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JOHANNES BRONKHorST
Did the Buddha Believe in Karma and Rebirth? 1

JINHUA CHEN
The Construction of Early Tendai Esoteric Buddhism: The Japanese Provenance of Saichō’s Transmission Documents and Three Esoteric Buddhist Apocrypha Attributed to Śubhākarasīraṇha 21

MIRIAM LEVERING
Dogen’s Raitokuzui and Women Teaching in Sung Ch’an 77

TOM TILLEMANS
A Note on Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasamuccaya and Nyāyamukha. What is the svadharmin in Buddhist Logic? 111

CHIKAFUMI WATANABE
A Translation of the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā with the Tarkajvalā III. 137-146 125

YANG JIDONG
Replacing hu with fan: A Change in the Chinese Perception of Buddhism during the Medieval Period 157
A Translation of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* with the *Tarkajvālā* III. 137-146

Introduction

The *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (hereafter, MHK) is one of the works ascribed to Bhāviveka (A.D. c. 490-570), who was one of the eight known commentators on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter, MMK) of Nāgārjuna (A.D. c. 150-250) and who used formal proofs in expounding Madhyamaka thought. The only known manuscript of the MHK was discovered and hand-copied by Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana at the Ža lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied the manuscript there, he registered his copy as "VII Ža lu Monastery, XXXVII, 1. 311. Tarkajvālā (Madhyamakahṛdaya)" in his handlist. Subsequently, Sāmkṛtyāyana entrusted the copy to V.V. Gokhale who later, when visiting Japan in 1971, allowed several scholars to copy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research on the MHK to them. Then, in 1972, when Gokhale visited Rome, he was given the chance to edit the photographs of the manuscript of the MHK in a collection by G. Tucci who, while travelling in India, Nepal and Tibet, had succeeded in photographing the MHK manuscript at the Ža lu monastery. Since then, a number of chapters of the MHK have been edited and published based upon these photographs from Gokhale’s notes and Tucci’s collection. In 1991, other photographs of this same manuscript of the MHK were published in China, and in 1994, S.S. Bahulkar published photographs of Gokhale’s notes in Japan. The MHK consists of roughly 928 anuṣṭubh-verses and is divided into eleven chapters. The third chapter of the MHK, *Tattvajñānaisanā*, is the most important chapter among the eleven because Madhyamika thought is primarily presented in this chapter, whereas in the other chapters Madhyamaka thought is expressed through the criticism of other systems and schools. A critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of the Tibetan text of the third chapter of the MHK was published and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima in 1980. In the same year, 1980, Shotaro Iida published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan
text of the Tarkajvālā (hereafter, TJ) corresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of the verses and the TJ.\textsuperscript{15} Prior to those works, the TJ corresponding to verses 1-146 of the MHK was translated by Jyosho NOZAWA into Japanese between 1954 and 1972.\textsuperscript{16}

The main subject of verses 137-256 in the third chapter of the MHK and the TJ is "the non-production of all dharmas." This is also the main subject discussed by Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna, many of whom tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoints. The non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness, in the Mādhyamika school, is basic and very important among the Buddha's teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible.

In this paper, I have translated verses 137-146\textsuperscript{17} together with the TJ\textsuperscript{18}. In verses 139-146, Bhāviveka criticizes the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state (satkārayavāda), etc., advocated by the Sāṃkhya school. The Sāṃkhya school claim that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is therefore self-generated. Bhāviveka, however, criticizes this opinion.

The present English translation of the MHK was made from the Sanskrit text edited by EJIMA and the English translation of the TJ was made from the Tibetan. I have attempted to translate the MHK and the TJ as literally as possible but in a form that is as readable as possible. Nevertheless, I fear that some ambiguity has unavoidably remained as both the style and subject matter of the textual material are often technical and dense. This problem has hopefully been resolved by amplifying the translation with phrases in square brackets. In addition, further explanatory comments may be found in the endnotes.

I have consulted the Peking, Derge (sDe dge) and Cone (Co ne) editions and made my own edition of the Tibetan text which will appear after the translation section. As is well known, however, the Peking edition is very close to the Narthang (sNar than) edition. On the other hand, the Cone edition is close to the Derge edition. These variations among the four editions seem to have resulted from scribal errors or spelling and punctuational changes. For this reason, I have referred only to the Derge and Peking editions in my edition of the Tibetan text. Moreover, I have only included the major corrections that I have made to the text in order to avoid overly complicating the paper. In the near
future, I will be publishing an edition of the Tibetan text of the TJ employing all four editions.

An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows:

III. 3 Introduction to the topic:

   The non-production of all dharmas
   A. The non-production from itself
   B. The non-production from others
   C. The criticism of the four conditions
      (i) hetu-pratyaya
      (ii) ālambana-pratyaya
      (iii) samanantara-pratyaya
      (iv) adhipati-pratyaya
   D. The problem of invalidation by pratyakṣa and pratīti
   E. The criticism of the theory of the Sāmkhya school
   F. The non-production from itself and others
   G. The non-production without cause
   H. The criticism of the Lokāyatās
   I. The criticism of the iśvara
   J. An examination of drṣṭi, ‘view’
   K. An examination of duḥkha, ‘suffering’
   L. An examination of the Buddha
   M. Seeing pratītyasamutpāda and seeing the Buddha
   N. Conclusion
TRANSLATION

III.3 Introduction to the topic: The non-production of all dharmas

[MHK:]

atha vā kalpanā-jāla-prasaro hy evamādikāḥ
jāta-bhāvāśrayo bālam ākulī-kurute balāt
vidvān vidyā-pradipena yathābhūtam parīkṣate
jāter niṣedhāt tacchānteh prapañcopasamās tadā

Or, indeed, the expansion of a net of conceptual constructions (kalpanā) which has such a beginning with such things as [dravya, pradhāna, jīva, ātman, etc.], and which has for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant person through its force.

When a knowledgeable person examines [the non-production of entities] as they are with the lamp of knowledge (vidyā-pradīpa), then because [he] negates production, it (production) is extinguished. Consequently the conceptual proliferation (prapañca) ceases.

[TJ:] Or, in order to explain entities as having no own-being (*niḥsvabhāvatā), making effort (*prayatna) is always to be continued. Why? [This is so] because that which [our] own and other [systems] have thoroughly imagined, [that is,] all things, beginning with a net of conceptual constructions (*kalpanā-jāla), depending upon the attachment that entities have arising, arise, [and this is so] because [all things, beginning with a net of conceptual constructions] confound an ignorant, unwise person whose eye of intelligence (*buddhi) is closed (*nimīlita) by them (the expansion of the net of conceptual construction, etc.). Therefore, through knowledge which has no partiality (phyogs su lhung ba, *pakṣapāta), when a knowledgeable person, a yogin whose eye of intelligence is well-opened by the pure lamp (*vimala-pradīpa) of knowledge (*vidyā), examines the non-production of entities as they are, then, because [he] sees the non-production of all entities in their nature just like illusion [having no arising], [he] negates the production [of entities], [and subsequently] the dirt of conceptual construction, i.e., production [of entities], is extinguished. Consequently all conceptual proliferations (*prapañca), i.e., activity of speech (tshig gi brjod pa'i
spros pa), ceases. For this reason, one should exercise (brtul bar bya ba, *upasamhāra) the means (*upāya) immediately.

How is the non-production of these entities understood? As to that, some say that entities are produced from themselves. Some state that they are produced from others. Some claim that they are produced from both. Some say that they are produced without cause. Some state that they are produced from the Lord (*śvarā), pure consciousness (*puruṣa), primary matter (*pradhāna), time (*kāla) and [the god] *Nārāyana. Among these, the Sāṃkhya state that [entities] are produced from themselves. To them, [Bhāviveka] says:

A. The non-production from itself

[MHK:]

\[
\text{tatra tāvat svato janma saṃvṛtyāpi na yujyate} / \\
\text{sātmakatvād yathā dadhnah}^{22} \text{ svato janma na vidyjate} / /139//
\]

Here, firstly,

[Thesis:]
production from itself is not proper even in conventional reality,

[Reason:]
because it [already] exists as itself,

[Example:]
just as curd (dadhi) has no birth from itself. //139//

[TJ:] "from itself" (*svataḥ) means "from [its own] self" (*ātmanah).\(^{23}\) As [the Sāṃkhya state], if entities arise from themselves,\(^{24}\) it would be possible that [entities] arise without cause (*hetu) and conditions (*pratyaya). Such things[, however,] are not seen even in [our] world (*loka), [and] much less even in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ). In [the phrase] "because it [already] exists as itself" (*sātmakatvād), "itself" (*ātmaka) is "that which has own-being" (*sasvabhāva), and [the phrase] "it [already] exists as itself" (*sātmaka) means "[it has] itself." Its (the word *ātmaka's) abstract noun is *ātmakatva. Accordingly, [the phrase] "because it [already] has itself" means "because it exists\(^{25}\) by [its] nature" (*svabhāvena = svātmanā vidyamānatvāt).

