

# JIABS

Journal of the International  
Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 26 Number 2 2003

<i>General Introduction</i> by Robert KRITZER .....	201
Nobuyoshi YAMABE <i>On the School Affiliation of Āśvaghoṣa: “Sautrāntika” or “Yogā- cāra”?</i> .....	225
Takumi FUKUDA <i>Bhadanta Rāma: A Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu</i> .....	255
Bart DESSEIN <i>Sautrāntika and the Hṛdaya Treatises</i> .....	287
Yoshifumi HONJŌ <i>Sautrāntika</i> .....	321
Robert KRITZER <i>Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> .....	331
Oskar VON HINÜBER <i>Report on the XIII<sup>th</sup> Conference of the IABS</i> .....	385
Cristina SCHERRER-SCHAUB <i>IABS Treasurer Final Financial Report</i> .....	391
Notes on the Contributors .....	395
JIABS volume 26 Number 1 2003 • <i>Errata</i> .....	397



BHADANTA RĀMA:  
A SAUTRĀNTIKA BEFORE VASUBANDHU<sup>1</sup>

TAKUMI FUKUDA

## I. Introduction

The full text of Saṅghabhadra's \**Abhidharmanyāyānusāra*, or "Conformance to the Correct Principle of Abhidharma," is, like many other Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, preserved only in the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang (T. 1562). It is a controversial work that attempts to defend Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin doctrine against the objections of opponents, especially of the Sautrāntikas, who are frequently cited and agreed with by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Following the example of the *Abhidharmakośa* in its compact and highly organized style of doctrinal presentation, Saṅghabhadra refutes Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika positions, which deviate from Sarvāstivādin orthodoxy.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Saṅghabhadra also quotes and criticizes the opinions of other

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this paper was published in Japanese under the title, "Kyōryōbu no daitoku Rāma," *Bukkyō shigaku kenkyū* 41/ 1 (1988): 1-36. I am grateful to Prof. Robert Kritzer for correcting my English, as well as for many helpful comments and suggestions. I have also benefited from the kind advice of Prof. Wasō Harada. Any inaccuracies in the present paper are, of course, solely my own responsibility.

<sup>2</sup> For a general survey of the \**Nyāyānusāra*, see Cox (1995: 56-58); Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 240-249). Other extant works attributed to Saṅghabhadra are: (1) \**Samayapradīpika*, the condensed version of the \**Nyāyānusāra* preserved in the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang (T. 1563); (2) \**Sūtrānurūpā Śāstrakārikābhāṣya*, a text that is preserved in the Tibetan tanjur as one of the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa* (Peking. 5592; sDe dge 4091). The \**Sūtrānurūpā* commentary used to be considered the work of *slob dpon 'Dul bzañ (= ācāryaVinūtabhadara)*, but Marek Mejer has asserted that this name is supported only by the Peking edition, and, according to other sources, it should be corrected to *slob dpon 'Dus bzañ (= ācāryaSaṅghabhadra)*. Further, Mejer assumes that the \**Sūtrānurūpā* might be an abridgment of the \**Samayapradīpika* edited by the Tibetan translator(s). This identification of the text itself cannot be accepted, because the \**Sūtrānurūpā* is, in fact, an abridgment of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, not of the \**Nyāyānusāra*. On the other hand Mejer's identification of the author seems to me to be correct. See Mejer (1991: 29-38).

Sautrāntikas preceding Vasubandhu who are not referred to in the *Kośa*, claiming that they are merely Dārṣṭāntikas and are not worthy of being called Sautrāntikas.<sup>3</sup>

Although Vasubandhu mentions nothing about the identity of his own Sautrāntika positions, or their relationship to the Dārṣṭāntika views, which appear in the *Kośa* three times,<sup>4</sup> Saṅghabhadra's above statement is

<sup>3</sup> In the opening section of the \**Nyāyānusāra*, where the distinction between defiled (*sāsrava*) and undefiled (*anāsrava*) factors is discussed, Saṅghabhadra refers to an opinion that the factors that constitute the body of an *arhat* are undefiled. According to Saṅghabhadra, this view is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, including Śrīlāta. The same opinion is mentioned in a Sautrāntika passage in Chapter Four of the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 197.8; La Vallée Poussin 1980. v. 3: 19; Pruden 1988-1990. v. 2: 563), not as the opinion of Sautrāntikas themselves but cited as an opinion of others (*apare*). The \**Nyāyānusāra* has a long discussion on this, and concludes with the following passage: "Besides, [to justify their doctrine] Dārṣṭāntikas make a vain effort, like stirring empty space. [Whatever they may say,] it is determined by Scripture (*sūtra*) that the first fifteen of the eighteen elements (*dhātu*) are, without exception, defiled (*sāsrava*), [and, therefore, the body of an arhat must be considered as defiled].... They say 'We do not recite such Scripture.' [However,] it is impossible to achieve their aim without reading Scriptures. Read Scriptures diligently if you want to accomplish your aim. Further, since they do not take all Scriptures as authority, how can they address [themselves] as the 'Scripturalists' (*Sautrāntika*). Indeed, when they look at a Scripture and find that it does not accord with their doctrine, then they reject it, or interpolate a passage which is suitable for their doctrine, and say 'the original passage has been corrupted by the transmitters.' Otherwise, as in the case of the \**Āyatana-paryāya* (*Shun pieh chu ching*, *Samyuktāgama* No.322, T. 99: 91c1-22), they do not believe in the whole [Scripture] at all and claim that it is not a holy teaching since it has been created and added to the corpus of canonical works (*āgama*) by Ābhīdhārmikas, who adhere to their own doctrine. Thus, they revolt against numerous Scriptures, violate the holy teachings, and assert various heterodoxies. In the present treatise I shall reveal them one by one" (T. 1562: 332a18-29). As Cox has noted (1995: 50 note 98), this is the only example of an identification of Dārṣṭāntikas with Sautrāntikas in the \**Nyāyānusāra*. However, in my opinion, Saṅghabhadra's stance is clearly stated in this one and only proclamation: Sautrāntikas are nothing else but Dārṣṭāntikas, and they are the primal opponent of this polemical work.

<sup>4</sup> All of these three references to "Dārṣṭāntika" views are found in Chapter Four of the *Kośa*: (1) The argument about the classification of determinate action (*niyatākarma*) and indeterminate action (*anīyatavedanīyakarma*) (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 229.17-31; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 116-117; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 626). Their mode of classification is rejected by both the *Kośa* and the \**Nyāyānusāra*. It is notable that Saṅghabhadra does not ascribe this "Dārṣṭāntika" view to Vasubandhu (T. 1562: 570b28-c28), while Yaśomitra says "Dārṣṭāntikas are Sautrāntikas" (*Dārṣṭāntikāḥ Sautrāntikāḥ* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 392.21]); (2) Dārṣṭāntikas state that greed (*abhidhyā*), wickedness (*vyāpāra*), and false view (*mīthyādr̥ṣṭi*) are nothing but mental action (*manaskarma*) (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 237.13-19; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 136; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 639). This seems to correspond to Śrīlāta's view (T. 1562: 339b14-20, 340b18-19),

considered reliable enough, since all the biographical information concerning Saṅghabhadra agrees that he was a learned Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda master contemporary with Vasubandhu.<sup>5</sup> This suggests that Saṅghabhadra should have known much about the background of the term Sautrāntika used by Vasubandhu. Later commentaries and the historical documents also agree that Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas belong to the same lineage.<sup>6</sup> Besides, it should be noted that Saṅghabhadra's statement supports the hypothesis shared by many modern scholars that the name Sautrāntika is used by the group itself as a self-designation since it has a positive connotation, while their opponents call them Dārṣṭāntikas, which has a pejorative connotation.<sup>7</sup> Thus, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the later Sautrāntikas are the descendants of the Dārṣṭāntikas who appear in the \**Vibhāṣā* Compendia<sup>8</sup> as the prime opponents of the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins.<sup>9</sup>

and, while Vasubandhu does not state his position on this topic, Saṅghabhadra criticizes it as if it were also supported by Vasubandhu (T. 1562: 574b29). Yaśomitra mentions that "Dārṣṭāntikas are a variety of Sautrāntikas" (*Dārṣṭāntikāḥ Sautrāntikaviśeṣa ity arthaḥ* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 400.17]); (3) The same opinion as above (2) is repeated in the interpretation of the term "course of action" (*karmapatha*) (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 248.10-12; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 169; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 658-659; Note that Poussin's translation takes this as the opinion of "Sautrāntikas," while both Chinese translations attribute it to "Dārṣṭāntikas." See T. 1558: 88c13; T. 1559: 243c8). Therefore, this, too, cannot be considered as Vasubandhu's own view, although Yaśomitra explains that this opinion is accepted by Vasubandhu (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 400.17). The \**Nyāyānusāra* ignores this argument. On the basis of these passages, the following explanation is suggested: Vasubandhu attributed to the "Dārṣṭāntikas" those views of the earlier Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas that were unacceptable to him, and distinguished them from his own "Sautrāntika" positions. Saṅghabhadra was indeed aware that Vasubandhu distinguished between the two names, although, following the standpoint of orthodox Sarvāstivāda, Saṅghabhadra claimed that the Dārṣṭāntikas were none other than Sautrāntikas. Yaśomitra, who commented on the *Kośa* several centuries later, was less aware of the difference. See Katō (1989: 81-85). For the period of Yaśomitra, see Mejor (1991: 38-39).

<sup>5</sup> For a review of the biographical information of Saṅghabhadra, see Cox (1995: 53-55); Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 241-243).

<sup>6</sup> See Cox (1995: 49-50, note 86).

<sup>7</sup> See Przyluski (1940: 250); Cox (1995: 39).

<sup>8</sup> There are three extant translations of the \**Vibhāṣā* commentaries preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka: \**Mahāvibhāṣā* (T. 1545) translated by Hsüan-tsang, \**Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (T. 1546) translated by Buddhavarman, Tao t'ai, and others, and \**Vibhāṣā* (T. 1547) translated by Saṅghabhūti. They clearly are not translated from the same original text but from three different recensions. For the complicated ramification of the Sarvāstivādins and of the transmission of *Vibhāṣā* texts, see Enomoto (1996); Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998:

Nevertheless, recent studies have raised the question of whether Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika views can be traced to the Dārṣṭāntikas. Indeed, there are certain similarities between the Dārṣṭāntikas in the \**Vibhāṣā* and the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas in the \**Nyāyānusāra* that indicate a consistent doctrinal development, at least in the case of Śrīlāta, a Sautrāntika master who is called "Sthavira" in the \**Nyāyānusāra*.<sup>10</sup> But the opinions

229-237). In this paper, I shall refer to Hsüan-tsang's version as the representative one (and often refer to the corresponding part of Buddhavarman's version). Although Hsüan-tsang renders the title as *A-p'i-ta-mo ta-p'i-p'o sha lun* (\**Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*), I am unable to find a Sanskrit source that suggests the term "mahā." Therefore, the original text that Hsüan-tsang translated can be considered to have been entitled *Abhidharmavibhāṣā*, not *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Similarly, when Hsüan-tsang translated the title of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as *Ta-ch'eng a-p'i-ta-mo chi lun* [*Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya*], he added the element "mahāyāna."

