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CHIKAFUMI WATANABE

A Translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* with the *Tarkajvālā* III. 137-146¹

Introduction

The *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (hereafter, MHK) is one of the works² ascribed to Bhāviveka³ (A.D. c. 490-570)⁴, who was one of the eight known commentators on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter, MMK)⁵ of Nāgārjuna (A.D. c. 150-250) and who used formal proofs in expounding Madhyamaka thought.⁶ The only known manuscript of the MHK was discovered and hand-copied by Rāhula SĀMKRṬYĀYANA at the Źa lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied the manuscript there, he registered his copy as “VII Źa lu Monastery, XXXVII, 1. 311. *Tarkajvālā* (*Madhyamakahrdaya*)” in his handlist.⁷ Subsequently, SĀMKRṬYĀYANA entrusted the copy to V.V. GOKHALE who later, when visiting Japan in 1971, allowed several scholars to copy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research on the MHK to them. Then, in 1972, when GOKHALE visited Rome, he was given the chance to edit the photographs of the manuscript of the MHK in a collection by G. TUCCI who, while travelling in India, Nepal and Tibet, had succeeded in photographing the MHK manuscript at the Źa lu monastery. Since then, a number of chapters of the MHK have been edited and published based upon these photographs from GOKHALE’s notes⁸ and Tucci’s collection. In 1991, other photographs of this same manuscript of the MHK were published in China⁹, and in 1994, S.S. BAHULKAR published photographs of GOKHALE’s notes in Japan.¹⁰ The MHK consists of roughly 928 *anuṣṭubh*-verses¹¹ and is divided into eleven chapters.¹² The third chapter of the MHK, *Tattvajñānaisaṇā*, is the most important chapter among the eleven because Mādhyamika thought is primarily presented in this chapter, whereas in the other chapters Madhyamaka thought is expressed through the criticism of other systems and schools.¹³ A critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of the Tibetan text of the third chapter of the MHK was published and translated into Japanese by Yasunori EJIMA in 1980.¹⁴ In the same year, 1980, Shotaro IIDA published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan

text of the *Tarkajvālā* (hereafter, TJ) corresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of the verses and the TJ.¹⁵ Prior to those works, the TJ corresponding to verses 1-146 of the MHK was translated by Jyosho NOZAWA into Japanese between 1954 and 1972.¹⁶

The main subject of verses 137-256 in the third chapter of the MHK and the TJ is “the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject discussed by Mādhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna, many of whom tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoints. The non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness, in the Mādhyamika school, is basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible.

In this paper, I have translated verses 137-146¹⁷ together with the TJ¹⁸. In verses 139-146, Bhāviveka criticizes the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state (*satkāryavāda*), etc., advocated by the Sāṃkhya school. The Sāṃkhyas claim that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is therefore self-generated. Bhāviveka, however, criticizes this opinion.

The present English translation of the MHK was made from the Sanskrit text edited by EJIMA and the English translation of the TJ was made from the Tibetan. I have attempted to translate the MHK and the TJ as literally as possible but in a form that is as readable as possible. Nevertheless, I fear that some ambiguity has unavoidably remained as both the style and subject matter of the textual material are often technical and dense. This problem has hopefully been resolved by amplifying the translation with phrases in square brackets. In addition, further explanatory comments may be found in the endnotes.

I have consulted the Peking, Derge (*sDe dge*) and Cone (*Co ne*) editions and made my own edition of the Tibetan text which will appear after the translation section. As is well known, however, the Peking edition is very close to the Narthang (*sNar than*) edition. On the other hand, the Cone edition is close to the Derge edition. These variations among the four editions seem to have resulted from scribal errors or spelling and punctuational changes. For this reason, I have referred only to the Derge and Peking editions in my edition of the Tibetan text. Moreover, I have only included the major corrections that I have made to the text in order to avoid overly complicating the paper. In the near

future, I will be publishing an edition of the Tibetan text of the TJ employing all four editions.

An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows:

III. 3 Introduction to the topic:

The non-production of all dharmas	vv. 137-138
A. The non-production from itself	vv. 139-146
B. The non-production from others	vv. 147-158
C. The criticism of the four conditions	v. 159
(i) <i>hetu-pratyaya</i>	vv. 160-162
(ii) <i>ālambana-pratyaya</i>	vv. 163-166
(iii) <i>samanantara-pratyaya</i>	vv. 167-169
(iv) <i>adhipati-pratyaya</i>	vv. 170-175
D. The problem of invalidation by <i>pratyakṣa</i> and <i>pratīti</i>	vv. 176-181
E. The criticism of the theory of the Sāṃkhya school	vv. 182-191
F. The non-production from itself and others	vv. 192-193
G. The non-production without cause	vv. 194-195
H. The criticism of the Lokāyatas	vv. 196-214
I. The criticism of the <i>īśvara</i>	vv. 215-223
J. An examination of <i>dr̥ṣṭi</i> , 'view'	vv. 224-229
K. An examination of <i>duḥkha</i> , 'suffering'	vv. 230-233
L. An examination of the <i>Buddha</i>	vv. 234-239
M. Seeing <i>praṭīyasamutpāda</i> and seeing the <i>Buddha</i>	vv. 240-246
N. Conclusion	vv. 247-256

TRANSLATION

III.3 Introduction to the topic: The non-production of all dharmas [MHK:]

*atha vā kalpanā-jāla-prasaro hy evamādikaḥ /
 jāta-bhāvāśrayo bālam ākulī-kurute balāt //137//
 vidvān vidyā-pradīpena yathābhūtaṃ parīkṣate /
 jāter niṣedhāt tacchānteḥ prapañcopaśamas tadā //138//*

Or, indeed, the expansion of a net of conceptual constructions (*kalpanā*) which has such a beginning with such things as [*dravya*, *pradhāna*, *jīva*, *ātman*, etc.],¹⁹ and which has for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant person through its force. //137//

When a knowledgeable person examines [the non-production of entities] as they are with the lamp of knowledge (*vidyā-pradīpa*), then because [he] negates production, it (production) is extinguished. Consequently the conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*)²⁰ ceases. //138//

[TJ:] Or, in order to explain entities as having no own-being (**niḥsva-bhāvatā*), making effort (**prayatna*) is always to be continued. Why? [This is so] because that which [our] own and other [systems] have thoroughly imagined, [that is,] all things, beginning with a net of conceptual constructions (**kalpanā-jāla*), depending upon the attachment that entities have arising, arise, [and this is so] because [all things, beginning with a net of conceptual constructions] confound an ignorant, unwise person whose eye of intelligence (**buddhi*) is closed (**nimīlita*) by them (the expansion of the net of conceptual construction, etc.). Therefore, through knowledge which has no partiality (*phyogs su lung ba*, **pakṣapāta*), when a knowledgeable person, a yogin whose eye of intelligence is well-opened by the pure lamp (**vimala-pradīpa*) of knowledge (**vidyā*), examines the non-production of entities as they are, then, because [he] sees the non-production of all entities in their nature just like illusion [having no arising], [he] negates the production [of entities], [and subsequently] the dirt of conceptual construction, i.e., production [of entities], is extinguished. Consequently all conceptual proliferations (**prapañca*), i.e., activity of speech (*tshig gi brjod pa'i*

spros pa), ceases. For this reason, one should exercise (*brtul bar bya ba, *upasamhāra*)²¹ the means (**upāya*) immediately.

How is the non-production of these entities understood? As to that, some say that entities are produced from themselves. Some state that [they are produced] from others. Some claim that [they are produced] from both. Some say that [they are produced] without cause. Some state that [they are produced] from the Lord (**īśvara*), pure consciousness (**puruṣa*), primary matter (**pradhāna*), time (**kāla*) and [the god] **Nārāyana*. Among these, the Sāṃkhyas state that [entities] are produced from themselves. To them, [Bhāviveka] says:

A. The non-production from itself

[MHK:]

*tatra tāvat svato janma samvṛtyāpi na yujyate /
sātmakatvād yathā dadhnaḥ*²² *svato janma na vidyate //139//*

Here, firstly,

[Thesis:]

production from itself is not proper even in conventional reality,

[Reason:]

because it [already] exists as itself,

[Example:]

just as curd (*dadhi*) has no birth from itself. //139//

[TJ:] “from itself” (**svataḥ*) means “from [its own] self” (**ātmanah*).²³ As [the Sāṃkhyas state], if entities arise from themselves,²⁴ it would be possible that [entities] arise without cause (**hetu*) and conditions (**pratyaya*). Such things[, however,] are not seen even in [our] world (**loka*), [and] much less even in ultimate reality (**paramārthataḥ*). In [the phrase] “because it [already] exists as itself” (**sātmakatvād*), “itself” (**ātmaka*) is “that which has own-being” (**sasvabhāva*), and [the phrase] “it [already] exists as itself” (**sātmaka*) means “ [it has] it-self.” Its (the word **ātmaka*’s) abstract noun is **ātmakatva*. Accordingly, [the phrase] “because it [already] has itself” means “because it exists²⁵ by [its] nature” (**svabhāvena = *svātmanā vidyamānatvāt*).

