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I. Introduction

The full text of Saṅghabhadra’s Abhidharmanyāyānusāra, or “Conformance to the Correct Principle of Abhidharma,” is, like many other Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, preserved only in the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang (T. 1562). It is a controversial work that attempts to defend Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin doctrine against the objections of opponents, especially of the Sautrāntikas, who are frequently cited and agreed with by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Following the example of the Abhidharmakośa in its compact and highly organized style of doctrinal presentation, Saṅghabhadra refutes Vasubandhu’s so-called Sautrāntika positions, which deviate from Sarvāstivādin orthodoxy. In addition, Saṅghabhadra also quotes and criticizes the opinions of other

\[1\] An earlier version of this paper was published in Japanese under the title, “Kyōryōbu no daitoku Rāma,” Bukkyō shigaku kenkyū 41/1 (1988): 1-36. I am grateful to Prof. Robert Kritzer for correcting my English, as well as for many helpful comments and suggestions. I have also benefited from the kind advice of Prof. Wasō Harada. Any inaccuracies in the present paper are, of course, solely my own responsibility.

\[2\] For a general survey of the Nyāyānusāra, see Cox (1995: 56-58); Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 240-249). Other extant works attributed to Saṅghabhadra are: (1) Saṃayapradīpika, the condensed version of the Nyāyānusāra preserved in the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang (T. 1563); (2) Sūtrānurūpā Śāstrakārikābhāṣya, a text that is preserved in the Tibetan tanjur as one of the commentaries on the Abhidharmakośa (Peking. 5592; sDe dge 4091). The Sūtrānurūpā commentary used to be considered the work of slob dpon ’Dul bzaṅ (= ācāryaViniṭabhadra), but Marek Mejor has asserted that this name is supported only by the Peking edition, and, according to other sources, it should be corrected to slob dpon ’Dus bzaṅ (= ācāryaSaṅghabhadra). Further, Mejor assumes that the Sūtrānurūpā might be an abridgment of the Saṃayapradīpika edited by the Tibetan translator(s). This identification of the text itself cannot be accepted, because the Sūtrānurūpā is, in fact, an abridgment of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, not of the Nyāyānusāra. On the other hand Mejor’s identification of the author seems to me to be correct. See Mejor (1991: 29-38).
Sautrāntikas preceding Vasubandhu who are not referred to in the Kośa, claiming that they are merely Dārśāntikas and are not worthy of being called Sautrāntikas.\(^3\)

Although Vasubandhu mentions nothing about the identity of his own Sautrāntika positions, or their relationship to the Dārśāntika views, which appear in the Kośa three times,\(^4\) Saṅghabhadra’s above statement is

\(^3\) In the opening section of the *Nyāyānusāra*, where the distinction between defiled (śāsvrava) and undefiled (anśrava) factors is discussed, Saṅghabhadra refers to an opinion that the factors that constitute the body of an arhat are undefiled. According to Saṅghabhadra, this view is attributed to the Dārśāntikas, including Śrīlāta. The same opinion is mentioned in a Sautrāntika passage in Chapter Four of the Kośa (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 197.8; La Vallée Poussin 1980. v. 3: 19; Pruden 1988-1990. v. 2: 563), not as the opinion of Sautrāntikas themselves but cited as an opinion of others (apare). The *Nyāyānusāra* has a long discussion on this, and concludes with the following passage: “Besides, [to justify their doctrine] Dārśāntikas make a vain effort, like stirring empty space. [Whatever they may say,] it is determined by Scripture (śūtra) that the first fifteen of the eighteen elements (ādhātu) are, without exception, defiled (śāsvrava), [and, therefore, the body of an arhat must be considered as defiled]….. They say ‘We do not recite such Scripture.’ [However,] it is impossible to achieve their aim without reading Scriptures. Read Scriptures diligently if you want to accomplish your aim. Further, since they do not take all Scriptures as authority, how can they address [themselves] as the ‘Scripturalists’ (Sautrāntika). Indeed, when they look at a Scripture and find that it does not accord with their doctrine, then they reject it, or interpolate a passage which is suitable for their doctrine, and say ‘the original passage has been corrupted by the transmitters.’ Otherwise, as in the case of the *Āyatana-Parāyāya (Shun pieh chu ching, Sānyuktāgama No.322, T. 99: 91c1-22),* they do not believe in the whole [Scripture] at all and claim that it is not a holy teaching since it has been created and added to the corpus of canonical works (āgama) by Abhidhārmikas, who adhere to their own doctrine. Thus, they revolt against numerous Scriptures, violate the holy teachings, and assert various heterodoxies. In the present treatise I shall reveal them one by one” (T. 1562: 332a18-29). As Cox has noted (1995: 50 note 98), this is the only example of an identification of Dārśāntikas with Sautrāntikas in the *Nyāyānusāra*. However, in my opinion, Saṅghabhadra’s stance is clearly stated in this one and only proclamation: Sautrāntikas are nothing else but Dārśāntikas, and they are the primal opponent of this polemical work.

\(^4\) All of these three references to “Dārśāntika” views are found in Chapter Four of the Kośa: (1) The argument about the classification of determinate action (nīyatakarman) and indeterminate action (aniyatavedaniyakarman) (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 229.17-31; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 116-117; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 626). Their mode of classification is rejected by both the Kośa and the *Nyāyānusāra*. It is notable that Saṅghabhadra does not ascribe this “Dārśāntika” view to Vasubandhu (T. 1562: 570b28-c28), while Yaśomitra says “Dārśāntikas are Sautrāntikas” (Dārśāntikāḥ Sautrāntikāḥ [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 392.21]); (2) Dārśāntikas state that greed (abhidhyā), wickedness (vyāpāra), and false view (mithyādṛṣṭi) are nothing but mental action (manaskarman) (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 237.13-19; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 136; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 639). This seems to correspond to Śrīlāta’s view (T. 1562: 339b14-20, 340b18-19),
considered reliable enough, since all the biographical information concerning Sañghabhadra agrees that he was a learned Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda master contemporary with Vasubandhu.5 This suggests that Sañghabhadra should have known much about the background of the term Sautrāntika used by Vasubandhu. Later commentaries and the historical documents also agree that Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas belong to the same lineage.6 Besides, it should be noted that Sañghabhadra’s statement supports the hypothesis shared by many modern scholars that the name Sautrāntika is used by the group itself as a self-designation since it has a positive connotation, while their opponents call them Dārṣṭāntikas, which has a pejorative connotation.7 Thus, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the later Sautrāntikas are the descendants of the Dārṣṭāntikas who appear in the *Vibhāṣā Compendia8 as the prime opponents of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins.9

and, while Vasubandhu does not state his position on this topic, Sañghabhadra criticizes it as if it were also supported by Vasubandhu (T. 1562: 574b29). Yaśomitra mentions that “Dārṣṭāntikas are a variety of Sautrāntikas” (Dārṣṭāntikāḥ Sautrāntikaviśeṣa ity arthaḥ [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 400.17]); (3) The same opinion as above (2) is repeated in the interpretation of the term “course of action” (karmapatha) (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 248.10-12; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 169; Prudan 1988-1990, v. 2: 658-659; Note that Poussin’s translation takes this as the opinion of “Sautrāntikas,” while both Chinese translations attribute it to “Dārṣṭāntikas.” See T. 1558: 88c13; T. 1559: 243c8). Therefore, this, too, cannot be considered as Vasubandhu’s own view, although Yaśomitra explains that this opinion is accepted by Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 400.17). The *Nyāyānusāra ignores this argument. On the basis of these passages, the following explanation is suggested: Vasubandhu attributed to the “Dārṣṭāntikas” those views of the earlier Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas that were unacceptable to him, and distinguished them from his own “Sautrāntika” positions. Sañghabhadra was indeed aware that Vasubandhu distinguished between the two names, although, following the standpoint of orthodox Sarvāstivāda, Sañghabhadra claimed that the Dārṣṭāntikas were none other than Sautrāntikas. Yaśomitra, who commented on the Kośa several centuries later, was less aware of the difference. See Katō (1989: 81-85). For the period of Yaśomitra, see Mejor (1991: 38-39).5


8 There are three extant translations of the *Vibhāṣā commentaries preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka: *Mahāvibhāṣā (T. 1545) translated by Hsüan-tsang, *Abhidharmavibhāṣā (T. 1546) translated by Buddhavarman, Tao t’ai, and others, and *Vibhāṣā (T. 1547) translated by Sanghabhūti. They clearly are not translated from the same original text but from three different recensions. For the complicated ramification of the Sarvāstivādins and of the transmission of Vibhāṣa texts, see Enomoto (1996); Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 241-243).
Nevertheless, recent studies have raised the question of whether Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika views can be traced to the Dārṣṭāntikas. Indeed, there are certain similarities between the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣā and the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas in the *Nyāyānusāra that indicate a consistent doctrinal development, at least in the case of Śrīlāta, a Sautrāntika master who is called “Śthavira” in the *Nyāyānusāra.10 But the opinions

229-237). In this paper, I shall refer to Hsiian-tsang’s version as the representative one (and often refer to the corresponding part of Buddhavarman’s version). Although Hsiian-tsang renders the title as A-p’i-ta-mo ta-p’i-p’o sha lun (*Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā), I am unable to find a Sanskrit source that suggests the term “mahā.” Therefore, the original text that Hsiian-tsang translated can be considered to have been entitled Abhidharmavibhāṣā, not Mahāvibhāṣa. Similarly, when Hsiian-tsang translated the title of the Abhidharmasamuccaya as Ta-ch’eng a-p’i-ta-mo chi lun [Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya], he added the element “mahāyāna.”


