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I. Introduction

The term “Sautrāntika” appears in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya approximately twenty times. In almost every case, the opinion attributed to the Sautrāntikas contradicts the orthodox Sarvāstivādin/Vaibhāṣika position, and, as Katō shows (75-78), represents Vasubandhu’s own opinion. Sautrāntika is closely associated with Dārṣṭāntika, which is often considered to be either the same as Sautrāntika or its immediate predecessor, and many of Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” opinions strongly resemble ones attributed to Dārṣṭāntika by the *Vibhāṣā.1 Recently, however, scholars have begun to notice that some of the same opinions can also be found in the Yogācārabhūmi. In this paper, I examine the occurrences in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of the term “Sautrāntika,” refer to relevant passages in the *Vibhāṣā and Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi, and show that the majority of the positions labelled Sautrāntika have correspondences in the Yogācārabhūmi, most frequently in the Viniścayasaṃgrahanaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi. I also discuss the possible implications of Vasubandhu’s evident reliance on the Yogācārabhūmi.

I limit myself here to those passages in which the word “Sautrāntika” actually appears in the Sanskrit text. There are many other positions that have been identified by commentators such as P’u-kuang and Yaśomitra as Sautrāntika, not to mention the more than 200 references by Saṃghabhadra to the ching-chu 經主 or “sūtra-master,”2 a term used to signal Vasubandhu’s departure from Sarvāstivādin orthodoxy (see Kritzer

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1 On the other hand, Vasubandhu does not agree with all the Dārṣṭāntika positions. It seems, in fact, as though he himself uses the term Dārṣṭāntika pejoratively. When he agrees with a Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika opinion, he labels it Sautrāntika (see Cox 37-39, which is based largely on Katō; see also Harada).

2 I borrow Cox’s translation (56).
Comparison, “Preliminary Report”). I also ignore references to yogācāras (practitioners of yoga) and pūrvācāryas (earlier teachers), except when they occur within a larger argument attributed to Sautrāntika.

II. Summary of Results

Of the nineteen positions that I have isolated, eleven involve Vasubandhu’s rejection of dharmas that the Sarvāstivādins classify as real and independent entities, including a number of the cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras (forces not associated with mind), the asaṃskṛtadharmanas (unconditioned dharmas), the anuśayas (latent defilements), and vijñaptirūpa (manifested matter) and avijñaptirūpa (unmanifested matter). Vasubandhu often asserts that the functioning of bījas (seeds), themselves merely prajñapti (provisional entities), is sufficient to explain the phenomena in question. Other positions concern the process of perception, the nature of the Buddha’s knowledge, the reality of the past, and the possibility of a fall from arhatship. In a number of these cases, too, Vasubandhu appeals to either bīja or the closely related idea of saṃtati-parināmaviveśa (transformation of the life-stream) in his unorthodox statements.

One of the nineteen positions seems to have nothing at all corresponding to it in the Yogācārabhūmi. In two other cases, the Yogācārabhūmi contains no argument similar to Vasubandhu’s, but its general position on the subject is in agreement with his. In the remaining sixteen cases, a correspondence between the two texts is more or less clear.

Six of the positions identified as Sautrāntika by Vasubandhu are attributed to Dārṣṭāntika by the *Vibhāṣā; in three other cases, statements related to the Sautrāntika positions are attributed to Dārṣṭāntika. How-

3 In an ongoing project, I am comparing every passage that Sāṃghabhadra identifies as the position of the ching-chu with the Yogācārabhūmi and compiling a list of correspondences. So far, I have completed the comparison for the first four chapters of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; the results of the first three chapters have been published (Kritzer Comparison).

4 Katō identifies 17 (74-78).

5 For this translation, see Cox (95).
ever, there is no mention of bīja or saṃtatiparināmaviśeṣa in the relevant passages in the *Vibhāṣā.* In other words, the Dārśāntika maintains the same general position as Sautrāntika but its reasoning is either unstated or different.

Similarly, Harivarman’s positions in the *Tattvasiddhi*, many of which probably can be considered Dārśāntika (see Mizuno), frequently agree in general with those of Vasubandhu. However, the reasons given by Harivarman are often different, and, again, Harivarman does not use the terms bīja or saṃtatiparināmaviśeṣa.

III. Sautrāntika Opinions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Correspondences in the *Vibhāṣa*, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and the Yogācārabhūmi

1. There is nothing that sees or is seen in perception: consciousness arises in dependence on organ and object.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*7 – In the verse (*Abhidharmakośa* I 42), Vasubandhu gives the accepted Vaibhāṣika opinion that it is the eye that sees rūpa (matter), but he uses the word kila (“so it is said”), according to Saṃghabhādra, to indicate that he disagrees.8 Vasubandhu then examines a number of other opinions found in the *Vibhāṣa*, most prominently that of Dharmatrāta, to the effect that it is the eye-consciousness that sees rūpa. As Katō points out, the commentators think that Vasubandhu favors Dharmatrāta’s opinion, but in fact, he may simply be using it to refute the Vaibhāṣikas (24). At the end of the discussion, Vasubandhu ascribes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees or is seen;

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6 Nishi states that there is not a single attribution of bīja theory to Sautrāntika in the entire *Vibhāṣa* (484), and an examination of the passages concerning bīja that he has collected from the *Vibhāṣa* suggests that there is no attribution to Dārśāntika, either (490-494).

7 atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ / kim idam ākāśaṁ khādyate / caṅṣuḥ hi pratītya rūpāṇi cotal-dyate caṅṣuḥ-vijñānam / tatra kāḥ paśyati ko vā drśyate / nirvāpyāraṇaṁ hīdaḥ dharmāṁcātraṁ hetuphalamātraṁ ca / tatra vyavahārārthaṁ cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante / caṅṣuḥ paśyati vijñānam viññāntī ti nātrābh ānivēśtavyam / utṣaṁ hi bhagavatā janapadani ruktiṁ nābhīniveśata saṁjñāṁ ca lokasya nābhīdhāved iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 31.11-16). The references for the entire discussion are Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 30.3-31.17; T. 1558: 10c8-11b8; La Vallée Poussin 1: 81-86; T. 1562: 363c12-368a11; Katō 23-24.

8 Saṃghabhādra uses the appellation ching-chu 聽主 here (T. 1562: 365a11).
consciousness simply arises in dependence on the organ and the object. There is no action here, merely dharmas, merely causes and results. However, in worldly discourse one can say that the eye sees.9

*Vibhāṣā10 – The *Vibhāṣā attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the position that the coming together of certain factors is equivalent to “seeing rūpa.”11

*Tattvasiddhi12 – Consciousness sees, not the organ.

Yogācārabhūmi13 – The Yogācārabhūmi contains a number of statements to the effect that cognition is really the result of the laws of cause and effect, not of something seeing and something else being seen. In particular, the Viṃśacayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijnānakātyamanobhūmi says that, at the highest level, neither the organ nor the consciousness per-
ceives. It gives three reasons: because the svabhāva (real nature) of all dharmas arises due to a multiplicity of causes; because nothing endures for more than a moment; because there is no real action. At the worldly level, however, one can say that the eye sees, because whenever there is an organ, consciousness will definitely not be lacking. On the other hand, it is possible for the organs to be lacking even when the stream of consciousness exists.

Comment – Here the Sautrāntika argument closely follows the Yogācārabhūmi in its ultimate rejection of anything that perceives and its acceptance on the worldly level of the notion that it is the organ that perceives. The conclusion of the*Tattvasiddhi is completely different.

2. Prthagjanatvam (the state of being an ordinary person) is not a real dharma. It is simply the saṃtati (life-stream) in which the āryadharmaś (the attributes of a noble or spiritually accomplished person) have not yet arisen.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya—Vasubandhu approves of the Sautrāntika definition of prthagjanatvam, according to which prthagjanatvam is the saṃtati in which the āryadharmaś have not yet arisen.15

*Vibhāṣā—The *Vibhāṣā attributes a denial of the real existence of prthagjanatvam to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

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14 evam tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / katham ca sautrāntikānām / anutpannārya-dharmasantatiḥ prthagjanatvam iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 66.16-18; T. 1558: 23c2-3; La Vallée Poussin 1: 193; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master and criticizes Vasubandhu for denying the real existence of prthagjanatvam [T. 1562: 399b10-c7; Cox 203-206; Katō 75].)
15 Cox points out that Vasubandhu does not specifically state here that prthagjanatvam is unreal, but she says that its unreality is implied in its definition as a saṃtati, “which, as a composite entity, cannot be real” (224 n. 109).
16 (T. 1646: 289c3-4; the argument continues until 289c13).
17 Katsura (86) cites T. 1646: 289a-c, in which various cittaviprayuktas are said to lack separate existence.
proof by inference of their ultimate reality \[\text{T. 1562: 406b20-29; Cox 312}\]; Kat
by perception or scripture, while proof by inference of their provisional reality would imply
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Comment — The definitions of prthagjanatvatvam in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi are essentially identical. While it is possible that the Dārṣṭāntika position is the source for the common definition in these two texts, the *Vibhāṣa does not give us any details.

3. The saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas (marks of the conditioned) are not real dharmas.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

— The saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas are not real entities since, unlike real dharmas such as rūpa, they cannot be known by perception, inference, or scripture.

*Vibhāṣa

— The *Vibhāṣa attributes a denial of the real nature of the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

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17 so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bs kyed pa'i gnas skabs la'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 77a8).

18 There is no prthagjanatvatvam different from the prthagarjana, the ordinary person himself. (The *Tattvasiddhi says that all of the cittaviprayuktasamśkāras are prajñapti.)

19 like a sense of the conditioned marks of the conditioned are not real dharmas. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

20 I have argued that there is no contradiction between the two definitions in the Viniścayasamgrahani, or between this and the one favored by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Kritzer Rebirth 246-248).

21 諸有為相非實有體，如鶏鳴者彼作是說諸有為相是不相應行蘊所攝。不相應行蘊無有實體。若諸有為相實有體 (T. 1545: 198a14-17; see also Cox 358 n. 32).

22 生者，生性在現在世名生。捨現在世名滅。相續故生。是生。故名為生異。非別有法名生住滅又佛法深義，謂衆緣合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法。又說，眼色等是眼識因緣。
*Tattvasiddhi* — *Jāti* (birth), *vyāya* (destruction), *sthiti* (continued existence), and *anyathātva* (change of state, i.e., aging) simply refer to the five *skandhas* at various points. They are not separate *dharmas*.

**Yogācārabhūmi** — The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviṃśakāya-manobhūmi* says that the four *sāṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, including *jāti*, are not real entities, separate from *rūpa* and the other *skandhas*.

Comment — Later in his presentation of the Sautrāntika argument, Vasubandhu gives his own explanation of the four *lakṣaṇas*: the first arising of the series of *sāṃskāras* is *jāti*; the series in the state of cessation is called *vyāya* (=*anityatā* [impermanence]); the procession of the series is called...
sthiti; the difference between earlier and later moments of the stream is called anyathātva. This explanation is very similar to one found later in the passage from the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi mentioned above: when, due to causes, formerly non-existent saṃskṛtadharmanas (conditioned dharmanas) arise, this is called jāti. When the saṃskṛtadharmanas that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called jara (old age). When these saṃskṛtadharmanas, having arisen, persist for a limited time, this is called sthiti. And when, after the moment of arising, the characteristics of these saṃskṛtadharmanas are destroyed, this is called cessation or anityatā.

Again, the basic positions of the Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and of the Yogācārabhāmi agree with those of Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman. However, we have no record of the Dārṣṭāntika explanation of the individual laksanās, and Harivarman does not use expressions like abhūtvā bhāvati (“not having existed, it exists”), which are found throughout the discussions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhāmi.

4. The Buddha did not say that an asaṃskṛta dharma can be a cause.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya—The Sautrāntikas deny that the Buddha said that an asaṃskṛta could be a cause. On the contrary, he said that all causes are impermanent and hence saṃskṛta.

"Naiva hi kvacid asaṃskṛtaṃ bhagavatā hetur ity uktam/ uktam tu paryāyena hetur iti sautrāntikāḥ / katham uktam / ye hetavo ye pratayāvā rūpasyotpādaya te "py anityāḥ / anityān khulu hetupratayah pratiyotpannam rūpani kuto nityam bhavisyatati / evam yāvad vijnānam iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 91.13-17; T. 1558: 33c22-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 277; not mentioned in Kātāki).

26 Miyashita finds in the Yogācārabhāmi the origin of the pen wu chin you (本無今有) theory in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

27 "Naiva hi kvacid asaṃskṛtaṃ bhagavatā hetur ity uktam/ uktam tu paryāyena hetur iti sautrāntikāḥ / katham uktam / ye hetavo ye pratayāvā rūpasyotpādaya te "py anityāḥ / anityān khulu hetupratayah pratiyotpannam rūpani kuto nityam bhavisyatati / evam yāvad vijnānam iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 91.13-17; T. 1558: 33c22-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 277; not mentioned in Kātāki).

28 復有執, 唯有佛是能作因非無法, 爲止彼執顯無為法亦能作因 (T. 1545: 103c21-23).
Vibhāṣaṇa – The *Vibhāṣaṇa mentions an opinion that *asaṃskṛtas cannot be karaṇahetu, but it does not attribute it to any specific group.

Tattvasiddhi – (nothing relevant)

Yogācārabhūmi – (nothing relevant)

Comment – This sentence marks the beginning of a very long passage in which Vasubandhu criticizes the *Vibhāṣaṇa definitions of asaṃskṛta-dharmas as real entities. Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not seem to include any statement similar to this one, see the following item for correspondences between the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi regarding the unreality of the asaṃskṛtas.

5. The asaṃskṛtas are not real and separate dharmas.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya – According to the Sautrāntika, the asaṃskṛtas are not real and separate dharmas like rūpa, vedanā (feeling), etc.

Vibhāṣaṇa (1) – The *Vibhāṣaṇa quotes the Bhadanta as saying that ākāśa (space) is prajñapti and refutes him.

29 sarvam evaasaṃskṛtam adravyam iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hi tad rūpavedanādīvata bhāvāntaram asti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 92.3-4; T. 1558: 34a12-14; La Vallée Poussin 1: 278; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a21-23] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 429a28]; Katō 75-76).