If it (an existing entity) arises, since [it] exists, what [possible] activity of re-arising (**punar-utpāda*) could there be? [There is not any activity!] For example, it is admissible in [our] world that curd (**dadhi*) is

produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible that curd is produced from curd itself. In the same manner, an existent having itself also does not arise from itself, because this would be a logical contradiction [implying] that activity [of arising] works on itself.²⁶ There is also another way (**mārga*) of proof (**pramāṇa*) [below].

[MHK:]

notpannāḥ svātmato bhāvā bhāvāt vāt tad yathā pumān //140ab//

[Thesis:]

Existents do not arise out of themselves,

[Reason:]

because they have existence,

[Example:]

just like the *puruṣa* (*pums*) [in your view]. //140ab//

[TJ:] Because it is stated in their scriptural text (**grantha*) that pure consciousness (**puruṣa*) does not arise,²⁷ admitting only “does not arise,” “just like [the **puruṣa*]” becomes an example of the negation of the arising of entities.²⁸

[MHK:]

nāpi cāt māsty ajātānām ajātatvāt kha-puṣpavat //140cd//

[Thesis:]

the unproduced has no self either,

[Reason:]

because it is not born,

[Example:]

just like the sky-flower (*kha-puṣpa*). //140cd//

[TJ:] If “self” (**ātman*) is “own-being” (**svabhāva*), [something] which does not arise from [it]self such as pure consciousness (**puruṣa*), does not have one (i.e., self), because it is not born, just like the sky-flower.

[Objection:] In regard to that, the Sāṃkhyas, imaging the meaning of the “sky-flower” in various ways, argue that there is no [valid] example [to support the above statement].

[The Sāṃkhyas ask:] (1) if “sky-flower” [which you employ as an example of the unproduced] means a flower which exists in the sky, [then] it would follow that the “sky-flower” would be a “flower” such as **tilaka*, **utpala* flower, etc., and they would also exist in space because

space is discriminated as the location.²⁹ Or, (2) [if you] name [it] the sky-flower, because [it is] a flower which arises from the sky, here too, analyzing the meaning of “from the sky,” [we ask:] Is [the sky-flower] a flower which is distinguished from the sky? or, is [the sky-flower] a flower which came from the sky? If [you] name the sky and the flower the sky-flower, then since both are existents, [your] example, the “sky-flower,” cannot prove non-existence. If you say that “because the flower which is connected to the sky does not exist, the sky-flower has to be taken as a flower which does not exist in the sky, therefore [we speak of] the sky-flower,” then it would not be in keeping with the idea that none of the three worlds are the sky-flower. Why? [It is] because the sky-flower would also exist according to some kind of nature. Therefore, we say: “There is no [valid] example [to support] your [thesis].”

[Answer:] To this [objection, Bhāviveka] replies:

[MHK:]

*kha-puṣpābhāva-vācyaṃ hi³⁰ khādi yady api te matam /
na kha-puṣpaṃ tad ity asmāt pakṣe 'pi nyūnatā na naḥ //141//*

Although you might think that the meaning of [our statement] ‘the sky-flower does not exist’ is “sky, etc.,” still that [sky, etc.] is not the sky-flower, therefore, we do not have a deficiency (*nyūnatā*) in [this] thesis statement (*pakṣa*) either. //141//

[TJ:] You think that the meaning of our example, the “sky-flower” being non-existent is “sky, etc.,” [where the word “sky” is analyzed as having various compound or case changings,] that is to say, by making distinctions, such as [the locative] “in the sky,” [the ablative] “from the sky,” [the *dvandva*] “sky and flower” and [the genitive] “flower of the sky,” you think that all of the three worlds (**trailokya*) also exist. However, these [distinctions you hold] are not the meaning of [our] example, “the sky-flower.”³¹

[Question:] Then, what [is the meaning of your example]?

[Answer:] The meaning of our example, the “sky-flower” is different from what you have conceptually constructed as space (**ākāśa*), etc., and you cannot prove that our example [the “sky-flower”] must exist as some kind of nature. Therefore, we do not have a deficiency of the similar example (**sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) in this thesis statement (**pakṣa*) either.³²

[Objection:] As to that, [some of the Sāṃkhyas] say: The assertion of some [others] who maintain that production is from the self which is of the nature of the effect has those [previously stated] faults. Since we hold that [entities] arise from causal own characteristics (**hetu-svalakṣaṇa*),³³ therefore, our statement does not have those mistakes, since everything that has origination (**utpattimat*) arises only from that which exists as causal nature.³⁴

[Then,] assuming the doubt (**āśaṅkā*) that others held, the author of [this] treatise (**śāstra-kāra*)³⁵ says:³⁶

[MHK:]

*kāryasya kāraṇaṃ svātmā tasya janma tato matam /
svato janma tato 'bhīṣṭaṃ bhāvānām iti cen matam //142//*

The own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) is considered to be from that (cause). Therefore, for existents [which are the effects], birth from themselves (=their own-being, the causes), is accepted. If this is [your] view, then //142//

[TJ:] this [view] has the following fault:

[MHK:]

svātmavat tadananyatvāt kāraṇaṃ syād akāraṇam //143ab//

because [the cause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self [of that effect], the cause would be no cause (i.e., cease to be a cause). //143ab//

[TJ:] If the cause and the effect are different [from each other], it is possible to establish the verbal expression (**vyavahāra*), “This is a cause. This is an effect.” However, when [the cause and the effect] are not different [from each other], it is impossible [to establish the verbal expression that “This is a cause. This is an effect.”] (1) It would follow that the seed would also not be a cause of the sprout. Why? [This is] because [the seed] would not be different from that [the sprout], [that is,] because the cause would be identical to the own-being of the effect (**kārya-svātma*). Therefore, (2) [we can say regarding the effect,] the sprout, in truth, would also not be an effect of the seed. [Why? This is so] because [the sprout] would not be different from that [seed], and because it would be identical to the own-being of the cause. Thus, there

would be the logical fault that the relation between the effect and the cause (**kāryakāraṇa-bhāvatā*) [in the verbal expression] would not exist. Moreover, [Bhāviveka says:]

[MHK:]

ajātātvaḥ ca kiṃ kasya kāraṇaṃ syād akāraṇam //143cd//

And since [*puruṣa*, *pradhāna*, etc.,] are unproduced, what, itself not being a cause, could be the cause of what? //143cd//

[TJ:] Since primary matter (**pradhāna*), pure consciousness (**puruṣa*), etc., are themselves unproduced, then there being no distinction (**viśeṣa*) in terms of before and after, [they are] not causes. Therefore, because being nothing and not being the cause of anything, how could it be the cause of anything else? [It could not!] In the same way, [the above statement] means that a seed, etc., which are not yet arisen, could not produce a sprout, etc.

[Objection:] Some [Sāṃkhyas]³⁷ hold the view that the cause itself is not exactly (**eva*) the same as the effect. Since the effect exists in the cause in a potential state,³⁸ it is manifested by cause and conditions. Since both that potentiality (**śakti*) and manifestation (**vyakti*) do not have different natures (**abhinnātmakatvāt*), [therefore,] origination from that [potentiality means] “origination from itself (**janma svataḥ*).”

[Answer:] To them, [Bhāviveka] replies:

[MHK:]

saty ātmani ca bhāvasya³⁹ vṛthā kāraṇa-kalpanā //144ab//

And, when the self of an existent [already] exists, it is useless to postulate a cause. //144ab//

[TJ:] When [you] hold that the cause produces the effect, if the effect itself exists [in the cause], what is the point in postulating a cause (**kāraṇa-kalpanā*)? There is also another major error below:

[MHK:]

tasmād eva tad utpannaṃ caikyam janaka-janyayoḥ //144cd//

“A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (*janaka*) and what is generated (*janya*) become identical (*ekya*). //144cd//

[TJ:] [The generator and what is generated] means the pair of cause and effect.

[Objection:] We could state that, although [something] is indeed produced from itself, both the generator (**janaka*) and what is generated (**janya*) would not be identical; for example, when the one property (**dharma*) which exists as the substance (**dravya*) “milk” ceases, then the other property (**dharma*), “curd” arises, and in that [situation,] the verbal expression “cause and result” would be justified.⁴⁰

[Answer:] [To them, Bhāviveka] replies:

[MHK:]

dadhi-bhāvena payaso 'vasthānāc ced abādhakam /
putratvenānavasthānāt pitur na hi na bādhakam //145//

If [what we have said above] does not refute [your position] because milk exists as curd, [then we would claim, on the contrary, that] it does refute, because of [the fact that] a father does not exist as a child. //145//

[TJ:] [That is to say,] it is not seen by anyone, anywhere, and in any way, that in abandoning the state of the father totally, the father completely changes to the nature of the child. Therefore, you have difficulty avoiding (*bzlog pa*) [your] fallacy that the generator and what is generated would be identical.