If it (an existing entity) arises, since [it] exists, what [possible] activity of re-arising (*punar-utpāda) could there be? [There is not any activity!] For example, it is admissible in [our] world that curd (*dadhi) is
produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible that curd is produced from curd itself. In the same manner, an existent having itself also does not arise from itself, because this would be a logical contradiction [implying] that activity [of arising] works on itself.\textsuperscript{26} There is also another way (*mārga) of proof (*pramāṇa) [below].

[MHK:]  
\begin{center}
notpannāḥ svātmato bhāvā bhāvatvāt tad yathā pumān //140ab//
\end{center}

[Thesis:] Existents do not arise out of themselves,
[Reason:] because they have existence,
[Example:] just like the puruṣa (pumā) [in your view]. //140ab//

[TJ:] Because it is stated in their scriptural text (*grantha) that pure consciousness (*puruṣa) does not arise,\textsuperscript{27} admitting only “does not arise,” “just like [the *puruṣa]” becomes an example of the negation of the arising of entities.\textsuperscript{28}

[MHK:]  
\begin{center}
nāpi cātmāsty ajātānām ajātattvāt kha-puspavat //140cd//
\end{center}

[Thesis:] the unproduced has no self either,
[Reason:] because it is not born,
[Example:] just like the sky-flower (kha-puṣpa). //140cd//

[TJ:] If “self” (*ātman) is “own-being” (*svabhāva), [something] which does not arise from [it]self such as pure consciousness (*puruṣa), does not have one (i.e., self), because it is not born, just like the sky-flower.  
[Objection:] In regard to that, the Sāmkhya, imaging the meaning of the “sky-flower” in various ways, argue that there is no [valid] example [to support the above statement].
[The Sāmkhya ask:] (1) if “sky-flower” [which you employ as an example of the unproduced] means a flower which exists in the sky, [then] it would follow that the “sky-flower” would be a “flower” such as *tilaka, *utpala flower, etc., and they would also exist in space because
space is discriminated as the location.\textsuperscript{29} Or, (2) [if you] name [it] the sky-flower, because [it is] a flower which arises from the sky, here too, analyzing the meaning of “from the sky,” [we ask:] Is [the sky-flower] a flower which is distinguished from the sky? or, is [the sky-flower] a flower which came from the sky? If [you] name the sky and the flower the sky-flower, then since both are existents, [your] example, the “sky-flower,” cannot prove non-existence. If you say that “because the flower which is connected to the sky does not exist, the sky-flower has to be taken as a flower which does not exist in the sky, therefore [we speak of] the sky-flower,” then it would not be in keeping with the idea that none of the three worlds are the sky-flower. Why? [It is] because the sky-flower would also exist according to some kind of nature. Therefore, we say: “There is no [valid] example [to support] your [thesis].”

[Answer:] To this [objection, Bhāviveka] replies:

\textit{[MHK:]}

\begin{quote}
kha-puspabhāva-vaṣyam hi\textsuperscript{30} khādi yady api te matam / na kha-puspam tad ity asmāt pakṣe 'pi nyūnatā na naḥ II141II
\end{quote}

Although you might think that the meaning of [our statement] ‘the sky-flower does not exist’ is “sky, etc.,” still that [sky, etc.,] is not the sky-flower, therefore, we do not have a deficiency (nyūnatā) in [this] thesis statement (pakṣa) either. //141//

\textit{[TJ:] You think that the meaning of our example, the “sky-flower” being non-existent is “sky, etc.,” [where the word “sky” is analyzed as having various compound or case changings,] that is to say, by making distinctions, such as [the locative] “in the sky,” [the ablative] “from the sky,” [the dvandva] “sky and flower” and [the genitive] “flower of the sky,” you think that all of the three worlds (*trailokya) also exist. However, these [distinctions you hold] are not the meaning of [our] example, “the sky-flower.”\textsuperscript{31}

[Question:] Then, what [is the meaning of your example]?

[Answer:] The meaning of our example, the “sky-flower” is different from what you have conceptually constructed as space (*ākāśa), etc., and you cannot prove that our example [the “sky-flower”] must exist as some kind of nature. Therefore, we do not have a deficiency of the similar example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) in this thesis statement (*pakṣa) either.\textsuperscript{32}
[Objection:] As to that, [some of the Śāṃkhyas] say: The assertion of some [others] who maintain that production is from the self which is of the nature of the effect has those [previously stated] faults. Since we hold that [entities] arise from causal own characteristics (*hetu-svalakṣaṇa), therefore, our statement does not have those mistakes, since everything that has origination (*utpattimat) arises only from that which exists as causal nature.  

[Then,] assuming the doubt (*āśāṅkā) that others held, the author of [this] treatise (*śāstra-kāra) says:

[MHK:]  
kāryasya kāraṇaṁ svātmā tasya jānma tato matam /  
svato jānma tato 'bhīṣṭaṁ bhāvānām iti cen matam //142//  
The own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) is considered to be from that (cause). Therefore, for existents [which are the effects], birth from themselves (=their own-being, the causes), is accepted. If this is [your] view, then //142//

[TJ:] this [view] has the following fault:

[MHK:]  
svātmavat tadananyatvāt kāraṇaṁ syād akāraṇaṁ //143ab//  
because [the cause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self [of that effect], the cause would be no cause (i.e., cease to be a cause). //143ab//

[TJ:] If the cause and the effect are different [from each other], it is possible to establish the verbal expression (*vyāvahāra), “This is a cause. This is an effect.” However, when [the cause and the effect] are not different [from each other], it is impossible [to establish the verbal expression that “This is a cause. This is an effect.”] (1) It would follow that the seed would also not be a cause of the sprout. Why? [This is] because [the seed] would not be different from that [the sprout], [that is,] because the cause would be identical to the own-being of the effect (*kārya-svātma). Therefore, (2) [we can say regarding the effect,] the sprout, in truth, would also not be an effect of the seed. [Why? This is so] because [the sprout] would not be different from that [seed], and because it would be identical to the own-being of the cause. Thus, there
would be the logical fault that the relation between the effect and the cause (*kāryakāraṇa-bhāvata) [in the verbal expression] would not exist. Moreover, [Bhāviveka says:]

[MHK:]  
ajātatvāc ca kim kasya kāraṇam syād akāraṇam //143cd//  
And since [puruṣa, pradhāna, etc.,] are unproduced, what, itself not being a cause, could be the cause of what? //143cd//

[TJ:] Since primary matter (*pradhāna), pure consciousness (*puruṣa), etc., are themselves unproduced, then there being no distinction (*višeṣa) in terms of before and after, [they are] not causes. Therefore, because being nothing and not being the cause of anything, how could it be the cause of anything else? [It could not!] In the same way, [the above statement] means that a seed, etc., which are not yet arisen, could not produce a sprout, etc.

[Objection:] Some [Sāmkhyas] hold the view that the cause itself is not exactly (*eva) the same as the effect. Since the effect exists in the cause in a potential state, it is manifested by cause and conditions. Since both that potentiality (*śakti) and manifestation (*vyakti) do not have different natures (*abhinandmakatvā), [therefore,] origination from that [potentiality means] “origination from itself (*janma svatah).”

