-vicāra</td>
<td>piti</td>
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<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 2</td>
<td>ekodibhāva</td>
<td>piti</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 3</td>
<td>ekodibhāva</td>
<td>upekkhā</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 4</td>
<td>ekodibhāva</td>
<td>upekkhā</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Simplified summary of *jhānas* 1 to 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>CONATION</th>
<th>FEELING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jhāna 1</td>
<td>vitakka-vicāra</td>
<td>piti</td>
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<td>jhāna 2</td>
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<td>piti</td>
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<td>jhāna 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 4</td>
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Table 4. Simplified summary of *jhānas* 1 to 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>CONATION</th>
<th>FEELING</th>
<th>SENSE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jhāna 1</td>
<td>vitakka-vicāra</td>
<td>piti</td>
<td>sukha</td>
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<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 2</td>
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<td>piti</td>
<td>sukha</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 3</td>
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<td>sukha</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>jhāna 5</td>
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Table 5. Equivalences between sub-stages and *jhānas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-STAGE</th>
<th>JHĀNA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>parikamma-nimitta</em> (preliminary sign)</td>
<td>1-4. <em>rūpa-jhānas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>uggaha-nimitta</em> (acquired sign)</td>
<td>5. <em>ākāsānañcāyatana</em> (endless space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>patibhaga-nimitta</em> (counterpart sign)</td>
<td>6. <em>viññānañcāyatana</em> (endless consciousness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>? upacāra-samādhi</em> (access concentration)</td>
<td>7. <em>ākiñcañnāyatana</em> (nothingness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>? appanā-samādhi</em> (fixed concentration)</td>
<td>8. <em>neva saññā nāsaññāyatana</em> (neither perception nor non-perception)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>