30 大德説曰。虛空不可知非所知事故。所知事者色非色性虛空與彼俱不相應。所知事者謂此彼性虛空與彼俱不相應。此虚空名。但是世間分別假立。詳曰應作是說。實有虛空彼不知即謂非有前教理實有虛空 (T. 1545: 388c24-29). The other *Vibhāṣaṇa texts (T. 1546 and T. 1547) attribute this position to Buddhadeva and Dharmatrata, respectively (Katō 22, 128 n. 47).

31 The Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya attributes a similar opinion to Dārṣṭāntika: 雖有者謂諸無色亦非非色。言無色者。隨順世間說 (T. 1552: 944a7-9).

32 謂或有執。想滅非想滅無常滅非實有體。如論者為遮彼執顯三種滅皆有實體 (T. 1545: 161a10-12).

33 問曰。若無色非色為何法。答曰。虛空名無法。但無色處名為虛空 (T. 1646: 343c12-14 [the argument is similar to that of the Viniṣcayasaṃgrahāṇi on the Pañcāvijñānakāyāmanabhūmi; see below]). 答曰。若實有法皆有所依。如依色依色亦依名。虛空無依故知無法 (T. 1646: 343c17-18). 答曰。非無泥洹。但無實法。若無泥洹則常處生死永無脫期 (T. 1646: 369a23-25 [a similar denial of the real existence of nīrodhasamapatti together with an admission that it is not totally nonexistent is found in the Vastusaṃgrahāṇi; see below]).
*Vibhaśa (2)* — The *Vibhaśa* attributes to the Dārśāntikas the opinion that three types of nirodha (cessation), including pratisāṃkhyaṇirodha (cessation resulting from knowledge) and apratisāṃkhyaṇirodha (cessation not resulting from knowledge), are not real and refutes them.

*Tattvasiddhi* — Ākāśa and nirvāṇa are not real dharmas.

Yogācārabhūmi (1) — The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāya manobhūmi says that ākāśa is simply an appellation expressing the absence of rūpa. If some place does not contain anything, the notion arises that the place contains ākāśa. Therefore, ākāśa is only a prajñāpatti and is not real.

Yogācārabhūmi (2) — The Vastusamgrahaṇī, in a definition of *phalaprajñāpatti* (果假有, provisionally real by way of being a result), mentions pratisāṃkhyaṇirodha, which, it says, is not non-existent, since it is a result of the path, but is not really existent, since it is simply a designation for

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34 de la nam mkha’ gaṅ že na / gzugs med pa tsam gyis rab ti phye ba ni nam mkha’ yin te / ’di ltar gaṅ la gzugs yi rnam pa mi dmigs pa de la nam mkha’i ’du śes ’byuṅ bar ’gyur pas de’i phyir de yan btags pa’i yod pa yin pa rin par bya’i rdzas su ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 39b1-2). 摭次虚空云何, 謂唯諸色非有所顯。是名虛空。所以者何, 若處所行都無所得。是處方有虚空想轉。是故當知此唯假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 593a15-18). See also Vastusamgrahaṇī (T. 1579: 879a14-18; not in Tibetan). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (personal communication).

35 果假者也。所謂殼滅是道果故, 不可說無, 然非實有, 唯約已斷一切煩悩。於當來世畢竟不生而假立故 (T. 1579: 879a5-8; not in Tibetan). The Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun gives a definition of pratisāṃkhyaṇirodha that is similar but mentions prajñā: 殼滅者, 謂由慧方便有漏諸行畢竟不起滅是離繫性 (T. 1602: 484e3-4).

36 so sor btags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa gaṅ že na / de la gzan pa skye ba’i rkyen mnon du gyur pa na de las gzan pa skye bas / de las gzan pa mi skye žin ſhe bar zi ba’i ’gog pa tsam ni so sor btags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa žes bya ste / gaṅ de’i tse na ma skyes śiṃ skye bas’i dus las thal ba de ni de’i tse na ma yaṅ skye bar mi ’gyur bas / de’i phyir de yai btags pa’i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su yod pa ni ma yin te / de’i raṅ gi mtshan ſad ni gzan cuṅ zad kyaṅ mi dmigs so / de yaṅ chos kyi rnam pa daṅ ma brał ba’i phyir dus gzan gyi tse rkyen daṅ phrad na ’byuṅ baṅ ’gyur baṅ de’i phyir so sor btags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa de ni gtn du ba ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 39b2-5). 摭次云何非殼滅, 謂若餘法生滅現前, 養法生故餘不得生, 唯滅唯靜名非殼滅, 諸所有法此時應生, 惟生時故彼於此時終不更生, 是故此滅亦是假有非實物有, 所以者何, 此無有餘自相可得故, 此法種類非離繫故。復於餘時遇緣可生, 是故非殼滅非一向決定 (T. 1579: 593a19-25). See also Vastusamgrahaṇī (T. 1579: 879a18-20; not in Tibetan). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (personal communication).
the total non-arising in the future of _kleśas_ (defilements) that have already been destroyed.

_Yogācārabhūmi_ (3)\(^\text{36}\) – The _Viniścaya_ on the _Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi_ says that _apratisamkhyānirodha_ is simply an appellation expressing destruction or pacification when a certain _dharma_, its conditions for arising having been actualized, does not arise because another _dharma_ arises. Whenever the time for a _dharma_ to arise is exceeded, that _dharma_ is destroyed and will not arise. (However, if the conditions for arising are encountered, it may arise in the future, so this is not a permanent destruction.) Because it has no separate _svalakṣaṇa_ (characteristic mark), _apratisamkhyānirodha_ is a _prajñāpāti_, not a real entity.

Comment – I have not found any passage in the _Yogācārabhūmi_ that explicitly states that the category of _asaṃskṛta_ is not really existing. However, in the passages referred to, the _Yogācārabhūmi_ questions or denies the real existence of _ākāśa_, _pratisamkhyānirodha_, and _apratisamkhyānirodha_. Its definition of _ākāśa_ is very similar to that of the Sautrāntika, according to whom _ākāśa_ is nothing more than the absence of that which is tangible.\(^\text{37}\) The definitions of _pratisamkhyānirodha_ are also similar, although the Sautrāntika definition stresses the role of knowledge,\(^\text{38}\) which is not mentioned in the _Yogācārabhūmi_. Finally, the Sautrāntika defines _apratisamkhyānirodha_ as the non-arising of _dharmas_ due not to knowledge but to a lack of causes for their arising.\(^\text{39}\) Like the definition in the _Yogācārabhūmi_, this insists that

\(^{36}\) _spraṭavyabhāvamātram ākāśam / tadyathā hy andhakāre pratighātam avindanta ākāśam ity āhuh_ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 92.4-5; 34a14-16; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a23-25] and criticizes it at great length [T. 1562: 429a28-430a7]). See Kritzer Comparison 53.

\(^{37}\) _uppannānuṣayajanamanirodhaḥ pratisamkhyābalenānyasyānupādah pratisamkhyānirodhah_ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 92.5-6; T. 1558: 34a17; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a25-26] and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 430a18-434b7]). See Kritzer Comparison 54.

\(^{38}\) _vinaiva pratisamkhyāyā pratyayavaiśāvyād anupādo yaḥ sa ‘pratisamkhyānirodhah / tad yathā nikāyasabhāgayeśasyāntarāntarane (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 92.7-8; T. 1558: 34a18; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a26-27] and criticizes it at great length [T. 1562: 434b8-435b2]). See Kritzer Comparison 55.

\(^{39}\) _naimittiko hi nāma bhagavān syād evaṃ sati na punah sākṣatkāri / tasmāt sarvam icchāmātreṇa bhagavān jānātīti sautrāntikāḥ / acintyo hi buddhānāṃ buddhaviśaya ity_
apratisamkhyanirodha, as the non-existence of something, can only be a prajñapti, not a real dharma. However, the phrasing is somewhat different, and I am not sure that the two definitions are completely in agreement.

6. The Buddha knows the future directly.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\textsuperscript{40} – Concerning the question of the Buddha’s knowledge of the future, the Sautrāntikas say that the Buddha knows it directly. Vasubandhu adds that the Buddha knows by merely wishing and explains that the Lord has said, “the Buddha-range of the Buddhas is acintya (unimaginable).”

\textit{*Vibhāṣa\textsuperscript{41} – The *Vibhāṣā refutes two other theories, which it does not attribute to a specific group, of how the Buddha knows the future (by inference or by means of a mark in beings’ saṃtātis that indicates the future results of their actions) and accepts the idea that he knows it directly.

\textit{uktam bhagavatā (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 99.9-11; T. 1558: 37a2-4; La Vallée Poussin 1: 304-305; Katō 76).

\textit{41} 復次何通。有說。世尊依過去現在。方知未來。若作是說。謂世尊觀過去現在。知種類補特伽羅。造如是業。猶所劫中不墮惡趣。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業現世受果。造如是業次次生受果。由此現見。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業比知當來。猶所劫中不墮惡趣。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業現世受果。造如是業當生受果。造如是業當後受果。

有餘師說。有情身中有如是相。是不相應行蔵所攝。世尊見彼。便知如是補特伽羅於未來世。猶所劫中不墮惡趣。亦知如補特伽羅所造諸業。或當現受。或當後受。或當生受。或當後受。明了無疑 (T. 1545: 51b15-c6).

\textit{42} 復次佛十力成就故智慧具足。以往反因緣故說十力。初處非處力。是因果中決定智也。知從是因生如是果不生果。如生不善必得苦報。不生善果。是處名有是事。非處名無是事。是初力者。謂力之本。開曰。世間亦知因果是處非處。如從麥生麥不生稻等。若果。處非處力。知業等法故。名此力甚深難。諸天世人所不能及。又了知生法因次第緣增上。是故此力名為微妙。謂知去來現在諸業及諸受果。如知果事。知因知報。是故此智名之為力。以知三世盡事因報。故名甚深。所以者何。或謂過去未來無法故。佛於此說言有力。又法在過去未來世中。雖無現相佛亦現知 (T. 1646: 240a26-b10). See Kritzer “Unthinkable” 69-71.

\textit{43} gžan yan gzha brtse bcom pa ni shioms par žugs na mňam par bžag pa yin la lašs na mňam par ma bžag pa yin gyi i de bźin gšegs pa la ni gnas skabs thams cad du sems mňam par ma bžag pa med pa dañ (Yogācārabhūmi: ‘i 114a5-6); 又阿羅漢入等至名之為定。若出等至即不名定。如來遍於一切位中無不定心 (T. 1579: 738c7-9).
*Tattvasiddhi* — Knowledge of the causes and effects of actions is very profound because the Buddha knows past and future dharmas even though they do not exist.

Yogācārabhūmi — In the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Tathāgata is said never to have an unconcentrated thought, while the arhat is said to be concentrated when he is in *samāpatti* (meditative trance) but not after he exits.

Comment — The position that the Buddha knows the future directly is in agreement with the *Vibhāṣa*, and Saṃghabhadra does not attack it. However, P'u-kuang notes that there are two possible Sautrāntika explanations of knowing by merely wishing. One of these is based on the notion that the Buddha never has an unconcentrated thought (T. 1821: 135b15-c6). This position is unacceptable to the Vaibhāṣikas. For a more detailed analysis of this passage, see Kritzer “Unthinkable.”

7. In ārūpyadhātu there is no support for consciousness external to consciousness itself.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya — According to Vasubandhu, in ārūpyadhātu (the immaterial realm) there is no support for consciousness other than the stream of consciousness itself. According to the Abhidharmikas, the support is *nikāyasabhāga* (the homogeneous character of beings) and *jīvitendriya* (life-force). The ākṣepahetu (projecting cause) is sufficient to establish the stream of consciousness in a new lifetime; if this cause

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42 tasmān nāsty arūpiṇām sattvānāṃ cittasantarān anyo [The first edition gives anyaṃ, while the second edition gives anyonyaṃ. I have corrected this on the basis of the Chinese and the Tibetan translations] niśraya iti sautrāntikāḥ / api tu yasyāś cittasantarān ākṣepahetur avitātyaṇa rūpe tasyāḥ saha rūpeṇa saṃbhavād rūpaḥ niśriya pravṛttir yasyās tu hetur vītātyaṇa rūpe tasyā anapeksya rūpaḥ pravṛttih / hetos tadvimukhatvād iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 112.18-20; T. 1558: 41b17-20; La Vallée Poussin 2: 6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 458c4] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 458c4-458c25]; Katō 76).

43 For this translation, see Cox (107).

45 For this translation, see Cox (107).

46 謂或有疑欲色界有色故心相續依色轉。無色界既無有色心相續應無依轉欲令此疑得決定故。顯無色界心等相續亦有依轉故作斯論。如有色有情心相續依身轉。無色有情心相續依何所轉。答依命根眾同分。於諸醉及於身不相應行 (T. 1545: 137a23-29).

47 答曰。或有物無因緣而生。如劫盡已。劫和大雨。是水從何所生。又諸天所欲。應念即得。如坐禪人。及大功德人。所欲隨意。是事有情相續斷已更生。若人生無色界。
is an action that is free from desire pertaining to rūpa, the stream of consciousness will evolve without requiring rūpa as its support.

*Vibhāṣā*46 – The *Vibhāṣā* mentions an opinion that the stream of consciousness in ārūpyadātū does not have a support. It does not attribute this opinion to a specific school but simply refutes it with the Ābhidharmika position mentioned above.

*Tattvasiddhi*47 – Rebirth in rūpadātū (the subtle material realm) after the rūpasamātā (material continuity) has been interrupted by birth in ārūpyadātū is mentioned as an example of something arising without a

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46 gal te rnam par šes pa gzugs kyi sa bon dañ ldan pa ma yin du zin na / so so'i skye bo gzugs med pa rnams su skyes pa tshe zad ciñ las zad nas de nas 'ci 'pho 'zhin yañ 'og tu skye pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon med pas 'byuñ bar mi 'gyur ba ŋig na 'byuñ ste / de lta bas na gzugs kyi sa bon dañ ldan pa'i rnam par šes pa de la brten nas / de'i gzugs 'byuñ bar rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 16b4-6; see Schmithausen 21, 288 n. 172 b). Rebirth in ārūpyadātū is mentioned as an example of something arising without a support. It does not have a support. It does not attribute this opinion to a specific school but simply refutes it with the Ābhidharmika position mentioned above.

