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ON THE SCHOOL AFFILIATION OF AŚVAGHOṢA: “SAUTRĀNTIKA” OR “YOGĀCĀRA”? *

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Introduction

Traditionally it was understood that Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra were three distinct traditions, but this framework has been seriously questioned in recent years.

Owing to the efforts of Paul Demiéville, Nishi Giyū (Abidatsuma, “Buha”), and other scholars, it is becoming clear that there were traditions of meditators called yogācāras within the Sarvāstivāda community before the establishment of the philosophical Yogācāra school. Further, Lambert Schmithausen has compared the magnum opus of the Yogācāra school, the Yogācārabhūmi, with the Sarvāstivāda/Mūlasarvāstivāda recensions of the Buddhist canon and has found that the Yogācārabhūmi was specifically based on the Mūlasarvāstivāda canon (“Beiträge,” “Zu dem Rezensionen”). Concerning the exact relationship between the appellations

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* This paper was originally prepared to satisfy a pre-dissertation requirement at Yale University and was submitted to the graduate school in 1991 (unpublished). In the first half of the original version, entitled, “On the School Affiliation of Aśvaghoṣa: A Comparative Study of the Saundarananda and the Śrāvakabhūmi,” I discussed relevant meditative elements, while I concentrated on doctrinal elements in the second. Later, I organized a study group of the Saundarananda at the Institute of Buddhist Studies, Kyushu Ryukoku Junior College, with Fujitani Takayuki and Harada Yasunori, and, based on our discussion, we published a revised and enlarged Japanese version of the first half of the aforementioned paper in 2002. The present paper is a concise version originally meant for the IABS conference at Bangkok in 2002, where I selectively discussed both meditative and doctrinal elements. I thank Professors Stanley Weinstein, Lambert Schmithausen, Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Lance Cousins, Robert Kritzer, Aramaki Noritoshi, Honjō Yoshifumi, Iwata Takashi, Miyashita Seiki, Muroji Yoshihito, and Harada Wasō for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. My particular thanks are due to Robert Kritzer for his organization of the panel at the IABS conference and for kindly editing my English. Professor Hokazono Kōichi has referred me to some of the relevant studies. I further thank my former collaborators Fujitani Takayuki and Harada Yasunori for their input during the period in which we read the relevant texts together.
“Sarvāstivāda” and “Mūlasarvāstivāda,” Enomoto Fumio has recently suggested that the word “Mūlasarvāstivāda” represents the Sarvāstivādin claim that Sarvāstivāda was the root (mūla) of the other sects; thus, according to him, “Mūlasarvāstivāda” does not refer to a subsect of the Sarvāstivāda tradition (“Konpon Setsu Issai Ubu,” “Mūlasarvāstivādin”).

Taken together, these points seem to suggest that the Yogācāra school did not exist as a distinct school separate from Sarvāstivāda. Rather, it appears that meditators practicing within the Sarvāstivāda community gradually systematized their views and eventually formed their own philosophical tradition.

Similarly, as early as 1953, Sakurabe Hajime doubted whether Sautrāntika was an independent school with its own canon. Rather, according to him, Sautrāntika seems to have been a philosophical tradition that existed within the Sarvāstivāda community. Further, several Japanese scholars, such as Mukai Akira, Matsuda Kazunobu, Hakamaya Noriaki, Miyashita Seiki (“Kusharon,” “Genkanhenchitai”), and myself (“Pūrvācārya,” “Yugashijiron”) have noted that many of the theories attributed to “Sautrāntika” or “Pūrvācārya” in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya can be traced back to the Yogācārabhūmi.3

A major breakthrough in Sautrāntika studies was brought about when Katō Junshō published his comprehensive study of Sautrāntika in 1989 (Kyōryōbu). In this important work, Katō demonstrates that a verifiable reference to the word “Sautrāntika” cannot be attested in any extant text older than the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereafter, Kośa). He further compared the Sautrāntika positions mentioned in the Kośa with the Dārśāntika positions found in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (hereafter, Vibhāṣā) and the *Tattvasiddhi, and Śrīlāta’s views recorded in the *Nyāyānusāra. Katō observes that, although Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” positions are in many cases closely related to the earlier Dārśāntika positions, Vasubandhu does not always agree with the Dārśāntika views.

After these significant findings of Katō, the close relationship between the Kośa and the Yogācārabhūmi came to be seen as even more important than before. Recently, Robert Kritzer (“Saṃskārapratyayāṇaṃ vijnānam,”

1 See also Lamotte (Histoire 582).
2 See also Schmithausen (“Zu den Rezensionen” 97), Katō (Kyōryōbu, 86-93).
3 See also Yamabe (“Bīja” 929; 931).
"Rebirth and Causation," "Vasubandhu") and Harada Wasō ("Dignāga," "Kyōryōbu") have been working very actively on this issue. In addition to the fact that Vasubandhu sometimes rejects the Dārṣṭāntika theories recorded in the earlier texts (such as the denial of the existence of a real sukha and of caittas), Harada notes that some of the Sautrāntika positions of Vasubandhu (especially the bija theory) cannot be traced back to the Dārṣṭāntika tradition but are found in the YOGĀCĀRABHÚMI. Thus, Harada speculates that when Vasubandhu discusses “Sautrāntika,” his real source is actually the YOGĀCĀRABHÚMI. Kritzer, based on his own observations, also suspects that Vasubandhu was already YOGACA when he composed the Kośa. This hypothesis will be discussed in detail by Kritzer himself in a separate paper in this issue.

Other noteworthy attempts are found in a series of papers of Honjō Yoshifumi ("Memyō no gakuha," "Memyō saku," "Memyō shi"). In these papers, Honjō points out that there are many Sautrāntika-like elements in the two major kāvyas of Āsvaghoṣa, namely the BUDDHACARITA and the SĀUNDARANANDA, and argues that Āsvaghoṣa was close to the Sautrāntika tradition. Since the school-affiliation of this celebrated Buddhist poet has long been an unsolved problem among Buddhist scholars, Honjō’s study is an important contribution, not only in the context of Sautrāntika studies, but also as a study of Āsvaghoṣa himself.

Honjō’s arguments are based on his extensive knowledge of abhidharma literature and are very solid. From my own point of view, however, there still seem to be significant points concerning Āsvaghoṣa that are not adequately covered by Honjō. First, the methods of meditation practice described in the latter portion of the SĀUNDARANANDA are closely related to those in the ŚRĀVAKABHÚMI section of the YOGĀCĀRABHÚMI. Second, as we might expect from the foregoing discussion, most of the Sautrāntika-like elements found in Āsvaghoṣa’s works are also found in the YOGĀCĀRABHÚMI. Thus, Āsvaghoṣa’s works, especially the SĀUNDARANANDA, seem to hold an important key for clarifying one aspect of the intricate relationship among Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and YOGACĀRA.

From this point of view, in this paper I would like to discuss Āsvaghoṣa’s works with regard to their practical and doctrinal aspects. For

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4 See also Honjō, “Sautrāntika,” for his view of this tradition.
the reasons stated above, my main focus will be on the *Saundarananda*. Since I cannot cover all the relevant points in a single paper, I confine my discussion here to a few representative points.