[Objection:] Here, opponents rebut the Mādhyamikas on the following grounds: The Mādhyamikas' reasons “because it [already] exists as itself” (v. 139c; *sātmakatvād*) and “because they have existence” (v. 140b; *bhāvatvāt*), which are established as the reasons for non-production, are [in fact] reasons which establish the dissimilar instances (**vipakṣa*) of non-production, i.e., things which do arise. However, they cannot be reasons establishing non-production. To explain: [The reasons] “existing as itself” and “having existence,” are present in produced entities such as jars, etc., but are absent in unproduced things such as rabbit's horns, etc. Consequently, [the reasons] “existing as itself” and “having existence,” i.e., the reasons for [proving] existence [of entities], are not present in any of the similar instances (**sapakṣa*) for [proving] the non-existence [of entities], but are present only in the dissimilar instances. Thus, the thesis is contradicted. Since [the reasons “because it [already] exists as itself” and “because they have existence,”] prove the existence of arising which is the opposite (**viparīta*) of the inherent nature (**sva-rūpa*) of

the subject [of the thesis] (**dharmin*),⁴¹ therefore, [your] thesis is contradicted.

[Answer:] [We] answer: [Our reasons that] “it [already] exists as itself” and “they have existence” are conventional. What arises, based upon them, has no own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatā*) in ultimate reality (**paramārthataḥ*). Since there is no arising in any way from itself, from others, from both [itself and others] and without cause, there is no dissimilar instance of non-production. Therefore, [Bhāviveka] says:

[MHK:]

vipakṣāsambhavād iṣṭā nāpi hetor viruddhatā //146ab//

Because of the impossibility of dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), it would also not be right to hold that the reason [in our proof formula] is contradicted. //146ab//⁴²

[MHK:]

evam tāvat svato janma bhāvānām nopadyate //146cd//

Thus, first of all [it has been proven] that existents are not produced from themselves. //146cd//

[TJ:] The meaning of the sentence (**vākyārtha*) is that in the way (**naya*) described above, [existents are not produced from themselves].

Tibetan Text of the *Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā* III. 137-146

III. 3 Introduction to the topic: *The non-production of all dharmas*

[D91a2, P97b5]

yañ na rnam rtog dra ba yi //

[D91a2, P97b6]

rgyun 'brel de dag la sogs pa //
 dños po skye bar 'dzin brten pas //
 nan gyis byis pa 'khrul bar⁴³ byed //<137>
 gañ tshe mkhas pa rig sgron gyis //
 yañ dag ji bzin yoñs rtog⁴⁴ pa //

de tshe skye bkag de źi bas //
 spros pa ńe [P97b7] bar źi bar 'gyur // <138>⁴⁵

źes bya ba ni yań na dńos po rnams ńo bo ńid med pa ńid du bstan pa'i
 phyir 'bad par byed pa de ni gnas yin pa kho na ste⁴⁶/ gań gi phyir źe na
 / rań dań gźan dag gis yońs su btags pa rnam par [P97b8] rtog pa'i dra
 [D91a4] ba'i rgyun 'brel pa de dag la sogs pa ma lus pa ni dńos po
 rnams la skye ba yod par 'dzin pa la brten te / byuń ba yin pas de dag
 gis nan gyis byis pa ma rig pas blo gros kyi mig zum⁴⁷ pa mi mkhas pa
 dag [P98a1] 'khrul bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir⁴⁸ gań gi
 [D91a5] tshe rnal 'byor pa mkhas pa rig⁴⁹ pa dri ma med pa'i sgron mas
 blo gros kyi mig legs par bye ba dag phyogs su lhuń ba'i blo na med pas
 dńos po rnams la skye ba [P98a2] med pa ńid du yań dag pa ji lta ba
 bźin yońs su rtog pa de'i tshe / dńos po thams cad sgyu ma bźin du ńo
 bo ńid kyis⁵⁰ [D91a6] skye ba med par mthoń źing skye ba bkag pa'i
 phyir / skye bar rnam par rtog pa'i dri ma de źi bas tshig gi [P98a3]
 brjod pa'i spros pa thams cad ńe bar źi bar 'gyur bas gcig car⁵¹ thabs de
 ńid la brtul bar bya ba'i rigs so //

dńos po de dag ma skyes par ji ltar khoń du chud par bya źe na /
 [D91a7] 'di la kha cig ni dńos po rnams [P98a4] bdag las skye bar
 'dod / kha cig ni gźan las / kha cig ni gńi ga las / kha cig ni rgyu med pa
 las / kha cig ni dbań phyug dań skyes bu dań gtso bo dań dus dań sred
 med kyi bu dag las skye bar 'dod do // de la [P98a5] grańs can [D91b1]
 dag ni bdag las skye bar smras pa / de dag gi phyir bśad pa /

A. *The non-production from itself*

de la re źig bdag skye ba //
 kun rdzob tu yań mi rigs te //
 bdag ńid yod phyir dper bya⁵² na //
 źo ni bdag las mi skye bźin //<139>⁵³

źes bya ba [P98a6] bdag las źes bya ba ni rań las źes bya ba'i tha tshig
 go // [D91b2] 'di ltar gal te dńos po rnams bdag las⁵⁴ skye bar 'gyur⁵⁵
 na / rgyu dań rkyen rnams med par yań skye ba'i rigs na / de lta bu ni
 'jig rten na yań ma mthoń na / don [P98a7] dam par lta smos kyań ci
 dgos / bdag ńid yod pa'i phyir źes bya ba la bdag ces bya ba ni rań gi ńo
 bo [D91b3] ńid dań bcas pa ste / bdag ńid yod pa'i don ni bdag go //
 de'i dńos po ni bdag ńid do // de'i phyir bdag ńid yod [P98a8] pa'i

phyir zés bya ba ni rañ gi ño bo ñid du yod pa'i phyir zés bya ba'i tha tshig go //

gal te de skye ba na yod pa ñid yin na / de la yang skye bas ci žig bya / [D91b4] dper bya na 'jig rten na 'o ma las žo skye bar 'dod kyi / žo ñid žo'i rañ [P98b1] gi bdag ñid las skye bar mi 'dod pa bžin du dños po bdag ñid yod pa yañ bdag las mi skye ste / rañ gi bdag ñid la byed pa 'gal ba'i skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // yañ na tshad ma'i lam [D91b5] gžan yañ yod de /

dños [P98a2] rnams bdag las ma skyes te⁵⁶//
dños po yin phyir skyes bu bžin // <140ab>⁵⁷

žes bya ba la skyes bu ni de dag gi gžun las ma skyes par 'dod pas / de bžin zés bya ba ni ma skyes pa tsam žig khas blañs nas dños po rnams kyi skye ba⁵⁸ [P98b3] dgag [D91b6] pa'i dper bya'o //

ma skyes pa la bdag med de //
ma skyes phyir na mkha' min bžin // <140cd>⁵⁹

žes bya ba la bdag ni ño bo ñid yin na </> de ni skyes bu la sogs pa bdag las⁶⁰ ma skyes pa dag⁶¹ la med de / ma skyes pa'i phyir [P98b4] nam mkha'i me tog bžin no //⁶²

'dir grañs can dag nam mkha'i me tog gi don rnam pa du mar rnam par brtags nas⁶³ dpe med pa ñid du [P98b5] rgol bar byed de / ci nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba de'i don gal te nam mkha' la 'dug pa'i me [D92a1] tog yin pas nam mkha'i me tog ces bya na⁶⁴ ni me tog ti-la-ka dañ ut-pa-la la sogs pa dag yin par thal [P98b6] bar 'gyur te / de dag kyañ nam mkha' la 'dug pa yin te / nam mkha' ni go skabs 'byed pa'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // [D92b2] 'on te nam mkha' las byuñ ba'i⁶⁵ me tog yin pas nam mkha'i me tog ces bya na ni 'di la [P98b7] yañ nam mkha' las zés bya ba'i don rnam par brtags nas / ci nam mkha' las gžan pa'i me tog yin nam / 'on te nam mkha' las 'oñs pa'i me tog yin [D92a3] grañ / gal te nam mkha' dañ me tog la nam mkha'i [P98b8] me tog ces bya na ni de lta na / de gñi ga yañ yod pa yin pa'i phyir nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba'i dpe de dños po med par sgrub par mi nus so // gal te khyod⁶⁶ 'di skad ces nam mkha' dañ 'brel ba'i me [D92a4] tog med pas [P99a1] nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba ni nam mkha' la ni me tog yod pa ma yin pa la bya ste / de'i phyir nam mkha'i me tog ces bya'o že na / de lta na / yañ 'jig rten gsum po thams cad nam mkha'i me tog ma [P99a2] yin pa'i don dañ mthun par mi 'gyur te / [D92a5] gañ gi phyir že na / nam mkha'i me tog kyañ bdag ñid 'ga' žig gis yod pa'i phyir khyed kyi dpe med pa kho na yin no že zer ro //