<sup>9</sup> For an extended review of the relation between the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas, see Cox (1995: 37-41).

<sup>10</sup> For the thought of Śrīlāta the Sautrāntika master, see Katō (1989). Although Katō's study of Śrīlāta is comprehensive, he does not investigate the reason why Śrīlāta is addressed as "Sthavira" throughout the \**Nyāyānusāra*. Yin shun (1980: 562) suggests the possibility that Saṅghabhadra applies this title ("the venerable monk") to Śrīlāta with a sense of irony, since there are several passages in the \**Nyāyānusāra* in which Saṅghabhadra taunts Śrīlāta for his senility (see note 25 below). On the other hand, in the commentaries of the *Kośa*, there are some Dārṣṭāntikas (or Sautrāntikas) who are also called "Sthavira."

One of these is the "Bhadanta" who appears in Chapter One of the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 13.12-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 36; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 78). Yaśomitra comments that he is "Sthavira" or a Sautrāntika who is called by such a name (*Bhadanta iti Sthaviraḥ / kaścit Sautrāntikas tannāmā vā* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 44.14-15]), while Sthiramati (Peking, 5875: To 84a7) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking, 5597: Ju 51a8) call him "Dārṣṭāntika sthavira Dharmatrāta" (*dpe ston sde pa'i gnas brtan Chos skyob / dpe ston pa gnas brtan Chos skyob*). The \**Nyāyānusāra* does not comment here.

Probably the same "Bhadanta" appears again in Chapter Two of the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 98.14-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 301; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 298). He is described as "Sthavira who is a Sautrāntika" by Yaśomitra (*Bhadantaḥ Sthaviraḥ Sautrāntikaḥ* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 232.28]), and as "Dārṣṭāntika sthavira Dharmatrāta" by Sthiramati (Peking, 5875: To 357a4) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking, 5597: Ju 287b3). The \**Nyāyānusāra* does not mention who he is but instead refers to the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas, which seems very similar to this position of Bhadanta's (T. 1562: 445b12-15).

The opinion of "others" (*apare*) is mentioned in Chapter Three of the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 135.6-7; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 71; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 408). Yaśomitra glosses *apare*: "Sthavira Vasubandhu, who is the teacher of ācārya Manoratha, says so" (*sthaviro Vasubandhur ācārya Manorathopādhyāya āha*; [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 289.6]). Sthiramati, Pūrṇavardhana, and Saṅghabhadra do not mention who this is. The Chinese commentator, P'u-kuang, says that he is "Vasubandhu the elder, a dissident Sarvāstivādin" (T. 1821: 167c20-22). It is notable that, as Mejer (1991: 44) has pointed out, the

ascribed to Sautrāntikas in the *Kośa* have no such obvious resemblance to this Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika lineage, not even to Śrīlāta, the older contemporary of Vasubandhu. Other modern scholarly studies have pointed out that the Sautrāntika views in the *Kośa* correspond more closely to early Yogācāra doctrine as seen in the *Yogācārabhūmi* than to any other preceding Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika lineage. Therefore, a number of scholars suspect that Vasubandhu already was a Yogācāra when he composed the *Kośa*, and that his appellation “Sautrāntika” was only a disguise for his actual affiliation.<sup>11</sup>

The aim of this paper is to reconsider this issue by examining the thought of another Sautrāntika master contemporary with Vasubandhu, Bhadanta Rāma. His opinions are fragmentarily referred to in the *\*Nyāyanusāra*, and Saṅghabhadra says that he is a disciple of Śrīlāta.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, as is mentioned below, some of his arguments are adopted in the *Kośa*. Hence, Bhadanta Rāma can be placed chronologically between Śrīlāta and Vasubandhu, and therefore an analysis of his arguments may

*Kośa*, following the opinion of this “sthavira Vasubandhu,” refers to a similar but more complicated view which is ascribed to Śrīlāta by Yaśomitra (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 289.23), Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: To 47b6), and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 344b6).

The opinion of “some” (*anye*) is mentioned in Chapter Four of the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 193.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 7; Pruden 1988-1990 v. 2: 554). According to the Sanskrit text of Yaśomitra’s commentary (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 347.9), they are “sthavira Vasubandhu and others,” but the Tibetan translation (Peking 5593: Chu 4a) renders it as sthavira Vasumitra (*gnas brtan Dbyig bśes*). Further, Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho 124a7) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ņu 6a7) refer to him as bhadanta Śrīlāta (*slob dpon Dpal len*). The *\*Nyāyanusāra* (T. 1562: 534a18) only says “some.” The Chinese commentators P’u-kuang (T. 1821: 202c11) and Fa-pao (T. 1822: 628c4-5) ascribe this opinion to “Sthavira.” See Mejer (1991: 46).

Thus, in the first two cases, the commentaries agree on the fact that Bhadanta is also called Sthavira (Dharmatrāta) and he is a Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika. The last two cases suggest that the positions of sthavira Vasubandhu (or sthavira Vasumitra) and Śrīlāta (who is called Sthavira in the *\*Nyāyanusāra*) are so close that they caused misidentification by later commentators (I do not accept Frauwallner’s hypothesis that this sthavira Vasubandhu was the “old Vasubandhu” who composed the commentaries on the works of Aśaṅga). From this evidence, I suppose that there was a subset or small group of Dārṣṭāntikas or Sautrāntikas who are distinguished by the appellation “sthavira” and that the *\*Nyāyanusāra* used the appellation to refer to Śrīlāta because he was the most renowned master in this group.

<sup>11</sup> See Kritzer (1999: 20, 202); Harada (1996: 148-160). The current state of the subject is surveyed by Robert Kritzer in his article in this issue. See also note 51.

<sup>12</sup> A Chinese source calls him “the third master of Sautrāntika.” See note 19.

provide some new information on the problem of doctrinal discontinuity between the preceding Dārṣāntika-Sautrāntika lineage and the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu.

## II. Fragments Concerning Rāma

Fragments of Rāma's arguments appear eight times in the \**Nyāyānu-sāra*. Seven of these are found in the third chapter or the \**Pratītya-samutpādanirdeśa*, corresponding to the *Lokanirdeśa* of the *Kośa*, while the last one is in the beginning of the next chapter, the *Karmanirdeśa*. Furthermore, there are two cases in which the opinions of "others" (*apare*) in the *Kośa* are ascribed to "Rāma" by later commentators. However, in these cases Saṅghabhadra says little and does not mention who those "others" are.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, they are not taken into consideration here, except

<sup>13</sup> There are two cases in which the opinion of "others" (*apare*) in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is ascribed to Rāma by the commentaries. One is found in Chapter Four (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 292.19-293.4; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 45; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 801-802). Here, Sarvāstivādins present their classification of four types of answers to questions: categorical answer (*ekāṃśavyākaraṇa*), answer by distinguishing (*vibhajyavyākaraṇa*), answer by question (*pariprechāvvyākaraṇa*), and no answer (*sthāpanīya*). Against this, "others" claim that such a division is meaningless, since "no answer" cannot be understood as a type of answer, while the remaining three can be integrated into the first type, "categorical answer." While Saṅghabhadra does not treat this opinion or mention who those others are, Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho. 267b5), Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5594: Ņu. 137b5, 138a1), and Yaśomitra (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 465.24,31) ascribe this view to Rāma. In the following argument, Ābhidhārmikas say that a question such as "Teach me dharmas" should be classified according to the interrogator's intention. If the question is asked with a sincere mind, then it should be answered by determining, "There are a lot of dharmas." However if the question is ill-intentioned, then one should respond with the question, "Which dharmas shall I teach you?" Then the opponent raises an objection that such dialogues cannot be considered as a kind of question and answer (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 293.14-15; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 46-47; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 803). This opponent is also identified as Rāma by Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho. 268a3), Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5594: Ņu, 138b2), and Yaśomitra (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 466.15). At the end of the argument, Vasubandhu supports the Vaibhāṣika position.

The other case is found in Chapter Six (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 375.17-18; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 4: 260-261; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 3: 1006-1007). The topic is the meaning of the term "temporary and cherished deliverance" (*sāmayikī kāntā ceto-vimukuti*). The Vaibhāṣikas interpret the term literally, for they think this term is evidence for their doctrine that even *arhats* have the possibility of retrogression: the deliverance attained by *arhats* is not always permanent, but sometimes temporary. However, Sautrāntika Vasubandhu



to note the fact that later commentators also accept that there was an *abhidharma* master called Rāma before Vasubandhu who opposed Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy. Below, all the fragments of Rāma in the \**Nyāyānusāra* will be examined according to their order of appearance in the text.

### Argument 1. Reflected Images

Against the Sarvāstivādins, who accept the existence of *antarābhava* or the intermediate state between death and rebirth, an opponent makes the objection that there is no *antarābhava* since sentient beings are reborn immediately after death, just as a mirror immediately reflects the image of the object at a distance.<sup>14</sup> Vasubandhu criticizes this saying that the

offers another interpretation, for he does not accept the retrogression of *arhats*: “it is described as temporary [deliverance] on the basis of the fact that the fundamental state of meditation (*maulo dhyānasamādhi*) is realized on an appropriate occasion, and it is also called ‘cherished [deliverance],’ since [one who has experienced this meditative state] desires repeatedly to stay in the true joy [of this meditative state]. Others [state] that [it is called ‘cherished deliverance’] because it is luscious.” Yaśomitra ascribes to Rāma the opinion, that it is called cherished because it is luscious (*āsvādanīyavād ity apara iti bhadanta Rāmah* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 589.17]). However, Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho. 413b6) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5594: Ū, 249a3-4) do not mention who these *apare* are. The \**Nyāyānusāra* (T. 1562, 714a14-c10) completely ignores this interpretation.

<sup>14</sup> The Dārṣṭāntikas in the \**Vibhāṣā* negate the existence of reflected images (T. 1545: 390c4-6). See Cox (1988: 53). However, their argument is not related to the issue of an intermediate state. Harivarman’s \**Tattvasiddhi* argues against the existence of the intermediate state but without using the simile of the reflected images (T. 1646: 256c21-257a14). On the other hand, the \**Vibhāṣā* refers to the opinion of the Vibhajyavādins that rebirth comes immediately after death so there is no intermediate state, just as light immediately destroys shadow, and shadow immediately destroys light (T. 1545: 356c24-25). I am not certain about the identity of the Vibhajyavādins, the opponents of the Vaibhāṣikas whose frequency of appearance in the \**Vibhāṣā* is secondary to that of the Dārṣṭāntikas. See Bareau (1955: 169). However, a similar view is found in the \**Śāriputrābhidharma* (T. 1548: 608a19), a text probably belonging to the Dharmaguptakas, a branch of the Mahīśāsakas (Bareau 1955: 193). The \**Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* also refers to a similar opinion: From death rebirth arises, just as the moon’s image is reflected in the distant water, while the moon itself does not move into the water. Hence, an intermediate state is not necessary for the rebirth of sentient beings (T. 1552: 963a14-20)\*.