1. Systems of Meditation

The latter half of the *Saundarananda* consists of the Buddha’s exposition of the way of practice (Cantos 12-16), a description of Nanda’s actual process of practice (Canto 17), and the approval of his achievement by the Buddha (Canto 18). Many elements of these portions have close parallels in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, as shown in tables 1-6 in the appendix.6

We should note here that not only at the level of general structure but also at the level of wording, the *Saundarananda* and the *Śrāvakabhūmi* are closely related. I give a few examples of their correspondences, together with their possible Nikāya sources below. The first correspondence is from the section on *śīla* (in Table 1, item 2).7

Evaṁ pabbajito samāno pātimokkha-saṅvāra-saṅvuto viharati ācāra-gocara-sampanno anumattesu vajjesu bhaya-dassāvī… (*Sāmaññaphala-sutta* 63.13-15)

The one who has thus become a recluse stays restrained in the restraints of precepts, maintains a good realm of conduct, and sees fear in minor faults…

etāvac chīlam ity uktam ācāro ‘yaṃ samāsataḥ / asya nāśena naiva syāt pravrajyā na grhaḥsthatā //
tasmāc cāritrasampanno brahmacaryam idam cara /
anumātresv avadyesu bhayadarśī dṛḍhavrataḥ // (*Saundarananda* 13.19-20)

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5 I have summarized some of the representative arguments about Aśvaghoṣa’s school affiliation in Yamabe, Fujitani, Harada (5-10). In addition to the works mentioned there, Dieter Schlingloff’s paper, which points out that the pictorial representation of Nanda legend in Ajanta Cave 16 is based on the *Saundarananda*, is noteworthy, although it is not directly relevant to doctrinal issues. J.W. de Jong’s review of Biswanath Bhattacharya’s *Aśvaghoṣa* is also helpful.

6 I refer to the *Saundarananda* and the *Buddhacarita* by canto and verse numbers. Other Sanskrit and Pāli texts I refer to by page and line numbers. In order to save space, I have omitted some of the relatively unimportant details. Therefore, these tables are not complete; for more comprehensive tables, I refer the reader to the Japanese paper that I published with Fujitani and Harada.

7 In this paper, in principle I quote the original texts in the notes. Here, however, in order to facilitate the comparison of the original passages, I quote them in the main text.
This much is called morality, and in sum, this is good conduct. If this is lost, there would be no life as a recluse or as a householder. Therefore, one who maintains good conduct should follow this pure practice.

One who firmly adheres to one’s vow sees fear in minor faults. açaṅgocarasampannah, anumātesv avadaysu bhayadarśi (Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. Shōmonji Kenkyūkai 16.18-19)

One who maintains a good realm of conduct sees fear in minor faults.

The next correspondence is from the section on “knowing the right amount when eating,” bhojane maṭrājñāḥ (Table 1, item 4).

patisaṅkhā yoniso āhāram āhārissāma, n’eva davāya na madāya na maṇḍanāya na vibhūsanāya, yāvad eva imassa kāyasass thitiyā yāpanāya, vihiṃ-śūparatiyā brahmacariyānuggahāya (Mahāśāpura-sutta 273.23-26)

I shall take food circumspectly and properly. It is not for play, sensual pleasure, adornment, or beauty. It is just for the sustenance and support of this body, for the cessation of harm, and for the promotion of pure practice.

evam abhyavahartavyam bhojanam pratismkhayā / na bhūsārtham na vapuse na madāya na drptaye // dhāraṇārtham śaṅrasya bhojanam hi vidhyate /

…. yogācāras tathāhāram śaṅrasya prayacchati / kevalam kuḍvighāṭārtham na rāgena na bhaktaye // (Saundarananda, 14.14-19)

Thus, food should be taken circumspectly. It is not for the sake of beauty, a nice-looking body, sensual pleasure, or arrogance, since food is provided for the maintenance of the body.

…. A yogacāra gives food to the body in this way. It is merely for the sake of removing hunger and not for the sake of lust or reverence.

sa tathā saṃvrīndriyāḥ pratismkhayaḥāram āharati, na darpārtham na maṇḍarthe na maṇḍanārtham na vibhūsanārtham, yāvad evāṣya kāyasaya sthitaye *yāpanāyai jighatsoparataye, brahmacaryānugrahāya*8 iti / (Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. Shōmonji Kenkyūkai 18.8-11)

The [practitioner], having thus guarded the senses, takes food circumspectly. It is not for the sake of arrogance, sensual pleasure, adornment, or beauty. It is just for the sustenance and support of this body, for the cessation of hunger, and for the promotion of pure practice.

8 The part between asterisks is lost due to a damage of the manuscript and is reconstructed by the editors based on parallel passages. Saṃdhi is not observed between the last -hāya and the following iti, but I follow the text here.
Again, due to limited space I cannot give too many examples, but even these few examples suggest that the Saundarananda and the Śrāvakabhūmi are significantly related.\(^9\)

Of course, as I myself have shown, we should keep in mind that these two texts seem to have had common sources in the Āgamic literature. Nevertheless, I think it is significant that almost all the items of the Saundarananda also appear in the Śrāvakabhūmi in a similar order. Thus, I think that the similarities are too extensive for us to assume that these two texts separately relied on common sources.

Rather, I suspect that there were efforts to systematize the various meditative methods found in Āgamic sources into a comprehensive system. The Yogācārabhūmi seems to represent a fairly developed stage of such systematization, while the Saundarananda appears to show a relatively early one. The meditation system recorded in the Saundarananda may well preserve an early form of the manuals of the yogācāra meditators that eventually culminated in the voluminous Yogācārabhūmi.\(^10\)

On the other hand, although the correspondences are not as extensive as those between the Saundarananda and the Śrāvakabhūmi, we should note that there are some partial agreements between the *Tattvasiddhi and the Saundarananda as well (Tables 1 and 2). Since the *Tattvasiddhi is considered to be a Dārśāntika work (Mizuno), this may suggest that these meditative methods were to some extent also shared by the Dārśāntika tradition.\(^11\)

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\(^9\) In the aforementioned paper (Yamabe, Fujitani, Harada), I have given the examples of correspondences more systematically and comprehensively. Therefore, interested readers are referred to that article.

\(^10\) Honjō (“Memyō shi” 390) regards the Saundarananda as a Yogācārabhūmi of the Sautrāntika tradition.

In this connection, we should perhaps also recall that the word yogācāra appears twice in the Saundarananda (14.19, 15.68), as has been already noted by Shastri (xi-xii). It is of course widely recognized that the word yogācāra is a common noun that appears in a wide range of Buddhist literature. Therefore, the mere occurrence of the word itself does not mean much for determining the school affiliation of a text. Nevertheless, taken together with the structural similarities between the Saundarananda and the Yogācārabhūmi, this word could appear once again as a symbolic word.

\(^11\) Saundarananda 14.14-15cd are quoted as “verses composed by Aśvaghoṣa” in the *Tattvasiddhi (T. 1646: 372a15-16). See Johnston xxxii, Fukuhara Ryōgon (51-52). Therefore, it is imaginable that the standpoints of the *Tattvasiddhi and Aśvaghoṣa are rather close, though we should note that there are also significant differences between them. See
2. Doctrinal Elements

We now turn to the doctrinal side. In his study of Aśvaghoṣa, Honjō raises several points that appear to link Aśvaghoṣa to the Sautrāntika tradition (“Memyō shi”). However, since a comprehensive discussion of all these points would make this paper too long, let us here discuss just a couple of the most significant ones.