'dir bśad pa /

nam mkha'i⁶⁷ me [P99a3] tog med pa'i don //
 mkha' la sogs par khyod 'dod pa //
 de dag nam mkha'i me tog min //
 [D92a6]
 de'i phyir kho bo'i phyogs med min // <141>⁶⁸

žes bya ba ni kho bo cag gi dpe nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba de'i med
 pa'i don la nam [P92a4] mkha' la sogs pa žes bya ba nam mkha' la dañ
 nam mkha' las dañ nam mkha' dañ me tog dañ nam mkha'i me tog ces
 rnam par [D92a7] dbye ba dag gis 'jig rten gsum po thams cad kyañ yod
 par [P99a5] khyod⁶⁹ 'dod pa de dag ni kho bo cag gi dpe nam mkha'i
 me tog ces bya ba'i don ma yin te⁷⁰/

'o na ji lta bu že na /

kho bo cag ni dpe nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba de'i don ni khyod
 kyis <nam>⁷¹ mkha' la sogs par btags pa de [D92b1, P99a6]] dag las
 gžan yin la / nam mkha'i me tog ces⁷² kho bo cag gi dper bžag pa de
 bdag ñid 'ga' žig gis yod par yañ khyed kyis sgrub⁷³ par mi nus pas /
 de'i phyir kho bo'i phyogs 'di la yañ chos mthun pa'i dpe [P99a7] med
 pa ma yin no //

'dir smras pa / [D92b2] gañ dag gi phyogs la 'bras bu'i rañ gi bdag
 ñid kyi bdag las skye bar 'dod pa de dag gi phyogs la ni skyon de dag tu
 yañ 'gyur gyi / kho bo ni rgyu'i rañ gi mtshan ñid las skye bar 'dod
 [P99a8] pas kho bo'i phyogs la skyon de dag med de / skye ba can
 thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag [D92b3] ñid du yod pa ñid las skye ba'i phyir
 ro že na /

pha rol po de dag gis dogs pa bsu nas bstan bcos byed pas /

gal te rgyu la⁷⁴ 'bras bdag⁷⁵ [P99b1] yod //
 de las de ni skye sñam⁷⁶ žiñ //
 dños rnam de las skye ba ni //⁷⁷
 bdag las skye ba ñid 'dod na // <142>⁷⁸

žes bya ba smos so // de la skyon 'di yod de /

[D92b4]
 de las⁷⁹ gžan min bdag bžin na //
 rgyu ni rgyu min ñid du 'gyur //<143ab>⁸⁰

žes bya ba ni gal te rgyu dañ 'bras [P99b2] bu dag gžan ñid yin na⁸¹ 'di
 ni rgyu'o 'di ni 'bras bu'o žes bya ba'i tha sñad rnam par gžag⁸² tu ruñ
 gi gžan ñid ma yin pa la mi ruñ ste / sa bon yañ myu gu'i [D92b5] rgyu
 ñid ma yin par 'gyur ro // ji ltar že na / de [P99b3] las gžan ma yin pa'i

phyir 'bras bu'i rañ gi bdag ñid bžin⁸³ pa'i phyir ro // des na myu gu
yañ yañ dag par na sa bon gyi⁸⁴ 'bras bu ma yin te / de las gžan ñid ma
yin pa'i phyir rgyu'i rañ gi bdag [P99b4] ñid bžin pas / [D92b6] de lta
na rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po ñid med pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro // gžan
yañ /

ma skyes phyir ni rgyu min pa //
ci žig yin žiñ gañ gi⁸⁵ rgyu // <143cd>⁸⁶

žes bya ba ni gtso bo dañ skyes bu la sogs pa rañ ñid [P99b5] ma skyes
pa'i phyir sñā⁸⁷ phyi'i khyad par med par ni rgyu ma yin pas ci [D92b7]
yañ ma yin žiñ gañ gi rgyur yañ mi 'gyur bas ji ltar gžan gyi rgyur
'gyur / de bžin du sa bon la sogs pa ma skyes pa dag gi⁸⁸ ni myu gu la
sogs [P99b6] pa mñon par sgrub par mi nus so žes bya ba'i tha tshig
go //

ci ste 'di sñam du rgyu gañ kho na yin pa de ñid 'bras bu ma yin
[D93a1] te / 'o na ji lta bu že na / rgyu la 'bras bu nus pa'i bdag ñid du
yod pas de rgyu dañ rkyen [P99b7] rnams kyis gsal bar byed de / nus pa
dañ gsal ba de gñis kyañ bdag ñid tha mi dad pa'i phyir de las skye ba ni
bdag las skye ba yin par sems [D93a2] na </>

de'i phyir bśad pa /

'bras bu⁸⁹ bdag ñid ñid yin na⁹⁰ //
[P99b8]

rgyur brtag pa ni don med 'gyur // <144ab>⁹¹

žes bya ba ni rgyu ni 'bras bu bskyed pa yin par 'dod na / gal te 'bras bu
bdag ñid⁹² yod pa ñid yin na </> rgyur brtag pas ci žig bya / skyon chen
po gžan 'di yañ yod de /

[D93a3]

de ñid las [P100a1] ni de skye na //

skyed⁹³ dañ bskyed bya gcig tu 'gyur // <144cd>⁹⁴

žes bya ba ni rgyu dañ 'bras bu gñis žes bya ba'i tha tshig go // gal te 'di
sñam du bdag las skye ba kho na yañ yin la / skyed pa dañ bskyed par
bya ba⁹⁵ gñis gcig pa ñid du yañ mi 'gyur ba kho bos [D93a4] ston par
nus te / dper na 'o ma že bya ba'i rdzas de ltar⁹⁶ gnas pa'i chos gžan
'gag pa na žo žes bya ba'i chos gžan skye žiñ de la rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i
tha sñad [P100a3] rnām par gžag⁹⁷ pa yañ yod pa bžin no sñam du sems
na / bśad pa /

gal te 'o ma žo ñid du //

gnas pas [D93a5] gnod pa med sñam na //

pha ni bu ñid mi 'gyur bas //
gnod pa med pa ma yin no // <145>⁹⁸

žes bya ba ni 'di [P100a4] ltar phas pha'i dños po ñid yoñs su bdañ nas bu'i no bo ñid du yoñs su⁹⁹ 'gyur ba ni sus kyañ gañ du ji ltar yañ ma mthoñ bas / de'i phyir khyod kyis skyed¹⁰⁰ pa dañ bskyed [D93a6] par bya ba gñis gcig pa ñid [P100a5] du 'gyur ba'i skyon bzlog par dka'o // 'dir pha rol po dag dbu ma pa'i gtan tshigs bdag ñid yod pa'i phyir žes bya ba dañ / dños po yin pa'i phyir žes bya ba dag skye ba med pa'i gtan tshigs su [P100a6] bžag pa dag ni skye ba med pa'i mi mthun pa'i [D93a7] phyogs skye ba can dag sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs yin gyi / skye ba med pa sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi ruñ no žes phyir zlog par byed de / 'di ltar bdag ñid [P100a7] yod pa ñid dañ dños po ñid ces bya ba ni bum pa la sogs pa'i dños po skyes pa dag la yod kyi / ri boñ gi rva la [D93b1] sogs pa ma skyes pa dag la ni med pas </> de'i phyir bdag ñid yod pa ñid dañ [P100a8] dños po ñid ces bya ba dños po'i bdag ñid kyi gtan tshigs de dag dños po med pa'i bdag ñid kyi mthun¹⁰¹ pa'i phyogs gañ la yañ med la / mi mthun pa'i phyogs kho na la yod pa'i phyir [D93b2] don 'gal ba ñid kyis [P100b1] skye ba med pa žes bya ba'i chos can gyi no bo ñid las bzlog pa skye ba yod pa ñid sgrub par byed pa'i phyir don 'gal ba ñid yin no že na / bśad pa / bdag ñid yod pa ñid dañ dños po ñid ces bya ba de dag ni kun [P100b2] rdzob pa yin te / de dag la brten nas byuñ [D93b3] ba ni don dam par no bo ñid med pa ñid yin te / bdag dañ gžan dañ gñi ga dañ rgyu med pa las rnam pa thams cad du skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba med pa'i mi [P100b3] mthun pa'i phyogs skye ba med pas /

mi mthun phyogs ni med pa'i phyir //
gtan tshigs 'gal ba ñid mi [D93b4] 'dod // <146ab>¹⁰²

ces bya ba smras so //

de ltar re žig dños po rnam //
bdag las¹⁰³ skye bar mi rigs so // <146cd>¹⁰⁴

[P100b4] žes bya ba'i tshig gi don ni ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis žes bya ba'i tha tshig go //

Explanation of abbreviations employed in this paper:

- CT *Co ne* edition of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā*.
- D *Sde dge* edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, ed. by K. HAYASHIMA, J. TAKASAKI, Z. YAMAGUCHI and Y. EJIMA, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai 1977.
- DCZC *Da-Cheng Zhang-Chen lun* (大乘掌珍論), Taishō Shinshū Daizō-kyō vol. 30; No. 1578.
- DK *Sde dge* edition of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.
- DT *Sde dge* edition of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā*.
- KT Kārikā text of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.
- MAS *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 3857, the Peking edition; No. 5258.
- MHK *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 3855, the Peking edition; No. 5255.
- MMK *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, kārikās in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* ed. by Louis DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.
- MRP *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 3854, the Peking edition; No. 5254.
- Ms Photocopy in Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by LI Zheng, JIANG Zhongxin and DUAN Qian Wenzhong, Jiangxi renmin chubanshe 1991, pp. 511-522.
- NBVV *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 4139, the Peking edition; No. 5640.
- P Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, ed. by D. T. SUZUKI, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute 1957-1961.
- Pāṇini *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, tr. by Sumitra M. KATRE, University of Texas Press, Austin 1987.
- PK Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.
- PP *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 3853, the Peking edition; No. 5253.
- PPT *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakāṭikā*, the *Sde dge* edition; No. 3859, the Peking edition; No. 5259.