10 For the thought of Śrīlāta the Sautrāntika master, see Katō (1989). Although Katō’s study of Śrīlāta is comprehensive, he does not investigate the reason why Śrīlāta is addressed as “Śthavira” throughout the *Nyāyānusāra. Yin shun (1980: 562) suggests the possibility that Saṅghabhadra applies this title (“the venerable monk”) to Śrīlāta with a sense of irony, since there are several passages in the *Nyāyānusāra in which Saṅghabhadra taunts Śrīlāta for his senility (see note 25 below). On the other hand, in the commentaries of the Kośa, there are some Dārṣṭāntikas (or Sautrāntikas) who are also called “Śthavira.”

One of these is the “Bhadanta” who appears in Chapter One of the Kośa (Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya: 13.12-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 36; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 78). Yasōmitra comments that he is “Śthavira” or a Sautrāntika who is called by such a name (Bhadanta iti Śthavirāh i kaścit Sautrāntikas tannāmā va [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 44.14-15]), while Śhiramati (Peking. 5875: To 84a7) and Pūṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 51a8) call him “Dārṣṭāntika śthavira Dhammatrāta (dpe ston sde pa’i gnas brtan Chos skyob / dpe ston pa gnas brtan Chos skyob). The *Nyāyānusāra does not comment here.

Probably the same “Bhadanta” appears again in Chapter Two of the Kośa (Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya: 98.14-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 301; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 298). He is described as “Śthavira who is a Sautrāntika” by Yasōmitra (Bhadantaḥ Śthavirāḥ Sautrāntikāḥ [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 232.28]), and as “Dārṣṭāntika śthavira Dharmatrāta” by Śhiramati (Peking. 5875: To 357a4) and Pūṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 287b3). The *Nyāyānusāra does not mention who he is but instead refers to the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas, which seems very similar to this position of Bhadanta’s (T. 1562: 445b12-15).

The opinion of “others” (apare) is mentioned in Chapter Three of the Kośa (Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya: 135.6-7; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 71; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 408). Yasōmitra glosses apare: “ŚthaviraVasubandhu, who is the teacher of ācārya Manoratha, says so” (śthavīra Vāsubandhur ācāryaManorathopādhitya āha; [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 289.6]). Śhiramati, Pūṇavardhana, and Saṅghabhadra do not mention who this is. The Chinese commentator, P’u-kuang, says that he is “Vasubandhu the elder, a dissident Sarvāstivādin” (T. 1821: 167c20-22). It is notable that, as Mejor (1991: 44) has pointed out, the
ascribed to Sautrāntikas in the Kośa have no such obvious resemblance to this Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika lineage, not even to Śrīlāta, the older contemporary of Vasubandhu. Other modern scholarly studies have pointed out that the Sautrāntika views in the Kośa correspond more closely to early Yogācāra doctrine as seen in the Yogācārabhūmi than to any other preceding Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika lineage. Therefore, a number of scholars suspect that Vasubandhu already was a Yogācāra when he composed the Kośa, and that his appellation “Sautrāntika” was only a disguise for his actual affiliation.11

The aim of this paper is to reconsider this issue by examining the thought of another Sautrāntika master contemporary with Vasubandhu, Bhadanta Rāma. His opinions are fragmentarily referred to in the *Nyāyanusāra, and Saṅghabhadra says that he is a disciple of Śrīlāta.12 On the other hand, as is mentioned below, some of his arguments are adopted in the Kośa. Hence, Bhadanta Rāma can be placed chronologically between Śrīlāta and Vasubandhu, and therefore an analysis of his arguments may

Kośa, following the opinion of this “sthavira Vasubandhu,” refers to a similar but more complicated view which is ascribed to Śrīlāta by Yaśomitra (Abhidharmkośavyākhyā: 289.23), Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: To 47b6), and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 344b6).

The opinion of “some” (anye) is mentioned in Chapter Four of the Kośa (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 193.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 7; Pruden 1988-1990 v. 2: 554). According to the Sanskrit text of Yaśomitra’s commentary (Abhidharmkośavyākhyā: 347.9), they are “sthavira Vasubandhu and others,” but the Tibetan translation (Peking 5593: Chu 4a) renders it as sthavira Vasumitra (gnas brtan Dbyig bses). Further, Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho 124a7) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ōu 6a7) refer to him as bhadanta Śrīlāta (slob dpon Dpal len). The *Nyāyanusāra (T. 1562: 534a18) only says “some.” The Chinese commentators P’u-kuang (T. 1821: 202c11) and Fa-pao (T. 1822: 628c4-5) ascribe this opinion to “Sthavira.” See Mejor (1991: 46).

Thus, in the first two cases, the commentators agree on the fact that Bhadanta is also called Sthavira (Dharmatrāta) and he is a Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika. The last two cases suggest that the positions of sthavira Vasubandhu (or sthavira Vasumitra) and Śrīlāta (who is called Sthavira in the *Nyāyanusāra) are so close that they caused misidentification by later commentators (I do not accept Frauwallner’s hypothesis that this sthavira Vasubandhu was the “old Vasubandhu” who composed the commentaries on the works of Asaṅga). From this evidence, I suppose that there was a subset or small group of Dārṣṭāntikas or Sautrāntikas who are distinguished by the appellation “sthavira” and that the *Nyāyanusāra used the appellation to refer to Śrīlāta because he was the most renowned master in this group.

11 See Kritzer (1999: 20, 202); Harada (1996: 148-160). The current state of the subject is surveyed by Robert Kritzer in his article in this issue. See also note 51.

12 A Chinese source calls him “the third master of Sautrāntika.” See note 19.
provide some new information on the problem of doctrinal discontinuity between the preceding Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika lineage and the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu.

II. Fragments Concerning Rāma

Fragments of Rāma’s arguments appear eight times in the *Nyāyānusāra. Seven of these are found in the third chapter or the *Pratītyasamutpādanirdeśa, corresponding to the Lokanirdeśa of the Kośa, while the last one is in the beginning of the next chapter, the Karmanirdeśa. Furthermore, there are two cases in which the opinions of “others” (apare) in the Kośa are ascribed to “Rāma” by later commentators. However, in these cases Saṅghabhadra says little and does not mention who those “others” are. Therefore, they are not taken into consideration here, except

13 There are two cases in which the opinion of “others” (apare) in the Abhidharma-kosaḥbhāṣya is ascribed to Rāma by the commentaries. One is found in Chapter Four (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 292.19-293.4; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 45; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 801-802). Here, Sarvāstivādins present their classification of four types of answers to questions: categorical answer (ekāṃsāvyākaraṇa), answer by distinguishing (vibhajyāvākaraṇa), answer by question (paripṛcchyaśvākaraṇa), and no answer (sthāpanīya). Against this, “others” claim that such a division is meaningless, since “no answer” cannot be understood as a type of answer, while the remaining three can be integrated into the first type, “categorical answer.” While Saṅghabhadra does not treat this opinion or mention who those others are, Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho. 267b5), Puṇavardhana (Peking. 5594: Nu. 137b5, 138a1), and Yaśomitra (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 465.24,31) ascribe this view to Rāma. In the following argument, Abhidharmikas say that a question such as “Teach me dharmas” should be classified according to the interrogator’s intention. If the question is asked with a sincere mind, then it should be answered by determining, “There are a lot of dharmas.” However if the question is ill-intentioned, then one should respond with the question, “Which dharmas shall I teach you?” Then the opponent raises an objection that such dialogues cannot be considered as a kind of question and answer (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 293.14-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 46-47; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 803). This opponent is also identified as Rāma by Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho. 268a3), Puṇavardhana (Peking. 5594: Nu, 138b2), and Yaśomitra (Abhidharma-kosaḥvyākhyā: 466.15). At the end of the argument, Vaubandhu supports the Vaibhāṣika position.

The other case is found in Chapter Six (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 375.17-18; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 260-261; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 1006-1007). The topic is the meaning of the term “temporary and cherished deliverance” (sāmayikī kāntā ceto-vimukti). The Vaibhāṣikas interpret the term literally, for they think this term is evidence for their doctrine that even arhats have the possibility of retrogression: the deliverance attained by arhats is not always permanent, but sometimes temporary. However, Sautrāntika Vasubandhu
to note the fact that later commentators also accept that there was an *abhidharma* master called Rāma before Vasubandhu who opposed Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy. Below, all the fragments of Rāma in the *Nyāyānusāra* will be examined according to their order of appearance in the text.