(1) The interpretation of anuṣaya (Honjō, “Memyō shi” 394-95)

At the beginning of the Anuṣayanirdeśa of the Kośa, there is a famous controversy over the interpretation of the compound kāmarāga-anuṣaya. This controversy is related to the extensive argument among various Buddhist schools over whether or not anuṣaya is identical to paryavasthāna. According to the available sources, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahāśāsaka, and Vibhajyavāda claim that anuṣaya is the latent form of paryavasthāna. In contrast to these traditions, Sarvāstivāda does not accept the existence of such a latent form of kleśa. Thus, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, orthodox Sarvāstivāda interprets the term kāmarāga-anuṣaya as an appositional compound (karmadhāraya) and says that kāmarāga is identical to anuṣaya.

Vasubandhu, however, does not accept this interpretation and supports the Sautrāntika view, which considers the compound kāmarāga-anuṣaya to be a dependent compound (tatpuruṣa), meaning “the anuṣaya (or evil potential) of kāmarāga”:

However, it is good [to understand the compound kāmarāga-anuṣaya] as the Sautrāntikas do. But how do the Sautrāntikas [understand this]? [They understand] that kāmarāga-anuṣaya means the anuṣaya of kāmarāga. And the anuṣaya is neither associated with nor dissociated from [the mind], because it [i.e., anuṣaya] is not a distinct entity. [The reason why anuṣaya is not a distinct entity is merely that] the dormant kleśa is called anuṣaya, and the awakened one, paryavasthāna. Then what is the dormancy (prasupti) of that

Louis de la Vallée Poussin (“Notes” 264). For quotations from the Saundarananda in other Buddhist texts, see Jens-Uwe Hartmann (70-73).

12 See Jaini (“The Sautrāntika” 239-44).
13 See Katō (“Zuimen” 10-20), and Fukuda (“Jōjitsuron” 152). A reference to the Vibhajyavādins in the Vibhāṣā will be discussed later in this paper.
14 kāmarāga evānuṣaya iti Vaibhāṣikā (278.6)
[kleśa]? The continuum of the latent [kleśa] in the state of seed (bījabhāva). What is the awakening (prabodha)? [The kleśa] in the manifest state. What is this state of seed? The capacity (śakti) of personal existence (āmabhāva) that has arisen from [past] kleśas and that generates [future] kleśas, like the capacity that derives from [the past] perception and that generates [the future] memory, or like the capacity of sprouts and so forth that derive from [past] fruits of rice and that generate [future] fruits of rice. (278.18-24)15

According to this position, paryavasthāna is the manifest kleśa, while anuśaya is the dormant kleśa, which, as a seed, generates future kleśa. As Honjō points out (“Memyō shi” 395), this theory is also quoted in the Abhidharmadīpa (as a Dārṣṭāntika theory)16 and in the *N yā yā n u s ā r a (as a theory of the *Sūtrakāra [Ching-chu 經主]).17

Honjō attempts to connect this theory to the following verses of the Saundarananda.

Their potential (anuśaya, i.e., the potential of the kāmas) remains, like a fire covered up with ashes. O friend, you should quench that [anuśaya] with practice, like fire with water. (15.5)

For those [kāmas] arise again from that [anuśaya], like sprouts from a seed (bīja). [But] those [kāmas] would not exist when that [anuśaya] is destroyed, as sprouts [do not exist] when the seed is destroyed. (15.6)18

These verses regard anuśaya as the latent form of kāma and equate the anuśaya with a seed from which the kāmas arise again in the future. Though “seed” (bīja) in the Saundarananda seems to be a figurative expression and not a well-established technical term, the similarity of

15 evaṁ tu sādhu yathā Sautrāntikānām / kathāṃ ca Sautrāntikānām / kāmarāgasyānuśaya-yaḥ kāmarāgānuśaya iti / na cānuśayah samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ tasyādṛavyāntaratvāt / prasupto hi kleśo ’nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhah paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptih / asammukhiḥbūtasya bījabhāvānubandhāḥ / kah prabodhet / sammuḥkhiḥbhāhav / ko yam bījabhāvo nāma / āmabhāvasya kleṣājā kleśotpādānāsaktih / yathānuḥbhajānānajā śṛṣṭyut-paramāsaktir yathā cāṅkurādinām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādānāsaktit iti /

222.3-223.1.

16 T. 1562: 596c24-597a2.

17 tiṣṭhataḥ anuśayas teṣām channo ’gnir iva bhasmanā / sa te bhāvanayā saumya prasāmyo ’gnir ivāmbunā // (15.5) te hi tasmat pravartante bhūyo bījād ivānkurāḥ / tasya nāśena te na syur bījānaśād ivānkurāḥ // (15.6)
the wording between the *Saundarananda* and the *Koṣa* seems evident to me.

However, as has been pointed out by Harada (“Dignāga” 108, “Kyōryōbu” 153), the same theory also appears in the *Yogaśāraḥbhūmi* (Savitarkaśavicāraṇādibhūmi in the Viniścayasaṃgraṇa) in the following way:

There the active (*kun tu ’byuṅ ba*, 現行, *samudācarita*) and manifest (*mnon du gyur pa*, 現起, *samāmukhābhitā*) kleśa (*ñon moṅs pa*, 頑癢) is called *paryavasthāna* (*kun nas dkris pa*, 頑癢). Its *seed* (*sa bon*, 種子, *bīja*), which has not been abandoned (*ma spāṅs*, 未斷, *aprahiṇa* or destroyed (*yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa*, 部, *asamudghātita*), is called *anuśaya* (*bag la ṇal*, 隨眠) and *daśṭhulaṇya* (*gnas ṇan len*, 隨重). Because it is *in the* dormant *state* (*ma sad pa*), it is *anuśaya*, and because it is *in the awakened state* (*sad pa’i gnas skabs*, 在覺位, *prabuddhavasthā*), it is *paryavasthāna*. (Pek. 5539: Zi 118b1-3; T. 1579:623a22-24)¹⁹

Needless to say, this system is exactly the same as the Sautrāntika theory in the *Koṣa* quoted above. Considering the aforementioned studies that point out the close relationship between the *Koṣa* and the *Yogaśāraḥbhūmi*, I think it is quite likely that Vasubandhu directly based his description of this Sautrāntika theory on this passage from the *Yogaśāraḥbhūmi*.

At this juncture, we should note that this theory, identified as a “Dāraṇāntika” position in the *Abhidharmapā*, cannot be confirmed in the earlier Dārṣṭāntika sources (i.e., the Dārṣṭāntika theories recorded in the *Vibhāṣa* and the *Tattvasiddhi*). In the *Vibhāṣa*, a similar theory is not attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas but to the Vibhajyavādins:

The Vibhajyavādins also say that *anuśaya* is the *seed* of *paryavasthāna*. The essence of *anuśaya* is not associated with mind, [while] the essence of *paryavasthāna* is associated with mind. *Paryavasthāna* arises from *anuśaya*. Because *paryavasthāna* manifests itself, arhats retrogress. [If] the *anuśaya* is already severed, *paryavasthāna* does not arise; how can he retrogress? Therefore, they say that [arhats] do not retrogress. (T. 1545: 313a1-4)²⁰

¹⁹ de la *ñon moṅs pa kun tu ’byuṅ ba mnon du gyur ba ni kun nas dkris pa žes bya’o // de żid kyi sa bon ma spāṅs śin yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la ṇal žes bya ste / gnas ṇan len kyaṅ de yin no // ma sad pa’i phyir ni bag la ṇal yin la sad pa’i gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkris pa yin no //

Harada presents a Sanskrit reconstruction of this passage in his “Kyōryōbu” (153).