Pras.	<i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikās</i> de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti, ed. by Louis DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St. Péterbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences 1913.
PT	Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the <i>Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā</i> .
SG	Photocopy of the handcopy by GOKHALE, based on the first copy or deciphering made by SĀMKRṬYĀYANA, Shrikant S. BAHULKAR, <i>The Madhyamaka-Hṛdaya-Kārikā of Bhāvaviveka: A Photographic Reproduction of Prof. V.V. Gokhale's Copy</i> , Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism, <i>Sambhāṣā</i> 15, Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Nagoya 1994.
Taishō	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> , ed. by J. TAKAKUSU and K. WATANABE, Tokyo: The Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kankōkai 1969.
TJ	<i>Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā</i> , the <i>Sde dge</i> edition; No. 3856, the Peking edition; No. 5256.
YD	<i>Yuktidīpikā</i> , ed. by Ram Chandra PANDEYA, Delhi 1967.

Explanation of signs employed in the edition of the Tibetan text

[]	folio No. < >
< >	addition

Notes

1. This paper is based upon my M.A. thesis submitted to the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, in 1994. I would like to thank Professor Ashok N. AKLUJKAR, who was my major professor at the University of British Columbia and who introduced me to Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. While a graduate student at the University of British Columbia, I was greatly influenced by Professor AKLUJKAR's lectures on Indian linguistics, philosophy and literature. I would also like to express my indebtedness to Professor Esho MIKOGAMI, who was my supervisor at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. Professor MIKOGAMI's generous help provided the rich basis which has allowed me to continue studying to the present. Mr. Yusho WAKAHARA, lecturer of Ryukoku University, kindly and generously helped me in reading and understanding the *Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā* providing many valuable insights into the text. I wish to express my debt to Professor Tom J. F. TILLEMANS of the University of Lausanne, who was a visiting professor at the University of Calgary, for critically reading an early draft of this paper and giving many invaluable suggestions which contributed to its final form. Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Jon ADAMS of the University of Calgary for correcting my English of this paper.

2. According to Tibetan tradition (Tāranātha 1970, p. 401), the following works are ascribed to Bhāviveka. (1) *Pradīpoddyotanānāmaṣīkā*, (hereafter, PNT) (2) *Pañcakramapañjikā*, (hereafter, PKP) (3) *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, (hereafter, PP) (4) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, (hereafter, MRP) (5) *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*, (hereafter, MAS) (6) *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*, (hereafter, NBVV) (7) *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, (hereafter, MHK) (8) *Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā*. (hereafter, TJ). Besides the above treatises, *Da-Cheng Zhang-Chen lun* (大乘掌珍論, hereafter, DCZC) is ascribed to Bhāviveka in the Chinese Tripiṭaka.

P. L. VAIDYA (1923: 51-52) ascribes *Madhyamakaprasītyasamutpāda* to Bhāviveka. In the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, however, this treatise is attributed to Kṛṣṇa. For this reason, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhāviveka. See YAMAGUCHI 1941: 57-58.

(1) PNT and (2) PKP are also not attributed to Bhāviveka in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Therefore, modern scholars do not at present consider them to be Bhāviveka's works. SCHAYER (1935: 206-211) and YAMAGUCHI (1941: 54-57) do not ascribe (4) MRP to Bhāviveka. RUEGG (1981: 66) and EJIMA (1990: 104) ascribe (4) MRP to later Bhavya who is different from Bhāviveka. On the other hand, LINDTNER (1982: 172-184) attributes this treatise to Bhāviveka. EJIMA (1980: 18-33) does not ascribe (5) MAS to Bhāviveka. LINDTNER (1981: 200, n. 14) and RUEGG (1981: 64, esp. n. 202), on the other hand, attribute (5) MAS to Bhāviveka. YAMAGUCHI (1941: 53-54) and EJIMA (1980: 10) doubt whether (6) NBVV was composed by Bhāviveka.

3. EJIMA (1990: 846-838), after examining the manuscripts of Candrakīrti (A.D. c. 600-650)'s Prasannapadā (hereafter, Pras.) and the Tibetan and Chinese sources, suggests that the name of the author of the MHK, PP and DCZC, etc., should be Bhāviveka. His collected evidence may be summarized as follows:

(1) The names "Bhāvaviveka" and "Bhāviveka" appear four times in the manuscripts of the Pras.. The name "Bhavya" never appears in these manuscripts.

(2) The transliteration "婆毘吠伽/迦" (b'uā-b'ji-b'jwai°-ka = Po-pi-fei-jia)" and the Chinese translation "清弁" (Qing-bian) appear in the Chinese materials. The former "婆毘吠伽 / 迦" refers to Bhāviveka, not Bhāvaviveka or Bhavyaviveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of the MHK, TJ, PP, etc., was translated as "清弁" and was identified with Bhāviveka by Xuan-zang (A.D. c. 600-664). Further, there is no indication in Chinese materials of the names "Bhāvaviveka," "Bhavyaviveka" or "Bhavya" which are assumed based upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of the MHK, etc.

(3) The name of the author of the MHK is "sNañ bral" or "sKal ldan" in the Tibetan translation of *Madhyamakālamkāraṣīkā* (P No. 5286: Sa. 126b4, 136b6, D No. 3886: Sa. 119b6, 128a2). The original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan "sNañ bral" should be "Bhāviveka" or "Bhāvivikta." On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan "sKal ldan" can be assumed to be "Bhavya." (*Mayāvyyutpatti*, No. 3495.)

The name of the author of the PP is given as "Legs ldan byed" or "Legs ldan 'byed" in the Tibetan translation of the PP and *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakāṣīkā* (hereafter, PPT), Avalokitavrata's sub-commentary on the PP, by Jñāna-

garbha and Klu'i rgyal mtshan. However, "Legs ldan byed" is probably the Tibetan translator's error. It should be corrected to "Legs ldan 'byed." The original Sanskrit word of the latter would be "Bhavyaviveka" corroborating the part "viveka."

(4) Atīśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, A.D. c. 982-1054) calls the author of the MHK and the PP "Bhavya" or "Bhavya sNañ bral (Bhavya-Bhāviveka)" in his *Bodhipathapradīpapañjikā* (P No. 5344: D No. 3948.), the autocommentary on *Bodhipathapradīpa* (P: Ki. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2, D: Khi. 280a6, 285a1, 280b4, 280b6). Besides his own treatise, Atīśa translated the MRP, MHK, TJ, NBVV and MAS into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translator Tshul khirms rgyal ba. He calls the author of the MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV "Bhavya," and Tshul khirms rgyal ba calls him "Legs ldan 'byed (Bhavyaviveka)" in the MAS.

(5) Tibetan Buddhist scholar lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (A.D. c. 1717-1786) states that the author of the MRP is not Bhāviveka who composed the MHK but is "junior Bhavya (Legs ldan chuñ ba)" or "later Bhavya (Legs ldan phi ma)." (... Legs ldan chuñ bar grags pas mdzad pa yin gyi slob dpon 'dis mdzad pa min no //); see MIMAKI 1982: 169 n. 458.

(6) The TJ is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the Dkar chag Ldan dkar ma (the catalogue of the Ldan dkar ma), completed in 842 A.D. (See LALOU 1953: 313-353). The surviving TJ was translated and finalized by Atīśa and Tshul khirms rgyal ba in the eleventh centuries. Assuming the correctness of EJIMA's investigation, I adopt the name "Bhāviveka" in this paper.