47 This explanation contains a somewhat similar explanation of how material continuity has been interrupted by birth in ārūpyadātū (the subtle material realm) after ārūpyadātū (the stream of consciousness) is present in ārūpyadātū (the subtle material realm) after ārūpyadātū. The Ābhidharmika position is mentioned as an example of something arising without a support. It does not have a support. It does not attribute this opinion to a specific school but simply refutes it with the Ābhidharmika position mentioned above.
cause. Consciousness in ārūpyadhātu is said to be without support: dharmas are able to exist without support.

Yogācārabhūmi (1)\textsuperscript{48} – The Viniścayasāṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi says that, if consciousness did not contain the seeds of rūpa, rebirth after falling from ārūpyadhātu would be impossible.

Yogācārabhūmi (2)\textsuperscript{49} – The Savitarkādiḥbhūmi specifies that the saṃskāras perfumed by karma, i.e., ākṣepahetu, which consists of bijas, project a new lifetime in all three realms.

Yogācārabhūmi (3)\textsuperscript{50} – The Viniścayasāṃgrahaṇī on the Cintāmaṇī Bhūmi includes nikāyasabhāga and jīvitendriya, along with the other cittaviprayuktasāṃskāras, in a long list of saṃskṛtadharmas that are prajñapti and thus not real.

Comment – The issue here is the support of consciousness in ārūpyadhātu, where its usual support, the body, cannot exist. The Vaibhāṣika solution is that two cittaviprayuktasāṃskāras, nikāyasabhāgatā and jīvitendriya, ensure that the disembodied consciousness doesn’t simply die in this realm. In the Yogācārabhūmi, on the other hand, consciousness itself is the support. However, as Schmithausen points out, the explanation

\[ ba'i las kyis yoñs su bsgos pa'i 'du byed rnams kyis khang gsum du sduŋ pa dān / mi sduŋ pa'i 'gro ba rnams su / sduŋ pa dān mi sduŋ pa'i lus rnams 'phen par byed pa dān / de niid kyi dbaṅ gis phyi rol gyi dūs po rnams kyaṅ / phan sum tshogs pa dān / rgad par 'gyur ba'i phyir te / de bas na 'du byed rnams kyi dge ba dān mi dge ba'i las kyi bag chags la brten nas 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs so (Yogācārabhūmi ; dzi 64b5-8). \]

\[ 'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dūs po la skye ba dān / rga ba dān / gnas pa dān / mi rtag pa dān / sa bon dān rnams par rig byed dān / rnams par rig byed ma yin pa dān / thob pa dān / 'thob pa ma yin pa dān / sro g gi dūb po dān / ris mthun pa dān / miṅ gi tshogs dān / tshig gi tshogs dān / yi ge'i tshogs rnams dān so so'i skye bo niid dān / tshogs pa dān ma tshogs pa dān / 'jug pa so sor 'nes pa dān / sbyor ba dān / myogs pa dān / go rīms dān / dus dān yul dān grangs tle bar 'dogs pa dān (Yogācārabhūmi ; zi 208a4-6). \]

\[ 50 'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dūs po la skye ba dān / rga ba dān / gnas pa dān / mi rtag pa dān / sa bon dān rnams par rig byed dān / rnams par rig byed ma yin pa dān / thob pa dān / 'thob pa ma yin pa dān / sro g gi dūb po dān / ris mthun pa dān / miṅ gi tshogs dān / tshig gi tshogs dān / yi ge'i tshogs rnams dān so so'i skye bo niid dān / tshogs pa dān ma tshogs pa dān / 'jug pa so sor 'nes pa dān / sbyor ba dān / myogs pa dān / go rīms dān / dus dān yul dān grangs tle bar 'dogs pa dān (Yogācārabhūmi ; zi 208a4-6). \]

\[ 51 Lamotte Samdhinirmocana 55 (5.2); Yogācārabhūmi ; 'i 58a2-5; T. 1579: 718a17-23; see Schmithausen 47, 320 ns. 329, 330.
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\[ 52 Yogācārabhūmi ; zi 4a8-4b5; T. 1579: 580a2-12; Schmithausen 51. \]
of how consciousness acts as a support develops over the course of the compilation of the text. In *Yogācārabhūmi* (1), quoted above, consciousness is taken to mean the six ordinary types of consciousness, which are said to contain the seeds of rūpa. Schmithausen thinks that the concept of bija here, according to which consciousness and the material sense faculties contain each other’s seeds, predates the theory of ālayavijñāna (21, 285-288, ns. 170-172).

Schmithausen, on the other hand, also refers to two other passages, one in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,* the other in what he calls the “*Pravṛtti Portion*” of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi.* He infers that in both passages the ālayavijñāna (store-consciousness) acts as the āśraya (support) of the new being in ārūpyadhātu. If I understand him correctly, he thinks these passages are significant because they are on different sides of a dividing line in the development of the concept of ālayavijñāna. The relevant chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana,* according to Schmithausen, still conceives of the ālayavijñāna (orphadānavijñāna [the appropriating consciousness]) as “sticking in the body” (50). However, it also states that, in ārūpyadhātu, the adānavijñāna does not appropriate the body, which does not exist there. Thus, the adānavijñāna mentioned here represents an intermediate stage between the six ordinary consciousnesses containing the seeds of rūpa and the more fully developed ālayavijñāna of the “*Pravṛtti Portion,*” in which the association of the ālayavijñāna with the physical body no longer applies (51). This ālayavijñāna supplants the physical body as the āśraya of all beings in the realms in which a physical body exists, as well as providing an āśraya for beings without bodies.

Vasubandhu’s claim that the cittasaṃśri (mental continuity) is a sufficient support for beings in ārūpyadhātu shows that he thinks that consciousness can function as āśraya. However, it is difficult to show a clear connection between Vasubandhu’s statement and the passages I have identified in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* His statement about the projecting cause is perhaps related to *Yogācārabhūmi* (2), but the context of that passage, an explanation of the ten types of causes, is quite different. As for *Yogācārabhūmi* (3), Vasubandhu’s implicit denial of nikāyasabhāga and jīvitendriya is in line with the *Yogācārabhūmi*’s denial of the reality of cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras. However, his focus here is not on nikāyasabhāga and jīvitendriya.
The term cittasaṃtati suggests the six ordinary consciousnesses, which points to Yogācārabhūmi (1), but Vasubandhu does not explain the mechanism by which ordinary consciousness could again produce a physical body when a being is reborn in a lower realm. Elsewhere, in a well-known passage concerning the question of how consciousness can resume after unconscious states like nirodhasamāpatti (trance of cessation), Vasubandhu quotes the opinion of the pūrvācāryas, who make an analogy to the question of how the sense faculties and body can resume when one is reborn in a lower realm after a period in ārūpyadhatu. According to these pūrvācāryas, the fact that consciousness and the sense faculties contain each other’s seeds answers both questions. This is the same theory of bija that underlies Yogācārabhūmi (1). However, in our current passage, Vasubandhu does not mention mutual seeding.

Nor does Vasubandhu refer to mutual seeding in yet another passage in which he explains the resumption of rūpa after rebirth from ārūpyadhātu into a lower realm. Here he states that the arising of rūpa is due solely to consciousness, the consciousness that was impregnated by the vipākahetu (cause of fruition) of that rūpa. Katō, who points out that Pūrṇavardhana identifies this as a Sautrāntika opinion, thinks that this passage is another expression of a theory of mutual seeding (261), and Yamabe (Yugashichiron) seems to agree with Katō. However, the word bija does not appear. Nor does Vasubandhu refer to the other aspect of mutual seeding, the arising of consciousness from rūpa. I think that this passage is more similar to the Sautrāntika statement under discussion here (that there is no support for consciousness in ārūpyadhātu besides consciousness itself) than to the opinion of the pūrvācāryas.

Therefore, it is possible that Vasubandhu distinguishes between the idea of the pūrvācāryas and that of the Sautrāntikas. Since Vasubandhu

53 apare punar āhuh / kathaṃ tāvad ārūpyopapamānāṃ ciraniruddhe ’pi rūpe punar api rūpaṁ jāyate / cittād eva hi tai jāyate na rūpāt / evaṁ cittam apy asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāj jāyate na cittāt / anyonyabījakam hy etad ubhayaṃ yaduta cittam ca sendriyāś ca kāya iti pūrvācāryāḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 72.18-21; T. 1558: 25c22-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 212; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master and criticizes this statement along with the seed theory that underlies it [T. 1562: 404a2-20; Cox 273-274]). This passage and its relationship to the Yogācārabhūmi have been discussed by Hakamaya, Schmithausen (285 n. 170), and Yamabe (Yugashichiron).

54 rūpasā cittād evotpattis tadhvākhetuparibhāvītād labdhaḥārtyāt (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 435.20: T. 1558: 146b2-3; La Vallée Poussin 5: 142).
does not use the terms ālayavijñāna or ādānavijñāna, there is no obvious connection between the Sautrāntika position here and the passages mentioned by Schmithausen. Nevertheless, Vasubandhu says that the beings in ārūpyadhātu have “no support other than the stream of consciousness”; he does not say that their support is the seeds of rūpa contained in the stream of consciousness. Thus it seems as though the Sautrāntika statement is based on a notion of a consciousness that has already “transcended its original feature of essentially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality” (Schmithausen 51). Furthermore, in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Vasubandhu adduces the inability of nikāyasabhāgatā and jīvendriya to act as a support for consciousness in ārūpyadhātu as proof that there exists a consciousness that can contain seeds and that is different from the six ordinary consciousnesses, namely the vipākavijñāna (maturation consciousness) or ālayavijñāna (Lamotte Traité 198.34-199.13, 248-249.))

55 If we admit the possibility that the term cittasamta can stand for ālayavijñāna,56 the connection between the passage in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi becomes more

55 The same argument also is found in the Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte La Somme 1: 39.1-4; 2: 61-62).
56 Schmithausen takes Odani to task for equating cittasamta with ālayavijñāna in the context of the Maulibhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi on the grounds that this is “inadmissible if we are to understand the materials of the Yogācārabhūmi in their original sense, and not from the point of view of later systematization” (342 n. 442). However, in the case of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu, unlike the author of the Maulibhūmi, was presumably familiar with a concept of ālayavijñāna that was systematized to at least some degree. Therefore, it is not impossible that he intentionally substituted the term cittasamta, which was current in abhidharma texts, for ālayavijñāna, which, of course, was not.
57 These are gods living in the second dhyāna heaven of rūpadhātu. See La Vallée Poussin 2: 18-20.
58 Schmithausen takes Odani to task for equating cittasamta with ālayavijñāna in the context of the Maulibhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi on the grounds that this is “inadmissible if we are to understand the materials of the Yogācārabhūmi in their original sense, and not from the point of view of later systematization” (342 n. 442). However, in the case of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu, unlike the author of the Maulibhūmi, was presumably familiar with a concept of ālayavijñāna that was systematized to at least some degree. Therefore, it is not impossible that he intentionally substituted the term cittasamta, which was current in abhidharma texts, for ālayavijñāna, which, of course, was not.
57 These are gods living in the second dhyāna heaven of rūpadhātu. See La Vallée Poussin 2: 18-20.
58 sautrāntikā vyācaksate / sūtra uktam yathā te nānāvasaṃjñānaḥ / tatār ye sattvā abhās- 
vare devanikāye ‘ciropapannā bhavanti naiva saṃvartanikālasā na vivartanikālasā asya lokasya 
te tāṃ arciṣāṃ dṛṣṭvā bhūtāḥ santa udvijante saṃvegam āpadyante / sahaivaśā ‘ṛcīḥ śūnyaṃ 
brāhmaṇaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhaṃ ‘ṛvāg āgamiśyaśīti / tatār ye sattvā abhāsvare devanikāye ciropa-
pannāḥ saṃvartanikālasā vivartanikālasā cāsya lokasya te tāṃ sattvān bhūtān āśvāsayantī / mā 
bhaśțā mārgāḥ mā bhaśța mārgāḥ / pūrvaṃ aprī ‘ṛcīḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhaṃ 
‘traivāntarhitē ti / ato ‘ṛcīḥ āgamaṃvapagama samjñāṇivāḥ bhūtā bhāsaṃjñāṇivāc ca te nānāt-
vasaṃjñino na sukhaudhāksamāsamjñīvād iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 116.16-23; T. 1558: 
43a10-19; La Vallée Poussin 2: 20; Samghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtra-
master [T. 1562: 463b5] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 463b6-11]; Katō 76).
likely. However, I shall have more to say later about the absence of the term ālayavijñāna in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

8. The Ābhāsvāra gods\(^{57}\) have different ideas because some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\(^{58}\) – The Ābhāsvāra gods are said to have different ideas because, at the time of the destruction of the universe, some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not. (According to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.)

*Vibhāṣā (1)\(^{59}\) – The *Vibhāṣā says that the Ābhāsvāra gods have different ideas, because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.

*Vibhāṣā (2)\(^{60}\) – The *Vibhāṣā also mentions the sūtra\(^{61}\) that states that some Ābhāsvāra gods are not afraid of the conflagration.

*Vibhāṣā (3)\(^{62}\) – It quotes the same sūtra describing Ābhāsvāra gods as being afraid.

*Tattvasiddhi – (nothing relevant)

\(^{57}\) 有色有情身一想異。如極淨天。是第三識住。有色等知前說。身一者。謂彼有情有一類身。一類顯形狀別無別。想異者。謂彼有情有樂想不苦不樂想 (T. 1545: 707b2-6).

\(^{58}\) 云何釋通契經所說。如契經說。苾芺當知。有極光淨先生。諸天見後生者觀劫火焰心生恐怖。而說言等。大仙勿怖大仙勿怖。我數會見此劫火焰燒空梵宮即於彼滅 (T. 1545: 386b5-9).

\(^{59}\) The Saptasūryavākaraṇa of the Dirghāgama (T. 1: 429a22-29; see La Vallée Poussin 2: 20).