\*The Sanskrit title of T. 1552 (*Tsa a p’i t’an s’hin hsin lun*) is usually reconstructed as *Samyukta-* (or *Kṣudraka-*) *abhidharmahṛdaya* (-śāstra). However, Harada (1993: 107) considers the original title to have been \**Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* for two reasons: (1) the Uighur version of Sthiramati’s *Tattvarthā*, a commentary on the *Kośa*, mentions this text as *Miśrakahṛdayaśāstra*; (2) *Kośa* II.73d (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 109.21-23) refers to a verse of “others” (*anye*) that exactly corresponds to T. 1552 (945a1-2), and Yaśomitra explains that “others” refers to the “author of the *Miśraka*” (*Miśrakakāra* [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*:

simile of the reflection is inappropriate here, for the reflected image is, unlike the next life, nonexistent. Then the *Kośa* presents some examples which disprove the reality of reflected images.<sup>15</sup>

Saṅghabhadra agrees with Vasubandhu that there is an *antarābhava*, but unlike Vasubandhu, he insists on the existence of the reflected images. It is a basic Sarvāstivāda doctrine that only existent objects can give rise to perceptions, and hence the reflected images on the mirror or on the water must be existent elements, produced from the original objects. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra enters into a long discussion about whether the reflected images exist as entities or not.

Here, while refuting Vasubandhu, the *\*Nyāyānusāra* also refers to the opinion of Bhadanta Rāma, which bears some similarity to the argument of the *Kośa*. Rāma presents five examples that prove the nonexistence of reflected images.

**a) Example of the moon in the water.** If the cause of one's visual perception of the moon were an image of the moon that exists in a limited area of the water, it should be fixed there, while if it were spread over the entire surface of the water, it should be seen everywhere in the water at the same time. However, the moon, in fact, appears in a limited area of the water, and it is not fixed, since when the viewer changes his position, the moon also moves (T. 1562: 470c9-14).

251.15]). Yaśomitra also mentions "Vasubandhu's own interpretation of the *Miśraśloka*" (*ācāryenaiva miśraśrokavyākhyāna* [ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 250.26-27]). The corresponding verse is found in the *Tsa* (*kṣudraka* or *miśraka*) chapter of T. 1552, so that one may assume that here the word *miśraka* designates the name of the chapter, not the title of the text. However, Harada claims that in such cases it is rare for the commentator to refer to the name of the chapter directly, without introducing the name of the whole text. Therefore, its original title is to be reconstructed as *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya*. In my opinion, of these two reasons, the first is less convincing, since the Uighur version of the *Tattvarthā* is a re-translation of the Chinese translation, and, a partial comparison with the extant Chinese fragment of the *Tattvarthā* (T. 1561) suggests that the Sanskrit nouns inserted in the Uighur version were added by the Uighur translator(s), and this reconstructed Sanskrit is sometimes questionable, for example, when the *Abhidharmakośa* is referred to as "*Kośavṛttiśāstra*" in the Uighur version. However, the second reason, the evidence of Yaśomitra, is strongly convincing. Therefore, I agree with Harada that the Sanskrit title of *Tsa a p'i t'an s'hin hsin lun* (T. 1552) is *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya*. For a description of the Uighur version of the *Tattvarthā*, see Mejer (1991: 93).

<sup>15</sup> For a detailed examination of the argument about the intermediate state and reflected images in the *Kośa*, see Kritzer (2000).

**b) Example of light and shadow.** When there are two mirrors hanging opposite each other, one in a dark place and the other in a light place, the mirror in the light shows the dark spot while the mirror in the shadow reflects the light. However, real light and shadow cannot occupy the same space (T. 1562: 470c14-17).

**c) Example of a variety of colors.** The image of Devadatta (i.e., any person) on the water changes its colors according to the standpoint of the viewer: from one angle, it appears blue, and from another yellow, red, or white. If there were a real image of Devadatta in a variety of colors, the image should appear to a single viewer as a mixture of miscellaneous colors (T. 1562: 470c17-21).

**d) Example of vision in perspective.** Seeing Devadatta in the mirror, one can recognize whether he is approaching or departing. If this perception arose from the real material existing on the surface of the mirror, the viewer would not be able to comprehend such differences (T. 1562: 470c21-23).

**e) Example of depth perception.** If the reflected image of the moon has the water as its material basis, then the viewer could not have depth perception: the moon would appear on the surface of the water. However, indeed, one who sees the moon in the water perceives it as if it were in the depth of the water, not on the surface of the water (T. 1562: 470c23-26).

After reciting these five examples, Rāma concludes his discussion as follows:

[Question:] If it is true [that no reflected image really exists,] then what does one see there [in the mirror or the water]? [Answer: In those cases,] the arising of visual perceptions are supported by “the form in itself” (*bimba*). Therefore, it is the same as the case of [ordinary] visual perception arising from the eyes and the material forms. Thus, with the eyes and the mirror (or the water), etc., as conditions, the visual perception [of the reflected image] is produced from the form in the mirror, etc. Indeed, it is said that one sees an image different [from the original object], when one sees the form in itself (T. 1562: 470c26-29).

As Saṅghabhadra says, Rāma’s argument has some similarity to the *Kośa*. For example, the *Kośa* states that: a) while the real light and shadow

cannot coexist in the same place, the mirror in the shadowy place can reflect the light of the sun;<sup>16</sup> b) the moon in the mirror appears with depth perception as if it were in the depth of the mirror, not on the surface.<sup>17</sup> These statements exactly correspond to Rāma's examples a) and e), respectively. Moreover, Vasubandhu also gives an explanation similar to Rāma's, that the reflected image is nothing else but an assemblage (*sāmāgrī*) of the mirror and the object that produces the visual perception of an image resembling the original object.

However, in his conclusion, Vasubandhu makes a vague statement: "Indeed inconceivable is the variety of the forces of the *dharmas*."<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, Rāma states clearly that it is "the form in itself" (*bimba*) of the original material form that makes possible one's visual perception of the reflected image. And for the same reason, he claims that there is no difference between the perception of the reflected image and of the original object. As Yin shun (1980: 573) has already pointed out, this view of Rāma's seems strikingly similar to a passage in a Mahāyāna scripture, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*:

For example when, supported by the [original] form, the form in itself [appears] in a polished mirror, one who sees it may think, "I am looking at a mere reflected image." In this case the [original] form and its reflected image appear in one's sight as if they were different from each other.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *chāyatapayoś ca davayoḥ sahaikatrabhāvo na dṛṣṭaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 120.26; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 35; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 384)

<sup>17</sup> *anyatraiva hi deśe ādarṣatalaṃ bhavety anyatraivāntargataṃ candrapratibimbakaṃ dṛṣyate* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 121.3; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 35; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 384)

<sup>18</sup> *acintyo hi dharmāṇāṃ śaktibhedaḥ* / (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 121.5; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 35; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 385). Kritzer (2002) has examined Vasubandhu's using of the term "unthinkable" (*acintya*) in the *Kośa* and concludes that it implies his acceptance of Yogācāra views on the topic.

<sup>19</sup> *dper na gzugs la brten nas me loṅ gi dkyil 'khor śin tu yoṅs su dag pa la gzugs ṅid mthoṅ yaṅ / gzugs brāṅ mthoṅ ṅo sñam du sems te / de la ni gzugs de daṅ gzugs brāṅ snaṅ ba de don tha dad par snaṅ ṅo //* (Lamotte 1935: 91). See also Hsüan-tsang's translation (T. 676: 698b6-9). The *Chieh-shen mi ching su*, a Chinese commentary on Hsüan-tsang's version of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* by Yuan-t'se, quotes the arguments about reflected images from the *Kośa* and the \**Nyāyānusāra* as relevant remarks on this sūtra passage. Here, Yuan-t'se refers to Rāma as "the third master of Sautrāntika," later than Kumāralāta and Śrīlāta (Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 34.1: 426).

Here the *Sūtra* states that it is the form in itself (*gzugs ñid = bimbam eva*)<sup>20</sup> of the original form that is reflected in the mirror, and though it does not really exist, it supports the arising of visual perception. This view implies that there is no distinction between the visual perception of existent objects and of nonexistent objects (e.g., the reflected image), and hence, that all objects of perception, like reflected images, are nonexistent. Indeed, Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* quotes this passage of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* as scriptural evidence for the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only (*viññaptimātratā*).<sup>21</sup>

However Rāma does not propose the mind-only doctrine here. Instead, he only follows the Dārṣṭāntika view, which accepts the existence of the objects of perception in general but makes an exception for certain objects, such as reflected images. And, as Saṅghabhadra suggests in the following portion of the *\*Nyāyānusāra*, Rāma is not successful in explaining how the mirror or the water can act as a special condition that produces visual perception without any existing object. From this point of view, it is interesting that Vasubandhu in the *Kośa*, though sharing a very similar view with Rāma, finally makes the ambiguous statement, "inconceivable is the variety of the forces of the *dharmas*." In my opinion, Vasubandhu here carefully avoids committing himself to the Yogācāra since he anticipates that it may conflict with the status of the *Kośa* as an *abhidharma* treatise. Rāma, on the other hand, does not seem aware of the consequences of approaching Yogācāra too closely.

## Argument 2. Four Characteristics

Analyzing the meaning of the word "*pratītyasamutpāda*," Vasubandhu explains the term "arising" (*samutpāda*) as meaning, "the forthcoming (*utpādābhimukho*) future dharma attains the conditions (*pratyayaṃ prāpya*) and then comes to exist (*samudbhāva*)."<sup>22</sup> Saṅghabhadra criticizes this

<sup>20</sup> While Lamotte renders this "*gzugs*" as "*rūpa*," Itō Shūken has proved that it should be restored as "*bimba*" (Itō 1972). See also the use in the *Kośa* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 120.17-18; 121.9-10,12), of the terms "*bimba*" and "*pratibimba*," which are translated as "*gzugs*" and "*gzugs brñan*" in Tibetan (Peking. 5591: 135a1; 135b2,4).

<sup>21</sup> *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §II.7 (Nagao 1982: 61-63).

<sup>22</sup> *pratyayaṃ prāpya samudbhavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ* / (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 138.3-4; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 78; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 413); *kiṃ avasthaś cotpadyate / utpādābhimukho 'nāgatgaḥ* / (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 138.12; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 79; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 414).