²⁰ 分別論者又説隨眠是種種子，隨眠自性心不相應，諸種自性與心相應，隨從隨眠生。繚現前故退諸阿羅漢，已斷隨眠繚既不生彼如何退，故説無退。
Here, one might note that the words “Dārśāntikas” and “Vibhajya-vādins” appear together in compounds on three other occasions in the Vibhāṣā. So these traditions apparently shared a few same tenets,21 but we should not overemphasize this point.22 (We should note that the common tenets do not include the anuṣaya or bija theory.) Fukuda (156-58) claims that the denial of the retrogression of arhats in the *Tattvasiddhi presupposes the theory of latent anuṣaya, although anuṣaya is not expressly equated with bija.23

Perhaps Dārśāntikas were not completely ignorant of the theory of latent anuṣaya, but this point is not at all certain at this stage.

(2) The Denial of the existence of a real sukha (Honjō, “Memyō shi” 392-94)

The Mārgapudgalanirdeśa of the Kośa refers to a theory held by “some people” who negate the existence of real pleasant sensation (sukha-vedanā), as follows:

Some people say that there is no pleasant sensation at all and that all [sensation] is painful. How should this be understood? From scripture and from reason…. How [does one understand it] from reason? It is because [what is normally regarded as] the cause of pleasure is [actually] not fixed; for, if some drink, food, coolness, or warmth, and so forth, which are regarded as the causes of pleasure, are applied in excess or at an inappropriate time, the same things turn out to be the causes of pain. And it is not reasonable that pain arises because the causes of pleasure increase, or because the moderate [amount of the causes of pleasure are applied] at another [inappropriate] time. Therefore, they [i.e., what appeared to be the causes of pleasure] were, from the very beginning, the causes of pain and not of pleasure. But when that pain becomes great, it eventually becomes manifest [that they were

22 Yin Shun notes that, though Vibhajyavāda and Dārśāntika were two distinct traditions, they shared certain common tendencies (Shuo i-ch’ieh yu-pu 410, 419-28). Concerning Vibhajyavāda, see also André Bareau 167-80; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośā lv-lviii; and Kimura Taiken.
23 I find Fukuda’s argument on this point reasonably plausible, but there are certain things that still need to be considered. First, in one of the passages Fukuda quotes from the *Tattvasiddhi in this connection (T 1646: 334a5-6), what is compared to a burnt seed is karma and not kleśa. Therefore, this passage is not directly relevant to anuṣaya. Second, this sort of seed-image is not uncommon in Buddhist literature, and, though I cannot find the image of a “burnt seed” in the Orthodox Sarvāstivāda theories in the Vibhāṣā, the image of a “rotten seed” is found in T. 1545: 98c1-2.
the causes of pain]. Change in the positions of the body should be understood in the same way. [The second reason is that we] feel pleasure from the remedy for pain or from the modification of pain; for, as long as one has not been [previously] afflicted by another type of pain caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or lust (kāmarāga), nothing is felt to be pleasant. Therefore, ignorant people feel pleasure merely from the remedy [for pain] and not from [the real] pleasure. Also, foolish people feel pleasure from the modification of pain, such as moving the load from one shoulder to the other. Therefore, there is no pleasure. (330.10-22)24

This theory is attributed to “Śrīlāta and so forth” (Śrīlātādayah) by commentators (Yaśomitra25 and Pūrvavardhana26) and is refuted by Vasubandhu. Honjō points out several verses of the Buddhacarita and the Saundarananda that convey similar ideas. Indeed, all the major points of the above discussion are found in these kāyas, as is shown below.

[1] There is no pleasant sensation:

For [a man] who is dragging around an afflicted and unstable body, there is no pleasure whatsoever from the standpoint of the highest truth. One considers [something] to be pleasant when a remedy for pain is applied, or when there is [only] a small pain. (Saundarananda 9.40)27

[2] The cause of pleasure is indefinite:

And because the objects of desire are not fixed [as the cause of pleasure], I do not think such objects enjoyable, for the very things that bring about pleasure also bring about pain. (Buddhacarita 11.41)28

24 nāsty eva sukhā vedanetey ekīyā duḥkhaiṣva tu sarvā / katham idam gamyate / sūtrād yuktitaś ca /.../ katham yuktītah / sukhahetvavyavasthānāt / ya eva hi kecit pānaḥbhojana-
25 saṃsūnaḥdaya iṣyante sukhahetavas ta evātyupayuktā akālopayuktaś ca punar duḥkhahetavah
26 sampadyante / na ca yuktā sukhahetuvṛddhiḥ samena vā 'nyasmin kāle duḥkhotpattīr ity ādīta eva te duḥkhahetavo na sukhasya / ante tu tadduḥkhham vṛddhim āpamannā vyaktīm āpadyata iti / evam īrāyaphāvīkalpe 'pi vaktavyam / duḥkhapratikāre ca sukhabuddher duḥkhavīkalpe ca / na hi tāvat sukham iti vedyate kińcid yāvan na duḥkhāntareṇopadradrto bhavati kṣutipīpāsāṅgaṣṭāsamakāmarāgagaprabhavena / tasmāt prātiṇāvā evāviduṣām sukhabuddhīr na sukhe duḥkhavīkalpe ca bālāh sukhabuddhim utpādayantī yathāṁśād aṁśām bhārām samcārayantah / tasmān nāsty eva sukham iti /
27 Abhidharmakośavyākhyā 518.21.
29 śārāṃśaṁ ćārtam pariṣkarataś caḷamaḥ na cāṣtī kimecit paramārthataḥ sukhām / sukhām hi duḥkhapratikārasevayāś šāhite ca duḥkhe tanunī vyavasyati //
30 kāmeśaḥ anākāntikatā ca yasmād ato śi pi me teṣu na bhogasāṁjñāḥ / ya eva bhāvāḥ hi sukham diśanti ta eva duḥkham punar āvahanti //
31 gurūṃ śaśāṃśaḥ agurūna āvaśya sukhāhī śīte hy asukhāya gharə / candrāṃśavaśaḥ candaṇam eva coṣṇe sukhāya duḥkhāya bhavanti śīte //
Thick garments and fragrant aloe wood entail pleasure when it is cold, but pain when it is hot. The rays of the moon and sandalwood entail pleasure when it is hot, but pain when it is cold. (*Buddhacarita* 11.42)29

[3] That which is in fact merely the remedy for pain is felt as pleasure:

If [you] think that the objects of desire are enjoyable, [you should understand that] none of these [objects of desire] is considered to be enjoyable. For in [this] world, things and qualities,30 such as clothes [and warmth], should be considered to be the remedy for pain. (*Buddhacarita* 11.36)31

Therefore, people’s [sense-]objects are the means of the remedy for pain and are not enjoyable things. What wise man applying the remedy [for pain] would think that he is enjoying something enjoyable? (*Buddhacarita* 11.39)32

Someone [a foolish person], who is burning with bilious fever and would consider a cold treatment to be an enjoyable thing, would imagine that the objects of desire are enjoyable things[, when in fact he is merely] applying the remedy for pain. (*Buddhacarita* 11.40)33

Because the exertion by a creature for the application of the remedy for pain, [which is] called pleasure, turns out to be the cause of bondage and destruction, he saw that [worldly] existence is painful. (*Saundarananda* 17.19)34

Here again Honjō’s argument is very persuasive, and the similarities between these verses and the theory quoted in the *Kośa* should be obvious.