\(^{60}\) 間若爾。經說當云何通。如說大地妙高山等皆悉洞然風吹絃焰展轉乃至上燒梵宮。極光淨天有生未久。於劫成壞不善了知。見已驚恐便作是念。勿彼火焰燒盡梵宮當復燒此 (T. 1545: 690b21-25).

\(^{61}\) ’od gsal gyi lha gnas na ni sṅa phyir skyes pa rnam / tshaṅs pa’i ’jig rten tshig pa’i me lee mthon ba las ’jigs pa dañ / mi ’jigs pa’i ’du šes su ’gyur bas / de daq ni ’du šes mi ’dra bar rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 211a5-6). 光音天衆先後生者。由觀梵世猛焰燒然。爾時便有怖不怖想。是故於彼有異類想 (T. 1579: 354c20-22).

\(^{62}\) Pratītyasamutpāda is the principle of conditioned origination, often expressed in a twelve-membered formula; according to the āvasthika interpretation, each member of the formula represents a different state (āvasthā) of the five skandhas.

\(^{64}\) atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kim khal etā īṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭir āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ / sūtrārtha ity āha / yādī sūtrārtho naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ / kathanī kṛtvā / yat tāvad
Yogācārabhūmi63 – According to the Śrutamayī Bhūmi, the Ābhāsvaras have different ideas because when they see Brahmā’s conflagration, some are afraid and some are not.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi clearly agree here. The *Vibhāṣā does not seem to recognize a controversy about what it means for these gods to have different ideas.

9. The āvasthika (static) interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda64 cannot be justified by sūtra.

Abhidharmakośabhāśya65 – Vasubandhu criticizes the āvasthika interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda. He says that it cannot be justified by sūtra because the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra is nītārtha (of explicit meaning).

*Vibhāṣā – (nothing relevant)
*Tattvasiddhi – (nothing relevant)

Yogācārabhūmi – (In the exposition of pratītyasamutpāda in the Sāvita-kādibhūmi, the explanation of the individual members essentially follows and comments upon the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra [T. 1579: 322b2-324a15; Yogācārabhūmi: 204.1-212.3; see Kritzer Rebirth 33-52 for a summary of this section]. Due to the length of the passage, I do not provide the text.)

uktām āvasthika eṣa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśapañcaskandhikā avasthā dvādaśāṅgānīty etad utṣītram / sūtre 'nyathā nirdeśād / avidyā katamā / yat tat pūrvānte 'jñānam iti vista-reṇa / yac ca nītārthaṁ na tat punar neyam bhavatīti naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāśya: 136.14-18; T. 1558: 50a7-13; La Vallée Poussin 2: 75; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, relates it to the last of the Śhavira’s six arguments against the āvasthika interpretation, and refutes it [T. 1562: 495c22-496a10; Katō 76]).

63 See Kritzer Rebirth 183-189.
64 saṅghitaparyāye coktaṃ mahāsaṃmudrād audārikah prāṇino jālat sthalam abhiruhya sikātāsthale 'nādiḥ sthāpayitvā sikātabhīr avaṣṭabhāya punar api mahāsaṃudre 'vataraṇī / tatra yāṣāṃ mātṛṇām aṅḍāṇy ārābhya śmṛtir na muṣyate tānī aṅḍāṇi na pūṭibhavanti yāsāṃ tu muṣyate tānī pūṭibhavanti / tad etan na varṇayāti sautraṇīkāh / mā bhūt para-kīyenaḥārenāḥāra iti / evaṃ tu varṇayānti /yeśāṃ aṅḍāṇāṃ mātaram ārābhya śmṛtir na muṣyate tānī na pūṭibhavanti / yeśāṃ tu muṣyate tānī pūṭibhavanti / tasyāḥ sparśāvaṇāḥyaḥ smaranīty (Abhidharmakośabhāśya: 154.4-7; T. 1558: 55b28-c1; La Vallée Poussin 2: 125; Katō 76-77).
Comment – Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not contain an explicit criticism of the Vaibhāṣika āvasthika interpretation, Vasubandhu seems to follow the Savitarkādibhūmi in relying on the Praṇītyasamutpādasūtra.66

10. The Samgītiparīyāya is criticized for its statement that large sea-beings, after they lay their eggs on the shore, provide nourishment in the form of manahsāṃcetanā (mental action or volition) by thinking of their eggs.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya67 – Vasubandhu criticizes the Samgītiparīyāya for its statement that large sea-beings, after they lay their eggs on the shore, provide nurture in the form of manahsāṃcetanā by thinking of their eggs. The Sautrāntikas say that one being’s thought cannot be nourishment for another being. Instead, the eggs, by thinking of their mother, provide such nourishment for themselves.68

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66 La Vallée Poussin says that some commentators specify “Sautrāntika” here, but so far the only texts that I’ve found that use the word are the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Paramārtha’s translation (T. 1559: 212c8). Neither the Tibetan (gu 162b1-4) nor Hsüan-tsang’s translation mentions whose opinion this is. Yasomitra, Saṃghabhadra, and Pu-kuang likewise fail to attribute the position to any teacher or school. Fa-pao mentions only that it is Vasubandhu’s preferred opinion (T. 1822: 612b14-15). According to Yamaguchi and Funahashi, none of the commentators attributes it to Sautrāntika (343 n. 8).

Katö notes that Hsüan-tsang omits “Sautrāntika” for reasons unclear. He also mentions that Saṃghabhadra does not identify whose opinion this is (76-77).

As Saeki notes (2: 450), the opinion that Vasubandhu quotes from the Samgītiparīyāya is an alternate opinion in the *Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 676b20-21). But Saeki does not note that the opinion that Vasubandhu prefers, which is attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the Sanskrit and in Paramārtha’s translation, is actually the preferred opinion of the *Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 676b16-20) and is what is said in the Samgītiparīyāya (T. 1536: 400c7-11). The *Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 676b21-23) refutes the alternate opinion with the same argument as Vasubandhu’s. Yamaguchi and Funahashi do not mention this discrepancy.

The opinion favored by Vasubandhu is also given in the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya (T. 1552: 952c8-9).

Van den Broeck suggests that Hsüan-tsang altered the text of the Samgītiparīyāya on the basis of Vasubandhu’s opinion, but he does not give any real basis for his suggestion (100 n. 7).

69 有說食增。云何知之。如集異門說。海中有獸時出海濤。於沙洲中生諸卵。以沙埋覆還入海中。後在卵殼憶念母故身不壞壞。謂憶念母先子煑時所有親故。若忘母身便壞壞。有餘師說。若母憶念卵中子卵則不壞。母若忘之卵便壞壞。此不應理。所以者何。勿以他食能持自命。是故前說於理為善 (T. 1545: 676b16-23).

70 nāsti samsthānaḥ dravyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / ekadimbhūnte hi bhūyasi varṇa utpanne dirghaṃ rūpaṃ iti prajñāpayate / tam evāpeksyāpyaṃ hrasvaṃ iti / caturdiṣṇaḥ bhūyasi.
11. Saṃsthānarūpa is a prajñāpti.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya – Saṃsthānarūpa (matter as shape) is only a prajñāpti, because if it were real, then a single saṃsthānarūpa would be perceived by two rūpindriyas (material sense organs), i.e., the eye, which would see the shape, and the faculty of touch, which would feel it. In fact, it is simply a designation for quantities of varṇa (matter as color) arranged in various ways.

*Vibhāṣā – (see the following item)
12. **Kāyavijñāpti** (physically manifested matter) is *saṃsthāna*, which is a *prajñāpti*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*\(^71\) – The Sautrāntika answer to the Sarvāstivādins’ question regarding the nature of *kāyavijñāpti* is *saṃsthāna*, which is, however, *prajñāpti*, not *dravya* (substantially real).\(^72\)

*Vibhāṣa*\(^73\) – The Dārṣṭāntika objects: “If *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti* are *rūpa*, then what are blue, yellow, red, and white?” The *Vibhāṣa* answers that it is not the case that there is no *rūpa* besides *varṇa*. *Kāyavijñāpti* is *saṃsthāna*, not *varṇa*.

*Tattvasiddhi*\(^74\) – *Saṃsthāna* is nothing other than *rūpa* (i.e., *varṇa*). If there is no color, there can be no perception of shape, while if shape

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\(^71\) The stated purpose of the whole section is to refute the Dārṣṭāntika opinion that *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti* are unreal (T. 1545: 634c9-10).

\(^72\) *Vibhāṣa* (T. 1579: 279b8-9). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and *sthāvijñapti* (personal communication).

\(^73\) *Vibhāṣa* (T. 1579: 599b11). *Kāyavijñāpti* is *saṃsthāna* (T. 1579: 279b8-9). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and *sthāvijñapti* (personal communication).

\(^74\) The stated purpose of the whole section is to refute the Dārṣṭāntika opinion that *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti* are unreal (T. 1545: 634c9-10).
were different from color, there could be a perception of it, even without a perception of color.

Yogācārabhūmi (1)\textsuperscript{75} – In the Viniścayasamgrahāṇi on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi, saṃsthabhūpa (shape) is said to be a prajñāpti because it is nothing more than a conglomeration of rūpa with no characteristics of its own.

Yogācārabhūmi (2)\textsuperscript{76} – In a passage in the Pañcavijñānakāyabhūmi (just after the one mentioned above), it is stated that saṃsthāna is a conglomeration of rūpa having features distinguished as “long,” etc.

Yogācārabhūmi (3)\textsuperscript{77} – The Viniścayasamgrahāṇi on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi adduces another reason for why saṃsthānarūpa is a prajñāpti: the mind can break down saṃsthānarūpa, like a cart, into component parts.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi\textsuperscript{78} agree that vijñapti is a prajñāpti, and the reasoning (see item 11) is essentially the same. The Dārsṭāntikās also deny the reality of vijñapti, but the *Vibhāṣā gives

\textsuperscript{75} Yamabe has identified another passage from the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi of the Viniścayasamgrahāṇi, according to which all vijñāptikarma, including kāyaviñapti, is merely prajñāpti (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 30b8; T. 1579: 589b11ff.) He notes the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (personal communication).

\textsuperscript{76} The Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa describes the theory of the Sauryodayikās (Lamotte Traité 188.33-189.11; 219-220), who may be the same as the Dārsṭāntikās (Lamotte Traité 219 n. 31). However, it is completely different from the Sautrāntika argument in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

\textsuperscript{77} karmasvabhāvaḥ katamaḥ / yo dharma utpadyamāno abhisamākralakṣanaḥ cotpadāyate tasya cotpadāt kāyaḥbhāṣamkāro vāgabhisamākśarasa tat uttarakālakā pravartate / ayam ucyate karmasvabhāvaḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 170.17-19); las kyi ño bo ñid gaṅ ze na / chos gaṅ skye ba na mñon par ’du byed pa’i mtshan ñid kyaṅ skye la / de skyes pas de’i rjes la lus kyi mñon par du ’byed pa dañ / ñag gi mñon par du ’byed pa ’jug par ’gyur te / ’di ni las kyi ño bo ñid ces bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 99b5-6); 業自性云何，謂若法生時，造作相起，及由彼生故，身行語行於彼後時造作而轉，是名業自性 (T. 1579: 321a18-20; see Kokuyaku Issaikyō Yuga-bu 1: 151 n. 27).

\textsuperscript{78} sā ’pi dravyato nāsti tī sautrāntikāḥ / abhyupetyākaraṇamātraitvat / attānī api mahanbhūtānī upādāya prajñaptes tēsyām cāvidyamānasvabhāvatvād rūpalakṣaṇabhāvāc ca (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 196.5-6; T. 1558: 68c26-28; La Vallée Poussin 3: 14; Samghabhadra quotes this passage [T. 1562: 539c9-11] and criticizes it at very great length; however, he does not mention the sūtra-master but simply attributes it to the Sautrāntikās [T. 1562: 539c11-540a25]; Katō 77).
no further details about their argument. As for the nature of karma, the Yogācārabhūmi does not say, in so many words, that karma is essentially volition. However, a definition in the Savitarkādibhūmi of the real nature of karma seems to suggest the primacy of volition: “What is the real nature of karma? When a dharma arises, which is characterized as (mental) determination also arises, and due to its arising, physical and vocal determination proceed later. This is the real nature of karma.”

13. Avijñapti does not really exist, for three reasons.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya — Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the statement that avijñapti does not really exist, for three reasons: it is simply the non-performance of an action that one has undertaken not to do; it is a prajñapti based on past mahābhūtas (great elements, i.e., the four types of matter [earth, etc.] in its most basic form), which themselves do not exist; it lacks the characteristics of rūpa.

82 These are special types of avijñapti (Hirakawa 191-193).
83 Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6; T. 1579: 659a12-16. See note 50 above.
84 Yogācārabhūmi; zi 19a1-21b1; T. 1579: 584c18-585c8. Due to the length of the passage, I have not included the text.
Vibhāṣā — The Vibhāṣā attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the argument that avijñapti is not real because, like vijñapti, it is not rūpa in the way that varṇa is.

Tattvasiddhī — Avijñapti is a cittaviprayuktasamskāra, and thus it has no separate existence.

Yogācārabhūmi (1) — The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi says that saṃvararūpa (a form of matter produced by taking a virtuous vow) and asaṃvararūpa (a form of matter produced by taking an evil vow) are merely prajñaptis.

Yogācārabhūmi (2) — The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Cintāmayī Bhūmi includes avijñapti, along with the cittaviprayuktasamskāras, vijñapti, and bīja, as prajñaptis, saying that they are nominal designations for saṃskṛtadharmas.

Yogācārabhūmi (3) — The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi denies the reality of past dharmas.

Comment — As in the case of vijñapti, Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi agree that avijñapti is a prajñapti. Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not give any reasons, Vasubandhu bases his second argument on a denial, which he shares with the Yogācārabhūmi, of the reality of the past.