(T. 1562: 481b24-c4): Since Vasubandhu does not allow the existence of the future, how can a nonexistent future factor “attain” the conditions? Then Saṅghabhadra also refers to Rāma’s interpretation of the word “arising.”

Rāma presents his opinion: a) The act of speech (*śabda*) is done to denote specific meanings. Spoken words such as “arising” or “passing away” are applied to each phase of the stream of conditioned forces (*saṃskārasaṃtāna*), and the essential [meanings of those words] are derived out of the wide range of meanings. [The word “arising” or “passing away”] cannot be applied to a single moment (*kṣaṇa*), since it is subtle and hence cannot be discerned; b) however, when the definitions [of those words] have been established in terms of the phases of the stream, they can also be applied by analogy to a single moment (T. 1562: 481c11-14).

This interpretation of Rāma’s is similar to a Sautrāntika view presented in the second chapter of the *Kośa* (*Indriyanirdeśa*), where the three or four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtadharma*) are discussed. On the basis of the *sūtra* passage that states the three characteristics of all conditioned factors, arising (*utpāda*), passing away (*vyaya*), and changing in continuance (*sthityanyathātva*), the Sarvāstivādins assume that there are four existing “conditioned characteristics” (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), which act as the cause of “birth” (*jāti*), “continuance” (*sthiti*), “change in continuance” (*sthityanyathātva*), and “extinction” (*anityatā*), of every single conditioned factor at each moment.<sup>23</sup>

However, Vasubandhu argues against this:

For the sake of removing their belief in false [views], the Lord, wishing to indicate that the stream of conditioned forces has the nature of being conditioned and dependently originated, made the following statement: “There are three conditioned characteristics of conditioned [factors].” [Therefore, these characteristics] do not belong to a single moment, since “birth,” and so on, belonging to a single moment, cannot be discerned, and that which is not discerned does not deserve to be established as a characteristic.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> For a detailed explanation of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the four characteristics, see Cox (1995: 133-158).

<sup>24</sup> *tasya mūthyādhimokṣasya vyāvarttanārthaṃ bhagavāms tasya saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukāma idam āha “triṇīmāni saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni” / na tu kṣaṇasya / na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante / na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhanti / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 76.26-77.3; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 226; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 241). The English translation presented here is based on Cox (1995: 360, note 49).*

Then the *Kośa* gives the Sautrāntika definition of the four characteristics:

In that case, the beginning of the stream [of conditioned factors] is arising, its extinction is passing away, that very stream [of conditioned factors], which is occurring, is continuance, and the distinction between the successive [moments] of this [stream of conditioned factors] is change in continuance. (Translation by Collett Cox)<sup>25</sup>

Thus for Vasubandhu, those four characteristics are provisionally established with respect to the “stream” (*pravāha*), not a single moment. This view clearly resembles Rāma’s opinion a). Śrīlāta, too, seems to have the same opinion, since Saṅghabhadra refers to this interpretation of Vasubandhu’s with the statement, “the *Sūtra* Master (Vasubandhu), conforming to the accepted doctrine of Sthavira’s (Śrīlāta’s) school, makes the following statement” (T. 1562: 407c9; Cox. 1995: 320). Further similar passages are also found in the *\*Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 200a6-7), where the opinion is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, in Harivarman’s *\*Tattvasiddhi* (T. 1646: 289b18-21), and in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (T. 1579: 585c24-28; Kritzer 1999: 234-235).

However, in the following portion, the *Kośa* gives another explanation similar to Rāma’s argument b).

These characteristics of conditioned factors can also be applied to a single moment if one does not imagine them to be discrete real entities. How so? Arising [as applied] to each moment [refers to the fact that it] exists not having existed. Passing away [refers to the fact] that having existed, it no longer exists. Continuance [refers to] the connection of each prior [moment] with subsequent moments. Change in continuance [refers to] the dissimilarity in that [connection]. (Translation by Cox)<sup>26</sup>

Here, Vasubandhu presents his secondary interpretation that the four characteristics can be applied not only to the stream of conditioned forces

<sup>25</sup> See Cox (1995: 362, note 64): *tatra pravāhasyādīr utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ / sa eva pravāho ’nuvarttamānaḥ sthitiḥ / tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 77.5-7; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 228; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 242).*

<sup>26</sup> See Cox (1995: 365, note 85): *pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpi saṃskṛtasyaitāni lakṣaṇāni yujyante vinā ’pi dravyāntarakalpanayā / katham iti / pratikṣaṇam abhūtvā bhāva utpādaḥ / bhūtvā ’bhāvo vyayaḥ / pūrvasya pūrvasyottarakṣaṇānubandhaḥ sthitiḥ / tasyāvisdṛśatvaṃ sthityanyathātvam iti / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 77.18-21; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 229; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 243).*

but also to a single moment. This view is also found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*,<sup>27</sup> which, like Vasubandhu, bases its position on a passage from the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*: “that which not having existed now exists, and after having existed, it no longer exists” (*abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchati*).<sup>28</sup>

Further, an explanation of the three characteristics found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* seems to resemble that of Rāma and Vasubandhu in applying these characteristics first to the moment and then to the stream of forces.<sup>29</sup> Thus, this fact suggests a close relationship between Rāma and Vasubandhu, as well as between these Sautrāntika masters and Yogācāras.

### Argument 3. The Formula of Dependent Origination

This passage provides a clue for determining the chronological order of Śrīlāta Rāma and Vasubandhu. The topic under discussion is the well-known formula of the teaching of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Why does it begin with the two tautological phrases, “When this exists, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises (*imasmin satīdam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate*)”? First, the \**Nyāyānusāra* refers to the opinion of Śrīlāta. According to Saṅghabhadra, those two phrases imply the dependent origination of factors constituting sentient beings (*sattvākhyā*) and of those not constituting sentient beings (*asattvākhyā*), respectively, while the following teaching of the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination, “depending on ignorance, conditioned forces [arise] (*avidyāpratīyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ*),” and so on, is applied only to factors constituting sentient beings (T. 1562: 482a6-8). Then a disciple of Śrīlāta expresses his objection: since the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination denotes only the factors constituting sentient beings, it is improper to think that the introducing formula can

<sup>27</sup> *Pañcaviṅśāṅakāyasaṃprayuktamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. (T. 1579, 586a19; Peking 5539: Zi 22b7).

<sup>28</sup> For the text and translation of the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra* (T. 99: 92c; T. 125: 713c-714b; T. 655: 806c-807a), see Lamotte (1973). For an examination of Vasubandhu’s interpretation of this sūtra, see Miyashita (1986).

<sup>29</sup> *Sūtravastu* of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*. (T. 1579, 795c20-29). I am grateful to Wasō Harada for this reference.



be applied to both kinds of factors. On this topic, Saṅghabhadra supports Śrīlāta, warning that a disciple should not lightly criticize his teacher (T. 1562: 482a8-b5). Next, Rāma's opinion is cited:

Bhadanta Rāma, who is not content to accept the explanation of his own teacher, also offers another interpretation of his own: a) if it is permissible for the twelve members to be classified into three lifetimes, then [this opening formula] would be the summary of the teaching of dependent origination over the course of three lifetimes: "When this (i.e., the former life) exists, that (the present life) exists, and, from the arising of this (present life), that (future life) arises"; b) if it is not permissible, then these two phrases should indicate immediate and mediate causation, respectively (T. 1562: 482b5-8).

From the context, it is evident that Saṅghabhadra thinks of Rāma as one of the disciples of Śrīlāta who are not completely obedient to their master. Here, Rāma presents two different explanations. The first is based on the Sarvāstivāda orthodox view of twelve-membered dependent origination, which is known as "three lifetimes with twofold causation": the past life as the cause produces the resultant aspect of the present life, and the causal aspect of the present life produces the future life as the result. The second, Rāma says, is offered for those who do not accept this theory. This suggests the possibility that Rāma himself tends to accept another way of dividing the members of dependent origination according to lifetimes, the two lifetimes and singlefold causation system developed by the Yogācāra tradition.<sup>30</sup>

Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa*, on the other hand, simply presents his own views without mentioning these arguments between Śrīlāta and his disciples. However, his interpretation implicitly includes Rāma's view:

Then, for what reason has the Lord taught [the discourse of dependent origination] with two phrases: "When this exists that exists, from the arising of this that arises"? A) For the purpose of defining [the specific cause], since it is said in other [scriptures] "When ignorance (*avidyā*) exists, conditioned forces (*saṃskāras*) exist, and conditioned forces never [arise] from elsewhere other than ignorance." [Thus the former phrase indicates the specific

<sup>30</sup> For the Yogācāra theory of two lifetimes and singlefold causation, see Kritzer (1999: 69-71). Kritzer points out that Vasubandhu's interpretation of dependent origination in the *Kośa* is much closer to the two-lifetimes singlefold causation theory of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* than to the Sarvāstivāda three-lifetimes twofold theory.

cause, and the latter phrase postulates that there is no other cause]. B) Otherwise, in order to indicate the succession of the members: “When this (ignorance) exists, those (conditioned forces) exists, and from the arising of these (conditioned forces) that (consciousness) arises.” C) Or [in order to indicate] the succession of the lifetimes: “When the former life exists, the present life exists; from the arising of the present life, the next life arises.” D) Or in order to indicate the difference between immediate and mediate causation. In some cases the conditioned forces arise immediately after ignorance, but in other cases, not immediately.<sup>31</sup>

Among these four explanations, the latter two are almost identical to Rāma’s. The commentaries interpret the last explanation as follows: When ignorance produces defiled conditioned forces directly, it is called “immediate” causation. On the other hand, ignorance can also produce undefiled conditioned forces, but not successively, since their natures are different from each other.<sup>32</sup> Alternatively, ignorance produces consciousness through conditioned forces. In those cases, it is called “mediate” causation.<sup>33</sup>

Rāma’s chronological position can be determined on the basis of this data. First, as mentioned above, it is clear that Rāma is a disciple of Śrīlāta. Next, the similarity between Rāma’s passage and the *Kośa* suggests three possible explanations: a) Vasubandhu has followed Rāma’s opinion and expanded upon it; b) Rāma has quoted a part of Vasubandhu’s interpretation to criticize Śrīlāta; c) there was a common source of interpretation preceding both Vasubandhu and Rāma.