4. KAJIYAMA investigated the relation of Bhāviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, and as a result, calculated the date of Bhāviveka given here. For details, see KAJIYAMA 1968/1969: 193-203, KAJIYAMA 1989: 177-187.
5. In his PPT (D 73a4,5), Avalokitavrata enumerates eight commentators on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter, MMK). The commentators are (1) Nāgārjuna himself (Akutobhayā, exists only in variant Tibetan translations), (2) Buddhapālita (A.D. c. 470-540; *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, exists only in variant Tibetan translations), (3) Candrakīrti (*Prasannapadā*, exists in Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations), (4) Devaśarman (fifth to sixth centuries; *Dkar po 'char ba*, exists in a Tibetan fragment), (5) Guṇaśrī (fifth to sixth centuries; the title of his commentary is not known), (6) Guṇamati (the fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known, exists in a Tibetan fragment), (7) Sthiramati (A.D. c. 510-570; *Da-Cheng Zhong-Guan Shi-lun*, 大乘中觀釋論, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and (8) Bhāviveka (*Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, exists in variant Tibetan and Chinese translations). Besides these commentaries, however, there are two commentaries on the MMK in the Chinese Tripiṭaka: (1) Piṅgala (青目; *Zhong lun*, 中論, tr. by Kumārajīva A.D. c. 350-409), (2) Asaṅga (A.D. c. 320-400; *Qin-Zhong lun*, 順中論, tr. by Prajñāruçi).
6. Bhāviveka attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) which included three unusual modifications; the adding the word "paramārthataḥ" (from the standpoint of the highest truth, or simply, in ultimate reality) to the proposition

in a proof formula; the specification that the negation in his proof formulae should be taken as "prasajyapratishedha" (simple negation); and the condition that no dissimilar instance is to be given. Verse 26 in the third chapter is the first proof formula in the MHK. In the TJ, Bhāviveka explains how his proof formulae are to be understood:

"Here, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*), the earth, etc., have no gross elements as their intrinsic natures, [Reason1:] because they are things which are made, or [Reason2:] because they are things which have causes, etc., [Example:] just like knowledge (*jñāna*). // III.26 //"¹ is understood as follows: "Here, [Thesis:] if considered by wisdom (*prajñā*) which is in conformity with ultimate reality, the earth, etc., have no gross elements as their intrinsic natures, [Reason1:] because they are things which are made, or [Reason2:] because they are things which have cause, knowableness (*jñeyatva*), expressibility (*vācyaṭva*), etc., [Example:] just as knowledge has no gross elements as its intrinsic nature." Skt.: *tatra bhūta-svabhāvām hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ/ kṛtakatvād yathā jñānam hetumattvādīto 'pi vā* // EJIMA 1980: 274. TJ: IDA 1980: 82-90. For the details of Bhāviveka's syllogisms, see EJIMA 1980: 92-144.

As I have mentioned, Bhāviveka attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent inference. At the same time, moreover, he strongly criticized Buddhapālita (A.D. c. 470-540), who was also one of the commentators of Nāgārjuna's MMK, in his PP (Cf. PP D 49a5 to 49b1, 50a5 to 50b1, etc., PPT D 73a4, 102a1, etc.). He maintained that Buddhapālita's statement was deficient, because neither a reason (*hetu*) nor an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) had been stated (See PP D 49a5 to 50a1). The Sanskrit of Bhāviveka's criticism against Buddhapālita is quoted by Candrakīrti. Pras.: (*ācārya-buddhapālitas tv āha*) *na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ / tad-utpāda-vaiyarthiyāt / atiprasaṅga-doṣāc ca / ... (atiraikē dūṣaṇam āhuḥ) tad-ayuktaḥ / hetu-dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānāt / parokta-doṣāparihārāc ca / prasaṅga-vākyatvāc ca prakṛtārtha-viparyayaṇa viparītārtha-sādhyā-tad-dharma-vyaktāu paramād utpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt / janma-nirodhāc ceti kṛtānta-virodhaḥ syāt* // (pp. 14,1-15,2). Candrakīrti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argument advocated by Bhāviveka and defended Buddhapālita's statement against the objections put forward by Bhāviveka. Candrakīrti argued that Buddhapālita's statement had no faults even though an independent reason and example had not been stated by him in his statement. That is, Candrakīrti's claim was that *prasaṅga* arguments were enough to refute the opponent's opinions and that therefore, the independent inference was not necessary (Pras. pp. 15,3- 39,7).

Later on, this controversy was considered to be the origin of the division of the two sub-school, i.e., Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, in the Mādhyamikas in Tibet. See RUEGG 1981: 58.

7. SĀMKRṬYĀYANA 1937: 1-163.
8. In his article, S.S. BAHULKAR lists a wide selection of publications on the MHK. See BAHULKAR 1994: ii, n. 4.
9. JIANG 1991: 511-522.
10. BAHULKAR 1994.

11. GOKHALE and BAHULKAR 1985: 76 n. 1. GOKHALE & BAHULKAR (1985: 77) says that the manuscript of the MHK is not later than the tenth century. According to EJIMA (1980: 263), however, the manuscript of the MHK was written in the "Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili" script of the eleventh century.
12. The MHK/TJ consists of the following eleven chapters. Chapter One. *Bodhicittāparityāga* (The non-abandonment of the bodhicitta). Chapter Two. *Munivratasamāśraya* (Taking the Muni's vow). Chapter Three. *Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* (The quest for the knowledge of reality). Chapter Four. *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvātāra* (Entering to the ascertainment of reality according to the Śrāvaka). Chapter Five. *Yogācāratattvaviniścaya* (The ascertainment of reality according to the Yogācāra). Chapter Six. *Sāṃkhyatattvāvātāra* (Entering reality according to the Sāṃkhya). Chapter Seven. *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* (The ascertainment of reality according to the Vaiśeṣika). Chapter Eight. *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (The ascertainment of reality according to the Vedānta). Chapter Nine. *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvātāra* (Entering the determination of reality according to the Mīmāṃsā). Chapter Ten. *Sarvajñatāsiddhinirdeśa* (Exposition of the proof of omniscience). Chapter Eleven. *Stutīlakṣaṇanirdeśa* (Exposition of the eulogy and characteristics).
13. According to GOKHALE, Bhāviveka originally composed the first three chapters under the title *Tattvāṃṛtāvātāra*, forming the core of the MHK adding the other chapters later. For the details, see GOKHALE 1958: 165-166, n. 1, 1972: 41-42, 1985: 78.
14. EJIMA 1980: 259-361.
15. IIDA 1980: 52-242.
16. NOZAWA 1954: 53-46, 1955a: 56-44, 1955b: 38-26, 1956: 43-31, 1959: 118-105, 1964a: 87-74, 1964b: 70-58, 1965: 80-64, 1971: 96-86, 1972: 108-89.
17. I am preparing, for publication, the next sections: non-production from others (vv. 147-158), the criticism of the four conditions (vv. 159-175), and I intend to translate the MHK and the TJ up to v. 266.
18. As we have seen in note 2 of this paper, the TJ is considered to be Bhāviveka's autocommentary (*svavṛtti*) on the MHK. There are, however, sufficient reasons to wonder whether or not the surviving Tibetan translation of the TJ has been preserved in the original form by this autocommentary. This is because, after some kārikās, it is written "thus says the *ācārya*" in what should be a reference to Bhāviveka, the author of the kārikās. Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kārikās, the expressions "this is the intention of the *ācārya*," "the *ācārya* says" and "the author of this treatise says" are used (TJ D 50a5, 75a1, 86a2, 92b3, 107a2, 112b6, 224b4, 246b5, 274b6, 321a5, etc.). The word "*ācārya*" usually means "senior teacher" or "great teacher." Therefore, it is not expected that Bhāviveka would call himself "*ācārya*." EJIMA 1980: 14, 1992: 840), hypothesizes that the surviving TJ is a revised recension of the original TJ. The original TJ was composed by Bhāviveka, the author of the MHK and PP, etc., while, on the other hand, the surviving TJ was written by Bhavya who lived in the eighth century to the tenth century. GOKHALE (1985: 77), however, suggests that sentences containing the word "*ācārya*" were explanatory comments by Atīśa, and that Tshul khriṃs rgyal ba, Atīśa's collaborator, inserted them into