**Argument 1. Reflected Images**

Against the Sarvāstivādins, who accept the existence of *antarābhava* or the intermediate state between death and rebirth, an opponent makes the objection that there is no *antarābhava* since sentient beings are reborn immediately after death, just as a mirror immediately reflects the image of the object at a distance.14 Vasubandhu criticizes this saying that the *

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14 The Daśāntikas in the *Vibhāṣa* negate the existence of reflected images (T. 1545: 390c4-6). See Cox (1988: 53). However, their argument is not related to the issue of an intermediate state. Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi* argues against the existence of the intermediate state but without using the simile of the reflected images (T. 1646: 256c21-257a14). On the other hand, the *Vibhāṣa* refers to the opinion of the Vibhajyavādins that rebirth comes immediately after death so there is no intermediate state, just as light immediately destroys shadow, and shadow immediately destroys light (T. 1545: 356c24-25). I am not certain about the identity of the Vibhajyavādins, the opponents of the Vaibhāvikas whose frequency of appearance in the *Vibhāṣa* is secondary to that of the Dārṣṭāntikas. See Bareau (1955: 169). However, a similar view is found in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* (T. 1548: 608a19), a text probably belonging to the Dhamaguptakas, a branch of the Mahiśāsakas (Bareau 1955: 193). The *Miśrakabhidharmahṛdaya* also refers to a similar opinion: From death rebirth arises, just as the moon’s image is reflected in the distant water, while the moon itself does not move into the water. Hence, an intermediate state is not necessary for the rebirth of sentient beings (T. 1552: 963a14-20)*. 

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*The Sanskrit title of T. 1552 (Ts'a a p'i t'an s'hin hsin lun) is usually reconstructed as *Samyukta* (or *Kṣudraka*) *abhidharmahṛdaya* (-śāstra). However, Harada (1993: 107) considers the original title to have been *Miśrakabhidharmahṛdaya* for two reasons: (1) the Uighur version of Shhiramati’s Tattvarthā, a commentary on the Kośa, mentions this text as *Miśrakahrdayaśāstra*; (2) Kośa II.73c (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 109.21-23) refers to a verse of “others” (anye) that exactly corresponds to T. 1552 (945a1-2), and Yāsomitra explains that “others” refers to the “author of the Miśraka” (Miśrakakāra * Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*:
simile of the reflection is inappropriate here, for the reflected image is, unlike the next life, nonexistent. Then the Kośa presents some examples which disprove the reality of reflected images.\(^{15}\)

Saṅghabhadra agrees with Vasubandhu that there is an antarābhava, but unlike Vasubandhu, he insists on the existence of the reflected images. It is a basic Sarvāstivāda doctrine that only existent objects can give rise to perceptions, and hence the reflected images on the mirror or on the water must be existent elements, produced from the original objects. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra enters into a long discussion about whether the reflected images exist as entities or not.

Here, while refuting Vasubandhu, the *Nyāyānusāra also refers to the opinion of Bhadanta Rāma, which bears some similarity to the argument of the Kośa. Rāma presents five examples that prove the nonexistence of reflected images.

**a) Example of the moon in the water.** If the cause of one’s visual perception of the moon were an image of the moon that exists in a limited area of the water, it should be fixed there, while if it were spread over the entire surface of the water, it should be seen everywhere in the water at the same time. However, the moon, in fact, appears in a limited area of the water, and it is not fixed, since when the viewer changes his position, the moon also moves (T. 1562: 470c9-14).

\(^{251.15}\). Yāsomitra also mentions “Vasubandhu’s own interpretation of the Miśraśloka” (ācāryenaiva miśraśrokovāyākhyāna [ Abhidharmakośasāvyākhyā: 250.26-27]). The corresponding verse is found in the Tsa (kṣudraka or miśraka) chapter of T. 1552, so that one may assume that here the word miśraka designates the name of the chapter, not the title of the text. However, Harada claims that in such cases it is rare for the commentator to refer to the name of the chapter directly, without introducing the name of the whole text. Therefore, its original title is to be reconstructed as Miśrakabhidharmahṛdaya. In my opinion, of these two reasons, the first is less convincing, since the Uighur version of the Tattvārthā is a re-translation of the Chinese translation, and, a partial comparison with the extant Chinese fragment of the Tattvārthā (T. 1561) suggests that the Sanskrit nouns inserted in the Uighur version were added by the Uighur translator(s), and this reconstructed Sanskrit is sometimes questionable, for example, when the Abhidharmakośa is referred to as “Kośavyttisāstra” in the Uighur version. However, the second reason, the evidence of Yasōmitra, is strongly convincing. Therefore, I agree with Harada that the Sanskrit title of Tsa a p’i t’an s’hin hsin lun (T. 1552) is Miśrakabhidharmahṛdaya. For a description of the Uighur version of the Tattvārthā, see Mejor (1991: 93).

\(^{15}\) For a detailed examination of the argument about the intermediate state and reflected images in the Kośa, see Kritzer (2000).
b) **Example of light and shadow.** When there are two mirrors hanging opposite each other, one in a dark place and the other in a light place, the mirror in the light shows the dark spot while the mirror in the shadow reflects the light. However, real light and shadow cannot occupy the same space (T. 1562: 470c14-17).

c) **Example of a variety of colors.** The image of Devadatta (i.e., any person) on the water changes its colors according to the standpoint of the viewer: from one angle, it appears blue, and from another yellow, red, or white. If there were a real image of Devadatta in a variety of colors, the image should appear to a single viewer as a mixture of miscellaneous colors (T. 1562: 470c17-21).

d) **Example of vision in perspective.** Seeing Devadatta in the mirror, one can recognize whether he is approaching or departing. If this perception arose from the real material existing on the surface of the mirror, the viewer would not be able to comprehend such differences (T. 1562: 470c21-23).

e) **Example of depth perception.** If the reflected image of the moon has the water as its material basis, then the viewer could not have depth perception: the moon would appear on the surface of the water. However, indeed, one who sees the moon in the water perceives it as if it were in the depth of the water, not on the surface of the water (T. 1562: 470c23-26).

After reciting these five examples, Rāma concludes his discussion as follows:

[Question:] If it is true [that no reflected image really exists,] then what does one see there [in the mirror or the water]? [Answer: In those cases,] the arising of visual perceptions are supported by “the form in itself” (*bimba*). Therefore, it is the same as the case of [ordinary] visual perception arising from the eyes and the material forms. Thus, with the eyes and the mirror (or the water), etc., as conditions, the visual perception [of the reflected image] is produced from the form in the mirror, etc. Indeed, it is said that one sees an image different [from the original object], when one sees the form in itself (T. 1562: 470c26-29).

As Saṅghabhadra says, Rāma’s argument has some similarity to the *Kośa*. For example, the *Kośa* states that: a) while the real light and shadow
cannot coexist in the same place, the mirror in the shadowy place can reflect the light of the sun;\textsuperscript{16} b) the moon in the mirror appears with depth perception as if it were in the depth of the mirror, not on the surface.\textsuperscript{17} These statements exactly correspond to Rāma’s examples a) and e), respectively. Moreover, Vasubandhu also gives an explanation similar to Rāma’s, that the reflected image is nothing else but an assemblage (sāmāgrī) of the mirror and the object that produces the visual perception of an image resembling the original object.

However, in his conclusion, Vasubandhu makes a vague statement: “Indeed inconceivable is the variety of the forces of the dharmas.”\textsuperscript{18} On the other hand, Rāma states clearly that it is “the form in itself” (bimba) of the original material form that makes possible one’s visual perception of the reflected image. And for the same reason, he claims that there is no difference between the perception of the reflected image and of the original object. As Yin shun (1980: 573) has already pointed out, this view of Rāma’s seems strikingly similar to a passage in a Mahāyāna scripture, the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra:

For example when, supported by the [original] form, the form in itself [appears] in a polished mirror, one who sees it may think, “I am looking at a mere reflected image.” In this case the [original] form and its reflected image appear in one’s sight as if they were different from each other.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} chaṭyatapayo ca davayoh sahaikatrabhāvo na drṣṭaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 120.26; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 35; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 384)

\textsuperscript{17} anyatatraiva hi deśe ādarsṣātalāṃ bhavety anyatraivaṁcandrapratibimbakaṁ drṣ̄yatē (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 121.3; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 35; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 384)


\textsuperscript{19} dper na gzugs la brten nas me loṅ gi dkyl ’khor šin tu yoṅs su dag pa la gzugs rūd mthoṅ yaṅ / gzugs brīṅan mthoṅ ho sīraṃ du sems te / de la ni gzugs de daṅ gzugs brīṅan snaṅ ba de don tha dad par snaṅ ho l (Lamotte 1935: 91). See also Hsiian-tsang’s translation (T. 676: 698b6–9). The Chieh-shen mi ching su, a Chinese commentary on Hsüan-tsang’s version of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra by Yuan-t’se, quotes the arguments about reflected images from the Kośa and the *Nyāyānusāra as relevant remarks on this sutra passage. Here, Yuan-t’se refers to Rāma as “the third master of Sautrāntika,” later than Kumāra-lātu and Śrīlāta (Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 34.1: 426).
Here the Sūtra states that it is the form in itself (gzugs ŋid = bimbam eva) 20 of the original form that is reflected in the mirror, and though it does not really exist, it supports the arising of visual perception. This view implies that there is no distinction between the visual perception of existent objects and of nonexistent objects (e.g., the reflected image), and hence, that all objects of perception, like reflected images, are nonexistent. Indeed, Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasamgraha quotes this passage of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as scriptural evidence for the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only (vijñaptimātratā).21

However Rāma does not propose the mind-only doctrine here. Instead, he only follows the Dārśāntika view, which accepts the existence of the objects of perception in general but makes an exception for certain objects, such as reflected images. And, as Saṅghabhadra suggests in the following portion of the *Nyāyānasāra, Rāma is not successful in explaining how the mirror or the water can act as a special condition that produces visual perception without any existing object. From this point of view, it is interesting that Vasubandhu in the Kośa, though sharing a very similar view with Rāma, finally makes the ambiguous statement, “inconceivable is the variety of the forces of the dharmas.” In my opinion, Vasubandhu here carefully avoids committing himself to the Yogācāra since he anticipates that it may conflict with the status of the Kośa as an abhidharma treatise. Rāma, on the other hand, does not seem aware of the consequences of approaching Yogācāra too closely.