Here the fact should be noted that Saṅghabhadra does not refer to Vasubandhu with respect to this topic. Needless to say, the *\*Nyāyānusāra* was

<sup>31</sup> *kathaṃ arthaṃ punar bhagavatā paryāyadvayam āha “imasmin satīdaṃ bhavati asyotpādād idam utpadyate” iti / avadhāraṇārtham, yathā ’nyatrāha “avidyāyāṃ satyāṃ saṃskārā bhavanti nānyatrāvidyāḥ saṃskārā” iti / aṅgaparaṃparaṃ vā darśayitum, asmin aṅge satīdaṃ bhavati asya punar aṅgasyotpādād idam utpadyate iti / janmaparaṃparaṃ vā, pūrvānte sati madhyānto bhavati madhyāntasyotpādād aparānta utpadyate iti / sāksāt pāraṃparyena pratyayabhāvaṃ darśayanti / kadācid dhi samanantaram avidyāyāḥ saṃskārā bhavanti kadācit pāraṃparyeṇeti / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 138.24-139.6; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 81-82; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 415-416)*

<sup>32</sup> *tatra sāksād yadāvidyāyāḥ samanantaram kliṣṭāḥ saṃskārā utpadyante / pāraṃparyeṇa tu yadā kuśalā utpadyante / kuśalāvasthāyāṃ avidyāyā abhāvāt / (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 297. 21-23).*

<sup>33</sup> *avidyā saṃskārānāṃ sāksāt pratyayo vijñānādīnāṃ pāraṃparyeṇa / (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 297. 23-24).*

intended to be a polemical book directed mainly against Vasubandhu's *Kośa*. Therefore, if the above-mentioned view indeed originated with Vasubandhu, and Rāma was only a follower, Saṅghabhadra ought to quote it as an opinion of Vasubandhu. In fact, however, he does not ascribe the opinion to Vasubandhu, but he refers to Rāma, saying that it is "his own interpretation." This suggests that the view was stated originally by Rāma and followed by Vasubandhu.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the probable order of the three masters is Śrīlāta – Rāma – Vasubandhu. However, since it is suggested by Saṅghabhadra that Śrīlāta was still living at the time when the \**Nyāyānusāra* was written,<sup>35</sup> they belong to the same general period.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> P'u-kuang states that this passage can be ascribed to Rāma since it is based on Rāma's view with some enlargement by Vasubandhu (T. 1821: 171b29-c10). On the other hand, Yaśomitra says that they are all ācārya's (i.e., Vasubandhu's) thought (*etat sarvam ācāryamatam* [ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 297.26]). However neither commentary seems to contradict the fact that Vasubandhu accepted Rāma's interpretation and improved it. Sthiramati (Peking. 5875: Tho 59b1-60a1) and Pūrṇavardhana (Peking. 5597: Ju 352b5-353a6) do not mention whose opinion this is.

<sup>35</sup> The \**Nyāyānusāra* sometimes says things like "Sthavira (Śrīlāta) makes a confused statement because of his senility" (T. 1562: 445b6-7), or "The time has passed, and he (Śrīlāta) has become a decrepit man who can hardly maintain rational thought" (T. 1562: 450b16-17). These expressions suggest that at the time when Saṅghabhadra wrote the \**Nyāyānusāra*, Śrīlāta was still living but had grown old. See Katō (1989: 56-57).

<sup>36</sup> After having discussed Rāma's interpretation presented here, the \**Nyāyānusāra* refers to some other opinions by "some followers of Sthavira" and Sthavira himself, which have already been criticized in the *Kośa*. Then Saṅghabhadra says, "Thus, when Sthavira says something, it is not accepted even by his disciples and his fellow believer, much less by persons who are obedient to the holy teachings and conform to the correct principle. How strange it is that such a person is held in honor in the eastern area!" (T. 1562: 482c12-14). From the context it seems that the phrase "his disciples" implies Rāma and others who are referred to in the \**Nyāyānusāra*, while "fellow believer" designates Vasubandhu. Thus, Saṅghabhadra thinks of Vasubandhu as Śrīlāta's "fellow believer," not as his disciple. Further, in the following portion, the *Kośa* refers to an interpretation of the "teachers" (*ācāryāḥ*). Saṅghabhadra objects, "Next, the *Sūtra* master (Vasubandhu) presents his own teacher's interpretation of these two phrases [of dependent origination] to indicate his allegiance and does not reveal its fault. The relationship between the teacher and pupil ought to be like this, [not like that between Śrīlāta and his disciples]. However, I have no loyalty to his teacher" (T. 1562: 483a8-9). Then Saṅghabhadra refutes the interpretation of Vasubandhu's "teacher." This is another piece of evidence that Saṅghabhadra does not think of Vasubandhu as a disciple of Śrīlāta. Therefore, Katō's identification of Śrīlāta as Vasubandhu's "teacher" based on this passage cannot be accepted. See Katō (1989: 58) and my objection, which is discussed by Cox (1995: 51 note 114). Katō has accepted my opinion and revised his hypothesis in a recent paper written in Japanese, in which he writes

#### Argument 4. Meditative State of Cessation

According to the Sarvāstivāda interpretation of the twelve-membered dependent origination in terms of rebirth, the formula “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises] (*viññānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*)” designates the moment when the present life of a sentient being arises from the former life, namely the moment when the primordial consciousness (*viññāna* or *pratisaṃdhiviññāna*) of the present life is implanted in the embryonic body (*nāmarūpa*). Then the formation of sense organs begins, and when those organs are completed, it is said, “depending on name-and-form, the six sense bases [arise] (*nāmarūpapratyayaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ*).”

However, since it is stated that consciousness and body are obtained in the state of *nāmarūpa*, the mental (*manas*) and tactile (*kāya*) faculties should have already been established there. Then why do the scriptures not say, “depending on *nāmarūpa*, which has two sense bases, the remaining four sense bases arise”? Concerning this question Saṅghabhadra refers to the opinion of Rāma:

Here Bhadanta Rāma presents his own interpretation: [The mental and the tactile faculties] are established [as sense bases], when they have passed over [the state of] name-and-form. Indeed, mind (*manas*) exists permanently [from the beginning of one’s life], but it is not equivalent to the mental base (*mano-āyatana*), [since] it (mind) necessarily has to contact the [external sense] base (i.e., the object) to be called a “[mental] base.” [For example,] in the meditative state of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), one’s mental base does not vanish. Therefore, it is allowed that mental perceptual consciousness (*mano-viññāna*) will be produced once again [after one exits the meditative state of cessation]. However, it (i.e., mind in the state of cessation) cannot contact [external objects] due to the absence of other conditions [that make the activity of mental perceptual consciousness possible]. For the same reason, the two faculties (*indriya*) of body and mind in the state of “consciousness” and “name-and-form” cannot be accepted as [sense] bases. Hence

that “Vasubandhu was not a direct disciple of Śrīlāta but was familiar with him both doctrinally and personally” (Katō 1997: 59). Therefore, the statement in Willemen, Dessein, and Cox (1998: 107) that refers to Katō’s identification of Śrīlāta as Vasubandhu’s teacher should be corrected. According to Yaśomitra, these “teachers” of Vasubandhu are “the old teachers” (*pūrvācāryāḥ*). And, as in the case of other references to the old teachers in the *Kośa* (Hakamaya 1986; Mejer 1991: 46-48), a parallel passage to this interpretation of Vasubandhu’s teacher is found in the *Savitar-kādibhūmi* of the basic section (*Maulībhūmi*) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 221.16-17). Thus, this seems to be further evidence suggesting a relationship between the *Kośa* and the *Yogācāra*. See Harada (1996: 142-145).

it is said [by the scriptures] that name-and-form precedes the six sense bases, and that depending on name-and-form, the six sense bases arise (T. 1562, 485c21-486a1).

Thus Rāma explains that the mind (i.e., consciousness) and the body of an embryo cannot be regarded as sense bases, not because they do not exist but because they do not contact external objects. He also says that it is the same as in the case of the meditative state of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), in which one does not perceive external objects but does not lose consciousness itself.

Rāma's interpretation of *nirodhasamāpatti* clearly corresponds to the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the \**Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 775a22-24) or Śrīlāta in the \**Nyāyānusāra* (T. 1562: 420b17-20). Against the Sarvāstivādins, who assert that consciousness must be extinguished in the state of cessation since there is no activity of mind, they claim that in this state one only extinguishes concomitant factors of consciousness (*caitta*, *caitasika*), such as conception (*saṃjñā*), feelings (*vedanā*), and so on, but not consciousness itself.<sup>37</sup>

The *Kośa* also attributes the same view to Vasumitra, the author of the treatise entitled *Paripṛcchā*.<sup>38</sup> However, it seems that Vasubandhu does

<sup>37</sup> This interpretation of the Dārṣṭāntikas is based on the fact that, in the scriptures, the meditative state of cessation is usually called "the cessation of conception and feelings" (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*). Therefore, the Dārṣṭāntikas assert that in this state one only extinguishes conception (*saṃjñā*) and feelings (*vedanā*) but not consciousness itself. It implies that, at least, conception and feelings must exist as entities distinct from consciousness itself. This corresponds to the view which is ascribed to Sautrāntikas in the later tradition: According to the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, a compendium of the doctrine of the fundamental Buddhist schools written in the fourteenth century, the Sautrāntikas in general state that the concomitant faculties of consciousness (*caitta*, *caitasika*), with the exception of conception and feelings, are nothing else than the various appearances of consciousness itself. See Mimaki (1979: 198; 1980: 151). The \**Nyāyānusāra* also refers to this Dārṣṭāntika opinion. See Cox (1995: 267). For a detailed discussion of the issue of *nirodhasamāpatti*, see Hakamaya (1975); Griffiths (1986: 122-128); Schmithausen (1987: 19-20); Cox (1995: 113-124).

<sup>38</sup> *bhadantaVasumitras tv āha Paripṛcchāyām yasyācittikā nirodhasamāpattis tasyaiṣa doṣo mama tu sacittikā samāpattir iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 72.21-22; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 212; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 231). Yaśomitra identifies this "Vasumitra" as the author of the *Pañcavastuka* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 167.22). However, both Chinese translations of the *Pañcavastuka* (the first chapter of the *Prakarāṇa*) clearly state that the consciousness and concomitant factors are extinguished in *nirodhasamāpatti*, as well as in *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* (T. 1541: 628c13-17; T. 1542: 694a19-21). Furthermore, this

not simply accept this theory, since he offers another explanation, that of the “old teachers” (*pūrvācārya*), which is known as the mutual seed theory: the body possessed of sense organs and consciousness contain each other’s seeds,<sup>39</sup> and therefore, consciousness can arise once again, after one exits the meditative state, from its seeds latent within the corporal basis. From this point of view, Rāma’s position here seems to be closer to that of the Dārṣṭāntikas who preceded him than to that of Vasubandhu.<sup>40</sup>

### Argument 5. Definition of Ignorance

According to Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy, the nature of ignorance, the first member of the formula of dependent origination, is identified with delusion (*moha*). Against this, Śrīlāta in the \**Nyāyānusāra* presents three different definitions: a) Ignorance is the name for the causes by which the arising of insight (*vidyā*) is interrupted (T. 1562: 499a24-25); b) it is the name for the ensemble of consciousness and concomitant factors which prevent the arising of insight (T. 1562: 499c27-28); c) the opposite of insight is called ignorance (T. 1562: 500a8-9). The last definition

passage is referred to in the \**Vibhāṣā* as the opinion of Vasumitra (T. 1545: 774a22-24; see also Cox 1995: 285 note 70). Therefore, Yaśomitra’s identification of these two Vasumitras seems incorrect. For a treatment of the various Vasumitras, see La Vallée Poussin (1980, v. 1: xliii-xlv; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 29-31).