14a. When the sūtra mentions rūpa that is invisible and not subject to collision (apratiṣṭha), it is referring not to avijñapti but to rūpa that is produced by meditation.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya — The Vaibhāṣikas give many different types of arguments in support of the real existence of avijñapti, but they are wrong. One argument in support is that the sūtra says that there are three
types of rūpa, one of which is invisible and not subject to collision (apratigha). According to the Vaibhāsikas, this must be avijñapti (Abhidharmaśabhapāya: 196.9-11; T. 1558: 69a2-4; La Vallée Poussin 3: 14). Vasubandhu, in making what he describes as the Sautrāntika argument against Vaibhāsika, quotes those who practice yoga (yogācārāh) as saying that, due to the power of meditation, rūpa that is the object of meditation is produced in meditators. This rūpa is invisible because it is not the object of caksurindriya, and it is not subject to collision because it does not cover any place. Vasubandhu defends this statement against a possible Sarvāstivāda objection.

*Vibhāṣā – (nothing relevant)
*Tattvasiddhi – (nothing relevant)

Yogācārabhūmi89 – The Viścayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśābhināyatmanobhūmi includes, in the category of really existent, rūpa that, due to supernatural power, is the object of samādhi (meditation), like a magical creation, rūpa that is the result of that samādhi, rūpa that is the object of that samādhi, and rūpa that is the object of the consciousness associated with that samādhi. This is contrasted with saṃvararūpa and asaṃvararūpa, which are merely prajñapti.

89 Yogācārabhūmi; zi 51a8-b1; T. 1579: 597b6-9. See note 84 above.
90 yad apy uktaṃ ānāsravāruपक्ति iti tad eva samādhiprabhāvasambhūtaṃ rūpaṃ ānāsrave samādāhyā anāsravāṃ varṇayaṇti yogācārāḥ (Abhidharmaśabhapāya: 197.7-8; T. 1558: 69b4-6; La Vallée Poussin 3: 18-19; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541a11-13] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 541a13-19]). Samghabhadra questions the identity of these yogācārās and expresses surprise that Vasubandhu quotes from them in interpreting sūtra (T. 1562: 541a14-15).

91 又如行者雖離色相以虛空功德能緣四空，如無色定能緣無漏色，是中無過非煩惱處。宗性亦應爾 (T. 1646: 343b17-19).
92 tat punaḥ samādhigocarāṃ rūpaṃ yatpratisamyutaḥ samādhiḥ tatpratisamyuktā eva tanmahābhūtaḥ upādāya laukikaṃ sāsravānāsravāṃ samādhiṁ upādāyotpādyate na tu lokottaraṃ / saprapaṃcākārasamādhihetukatvāt tasya (according to Matsuda [personal communication], this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the Viścayasamgrahaṇī preserved in St. Petersburg). tiṇ he ’dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs de yab tiṅ he ’dzin ’byun ba chen po dag rgyur byas pa ’i gzugs gaṅ daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa de dag niṅ daṅ de yab mtshuṅs par ldan pa yin no ’’jig rten pa ’i tiṅ he ’dzin zag pa daṅ
Comment – There is a clear correspondence here between the statement of those who practice *yoga*, quoted by Vasubandhu, and the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*.

14b. *Anāsravarūpa* (undefined matter) is not *avijñapti*. The *rūpa* produced by the power of *samādhi* is *anāsrava* if the *samādhi* in which it is produced is *anāsrava*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*⁹₀ – Another Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that there is an *anāsravarūpa*. Vasubandhu again quotes those who practice *yoga*, who say that the *rūpa* produced by the power of *samādhi* is *anāsrava* if the *samādhi* in which it is produced is *anāsrava*.

*Vibhāṣā* – (nothing relevant)

*Tattvasiddhi*⁹¹ – The *Tattvasiddhi* does not make this argument concerning *avijñapti*, but in another context it refers to the fact that an *ārūpya samādhi* can produce an *anāsrava rūpa*.

*Yogācārabhūmi*⁹² – The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi* on the *Pañcavijñānakāryanobhūmi* says that the *rūpa* that is the object of *samādhi* arises on the basis of the *mahābhūtas* associated with that *samādhi*, and it arises on the basis of *laukikasamādhi* (mundane meditation), whether *sāsrava* or *anāsrava*. However, it does not arise on the basis of *lokottarasamādhi* (supermundane meditation) because it is caused by a *samādhi* in which *prapañca* (conceptual proliferation)⁹³ is present.

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⁹₀ For this translation, I follow Nāṇananda as quoted in Schmithausen’s long note on the term (509 n. 1405).

⁹₁ For this translation, I follow Nāṇananda as quoted in Schmithausen’s long note on the term (509 n. 1405).

⁹₂ For this translation, I follow Nāṇananda as quoted in Schmithausen’s long note on the term (509 n. 1405).

⁹₃ For this translation, I follow Nāṇananda as quoted in Schmithausen’s long note on the term (509 n. 1405).

⁹₄ *yad api uktam punyābhivyuddhivacanād iti tatrāpi pūrva-cāryā nirṛiśanti dharmatā hy esa yathā yathā dātṛṇām dāyāḥ pariḥbhujyante tathā tathā bhoktṛṇām gunaviśeṣād anuvṛtiḥviṣeṣāc cānyamanasām api datṛṇāṃ tadālambanadānacetanābhāvātāh saññatayāḥ sūkṣmaṃ pariḥnaviśeṣāṃ prāpnuvanti yenāyatāṃ bahutaraphalābhīnispattaye samarth bhavanti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 197.15-19; T. 1558: 69b14-20; La Vallée Poussin 3: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 541c8-14] and explains and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 541c14-542b6]).
Comment – The passage in the Yogācārabhūmi implies what Vasubandhu states more clearly, that anāsravarūpa can arise due to samādhi.

14c. Merit increases, not due to avijñapti, but due to a gradual transformation of the saṃtattati of the giver.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\(^4\) – A third Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of avijñaptirūpa is that the sūtra says that merit increases.

95 yeṣu sansākāreṣu yac chubbhāsubhaṃ karmotpattanairuddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratayayena viśiṣṭa sanskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanetī ucayate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatiṭāyā īṣṭāṇiṣṭaphalaṁ nirvartate (Yogācārabhūmi: 128.2-4). 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye bra' can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni ba' chaqs žes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sdg pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gur ba'i phyir (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 75b4-5). 謂於諸行中，曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣，由此相續所攝習氣故，受不愛果生 (T. 1579: 305b3-6).

96 ji itar na sbyin pa las loṅs spyod can du 'gyur ba yin ze na / 'di itar 'di na la la sḥon gyi tshe rabs gaṅ dag tu sbyin pa las byaṅ bai bsod nams bya ba'i dḥos po byas sīṅ bsags par gyur te / de da itar phyug pa'i khyim daṅ / nor che ba nas mdzod daṅ / baṅ mdzod kyi tshogs maṅ ba'i bar gyi khyim du skye bar 'gyur ba 'bta bu'o (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 269a2-4). 云何布施能具珍財，謂如有一昔餘生中及增長施福事業。由此因緣，今生巨富大財寶家。乃至衆多府軍盈積云 (T. 1579: 375b13-16).

97 dharmatā-yuktiḥ katamā / kena kāraṇena tathābhūte ete skandhā(s) tathābhūto lokasaṃnviveṣaḥ kena kāraṇena khaṇa-lakṣaṇā prthivī dravalaṅkaṇa āpaḥ uṣṇaṅkaṇaṃ teta(h) samudrāṅkalakṣaṇo vayaḥ / anityāḥ skandhā(h) / kena kāraṇena śāntam nirvāṇaṃ iti / tathā rūpa[n]aṅkaṇaṃ rūpaṃ anubhavaṅkaṅkalṣaṇa vedaṇā saṃjñaṅkaṇaṅkaṇaṃ saṃjñaḥ abhisamskaraṇa-lakṣaṇaḥ samśkritā vijñaṅkaṇaṅkaṇaṃ vijñaṇam iti / prākṛtir eṣāṃ dharmāṅnāṃ idaṃ svabhāva eṣa idṛṣṭā dharmatāsāṃ(ṇ) caiva cāsa dharmatā / saivātra yuktir yoga apāyaḥ evaṃ vā etasmāḥ / ananyāḥ vā vaiśvām saṁvattraiva ca dharmatā prativiprasaṅgaṇaṃ dharmatāva yuktiḥ / citatantyāpanāya cittaśāntaṇapāṇāya ityaṃ ucayate dharmatā-yuktiḥ (Śrāvakabhiṣmi: 143.4-16; Śrāvakabhiṣmi; Wayman 79). chos ſid kyi rigs pa gaṅ ze na / ci'i phyir phyin po rnams de lta bur gyur pa yin / 'jig rten gnas pa de lta bur gyur pa yin / ci'i phyir sa'i mtshan ſid sra ba yin / chu'i mtshan ſid gser ba yin / me'i mtshan ſid tsha ba yin / rluṅ gi mtshan ſid gyo ba yin / ci'i phyir phyin po rnams mi rtag pa yin / ci'i phyir mya 'nan las 'das pa 'zi ba yin / de bzhin du ci'i phyir gzhugs kyi mtshan ſid gzhugs su ruṅ ba yin / tshor ba'i mtshan ſid myoṅ ba yin / 'du šes kyi mtshan ſid kun šes par byed pa yin / 'du byed rnams kyi mtshan ſid mgon par 'du byed pa yin / rnams par šes pa'i mtshan ſid rnam par šes par byed pa yin ze na / de ni chos ſid yin te / chos de dag gi raṅ bzin de yin žin / de dag gi no bo ſid de lta bu yin pas chos ſid de gaṅ kho na yin pa de ſid 'dir rigs pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / thabs yin no / de bzhin de lta bu 'am / gaṅ nam / gaṅ du na 'gyur pa ni sems la bzhag par bya ba daṅ / sems la go bar bya ba'i phyir thams cad du yān chos ſid kho na la brten pa daṅ / chos ſid kho na'i rigs pa yin te / de ni chos ſid kyi rigs pa 'es bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 75b5-6). 云何名為法爾道理。謂何因緣故即彼諸錯。 如是種類。 諸器世間。 如是安布。
Vasubandhu quotes the pūrvacāryas, who say that the merit increases when the recipient of a gift uses the gift, even though, in the time between the giving of the gift and its use, the giver of the gift might have a bad thought. Due to the nature of dharmas, the saṃtati of the giver of a gift is perfumed by the volition towards the recipient that accompanied the gift, and his saṃtati undergoes a gradual transformation until the saṃtati can give rise to greater results.

*Vibhāṣā – (nothing relevant)*

*Tattvasiddhi – (nothing relevant)*

Yogācārabhūmi (1)\textsuperscript{95} – The Savitarkādibhūmi uses the phrase viśiṣṭa saṃskārasaṃtatiḥ pravartate (“a distinguished series of conditioning forces proceeds”) in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results.

Yogācārabhūmi (2)\textsuperscript{96} – In the Cintāmayī Bhūmi, it is said that wealth accrues due to good karma produced by dāna (charity) and accumulated in former lives.

Yogācārabhūmi (3)\textsuperscript{97} – The idea that certain observable phenomena are attributable to the nature of dharmas [dharmatā] appears in various places in the Yogācārabhūmi in definitions of dharmatāyukti (reasoning with respect to the nature of dharmas), for example in the Śrāvakabhūmi.

Comment – Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not explain the accumulation of merit in terms of saṃtati-pariṇāmaviśeṣa (the transformation of the saṃtati), Vasubandhu’s theory of such a transformation may be based on the Yogācārabhūmi (see Yamabe “Bīja”). Hakamaya mentions this passage and suggests the possibility that the idea of pariṇāmaviśeṣa here...
may be that of a Sautrāntika group that preceded Vasubandhu and that cannot be identified with Yogācāra. However, Hakamaya does not provide any evidence from, for example, the *Vibhāṣa, the *Tattvasiddhiṣṭāstra, or the *Nyāyānusāra, and he leaves the question open.

15. *Asaṃvāra does not really exist separately (from volition).

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* — The Sautrāntikas say that *asaṃvāra* does not really exist separately (from volition). It is the intention to do something bad, an intention that continues until it is destroyed.

*Vibhāṣa* — The *Vibhāṣa* does not deal with this issue directly. However, it mentions that those who assert the unreality of *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* would be unable to establish the differences between those who are established in *saṃvara*, *asaṃvāra*, or *naivasaṃvāra* (neither *saṃvara* nor *asaṃvāra*).

*Tattvasiddhi* — *Avijñapti* is a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, and thus it has no separate existence (see above).
Yogācārabhūmi\textsuperscript{100} – The long explanation of asaṃvara in the Viṃścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamobhūmi (T. 1579: 589b24-c20) contains a definition very similar to that of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

Comment – Both Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi explain asaṃvara in terms of volition. Harivarman’s explanation is quite different.

16. Saṃvara and asaṃvara can be incomplete or partial.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\textsuperscript{101} – The Sautrāntikas say that saṃvara and asaṃvara can be incomplete or partial.
*Vibhāṣa*102 — According to the *Vibhāṣa*, the Gandhāra teachers say that *asaṃvara* can be incomplete, while the Kāśmīra teachers say that it cannot.

*Tattvasiddhi*103 — The *Tattvasiddhi* says that *saṃvara* cannot be partial.

Yogācārabhūmi104 — The explanation of the unrestrained person in the Viścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyanamobhūmi suggests that becoming unrestrained is a gradual process resulting from the accumulation of bad actions based on bad thoughts or intentions.

Comment — Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not contain a similar argument or an explicit statement that *saṃvara* or *asaṃvara* can be partial or incomplete, its description of the gradual process of becoming *asaṃvara* may imply that one can be unrestrained toward certain beings and not others or with regard to certain rules and not others. In this case, Harivarman seems to disagree with Vasubandhu and perhaps the Yogācārabhūmi.