**Argument 2. Four Characteristics**

Analyzing the meaning of the word “pratītyasamutpāda,” Vasubandhu explains the term “arising” (samutpāda) as meaning, “the forthcoming (utpādabhimaṅkho) future dharma attains the conditions (pratyayam prāpya) and then comes to exist (samudbhava).”22 Saṅghabhadra criticizes this

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20 While Lamotte renders this “gzugs” as “rūpa,” Itō Shūken has proved that it should be restored as “bimba” (Itō 1972). See also the use in the Kośa (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 120.17-18; 121.9-10.12), of the terms “bimba” and “pratibimba,” which are translated as “gzugs” and “gzugs brñan” in Tibetan (Peking. 5591: 135a1; 135b2,4).

21 Mahāyānasamgraha, §II.7 (Nagao 1982: 61-63).

Since Vasubandhu does not allow the existence of the future, how can a nonexistent future factor “attain” the conditions? Then Saṅghabhadra also refers to Rāma’s interpretation of the word “arising.”

Rāma presents his opinion: a) The act of speech (śabda) is done to denote specific meanings. Spoken words such as “arising” or “passing away” are applied to each phase of the stream of conditioned forces (saṃskārasamāṇa), and the essential [meanings of those words] are derived out of the wide range of meanings. [The word “arising” or “passing away”] cannot be applied to a single moment (ksaṇa), since it is subtle and hence cannot be discerned; b) however, when the definitions [of those words] have been established in terms of the phases of the stream, they can also be applied by analogy to a single moment (T. 1562: 481c11-14).

This interpretation of Rāma’s is similar to a Sautrāntika view presented in the second chapter of the Kośa (Indriyanirdeśa), where the three or four characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of the conditioned factors (saṃskṛtadharma) are discussed. On the basis of the sūtra passage that states the three characteristics of all conditioned factors, arising (utpāda), passing away (vyaya), and changing in continuance (sthityanyathātva), the Sarvāstivādins assume that there are four existing “conditioned characteristics” (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa), which act as the cause of “birth” (jāti), “continuance” (sthiti), “change in continuance” (sthityanyathātva), and “extinction” (anityatā), of every single conditioned factor at each moment.  

However, Vasubandhu argues against this:

For the sake of removing their belief in false [views], the Lord, wishing to indicate that the stream of conditioned forces has the nature of being conditioned and dependently originated, made the following statement: “There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors].” [Therefore, these characteristics] do not belong to a single moment, since “birth,” and so on, belonging to a single moment, cannot be discerned, and that which is not discerned does not deserve to be established as a characteristic.  

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23 For a detailed explanation of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the four characteristics, see Cox (1995: 133-158).

Then the Kośa gives the Sautrāntika definition of the four characteristics:

In that case, the beginning of the stream [of conditioned factors] is arising, its extinction is passing away, that very stream [of conditioned factors], which is occurring, is continuance, and the distinction between the successive [moments] of this [stream of conditioned factors] is change in continuance. (Translation by Collett Cox)25

Thus for Vasubandhu, those four characteristics are provisionally established with respect to the “stream” (pravāha), not a single moment. This view clearly resembles Rāma’s opinion a). Śrīlāta, too, seems to have the same opinion, since Saṅghabhadra refers to this interpretation of Vasubandhu’s with the statement, “the Sūtra Master (Vasubandhu), conforming to the accepted doctrine of Sthavira’s (Śrīlāta’s) school, makes the following statement” (T. 1562: 407c9; Cox. 1995: 320). Further similar passages are also found in the *Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 200a6-7), where the opinion is attributed to the Dārśāntikas, in Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi (T. 1646: 289b18-21), and in the Viniścayasaṃgharāṇi of the Yogācārabhūmi (T. 1579: 585c24-28; Kritzer 1999: 234-235).

However, in the following portion, the Kośa gives another explanation similar to Rāma’s argument b).

These characteristics of conditioned factors can also be applied to a single moment if one does not imagine them to be discrete real entities. How so? Arising [as applied] to each moment [refers to the fact that it] exists not having existed. Passing away [refers to the fact] that having existed, it no longer exists. Continuance [refers to] the connection of each prior [moment] with subsequent moments. Change in continuance [refers to] the dissimilarity in that [connection]. (Translation by Cox)26

Here, Vasubandhu presents his secondary interpretation that the four characteristics can be applied not only to the stream of conditioned forces


but also to a single moment. This view is also found in the Yogācārabhūmi,\(^\text{27}\) which, like Vasubandhu, bases its position on a passage from the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra: “that which not having existed now exists, and after having existed, it no longer exists” \((abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchati)\).\(^\text{28}\)

Further, an explanation of the three characteristics found in the Vastuśaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi seems to resemble that of Rāma and Vasubandhu in applying these characteristics first to the moment and then to the stream of forces.\(^\text{29}\) Thus, this fact suggests a close relationship between Rāma and Vasubandhu, as well as between these Sautrāntika masters and Yogācāras.

**Argument 3. The Formula of Dependent Origination**

This passage provides a clue for determining the chronological order of Śrīlāta Rāma and Vasubandhu. The topic under discussion is the well-known formula of the teaching of dependent origination \((pratītyasamutpāda)\). Why does it begin with the two tautological phrases, “When this exists, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises \((imasmin satīdāṁ bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate)\)”? First, the *Nyāyaḥusāra refers to the opinion of Śrīlāta. According to Saṅghabhadra, those two phrases imply the dependent origination of factors constituting sentient beings \((sattvākhyā)\) and of those not constituting sentient beings \((asattvākhyā)\), respectively, while the following teaching of the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination, “depending on ignorance, conditioned forces [arise] \((avidyāpratayāḥ saṃskārāḥ)\),” and so on, is applied only to factors constituting sentient beings \((T. 1562: 482a6-8)\). Then a disciple of Śrīlāta expresses his objection: since the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination denotes only the factors constituting sentient beings, it is improper to think that the introducing formula can

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\(^{27}\) Pañcaviṃśatikāyāsamyaptamanabhūmi of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. \((T. 1579, 586a19; Peking 5539: Zi 22b7)\).

\(^{28}\) For the text and translation of the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra \((T. 99: 92c; T. 125: 713c-714b; T. 655: 806c-807a)\), see Lamotte (1973). For an examination of Vasubandhu's interpretation of this sūtra, see Miyashita (1986).

\(^{29}\) Saṃskāravastu of the Vastuśaṃgrahaṇī. \((T. 1579, 795c20-29)\). I am grateful to Wasō Harada for this reference.
be applied to both kinds of factors. On this topic, Saṅghabhadra supports Śrīlāta, warning that a disciple should not lightly criticize his teacher (T. 1562: 482a8-b5). Next, Rāma’s opinion is cited:

Bhadanta Rāma, who is not content to accept the explanation of his own teacher, also offers another interpretation of his own: a) if it is permissible for the twelve members to be classified into three lifetimes, then [this opening formula] would be the summary of the teaching of dependent origination over the course of three lifetimes: “When this (i.e., the former life) exists, that (the present life) exists, and, from the arising of this (present life), that (future life) arises”; b) if it is not permissible, then these two phrases should indicate immediate and mediate causation, respectively (T. 1562: 482b5-8).