<sup>39</sup> *anyonyabījakam hy etad ubhayaṃ yaduta cittaṃ ca sendriyaś ca kāya* / (*Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*: 72.20; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 1: 212; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 1: 231). It is known that this theory of seeds is also found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See Schmithausen (1987: 21). The explanation of the *pūrvācāryas* in the *Kośa*, which is attributed to the Sautrāntikas by the commentaries, seems more primitive than the version in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, Nobuyoshi Yamabe has analyzed the *Yogācārabhūmi* passage and concluded that this theory was probably formed within the Yogācāra tradition as a compilation of their earlier conceptions of seeds, and that it is very unlikely that the Yogācāras introduced this theory from some other tradition, such as Sautrāntika. Therefore, Yamabe suggests, this theory is considered to be derived from the *Yogācārabhūmi* and quoted in an abridged form in the *Kośa*. See Yamabe (2000 a).

<sup>40</sup> However, it is notable that here Rāma says, “Therefore it is allowed that consciousness will be produced once again.” This suggests that Rāma relates this argument to the issue of re-arising of the consciousness after the meditative state of cessation. On the other hand, the Dārṣṭāntikas in the \**Vibhāṣā* seemingly have no interest in explaining the process of how consciousness can arise again after the meditative state of cessation: the Dārṣṭāntika’s aim in asserting the existence of consciousness in the state of cessation appears simply to be to distinguish this meditative state from the state of death. From this viewpoint, Rāma’s position is considered to be closer to Vasubandhu and the Yogācāras than to the earlier Dārṣṭāntikas.

has two meanings: since the scripture states, “false view activates delusion (*moha*),” one can see that it is false view or false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) that opposes insight. On the other hand, delusion or darkness (*andhakāra* or *tamas*), which is activated by false view, can also be considered as the opposite of insight (T. 1562: 500a8-12).<sup>41</sup> The \**Nyāyānusāra* replies that false view indeed increases the force of ignorance; however, it is therefore not identical to ignorance itself, but it coexists with ignorance. Next, Saṅghabhadra refers to the opinion of Rāma:

Bhadanta Rāma says: The nature of false view is not ignorance. It is a fact that greed (*abhidhyā*), malice (*vyāpāda*), and false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) have different kinds of desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*) as their own roots individually and are increased by them, respectively (T. 1562: 500b10-11).

While the meaning of the argument is not clear, it is another piece of evidence that Rāma does not always agree with his teacher Śrīlāta. The argument seems to be related to the Sarvāstivādin view found in the *Kośa*, that the three kinds of unvirtuous mental action (*manaskarman*) — greed (*abhidhyā*), malice (*vyāpāda*), and false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) — have desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*) as their own roots, because the former three appear immediately after the latter three respectively.<sup>42</sup> Rāma seems to be saying that false view is thus distinguished from delusion, and delusion is to be identified with ignorance. If this understanding is correct, Rāma’s opinion above is closer to that of the Sarvāstivādins than to that of Śrīlāta, since it is based on the premise that ignorance is synonymous with delusion.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> The *Kośa* also refers to the opinion of Śrīlāta here, but it is not exactly the same as the citation in the \**Nyāyānusāra*. According to the *Kośa*, someone states that “all the defilements are ignorance” (*sarvakleśā avidyā*), and the commentaries attribute this view to Śrīlāta. See *Kośa* III 29d (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 141.24; Poussin 1980, v. 2: 91; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 421); Sthiramati (Peking, 5875: Tho 65a7); Pūrṇavardhana (Peking, 5597: Ju 358a8); Yaśomitra (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 302.2). For a survey of this argument of Śrīlāta’s, see Miyashita (1992:8-9).

<sup>42</sup> See *Kośa* VI 69ab (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 241.18-21; Poussin 1980, v.3: 148; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 646-647). I am grateful to Robert Kritzer for this reference.

<sup>43</sup> However, Saṅghabhadra does not accept this opinion of Rāma for two reasons: (1) It is impossible to say that greed (*abhidhyā*) is a “different kind” of desire (*rāga*), or malice (*vyāpāda*) a “different kind” of hatred (*dveṣa*); (2) Delusion increases not only the force of false view but also the forces of greed and malice as their “root,” and desire and hatred,

### Argument 6. Impressions

In the next portion of his definition of ignorance, Vasubandhu refers to another opinion, that the nature of ignorance (*avidyā*) is defiled insight (*kliṣṭā prajñā*) since it is opposed to knowledge (*vidyā*), which is identified with pure insight (*anāsravā prajñā*). But, says Vasubandhu, this definition conflicts with the *sūtra* passage, “insight is defiled by ignorance and becomes impure”: If the nature of ignorance were defiled insight, it would not exist together with pure insight, for Sarvāstivādins do not allow more than one of the same kind of mental factors (i.e., insight) to coexist within one’s mind at a single moment. Hence it is impossible for insight to be defiled by “defiled insight.” Concerning this issue, the opponents propose two answers: a) Ignorance does not coexist but alternates with insight from moment to moment (*vyavakīryamāṇa*), and this condition is called “defiled”;<sup>44</sup> or b) insight is not directly defiled by ignorance itself but is damaged (*upahata*) by the impression (*vāsanā*) of ignorance, and therefore, there is no contradiction between their definition of ignorance and the *sūtra* passage.<sup>45</sup> After referring to their opinions without making any detailed examination, the *Kośa* simply concludes the argument with the Sarvāstivāda statement that the nature of ignorance is different from insight.<sup>46</sup> Here Vasubandhu seems to have little interest in the topic. Or perhaps he does not want to discuss conceptions like *vāsanā*, which are evocative of Yogācāra doctrine.

too, can be considered as the “roots” of false view (T. 1562: 500b13-16). While I am not sure that I correctly understand Saṅghabhadra’s passage, it seems that Saṅghabhadra aims to criticize the inadequacy of Rāma’s distinction between the three unvirtuous mental actions and the three fundamental defilements in the first response, and to refute Rāma’s usage of the term “root,” which means “to increase the force,” in the second response.

<sup>44</sup> *kliṣṭayā prajñayā kuśalā prajñā vyavakīryamāṇā na viśudhyati / ato 'sau tasyā upakleśa iti / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 141.19-20; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 91; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 421); vyavakīryamāṇā na viśudhyati / antarāntarotpadyamāṇayā kliṣṭayā prajñayā vyavakīryamāṇā kṣaṇāntarotpannā kuśalā prajñā na viśudhyati arthaḥ / (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 301.28-30).*

<sup>45</sup> *yad vāpi rāgopakliṣṭam cittaṃ na vimucyate / kiṃ tad avaśyaṃ rāgaparyavasthitaṃ bhavati / upahataṃ tu tat tathā rāgeṇa bhavati yan na vimucyate / tām punar vāsanā vyāvartayato vimucyate / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 141.20-22; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 91; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 421); kiṃ tad avaśyaṃ rāgaparyavasthitaṃ iti rāgasamprayuktam ity arthaḥ / upahataṃ tu tat tathā rāgeneti / na samudācaratā rāgeṇa / vāsanādhānena tad upahataṃ bhavati / tām vāsanām tad dauṣṭhulyam vyāvartayato yogi-naḥ tac cittaṃ vimucyate / (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 301. 30-33).*

<sup>46</sup> For a review of these arguments, see Miyashita (1992: 7-12).



The \**Nyāyānusāra*, on the other hand is concerned with the conception of impression and continues the argument: Ignorance is defined as unwisdom (*ajñāna*), and it is classified into two types. In a narrow sense, it is defiled (*kliṣṭa*) unwisdom or delusion (*moha*), the existing factor opposed to wisdom (*jñāna*), while in a broad sense, it is undefiled (*akliṣṭa*) unwisdom, which designates the lack of wisdom but is not an existing entity. For example, saints such as *arhats* or *pratyekabuddhas* have already abandoned delusion, so they have no defiled unwisdom. However, compared with that of the Lord Buddha, the wisdom they have attained is still imperfect, and such “insufficiency” or “lack” of wisdom is called undefiled unwisdom, or the impression (*vāsanā*) of ignorance (T. 1562: 501c22-502a3).

Based upon these speculations, Saṅghabhadra gives his own definition: “impression is a general name for the mental factors that arise together with lesser wisdom” (T. 1562: 502a25-26). Thus, Saṅghabhadra accepts the conception of impression as a provisional (*prajñapti*) existent.<sup>47</sup>

Then Saṅghabhadra refers to Rāma’s interpretation of impressions:

Bhadanta Rāma makes this sort of statement: there are undefiled factors called impressions, which are like the matured effects (*vipāka*) produced from unvirtuous causes (*akuśalahetu*). When the Blessed One was a *bodhisattva*, he did various preparatory practices (*prayoga*) for an astronomically long period of time. Although he had afflictions (*kleśa*), he gradually abandoned the undefiled impressions produced from the afflictions and instead gradually increased the impressions of white factors (*śukladharma*). Afterward, when the lasting abandonment of all defilements (*āsrava*) had been accomplished, some of those impressions disappeared, but others remained. [That is to say,] even when the supreme and everlasting abandonment of all

<sup>47</sup> According to Yamabe (1989: 212-213), the original meaning of the term *vāsanā* in the early Yogācāra tradition is limited to “the impression of defilements (*kleśa*)” or “the impression of action (*karman*).” Saṅghabhadra’s explanation here seems to correspond to the former. Compare it with the passage in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: “Activities similar to affliction never occur to the Thus Come One, whenever he moves, looks, talks, or stays. It is said ‘The Thus Come One has abandoned the impressions absolutely.’ On the other hand, in the case of *arhats*, activity similar to affliction occurs when they move, look, talk, or stay, though they have already abandoned the defilements themselves” (*tatra yā tathāgatasya spandīte vā prekṣīte vā kathīte vā vihāre vā kleśasādṛśaceṣṭā śamudācārapracuratā / ayaṃ tathāgatasya vāsanāsamudghatā ity ucyate / arhatāṃ punaḥ prahīnakleśānāṃ api kleśasadbhavasādṛśī ceṣṭā spandītaprekṣītakathita viḥṛṭesu bhavaty eva / [Bodhisattvabhūmi: 404.18-22] ).*

defilements had been achieved as a result of extended practice, the impressions of white factors still remained with the Buddha [while the undefiled impressions had disappeared], since it is said that there are both perishable impressions (i.e., impressions of defilements) and imperishable ones (i.e., impressions of virtuousness). [Saṅghabhadra answers:] Of course, such an explanation may also be possible, but he (Rāma) could never demonstrate their nature as truly existent (T. 1562: 502b13-20).