In this case, this theory is well attested in a Dārśāntika source, *Tattvasiddhi* (chapter 78, “The Chapter on the Characteristics of Vedanā,” and

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30 I follow Honjō’s interpretation of *dravyaguṇa* (“Memyō shi” 393).
31 *kāmās tu bhogā iti yan matiṃ yamata pradhāryāḥ //
   vastrādayo dravyagūṇā hi loke duḥkkhapatikāraḥ iti pradhāryāḥ //
   duḥkhapatikārabhirnimitthūtām tasmat prajānām visāyā na bhogāḥ /
   aśnāmi bhogān iti ko ‘bhuyeyat prajñāḥ pratikāravidhau pravrto //
   yāh pitādāhena vidhayamānaḥ sitakriyām bhoga iti vyavasyet /
   duḥkhapatikāravidhau pravrtoḥ kāmāsu kuryāt sa hi bhogasamjñām //
32 yataḥ prasūtasya ca karmayogāḥ prasajyate bandhavigātihetūḥ /
   duḥkhapatikāravidhau sukhaḥ khyātāṁ tato bhavam duḥkham iti vyapaśyat //
33 T. 1646: 281c-282c. Honjō (“Memyōshī” 393) points out that similar arguments appear also in the *Pratyisasamutpadavyākhyā* (Pek. 5496: Chi 40a6ff). Further, Katō (*Kyo-ryōbu* 191) points out that similar arguments are found in the *Vibhāṣā* (without specifying who claimed them; T. 1545: 402c16-29; 714c2-3) and in the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* (T. 1555: 994c5-18).
34 Cintāmayibhumī of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī (Pek. 5539: Zi 220b4-221a6; T. 1579: 663b12-27), which states that from the standpoint of *samskāraduhkhakātā*, all *vedanā* is considered *duḥkha*. Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (329.22-330.2).
chapter 79, “The Chapter on Saṃskāradūkhā”), but not in the Yogācārabhūmi. Saṃskāradūkhā is highly emphasized in the Yogācārabhūmi, and somewhat similar arguments are also found there, but a flat negation of sukha-vedanā is, as far as I can see, not found anywhere in the Yogācārabhūmi. The Yogācārabhūmi seems to subscribe to the traditional tri-vedanā theory, and Harada (“Dignāga” 109-110) suspects that this is the reason why Vasubandhu rejects this Dārśāntika theory in his Kośa.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that a very similar argument is also found in the Tso-ch’an san-mei ching, a Chinese meditation manual compiled by Kumārajīva based on several Indian meditation manuals. The passage in question runs as follows:

One should realize that in fact pleasant sensation cannot be recognized. How so? Owing to clothing and food, pleasure is brought about. Excessive pleasure, however, gives rise to pain, because [what appears to be pleasure] is not truly pleasure. When the pain of a wound is stopped by applying medicine (i.e., a remedy), it is called comfort. Because of a great pain, a small pain is considered to be pleasant, but it is not real pleasure. Also, because of an old pain, a new pain is considered to be pleasant. When one carries a heavy load, and when one moves it from one shoulder to the other, the new weight is felt to be pleasant, but it is not real, lasting pleasure. In the case of the nature of fire, it is always hot and does not cool down even for a moment. If these [examples] were truly pleasant, they should not become unpleasant.

[Another point is that] we [merely] regard a small pain in [the face of] a larger pain as pleasant. For example, when a person is facing execution, if he [manages to] keep his life and is [merely] whipped, he regards this [being whipped] as pleasant.

According to the preface to this text by Kumārajīva’s disciple, Sêng-jui, preserved in the Ch’u san-tsang chi chi (T. 2145: 65a19-b20),

37 E.g., Savitarkasavicāradibhūmi (208.1-7).
40 A very similar line is found in the *Tattvasiddhi (T. 1646: 282b6-7).
41 "当観楽染著不可得, 云何不得, 因衣食故致樂, 製過則苦生, 非實樂故, 如患痛苦以藥塗治痛止之為樂. 以大苦故, 謂小苦為樂. 非實樂也. 復次以故苦為苦, 新苦為樂. 如重重易肩而以新重為樂. 非實常樂也. 如火性熱無暫冷時. 若是實樂不應有不樂. . . . 於大苦中以小苦為樂也. 如人遇死全命受饗, 以是為樂. . . .
Kumārajīva’s sources were the “teachings on the essence of meditation” (*ch’an-yao* 禪要) of “various masters” (*chung-chia* 衆家), such as Vasumitra, Saṅgharakṣa, Upagupta, Saṅghasena, Pārśva, Aśvaghoṣa, and Kumāralāta.42 Unfortunately Sêng-jui does not specify the source of this particular portion. Though not mentioned in his list, a relationship with Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi* (T. 1646: 281c16-282c22) should perhaps be considered, for the relevant portions of these two texts share many similar elements. Since the *Tattvasiddhi* was also translated by Kumārajīva, he must have been familiar with its content. Katō (Kyōryōbu 46, 52) argues that Harivarman was a disciple of Kumāralāta. If so, we might also consider the possibility that the passage in question from the *Tso-ch’an san-mei ching* is derived from Kumāralāta’s meditation manual.

In any case, this theory must have been included in the “teachings on the essence of meditation” of some master. Thus, although this theory was not admitted into the *Yogācārabhūmi*, it seems to have been propounded by some of the earlier meditators.

(3) *Parikalpa* (Honjō, “Memyō shi” 390, supplement)

The *Saundarananda* (13.49-53) states as follows:

Even if a sense faculty (*indriya*) is directed to an object (*viśaya*), as long as no mental discrimination (*manasas parikalpa*) is directed there, it [i.e., *indriya*] does not adhere to it [i.e., *viśaya*]. (13.49)

As fire blazes when there are firewood and wind, so the fire of *kleśa* arises from the object and from the discrimination. (13.50)

For a man is bound by the erroneous discrimination (*abhūtaparakalpa*) of an object. When he sees the same object as it is (*bhūtataḥ*), he is liberated, (13.51)

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42 Since the incorporation of Aśvaghoṣa’s and Saṅgharakṣa’s texts into the *Tso-ch’an san-mei ching* can be confirmed at the places where Sêng-jui specifies, this preface should be considered to be a reliable one. See Matsunami, *Memyō Tansei* 162-168; “Yugagyōha” 131-144; Yamabe, *The Sūtra* 78-79. It should be noted that “various masters” might include some other masters not expressly mentioned by Sêng-jui.
Having seen one visible thing (rūpa), one person is attached [to it] (rajyate), another is offended (pradusyati), a third person stays neutral (madhyastha), yet another becomes compassionate (ghṛṇāyate) with regard to the same [object]. (13.52)

Therefore, the object is not the cause of bondage or liberation. Whether there is attachment or not depends on the type of discrimination (parikalpaviśeṣa). (13.53)

Honzō links these verses to the following passage from the *Nyāyānusāra (Anuśayanirdēśa):

The Dārṣṭāntikas say as follows: Because pain and pleasure arise depending upon discrimination, we know that the nature of objects cannot be substantially established. As is said by the Buddha in the Māgandiya Sūtra:44 “Lepers feel pleasant when they touch painful fire.” He also says, “A visible thing is regarded as a pleasing object by one sentient being, but not by another.”