From the context, it is evident that Saṅghabhadra thinks of Rāma as one of the disciples of Śrīlāta who are not completely obedient to their master. Here, Rāma presents two different explanations. The first is based on the Sarvāstivāda orthodox view of twelve-membered dependent origination, which is known as “three lifetimes with twofold causation”: the past life as the cause produces the resultant aspect of the present life, and the causal aspect of the present life produces the future life as the result. The second, Rāma says, is offered for those who do not accept this theory. This suggests the possibility that Rāma himself tends to accept another way of dividing the members of dependent origination according to lifetimes, the two lifetimes and singlefold causation system developed by the Yogācāra tradition.30

Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, on the other hand, simply presents his own views without mentioning these arguments between Śrīlāta and his disciples. However, his interpretation implicitly includes Rāma’s view:

Then, for what reason has the Lord taught [the discourse of dependent origination] with two phrases: “When this exists that exists, from the arising of this that arises”? A) For the purpose of defining [the specific cause], since it is said in other [scriptures] “When ignorance (avidyā) exists, conditioned forces (saṃskāras) exist, and conditioned forces never [arise] from elsewhere other than ignorance.” [Thus the former phrase indicates the specific

30 For the Yogācāra theory of two lifetimes and singlefold causation, see Kritzer (1999: 69-71). Kritzer points out that Vasubandhu’s interpretation of dependent origination in the Kośa is much closer to the two-lifetimes singlefold causation theory of the Abhidharma-samuccaya than to the Sarvāstivāda three-lifetimes twofold theory.
cause, and the latter phrase postulates that there is no other cause]. B) Other-
wise, in order to indicate the succession of the members: “When this (ignor-
ance) exists, those (conditioned forces) exists, and from the arising of these
(conditioned forces) that (consciousness) arises.” C) Or [in order to indicate]
the succession of the lifetimes: “When the former life exists, the present life
exists; from the arising of the present life, the next life arises.” D) Or in order
to indicate the difference between immediate and mediate causation. In some
cases the conditioned forces arise immediately after ignorance, but in other
cases, not immediately.31

Among these four explanations, the latter two are almost identical
to Rāma’s. The commentaries interpret the last explanation as follows:
When ignorance produces defiled conditioned forces directly, it is called
“immediate” causation. On the other hand, ignorance can also produce
undefiled conditioned forces, but not successively, since their natures are
different from each other.32 Alternatively, ignorance produces conscious-
ness through conditioned forces. In those cases, it is called “mediate”
causation.33

Rāma’s chronological position can be determined on the basis of this
data. First, as mentioned above, it is clear that Rāma is a disciple of Śrī-
lāta. Next, the similarity between Rāma’s passage and the Kośa suggests
three possible explanations: a) Vasubandhu has followed Rāma’s opinion
and expanded upon it; b) Rāma has quoted a part of Vasubandhu’s inter-
pretation to criticize Śrīlāta; c) there was a common source of interpreta-
tion preceding both Vasubandhu and Rāma.

Here the fact should be noted that Saṅghabhadra does not refer to Vasu-
bandhu with respect to this topic. Needless to say, the *Nyāyānusāra was

31 kathaṃ arthaṃ punar bhagavatā paryāyadvayam āha “imasmin satidaṃ bhavati
asyoṣṭōpādād idam utpadyate” iti / avadhāraṇārtham, yathā ‘nyattrāha “avidyāyaṃ satyāṃ
saṃskāra bhavanti nānyatāvidyāḥ saṃskāraḥ” iti / āṅgāparāmparāṁ vā ārṣaṅyātan, asmin
aṅge satīdaṃ bhavati asya punar āṅgasyotpādād idam utpadyata iti / janmaparāmparāṁ
vā, pūrvānte sati madhyānto bhavati madhyāntasyotpādād aparānta utpadyata iti / sāksāt
pārāmparyena pratayabhāvam ārṣaṅyātan / kadācid dhi samānantarām avidyāyāḥ
saṃskāra bhavanti kadācit pārāmparyeneti / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 138.24-139.6; La

32 tatra sāksāt yadāvidyāyāḥ samānantarām kliṣṭāḥ saṃskāraḥ utpadyante / pārāmp-
aryena tu yadā kuśalaḥ utpadyante / kuśalāvasthāyām avidyāyā abhāvāt / (Abhidharmako-
savyākhyaḥ: 297. 21-23).

33 avidyā saṃskārānāṃ sāksāt pratayayo vijñānādīnāṃ pārāmparyena / (Abhidharmako-
intended to be a polemical book directed mainly against Vasubandhu’s *Kośa*. Therefore, if the above-mentioned view indeed originated with Vasubandhu, and Rāma was only a follower, Saṅghabhadra ought to quote it as an opinion of Vasubandhu. In fact, however, he does not ascribe the opinion to Vasubandhu, but he refers to Rāma, saying that it is “his own interpretation.” This suggests that the view was stated originally by Rāma and followed by Vasubandhu. Thus, the probable order of the three masters is Śrīlāta – Rāma – Vasubandhu. However, since it is suggested by Saṅghabhadra that Śrīlāta was still living at the time when the *Nyāyānusāra* was written, they belong to the same general period.

34 P’u-kuang states that this passage can be ascribed to Rāma since it is based on Rāma’s view with some enlargement by Vasubandhu (T. 1821: 171b29-c10). On the other hand, Yaśomitra says that they are all ācārya’s (i.e., Vasubandhu’s) thought (*etat sarvam ācāryamanatam* [Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 297.26]). However neither commentary seems to contradict the fact that Vasubandhu accepted Rāma’s interpretation and improved it. Sthiramati (Peking, 5875: Tho 59b1-60a1) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking, 5997: Ju 352b5-353a6) do not mention whose opinion this is.

35 The *Nyāyānusāra* sometimes says things like “Sthavira (Śrīlāta) makes a confused statement because of his senility” (T. 1562: 445b6-7), or “The time has passed, and he (Śrīlāta) has become a decrepit man who can hardly maintain rational thought” (T. 1562: 450b16-17). These expressions suggest that at the time when Saṅghabhadra wrote the *Nyāyānusāra*, Śrīlāta was still living but had grown old. See Katō (1989: 56-57).

36 After having discussed Rāma’s interpretation presented here, the *Nyāyānusāra* refers to some other opinions by “some followers of Sthavira” and Sthavira himself, which have already been criticized in the *Kośa*. Then Saṅghabhadra says, “Thus, when Sthavira says something, it is not accepted even by his disciples and his fellow believer, much less by persons who are obedient to the holy teachings and conform to the correct principle. How strange it is that such a person is held in honor in the eastern area!” (T. 1562: 482c12-14). From the context it seems that the phrase “his disciples” implies Rāma and others who are referred to in the *Nyāyānusāra*, while “fellow believer” designates Vasubandhu. Thus, Saṅghabhadra thinks of Vasubandhu as Śrīlāta’s “fellow believer,” not as his disciple. Further, in the following portion, the *Kośa* refers to an interpretation of the “teachers” (ācāryāḥ). Saṅghabhadra objects, “Next, the Sūtra master (Vasubandhu) presents his own teacher’s interpretation of these two phrases [of dependent origination] to indicate his allegiance and does not reveal its fault. The relationship between the teacher and pupil ought to be like this, [not like that between Śrīlāta and his disciples]. However, I have no loyalty to his teacher” (T. 1562: 483a8-9). Then Saṅghabhadra refutes the interpretation of Vasubandhu’s “teacher.” This is another piece of evidence that Saṅghabhadra does not think of Vasubandhu as a disciple of Śrīlāta. Therefore, Katō’s identification of Śrīlāta as Vasubandhu’s “teacher” based on this passage cannot be accepted. See Katō (1989: 58) and my objection, which is discussed by Cox (1995: 51 note 114). Katō has accepted my opinion and revised his hypothesis in a recent paper written in Japanese, in which he writes
Argument 4. Meditative State of Cessation

According to the Sarvāstivāda interpretation of the twelve-membered dependent origination in terms of rebirth, the formula “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises] (vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam)” designates the moment when the present life of a sentient being arises from the former life, namely the moment when the primordial consciousness (vijñāna or pratisandhivijñāna) of the present life is implanted in the embryonic body (nāmarūpa). Then the formation of sense organs begins, and when those organs are completed, it is said, “depending on name-and-form, the six sense bases [arise] (nāmarūpapratyayaṃ sādāyatanam).”

However, since it is stated that consciousness and body are obtained in the state of nāmarūpa, the mental (manas) and tactile (kāya) faculties should have already been established there. Then why do the scriptures not say, “depending on nāmarūpa, which has two sense bases, the remaining four sense bases arise”? Concerning this question Saṅghabhadra refers to the opinion of Rāma:

Here Bhadanta Rāma presents his own interpretation: [The mental and the tactile faculties] are established [as sense bases], when they have passed over [the state of] name-and-form. Indeed, mind (manas) exists permanently [from the beginning of one’s life], but it is not equivalent to the mental base (mano-āyatana), [since] it (mind) necessarily has to contact the [external sense] base (i.e., the object) to be called a “[mental] base.” [For example,] in the meditative state of cessation (nīrodhasamāpatti), one’s mental base does not vanish. Therefore, it is allowed that mental perceptual consciousness (mano-vijñāna) will be produced once again [after one exits the meditative state of cessation]. However, it (i.e., mind in the state of cessation) cannot contact [external objects] due to the absence of other conditions [that make the activity of mental perceptual consciousness possible]. For the same reason, the two faculties (indriya) of body and mind in the state of “consciousness” and “name-and-form” cannot be accepted as [sense] bases. Hence that “Vasubandhu was not a direct disciple of Śrīlāta but was familiar with him both doctrinally and personally” (Katō 1997: 59). Therefore, the statement in Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 107) that refers to Katō’s identification of Śrīlāta as Vasubandhu’s teacher should be corrected. According to Yasomitra, these “teachers” of Vasubandhu are “the old teachers” (pūrvācārāyāh). And, as in the case of other references to the old teachers in the Kośa (Hakamaya 1986; Mejor 1991: 46-48), a parallel passage to this interpretation of Vasubandhu’s teacher is found in the Savitarkādībhāmi of the basic section (Maulībhāmi) of the Yogācārabhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi: 221.16-17). Thus, this seems to be further evidence suggesting a relationship between the Kośa and the Yogācāra. See Harada (1996: 142-145).
it is said [by the scriptures] that name-and-form precedes the six sense bases, and that depending on name-and-form, the six sense bases arise (T. 1562, 485c21-486a1).