Thus, Rāma states that there are “impressions of white factors” opposed to undefiled impressions which are matured effects of affliction. As Yin shun (1980: 572) has pointed out, this idea seems similar to the concept of the “seed of the impression produced by hearing [the teaching of the Buddha] that flowed from the realm of purest truth” (*suviśuddhadharmadhātuniṣyandaśrutavāsanābīja*) found in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.<sup>48</sup> At least it is not difficult to find here the influence of Yogācāra doctrine, as in the case of the *bīja* theory of Vasubandhu, the *Kośa* master, or the *\*anudhātu* of Sthavira Śrīlāta. Therefore, the *\*Nyāyānusāra* sometimes refers to the terms *vāsanā*, *bīja*, and *anudhātu* as variations of a single concept:

In the arguments among the various Ābhidhārmikas, the Dārṣāntikas often appeal to their own [theory] of seeds (*bīja*), and thereby, pervert the correct meaning and cause it to become unclear. There are certain masters who give different names to these seeds, each according to his own understanding. Some call them subsidiary elements (*\*anudhātu*), others call them impressions (*vāsanā*); still others call them capability (*sāmarthyā*), non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*), or accumulation (*upacaya*) (T. 1562: 398b25-29; translation by Cox 1995: 197).<sup>49</sup>

Vasubandhu states that the seed (*bīja*) is one’s psycho-physical stream itself, which conveys the potency of past action into the future. Yamabe

<sup>48</sup> *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.45 (Nagao 1982: 44-45). As concerns the *Yogācārabhūmi*, such a purificatory function of seed is found only in an interpolated paragraph in the Nivṛtti portion of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. See Schmithausen (1987: 77-81).

<sup>49</sup> Statements similar to this are repeated in the *\*Nyāyānusāra* several times: “Conceptions like accumulation (*upacaya*), capability (*sāmarthyā*), subsidiary elements (*\*anudhātu*), impressions (*vāsanā*), or seeds (*bīja*) of the force of mind have already been rejected” (T. 1562: 535a23-26); “Subsidiary elements (*\*anudhātu*), capability (*sāmarthyā*), impressions (*vāsanā*), seeds (*bīja*), accumulation (*upacaya*), non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*), and so on, which are asserted by the artful deceivers (i.e., the Dārṣāntikas), have been denied” (T. 1562: 627a19-20). However, among these conceptions, accumulation (*upacaya*) and non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*) can in fact be ascribed to Mahāsamghika and Saṃmitīya respectively. See Lamotte (1936: 230-231); Yin shun (1980: 558).

(1990) has pointed out the possibility that Vasubandhu's theory of seed can be traced back to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Sthavira Śrīlāta offers a conception of subsidiary element (*\*anudhātu* or *\*pūrvānudhātu*) which, as Katō (1989: 250-260) has shown, generally corresponds to Vasubandhu's seed.<sup>50</sup> It is notable that the term *dhātu* has been used as a synonym for *bīja* in the Yogācāra tradition from the earliest stage (Yamabe 1997: 212-213). And Rāma explains that the effect of the past practice is preserved in the form of impression (*vāsanā*). Here, Saṅghabhadra seems not only to reveal their lack of consistency in terminology but also to suggest that they are all in imitation of Yogācāra thought.

However, at the same time it should be noted that, while both Vasubandhu's seed and Śrīlāta's subsidiary element seem to have originated from early Yogācāra theory, Rāma's conception of impression evidently reflects more highly developed Yogācāra thought, such as that seen in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

### Argument 7. Mutual Relationship of Cause and Effect

Among the various teachings of dependent origination, there are some *sūtras*, such as the *Nagarasūtra* and the *Mahānidānaparyāyasūtra*, that, following the formula, “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises]” (*viññānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*), insert the reversed phrase, “depending on name-and-form, consciousness [arises]” (*nāmarūpapatyayaṃ viññānaṃ*). Saṅghabhadra explains that these *sūtras* indicate the fact that the body (i.e., name-and-form) and mind (consciousness) of an embryo should arise together: body depends on mind in the sense that body cannot exist without mind, while mind similarly cannot exist independently from body. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra says, these *sūtras* explain that consciousness and name-and-form have a simultaneous cause and effect relationship with each other (T. 1562: 502a1-10).<sup>51</sup> Next, Saṅghabhadra refers to another interpretation presented by Rāma:

<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the *\*Nyāyānusāra* says that *\*pūrvānudhātu* is just an alternative name for Vasubandhu's conceptions of *bīja* (T. 1562: 440b9-10) or *saṃtatipariñāmaviśeṣa* (T. 1562: 541c26-27).

<sup>51</sup> The *Kośa* does not take up this topic. For the significance of the *Nagarasūtra* in the doctrinal development of early Buddhist conceptions of dependent origination, see Kajiyama (1985). The *Mahānidānaparyāyasūtra* (T. 1, No. 13; T. 14; T. 26, No. 97; DN No. 15) seems to be more important for the Sarvāstivādins, for it contains a passage that evidently

Bhadanta Rāma presents his own opinion: When the new existence (*upa-pattibhava*) arises from the intermediate state (*antarābhava*), depending on the name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) of the intermediate state, the primal consciousness of the new existence (*pratisaṃdhivijñāna*) and other [mental factors] are produced. Then the name-and-form of the intermediate state is destroyed, leaving that consciousness, and from it, the name-and-form of the new existence is produced (T. 1562: 504a10-13).

Thus, according to Rāma, the passage “depending on name-and-form, consciousness [arises],” connotes that the consciousness of the new existence is produced from the body of the intermediate state, while the following and reversed phrase, “depending on consciousness, name-and-form [arises],” connotes that the body of the new existence is born from the first moment of consciousness of the new existence. The reason for the argument is not clear, but comparing this with the following objection raised by Saṅghabhadra, we can infer that here Rāma would like to follow Śrīlāta’s view, which does not allow a simultaneous relationship between cause and effect.<sup>52</sup>

### Argument 8. Nature of Action

In the second verse of Chapter Four of the *Kośa* (IV 2bc), the Vaibhāṣikās state their definition of *vijñapti*, according to which the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) or the ethical subject of manifested bodily action

suggests the so-called “embryogenetic” interpretation of dependent origination. Besides, this sūtra has no reference to ignorance (*avidyā*), conditioned forces (*saṃskārāḥ*), or the six sense bases (*ṣaḍāyatanāni*) in its original version: the formula begins with the interactive cause-effect relationship between consciousness (*vijñāna*) and name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*), and there is no six sense bases (*ṣaḍāyatanāni*) between name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) and contact (*sparṣa*). Therefore, the *Dharmaskandha* (T. 1537; Dietz 1984), one of the earliest works of the Sarvāstivādins, inserts the phrases “depending on name-and-form, consciousness arises” and “depending on name-and-form, contact arises” in its interpretation of the dependent origination. It seems that Saṅghabhadra here treats the problem of interactive causation between consciousness and name and form with reference to the explanation of the *Dharmaskandha*.

<sup>52</sup> Śrīlāta clearly states, “conditioned factors can never be simultaneous causes” (T. 1562: 421b18-22). This refusal to accept the simultaneity of cause and effect (e.g., contact of eyes and visible material form, and the arising of visual perception) results in a successive model of perception. See Cox (1988: 40-41). Though tradition says that this model of successive perception is common to the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika view, Vasubandhu in the *Kośa* does not accept it and supports the Vaibhāṣika view of a simultaneous cause-effect relationship (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 146.18-20; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 2: 107; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 430).

(*kāyaviññapti*) is appearance (*saṁsthāna*) as an existent visible material form (*rūpa*). Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of “others,” identified by the commentaries as Vātsīputrīyas or Saṁmitīyas, according to whom the nature of manifested action is “movement” (*gati*). However, the *Kośa* immediately rejects this view:

Indeed, every conditioned factor, after having attained its existence, no longer exists. It vanishes at the place where it arises, and hence it cannot transmigrate to another place. Therefore, bodily action is not movement.<sup>53</sup>

The conditioned factor arises at one moment and passes away into non-existence at the next, without enduring for even one moment. And when a series of factors arises moment by moment, gradually shifting its locus, the phenomenon is called “movement.” Thus, there is, in fact, no movement. This view bears some similarity to argument of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (T. 1579: 598a18-19, 600a10-13).

On the other hand, the *\*Nyāyānusāra* does not cite this passage of the *Kośa*, but instead refers to Rāma:

Bhadanta Rāma gives his opinion: The stream of conditioned factors, by attaining its existence, arises at a certain place and then goes out of existence at that very place. Therefore, there is no movement (T. 1562: 533a26-28).

Then Saṅghabhadra criticizes this: since Rāma does not admit the existence of the past and future factors, how is it possible for the nonexistent future factor “to attain its existence”?

It seems that Vasubandhu’s passage corresponds more closely to that of Rāma than to that of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. This fact suggests that Saṅghabhadra thought of Rāma as a precursor of the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu, at least with respect to the present topic; therefore, Saṅghabhadra quotes Rāma here, instead of Vasubandhu.