Also, because the [distinction between] cleanliness and dirtiness, etc. cannot be substantially established, the nature of objects cannot be substantially established. This means that different types of sentient beings judge the cleanliness and the dirtiness of the same thing differently.45 Because we recognize that the characteristics, clean and dirty, are relative, [the distinction between] clean objects and dirty objects cannot be substantially established. (T. 1562: 639b4-10)

43 nendriyam visaye tāvat pravṛttam api sajjate / yāvan na manasās tatra parikalpā pravartate // (13.49)

44 For the Māgandiya Sūtra, see the Hsū-hsien-tʿi ching 處俱提經 (Madhyamāgama, no. 153) T. 26: 670a-73a; the Māgandiya-suttanta (Majjhima-nikāya, no.75) 1: 501-13.

45 This would mean that, for example, what is dirty for a human being can be clean for certain animals.

46 警喻師師作如是說。由分別力苦樂生故，知諸境界體不成實，示以彼思想地說契約中說。諸癡病者，觸苦火時以為樂故，又說一色，於一有情名可意境，非於餘故，又如淨穢不成實故。諸別趣顯同分有情，於一事中取淨穢異，既淨穢相非定可得，故無成實淨穢二境。

47 It is well known that Sanghabhadra (the author of the *Nyāyānusāra), Yaśomitra, Sthiramati, and the Abhidharmadīpa do not distinguish Dārṣṭāntika from Sautrāntika (e.g., Katō Kyōryōbu 68-85, Honjō “Sautrāntika” 937, Tokoro 49; 62-63).
Here the theory is attributed to the Dārśāntikas. In this regard, we should note that a theory very similar to Saundarananda 13.52 is mentioned as a Dārśāntika theory in the Vibhāṣā as follows:

The Dārśāntikas say… since defiled and undefiled objects are indeterminate, one knows that objects are unreal. For example, [when] a colorfully adorned, beautiful woman enters an assembly, upon seeing her, some give rise to respect, others give rise to lust, yet others give rise to hatred, envy, disgust, compassion, or equanimity. One should know that among these people, [her] children see her and give rise to respect. Those who indulge in desire see her and give rise to lust. Enemies see her and give rise to hatred. Those who share the same husband see her and give rise to envy. Those who have practiced the meditation on impurity give rise to disgust. Detached sages see her and give rise to compassion, thinking thus: “These beautiful appearances will soon perish due to impermanence.” Arhats see her and give rise to equanimity. Therefore, one knows that objects have no reality.

(T. 1545: 288b16-27)48

48 疑瑜者說，…有染與無染境不決定故知境界非實，謂如有一端正女人種種莊嚴夾入衆會。有見起敬。有見起貪。有見起嗔。有見起悲。有見生捨。應知此中子見起貪。諸恥欲者見起貪。諸怒怨者見起怒。諸同夫者見起悲。諸有修習不淨観者見起捨。諸離欲仙見起慈悲。作如是念。此妙色相不久當滅無常所滅。諸阿羅漢見而生捨。由此故知境界無實體。

Further, a very similar theory appears in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra as well, where it is not attributed to any particular person or group. As Yin points out, judging from the close similarity to the Dārśāntika theory in the Vibhāṣā, this theory should probably also be attributed to the Dārśāntikas (Dai chido ron 52-53).

Next, in the case of the beautiful appearance [of a woman], a lustful person sees her, considers her to be wonderful, and is attached to her. One who practices the meditation on impurity sees her [and thinks that] she is filled with various filthy things and that not a single spot is clean. Fellow wives (*sapatnī) see her and [are driven by] envy and hatred. They do not want to look at her and consider [her] to be impure. A lustful man looks at her and considers her to be pleasing. An envious person looks at her and considers her to be unpleasant. A practitioner looks at her and attains the way. One who has completed the way looks at her and is indifferent, as if he were looking at soil or wood. If this beautiful appearance were really pure, the four types of people should see it as pure. If really impure, the four types of people should all consider it as impure. Therefore, one should know that beauty and ugliness exist in one’s mind; they are not fixed outside of the mind. One observes emptiness in the same way.

49 Consider, for example, the famous verse 1.1 of the Madhyāntavibhāga. See also Matsunami (“Memyō saku” 127-28), who attempts to connect Saundarananda 13.41-53
However, these verses of the Saundarananda seem to me to be also closely linked to the Yogācāra tradition. First, we should consider that the expression (abhūta-)parikalpa ([erroneous] discrimination) is strongly reminiscent of the Yogācāra tradition. Second, the whole line of the argument is quite similar to that of the Yogācāra tradition, and indeed an idea comparable to that of Saundarananda 13.52 appears in the *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana (Pek. 5552; Li 276a2-3; T. 1598: 402c26-27), as follows:

A mendicant, a lustful one, and a dog have three [different] concepts (vikalpa) regarding a beautiful woman’s body; namely, [they see it] as a corpse, as a lovely woman, and as food.

Further, here again I would like to reiterate the importance of structural comparison. In Table 1, these verses of the Saundarananda fall in the section on indriyasaṃvara (no. 3). Then, obviously the first thing to do is to compare them with the corresponding part of the Śrāvakabhūmi, where we find the following passage:

Visual consciousness (caksurṣvijñāna) arises dependent on the eye (cakṣus) and visible things (rūpāṇi). Following the visual consciousness, discriminating mental consciousness (vikalpakanā manovijñāna) arises, and it is through this discriminating mental consciousness that one clings to (saṃrajyate) a
visible thing of attractive appearance and hates (vyāpadye) visible things of unattractive appearance. (Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed. 102.2-5)³¹

This passage should be compared, in particular, with Saundarananda 13.49 quoted above. These two passages express fairly similar ideas using similar words.

In the Saundarananda, in the same section on indriyasamvara just prior to the aforementioned verses, there appears another noteworthy verse:

Inevitably, here in this world, the sense faculties would function in their respective spheres. But there [in their spheres], the primary characteristics (nimitta) or the secondary characteristics (anuvyañjana) should not be grasped (na grāhyā). (13.41)³²

This verse is reminiscent of the following passage from the Śrāvakabhūmi:

Having seen visible things with his eye, [the practitioner] does not grasp their primary or secondary characteristics. (Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed. 16.22-23)³³

It should be noted that: (a) in both the Saundarananda and the Śrāvakabhūmi, grasping the nimitta and the anuvyañjana is discussed; (b) in both texts, the emphasis is on the discriminating manas or manovijñāna that works with or after sensory perception (see Saundarananda 13.49). The Saundarananda and the Śrāvakabhūmi seem to be closely related on these points.

Therefore, Aśvaghosa, Dārṣṭāntika, and Yogācāra seem to share the same position on this matter. It is clear that this view is not shared by the orthodox Sarvāstivāda, since it is expressly rejected in the Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 288b27-c1).³⁴

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³² avaśyam gocare sve sve varitavyam ihendriyaiḥ / nimittam tatra na grāhyam anuvyañjanaṃ eva ca //
³³ sa cakṣuṣā rūpāni drṣṭvā na nimittagrāhī bhavati, nānuvyañjanagrāhī.
This line is in Śrāvakabhūmi (A) in Table 1. See Yamabe, Fujitani, and Harada (11, 16-17).
³⁴ It is noteworthy that a somewhat similar theory appears in the Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā (9.28-10.10; Mori 182) as a theory of the Vītāṇḍavādin. Concerning the identity of the Vītāṇḍavādin, see Mori and Silk. I thank Professor Lance Consins for bringing this point to my attention.
Provisional Conclusions

Thus far we have examined the relationship among Aśvaghoṣa, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra from the meditative and theoretical points of view. Admittedly, we have only been able to discuss a few of the relevant points, but even this limited examination has revealed that these traditions were intricately intertwined.