Thus Rāma explains that the mind (i.e., consciousness) and the body of an embryo cannot be regarded as sense bases, not because they do not exist but because they do not contact external objects. He also says that it is the same as in the case of the meditative state of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), in which one does not perceive external objects but does not lose consciousness itself.

Rāma’s interpretation of nirodhasamāpatti clearly corresponds to the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 775a22-24) or Śrīlāta in the *Nyāyānusāra (T. 1562: 420b17-20). Against the Sarvāstivādins, who assert that consciousness must be extinguished in the state of cessation since there is no activity of mind, they claim that in this state one only extinguishes concomitant factors of consciousness (caitta, caitasika), such as conception (saṃjñā), feelings (vedanā), and so on, but not consciousness itself.37

The Kośa also attributes the same view to Vasumitra, the author of the treatise entitled Paripṛchchā.38 However, it seems that Vasubandhu does

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37 This interpretation of the Dārṣṭāntikas is based on the fact that, in the scriptures, the meditative state of cessation is usually called “the cessation of conception and feelings” (saṃjñāvedayita nirodha). Therefore, the Dārṣṭāntikas assert that in this state one only extinguishes conception (saṃjñā) and feelings (vedanā) but not consciousness itself. It implies that, at least, conception and feelings must exist as entities distinct from consciousness itself. This corresponds to the view which is ascribed to Sautrāntikas in the later tradition: According to the Blo gsal grub mtha’, a compendium of the doctrine of the fundamental Buddhist schools written in the fourteenth century, the Sautrāntikas in general state that the concomitant faculties of consciousness (caitta, caitasika), with the exception of conception and feelings, are nothing else than the various appearances of consciousness itself. See Mimaki (1979: 198; 1980: 151). The *Nyāyānusāra also refers to this Dārṣṭāntika opinion. See Cox (1995: 267). For a detailed discussion of the issue of nirodhasamāpatti, see Hakamaya (1975); Griffiths (1986: 122-128); Schmithausen (1987: 19-20); Cox (1995: 113-124).

38 bhadantaVasumitra tv aha Paripṛchchāyāṁ yasyācittikā nirodhasamāpattīn tasyaiṣa doṣo mama tu sacittikā samāpattir iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 72.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 212; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 231). Yasomitra identifies this “Vasumitra” as the author of the Pañcavastuka (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 167.22). However, both Chinese translations of the Pañcavastuka (the first chapter of the Prakaraṇa) clearly state that the consciousness and concomitant factors are extinguished in nirodhasamāpatti, as well as in asamjñīsamāpatti (T. 1541: 628c13-17; T. 1542: 694a19-21). Furthermore, this
not simply accept this theory, since he offers another explanation, that of
the “old teachers” (pūrvācārya), which is known as the mutual seed the-
ory: the body possessed of sense organs and consciousness contain each
other’s seeds,\(^{39}\) and therefore, consciousness can arise once again, after
one exits the meditative state, from its seeds latent within the corporal
basis. From this point of view, Rāma’s position here seems to be closer
to that of the Dārṣṭāntikas who preceded him than to that of Vasubandhu.\(^{40}\)

**Argument 5. Definition of Ignorance**

According to Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy, the nature of ignorance, the first
member of the formula of dependent origination, is identified with delu-
sion (moha). Against this, Śrīlāta in the *Nyāyānusāra presents three
different definitions: a) Ignorance is the name for the causes by which
the arising of insight (vidyā) is interrupted (T. 1562: 499a24-25); b) it is
the name for the ensemble of consciousness and concomitant factors
which prevent the arising of insight (T. 1562: 499c27-28); c) the oppo-
site of insight is called ignorance (T. 1562: 500a8-9). The last definition

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\(^{40}\) However, it is notable that here Rāma says, “Therefore it is allowed that con-
sciousness will be produced once again.” This suggests that Rāma relates this argument
to the issue of re-arising of the consciousness after the meditative state of cessation. On the
other hand, the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣa seemingly have no interest in explaining the
process of how consciousness can arise again after the meditative state of cessation: the
Dārṣṭāntika’s aim in asserting the existence of consciousness in the state of cessation
appears simply to be to distinguish this meditative state from the state of death. From this
viewpoint, Rāma’s position is considered to be closer to Vasubandhu and the Yogācāras
than to the earlier Dārṣṭāntikas.
has two meanings: since the scripture states, “false view activates delusion (moha),” one can see that it is false view or false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) that opposes insight. On the other hand, delusion or darkness (andhakāra or tāmas), which is activated by false view, can also be considered as the opposite of insight (T. 1562: 500a8-12). The *Nyāyānusāra replies that false view indeed increases the force of ignorance; however, it is therefore not identical to ignorance itself, but it coexists with ignorance. Next, Saṅghabhadra refers to the opinion of Rāma:

Bhadanta Rāma says: The nature of false view is not ignorance. It is a fact that greed (abhidhāya), malice (vyāpāda), and false view (mithyādṛṣṭi) have different kinds of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha) as their own roots individually and are increased by them, respectively (T. 1562: 500b10-11).

While the meaning of the argument is not clear, it is another piece of evidence that Rāma does not always agree with his teacher Śrīlāta. The argument seems to be related to the Sarvāstivādin view found in the Kośa, that the three kinds of unvirtuous mental action (manaskarman) — greed (abhidhāya), malice (vyāpāda), and false view (mithyādṛṣṭi) — have desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha) as their own roots, because the former three appear immediately after the latter three respectively. Rāma seems to be saying that false view is thus distinguished from delusion, and delusion is to be identified with ignorance. If this understanding is correct, Rāma’s opinion above is closer to that of the Sarvāstivādins than to that of Śrīlāta, since it is based on the premise that ignorance is synonymous with delusion.

41 The Kośa also refers to the opinion of Śrīlāta here, but it is not exactly the same as the citation in the *Nyāyānusāra. According to the Kośa, someone states that “all the defilements are ignorance” (sarvakleśā avidyā), and the commentaries attribute this view to Śrīlāta. See Kośa III 29d (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 141.24; Poussin 1980, v. 2: 91; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 421); Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho 65a7); Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 358a8); Yaśomitra (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 302.2). For a survey of this argument of Śrīlāta’s, see Miyashita (1992:8-9).


43 However, Saṅghabhadra does not accept this opinion of Rāma for two reasons: (1) It is impossible to say that greed (abhidhāya) is a “different kind” of desire (rāga), or malice (vyāpāda) a “different kind” of hatred (dveṣa); (2) Delusion increases not only the force of false view but also the forces of greed and malice as their “root,” and desire and hatred,
Argument 6. Impressions

In the next portion of his definition of ignorance, Vasubandhu refers to another opinion, that the nature of ignorance (avidyā) is defiled insight (kliṣṭa prajñā) since it is opposed to knowledge (vidyā), which is identified with pure insight (anāsravā prajñā). But, says Vasubandhu, this definition conflicts with the sūtra passage, “insight is defiled by ignorance and becomes impure”: If the nature of ignorance were defiled insight, it would not exist together with pure insight, for Sarvāstivādins do not allow more than one of the same kind of mental factors (i.e., insight) to coexist within one’s mind at a single moment. Hence it is impossible for insight to be defiled by “defiled insight.” Concerning this issue, the opponents propose two answers: a) Ignorance does not coexist but alternates with insight from moment to moment (vyavakīryamāna), and this condition is called “defiled”; or b) insight is not directly defiled by ignorance itself but is damaged (upahata) by the impression (vāsanā) of ignorance, and therefore, there is no contradiction between their definition of ignorance and the sūtra passage. After referring to their opinions without making any detailed examination, the Kośa simply concludes the argument with the Sarvāstivāda statement that the nature of ignorance is different from insight. Here Vasubandhu seems to have little interest in the topic. Or perhaps he does not want to discuss conceptions like vāsanā, which are evocative of Yogācāra doctrine.

too, can be considered as the “roots” of false view (T. 1562: 500b13-16). While I am not sure that I correctly understand Saṅghabhadra’s passage, it seems that Saṅghabhadra aims to criticize the inadequacy of Rāma’s distinction between the three unvirtuous mental actions and the three fundamental defilements in the first response, and to refute Rāma’s usage of the term “root,” which means “to increase the force,” in the second response.