- the text. On the recent consideration regarding this question, see RUEGG 1990: 59-71.
19. Cf. *dravya-pradhāna-jīvādi jñeyam yat tīrthya-kalpitam / yathāyogaṃ niṣeddhavyam yukty-āgama-viśāradaḥ* // III. 135 // *iti sva-para-siddhānta-kalpitātmanirātmatām / vidvān vibhāvya bhāvānām tattva-jñānāmṛtaṃ pibet* // III. 136 // EJIMA 1980: 300-301. [Tr:] Those who are proficient in reason (*yukti*) and āgamas should negate what the heretics conceptually constructed, objects of knowledge (*jñeya*) such as a substantial entity (*dravya*), primary matter (*pradhāna*), life-monad (*jīva*), etc.// III. 135// Thus, self (*ātman*) which our own and other systems have conceptually constructed is selfless (*nirātman*). Realizing [selflessness] of entities, wise men drink the ambrosia of the knowledge of truth. // III. 136 //
 20. "Prapañca" plays a role close to language in the Madhyamaka school. In the TJ, Bhāviveka explains that "prapañca" is "activity of speech-language" (*tshig gi brjod pa'i spros pa*). See my translation, p. 126. He, moreover, says in his PP that because the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the nature of speech (=verbal expression) is pacified, "prapañca" ceases. (*spros pa ñer ži žes bya ba ni brjod pa'i bdag ñid mñon par žen pa ži ba'i phyir* / (D: 47a7-47b1). Candrakīrti says that because when, noble men see *pratītya-samutpāda* as it is in reality, "prapañca" characterized by what is to be spoken, etc., ceases in every way, here (*pratītya-samutpāda*) "prapañca" is pacified. (Pras.: *yathāvasthita-pratītya-samutpāda-darśane sati āryānām abhidheyādi-lakṣaṇasya prapañcasya sarvathoparamāt / prapañcānām upaśamo 'sminn iti* / p. 11). He, further, defines "prapañca" as follows: "Prapañca" is language (*vāk*) which produces the verbal differentiation (*prapañcayati*) of referents (Pras.: *prapañca hi vāk prapañcayati arthān*, p. 373 tr. by P. WILLIAMS 1980: 31). Thus, according to the Mādhyamikas, "prapañca" is closely related to language. Nāgārjuna states in his MMK as follows: "There is emancipation (*mokṣa*) from the extinction of action and affliction (*karma-kleśa*). Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). They (conceptual constructions) [are produced] from "prapañca". However, "prapañca" is destroyed in emptiness."// XVIII. 5 // Skt: *karma-kleśa-kṣayan mokṣaḥ karma-kleśā vikalpataḥ / te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate* // (Pras., p. 349). That is, conceptual construction is the cause of the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptual construction is produced from "prapañca." We do not think anything without language. Thinking based on language, i.e., conceptual construction, is the cause of wrong actions and afflictions. Therefore, "prapañca," i.e., the cause of the conceptual constructions, must be pacified.
 21. Literally, drawing towards one's self or bringing near. MONIER-WILLIAMS 1899: 209.
 22. Ms, SG: *dadhmaḥ*, EJIMA (1980: 302): *dadhyaḥ*. Cf. Pāṇini VII.1.75.
 23. Cf. PP D 48b-5: "from itself" (*svataḥ*) means "from [its own] self" (*ātmanah*). Tib.: *bdag las žes bya ba ni bdag ñid las žes bya ba'i tha tshig go* // Avalokitavratā glosses: the meaning of the self connects to the fivefold, that is, [the self] connects to (1) its own self (*ātman*), (2) one's own (*ātmīya*), (3) acquaintance (*jñātr*), (4) the Lord (*iśvara*) and (5) kinsman (*jñāti*). Therefore, in order to

- avoid (2) one's own, (3) acquaintance, (4) the Lord and (5) kinsman, here [Bhāviveka] says that “from itself” means “from [its own] self.” PPT D: *bdag ces bya ba'i don nam pa lha la sbyor te / bdag ñid dan bdag gi dan ses pa dan dbaṅ phyug dan ñe du dag la sbyor bas / de'i phyir bdag gi dan ses pa dan dbaṅ phyug dan ñe du dag nam par gcad pa'i phyir'dir bdag las zes bya ba ni bdag ñid las zes bya ba'i tha tshig go zes bsad de / (62a4,5,6).*
24. The Sāṃkhyas have the view that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a potential state. This is a form of the idea of “origination from itself.” See LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 68-72, etc.
 25. Candrakīrti criticizes this reason “because it exists.” According to Candrakīrti, the reason “because it exists” establishes what is already established (*siddha-sādhana*) and has a contradictory meaning (*viruddhārthatā*). Pras.: *kuto 'smākaṃ vidyamānatvād iti hetur yasya siddha-sādhanam viruddhārthatā vā syāt / yasya siddha-sādhanasya yasyāś ca viruddhārthatāyāḥ parihārārtham yatnam kariṣyāmaḥ / (p. 18).* Candrakīrti, moreover, points out that for opponents, the reason “because it exists” is an inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Pras.: *sattvād (= vidyamānatvād) iti cāyam hetuḥ parato 'naikāntikaḥ / kiṃ sattvāt / caitanyavan nādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpadyantām / utāho ghaṭādivat svata utpadyantām iti / ghaṭādinām sādhya-samatvān nānaikāntikateti cet / naitad evaṃ tathānabhidhānāt / (p. 33).*
 26. NOZAWA 1972: 97) reconstructs this phrase into Sanskrit: *svātmani kriyā-virodha-doṣa-prasaṅgāt*. Tib.: *raṅ gi bdag ñid la byed pa 'gal ba'i skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // (DT 91b4, PT 98b1, p. 137 in my edition).*
 27. Cf. *Sāṃkyakārikā* v. 3d: *na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ / (puruṣa is neither created nor creative. Tr. by LARSON).* See LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1979: 256.
 28. *Puruṣa* is one of the two substantial principles which the Sāṃkhyas admit as a real, unproduced, unchanging, unevolving entity. See LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1987: 78-83. Buddhists do not accept *puruṣa* as a substantial principle. Here, however, Bhāviveka, admitting only the view that *puruṣa* does not arise, employs the *puruṣa* as an example which implies the negation of arising of entity.
 29. I do not understand this reason properly. NOZAWA (1972: 97) reconstructs this phrase into Sanskrit: *avakāśodghāṭanātmakatvāt*. Tib.: *nam mkha' ni go skabs 'byed pa'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // (DT 92a1, PT 98b6, p. 137 in my edition).*
 30. SG omits *hi*.
 31. Here the Sāṃkhyas interprets the meaning of the sky-flower in four ways, that is, the flower in the sky (locative *tatpuruṣa*), the flower which comes from the sky (ablative *tatpuruṣa*), the flower and the sky (*dvandva*) and the flower of the sky (genitive *tatpuruṣa*).
 32. I do not fully understand the argument here. It seems that the Sāṃkhyas state that since the sky-flower is an existent, the sky-flower cannot be an example that proves non-existence of entities. Bhāviveka, however, employs the sky-flower as a non-existent. Therefore, the sky-flower can be an example that proves

non-existence of entities, i.e., is a similar example of the non-existence of entities. To the best of my knowledge, however, I do not know that the Sāṃkhyas state that the sky-flower is an existent.

DCZC has a similar argument regarding the sky-flower. However, DCZC adopts “khasya puṣpaḥ” (genitive *taṭpuruṣa*). DCZC: “Others object: The sphere is an existent, because it is common sense. The flower is also an existent, because the *utpala* [flower], etc., appear. Though the two, sky and flower, do not connect [to each other], [they are] not non-existents. Therefore, the example “sky-flower” is not established. This objection is not, however, correct, because this example “sky-flower,” is taken as “genitive *taṭpuruṣa* compound,” that is, “the flower of the sky,” we name it the “sky-flower.” Since it is not existent, this example is valid (literally, there is a [valid] example.)” (DCZC: 有余難言虛空有性 世間共知故。花亦有性。媼鉢羅等世現見故。空花二種雖不相應非無自性。故空花喻所立不成。此難不然。此空花喻就第六轉依土訓釋。空之花故說名空花。此既非有故 喻非無。 Taishō, vol. 30, p. 274a10-15).

33. The point of this statement is probably that the manifest result is produced from its prior unmanifest state in the cause, since the Sāṃkhyas state that the result exists in the cause in a potential state, that is, the cause has the characteristic of an unmanifest state of result.
34. Tib.: *skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag ñid du yod pa ñid las skye ba'i phyir ro že na //* (D 92b2,3, P 99a8, p. 138 in my edition). The reconstructed Skt.: *kāraṇātmanā vidyamānataiva sarvasyotpattimat utpādād / PP: skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag ñid du yod pa kho na las skye ba'i phyir ro //* (D 49a4,5).
35. As I have mentioned in note 18, this expression is curious. The expression “śāstra-kāra” (author of the treatise or composer of the treatise) is usually used by the third person or commentator who is not the author of the basic text. Therefore, “śāstra-kāra” might be an insertion by the translator. As RUEGG (1990: 70, n. 19) reports, however, according to P.V. KANE (1968: 195), “in order to avoid looking egoistic, ancient authors generally put their own views in the third person as said by early writers like Medhātūthi and Viśvarūpa.” KANE (1971: 171), moreover, states that there is no prohibition against an author saying that he himself composed the *sūtra* and the *vr̥tti*, even when he speaks of himself in the third person in the *vr̥tti*. As I have also mentioned in the same note 18, on the other hand, GOKHALE (1985: 77) suggests that Tshul khriṃs rgyal ba, Atīśa’s collaborator, might have inserted the explanatory comments containing the word “ācārya” given by Atīśa. However, if Tshul khriṃs rgyal ba inserted the sentences containing the word “ācārya” or “śāstra-kāra,” the word “ācārya” or “śāstra-kāra” seems to refer to the author of the MHK. See RUEGG 1990: 64.
36. Literally: going on the doubt by the others, it is said by the author of [this] treatise. Tib.: *pha rol po de dag gis dogs pa bsu nas bstan bcos byed pas ... ź'es bya ba smos so //* (D 92b3, P 99a8).
37. These opponents are the Sāṃkhyas who are proponents of potentiality (*śaktivādin*, cf. PP D 49b1,2, PPT D 75a1). That is, according to them, any effect is not produced from nothing and must have a common basis as its cause. The manifested is a series of a basic cause. The effects pre-exist potentially in the cause and are