On the one hand, it seems very likely that Aśvaghoṣa was close to the meditative tradition that later formed the Yogācāra school. On the other hand, Aśvaghoṣa’s texts contain many points that are akin to the Dārśāntika or Sautrāntika tradition. Further, as I have mentioned, many of these Sautrāntika-like elements are also found in the Yogācārabhūmi. Considering these points, it appears that the Yogācāra tradition and the Sautrāntika-like elements were almost inseparably interconnected long before the compilation of the Yogācārabhūmi.

This, however, does not mean that we can trace a single line of development from Aśvaghoṣa via the Yogācārabhūmi to Vasubandhu. As we have seen, the matter is far more complex. See Table 7 in the appendix. One point of which Aśvaghoṣa approves (i.e., the denial of the existence of real sukha) is neither found in the Yogācārabhūmi nor accepted by Vasubandhu. Nevertheless, this point is attested in an early Dārśāntika text (*Tattvasiddhi) and a few other relevant sources. Another point Aśvaghoṣa propounds (i.e., anuśaya = bīja theory) is attested in the Yogācārabhūmi and is also accepted by Vasubandhu but is not (at least clearly) attested in the early Dārśāntika sources. The same theory is attributed to the Vibhajyavādins in the Vibhāṣā. Things are very complicated, and we need to do much more research before we can paint a more reliable picture.

One point that seems relatively certain at this moment is that the Dārśāntika or Sautrāntika tradition was fairly closely linked to meditative traditions.⁵⁵ Therefore, my (admittedly very tentative) working hypothesis at this stage is that the critiques of the orthodox Sarvāstivāda theories transmitted to us as Dārśāntika or Sautrāntika views were perhaps the

⁵⁵ Cf. Yin Shun, who observes that the Dārśāntikas emphasized the practice of meditation (*Shuo i-ch’ieh you-pu 374-75).
opinions of more practice-oriented people who found the Sarvāstivāda system at times too artificial to follow. Of course, there would have been variant opinions even among these practice-oriented people, and so it is not surprising that scholars have noticed many different opinions within the Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika tradition. Needless to say, at this stage this is nothing but an untested hypothesis, and I would like to examine its validity in my future research.
## Appendix

Table 1. Prerequisites to Meditation  
Cf. *Mahāsaṃgīta-sutta; Cūlahatthipanā-sutta, Sāmaññaphala-sutta.*

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<th>Šāvaka bhūmi (C) (Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>parasampad (62.8) 他圆滿 (402a19)</td>
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<td>kusālo dharmacchandaḥ (16.4-11) 善法欲 (397a7-14) Cf. śraddhā (16.5) 淨信 (397a9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. sīla  (13.10-29)</td>
<td>淨持戒 (351a23-b29) sīlasamvara (16.17-19) 戒律儀 (397a16-19)</td>
<td>sīlasamvara (62.11-98.19) 戒律儀 (402a21-406b10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. indriyasamvara (13.30-56)</td>
<td>守護根門 (361c21-26) indriyasamvara (16.21-18.6) 根律儀 (397a19-b1)</td>
<td>indriyasamvara (100.2-114.24) 根律儀 (406b20-408a14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. bhojane mātراجjātā (14.1-19)</td>
<td>飲食知量 (351c26-352a8) bhojane mātراجjātā (18.8-13) 於食知量 (397b1-7)</td>
<td>bhojane mātراجjātā (116.2-148.7) 於食知量 (408a14-411b22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. pūrvaṃ yāmaṃ triyāmāyāḥ pravṛttaṃ prayogenātī Büyükā... (14.20-34)</td>
<td>pūrvarāṭparāṭrāṭaṃ jāgarikānuṅyayogā (18.15-20.2) 初夜後夜常勤修習覺悟瑜伽 (397b7-16)</td>
<td>pūrvarāṭparāṭrāṭaṃ jāgarikānuṅyutattā (150.2-170.17) 初夜後夜常勤修習覺悟瑜伽 (411b8-413c29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. samprajāṇān... sīmṛtim adhātum (14.35-45)</td>
<td>samprajāṇādvihārītā (20.4-8) 正知而住 (397b16-22)</td>
<td>samprajāṇādvihārītā (172.2-210.8) 正知而住 (413c29-417a17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. kāyasya/ manaso vivekaḥ (14.46-52)</td>
<td>prāviveka (20.10-13) 樂遠離 (397b22-26)</td>
<td>prāvivekyāntāryā (248.7-250.7) 遠離障 (420a15-420b5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Abandoning the Six Vitarkas
Cf. Aṅguttara-nikāya, no. 3.100; Samyuktāgama, no. 1246

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saundarananda</th>
<th><em>Tattvasiddhi</em> (T. 1646)</th>
<th>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
<th>Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. vitarkaprahāna (15.1-69) 治思覺法門 (273a12ff.)</td>
<td>不善覺 (352b1-353a22)</td>
<td>vitarka (399.4) 尋思障 (457b11-12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1. kāma (15.3-11) 欲覺 (273b8-12)</td>
<td>欲覺 (352b5-7)</td>
<td>kāmavitarkādayāḥ (399.4-5) 欲尋思等染污尋思 (457b12)</td>
<td>kāmavitarka (145.12) 欲尋思 (512c17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2. vyāpāda, vihiṃsā (15.12-17) 慾恚覺, 憎 (273b22-c3)</td>
<td>嬈覺, 憎覺 (352b7-9)</td>
<td>[vyāpāda, vihiṃsā]³</td>
<td>vyāpāda, vihiṃsā (145.14) 慈, 憎 (512c18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3. akuśala (15.18-29) 不善覺 (273c4-8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4. jñātijana (15.30-41) 親里覺 (274a5-20)</td>
<td>親里覺 (352b16-c1)</td>
<td>jñāti[-vitarka] (400.4) 親屬 (457b27)</td>
<td>jñāti (145.14) 親里 (512c19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5. janapada (15.42-51) 國土覺 (274b3-15)</td>
<td>國土覺 (352c2-13)</td>
<td>janapada[-vitarka] (400.4) 國土 (457b27)</td>
<td>janapada (145.14) 國土 (512c19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6. amaraṇa (15.52-63) 不死覺 (274b19-c3)</td>
<td>不死覺 (352c13-353a5)</td>
<td>amaravitarka (400.4) 不死 (457b27)</td>
<td>amara (145.14) 不死 (512c19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7. pratipakṣa (15.64-69) (273a13, a27-b2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>pratipakṣa (400.15) 修習對治 (457c6-7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Exposition of the Four Noble Truths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saundarananda</th>
<th>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. āryasatyavyākhyaṇa (16.1-98)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Timely Practice
Cf. Aṅguttara-nikāya, no. 3.100; Saṃyuktāgama, no. 1247