45 For a review of these arguments, see Miyashita (1992: 7-12).
The *Nyāyānusāra*, on the other hand is concerned with the conception of impression and continues the argument: Ignorance is defined as unwisdom (ajñāna), and it is classified into two types. In a narrow sense, it is defiled (kliṣṭa) unwisdom or delusion (moha), the existing factor opposed to wisdom (jñāna), while in a broad sense, it is undefiled (akliṣṭa) unwisdom, which designates the lack of wisdom but is not an existing entity. For example, saints such as arhats or pratyekabuddhas have already abandoned delusion, so they have no defiled unwisdom. However, compared with that of the Lord Buddha, the wisdom they have attained is still imperfect, and such “insufficiency” or “lack” of wisdom is called undefiled unwisdom, or the impression (vāsanā) of ignorance (T. 1562: 501c22-502a3).

Based upon these speculations, Saṅghabhadra gives his own definition: “impression is a general name for the mental factors that arise together with lesser wisdom” (T. 1562: 502a25-26). Thus, Saṅghabhadra accepts the conception of impression as a provisional (prajñapti) existent.

Then Saṅghabhadra refers to Rāma’s interpretation of impressions:

Bhadanta Rāma makes this sort of statement: there are undefiled factors called impressions, which are like the matured effects (vipāka) produced from unvirtuous causes (akuśalahetu). When the Blessed One was a bodhisattva, he did various preparatory practices (prayoga) for an astronomically long period of time. Although he had afflictions (kleśa), he gradually abandoned the undefiled impressions produced from the afflictions and instead gradually increased the impressions of white factors (śukladharma). Afterward, when the lasting abandonment of all defilements (āsrava) had been accomplished, some of those impressions disappeared, but others remained. [That is to say,] even when the supreme and everlasting abandonment of all

47 According to Yamabe (1989: 212-213), the original meaning of the term vāsanā in the early Yogācāra tradition is limited to “the impression of defilements (kleśa)” or “the impression of action (karman).” Saṅghabhadra’s explanation here seems to correspond to the former. Compare it with the passage in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: “Activities similar to affliction never occur to the Thus Come One, whenever he moves, looks, talks, or stays. It is said ‘The Thus Come One has abandoned the impressions absolutely.’ On the other hand, in the case of arhats, activity similar to affliction occurs when they move, look, talk, or stay, though they have already abandoned the defilements themselves” (tatra yā tathāgatasya spandite vā prekṣite vā kathite vā vihāre vā kleśāśādyācetaśa śamudācāra-pracurarā / ayaṃ tathāgatasya vāsanāśamudghatā ity ucyate / arhatām punaḥ prahīṇakleśānām api kleśasadbhasadyāt ceṣṭā spandita-prekṣita-kathita vihṛtesu bhavaty eva / [Bodhisattvabhūmi: 404.18-22]).
defilements had been achieved as a result of extended practice, the impressions of white factors still remained with the Buddha [while the undefiled impressions had disappeared], since it is said that there are both perishable impressions (i.e., impressions of defilements) and imperishable ones (i.e., impressions of virtuousness). [Saṅghabhadra answers:] Of course, such an explanation may also be possible, but he (Rāma) could never demonstrate their nature as truly existent (T. 1562: 502b13-20).

Thus, Rāma states that there are “impressions of white factors” opposed to undefiled impressions which are matured effects of affliction. As Yin shun (1980: 572) has pointed out, this idea seems similar to the concept of the “seed of the impression produced by hearing [the teaching of the Buddha] that flowed from the realm of purest truth” (suviśuddhadhar-madhātunisyaṃdāsrutavāsanābija) found in the Mahāyānasamgraha.48 At least it is not difficult to find here the influence of Yogācāra doctrine, as in the case of the bīja theory of Vasubandhu, the Kośa master, or the *anudhātu of Sthavira Śrīlāta. Therefore, the *Nyāyānusāra sometimes refers to the terms vāsanā, bīja, and anudhātu as variations of a single concept:

In the arguments among the various Ābhidhārmikas, the Dārśāntikas often appeal to their own [theory] of seeds (bīja), and thereby, pervert the correct meaning and cause it to become unclear. There are certain masters who give different names to these seeds, each according to his own understanding. Some call them subsidiary elements (*anudhātu), others call them impressions (vāsanā); still others call them capability (sāmarthyā), non-disappearance (avipraśa), or accumulation (upacaya) (T. 1562: 398b25-29; translation by Cox 1995: 197). 49

Vasubandhu states that the seed (bīja) is one’s psycho-physical stream itself, which conveys the potency of past action into the future. Yamabe

48 Mahāyānasamgraha, §1.45 (Nagao 1982: 44-45). As concerns the Yogācārabhūmi, such a purificatory function of seed is found only in an interpolated paragraph in the Nivṛttī portion of the Viniścayasaṃgrahanaṇī. See Schmithauser (1987: 77-81).

49 Statements similar to this are repeated in the *Nyāyānusāra several times: “Conceptions like accumulation (upacaya), capability (sāmarthyā), subsidiary elements (*anudhātu), impressions (vāsanā), or seeds (bīja) of the force of mind have already been rejected” (T. 1562: 535a23-26); “Subsidiary elements (*anudhātu), capability (sāmarthyā), impressions (vāsanā), seeds (bīja), accumulation (upacaya), non-disappearance (avipraśa), and so on, which are asserted by the artful deceivers (i.e., the Dārśāntikas), have been denied” (T. 1562: 627a19-20). However, among these conceptions, accumulation (upacaya) and non-disappearance (avipraśa) can in fact be ascribed to Mahāsamghika and Saṃmitīya respectively. See Lamotte (1936: 230-231); Yin shun (1980: 558).
(1990) has pointed out the possibility that Vasubandhu’s theory of seed can be traced back to the Yogacārabhumi. Sthavira Śrīlāta offers a conception of subsidiary element (*anudhātu or *pūrvānudhātu) which, as Katō (1989: 250-260) has shown, generally corresponds to Vasubandhu’s seed. It is notable that the term dhātu has been used as a synonym for bīja in the Yogacāra tradition from the earliest stage (Yamabe 1997: 212-213). And Rāma explains that the effect of the past practice is preserved in the form of impression (vāsanā). Here, Saṅghabhadra seems not only to reveal their lack of consistency in terminology but also to suggest that they are all in imitation of Yogacāra thought.

However, at the same time it should be noted that, while both Vasubandhu’s seed and Śrīlāta’s subsidiary element seem to have originated from early Yogacāra theory, Rāma’s conception of impression evidently reflects more highly developed Yogacāra thought, such as that seen in the Mahāyānapaśngraha.

Argument 7. Mutual Relationship of Cause and Effect

Among the various teachings of dependent origination, there are some sūtras, such as the Nagarasūtra and the Mahāniddānaparīyāsāsūtra, that, following the formula, “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises]” (vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ), insert the reversed phrase, “depending on name-and-form, consciousness [arises]” (nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ). Saṅghabhadra explains that these sūtras indicate the fact that the body (i.e., name-and-form) and mind (consciousness) of an embryo should arise together: body depends on mind in the sense that body cannot exist without mind, while mind similarly cannot exist independently from body. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra says, these sūtras explain that consciousness and name-and-form have a simultaneous cause and effect relationship with each other (T. 1562: 502a1-10). Next, Saṅghabhadra refers to another interpretation presented by Rāma:

50 Therefore, the *Nyāyānusāra says that *pūrvānudhātu is just an alternative name for Vasubandhu’s conceptions of bīja (T. 1562: 440b9-10) or samtatipariṇāma-viśeṣa (T. 1562: 541c26-27).

51 The Kośa does not take up this topic. For the significance of the Nagarasūtra in the doctrinal development of early Buddhist conceptions of dependent origination, see Kajiyama (1985). The Mahāniddānaparīyāsāsūtra (T. 1, No. 13; T. 14; T. 26, No. 97; DN No. 15) seems to be more important for the Sarvāstivādins, for it contains a passage that evidently
Bhadanta Rāma presents his own opinion: When the new existence (upāpattiḥavana) arises from the intermediate state (antarābhava), depending on the name-and-form (nāmarūpa) of the intermediate state, the primal consciousness of the new existence (pratisamdhivijñāna) and other [mental factors] are produced. Then the name-and-form of the intermediate state is destroyed, leaving that consciousness, and from it, the name-and-form of the new existence is produced (T. 1562: 504a10-13).