[Answer:] To them, [Bhāviveka] replies:

[MHK:]  
satyātmani ca bhāvasya39 vṛthā kāraṇa-kalpanā //144ab//  
And, when the self of an existent [already] exists, it is useless to postulate a cause. //144ab//

[TJ:] When [you] hold that the cause produces the effect, if the effect itself exists [in the cause], what is the point in postulating a cause (*kāraṇa-kalpanā)? There is also an another major error below:

[MHK:]  
tasmād eva tad utpannam caikyam janaka-janyayoh //144cd//  
“A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (janaka) and what is generated (janya) become identical (ekya). //144cd//
[TJ:] [The generator and what is generated] means the pair of cause and effect.

[Objection:] We could state that, although [something] is indeed produced from itself, both the generator (*janaka) and what is generated (*janya) would not be identical; for example, when the one property (*dharma) which exists as the substance (*dravya) "milk" ceases, then the other property (*dharma), "curd" arises, and in that [situation,] the verbal expression "cause and result" would be justified.40

[Answer:] [To them, Bhāviveka] replies:

[MHK:]

\[
dadhi-bhāvena payaso 'vasthānāc ced abādhakam / 
putratvenānavasthānāt pitur na hi na bādhakam //145//
\]

If [what we have said above] does not refute [your position] because milk exists as curd, [then we would claim, on the contrary, that] it does refute, because of [the fact that] a father does not exist as a child. //145//

[TJ:] [That is to say,] it is not seen by anyone, anywhere, and in any way, that in abandoning the state of the father totally, the father completely changes to the nature of the child. Therefore, you have difficulty avoiding (bzłog pa) [your] fallacy that the generator and what is generated would be identical.

[Objection:] Here, opponents rebut the Mādhyamikas on the following grounds: The Mādhyamikas' reasons "because it [already] exists as itself" (v. 139c; sātmakatvād) and "because they have existence" (v. 140b; bhāvatvāt), which are established as the reasons for non-production, are [in fact] reasons which establish the dissimilar instances (*vipaksa) of non-production, i.e., things which do arise. However, they cannot be reasons establishing non-production. To explain: [The reasons] "existing as itself" and "having existence," are present in produced entities such as jars, etc., but are absent in unproduced things such as rabbit's horns, etc. Consequently, [the reasons] "existing as itself" and "having existence," i.e., the reasons for [proving] existence [of entities], are not present in any of the similar instances (*sapakṣa) for [proving] the non-existence [of entities], but are present only in the dissimilar instances. Thus, the thesis is contradicted. Since [the reasons "because it [already] exists as itself" and "because they have existence,"] prove the existence of arising which is the opposite (*vīparīta) of the inherent nature (*sva-rūpa) of
the subject [of the thesis] (*dharmin),\textsuperscript{41} therefore, [your] thesis is contradicted.

[Answer:] [We] answer: [Our reasons that] "it [already] exists as itself" and "they have existence" are conventional. What arises, based upon them, has no own-being (*niḥsvabhāvatā) in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ). Since there is no arising in any way from itself, from others, from both [itself and others] and without cause, there is no dissimilar instance of non-production. Therefore, [Bhāviveka] says:

[MHK:]

\begin{quote}
vipakṣāsaṃbhavād iṣṭā nāpi hetor viruddhatā //146ab//

Because of the impossibility of dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), it would also not be right to hold that the reason [in our proof formula] is contradicted. //146ab//\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

[MHK:]

\begin{quote}
evam tāvat svato janma bhāvānāṃ nopapadyate //146cd//

Thus, first of all [it has been proven] that existents are not produced from themselves. //146cd//
\end{quote}

[TJ:] The meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha) is that in the way (*naya) described above, [existents are not produced from themselves].

Tibetan Text of the

\textit{Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajvālā} III. 137-146

III. 3 \textit{Introduction to the topic: The non-production of all dharmas}

[D91a2, P97b5]

\begin{verbatim}
yaṅ na rnam rtog dra ba yi //
\end{verbatim}

[D91a2, P97b6]

\begin{verbatim}
rgyun ’brel de dag la sogs pa //
dnos po skye bar ’dzin brten pas //
nan gyis byis pa ’khrul bar\textsuperscript{43} byed //<137>
gaṅ tshe mkhas pa rig sgron gyis //
yaṅ dag ji bzin yoṅs rtog\textsuperscript{44} pa //
\end{verbatim}
A. The non-production from itself

de la re ŋig bdag skye ba //
kun rdzob tu yaṅ mi rigs te //
bdag ŋid yod phyir dper bya52 na //
žo ni bdag las mi skye bźin <|139>53

žes bya ba [P98a6] bdag las žes bya ba ni raṅ las žes bya ba’i tha tshig go <|D91b2| ‘di ltar gal te dños po rnam bdag las54 skye bar ’gyur55 na / rgyu daṅ rkyen rnam med par yaṅ skye ba’i rigs na / de lta bu ni ’jig rten na yaṅ ma mthoṅ na / don [P98a7] dam par lta smos kyaṅ ci dgos / bdag ŋid yod pa’i phyir žes bya ba la bdag ces bya ba ni raṅ gi no bo [D91b3] ŋid daṅ bcas pa ste / bdag ŋid yod pa’i don ni bdag go <|de’i dños po ni bdag ŋid do <|de’i phyir bdag ŋid yod [P98a8] pa’i
phyir žes bya ba ni raṅ gi ŋo bo ŋīd du yod pa’i phyir žes bya ba’i tha tshig go //

gal te de skye ba na yod pa ŋīd yin na / de la yang skye bas ci žig bya / [D91b4] dper bya na ’jig rten na ’o ma las žo skye bar ’dod kyī / žo ŋīd žo’i raṅ [P98b1] gi bdag ŋīd las skye bar mi ’dod pa bzin du ñōs po bdag ŋīd yod pa yan bdag las mi skye ste / raṅ gi bdag ŋīd la byed pa ’gal ba’i skyon du ’gyur ba’i phyir ro // yan na tshad ma’i lam [D91b5] gzan yan yod de /

ñōs [P98a2] rams bdag las ma skyes te56//
ñōs po yin phyir skyes bu bzin // <140ab>57
žes bya la skyes bu ni de dag gi gźun las ma skyes par ’dod pas / de bzin žes bya ba ni ma skyes pa tsam žig khas blaṅs nas ñōs po rams kyi skye ba58 [P98b3] dgag [D91b6] pa’i dper bya’o //
ma skyes pa la bdag med de //
ma skyes phyir na mkha’ min bzin // <140cd>59
žes bya la bdag ni ŋo bo ŋīd yin na </> de ni skyes bu la sols po bdag las60 ma skyes pa dag61 la med de / ma skyes pa’i phyir [P98b4] nam mkha’i me tog bzin no /62
’dir graṅs can dag nam mkha’i me tog gi don rnam pa du mar rnam par brtags naś63 dpe med pa ŋīd du [P98b5] rgo bar byed de / ci nam mkha’i me tog ces bya ba de’i don gal te nam mkha’ la ’dug pa’i me [D92a1] tog yin pas nam mkha’i me tog ces bya na64 ni me tog ti-la-ka daṅ ut-pa-la la sols pa dag yin par thal [P98b6] bar ’gyur te / de dag kyaṅ nam mkha’ la ’dug pa yin te / nam mkha’ ni go skabs ’byed pa’i bdag ŋīd yin pa’i phyir ro // [D92b2] ’on te nam mkha’ las byuṅ ba’i65 me tog yin pas nam mkha’i me tog ces bya na ni ’di la [P98b7] yaṅ nam mkha’ las žes bya ba’i don rnam par brtags nas / ci nam mkha’ las gzan pa’i me tog yin nam / ’on te nam mkha’ las ’ouns pa’i me tog yin [D92a3] graṅ / gal te nam mkha’ daṅ me tog la nam mkha’i [P98b8] me tog ces bya na ni de laṭa na / de ġī ga yaṅ yod pa yin pa’i phyir nam mkha’i me tog ces bya ba’i dpe de ñōs po med par sgrub par mi nus so // gal te khyod66 ’di skad ces nam mkha’ daṅ ’brel ba’i me [D92a4] tog med pas [P99a1] nam mkha’i me tog ces bya ba ni nam mkha’ la ni me tog yod pa ma yin pa la bya ste / de’i phyir nam mkha’i me tog ces bya’o že na / de laṭa na / yaṅ ’jig rten gsum po thams cad nam mkha’i me tog ma [P99a2] yin pa’i don daṅ mthun par mi ’gyur te / [D92a5] gaṅ gi phyir že na / nam mkha’i me tog kyaṅ bdag ŋīd ’ga’ žig gis yod pa’i phyir khyed kyi dpe med pa kho na yin no že zer ro //
'dir bṣad pa /

nam mkha'ib67 me [P99a3] tog med pa'i don //
mkha' la sogs par khyod 'dod pa //
del dag nam mkha'i me tog min //
[D92a6]
de'i phyir kho bo'i phyogs med min // <141>68