*SAUTRĀNTIKA IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚABHĀṢYA* 363

**iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya): 278.17-22; T. 1558: 99a1-9; La Vallée Poussin 4: 6-7; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c24-597a2] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 597a2-15]; Katō 78).**

**分べ論者又説随眠是繫種子。繫眠自性心不相應。諸繫自性與心相應。繫從隨眠生 (T. 1545: 313a1-3).**

**故不應言諸使非心相應 (T. 1646: 258c7-8).**

**Katsura points out that, according to the *Tattvasiddhi*, caittas are not real dharmas (44).**

**ñon moṅs pa’i kun nas ñon moṅs pa’i rab tu dbye ba rnam par gzag pa gaṅ že na / mdor bsdu na ñon moṅs pa daṅ nê ba’i ñon moṅs pa ji skad bstan pa rnam s kyis ni rgyu gnis kyis sems can rnam s kun nas ñon moṅs par byed de / ‘di ltu ste / kun nas dkris pa daṅ bāq la ñal gyis so / de la ñon moṅs pa kun tu ’byuṅ ma mton du gyur pa ni kun nas dkris pa žes bya’o / de ngi kyi sa bon ma sphaṅs šiṅ yan dag par ma bcom pa ni bāq la ñal žes bya ste / gnas nγan len kyaṅ de yin no / ma sad pa’i phyir ni bāq la ñal yin la yin no pa’i gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkris pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 118a8-b3).**

**云何建立煩惱雜染染淨差別 轍如所説本随二 惡略二縁故染惱有情 一由縁故 二隨眠故 現行現起煩惱名縁 此即種子未斷未害 名曰隨眠亦名縁重 又不覺位名曰隨眠 若在覺位説名縁 (T. 1579: 623a20-24). Yamabe has noted that the passage from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is directly based on this passage (personal communication).**

**sarvalaukikotkārṣabhiṣāṅgamyātvac anuśāydh (Yogācārabhūmi: 167.6). ’jig rten pa’i yar ’phel ba thams cad kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pas na bāq la ñal rnam so (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 97b8-98a1). 一切世際增上種子之隨逐故名隨緣 (T. 1579: 314b25-26).**

**de la daṅ ba’i gzugs daṅ / sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba’i chos ji skad bstan pa thams cad la ñon moṅs pa’i sa bon yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa daṅ / ma sphaṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de ni bāq la ñal žes bya ste / gnas nγan len kyaṅ de yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 215a5-6).**
17. *Anuṣayas* are *kleśas* in the state of seeds, not separate entities (*dravyas*).

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\(^{105}\) — The Sautrāntikas define *anuṣayas* as *kleśas* in the state of seeds and say that they are not separate *dravyas*. *Anuṣayas* are dormant, i.e., not actualized, while *paryavasthāṇas* (active defilements) are awakened.

\(^{*Viḥśāyā}\(^{106}\) — According to the Viḥjayavādins, *anuṣayas* are the seeds of *paryavasthāṇas*, and they are dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayukta*).

\(^{*Tattvasiddhip}\(^{107}\) — *Anuṣayas* are *cittasamprayukta*.*\(^{108}\)

Yogācārabhūmi (1)\(^{109}\) — The Viśeṣayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi contains an explanation of *anuṣaya* and *paryavasthāṇa* almost identical to that in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

Yogācārabhūmi (2)\(^{110}\) — The Savitarkādi-bhūmi identifies *anuṣayas* as being the seeds of *kleśas*.

若於清淨諸色。及於如前所說一切心心所中。煩惱種子未害未斷。說名隨眠。亦名麁重
(T. 1579: 661b26-29).

\(^{111}\) Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6; T. 1579: 659a12-16. See note 50 above.

\(^{112}\) naiva hi sautrāntikāḥ attāt karmanāḥ phalotpattinā varayanti / kim tarhi / tatpurvakaḥ saṃtānaaviśeṣād ity ātmāvadapratipāde sampravedayiyāmaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 300.19-21; T. 1558: 106a11-13; La Vallée Poussin 4: 63; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 629b3-5], refers to Vasubandhu’s longer explanation at the end of Chapter 9 [Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 477.7-18] of *saṃtānaaviśeṣa* [T. 1562: 629b15-17] and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 629b18-630a11]; Katō 78).

\(^{113}\) 復有三法。謂過去未來現在法。問何故作此論。答為他宗顯正理故。謂或有執。世與行異。如譬喻者分別論師。彼作是說。世體是常行體無常 (T. 1545: 393a9-12).

\(^{114}\) 毘祇是業雖滅而能與果作因。不言定知如字在紙。罪業亦爾。以此身造業是 業雖滅果報不失 (T. 1646: 255c24-26). See Katsura, who points out that Harivarman does not mention *saṃtānaaviśeṣa* in this respect (41).

\(^{115}\) yad api utkam astya aṭṭhaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābaddhā vyābādhāṃ vedayan-
tiḥ / tatrātipi tadvāsanāyaḥ tadasthitopacāraṃ abhiprayoktan / yeśu saṃskāreṣu yaḥ chu-
bhāśubhāṃ karmatpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratayayena viśiṣṭa saṃskāra-
santaḥ pravartate sā vāsanetī yucaye / yasyāḥ prabhapṛpatīyā ēściṁṣaṭaphalaṃ
 nirvartate iti na yujyate / tato ’pi nāsti dosāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 127.19-128.4). ‘das pa’a’ las yod do ōs gusnus pa gañ yin pa de la yāh / bag chags de la / de yod pa’aı’ ‘dogs pa la dgoñs nas gusnus pa yin te / ’du byed gañ dag la dge ba dañ mi dge bı’ las skies nas gags pa yod la / rgyu de dañ rken des ’du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud ’jug pa de la ni bag chags ōs bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa dañ mi sdug pa’ı’ ‘bras bu grub par ’gyur ba’ı phyir mi ruñ ste (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 75b3-5). 又雖說言有過去業。由此業故諸
Yogācārabhūmi (3)\textsuperscript{111} – In the Cintāmāṇiprajñābhūmi of the Viścayasaṃgrahāṇī, the undestroyed seeds of kleśas are called anusayas.

Yogācārabhūmi (4)\textsuperscript{112} – According to the Cintāmāṇiprajñābhūmi of the Viścayasaṃgrahāṇī, bijas are praṇāpti.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi explain anusayas in the same way. Harivarman’s explanation is very different.

18. A result arises due to a saṃtānaviśeṣa (a special state of the saṃtātī)
based on a past action, not directly due to a past action.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\textsuperscript{113} – A result does not directly arise from a past action; instead, it arises due to a saṃtānaviśeṣa based on a past action.

有情受有損害受無損害受，此亦依彼習氣密意假說為有。謂於諸行中，曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理 (T. 1579: 305b1-6).

\textsuperscript{111} bcom ldan ’das kyis las ’das pa ni yod de gal te las ’das pa med du zin na ’di na la las gnod pa dañ bcas pa dañ / gnod pa med pa ’i tshor ba myon ba mi ’gyur žes gañ gsnis pa de la dgoṅs pa gañ že na / ’das pa ’i tshor ba sams sa las dge ba dañ mi dge ba bskyed ciṅ ’gags pas phyī ma la ’bras bu ’dod pa dañ mi ’dod pa mion par ’grub par de’i sa bon gyis ’du byed kyi rgyun phyī ma phyī ma yoṅs su bsgom pa las dgoṅs nas (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 20b4-6). 間如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害受。或復不應有一領納無損害受。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已起已減。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子攝受薰習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊為顯如是相續。是故說言過去業 (T. 1579: 585b7-13).

\textsuperscript{112} arhattvād api nāsti parihiṣṭiḥ iti sautrāntikāḥ / eso eva ca nyāyāḥ / katham idāṃ gamyate / āgamād yuktiṣṭaḥ ca (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 375.10-11 [but the whole argument continues until 377.5]; T. 1558: 130a16-130c16; La Vallée Poussin 4: 258 -265]; Sangghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 711c2-3] and criticizes it at exceedingly great length [T. 1562: 711c7-716a13; I have not distinguished here between his brief quotations of Vasubandhu’s opinions and his lengthy criticisms]; Katō 78).

\textsuperscript{113} yadi tāvad arhatas tadṛṣṭaḥ pratipakṣa utpanno yena kleśā atyantam anuttappi-dharmaṃ āpnanāḥ / katham punah parihiṣṭate / atha notpannah / katham kṣīṇāsravo bhavati / atyantam anayodṛṣṭaḥ tadbidjadharmatāyam aṣṭiṣṇāsravo vā punah katham arhaṃ bhavaitya evaṃ yuktīḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 376.17-20; T. 1558: 130c2-4; La Vallée Poussin 4: 263-264; Sangghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 716a1-4] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 716a4-13]).
*Vibhāsā*114 — At the beginning of its long defense of the reality of the three times, the *Vibhāsā* identifies Dārṣṭāntika and Vibhajyavāda as the opponents. However, it does not refer to the theory of *samānāviveśa*.

*Tattvasiddhi*115 — Although past karma gives rise to real results, it does not exist.

Yogācārabhūmi (1)116 — The Savitarkādibhūmi explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impres-
sions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the saṃhitati with the potential to yield results.

Yogācārabhūmi (2)\textsuperscript{117} – The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṃśatīyamanobhūmi gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term karmabīja (seed of karma).

Comment – See item 14c.

19. One cannot fall from arhatship.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\textsuperscript{118} – The Sautrāntikas say that one cannot fall from arhatship. They argue that the definition of an arhat is one whose kleśas are completely destroyed. This implies that the seeds of his kleśas are likewise destroyed, in which case it is impossible for the kleśas to arise again.\textsuperscript{119}

*Vibhāṣā (1)\textsuperscript{120} – The *Vibhāṣā mentions the view of the Vibhajyavādins, who say that the kleśas cannot arise again after having been destroyed.

*Vibhāṣā (2)\textsuperscript{121} – The *Vibhāṣā attributes to the Dārṣṭāntika the view that parihāṇī (fall from arhatship) is a prajñāpti and not a real dharma.

*Tattvasiddhi\textsuperscript{122} – The *Tattvasiddhi gives many arguments to the effect that once the arhat has destroyed the kleśas, they cannot arise again. But it does not mention the destruction of the bījas of kleśas.

Yogācārabhūmi (1)\textsuperscript{123} – The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṃśatīyamanobhūmi says that the arhat, who has destroyed the kleśas and their bījas, cannot fall from arhatship.

\textsuperscript{124} rnam par byaṅ ba’i phyogs daṅ mthun pa’i chos rnams kyis de yoṅs su bstan to /
**Yogācārabhūmi (2)**\(^{24}\) — The *Viścayasaṃgrahani* on the Śrāvakabhūmi says that one cannot fall from the four śrāmaṇyaphalas (attainment of the four stages of advanced Buddhist practice).

Comment — Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika position here and his argument for it are identical to those of the *Viścayasaṃgrahani* on the Pañcaviṃśānā-kāyamanobhūmi. The *Tattvasiddhi* and the *Vibhajyavādin* positions seem to agree with Sautrāntika to a great extent.

**IV. Sautrāntika or Yogācāra?**

A. The Dilemma

There are two possible explanations of the relationship between Vasubandhu’s ideas and those found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*: 1) Vasubandhu and the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi* both relied on ideas, particularly a theory of *bijā*, developed by a group, called Sautrāntika by Vasubandhu, that was active before the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; or 2) the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, perhaps influenced by a non-orthodox group, developed these ideas, which were then adopted by Vasubandhu, who, for reasons of his own, referred to them as Sautrāntika. Both explanations, however, present problems.

The problem with the first explanation is that we don’t really know what “Sautrāntika” means. Primarily on the basis of a handful of attributions by Vasubandhu, scholars beginning with Vasubandhu’s contemporary, Samghabhadra, and continuing up until the present, have assumed that a group of thinkers called “Sautrāntikas” preceded Vasubandhu. Thus, for example, one often sees references to Sautrāntika theories of seeds (e.g., Jaini) or to a Sautrāntika conception of ālayavijñāna, different from that of Yogācāra (Lamotte *Traité* 178-179). However, prior to the *Abhidharma-makośabhāṣya* itself, we have no textual evidence for a group of that name that asserts such ideas.\(^{125}\)

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\(^{124}\) See Cox (38), who summarizes Katō as saying that while both the *Vibhāṣā* and the

\(^{125}\) See Cox (38), who summarizes Katō as saying that while both the *Vibhāṣā* and the
On the other hand, an examination of the passages in which Vasubandhu attributes a doctrinal position to Sautrāntika shows that, in almost every case, a closely related, if not identical, position can be found somewhere in the Yogācārabhūmi. Corresponding passages appear most frequently in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśānakaśyamanobhūmi, followed by the Savitarkādibhūmi of the Maulībhūmi and other sections of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī. If, however, Vasubandhu is actually following the Yogācārabhūmi, one must explain why he uses the term Sautrāntika and why he never refers to the Yogācārabhūmi or its characteristic doctrine, ālayavijñāna, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

B. The Traditional Explanation: Vasubandhu’s Position in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is Sautrāntika

The commonly held view concerning Vasubandhu’s philosophical development is the one sarcastically described by Lamotte in his introduction to the Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa: “Who can believe that Vasubandhu without mentioning his acquaintance with the Sāṃkhyā, was a Vaibhāṣika in his youth, a Sautrāntika in his mature years, a Viśnovādin in his old age, and a Pure Land follower of Amitābha at his death?” (Lamotte History 39 [English translation of Histoire 179]). Having asked this acute rhetorical question, Lamotte indicates that he accepts at least the traditional description of the mature Sautrāntika, whom he identifies as the author of both the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa.126

Since Lamotte’s exposition of Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika standpoint in the Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa is the most explicit that I know, and since most of his arguments apply equally to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, I discuss it as representative of the traditional explanation of Vasubandhu’s position. Lamotte begins by saying that the purpose of both texts is “to combat, within the framework of the Hinayāna and relying on the best of the Sautrāntika, the exaggerated realism of the Vaibhāṣikas and the spiritualism of the Vātsīputriyās” (Lamotte History 40 [English translation of

Samayabhedoparacanacakra use the term Sautrāntika, neither text uses it to refer to the same group as Vasubandhu.

126 For a discussion of Vasubandhu’s career, see Kritzer Rebirth 198-199.
Lamotte *Histoire* 180). Furthermore, he points out that the two texts ignore Mahāyāna, including Yogācāra idealism, and goes on to refute the Chinese and Tibetan tradition that the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a Mahāyāna work, disagreeing in particular with Bu-ston’s characterization of the text as idealistic.

Then Lamotte presents what he considers to be internal evidence supporting his claim that the text is Sautrāntika. First, he calls attention to the fact that the teachers and schools mentioned and the majority of the scriptures quoted in the text, with the exception of two quotations from the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*, belong to Hinayāna. However, this in itself does not prove anything. After all, many portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* also fail to quote Mahāyāna sūtras. The *Viniścayasaṃgṛahaṇī*, which does quote Mahāyāna sūtras, to the best of my knowledge quotes primarily the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*.