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saundarananda Tso-ch’an san-mei ching (T. 614)</th>
<th>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.2. kāla and abhyupāya of yoga (16.49-67)</td>
<td>kālaprayogatā (391.9-4-394.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>時・方便 (285c1ff.)</td>
<td>應時加行 (456a9-b14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.1. uddhanyāme: śāmāya nimittam (16.53-54)</td>
<td>uddhate citte uddhataavābhīṣaṃkini: śamathanimitta (391.18-392.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>調動; 定 (285c9-12)</td>
<td>心掉舉時，或恐掉舉時：止相 (456a16-b4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.2. liyamāne: pragrāhakaṃ nimittam (16.55-56)</td>
<td>liṃaṃ cittam linavābhīṣaṃkini: pragrahānimitta (392.20-393.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>軟復懶怠: 精進勇猛心 (285c13-16)</td>
<td>心沈下時，或恐掉舉時：舉相 (456b4-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.3. sāmyam gate: aupeśiṣkam nimittam (16.57-58)</td>
<td>śamathavipaśyanāpaksalayauddhatya- vinirmukte cetasi: upeśānimitta (393.6-394.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>正等心: 捨慈 (285c17-20)</td>
<td>於奢摩他毘鉏舍那品所有[沈下]掉舉心已解脫: 捨相 (456b8-11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Practice Suitable for One’s Temperament
Cf. Mahānīddesa 2: 239, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yogācārabhūmi of Saṅgharākṣa (T. 606)</th>
<th>Saundarananda Tso-ch’an san-mei ching (T. 614)</th>
<th>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.2.4. rāga: aśubhā (16.59-60)</td>
<td>rāgacarita (198.13; 207.2; 389.14): aśubhā (198.14; 202.6; 389.4-5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多淫欲: 観不淨 (285c21-24)</td>
<td>食行 (428a11-12; 429c1; 455b28): 不淨 (428a12; 428c20; 455b28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.5. vyāpāda: maitrī (16.61-62)</td>
<td>dvesacarita (198.15; 209.14; 389.15): maitrī (198.16; 207.7; 389.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多嗔恚: 行慈心 (285c25-28)</td>
<td>職行 (428a13; 429c25; 455b29): 慈愍 (428a13; 429c3; 455b29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>慈欲熾盛: 不淨之法 (191c17-20)</td>
<td>anurūpe ālambane cittam upanibadhāti (198.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>阿僧格 (191c18-192a18)</td>
<td>anurūpapravagatā (389.14) 於相續緣安住其心 (428a11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.4. rāga: aśubhā (16.59-60)</td>
<td>相應加行 (455b27-28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多淫欲: 観不淨 (285c21-24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogācārabhūmi of Saṅgharakṣa</td>
<td>Saundarananda Tso-ch’an san-mei ching</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T. 606)</td>
<td>(T. 614)</td>
<td>(T. 1579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多愚癡: 十二因縁 (192a19-25)</td>
<td>9.2.6. moha: idampratyayataś (16.63-64)</td>
<td>mohacarita (198.16; 210.9-10): idampratyayatāpratītyasa mutpāda (198.16; 210.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多愚癡: 觀因縁 (285c29-286a3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>縁行 (428a14; 430a11; 455b29): (縁生)緣起 (428a14; 430a7; 455b29-c1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>阿慢慢: 骨鎖 (192b1-14)</td>
<td>mānacarita (198.17; 218.9): *dhāturūpa (198.17; 211.1)</td>
<td>(阿慢慢) (428a15; 430c1; 455c1-2); 無差別 (428a15; 430a14; 455c1-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多想念: 出入數息 (192a26-29)</td>
<td>vitarkacarita (198.18; 236.15; 389.16): ānāpānasmi (198.18; 219.1; 389.16)</td>
<td>尋思行 (428a16; 433b24; 455c2); 阿那般那念 (428a16; 430c5; 455c2-3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2.7. Concluding remarks about kāla and abhyupāya (16.65-67)
非時方便 (286a4-9)

9.3. Concluding remarks about abandoning the vitarkas (16.68-85)
癡煩與癡 (286a10-11)

9.4. virya (16.86-98)

Table 6. Attainment of Arhatship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Yogācārabhūmi of Saṅgharakṣa (T. 606)</th>
<th>Saundarananda</th>
<th>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.) (T. 1579)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(217a3-223a14)</td>
<td>10. amṛtādhigama (17.1-73)</td>
<td>(437.16-508.4) (465b15-477a13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Saundarananda</th>
<th>Vibhāṣā (T. 1545)</th>
<th>*Tattvasiddhi (T. 1646)</th>
<th>Yogācāra-bhūmi</th>
<th>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anuśaya = bija</td>
<td>15.5-6</td>
<td>“Vibhajya-vādīn” 313a1-4</td>
<td>— (?)</td>
<td>Savitarka-savicārādibhūmi-Viniścaya Pek. 5539: Zi 118b1-3.</td>
<td>“Sautrāntika” 278.18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denial of the existence of a real sukha</td>
<td>9.40, 17.19 Buddhacarita 11.36-42</td>
<td>402c16-29; 714c2-3 (without specification of the proponent)</td>
<td>282b-c</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>“Śrilāta” 330.10-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parikalpa</td>
<td>13.49-53</td>
<td>“Dārśāntīka” 288b16-27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Śrāvakabhūmi Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed. 102.2-5, etc.</td>
<td>“Dārśāntīka” (Nyāyānusāra) T. 1562: 639b4-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 I thank Professor Miyashita Seiki for drawing my attention to the Sāmaññaphala-sutta. Tables 1-6 show the correspondences among the Saundarananda, Śrāvakabhūmi, and other relevant texts. In these tables, when the breaks of the relevant sections are clear, I refer to the beginning and the end of each section. Otherwise, I refer to the line where each key word appears. In this respect, these tables are not entirely consistent. I omit minor annotations to the following tables. For more detailed annotations, the reader is referred to Yamabe, Fujitani, Harada (“Memyō” 44-65).

2 Since this portion of the Saundarananda is incorporated into the Tso-ch’an san-mei ching, I also show the corresponding portions of that text in this table, as well as in Tables 4 and 5. However, it should be noted that not all the verses in the respective sections are incorporated into the Tso-ch’an san-mei ching. For more details, see Matsunami (“Yugagyōha” 131-44).

3 Vyāpāda and vihīnsā are not mentioned here. However, comparisons with the list in the Bodhisattvabhūmi shown in the right-most column and with similar lists elsewhere in the Yogācārabhūmi confirm that kāmakīrttādayah implies vyāpāda and vihīnsā.

4 The expression, “kālaprayogatā,” is missing here, but it is attested at the concluding line of this section (394.1).
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Primary Sources

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Māgandiya-sutta. Majjhima-nikāya, no. 75.
Mahāniddesa. In Niddesa. PTS ed.
*Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra (Ta chih-tu lun 大智度論). T. 1509.
Mahāsāgāra-sutta. Majjhima-nikāya, no. 39; Ma-i ching 馬邑經 (Madhyamāgama, no. 182); Ekottarikāgama, no. 49.8.
Majjhima-nikāya. PTS ed.
Śāmaññaphala-sutta. Dīghanikāya, no. 2.
ON THE SCHOOL AFFILIATION OF AŚVAGHOŚA


Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi in the Viṇīcāyasamgrahāṇi. Pek. 5539; T. 1579.


*Tattvasiddhi (Ch'êng-shih lun 成實論). Harivarman. T. 1646.


Yogacārabhūmi. See Bodhisattvabhūmi; Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi; Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi in the Viṇīcāyasamgrahāṇi; Śrāvakabhūmi.

*Yogacārabhūmi of Saṅgharakṣa (Hsiu-hsin tao-ti ching 修行道地經). T. 606.

Modern Works


ON THE SCHOOL AFFILIATION OF AŚVAGHOŠA


—. “Yugashijiron ni okeru zen’aku ingasetsu no ichi sokumen: Iwayuru ‘shikishin gokun’ setsu o chūshin to shite” 『瑜伽師地論』における善惡因果説の一側