ţes bya ba ni kho bo cag gi dpe nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba de'i med pa'i don la nam [P92a4] mkha' la sogs pa ţes bya ba nam mkha' la dañ nam mkha' las dañ nam mkha' dañ me tog dañ nam mkha'i me tog ces rnam par [D92a7] dbye ba dag gis 'jig rten gsum po thams cad kyañ yod par [P99a5] khyod69 'dod pa de dag ni kho bo cag gi dpe nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba'i don ma yin te70/

'o na ji lta bu že na /

kho bo cag ni dpe nam mkha'i me tog ces bya ba de'i don ni khyod kyis <nam>71 mkha' la sogs par btags pa de [D92b1, P99a6]] dag las gţan yin la / nam mkha'i me tog ces72 kho bo cag gi dper bţag pa de bdag ņid 'ga' zig gis yod par yañ khyed kyis sgrub73 par mi nus pas / de'i phyir kho bo'i phyogs 'di la yañ chos mthun pa'i dpe [P99a7] med pa ma yin no //

'dir smras pa / [D92b2] gañ dag gi phyogs la 'bras bu'i rañ gi bdag ņid kyi bdag las skye bar 'dod pa de dag gi phyogs la ni skyon de dag tu yañ 'gyur gyi / kho bo ni rgyu'i rañ gi mtshan ņid las skye bar 'dod [P99a8] pas kho bo'i phyogs la skyon de dag med de / skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag [D92b3] ņid du yod pa ņid las skye ba'i phyir ro že na /

pha rol po de dag gis dogs pa bsu nas bstan bcos byed pas /

gal te rgyu la74 'bras bdag75 [P99b1] yod //
de las de ni skye sţam76 ŋin //
dţos rnam ds las skye ba ni //77
bdag las skye ba ņid 'dod na // <142>78

ţes bya ba smos so // de la skyon 'di yod de /

[D92b4]
de las79 gţan min bdag bţin na //
gryu ni rgyu min ņid du 'gyur //<143ab>80

ţes bya ba ni gal te rgyu dañ 'bras [P99b2] bu dag gţan ņid yin na81 'di ni rgyu'o 'di ni 'bras bu'o ţes bya ba'i tha sţad rnam par gţag82 tu ruñ gi gţan ņid ma yin pa la mi ruñ ste / sa bon yah myu gu'i [D92b5] rgyu ņid ma yin par 'gyur ro // ji ltar že na / de [P99b3] las gţan ma yin pa'i
phyir 'bras bu'i rañ gi bdag ñid bźin pa'i phyir ro // des na myu gu yañ yañ dag par na sa bon gyi 'bras bu ma yin te / de las gźan ñid ma yin pa'i phyir rgyu'i rañ gi bdag [P99b4] ñid bźin pas / [D92b6] de lta na rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po ñid med pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro // gźan yañ /

ma skyes phyir ni rgyu min pa //
ci žig yin žiñ gañ gi rgyu // <143cd>

žes bya ba ni gtso bo dañ skyes bu la sogs pa rañ ñid [P99b5] ma skyes pa'i phyir sña phyi'i khyad par med par ni rgyu ma yin pas ci [D92b7] yañ ma yin žiñ gañ gi rgyur yañ mi 'gyur bas ji ltar gźan gyi rgyur 'gyur / de bźin du sa bon la sogs pa ma skyes pa dag gi ni myu gu la sogs [P99b6] pa mñoñ par sgrub par mi nus so žes bya ba'i tha tshig go //
ci ste 'di sñam du rgyu gañ kho na yin pa de ñid 'bras bu ma yin [D93a1] te / 'o na ji lta bu že na / rgyu la 'bras bu nus pa'i bdag ñid du yod pas de rgyu dañ rkyen [P99b7] mams kyis gsal bar byed de / nus pa dañ gsal ba de gñis kyañ bdag ñid tha mi dad pa'i phyir de las skye ba ni bdag las skye ba yin par sems [D93a2] na ///</
de'i phyir bśad pa /

'bras bu89 bdag ñid ñid yin na90 //
[P99b8]
rgyur brtag pa ni don med 'gyur // <144ab>

žes bya ba ni rgyu ni 'bras bu bskyed pa yin par 'dod na / gal te 'bras bu bdag ñid92 yod pa ñid yin na ///</rgyur brtag pas ci žig bya / skyon chen po gźan 'di yañ yod de /

[D93a3]
de ñid las [P100a1] ni de skye na //
skyed93 dañ bskyed bya gcig tu 'gyur // <144cd>

žes bya ba ni rgyu dañ 'bras bu gñis žes bya ba'i tha tshig go // gal te 'di sñam du bdag las skye ba kho na yañ yin la / skyed pa dañ bskyed par bya ba95 gñis gcig pa ñid du yañ mi 'gyur ba kho bos [D93a4] ston par nus te / dper na 'o ma že bya ba'i rdzas de ltar96 gnas pa'i chos gźan 'gag pa na žo žes bya ba'i chos gźan skye žiñ de la rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i tha sñad [P100a3] mram par gžag97 pa yañ yod pa bźin no sñam du sems na / bśad pa /

gal te 'o ma žo ñid du //

gnas pas [D93a5] gnod pa med sñam na //
pha ni bu ŋid mi 'gyur bas //

gnod pa med pa ma yin no // <145>98

žes bya ba ni 'di [P100a4] ltar phas pha'i dños po ŋid yoṅs su bdaṅ nas
bu'i no bo ŋid du yoṅs su99 'gyur ba ni sus kyaṅ gaṅ du ji ltar yaṅ ma
mthoṅ bas / de'i phyir khyod kyis skyed100 pa daṅ bskyed [D93a6] par
bya ba gñis gcig pa ŋid [P100a5] du 'gyur ba'i skyon bzlog par dka'o //
'dir pha rol po dag dbu ma pa'i gan tshigs bdag ŋid yod pa'a'i phyir žes
bya ba daṅ / dños po yin pa'a'i phyir žes bya ba dag skye ba med pa'i gan
tshigs su [P100a6] bţag pa dag ni skye ba med pa'ai mi mthun pa'ai
[D93a7] phyogs skye ba can dag sgrub pa'a'i gan tshigs yin gyi / skye ba
med pa sgrub pa'i gan tshigs su mi ruṅ no žes phyir zlog par byed de /
'di ltar bdag ŋid [P100a7] yod pa ŋid daṅ dños po ŋid ces bya ba ni bum
pa la sogs pa'ai dños po skyes pa dag la yod kyi / ri boṅ gi rva la
[D93b1] sog pa ma skyes pa dag la ni med pas </> de'i phyir bdag ŋid
yod pa ŋid daṅ [P100a8] dños po ŋid ces bya ba dños po'i bdag ŋid kyi
gan tshigs de dag dños po med pa'ai bdag ŋid kyi mthun101 pa'ai phyogs
gañ la yaṅ med la / mi mthun pa'ai phyogs kho na la yod pa'ai phyir
[D93b2] don 'gal ba ŋid kyis [P100b1] skye ba med pa žes bya ba'i chos
can gyi ŋo bo ŋid las bzlog pa skye ba yod pa ŋid sgrub par byed pa'ai
phyir don 'gal ba ŋid yin no že na / bṣad pa / bdag ŋid yod pa ŋid daṅ
dños po ŋid ces bya ba de dag ni kun [P100b2] rdzob pa yin te / de dag
la brten nas byuṅ [D93b3] ba ni don dam par no bo ŋid med pa ŋid yin
te / bdag daṅ gzan daṅ gñi ga daṅ rgyu med pa las rnam pa thams cad du
skye ba med pa'ai phyir skye ba med pa'ai mi [P100b3] mthun pa'ai
phyogs skye ba med pas /