- just manifestation of a basic “existent.” See LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1987: 100-101.
38. Literally, the effect exists as the self of the potentiality (*śakti*) in the cause, Tib: *rgyu la 'bras bu nus pa'i bdag ñid du yod pas*. The reconstructed Sanskrit: *hetau kāryaḥ śakty-ātmanā vidyamānatvāt*.
 39. Ms, SG *bhāvasya*, KT, DT, PT '*bras bu* (*kārya*{*sya*}). Cf. TJ: *gal te 'bras bu <bdag> ñid yod pa ñid yin na* (D 93a2, P 99b8, p. 139 in my edition).
 40. These opponents seem to be the Vārṣaganyas in the Sāṃkhya school. According to the Vārṣaganyas, the entire world (*trailokya*) ceases to be manifest from time to time. This, however, does not imply that the world actually ceases to exist. That is to say, this “disappearance” of the world is substitution of one property of a substantial entity by another property of the same substantial entity. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* (YD): *pariṇāmo hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntara-nivṛtīḥ dharmāntara-pravṛtīś ca* / (p. 49, 6-7): *jahad dharmāntaraṃ pūrvam upādatte yadā param / tattvādapracyuto dharmo pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate* // (p. 49, 10-11): ... *sāadhanānugrhītasya dharmiṇo dharmāntarasyāvīrbhāvāḥ pūrvasya ca tirobhāvāḥ pariṇāmaḥ / na cāvīrbhāva-tirobhāvāv utpatti-nirodhau* / (p. 53, 25-26). For the details of the Vārṣaganyas, see LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1987: 131-140, MURAKAMI 1991: 73-77.
 41. That is, the opponents point out *dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana* (proving the opposite of the inherent nature of the subject of a thesis, or a reason which proves the opposite of the inherent nature of the subject of a thesis). According to Dignāga's logic, a correct reason (*hetu*) in a proof formula is conditioned by three aspects (*trairūpya*). These are: (1) *pakṣa-dharmatva*, namely the reason should be the predicate of the subject of the proposition, (2) *sapakṣa eva sattvam*, namely the reason must belong only to an example similar to the subject of the proposition, and (3) *vipakṣe 'sattvam eva*, namely the reason must not belong to a dissimilar instance of the subject of the proposition. When the reason in the proof formula has none of the above three aspects, it cannot be the correct reason. Here the opponents point out that Bhāviveka's reason lacks item (3). For the details of the *trairūpya* and Dignāga's logic, see KATSURA 1983: 544-538 and TACHIKAWA 1971: 111-145.
 42. For Bhāviveka, there is no dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) in these proof formulae in question. In his TJ (Tib. IIDA 1980: 89), Bhāviveka says: “Here, among three aspects (*trairūpya*) of reason, due to the non-indication of the third condition, i.e., absence of a dissimilar instance, what we intend to say is conventionally explained by using only two aspects of the reason. The property of the subject (*pakṣa-dharma*) is present only in the similar instance (*sapakṣa eva sattvam*), not in the dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) because the latter, which has own-being differs from the former, never exists. Therefore, we do not state examples (*drṣṭānta*) which are different from the dissimilar instance and the reason.” He, moreover, states in his PP: “If you say that since it has not been shown that the reason “it already exists” is different from the dissimilar instance, [it is] not [valid] reason,” we reply: “Because there are no impossibilities of dissimilar instances at all, there is no absence [of the reason] in that (non-existent dissimilar instance), therefore, here and in all [proof formulae], there is no fault.” See also

PP: *gal te gtan tshigs yod pa ñid ni mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa ma bstan pas/ gtan tshigs ñid ma yin no ze na / med pa kho na'i phyir de la ldog pa med pas 'di dan thams cad la ñes pa med do // (D 49a3)*. That is, for Bhāviveka, it is not necessary to indicate the third aspect of the reason, since the dissimilar instance does not exist.

43. DT 'khrul bar: PT 'khrug par
44. DT, PT rtog: DK, PK rtogs pa. Cf. Tarkajvālā: ... *yañ dag pa ji lta ba bñin yons su rtog pa de'i tshe /*
45. *atha vā kaḷpanā-jāla-prasaro hy evamādikaḥ / jāta-bhāvāśrayo bālam ākulīkurute balāt //137// vidvān vidyāpradīpena yathābhūtaṃ parīkṣate / jāter niṣedhāt tacchānteḥ prapañcopaśamas tadā //138//*
46. DT, PT ... *gnas ma yin pa kho na ste /*. NOZAWA (1972: 99) reads ... *gnas yin pa kho na ste /*. I adopt NOZAWA's reading.
47. PT zum : DT, zums
48. DT ... *ro // de'i phyir* : PT om. ... *ro // de'i phyir*.
49. DT rig : PT rigs
50. DT kyis : PT gis
51. PT gcig car : DT cig car
52. DT bya : PT byas
53. *tatra tāvat svato janma samvṛtyāpi na yujyate / sātmakatvād yathā dadhnaḥ svato janma na vidyate //139//*
54. DT las : PT la
55. CT, DT. gyur
56. DK, DT, PT te : PK ste
57. *notpannāḥ svātmato bhāvā bhāvatvāt tadyathā pumān //140ab//*
58. PT ba : DT om. ba
59. *nāpi cātmāsty ajātānām ajātavāt kha-puṣpavat //140cd//*
60. DT bdag las : PT dag la
61. PT *ma skyes pa dag* : DT. *ma skyes pas bdag*. Cf. *ajātānām* in v. 140cd.
62. *dbu ma'i sñiñ po'i [D92b7] 'grel (PT 'brel) pa rtog ge 'bar ba / bam po bdun pa*
63. DT nas : PT na
64. DT na: PT ba
65. DT ba'i : PT bas
66. PT khyod : DT khyed
67. DT mkha'i : PT mkha'
68. *kha-puṣpābhāvavācyam hi khādi yady api te matam / na kha-puṣpaṃ tad ity asmāt pakṣe 'pi nyūnatā na naḥ //141//*
69. Emend to khyod? DT, PT khyed. Cf. v. 141b in the Tibetan text.
70. DT te : PT om. te
71. Add nam. DT, PT om. nam

72. DT *ces* : PT om. *ces*
73. DT *sgrub* : PT *bsgrub*
74. DK, PK *la* : DT *dañ*, PT *las*
75. PT *bdag* : DT *dag*
76. DT *sñam* : PT *mñam*
77. The *pāda* c left out in DT and PT.
78. *kāryasya kāraṇaṃ svātmā tasya janma tato matam / svato janma tato 'bhīṣṭaṃ bhāvānām iti cen matam //142//*
79. DT, PK, PT *de las*: DK *de la*
80. *svātmavat tadanañatvāt kāraṇaṃ syād akāraṇam //143ab//*
81. DT om. *na* : PT has *ni* after *na*.
82. DT *g'zag*: PT *b'zag*
83. DT om. *b'zin*: PT has *yin* after *b'zin*.
84. DT *gyi*: PT *gyis*
85. DT *gi*: PT *gis*
86. *ajātātvaḥ ca kiṃ kasya kāraṇaṃ syād akāraṇam //143cd//*
87. DT *phyir sña* : PT om. *phyir sña*
88. PT *gi* : DT *gis*
89. '*bras bu* = *kārya(sya)*, but Ms reads *bhāvasya*.
90. DK *yin na* : PK, DT, PT *yod*. Cf. TJ: *gal te 'bras bu bdag ñid yod pa ñid yin na...*
91. *saty ātmani ca bhāvasya vṛthā kāraṇa-kalpanā //144ab//*
92. DT, PT '*bras bu ñid*, but I read '*bras bu bdag ñid*. Cf. *ātmani* in v. 144a and Tibetan *kārikā*.
93. DT, PT *skyed*: DK, PK *bskyed*
94. *tasmād eva tad utpannaṃ caikyam janaka-jañayoḥ //144cd//*
95. DT *ba* : PT om. *ba*
96. DT, PT *ji ltar*, but NOZAWA (1972: 95) corrects to *de ltar*. I adopt NOZAWA's reading.
97. DT *g'zag* : PT *b'zag*
98. *dadhi-bhāvena payaso 'vasthānāc ced abādhakam / putratvenānavasthānāt pitur na hi na bādhakam //145//*
99. PT *yoñs su* : DT om. *yoñs su*
100. DT *skyed* : PT *bskyed*
101. PT *mthun* : DT *mi mthun*
102. *vipakṣāsambhavād iṣṭā nāpi ka' kasmāt para iṣyate //146ab//*
103. DK, PK, DT *las* : PT *la*
104. *evaṃ tāvat svato janma bhāvānām nopapadyate //146cd//*

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