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127 See item 11 above.

128 *de la gzhugs kyi phun po thams cad ni skad cig pa yin par brjod par bya’o/ de’i ci phyir ze na/ skies nas ‘jig [corrected from na jig on the basis of the Derge] pa dmigs pa’i phyir ro/ skye ba’i rgyu ni ‘jig pa’i rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ste/ mtshan ŋid mi ’dra ba’i phyir ro/ skies pa gnas pa’i rgyu de las gzan pa yaṅ mi dmigs pa de’i phyir ’du byed thams cad ni raṅ gi naṅ gis ’jig pa yin par rig par bya ste/ de’i phyir skad cig pa ŋid rab tu grub po (Yogācārabhūmi; zii 58a4-6). 復次一切色貪常言皆是剎那滅性，何以故。壞滅，現可得故，又不應謂能生之因即是滅因。其相異故，又法生已餘徃住因不可得故，是故當知一切諸行皆任運滅。由此道理剎那滅（T. 1579: 600a18-22). See also the Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya: sanskṛtasyāvavṛtyam vyavāt ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṁ vināśaḥ/ kiṃ kāraṇam/ kāryasya hi kāraṇam bhavati/ vināśaś cābhāvaḥ/ yāś cābhāvaḥ tasya kiṃ kartavyam/ so ‘sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpamānātāsaya na syāt paścad api na syād bhāvasya talyaṭvāt/ athānāthāḥbhāthāḥ na yuktāṃ tasyai-vyayaḥbhāthāvam/ na his sa eva tasmād vilakṣaṇo yuyate/ ko ‘yam kṣaṇo nāma/ ātmalābhā ’nantaraviniśā/ so svātātīti kuśāntam/ daṇḍi-kavat (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya): 193.5-10; T. 1558: 67c17-20; La Vallée Poussin 3: 5; Sanghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master (T. 1562: 533b21-22) and criticizes it, saying that, because of the validity of the *samskṛtalaksana*, destruction must have a cause (T. 1562: 533c10-21; see Rosspat 180-181).

The passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* is translated by Rosspat, who also provides the Tibetan text and the text from the Sanskrit manuscript (181-182 n. 399). Rosspat thinks that the argument here is somewhat different from that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (181-182).

129 *de la lus yul nas yul gzan du ’byuṅ ba tsam daṅ/ de ŋid na ’gyur ba ’byuṅ ba tsam ni lus kyi rnam par rig byed do/ ṇag tsam ni ṇag gi rnam par rig byed do/ de bzin du sens miṅ pa/ ’du byed pa skies pa’i sens pa tsam ni yid kyi rnam par rig byed do/ de ci’i phyir ze na/ ’du byed thams cad ni skad cig pa yin pa’i phyir yul nas yul gzan du ’pho bar mi rigs pas (Yogācārabhūmi; zii 31a4-5). 此中唯有身處滅於餘處生或即此處唯變異，生名身表業，唯有語音名音表業，唯有發起心造作恩名意表業。何以故。由一切行皆剎那故。
Next, Lamotte identifies and characterizes as Sautrāntika a number of positions asserted by Vasubandhu (Traité 177-179), many of which are also found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Below I summarize these positions and provide corresponding passages from the Yogācārabhūmi:

1) According to Lamotte, Vasubandhu adopts Sautrāntika positions on major issues regarding karma.

a) Positions concerning vijñapti and avijñapti:

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – Saṃsthāna does not exist separately from color.  
Yogācārabhūmi – The same position is found in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavigijnānakāyamanobhūmi.\(^{127}\)

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – Destruction is spontaneous, without a cause.  
Yogācārabhūmi – The same position is found in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavigijnānakāyamanobhūmi.\(^{128}\)

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – There is no duration or movement.  
Yogācārabhūmi – A similar statement is found in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavigijnānakāyamanobhūmi.\(^{129}\)

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – The essence of body and speech karma is volition.  
Yogācārabhūmi – A similar position may be implied by the Savitarkādi-bhūmi.\(^{130}\)

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – Avijñapti proceeds from volition, not from matter.  
Yogācārabhūmi – The definition of asaṃvara in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavigijnānakāyamanobhūmi implies that asaṃvara is based on volition.\(^{131}\)

b) Positions concerning action and retribution:

\(^{130}\) See note 66, comment on item 12.
\(^{131}\) See item 15.
\(^{132}\) See item 18.
\(^{133}\) See item 14c.
\(^{134}\) ‘jug pa’i rnam par šes pa tsam ņe bar ņi bar zad kyi / kun gĩ rnam par šes pa ņe
Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – Past actions do not really exist.

Yogācārabhūmi – The same position is found in the Savitarkādibhūmi and Viścayasaṅgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṣṇunakāyamanabhūmi.132

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – Action comes to fruition by means of saṃtattapiṛiṇāmaviṣeṣa.

Yogācārabhūmi – A similar mechanism is described in the Savitarkādibhūmi.133

c) Position concerning the perfuming of a retribution consciousness:

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – In the context of explaining how nirodhasamāpatti is sacittaka (accompanied by mind), Vasubandhu agrees with the Sūtraprāmāṇikas in believing that a vipākaviṣṇuṇa, perfumed by the pravṛttivijñānas (the six ordinary consciousnesses), is not interrupted in the meditations “not accompanied by mind” (acittaka).

Yogācārabhūmi – A similar position (according to which, however, the term vipākaviṣṇuṇa is replaced by ālayaviṣṇuṇa) is found in the Viścayasaṅgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṣṇunakāyamanabhūmi.134

2) According to Lamotte, the ālayaviṣṇuṇa Vasubandhu teaches is “Sautrāntika,” differing from that of Viṣṇunāvāda.

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – There is no two-fold division of consciousness into nimittabhāga (image portion) and darśanabhāga (vision portion).

Yogācārabhūmi – A developed form of idealism characterized by such a division of consciousness is not found in the Yogācārabhūmi either.135

135 See Schmithausen 32-33.
136 ci’i phyir gnas len pa mi ruñ že na smras pa (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 2b4). 何故若無阿頤耶識依止執受不應道理 (T. 1579: 579a25-26).
137 See note 112.
138 len pa’i rnam par šes pa zab ciṅ phra / sa bon thams cad chu bo kluṅ ltar ’bab / bdag tu rtog par gyur ni ma ruñ źes / byis [corrected from phyis on the basis of the Derge] pa rnam las ni de ma bstan (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 2b1). 阿頤耶識甚深細一切種子如海流我於凡愚不開演 恐被分別執為我 (T. 1579: 579a15-16).
Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – The ālayavijñāna appropriates a body that consists of rūpa, the reality of which is not questioned.

Yogācārabhūmi – One of the proofs of ālayavijñāna in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikā�amanobhūmi is that, without an ālaya, there could be no appropriation of the body. Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi generally does not question the reality of rūpa.

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa – The explanation of why the Buddha did not teach ālaya to his disciples is different from Asaṅga’s in the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, which is predicated on the unreality of the external object. In the Karmasiddhi, Vasubandhu quotes the Saṃdhinirmocana, saying that ignorant people would mistake the ālaya for a soul.

Yogācārabhūmi – The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikā�amanobhūmi quotes the same passage at the beginning of its exposition of ālayavijñāna to explain why it has not been taught before.

As we can see, all of these positions supposedly characteristic of Sautrāntika can be traced more or less clearly to the Yogācārabhūmi, particularly to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikā�amanobhūmi. And not one of these positions can be traced to a text earlier than the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in which it is identified as Sautrāntika. Thus, the Sautrāntika positions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, a text that is considered to be later than the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and more developed, i.e., closer to classical Yogācāra, are comparable if not identical. The only striking difference is that the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa mentions ālayavijñāna.

Therefore, Lamotte’s “internal evidence” that the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa is a Hinayāna Sautrāntika text can equally well be viewed as testimony to Vasubandhu’s reliance on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, a reliance similar to that which we have seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Lamotte calls the positions that he cites “Sautrāntika” because Vasubandhu has identified them as such in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya or because the commentator on the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa

139 Schmithausen disagrees with Lamotte, who thinks that the ālayavijñāna that appears
does so. In either case, the ultimate source of this identification is Vasubandhu himself.

Those, like Lamotte, who argue that Vasubandhu’s position in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa is Sautrāntika point to the fact that his theories, while departing from Sarvāstivāda, are not classical Yogācāra, that is to say, they are not vijñaptimātra (consciousness-only). It is not claimed that Vasubandhu was in the process of working out the system; that role is traditionally attributed to Asaṅga. Rather, Vasubandhu was in the process of his own conversion from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna, from Sarvāstivāda to Yogācāra, and these Sautrāntika positions were a step away from the orthodox Sarvāstivāda that had become unsatisfactory to him. On the other hand, he was not ready to take the final step to Mahāyāna idealism.

Interestingly, a similar progression is described by Schmithausen with respect to the composition of the Yogācārabhūmi. He identifies an earlier stratum of the text that is, in his coinage, “pre-ālayavijñānic,” a stratum in which the term ālayavijñāna is used but the concept is not fully developed, and a later stratum in which the ālayavijñāna more closely resembles that of later Yogācāra texts such as the Mahāyānasamgraha. According to Schmithausen, the Viścayasaṃgrahāṇī as a whole comprises the third stratum, although even there one can find earlier material in which the ālayavijñāna is not mentioned or presupposed (14, 271-272 n. 131). It is as if Schmithausen sees the Yogācārabhūmi as a fossil record of the evolution of the concept of ālayavijñāna, and if the text is a compilation, it makes sense that ideas that are the forerunners of ālayavijñāna should be preserved therein.

However, I find it difficult to accept a similar model for the development of Vasubandhu’s thought. Although we know the precise dates of none of the texts under discussion, I assume that the Yogācārabhūmi was available to Vasubandhu in a form similar to the one we know, i.e., with at least the Maulībhūmi and the Viścayasaṃgrahāṇī included in one text. If Vasubandhu was not familiar with the Yogācārabhūmi, then we would have to assume that he learned his Sautrāntika ideas from the same sources as the authors of the corresponding passages in the Yogācārabhūmi. As we

in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa reflects a Sautrāntika theory of ālayavijñāna. Rather, Schmithausen thinks that Vasubandhu uses the Yogācāra ālayavijñāna as a model (257-258, n. 78).
have seen, written records of these sources, if they ever existed, are no longer extant.

According to the traditional view of his career, Vasubandhu wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* after he had come to accept Sautrāntika ideas. Some time later, having learned the doctrine of ālayavijñāna, perhaps directly from Asāṅga, perhaps from a text like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, he converted to Mahāyāna and became a Yogācāra/Vijñānavādin. In this case, it is difficult to explain his mentioning ālayavijñāna in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. According to the traditional explanation, Vasubandhu wrote this text before his conversion. Did he invent a non-Vijñānavādin version of ālayavijñāna independently, as a sort of logical development of his Sautrāntika seed theory, in the same process that Schmithausen describes with respect to the *Yogācārabhūmi*? Did he borrow the term from one of the no longer extant Sautrāntika sources that I postulated above? If Schmithausen is correct that the theory of ālayavijñāna developed within the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both of these hypotheses seem far-fetched.

It is far more likely that Vasubandhu was, in fact, familiar with the *Yogācārabhūmi*. If so, he would have known the positions that he calls Sautrāntika from that text and perhaps from the lost Sautrāntika sources as well. In either case, according to the traditional explanation, at the time of writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu must have adopted these ideas, while not yet accepting the theory of ālayavijñāna, which he would have also known from the *Yogācārabhūmi*. By the time he wrote *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, he tentatively believed in a not fully developed, Sautrāntika-like ālayavijñāna, which he knew from the *Yogācārabhūmi* and perhaps from a lost Sautrāntika source. Finally, he wrote texts like the *Trimsūkā* after his conversion to Mahāyāna. In other words, the development of Vasubandhu’s belief in ālayavijñāna paralleled the develop-

140 Schmithausen 34-65. I have undoubtedly grossly oversimplified his complex argument.
141 Schmithausen 10, 259 n. 92. He identifies the section as *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 1b2-10b6; T. 1579: 579a7-582a12.
142 Schmithausen identifies the section as *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 2b2-4a4; T. 1579: 579a14-c22 (300 n. 226). He also shows that the various proofs are not completely consistent in the ideas of ālayavijñāna on which they are based (194-196).
ment of the theory of ālayavijñāna in the Yogācārabhūmi but some time after the Yogācārabhūmi was already completed.

However, it seems strange that Vasubandhu would repeat the entire process of the discovery of ālayavijñāna. A fairly complete version of the theory must have been available to him in what Schmithausen calls the “ālayavijñāna treatise” at the beginning of the Vinīścayasamgrahani.141 It is hard to believe that Vasubandhu would have been satisfied with a theory like mutual seeding once he had been exposed to the eight-fold proof of ālayavijñāna, which includes among its arguments a refutation of that very theory.142 Nevertheless, Vasubandhu does, in fact, present the theory of mutual seeding on at least one occasion, evidently with approval.143 If Vasubandhu already believed in ālayavijñāna when he wrote the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, we must explain why he introduces such positions that are superseded by the more developed theory of ālayavijñāna.

C. An Alternative Explanation: Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Position in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Reflects his Yogācāra Beliefs

I have previously speculated that Vasubandhu was a Yogācāra when he wrote the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Kritzer “Vasubandhu,” Rebirth 199-204), and I have not changed my mind. In this article, I hope to present more persuasive arguments based on further evidence.