mi mthun phyogs ni med pa'a'i phyir //

gtan tshigs 'gal ba ŋid mi [D93b4] 'dod // <146ab>102

ces bya ba smras so //

de ltar re žig dños po rnams //

bdag las103 skye bar mi rigs so // <146cd>104

[P100b4] žes bya ba'i tshig gi don ni ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis žes bya
ba'i tha tshig go //
Explanation of abbreviations employed in this paper:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Co ne edition of the Tibetan translation of the <em>Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajāvālā</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCZC</td>
<td><em>Da-Cheng Zhang-Chen lun</em> (大乘掌珍論), Taishō Shinshū Daizō-kyō vol. 30; No. 1578.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Sde dge edition of the Tibetan translation of the <em>Madhyamakahrdayakārikā</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Sde dge edition of the Tibetan translation of the <em>Madhyamakahrdayavṛttitarkajāvālā</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KT</td>
<td>Kārikā text of the Tibetan translation of the <em>Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td><em>Madhyamakārthasamgraha</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 3857, the Peking edition; No. 5258.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHK</td>
<td><em>Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 3855, the Peking edition; No. 5255.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMK</td>
<td><em>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</em>, kārikās in Candrakīrti’s <em>Prasannapadā</em> ed. by Louis de La Vallée Poussin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td><em>Madhyamakaratanarpadīpa</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 3854, the Peking edition; No. 5254.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Photocopy in Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, JIANG Zhongxin and DUAN Qian Wenzhong, Jiangxi renmin chuban she 1991, pp. 511-522.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBVV</td>
<td><em>Nikāyabhedavibhāṅgavyākhyāna</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 4139, the Peking edition; No. 5640.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāṇini</td>
<td>Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, tr. by Sumitra M. Katre, University of Texas Press, Austin 1987.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the <em>Madhyamakahrdayakārikā</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td><em>Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 3853, the Peking edition; No. 5253.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td><em>Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakaṭṭikā</em>, the Sde dge edition; No. 3859, the Peking edition; No. 5259.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PT Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the Madhyamaka-hṛdayavṛttitarka-jvalā.

SG Photocopy of the handcopy by GOKHALE, based on the first copy or deciphering made by SĀMKRTYAYANA, Shrikan S. BAHULKAR, The Madhyamaka-Hṛdaya-Kārikā of Bhāvaviveka: A Photographic Reproduction of Prof. V.V. Gokhale’s Copy, Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism, Sambhāsa 15, Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Nagoya 1994.


TJ Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarka-jvalā, the Sde dge edition; No. 3856, the Peking edition; No. 5256.

YD Yuktidīlpikā, ed. by Ram Chandra PANDeya, Delhi 1967.

Explanation of signs employed in the edition of the Tibetan text

[] folio No. < >

<< > addition

Notes

1. This paper is based upon my M.A. thesis submitted to the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, in 1994. I would like to thank Professor Ashok N. AKLUJKAR, who was my major professor at the University of British Columbia and who introduced me to Bhaviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. While a graduate student at the University of British Columbia, I was greatly influenced by Professor AKLUJKAR’s lectures on Indian linguistics, philosophy and literature. I would also like to express my indebtedness to Professor Esho MIKOGAMI, who was my supervisor at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. Professor MIKOGAMI’s generous help provided the rich basis which has allowed me to continue studying to the present. Mr. Yusho WAKAHARA, lecturer of Ryukoku University, kindly and generously helped me in reading and understanding the Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarka-jvalā providing many valuable insights into the text. I wish to express my debt to Professor Tom J. F. TILLEMANS of the University of Lausanne, who was a visiting professor at the University of Calgary, for critically reading an early draft of this paper and giving many invaluable suggestions which contributed to its final form. Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Jon ADAMS of the University of Calgary for correcting my English of this paper.

P. L. VAIDYA (1923: 51-52) ascribes Madhyamakapraśītaryasamutpāda to Bhāviveka. In the Tibetan Tripitaka, however, this treatise is attributed to Kṛṣṇa. For this reason, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhāviveka. See YAMAGUCHI 1941: 57-58.

(1) PNT and (2) PKP are also not attributed to Bhāviveka in the Tibetan Tripitaka. Therefore, modern scholars do not at present consider them to be Bhāviveka’s works. SCHAYER (1935: 206-211) and YAMAGUCHI (1941: 54-57) do not ascribe (4) MRP to Bhāviveka. RUEGG (1981: 66) and EJIMA (1990: 104) ascribe (4) MRP to later Bhavya who is different from Bhāviveka. On the other hand, LINDTNER (1982: 172-184) attributes this treatise to Bhāviveka. EJIMA (1980: 18-33) does not ascribe (5) MAS to Bhāviveka. LINDTNER (1981: 200, n. 14) and RUEGG (1981: 64, esp. n. 202), on the other hand, attribute (5) MAS to Bhāviveka. YAMAGUCHI (1941: 53-54) and EJIMA (1980: 10) doubt whether (6) NBVV was composed by Bhāviveka.

3. EJIMA (1990: 846-838), after examining the manuscripts of Candrakīrti (A.D. c. 600-650)’s Prasannapaddā (hereafter, Pras.) and the Tibetan and Chinese sources, suggests that the name of the author of the MHK, PP and DCZC, etc., should be Bhāviveka. His collected evidence may be summarized as follows:

(1) The names “Bhāvaviveka” and “Bhāviveka” appear four times in the manuscripts of the Pras. The name “Bhavya” never appears in these manuscripts.

(2) The transliteration “婆思吠喩迦 / 加 (b’u-a-b’s-b’i-b’j-wai-o-k’a = Po-pi-fei-jia)” and the Chinese translation “清井” (Qing-bian) appear in the Chinese materials. The former “婆思吠喩迦 / 加” refers to Bhāviveka, not Bhāvaviveka or Bhavyaviveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of the MHK, TJ, PP, etc., was translated as “清井” and was identified with Bhāviveka by Xuan-zang (A.D. c. 600-664). Further, there is no indication in Chinese materials of the names “Bhāvaviveka,” “Bhavyaviveka” or “Bhavya” which are assumed based upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of the MHK, etc.

(3) The name of the author of the MHK is “sNaṅ bral” or “sKal ldan” in the Tibetan translation of Madhyamakālaṃkāraṭīkā (P No. 5286: Sa. 126b4, 136b6, D No. 3886: Sa. 119b6, 128a2). The original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sNaṅ bral” should be “Bhāviveka” or “Bhāvivikta.” On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sKal ldan” can be assumed to be “Bhavya.” (Mayāvyutpatti, No. 3495.)

The name of the author of the PP is given as “Legs ldan byed” or “Legs ldan 'byed” in the Tibetan translation of the PP and Prajñāpradīpamālamadhyamakāṣṭikā (hereafter, PPT), Avalokitavrata’s sub-commentary on the PP, by Jñāna-
garbha and Klu'i rgyal mtshan. However, "Legs ldan byed" is probably the
Tibetan translator's error. It should be corrected to "Legs ldan 'byed." The
original Sanskrit word of the latter would be "Bhavyaviveka" corroborating the
part "viveka."

(4) Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, A.D. c. 982-1054) calls the author of the
MHK and the PP "Bhavya" or "Bhavya sNaṅ bral (Bhavya-Bhāviveka)" in his
Bodhipaṭhaṇapradaṇapāṇijnika (P No. 5344: D No. 3948.), the autocommentary
on Bodhipaṭhaṇapāṇi (P: Ki. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2, D: Khi. 280a6, 285a1,
280b4, 280b6). Besides his own treatise, Atiśa translated the MRP, MHK, TJ,
NBVV and MAS into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translator Tshul
khirm rgyal ba. He calls the author of the MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV "Bhavya,"
and Tshul khirms rgyal ba calls him "Legs ldan 'byed (Bhavyaviveka)" in the
MAS.