Thus, according to Rāma, the passage “depending on name-and-form, consciousness [arises],” connotes that the consciousness of the new existence is produced from the body of the intermediate state, while the following and reversed phrase, “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises],” connotes that the body of the new existence is born from the first moment of consciousness of the new existence. The reason for the argument is not clear, but comparing this with the following objection raised by Saṅghabhadrā, we can infer that here Rāma would like to follow Ārya’s view, which does not allow a simultaneous relationship between cause and effect.52

Argument 8. Nature of Action

In the second verse of Chapter Four of the Kośa (IV 2bc), the Vaibhāṣīkās state their definition of vijñapti, according to which the intrinsic nature (svabhava) or the ethical subject of manifested bodily action suggests the so-called “embryogenetic” interpretation of dependent origination. Besides, this sūtra has no reference to ignorance (avidyā), conditioned forces (samskāraḥ), or the six sense bases (saḍāyatanāni) in its original version: the formula begins with the interactive cause-effect relationship between consciousness (vijñāna) and name-and-form (nāmarūpa), and there is no six sense bases (saḍāyatanāni) between name-and-form (nāmarūpa) and contact (sparṣa). Therefore, the Dharmaskandha (T. 1537; Dietz 1984), one of the earliest works of the Sarvāstivādins, inserts the phrases “depending on name-and-form, consciousness arises” and “depending on name-and-form, contact arises” in its interpretation of the dependent origination. It seems that Saṅghabhadrā here treats the problem of interactive causation between consciousness and name and form with reference to the explanation of the Dharmaskandha.

52 Ārya clearly states, “conditioned factors can never be simultaneous causes” (T. 1562: 421b18-22). This refusal to accept the simultaneity of cause and effect (e.g., contact of eyes and visible material form, and the arising of visual perception) results in a successive model of perception. See Cox (1988: 40-41). Though tradition says that this model of successive perception is common to the Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika view, Vasubandhu in the Kośa does not accept it and supports the Vaibhāṣika view of a simultaneous cause-effect relationship (Abhidharmakosābhāṣya: 146.18-20; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 107; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 430).
(kāyavijñānapti) is appearance (saṃsthāna) as an existent visible material form (rūpa). Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of “others,” identified by the commentaries as Vātsīpatrīyas or Saṃmitīyas, according to whom the nature of manifested action is “movement” (gati). However, the Kośa immediately rejects this view:

Indeed, every conditioned factor, after having attained its existence, no longer exists. It vanishes at the place where it arises, and hence it cannot transmigrate to another place. Therefore, bodily action is not movement.53

The conditioned factor arises at one moment and passes away into non-existence at the next, without enduring for even one moment. And when a series of factors arises moment by moment, gradually shifting its locus, the phenomenon is called “movement.” Thus, there is, in fact, no movement. This view bears some similarity to argument of the Viṇīścayasaṃgrahāṇi of the Yogācārabhūmi (T. 1579: 598a18-19, 600a10-13).

On the other hand, the *Nyāyānusāra does not cite this passage of the Kośa, but instead refers to Rāma:

Bhadanta Rāma gives his opinion: The stream of conditioned factors, by attaining its existence, arises at a certain place and then goes out of existence at that very place. Therefore, there is no movement (T. 1562: 533a26-28).

Then Saṅghabhadrā criticizes this: since Rāma does not admit the existence of the past and future factors, how is it possible for the nonexistent future factor “to attain its existence”? It seems that Vasubandhu’s passage corresponds more closely to that of Rāma than to that of the Yogācārabhūmi. This fact suggests that Saṅghabhadrā thought of Rāma as a precursor of the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu, at least with respect to the present topic; therefore, Saṅghabhadrā quotes Rāma here, instead of Vasubandhu.

III. Conclusion

On the basis of the passages discussed above, the thought of Bhadanta Rāma can be outlined as follows:

a) Following the Dārṣṭāntika views in the *Vibhaṣā, Rāma maintains the existence of consciousness in the meditative state of cessation (argument 4) and refutes the simultaneous arising of cause and effect (argument 7). These opinions are also accepted by Śrīlāta, and this confirms Saṅghabhadra’s account that Rāma was a disciple of Śrīlāta. However, Rāma is not always an obedient pupil; for example, he objects to Śrīlāta’s interpretation of the term “ignorance” (argument 5).

b) Furthermore, concerning topics such as the interpretation of the opening formula of the teaching of dependent origination (argument 3) or the negation of the Vātsīputriya definition of the nature of manifested bodily action (argument 8), Rāma’s accounts closely resemble passages in the Abhidharmakośa. Considering the fact that Saṅghabhadra chooses to refer to Rāma rather than Vasubandhu in both cases, it is possible to assume that Vasubandhu inherited these arguments from Rāma. Rāma’s interpretation of the term “arising,” which is similar to Vasubandhu’s definition of the four characteristics in the Kośa (argument 2), should perhaps be added here.

c) In addition, regarding other topics Rāma’s opinion indicates the influence of the Yogācāra school. As has been suggested by the studies of some modern scholars, Vasubandhu also seems to have been familiar with Yogācāra ideas at the time when he wrote the Kośa and introduced some of them into the Kośa as the opinions of the Sautrāntikas or the pūrvācāryas. However, according to those studies, the Yogācāra source materials for the Sautrāntika opinions in the Kośa are limited to early texts that do not necessarily presuppose the conception of ālayavijñāna.\footnote{According to Schmithausen, the Yogācārabhūmi consists mainly of three heterogeneous or chronologically distinct layers: (1) the oldest layer, which refers neither to ālayavijñāna nor to the Samdhinirmocanasūtra; (2) a middle layer, which refers occasionally to ālayavijñāna, but not to the Samdhinirmocana; (3) the newest layer, which contains both material from the Samdhinirmocana and detailed treatments of ālayavijñāna. Further, each of these layers is not homogeneous in itself: the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī also include some old material. See Schmithausen (1987: 13-14). For a different analysis of the layers of the Yogācārabhūmi, see Aramaki’s hypothesis (unpublished) which is summarized by Kritzer (1999: 12 note 17; 200). At any rate, it is certain that the arguments found in the Yogācārabhūmi do not always presuppose the conception of ālayavijñāna. Therefore, the relationship between the Sautrāntika opinions in the Kośa and the Yogācārabhūmi does not imply immediately that Vasubandhu as the author of the Kośa has already accepted the
On the other hand, Rāma’s arguments regarding the nonexistence of the reflected image, which would inevitably result in the mind-only theory (argument 1), and his explanation of the impressions of the white factors (argument 6), are apparently based on more highly developed Yogācāra scriptures, such as the *Saṃdhinirmochanasūtra*, or treatises like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

In brief, the doctrine of Rāma is a blend of the views of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣā* and Śrīlāta the Sthavira in the *Nyāyānusāra* as well as some Yogācāra ideas. This fact suggests that the Sautrāntikas are definitely descended from the Dārṣṭāntika lineage, but, as Yīn shun says, “It seems that in the period of Bhadanta Rāma, the Yogācāra Mahāyānists flourished, so they would have influenced the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas” (Yīn shun 1980: 572-573). The Sautrāntika positions of Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* should also be considered in this context.

However, while Rāma’s arguments appear to be an indiscriminate combination of Dārṣṭāntika and Yogācāra views, Vasubandhu seems more deliberate in introducing Yogācāra theory into the *Kośa*. On the one hand he rejects certain opinions of the Dārṣṭāntikas, such as the negation of the simultaneous cause-effect relationship, since they conflict with the Yogācāra views that he accepts, and on the other hand, unlike Rāma, he carefully avoids introducing fully developed Yogacāra conceptions, for they might conflict with the scheme of abhidharmic philosophy that forms the *ālayavijñāna*. Regarding this issue, Kritzer has examined Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the term “consciousness” (vijñāna) as a member of the formula of dependent origination and has concluded that the *Kośa* presupposes the conception of *ālayavijñāna*, while Vasubandhu does not actually use the term in the *Kośa* because it is not required in its exegetical context (Kritzer 1999: 175-207). On the other hand, Yamabe, in his review of Kritzer’s book, says that the main sources for the Sautrāntika views in the *Kośa* seem limited to the *Savitarkādiḥbhumī* of the *Maulībhūmi* of the *Yogācarabhūmi*, a portion in which there is little reference to *ālayavijñāna*, and the parts of the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Vīṇśicayamgrahanī* in which the conception of *ālayavijñāna* is not necessarily required. This suggests the possibility that the author of the *Kośa* has not yet “discovered” *ālayavijñāna*. Hence, Yamabe reserves judgement on whether Vasubandhu already accepted *ālayavijñāna* when he wrote the *Kośa* (Yamabe 2000 b: 68). I am not in a position to decide this issue, but if my conclusions in this article are correct, other Sautrāntikas, contemporary with Vasubandhu, were familiar with developed Yogācāra scriptures like the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and with treatises like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, which discuss the conception of *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore it is not impossible to suppose that Vasubandhu knew *ālayavijñāna*, although, at the time of composing the *Kośa*, he did not want to refer explicitly to such a novel idea, which never appears in the traditional exegetical abhidharma works.
substructure of the Kośa. Thus he succeeds in formulating a coherent, high-level abhidharma theory of his own, under the name of “Sautrāntika.” Perhaps this is the reason why Vasubandhu’s fate was different from that of his contemporary Sautrāntikas, whose works are no longer extant. There must have been more Sautrāntika masters at the time of Vasubandhu, but, like Rāma, they could not establish a method to harmonize their abhidharmic views with Yogācāra theory, and therefore, their works are lost to history. The Abhidharmakośa is a rare example of a Sautrāntika work that achieved such harmony and therefore survived. As for Vasubandhu himself, the composition of this treatise probably served as a springboard for his conversion to Yogācāra.

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