In my earlier works, I reasoned primarily on the basis of two arguments in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” definition of vijñāna as a member of the pratītyasamutpāda formula and his criticism of certain cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras. Since then, I have begun a more systematic examination of Vasubandhu’s unorthodox opinions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. In addition to my search for the term Sautrāntika, the results of which I have presented in Section III of this paper, I have also searched for opinions identified by Saṃghabhadra as those of the sūtra-master. Saṃghabhadra uses this appellation with reference not only to most of the positions that Vasubandhu himself labels Sautrāntika,

143 See section III, item 7.
144 I have published the results regarding the first three chapters of the Abhidharma-
but to many others as well. Many of these passages also correspond more or less clearly to passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.\(^{144}\)

Although some of the correspondences that I have identified are less certain than others, their sheer number strongly suggests that Vasubandhu relies heavily on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for his criticism of Sarvāstivāda. However, the great majority of the correspondences between the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (and the *Karmasiddhipray卡拉ṇa*) and the *Yogācārabhūmi* involve passages that do not appear to be based on a theory of ālayavijñāna.

In trying to account for this, I run the danger of reading too much into Vasubandhu’s statements. In essence, I argue that Vasubandhu favors positions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that do not mention ālayavijñāna because he infers a theory of ālayavijñāna underlying them. This is clearly a risky proposition, especially since Sautrāntika is traditionally seen as preceding Yogācāra, both historically and in the development of Vasubandhu’s thought. With reference to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Schmithausen warns us not to “lightly interpret our text on the lines of later sources and developments” (205). This very principle is what enables Schmithausen to challenge the traditional view that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a coherent composition of one man, Asaṅga, and I believe that Schmithausen is correct in his approach.

\(^{145}\) *Kritzer Rebirth* 200. As far as I know, Aramaki has not published this observation, which he conveyed to me personally. However, in the meantime, he has publicly stated his ordering of the strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which differs significantly from Schmithausen’s. According to Aramaki, the *Maulīḥūmi* (excluding the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi*), which contains much of the traditional *abhidharma* material found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is later than the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*, in which ālayavijñāna is taught and the *Sandhīṃrocanaśūra* is quoted.

\(^{146}\) de la kun rāzob kyi tshul rnam par bţag pas ’jug pas ni ’di lta ste / yid kyi sar sīnar bstan pa žin du rig par bya’o / de la don dam pa’i tshul rnam par bţag pa bsad par bya ste / don dam pa’i tshul rnam par bţag pa ’jug pa gaṅ že na / mdor bsdu na rnam par šes pa ni rnam par gños te / kun gzi rnam par šes pa daṅ / ’jug pa’i rnam par šes pa’o (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 189a8-b2). 云何世俗道理建立。謂依世俗道理建立諸心差別轉義。當知如前意地已說。勝義道理建立差別我今當說。云何名為勝義道理建立差別。謂略有二識。一者阿賴耶識。二者轉識 (T. 1579: 651b11-15; see Schmithausen 689-690).

\(^{147}\) sa bon rnam par bţag pa’i tshul ’di ni kun gzi rnam par šes pa rnam par ma gţag pa la rig par bya’o / rnam par bţag pa la ni mdor bsdu na de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig bar bya ste / sa bon de dag ni ma spāns pa daṅ spāṅ bar bya ba ma yin
Nevertheless, there are two major differences between the Yogācāra-bhūmi and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that I feel justify some departure from Schmithausen’s principle. First, several of the most important sources for Yogācāra doctrine, including the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the completed Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the Mahāyānasamgrahā are generally considered to predate Vasubandhu’s work. In other words, Vasubandhu must have known the doctrine of ālayavijñāna, whether he agreed with it or not. Second, to the best of my knowledge, no one, not even Schmithausen, has suggested that the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is not a coherent composition of one man, Vasubandhu.

I have proposed that Vasubandhu’s reason for not mentioning ālayavijñāna in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya has to do with the nature of the text, which is an exposition and criticism of traditional abhidharma, not a presentation of Yogācāra ideas (Kritzer Rebirth 203-204). I referred to Aramaki Noritoshi’s idea that portions of the Yogācārabhūmi present the Yogācāra exposition of ultimate truth, that is, the doctrine of ālayavijñāna, while other portions, which do not mention ālayavijñāna, represent provisional truth.145 My conclusion was that the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, like the abhidharma portions of the Yogācārabhūmi, is an exposition of provisional truth. Since the Yogācāras seem to have arisen from a Sarvāstivādin milieu (Yamabe “An Shigao”), it is not surprising that much Yogācāra

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148 de la 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa gañ že na / ci yañ med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags dañbral goñ ma'i 'dod chags dañbrañ ma yah ñuh / 'dod chags dañbral yah ruñ ba'i gnas pa'i' du ñes sion du btañ ba'i yid la byed pas sens dañ sens las byuñ ba'i' chos rnam' 'gog pa tsam dañ / ñe bar ži žiñ mi 'byuñ bsam ni 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa žes bya ste / 'jug pa'i rnam par ñes pa tsam ñe bar ži bar zad kyi / kun gzi rnam par ñes pa 'ňe bar ži ba ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; ži 39a3-6). 復次云何滅盡定，謂己離無所有處貪離上貪，或復離由止息想作意為先故，諸心心所唯滅靜唯不轉。是名滅盡定。此定唯能滅靜轉議。不能滅靜阿賴耶識 (T. 1579: 593a1-4; see Schmithausen 272 n. 131).

149 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa ni ci yañ med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags dañbral ba'i gnas pa'i' du ñes sion [corrected from mignon on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese] du btañ ba'i yid la byed pas miñ 'gog pa'i gnas skabs lâ'o / de yañ rnam pa gsum ste / bo bo niñ las ni dge ba niñ yin no / gañ zag las ni 'phaqs pa'i rgyud du gtos te / slob pa'i rgyud dam mi slob pa'i rgyud du gtos pa yin no / skye ba las ni kun gzi rnam par ñes pa rnam par ma gžag ni dañ po' dir skyes cî / de'i og tu gzung kyi kham su mignon du byed do / mignon du byed pa ni gzung kyi lus la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro / kun
and Sarvāstivādin teachings on this level essentially agree. Thus, Vasubandhu is able to use the general framework of the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, while he “corrects” those details that seriously conflict with the Yogācāra abhidharma.

I have noticed that Schmithausen refers to a passage in the Yogācārabhumi that supports Aramaki’s idea. In the Viniścayasamgrahani on the Sacittakabhumi, it is said that the traditional way of establishing consciousness is taught in the Manobhumi (of the Maulībhumi), while the ultimate teaching is that there are two types of consciousness, the ālayavijñāna and the pravṛttivijñānas. Although Schmithausen mentions this only to prove that the mention of ālayavijñāna in the Manobhumi is a later addition to the text, the passage shows that the author(s)/compiler indeed distinguishes between levels of teaching within the text.

Three passages in the Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcaviṣṇakāyamanobhumi, identified by Schmithausen, may also be relevant. The first comes at the end of a long explanation of mutual seeding (see section III, item 7), in which mutual seeding is said to be taught only when ālayavijñāna is not yet established. The next states that the definition of nirodhasamāpatti as a state in which all cittas and caitasikas (mental dharmas) are suppressed refers only to the pravṛttivijñānas, not to ālayavijñāna. In the third passage, nirodhasamāpatti is said to be obtainable in rūpadhātu after it has been obtained in kāmadhātu (the realm of desire).
However, according to the text, when ālayavijñāna has been established, nirodhasamāpatti must be obtainable in ārūpyadhatu as well.\textsuperscript{149}

Schmithausen mentions all of these references to ālayavijñāna as examples of later additions made by the compiler (271-272 n. 131). In the case of the first passage, at least, he also states that he does “not hesitate to take this systematical statement of the compiler historically, viz. in the sense that this bīja theory was devised when ālayavijñāna had not yet been introduced” (288 n. 173). Schmithausen thus does not connect these statements with that of the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Sačittakabhūmi concerning two levels of teaching. Given his confidence that the Yogācārabhūmi is not the work of a single author, this is understandable. However, Schmithausen does assume that there was a compiler who put together the various strata into the text we now have, and he allows for the possibility of the compiler’s having inserted his own comments into the text.

Therefore, in light of the fact that either the author of the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Sačittakabhūmi or the compiler explicitly refers to ālayavijñāna as an ultimate teaching, it does not seem unreasonable that the author/compiler’s comments on the three passages in the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi reflect his judgement regarding the level at which their statements apply rather than, or as well as, his understanding of the historical development of the relevant doctrines. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra contains the famous statement that the Buddha did not teach ālayavijñāna\textsuperscript{150} to fools who might mistake it for a soul (ātman).\textsuperscript{151} The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which Lopez (6) describes as providing for Yogācāra the criteria for determining “what bhavati / eṣa tāvat pāramārthiko ’bhiddharmaḥ / sāṃketikas tu tatprāptaye yāpi ca yac ca śāstram (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 2.3-6; La Vallée Poussin 1: 3-4).

\textsuperscript{153} atas tadhetos tasya dharmapracayasyārthe śāstrā kila buddheṇābhidharma uktāḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 3.1; La Vallée Poussin 1: 5-6).

\textsuperscript{154} prāyena hi kāśmirvaibhāṣikāṅkāṁ nītyādīsiddha eṣo ’smābhir abhidharma ākhyātāḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 450.1-2; La Vallée Poussin 5: 223).\textsuperscript{155} 郭主此中述己本意，言依此國諸善逝子，議對法理大毘婆沙，發起正勤如理觀察。如法運法久住世間，德益有情故造斯論。多言顯示少有異途。謂形像色去來等 (T. 1562: 775b20-23; La Vallée Poussin 5: 223 n. 1b).

\textsuperscript{156} See Jaini’s introduction to the Abhidharmadīpa (second ed. 111); Rhys Davids and Stede (488).

\textsuperscript{157} See, for example, Vasubandhu’s definition of bīja in the context of his denial of the
constitutes the definitive (nītārtha) and the interpretable (neyārtha),” implies that the doctrine of ālayavijñāna, besides being dangerously difficult to understand, is a more definitive teaching than that of the traditional six ordinary types of consciousness. Although the main force of the statement in the Saṃdhinirmocanāsūtra is to explain why the crucial term ālayavijñāna cannot be found in the āgamas (scriptures), it also suggests a reason for the limited use of the term in Yogācāra abhidharma.

It is true that, in the context of Sarvāstivāda, abhidharma is the definitive teaching. But early in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu distinguishes between abhidharma in its ultimate meaning, i.e., pure wisdom, and abhidharma in a conventional sense, namely impure wisdom as well as the śāstra (doctrinal treatises) that result in the attainment of pure wisdom. Furthermore, as is well known, Vasubandhu denies that the abhidharma śāstras are the words of the Buddha. Therefore, from Vasubandhu’s point of view, although most of the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma that he describes without criticism in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is conducive to pure wisdom, it is not necessarily a statement of all that is known by pure wisdom.

In other words, the purview of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya does not include Mahāyāna teachings such as ālayavijñāna. Vasubandhu accurately describes his own work as abhidharma based in general on the teaching of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. Saṃghabhadra elaborates on this, quoting Vasubandhu as saying that, in addition to Vaibhāṣika teachings, he has also taught a bit of another path. Saṃghabhadra gives as examples Vasubandhu’s statements about saṃsthitānarūpa and the past and
reality of prāpti: kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samartham sākṣāt pāramārṣya vā / santatiparīṇāmaviśeṣāt (Abhidharmakośabhaṣya: 64.4-5).

158 kāh Saurāntikārthạḥ ye sūtra-prāmāṇikāḥ na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ. te Saurāntikāḥ (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 11.29-30).
future. We can speculate that Vasubandhu feels it necessary to correct the Vaibhāṣika positions on these and other issues because they are irre-
trievably in conflict with his true beliefs. But rather than introducing terms like ālayavijñāna, totally alien to the abhidharma literature on which he claims to rely, he appeals to concepts like bija, which, on the one hand, is not completely unknown in the traditional āgama, where metaphors concerning seeds can be found,\textsuperscript{156} and, on the other hand, can be explained technically in terms familiar in an abhidharma context.\textsuperscript{157}

Finally, I must return to the term “Sautrāntika,” the significance of which remains unclear. It would be nice to imagine that the sūtras in question are Mahāyāna sūtras, particularly the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, and that Vasubandhu uses the term to signal a reliance on such works. However, I have found no evidence to support such a fanciful theory. For now, I must follow Yaśomitra’s explanation: “What is the meaning of sautrāntika? Those who take sūtra as their authority, not śāstra, are Sautrāntikas.”\textsuperscript{158} At least some of Vasubandhu’s opinions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,
whether or not they can be characterized as Yogācāra, contradict orthodox Vaibhāṣīka, for which the texts of the Sarvāstivādin abhidharmapiṭaka are authoritative. If Vasubandhu admitted that they are indeed authoritative, he would not be able to criticize them as fundamentally as he does. By siding with “those who take sūtra as authority,” he is free to reject that with which he disagrees, implying that it has not been taught in the sūtras. On the other hand, he is still free to accept those Sarvāstivādin opinions with which he agrees. As Yaśomitra makes clear, much of abhidharma can be found in the sūtras, particularly ones like the Arthaviniścayasūtra that illuminate the characteristics of dharmas. Furthermore, the sūtras can often be interpreted in more than one way. For example, the words citta, manas, and vijñāna are mentioned together in the Dīghanikāya, apparently as synonyms, which is in fact the way that they are understood by the Vaibhāṣīkas. But the Yogācārabhūmi famously differentiates them: vijñāna refers to the six traditional forms of consciousness, manas is kliṣṭamanas, and citta is ālayavijñāna. If Vasubandhu’s intention in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is secretly to reinterpret abhidharma, it is perhaps no wonder that he refers to his opinions as “Sautrāntika.”

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159 sūtre ‘pi hy abhidharma-piṭakāḥ pathyate. traipitako bhikṣur iti naiṣa doṣah. sūtra-viśeṣa eva hy Arthaviniścayādayo ‘bhidharma-saṁjñāḥ yesu dharma-lakṣaṇaṃ varṇyate (Abhidharmakośayākyāya: 11.32-12.1).

160 Yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā ayaṃ attā nicco dhuva sassato avipariṇāma-dhammo sassati-saṁmaṭ tath’ eva ṭhassaṭti (Dīghanikāya: 21.20-23).

161 citta mano ‘tha viññānām ekārthaṃ (Abhidharmakośa II 34ab [Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya: 61.20]).

162 See Yogācārabhūmi: 11.3-8 (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 6a8-b3; T. 1579: 280b5-8; Schmithausen 117).
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