(5) Tibetan Buddhist scholar lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (A.D. c. 1717-1786)
states that the author of the MRP is not Bhāviveka who composed the MHK but
is "junior Bhavya (Legs ldan chuṅ ba)" or "later Bhavya (Legs ldan phi ma)."
(...) Legs ldan chuṅ bar grags pas mdzad pa yin gyi slob dpon 'dis mdzad pa min
no //); see MīMAkī 1982: 169 n. 458.

(6) The TJ is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the Dkar
chag Ldan dkar ma (the catalogue of the Ldan dkar ma), completed in 842 A.D.
(See LALOU 1953: 313-353). The surviving TJ was translated and finalized by
Atiśa and Tshul khirm rgyal ba in the eleventh centuries. Assuming the correct­
ness of EJIMA's investigation, I adopt the name "Bhāviveka" in this paper.

4. KAJIYAMA investigated the relation of Bhāviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapāla,
and as a result, calculated the date of Bhāviveka given here. For details, see

5. In his PPT (D 73a4,5), Avalokitaṇvara enumerates eight commentators on
Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (hereafter, MMK). The commentators are
(1) Nāgārjuna himself (Akutobhayā, exists only in variant Tibetan translations),
(2) Buddhapālita (A.D. c. 470-540; Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti, exists
only in variant Tibetan translations), (3) Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā, exists in
Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations), (4) Devaśarman (fifth to
sixth centuries; Dkar po 'char ba, exists in a Tibetan fragment), (5) Guṇaśrī
(fifth to sixth centuries; the title of his commentary is not known), (6) Gunamati
(the fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known, exists in a
Tibetan fragment), (7) Sthiramati (A.D. c. 510-570; Da-Cheng Zhong-Guan
Shi-lun, 大乘中觀釋論, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and (8)
Bhāviveka (Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti, exists in variant Tibetan and
Chinese translations). Besides these commentaries, however, there are two
commentaries on these commentaries in the MMK in the Chinese Tripitaka: (1) Piṅgala (青目; Zhong
lun, 中論, tr. by Kumārajīva A.D. c. 350-409), (2) Asaṅga (A.D. c. 320-400;
Qin-Zhong lun, 順中論, tr. by Prajñāruuci).

6. Bhāviveka attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his own philosophy
by means of the independent inferences (svatantrānumāna) which included
three unusual modifications; the adding the word "paramārthataḥ" (from the
standpoint of the highest truth, or simply, in ultimate reality) to the proposition
in a proof formula; the specification that the negation in his proof formulae should be taken as "prasajyapratisedha" (simple negation); and the condition that no dissimilar instance is to be given. Verse 26 in the third chapter is the first proof formula in the MHK. In the TJ, Bhāviveka explains how his proof formulae are to be understood:

"Here, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), the earth, etc., have no gross elements as their intrinsic natures, [Reason1:] because they are things which are made, or [Reason2:] because they are things which have causes, etc., [Example:] just like knowledge (jñāna). // III.26 //" is understood as follows:

"Here, [Thesis:] if considered by wisdom (prajñā) which is in conformity with ultimate reality, the earth, etc., have no gross elements as their intrinsic natures, [Reason1:] because they are things which are made, or [Reason2:] because they are things which have cause, knowableness (jñeyatva), expressiblity (vācyatva), etc., [Example:] just as knowledge has no gross elements as its intrinsic nature."


As I have mentioned, Bhāviveka attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent inference. At the same time, moreover, he strongly criticized Buddhapālīta (A.D. c. 470-540), who was also one of the commentators of Nāgārjuna's MMK, in his PP (Cf. PP D 49a5 to 49b1, 50a5 to 50b1, etc., PPT D 73a4, 102a1, etc.). He maintained that Buddhapālīta's statement was deficient, because neither a reason (hetu) nor an example (drṣṭānta) had been stated (See PP D 49a5 to 50a1). The Sanskrit of Bhāviveka's criticism against Buddhapālīta is quoted by Candrākirti. Pras.: (ācārya-buddhapālītas tv āhā) na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ / tad-utpāda-vaiyārthyaḥ / atiprasaṅga-dosāc ca / ... (atraike dūṣaṇām āhūḥ!) tad-ayuktaḥ / hetu-drṣṭāntanabhidhānāt / parokta-dosāparīhārāc ca / prasaṅga-vākyatvāc ca prakṛtārtha-viparyayena viparītārtha-sādhyā-utpannaḥ utpannaḥ bhāvā janmasāphalyāt / janma-nirdhāc ceti kṛtānta-virodhāḥ syāt // (pp. 14,1-15,2). Candrākirti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argument advocated by Bhāviveka and defended Buddhapālīta's statement against the objections put forward by Bhāviveka. Candrākirti argued that Buddhapālīta's statement had no faults even though an independent reason and example had not been stated by him in his statement. That is, Candrākirti's claim was that prasaṅga arguments were enough to refute the opponent's opinions and that therefore, the independent inference was not necessary (Pras. pp. 15,3- 39,7).

Later on, this controversy was considered to be the origin of the division of the two sub-school, i.e., Prāṣāṅga and Svātantrika, in the Mādhyamikas in Tibet. See RUEGG 1981: 58.

11. GOKHALE and BAHULKAR 1985: 76 n. 1. GOKHALE & BAHULKAR (1985: 77) says that the manuscript of the MHK is not later than the tenth century. According to EJIMA (1980: 263), however, the manuscript of the MHK was written in the “Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili” script of the eleventh century.


13. According to GOKHALE, Bhāviveka originally composed the first three chapters under the title Tattvāmyatavatāra, forming the core of the MHK adding the other chapters later. For the details, see GOKHALE 1958: 165-166, n. 1, 1972: 41-42, 1985: 78.


17. I am preparing, for publication, the next sections: non-production from others (vv. 147-158), the criticism of the four conditions (vv. 159-175), and I intend to translate the MHK and the TJ up to v. 266.

18. As we have seen in note 2 of this paper, the TJ is considered to be Bhāviveka’s autocommentary (svavṛtti) on the MHK. There are, however, sufficient reasons to wonder whether or not the surviving Tibetan translation of the TJ has been preserved in the original form by this autocommentary. This is because, after some kārikās, it is written “thus says the ācārya” in what should be a reference to Bhāviveka, the author of the kārikās. Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kārikās, the expressions “this is the intention of the ācārya,” “the ācārya says” and “the author of this treatise says” are used (TJ D 50a5, 75a1, 86a2, 92b3, 107a2, 112b6, 224b4, 246b5, 274b6, 321a5, etc.). The word “ācārya” usually means “senior teacher” or “great teacher.” Therefore, it is not expected that Bhāviveka would call himself “ācārya.” EJIMA 1980: 14, 1992: 840), hypothesizes that the surviving TJ is a revised recension of the original TJ. The original TJ was composed by Bhāviveka, the author of the MHK and PP, etc., while, on the other hand, the surviving TJ was written by Bhavya who lived in the eighth century to the tenth century. GOKHALE (1985: 77), however, suggests that sentences containing the word “ācārya” were explanatory comments by Atiśa, and that Tshul khrims rgyal ba, Atiśa’s collaborator, inserted them into
the text. On the recent consideration regarding this question, see RUEGG 1990: 59-71.