### III. Conclusion

On the basis of the passages discussed above, the thought of Bhadanta Rāma can be outlined as follows:

<sup>53</sup> *sarvaṃ hi saṁskṛtam ātmalābhād ūrdhvaṃ na bhavātīti yatraiva jātaṃ tatraiva dhvasyate / tasyāyukto deśāntarasamkrāntiḥ / tasmān na gatiḥ kāyakarmaḥ / (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 193.3-4; La Vallée Poussin 1980, v. 3: 4-5; Pruden 1988-1990, v. 2: 553). See also Vasubandhu’s Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Lamotte 1935-1936: 212-219).*

a) Following the Dārṣṭāntika views in the \**Vibhāṣā*, Rāma maintains the existence of consciousness in the meditative state of cessation (argument 4) and refutes the simultaneous arising of cause and effect (argument 7). These opinions are also accepted by Śrīlāta, and this confirms Saṅghabhadra's account that Rāma was a disciple of Śrīlāta. However, Rāma is not always an obedient pupil; for example, he objects to Śrīlāta's interpretation of the term "ignorance" (argument 5).

b) Furthermore, concerning topics such as the interpretation of the opening formula of the teaching of dependent origination (argument 3) or the negation of the Vātsīputrīya definition of the nature of manifested bodily action (argument 8), Rāma's accounts closely resemble passages in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Considering the fact that Saṅghabhadra chooses to refer to Rāma rather than Vasubandhu in both cases, it is possible to assume that Vasubandhu inherited these arguments from Rāma. Rāma's interpretation of the term "arising," which is similar to Vasubandhu's definition of the four characteristics in the *Kośa* (argument 2), should perhaps be added here.

c) In addition, regarding other topics Rāma's opinion indicates the influence of the Yogācāra school. As has been suggested by the studies of some modern scholars, Vasubandhu also seems to have been familiar with Yogācāra ideas at the time when he wrote the *Kośa* and introduced some of them into the *Kośa* as the opinions of the Sautrāntikas or the *pūrvācāryas*. However, according to those studies, the Yogācāra source materials for the Sautrāntika opinions in the *Kośa* are limited to early texts that do not necessarily presuppose the conception of *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> According to Schmithausen, the *Yogācārabhūmi* consists mainly of three heterogeneous or chronologically distinct layers: (1) the oldest layer, which refers neither to *ālayavijñāna* nor to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*; (2) a middle layer, which refers occasionally to *ālayavijñāna*, but not to the *Samdhinirmocana*; (3) the newest layer, which contains both material from the *Samdhinirmocana* and detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna*. Further, each of these layers is not homogeneous in itself: the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* also include some old material. See Schmithausen (1987: 13-14). For a different analysis of the layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see Aramaki's hypothesis (unpublished) which is summarized by Kritzer (1999: 12 note 17; 200). At any rate, it is certain that the arguments found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not always presuppose the conception of *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore, the relationship between the Sautrāntika opinions in the *Kośa* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not imply immediately that Vasubandhu as the author of the *Kośa* has already accepted the

On the other hand, Rāma's arguments regarding the nonexistence of the reflected image, which would inevitably result in the mind-only theory (argument 1), and his explanation of the impressions of the white factors (argument 6), are apparently based on more highly developed Yogācāra scriptures, such as the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, or treatises like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

In brief, the doctrine of Rāma is a blend of the views of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the \**Vibhāṣā* and Śrīlāta the Sthavira in the \**Nyāyānusāra* as well as some Yogācāra ideas. This fact suggests that the Sautrāntikas are definitely descended from the Dārṣṭāntika lineage, but, as Yin shun says, "It seems that in the period of Bhadanta Rāma, the Yogācāra Mahāyanists flourished, so they would have influenced the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas" (Yin shun 1980: 572-573). The Sautrāntika positions of Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* should also be considered in this context.

However, while Rāma's arguments appear to be an indiscriminate combination of Dārṣṭāntika and Yogācāra views, Vasubandhu seems more deliberate in introducing Yogācāra theory into the *Kośa*. On the one hand he rejects certain opinions of the Dārṣṭāntikas, such as the negation of the simultaneous cause-effect relationship, since they conflict with the Yogācāra views that he accepts, and on the other hand, unlike Rāma, he carefully avoids introducing fully developed Yogācāra conceptions, for they might conflict with the scheme of abhidharmic philosophy that forms the

*ālayavijñāna*. Regarding this issue, Kritzer has examined Vasubandhu's interpretation of the term "consciousness" (*vijñāna*) as a member of the formula of dependent origination and has concluded that the *Kośa* presupposes the conception of *ālayavijñāna*, while Vasubandhu does not actually use the term in the *Kośa* because it is not required in its exegetical context (Kritzer 1999: 175-207). On the other hand, Yamabe, in his review of Kritzer's book, says that the main sources for the Sautrāntika views in the *Kośa* seem limited to the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a portion in which there is little reference to *ālayavijñāna*, and the parts of the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* in which the conception of *ālayavijñāna* is not necessarily required. This suggests the possibility that the author of the *Kośa* has not yet "discovered" *ālayavijñāna*. Hence, Yamabe reserves judgement on whether Vasubandhu already accepted *ālayavijñāna* when he wrote the *Kośa* (Yamabe 2000 b: 68). I am not in a position to decide this issue, but if my conclusions in this article are correct, other Sautrāntikas, contemporary with Vasubandhu, were familiar with developed Yogācāra scriptures like the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and with treatises like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, which discuss the conception of *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore it is not impossible to suppose that Vasubandhu knew *ālayavijñāna*, although, at the time of composing the *Kośa*, he did not want to refer explicitly to such a novel idea, which never appears in the traditional exegetical *abhidharma* works.

substructure of the *Kośa*. Thus he succeeds in formulating a coherent, high-level *abhidharma* theory of his own, under the name of “Sautrāntika.” Perhaps this is the reason why Vasubandhu’s fate was different from that of his contemporary Sautrāntikas, whose works are no longer extant. There must have been more Sautrāntika masters at the time of Vasubandhu, but, like Rāma, they could not establish a method to harmonize their abhidharmic views with Yogācāra theory, and therefore, their works are lost to history. The *Abhidharmakośa* is a rare example of a Sautrāntika work that achieved such harmony and therefore survived. As for Vasubandhu himself, the composition of this treatise probably served as a springboard for his conversion to Yogācāra.

## References

### *Primary Sources*

- Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Edited by P. Pradhan. Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series Vol. VIII, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971. Reprint (First edition: Tokyo: The publishing Association of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 1932-1936).
- Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971. Reprint (First edition: 1936).
- Chü-she lun chi*. P’u-kuang. T. 1821.
- Chü-she lun shu*. Fa-pao. T. 1822.
- Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī abhidharmakośaṭīkā*. Pūrṇavardhana. Peking Bstan ’gyur 5594.
- Nyāyānusāra (Ap’i-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun)*. Saṅghabhadra. T. 1562.
- Tattvārthā abhidharmakośaṭīkā*. Sthiramati. Peking Bstan ’gyur 5875.
- Tattvasiddhi (Ch’eng shih lun)*. Harivarman. T. 1646.
- Vibhāṣā (Ap’i-ta-mo ta-p’i-p’o sha lun)*. Translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 1545.
- Yogācārabhūmi*. Edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Part I. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957.
- Yogācārabhūmi (Yü-ch’ieh-shih ti lun)*. Translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 1579.

### *Modern Works*

- Bureau, André. *Le sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*. Publications de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient XXXVIII. Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient 1955.
- Cox, Collett. “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣāntika Theories.” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 11/1 (1988): 31-87.



- , *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence*. Studia Philologica Buddhica: Monograph Series 11. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995.
- Dietz, Siglinde. *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha. Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen: Philologisch-Historische Klasse 2/142. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984.
- Enomoto Fumio. “A Sanskrit Fragment from the Vibhāṣā Discovered in Eastern Turkestan.” In *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen III Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden*, edited by Heinz Bechert. Supplement 6. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996, 135-143.
- Griffiths, Paul J. *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem*. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986.
- Hakamaya Noriaki. “Nirodhasamāpatti – Its Historical Meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā System.” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 23/2 (March 1975): 1084-1074.
- , “Pūrvācārya kō.” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 34/2 (March 1986): 93-100.
- Harada Wasō. “Dignāga no Hastavālaprakaraṇa & Vṛtti.” *Ryūkoku Daigaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyūshitsu Nempō* 6 (March 1993): 92-110.
- , “Kyōryōbu no tansō no shiki no nagare to iu gainen eno gimon I.” *Indogaku Chibettogaku Kenkyū* 1 (1996): 135-193.
- Itō Shūken. “Honzetsu no gengo ni tsuite.” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 21/1 (December 1972): 134-135.
- Kajiyama Yūichi. “Rinne to chōetsu – Jōyūkyō no engi setsu to sono kaishaku.” *Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 550 (1985): 324-359.
- Katō Junshō. *Kyōryōbu no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1989.
- , “Higashi ajia no juyō shita abidarumakei ronsho – jōjitsuron to kusharon no bāi.” In *Bukkyō no tōzen: higashi asia no bukkyō shisō I*, Shirizu Higashiajia bukkyō, edited by Takasaki Jikidō and Kimura Kiyotaka. Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1997, 37-78.
- Kritzer, Robert. *Rebirth and Causation in the Yogācāra Abhidharma*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 44. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1999.
- , “Rūpa and the antarābhava.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 28/3 (June 2000): 235-272.
- , “Unthinkable Matters: the Term *acintya* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.” In *Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Thought: In Honor of Dr. Hajime Sakurabe on His Seventy-seventh Birthday*. Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 2002, 65-86.
- Lamotte, Étienne. *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra: L'explication des mystères*. Recueil de travaux publiés par les membres des Conférences d'Histoire et du Philologie 2/34. Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935.

- “Le Traite de l’Acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.” *Mélanges Chinois et bouddhiques* 4 (1936): 151-263.
- “Trois Sūtra du Saṃyukta sur la vacuité.” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 36/2 (1973): 313-323.
- La Vallée Poussin, Louis de. *L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. New edition. *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 16. Bruxelles: Institute Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1980. Reprint (First edition: Louvain: J.B. Istas, 1923-1931).
- Mejor, Marek. *Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur*. Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien 42, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.
- Mimaki Katsumi. “Le chapitre du *Blo gsal grub mtha’* sur les Sautrāntika: Présentation et édition.” *Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University* 15 (1979): 175-210.
- “Le chapitre du *Blo gsal grub mtha’* sur les Sautrāntika: Un essai de traduction.” *Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University* 16 (1980): 143-172.
- Miyashita Seiki. “Mumyō to shogyō – kusharon ni okeru kokoro to katachi” *Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nenpō* 57 (1992): 1-28.
- Nagao Gajin. *Shōdaijōron wayaku to chūkai* (jō). Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982.
- Pruden, Leo M. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* by Louis de La Vallée Poussin (English Translation). 4 vols. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988-1990.
- Przyluski, Jean. “Dārṣāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādin.” *Indian Historical Quarterly* 16 (1940): 246-254.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series 4. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987.
- Willemen, Charles, Bart Dessein, and Collett Cox. *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism*. Handbuch der Orientalistik: Abt. II, Indien, Band 11. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
- Yamabe Nobuyoshi. “Bīja Theory in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 38/2 (March 1990): 13-15.
- “Shūji no honnu to shinkun no mondai ni tsuite.” *Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nenpō* 54 (May 1989): 43-58.
- “A Critical Exchange on the Idea of Dhātu-vāda: Riposte.” In *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism*, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press (1997): 208-219.
- “Yugashijiron ni okeru zen aku ingasetu no ichisokumen.” *Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nenpō* 65 (May 2000): 127-146. [2000a]
- Review of *Rebirth and Causation in the Yogācāra Abhidharma* by Robert Kritzer; *Bukkyōgaku Seminā* 72 (October 2000): 59-69. [2000b]

Yin shun. *Shuo yi ch'ieh yu pu wei chu te lun shu yu lun shih chih yen chiu*. Taipei: Cheng wen chu pan she, 1980. Reprint (First edition: Taipei: Hui jih Chiang t'ang, 1968).