19. Cf. dravya-pradhāna-jīvādi jñeyaḥ yat tīrtha-kalpitam / yathāyogam niśeddhav- 
vyaḥ yukty-āgama-viśāradaiḥ // III. 135 // iti sva-para-siddhānta-kalpitātma-
 nirāmmatām / vidvān vibhāvyā bhāvānām tattva-jñānāṁrtam pibet // III. 136 //
EJIMA 1980: 300-301. [Tr.]: Those who are proficient in reason (yukti) and 
āgamas should negate what the heretics conceptually constructed, objects of
knowledge (jñeya) such as a substantial entity (dravya), primary matter
(pradhāna), life-monad (jīva), etc. // III. 135// Thus, self (ātman) which our
own and other systems have conceptually constructed is selfless (nirātman).
Realizing [selflessness] of entities, wise men drink the ambrosia of the knowledge
of truth. // III. 136 //

20. “Prapañca” plays a role close to language in the Madhyamaka school. In the TJ,
Bhāviveka explains that “prapañca” is “activity of speech-language” (tshig gi
brjod pa’i spros pa). See my translation, p. 126. He, moreover, says in his PP
that because the attachment (abhiniveśa) to the nature of speech (=verbal
expression) is pacified, “prapañca” ceases. (spros pa ‘ner & ŋes bya ba ni brjod
pa’i bdag ŋid mhon par ŋen pa ’ti ba ’phiyir / (D: 47a7-47b1). Candrakīrti says
that because when, noble men see pratiṣṭhāya-samutpāda as it is in reality, “prapañca”
characterized by what is to be spoken, etc., ceases in every way, here (pratiṣṭitya-
samutpāda) “prapañca” is pacified. (Pras.: yathāvasthita-pratiṣṭhāya-samutpāda-
darsane satī āryāṇām abhidhāyādī-lakṣaṇasya prapañcasya sarvahoparamāt I
prapañcānām upaśamo ‘sminn iti / p. 11). He, further, defines “prapañca” as
follows: “Prapañca” is language (vāk) which produces the verbal differentiation
(prapañcayati) of referents (Pras.: prapañcā hi vāk prapañcayati arthān, p. 373
tr. by P. WILLIAMS 1980: 31). Thus, according to the Mādhyamikas, “prapañca”
is closely related to language. Nāgārjuna states in his MMK as follows: “There
is emancipation (mokṣa) from the extinction of action and affliction (karma-kleśa).
Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptual construction (vikalpa).
They [conceptual constructions] [are produced] from “prapañca”. However,
“prapañca” is destroyed in emptiness.”// XVIII. 5 // Skt: karma-kleśa-ksayan
mokṣaḥ karma-kleśā vikalpaḥ / te prapañcāt prapañcasc tu śūnyatādāṃ
niruddhyate // (Pras., p. 349). That is, conceptual construction is the cause of
the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptual construction is produced from
“prapañca.” We do not think anything without language. Thinking based on
language, i.e., conceptual construction, is the cause of wrong actions and
afflictions. Therefore, “prapañca,” i.e., the cause of the conceptual constructions,
must be pacified.

21. Literally, drawing towards one’s self or bringing near. MONIER-WILLIAMS
1899: 209.


Tib.: bdag las ŋes bya ba ni bdag ŋid las ŋes bya ba’i tha tshig go //. Avalokitavrata
glosses: the meaning of the self connects to the fivefold, that is, [the self]
connects to (1) its own self (ātman), (2) one’s own (ātmya), (3) acquaintance
(jñātṛ), (4) the Lord (iśvara) and (5) kinsman (jñāti). Therefore, in order to
avoid (2) one's own, (3) acquaintance, (4) the Lord and (5) kinsman, here [Bhāviveka] says that “from itself” means “from [its own] self.” PPT D: bdag ces bya ba'i don rnam pa la la sbyor te / bdag ŋid dan bdag gi dan ŋes pa dan dban phyug dan ŋe du dag la sbyor bas / de'i phyir bdag gi dan ŋes pa dan dban phyug dan ŋe du dag rnam par gcad pa'i phyir'dir bdag las ŋes bya ba ni bdag ŋid las ŋes bya ba'i tha tshig go ŋes bṣad de l (62a4,5,6).

24. The Śāṃkyas have the view that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a potential state. This is a form of the idea of “origination from itself.” See LARSON and BHATTACHARYA 1987: 68-72, etc.

25. Candrakīrti criticizes this reason “because it exists.” According to Candrakīrti, the reason “because it exists” establishes what is already established (siddha-sādhanā) and has a contradictory meaning (viruddhārthatā). Pras.: kuto 'smākaṃ vidyamānatvād iti hetur yasya siddha-sādhanam viruddhārthatā vā syāt / yasya siddha-sādhanasya yasyāś ca viruddhārthatāyāḥ parihārārtham yatnāṃ karisyāmaḥ / (p.18). Candrakīrti, moreover, points out that for opponents, the reason “because it exists” is an inconclusive (anaiṁktika). Pras.: sattvād (= vidyamāna-tvād) iti cāyaṃ hetuḥ parato 'naiṁktikaḥ / kim sattvāt / caitanyavān nādhyaṁ-kānyāy atyatanāṃ svata utpadyantām / utāho ghaṭādivat svata utpadyantām iti / ghaṭādivām sādhyā-samatvān nāaikāntikatetī cet / naitad evaṃ tathānabhi-dhanāt / (p.33).


27. Cf. Śāmkakārikā v. 3d: na prakṛtir na viśvā pruṣaṇaḥ / (pruṣa is neither created nor creative. Tr. by LARSON). See LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1979: 256.

28. Pruṣa is one of the two substantial principles which the Śāṃkyas admit as a real, unproduced, unchanging, unevolving entity. See LARSON & BHATTACHARYA 1987: 78-83. Buddhists do not accept pruṣa as a substantial principle. Here, however, Bhāviveka, admitting only the view that pruṣa does not arise, employs the pruṣa as an example which implies the negation of arising of entity.

29. I do not understand this reason properly. NOZAWA (1972: 97) reconstructs this phrase into Sanskrit: avakāśodghaṇṭanamakathā. Tib.: nam mkha' ni go skabs 'byed pa'i bdag ŋid yin pa'i phyir ro l (DT 92a1, PT 98b6, p.137 in my edition).

30. SG omits hi.

31. Here the Śāṃkyas interprets the meaning of the sky-flower in four ways, that is, the flower in the sky (locative tātpuruṣa), the flower which comes from the sky (ablative tātpuruṣa), the flower and the sky (dvandva) and the flower of the sky (genitive tātpuruṣa).

32. I do not fully understand the argument here. It seems that the Śāṃkyas state that since the sky-flower is an existent, the sky-flower cannot be an example that proves non-existence of entities. Bhāviveka, however, employs the sky-flower as a non-existent. Therefore, the sky-flower can be an example that proves
non-existence of entities, i.e., is a similar example of the non-existence of entities. To the best of my knowledge, however, I do not know that the Sāṁkhya state that the sky-flower is an existent.

DCZC has a similar argument regarding the sky-flower. However, DCZC adopts "khaśya pūṣpah" (genitive tatpurusa). DCZC: "Others object: The sphere is an existent, because it is common sense. The flower is also an existent, because the utpala [flower], etc., appear. Though the two, sky and flower, do not connect [to each other], [they are] not non-existents. Therefore, the example "sky-flower" is not established. This objection is not, however, correct, because this example "sky-flower," is taken as "genitive tatpurusa compound," that is, "the flower of the sky," we name it the "sky-flower." Since it is not existent, this example is valid (literally, there is a [valid] example.)." (DCZC: 有余難言虚空有性 世间共知故。花亦有性。麁銅羅等世現見故。空花二種雖不相應非無自性。故空花喻所立不成。此難不然。此空花喻就第六轉依士訓釋。空之花故說名空花。此既非有故 論非無。Taishō, vol. 30, p. 274a10-15).

33. The point of this statement is probably that the manifest result is produced from its prior unmanifest state in the cause, since the Sāṁkhya state that the result exists in the cause in a potential state, that is, the cause has the characteristic of an unmanifest state of result.

34. Tib.: skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag ŋid du yod pa ŋid las skye ba'i phyir ro ze na // (D 92b2,3, P 99a8, p. 138 in my edition). The reconstructed Skt.: kāraṇātmanā vidyāmnātava sarvasyatattīmattām utpādā /// PP: skye ba can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag ŋid du yod pa kha na las skye ba'i phyir ro // (D 49a4,5).

35. As I have mentioned in note 18, this expression is curious. The expression "śāstra-kāra" (author of the treatise or composer of the treatise) is usually used by the third person or commentator who is not the author of the basic text. Therefore, "śāstra-kāra" might be an insertion by the translator. As RUEGG (1990: n. 19) reports, however, according to P.V. KANE (1968: 195), "in order to avoid looking egoistic, ancient authors generally put their own views in the third person as said by early writers like Medhātithi and Viśvarūpa." KANE (1971: 171), moreover, states that there is no prohibition against an author saying that he himself composed the sūtra and the vyāti, even when he speaks of himself in the third person in the vyāti. As I have also mentioned in the same note 18, on the other hand, GOKHALE (1985: 77) suggests that Tshul khrims rgyal ba, Atīśa's collaborator, might have inserted the explanatory comments containing the word "ācārya" given by Atīśa. However, if Tshul khrims rgyal ba inserted the sentences containing the word "ācārya" or "śāstra-kāra," the word "ācārya" or "śāstra- kāra" seems to refer to the author of the MHK. See RUEGG 1990: 64.

36. Literally: going on the doubt by the others, it is said by the author of [this] treatise. Tib.: pha rol po de dag gis dogs pa bsn nas bstan bcos byed pas ... žES bya ba smos so // (D 92b3, P 99a8).

37. These opponents are the Sāṁkhya who are proponents of potentiality (saktivādin, cf. PP D 49b1,2, PPT D 75a1). That is, according to them, any effect is not produced from nothing and must have a common basis as its cause. The manifested is a series of a basic cause. The effects pre-exist potentially in the cause and are

38. Literally, the effect exists as the self of the potentiality (ḍakṣī) in the cause, Tib: rgyu la ’bras bu nus pa’i bdag ṣid du yod pas. The reconstructed Sanskrit: hetau kāryaḥ śakti-ātmanāḥ vidyamāvatāt.


40. These opponents seem to be the Vārṣaganyas in the Sāṃkhya school. According to the Vārṣaganyas, the entire world (tālloka) ceases to be manifest from time to time. This, however, does not imply that the world actually ceases to exist. That is to say, this “disappearance” of the world is substitution of one property of a substantial entity by another property of the same substantial entity. Cf. Yuktidipikā (YD): pariṇāma hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntara-nivṛttiḥ dharmāntara-pravṛttiḥ ca / (p. 49, 6-7): jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādattat yadd param / tattvādāpracyuto dharmo pariṇāmah sa ucyate // (p. 49, 10-11):

41. That is, the opponents point out dharmi-svarupa-viparlta-sādhana (proving the opposite of the inherent nature of the subject of a thesis, or a reason which proves the opposite of the inherent nature of the subject of a thesis). According to Dignāga’s logic, a correct reason (hetu) in a proof formula is conditioned by three aspects (traitārya). These are: (1) pakṣa-dharmatva, namely the reason should be the predicate of the subject of the proposition, (2) sapakṣa eva sattvam, namely the reason must belong only to an example similar to the subject of the proposition, and (3) vipakṣe sattvam eva, namely the reason must not belong to a dissimilar instance of the subject of the proposition. When the reason in the proof formula has none of the above three aspects, it cannot be the correct reason. Here the opponents point out that Bhāviveka’s reason lacks item (3).

42. For Bhāviveka, there is no dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) in these proof formulae in question. In his TJ (Tib. IIDA 1980: 89), Bhāviveka says: “Here, among three aspects (traitārya) of reason, due to the non-indication of the third condition, i.e., absence of a dissimilar instance, what we intend to say is conventionally explained by using only two aspects of the reason. The property of the subject (pakṣa-dharma) is present only in the similar instance (sapakṣa eva sattvam), not in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) because the latter, which has own-being differs from the former, never exists. Therefore, we do not state examples (ārṣṭānta) which are different from the dissimilar instance and the reason.” He, moreover, states in his PP: “If you say that since it has not been shown that the reason “it already exists” is different from the dissimilar instance, [it is] not [valid] reason,” we reply: “Because there are no impossibilities of dissimilar instances at all, there is no absense [of the reason] in that (non-existent dissimilar instance), therefore, here and in all [proof formulae], there is no fault.” See also
PP: gal te gan tshigs yod pa ŋid ni mi mthun pa ’i phyogs las ldog pa ma bstan pas/ gan tshigs ŋid ma yin no ’e na / med pa kho na ’i phyir de la ldog pa med pas ’di dan thams cad la ñes pa med do l / (D 49a3). That is, for Bhaviveka, it is not necessary to indicate the third aspect of the reason, since the dissimilar instance does not exist.

43. DT ’khrul bar: PT ’khrug par
44. DT, PT rtog: DK, PK rtogs pa. Cf. Tarkajvalā: ... yan dag pa ji lta ba bzin yongs su rtog pa de ’i tshe l.
45. aṭha vā kalpanā-jāla-prasaro hy evamādikāḥ / jāta-bhāvāśrayo bālam ākūlikurute balāt /137// vidvān vidyāpradīpena yathābhūtaṃ parikṣate / jāter niṣedhāt tacchānteḥ prapañcoppasamas tadā /138//
46. DT, PT ... gnas ma yin pa kho na ste l. NOZAWA (1972: 99) reads ... gnas yin pa kho na ste l. I adopt NOZAWA’s reading.
47. PT zum: DT, zums
48. DT ... ro l de’i phyir: PT om. ... ro l de’i phyir.
49. DT rig: PT rigs
50. DT kyis: PT gis
51. PT gcig car: DT cig car
52. DT bya: PT byas
53. tatra tāvat svato janma samvṛtāpi na yujyate / sātmakatvād yathā dadhnāḥ svato janma na vidyate /139//
54. DT las: PT la
55. CT, DT, gyur
56. DK, DT, PT te: PK ste
57. nōtpānāḥ svātmato bhāvā bhāvatvāt tadyathā pumān /140ab//
58. PT ba: DT om. ba
59. nāpi cātmāstya ajātānām ajātatvāt kha-puspavat /140cd//
60. DT bdag las: PT dag la
61. PT ma skyes pa dag: DT. ma skyes pas bdag. Cf. ajātānām in v. 140cd.
62. abu ma’i shin po’i [D92b7] ’grel (PT ’brel) pa rtog ge ’bar ba / bam po bdun pa
63. DT nas: PT na
64. DT na: PT ba
65. DT ba’i: PT bas
66. PT khyod: DT khyed
67. DT mkha’i: PT mkha’
68. kha-puspābhāvāvācyam hi khādi yady api te matam l na kha-puspam tad ity asmāt pakṣe ’pi nyānatā na naḥ /141//
70. DT te: PT om. te
71. Add nam. DT, PT om. nam
72. DT ces : PT om. ces
73. DT sgrub : PT bsgrub
74. DK, PK la : DT dan, PT las
75. PT bdag : DT dag
76. DT sñam : PT mñam
77. The pāda c left out in DT and PT.
78. kāryasya kāraṇam svātmā tasya janma tato matam / svato janma tato 'bhīṣṭaṁ bhāvānāṁ iti cern matam //142//
79. DT, PK, PT de las: DK de la
80. svātmavat tadanañatvat kāraṇam syād akāraṇam //143ab//
81. DT om. na : PT has ni after na.
82. DT gzag: PT bţag
83. DT om. bţin: PT has yin after bţin.
84. DT gyi: PT gyis
85. DT gi: PT gis
86. ajāttavāc ca kim kasya kāraṇam syād akāraṇam //143cd//
87. DT phyir sña : PT om. phyir sña
88. PT gi : DT gis
89. 'bras bu = kārya(sya), but Ms reads bhāvasya.
90. DK yin na : PK, DT, PT yod. Cf. TJ: gal te 'bras bu bdag ŋid yod pa ŋid yin na...
91. saty ātmani ca bhāvasya vṛthā kāraṇa-kalpanā //144ab//
92. DT, PT 'bras bu ŋid, but I read 'bras bu bdag ŋid. Cf. ātmani in v. 144a and Tibetan kārikā.
93. DT, PT skyed: DK, PK bskyed
94. tasmād eva tad utpannam caikyam janaka-jañayoḥ //144cd//
95. DT ba : PT om. ba
96. DT, PT ji ltar, but NOZAWA (1972: 95) corrects to de ltar. I adopt NOZAWA'S reading.
97. DT gzag : PT bţag
98. dadhi-bhāvenas payasos 'vasthānāc ced abādhakam / putratvenānavasthānāt pitur na na bādhakam //145//
99. PT yons su : DT om. yons su
100. DT skyed : PT bskyed
101. PT mthun : DT mi mthun
102. vipakṣasāṁbhavād iṣṭā nāpi ka' kasmāt para iṣyate //146ab//
103. DK, PK, DT las : PT la
104. evam tāvat svato janma bhāvānāṁ nopapadyate //146cd//
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